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Inmate Pride in Total Institutions[1]

Roland Wulbert

ABSTRACT

Research in a mental hospital suggests that low inmate pride, the avoidance of identification with inmate status, underlies dimensions of collective behavior and customary social relations among mental patients. It is found that personnel turnover is depriving, retards succession of informal leaders, prevents organized collective behavior and aggression against staff members, decreases rates of inmate interaction, increases assertions of friendship with non-inmates and alienation from inmates, and hampers the growth of an inmate code. Mental hospitals are compared with prisons. Differential inmate pride is used to explain the differential forms of collective behavior and custom found in the two total institutions.

The interrelations of customs and dimensions of social change in total institutions can be explained by inmate pride. The following analysis begins with social change in a mental hospital. Collective behavior and its antecedents are described multidimensionally and placed in their context of custom. Inmate pride is introduced as an explanatory concept and ultimately extended to prison riots and customs.

DIMENSIONS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Most analyses of collective behavior in mental hospitals speculate on, rather than demonstrate, the association of variables.[2] As a rule, it is only after the disorder is well under way, or over, that it begins to interest researchers, who are thus unable to record changes in associated variables and so simply speculate about them.[3] The data reported here can describe changes over time because, by chance, a survey of the patients had been completed just before the disturbance. Although the survey had not been designed to study collective behavior, relevant questions were repeated

[1] I am grateful to Mayer Zald, Vernon Dibble, and Leonard Borman for their suggestions and criticisms.

[2] There are two exceptions. Caudill had been measuring staff interaction before mental-patient deviance increased suddenly. Thus he was able to demonstrate that administrative withdrawal preceded it (William Caudill, "Social Processes in a Collective Disturbance on a Psychiatric Ward," in Milton G. Greenblatt, Daniel J. Levinson, and Richard H. Williams [eds], *The Patient and the Mental Hospital* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957], pp. 438-71).

Wallace and Rashkis are the only researchers who have repeatedly measured the dynamics of the independent (staff disorganization, in this case) and dependent (mental-patient deviance) variables. They found no uniform relation; however, "collective disturbance" did not mean to them what it did to other researchers. They defined it so broadly that fifty-five instances were recorded in seven consecutive weeks of research. Other researches, the present one included, deal with highly unusual events (Anthony F. C. Wallace and Harold A. Rashkis, "Staff Consensus and Patient Disturbance," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV [December, 1959], 829 35).

[3] What little description there is usually concentrates on a few acts of aggression or bizarre be-

when order was re-established. The two surveys, along with observations, hospital records, and informants' reports, show changes in ward structure over time.[4]

The scene of the collective behavior was two male wards on the same floor of a large psychiatric hospital that draws most of its 2,400 patients from the Chicago metropolitan area and adjoining counties. Mental patients in these two wards have common activities, interact frequently, and are

TABLE 1

DYNAMICS OF RULE VIOLATION: FREQUENCY OF INMATE DEVIATION BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER DISORDER

	Rule Violations*						
	S	*E*	*A*	*D*	*R*	Total	Increment
Before disorder (July 5-August 5)	1	0	0	0	0	1	.
During disorder (August 6-13)	1	3	3	1	1	9	+8
After disorder (August 14-September 14)	0	0	0	0	0	0	−9

* *S* = suicide attempts; *E* = elopements attempted; *A* = assault; *D* = destruction of property; *R* = refusal to obey staff.

represented by one patient council. They are essentially one group and will be treated as such.

All communicative patients on the two wards were interviewed, twenty-five before the disturbance and twenty-two afterward. Twenty patients were interviewed both times. The first survey had been completed about a week before the collective behavior began, and the second survey, initiated about half a week after the disorder ended, took a week to complete.

Table 1 shows the frequency of inmate deviation before, during, and after the disorder. Deviance increased sharply, by eight acts, in the second period, and then decreased just as sharply in the third. The duration of patient-council meetings also expressed disruption. Table 2 shows that patient-council meetings were disrupted slightly before hospital rules were. In the second period, when rule violations were greatest, disruption of the patient council was also greatest. In this period the length of meetings decreased by thirty minutes.

TABLE 2

DYNAMICS OF PATIENT-COUNCIL MEETINGS LENGTH BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER DISORDER

	Length (Minutes)	Mean	Increment
Before disorder:			
July 3	40	45	......
July 10	50		
July 17	40		
July 24	40		
Week before disorder:			
July 31	20	15	−30
During disorder:			
August 7	10		
After disorder:			
August 14	40	40	+25
August 21	40		
August 28	40		

And, like rule violations, patient-council meetings returned to normal in the third period, increasing in length by twenty-five minutes.

Other symptoms of disruption in the patient council were observed but not measured precisely. Attendance decreased suddenly. Many patients chose to stay out on work details or simply did not come. Participation decreased as a few patients increasingly dominated the meetings. The week before the height of the disruption

havior. One of the more general and reliable descriptions is given by R. W. Boyd, S. S. Kegeles, and M. G. Greenblatt, "Outbreak of Gang Destructive Behavior on a Psychiatric Ward," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders,* CXX (1954), 338–42.

[4] A discussion of problems involved in obtaining this sort of information is found in Anselm Strauss's "Research in Collective Behavior: Neglect and Need," *American Sociological Review,* XII (1947), pp. 352–54.

there was a suggestion that the meetings be discontinued. During a typical meeting some patients walk around, others hallucinate or manifest bizarre symptoms; an occasional speech or question betrays pathology. All three of these symptoms increased in frequency just before and during the disruption.

Patients spontaneously mentioned that they were becoming more dissatisfied with the meetings. These sentiments ceased after the disruption. The disorder also became a topic of conversation among staff members. They speculated on causes and said that they had not seen anything like it since moving into the present building.

In summary, disorder has been described in terms of a sudden increase in deviance, deterioration of patient-council meetings, and recognition of these changes. Two facts are of special interest. First, all aggression was directed against fellow patients and not one of the ten deviant acts (recorded in Table 1) was overt aggression against the staff.[5] Second, disorder was unorganized.[6] It consisted of isolated individual acts. There was no hint of group formation, of influence, or of concerted action.[7]

Collective behavior was preceded by a period of unusually high turnover among patients and staff. For a long time the ward personnel had been static. The same faces followed each other in the same order every day. Then things changed. Many people left, temporarily or permanently; others would soon follow. One of the two ward physicians had been on vacation for over two weeks before the episode of collective behavior, and the other left in the middle of it. A clinical psychologist, who was active in ward affairs, went on vacation at the beginning of the disorder. One head nurse had been on vacation for a week before the disruption began. The student nurses had left earlier; they had been well liked by patients. Ten patients had left just before the disruption or were about to leave. Four of them had been discharged and another four, who were about to be discharged, were getting month-long leaves of absence or passes to go home every weekend. Patients knew who was about to be discharged and would mention it during interviews and informal talks. One of the ten patients had transferred to another ward, and the tenth one was about to become an aide. Total turnover involved more than one-fourth of the patients.[8]

Patients were asked, before and after the disorder, "Is a patient discharged when he has improved, or does he have to wait a long time?" "Long time" answers imply dissatisfaction with the hospital and evaluation of its discharge policies as unfair. Table 3 reveals that dissatisfaction decreased after the disorder. Disorder ap-

[5] The one act of aggression by omission occurred when a patient refused to obey a staff order to walk to his ward.

[6] Many theorists have seen amount of organization as an essential concept in categorizing collective behavior. It is used frequently, although somewhat ambiguously, in the writings of Gustave LeBon, *The Crowd* [translated] [London: F. Unwin, 1903]. A much more lucid contrast of organized and unorganized collective behavior is found in William MacDougall, *The Group Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920). A good summary of the uses of this dimension is found in Roger Brown's "Mass Phenomena," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), pp. 833–76.

[7] The disorder was a "mass action," i.e., it was characterized by "little interaction or exchange of experience," and the patients were "very loosely organized and unable to act with the concertedness or unity that marks the crowd" (Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Robert E. Park [ed.], *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology* [New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1939]), p. 242.

[8] This value is derived in the following way: (1) s is the number of patients on the ward at time 1 and 2, i.e., before and after the disorder. (2) d is the number of patients discharged or about to be discharged, patients on the ward before the disorder but not after it. (3) a is the number of patients admitted on the ward after the disorder but not before it. And (4) t is turnover, a function of s, d, and a. $t = (d + a)/(s + d + a)$. Therefore $t = (10 + 3)/(34 + 10 + 3) = 0.28$.

parently consumes the dissatisfaction aroused by high turnover.

Informal social structure among patients also changed markedly during the episode of collective behavior. Before and after the disorder all communicative patients were asked: Among patients, (1) who are best liked by other patients? (2) Who contributes most to patient-council meetings? (3) Who has the most influence on other patients? Each respondent named as many patients as he wished. Every patient named at least once is a "leader." "Present leaders" are those currently on the floor, not to be discharged for at least a month. "Absent leaders" had either been discharged or would be within a month. Table 4 shows how the informal social structure of mental patients lagged behind reality. Before the collective behavior mental patients seemed to cling to absent leaders. Afterward absent leaders were replaced.[9]

TABLE 3

DEPRIVATION BEFORE AND AFTER WARD DISORDER*

	No. Inmates Who Expected Time until Discharge To Be		Total
	Long (Dissatisfaction)	Not Long (Satisfaction)	
Before disorder......	15	5	20
After disorder	7	13	20

* $\phi = 0.40; \phi/\phi\text{Max} = .40/.91 = 0.44, .025 > P > .010$.

This association between collective behavior and turnover is not an isolated finding. Although it has not figured in theoretical formulations, it has received brief mention.[10] Miller remarks in passing that the informal patient leader had been discharged just before the outbreak of the disruption he studied in a mental hospital.[11] In addition, there had been considerable turover of physicians; staff members went on vacations, and "those remaining took on extra duties. . . . Two new patients had been admitted in close succession."[12] Caudill notes that "just prior to the collective disturbance two key members of the patient group were discharged."[13] Two new patients were admitted at the same time. Stanton and Schwartz mention the same pattern. Immediately before the increased deviation "there was a sharp influx of patients from other wards."[14] And "alterations among the nursing staff contributed to the tension. Absenteeism increased . . . two central figures of the nursing staff were ill."[15] The disruption studied

TABLE 4

INMATE LEADERSHIP CHOICES BEFORE AND AFTER WARD DISORDER*

	Number of Subjects	Mean Proportion of Choices for Present Leaders
Before disorder.........	25	0.37
After disorder.	22	0.80

* $t = 3.95$; $P < .001$.

[9] Table 4 is intended to show how group properties changed and so group means are compared. However, it does not reveal how much of this change was due to individual changes and how much to changes in group composition. Individual effects can be isolated by taking as the basic measure to be studied the distribution of differences between the two (before and after) measures. The sample population is now restricted to patients who were interviewed at both times. In this case $n = 20$, $t = 3.6$, and $0.005 > P > 0.001$.

[10] Previous analyses have related collective disturbance in mental hospitals to such social factors as staff disorganization (A. H. Stanton and M. S. Schwartz, *The Mental Hospital* [New York: Basic Books, 1954]; William Caudill, *op. cit.*) and hostility to patients (Boyd *et al.*, *op. cit.*).

[11] D. H. Miller, "The Etiology of an Outbreak of Delinquency in a Group of Hospitalized Adolescents," in Greenblatt *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 427–37.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

[13] Caudill, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 387.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

by Boyd, Kegeles, and Greenblatt came during the "weekend slump" when the hospital was undermanned and staff was "reduced by at least two out of five."[16]

The following picture of collective behavior and its antecedents emerges: Abnormally high patient and staff turnover is the initial impulse; turnover is depriving to patients, motivating dissatisfaction with the discharge system, reluctance to replace informal leaders, and collective behavior which is unorganized and characterized by aggression against fellow patients rather than staff. After the disturbance, dissatisfaction diminishes and informal leaders are replaced.

The problem now is to explain these facts. That is, not to answer simply (1) Why is turnover depriving? but also (2) Why is aggression directed against patients rather than staff? (3) Why is mental patient collective behavior a mass rather than crowd action?[17] (4) Why are patient leaders replaced so slowly? Many theories can answer any one question, but the number that can answer all four is much smaller.

LACK OF INMATE PRIDE IN MENTAL HOSPITALS

In order to avoid the degrading name of "mental patient" without giving up the security of the hospital, inmates communicate that they are only passing through.[18] But things are not so easy. People cannot be tourists just by saying so, not even mental patients. How can this tourist myth resist time? The answer is simple enough: it cannot. Then how do we account for it in mental hospitals? Again the answer is simple: Time does not pass in mental hospitals, and so there is no problem. Patients are moved through a well-developed routine. They see the same faces and do the same things with the same people in the same order every day. They have world enough and time. But there are flaws in this conspiracy to deny reality. Anguish arises when time's illusory immobility is threatened, when the context—the pattern of roles, the sequence of activities, the people on the ward—alters, when the iceman comes.

Turnover symbolizes the passage of time. It forces reality on patients. Time has passed and they are still in the hospital. How can they claim tourist status? The data in Table 3 suggest the deprivation of time's passage. And Table 4 implies that patients try to hold back the clock by not replacing absent leaders. They do everything in their power to preserve the illusion that their leaders have not left and that time has not passed. But they cannot avert the painful confrontation; they can only express it in an outbreak of collective behavior.

What is more, when disturbance does occur it will certainly be unorganized. In order to band together in some sort of corporate revolt, inmates must perceive a common interest, or at the very least they must feel that the results of corporate action are worth the membership costs of communicating a common identity. But if mental patients feel that nothing outweighs the avoidance of inmate status, common identity will not develop and collective behavior will be unorganized. Mental patients do not form a social contract when they are deprived because expressive costs

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

[17] When collective behavior occurs within a total institution its participants are not strangers, as they are in panics and mob actions. The two most comprehensive typologies of collective behavior are found in Neil J. Smelser's *Theory of Collective Behavior* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), and in Roger Brown's "Mass Phenomena," *op. cit.*

[18] The disesteem for mental patients and mental hospitals is documented in Derek L. Phillips, "Rejection as a Consequence of Seeking Help for Mental Disorders," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 963–72, and in Elaine and John Cumming, *Closed Ranks* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

exceed instrumental returns.[19] Degree of inmate pride not only determines how collective behavior is organized; it also selects the objects of aggression. In addition to venting frustration, aggression against other inmates expresses alienation from them.

Low inmate pride accounts not only for the deprivation caused by staff and patient turnover but also for intrastatus aggression, the unorganized form of collective behavior, and the reluctance to replace absent leaders. This is not to say that motives other than presence or absence of inmate pride do not exist. Each dimension of collective behavior undoubtedly has multiple motivations. In all likelihood, aggression against patients expresses general frustration as well as alienation from public status, and discharge of leaders may very well mean to patients not only time elapsed but also broken friendships and loss of a means of controlling the hospital environment. Low inmate pride should not be regarded as the only factor underlying collective behavior, but as the most pervasive one.

Up to now discussion has centered on the functional integration of social change. Turnover is depriving, at least in part, because it threatens the tourist myth, and two responses to this threat—unorganized, internally aggressive collective behavior and reluctance to replace absent leaders—maintain alienation from inmate status. The next section turns from social change to mental hospital customs. If low inmate pride is actually a fundamental factor, then it should functionally integrate customs as well as dimensions of social change. If it does not, the validity of the inmate-pride hypothesis is put in question. Each additional cultural component that the model accounts for increases its usefulness.

[19] It might seem that the reason for the lack of organization in mental-hospital collective behavior is that mental patients are incapable, by the very nature of their illness, of forming groups. This view is disproved by the most casual observation of a patient-council meeting. The organization of a riot requires little more of its members than a patient-council meeting.

CUSTOMS IN MENTAL HOSPITALS

When they talk to outsiders for the first time—to social scientists, student nurses, new aides—most mental patients bring up their outside status. They talk about work, family, school, or anything to communicate that their hospital status is entirely temporary, accidental, a minor digression from their true careers. More directly, Dunham and Weinberg quote dozens of patients who say that they do not really belong in a mental hospital.[20] Some patients customarily use patient-council meetings to claim they have been hospitalized by mistake and demand to be released because they are not really crazy like all the others.

In the survey made before the disturbance, patients were asked, "What do you feel you have in common with other patients?" Over one-third of those who answered said they had nothing at all in common. What is more, those who said they did have something in common usually chose only the most general attributes. A frequent answer was, "We're all human." Patients would admit they had in common what they could not help sharing with humanity.

When asked, "Do you have more friends in this hospital or out?" over two-thirds said they had more friends outside. Even though their median length of hospitalization was over a year and a half, patients insisted on their connection to the outside. Quite often a patient would say that he had more friends on the outside and then add, "Well, *right now* I'm not seeing much of them," again communicating that his occupation of inmate status was temporary.

The organization of interaction among mental patients communicates their alienation from a common identity. As Goffman observes, the mental patient "may avoid talking to anyone, may stay by himself

[20] H. Warren Dunham and S. Kirsen Weinberg, *The Culture of the State Mental Hospital* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960).

when possible, and may even be 'out of contact' or 'manic' so as to avoid ratifying any interaction that presses a politely reciprocal role upon him and opens him up to what he has become in the eyes of others."[21]

In short, low inmate pride is manifest in low rates of interaction, alienation from other inmates, attachment to outsiders, and absence of attempts to raise inmate rank or proclaim its superiority. "Low inmate pride" is a central tendency of mental patients, which makes internal analysis possible. It follows from the preceding discussion that higher rates of interaction and attempts to raise mental patient rank or proclaim its superiority should be correlated because both manifest higher inmate pride. And this is just what Polansky *et al.* found.[22] They scaled the amount of rights mental patients felt they should have and found that members of cliques demanded more rights than did non-members. This intra-institutional comparison supports the inmate-pride hypothesis, as does the following inter-institutional comparison between mental hospitals and prisons.

INMATE PRIDE IN PRISONS

In 1952 and 1953 a wave of remarkably similar prison riots swept America. Prisoners would capture some building in the compound, hold guards captive, and refuse to come out until prison officials had agreed to meet their demands for better food, more time to talk to the parole board, freedom from brutality of guards, and investigation of the prison by the John Howard Agency. There were occasional escape attempts and general destructive riots, in which large numbers of prisoners, ostensibly ignited by something like finding salt in their coffee, would destroy everything they could. The most striking difference between collective outbursts in prisons and mental hospitals is the amount of group organization. Prisoners organize and develop leadership; they differentiate roles, lines of communication and authority; they define themselves as a group and formulate goals and policy. Organized collective behavior is a manifestation of high inmate pride, and so, according to the previous derivation, it should be associated with customs which attempt to raise the rank of prisoners or proclaim their superiority. And again this is just what researchers have found.

Skyes and Messinger write, "Despite the number and diversity of prison populations, observers of such groups have reported only one strikingly pervasive value system . . . the maxims are usually asserted with great violence by the inmate population, sanctions ranging from ostracism to physical violence."[23] The code contains five maxims: (1) Be loyal to your class—the cons. (2) Don't lose your head. (3) Don't exploit inmates. (4) Be tough. Be a man. (5) Guards are to be treated with constant suspicion and distrust. In any situation of conflict between officials and prisoners, the former are automatically in the wrong."[24]

Ohlin says, "In the majority of prisons throughout the country the leaders among inmates are those who embody in clearest form antiadministration and anticonventional values."[25] Cloward also finds that the

[21] Erving Goffman, "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient," in his *Asylums* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 146.

[22] Norman A. Polansky, Robert B. White, and Stuart C. Miller, "Determinants of the Role-Image of the Patient in a Psychiatric Hospital," in G. Greenblatt *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 380–401.

[23] Gresham M Skyes and Sheldon L. Messinger, "The Inmate Social System," in Richard A. Cloward, Donald R. Cressey, George H. Grosser, Richard McCleery, Lloyd E. Ohlin, Gresham M. Skyes, and Sheldon L. Messinger (eds.), *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), p. 5.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–11.

[25] Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Sociology and the Field of Corrections* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956), pp. 18–19.

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[22] Norman A. Polansky, Robert B. White, and Stuart C. Miller, "Determinants of the Role-Image of the Patient in a Psychiatric Hospital," in G. Greenblatt *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 380-401.

[23] Gresham M. Skyes and Sheldon L. Messinger, "The Inmate Social System," in Richard A. Cloward, Donald R. Cressey, George H. Grosser, Richard McCleery, Lloyd E. Ohlin, Gresham M. Skyes, and Sheldon L. Messinger (eds.), *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), p. 5.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-11.

[25] Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Sociology and the Field of Corrections* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956), pp. 18-19.

charismatic prison leader is the right guy who "gains prestige from his fellows largely because he is able to elicit a deferential response from the authorities" against whom "he is capable of mobilizing and employing violence."[26]

The research reported here on the mental hospital included observation, formal interviews, and informal talks. Not once was anything similar to the prison code mentioned. No such code has been reported in the literature on mental hospitals.[27] Dunham and Weinberg, in their exhaustive account of norms and values in mental hospitals, record nothing like it.[28]

In their code and choice of leaders, prisoners manifest higher regard for their status than do mental patients. Prisoners make little distinction between private and public status; they stress the heroic, manly, colorful aspects of inmate status. Mental patients accept a dishonorable definition and so communicate the alienation of their private selves from this public status through such customs as the tourist myth. Inmate pride is greater for prisoners than for mental patients, and so prisoners, unlike mental patients, will not avoid organized or externally aggressive collective behavior simply because it identifies them as prisoners.

The reminder above that degree of inmate pride refers to a central tendency, around which there is a good deal of variation. This also holds true for prisons, of course. We would expect to find differences not only among prisoners, but among prisons, for example, between custodial and therapeutic prisons. Thus some mental patients may have greater inmate pride than some prisoners. It is this sort of variation that encourages internal analysis.

The inmate-pride model can be generalized under some conditions to the encompassing society. For instance, "decadence" is what Crane Brinton calls low status pride among a traditional elite. It is integrated with non-corporate activities, just as in mental hospitals and prisons. "When numerous and influential members of such a class begin to believe that they hold power unjustly . . . or that the beliefs they were brought up on are silly . . . they are not likely to resist successfully any serious attack on their social, economic, or political position."[29]

Amount of inmate pride may change over time, making historical analysis indispensable. Themes in Caribbean literature reveal that an increase in organized external aggression (in terms of social revolt and rejection of European culture), marking their emergence from colonial status, was accompanied by islanders' increased commitment to public identity (Afro-Cubanism and *négritude*).[30]

But even though similarities may be striking, the inmate-pride model cannot be generalized mechanically from total institutions to more complex social structures. For one thing, interpretation of aggression becomes more difficult. Unlike total institutions, more complex societies are rarely composed of two mutually exclusive castes, and so aggression against one group might mean identification with any number of others. A factory-worker whose answer to the question, "When business booms, does anyone get an unfair share of the profits?" is "The upper class," may not identify with the urban working class but rather with farmers or southerners.[31]

[26] Richard A. Cloward, "Social Control in the Prison," in Cloward *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[27] It is found only in fiction. See Ken Kesey, *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (New York: Signet Books, 1963).

[28] *Op. cit.*

[29] *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), p. 54.

[30] G. R. Coulthard, *Race and Color in Caribbean Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[31] Ambiguity of this sort was encountered by John C. Leggett in his interesting analysis, "Uprootedness and Working Class Consciousness," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (May, 1963), 682–92.

SUMMARY

Mental patients, like other-world oriented religionists and Chinoy's automobile workers, are alienated from their public status.[32] This alienation, or low inmate pride, integrates customs and dimensions of collective behavior. Mental patients are away from home, in a hotel for transients. Turnover threatens to identify them with their inmate status, but so would organized action and aggression against staff, and so a period of unusually high turnover precipitates a crisis culminating in unorganized, internally aggressive collective behavior. For the same reason, customs are characterized by low rates of interaction and attempts by patients to communicate their alienation from each other. Conversely, in such total institutions as prisons, where inmate pride runs high, customs communicating the worth of inmates and organized, externally aggressive collective behavior are associated.

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[32] Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955).

Bilingualism in Montreal: A Demographic Analysis[1]

Stanley Lieberson

ABSTRACT

Census data and indexes adopted from linguistics are used to examine trends in the ability of Montreal's population to communicate with one another between 1921 and 1961. There has been no increase in linguistic communication during this period. The probabilities of members sharing a mutually intelligible tongue within the British and French ethnic groups remain far higher than the probability of linguistic communication between the groups. Bilingualism appears to be an end product of language contact rather than an intermediate step toward monolingualism. Both major languages maintain their positions in intergenerational transfer. Cohort analysis discloses relatively low degrees of bilingualism among small children, a rapid rise during the school and young adult ages, and an actual net decline during the middle and older ages.

Montreal might be viewed as a battleground between the French language and culture of Quebec and the English-speaking Canadians and Americans who surround French Canada. This metropolitan area, containing more than 10 per cent of Canada's population, is incontestably the great center of English-French contact in North America. More than 800,000 speak only the French official language, nearly a half-million speak only English, and more than three-quarters of a million are bilingual (speaking both English and French). The latter group comprises slightly more than a third of the nation's bilingual population.[2]

Perhaps "battleground" is too dramatic a term for describing French-English relations in Montreal, although the occasional acts of violence, the more frequent verbal expressions of nationalism, and the self-consciousness about language make our metaphor apt. If inherent in linguistic contact is the danger or possibility that one language will decline and the other expand, then, in this fundamental sense, Montreal, or any other multilingual setting, is a battleground.

Although we are not prepared to assert that the loss of French in Montreal would mean a decline in the importance of this language elsewhere in the province, it is reasonable to assume that Montreal facilitates the maintenance of the French tongue and the bicultural society in Canada. Since 40 per cent of Quebec's population is located in this metropolitan area, Montreal is of intrinsic interest because of its sheer size. Moreover, if there is any validity to the concept of metropolitan dominance, we would expect the linguistic outcome in Montreal to influence those parts of Quebec in its hinterland. As Hughes put it, "Montreal is the port of entry from which English influence and the industrial revolution radiate into the remote corners of the French-Canadian world."[3] The presence of Montreal as a French-speaking center provides Canada with a complete French-language society, which runs the gamut from backward rural areas to a modern metropolis maintaining relations with the rest of the world. The existence of this metropolis allows for a more self-contained

[1] This study was supported by the National Science Foundation Grant No. G-23923. The assistance of Elaine F. Green and David Sorenson is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] All figures based on 1961 census data.

[3] Everett C. Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 202.

French community than would otherwise occur. Of considerable importance, too, is the extensive out-migration from rural French Canada currently under way.[4] Montreal provides an outlet without necessarily a loss of these people from the French language of the ethnic community.

In this paper we first examine the trends in language usage over the past forty years and then interpret them from a primarily demographic perspective. Our interest stems from the fact that the encounter of different speech groups is often a concomitant of racial and ethnic contact. The linguistic outcome in a society composed of peoples with different tongues is by no means a foregone conclusion in Canada or in such varied parts of the world as Belgium, Soviet Moslem Asia, India, South Africa, Ceylon, and Paraguay.[5] Although recognizing that many theoretical approaches are appropriate, we are concerned here with those demographic factors that maintain a multilingual system and those that lead to monolingualism.

BILINGUALISM IN DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE

If, by definition, no society can exist unless its members are able to communicate with one another, then the development of a bilingual population can be expected in any settlement in which different language groups reside. In this sense, bilingualism may be viewed as an adaptation by individuals to the presence of persons with another tongue. Although bilingualism is expected, there is no assurance that it will be of the reciprocal variety in which each group learns a second language to an equal degree. Clearly, far more non-English-speakers within the United States learn English than native Americans learn the immigrant tongues.[6] Moreover, the existence of bilingualism raises a fundamental question for Montreal or for any similar setting, namely, "Does second-language-learning occur without a permanent change in the linguistic composition of the population, or does it lead to a loss in the next generation in the position of one of the mother-tongue groups?"

Bilingualism may be viewed as having three possible outcomes. First, it can provide the mechanism leading to the development of a monolingual population. This is what occurred in the United States among non-English-speaking groups who migrated after the establishment of Anglo-Saxon dominance. After these groups learned the nation's language and became bilingual, somewhere along the line of linguistic transfer between generations only English was passed on and not the mother tongue of the old world. Although completion of this process may have taken several generations, clearly bilingualism was an intermediate stage between the arrival of non-English-speakers and the final loss of the foreign tongue.

Second, bilingualism may be an end product in itself. In this case, there is sufficient bilingualism to enable a population with different mother tongues to maintain the social system, but the bilingualism of parents does not lead to the loss of the mother tongue among the next generation. Rather, the next generation receives the parents' first language and merely repeats the process. Under such circumstances, two populations may be in contact indefinitely without the decline of either language.

The third possibility, which need not concern us here but will be mentioned merely for the sake of completeness, is that the speakers of one language may begin to use

[4] Nathan Keyfitz, "L'Exode rural dans la province de Québec, 1951–1961," *Recherches sociographiques,* III (September–December, 1962), 303–15.

[5] See, for example, United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1956* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1956), Table 9; *Demographic Yearbook, 1963* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1964), Table 10.

[6] In 1930, less than 10 per cent of immigrants 10 years old and over were unable to speak English. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), II, 1347.

a simplified form of the other group's tongue (pidginization), which in turn is passed on to children as their first or mother tongue (creolization).[7] Since this is unlikely in a society such as Canada's where both languages are standardized, we shall restrict our attention to the first two possibilities. This is not to deny, of course, the incorporation into each language of loan words from the other.[8]

DATA AND METHODS

Unless otherwise indicated, the decennial censuses of Canada are the sources for the data used in this study. Two basic language questions have been asked for a number of decades. The first concerns the population's mother tongue. The census data on mother tongue can be used as a reasonably good measure of the first language learned. There is one difficulty, however, caused by the stipulation that, to qualify as one's mother tongue, the first language learned must still be understood (beginning with the 1941 census) or spoken (1931 and earlier). Since we are dealing with a setting in which the number of both English and French speakers is large, it would seem reasonable to assume that nearly all persons in Montreal whose first language was either French or English will retain sufficient knowledge of the language so that they will meet this mother tongue criteria of the census takers if their first language was either of these. Very likely part of the population who learned some other language first will no longer be able to speak or understand it and, therefore, will have some other language which they currently know reported as their mother tongue. This might especially be the case for foreign-born adults who had come to Canada as small children. When using data from Canadian censuses, then, equating "mother tongue" and the first language learned is open to error. However, we shall see that this error is counter to the results reported and does not bias the data in favor of the interpretations offered below.

The second-language question relates to the respondents' ability to speak the official languages of Canada—English and French—at the time of the census. The results lead to four categories: persons able to speak only English; only French; both English and French; neither official language. The reader should note that the data on current linguistic ability refer only to the two official languages. Hence a person recorded as speaking "English only" may be quite fluent in, say, German and Italian.

The difficulty in the official-language data lies in the great simplicity of the census question, namely, "Can you speak English? French?" We are unable to determine the subjective criteria a respondent uses when he reports his ability to speak these languages. Moreover, there is some uncertainty about the biases of respondents. On the one hand, there is social-psychological evidence to indicate that English has greater prestige than French in Montreal.[9] By contrast, the recent intensification of French-Canadian nationalism and separatism in Canada would lead us to expect an underreporting of English-speaking ability among the French population. The frequent exposure to the languages through acquaintances, radio and television, signs, newspapers, and conversations of strangers in public places would lead us to expect that the questions are less ambiguous for Montreal than for other parts of Canada, because Montreal residents constantly encounter a "reality check." Finally,

[7] See, for example, William J. Samarin, "Lingua Francas, with Special Reference to Africa," in Frank A. Rice (ed.), *Study of the Role of Second Languages* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1962), pp. 54–64.

[8] For a discussion of English loan words used by French Canadians in an outlying rural area, see Horace Miner, *St. Denis: A French-Canadian Parish* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 32–35, 242–45.

[9] Wallace E. Lambert, R. C. Hodgson, R. C. Gardner, and S. Fillenbaum, "Evaluational Reactions to Spoken Languages," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LX (1960), 44-51.

adopting the standard demographic checks for census data, we have tested the mother-tongue and the official-language data for Canada for internal and external consistency without revealing any serious errors.[10]

As is customary with analyses over time, various adjustments, splices, and estimates to maximize comparability through the decades have been used. This is particularly important with respect to the spatial area covered. As much of the metropolitan area of Montreal as was defined in 1961 has been included for earlier periods as well. However, unlike the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S. Census, Canadian metropolitan areas are not defined in terms of total counties. Hence, comparisons of the total metropolitan area would be based on dissimilar spatial units which cannot be reconciled for the different decades.

The linguist Greenberg has proposed a series of measures of linguistic diversity that can be used to determine the possibilities of communication among the population of some delimited area.[11] One of these measures, the index of communication (H), has been adapted to the Montreal study. The H gives the probability of two randomly drawn residents of Montreal being able to speak to each other in one or both official languages. Thus, an H of 1.00 would mean that all persons in the area share a mutually intelligible language. At the other extreme, we would obtain $H = 0$ when there was no chance of two randomly drawn persons in an area sharing the same official language. More formally, let $a =$ the proportion of the population speaking only English; $b =$ the proportion of the population speaking only French; $c =$ the proportion of the population that is bilingual; $d =$ the proportion unable to speak either official language. Then $H_w = a^2 + b^2 + c^2 + 2ac + 2bc$.

An extension of Greenberg's index has been proposed that allows us to measure the probability of communication between members of different ethnic segments of the metropolitan area.[12] Using the same scale we can determine the probability of mutually intelligible communication between randomly selected members of two groups as contrasted with Greenberg's measures of communication within a group. These measures, used in tandem, allow us to determine the extent of linguistic cohesion within populations such as the total city or ethnic group as well as the linguistic potential between such populations. We shall use H_w to indicate Greenberg's measure of communication among randomly selected members of a single population and H_b to indicate communication between randomly selected members of two populations. For groups i and j,

$$H_b = a_i(a_j + c_j) + b_i(b_j + c_j) + c_i(a_j + b_j + c_j).$$

TRENDS

Communication.—The H_w gives the probability of two randomly drawn residents of Montreal being able to speak to each other in one or both official languages of Canada. For 1961, we would expect two persons randomly selected from the metropolitan area to speak in a mutually intelligible official language slightly less than eight out of ten times. This is a fairly high degree of mutual intelligibility; multilingual Brussels (Brabant), for example, has a slightly lower H for 1947.[13] However, we should not lose sight of the fact that somewhat more than 20 per cent of the time there is no shared communication possible in these languages. More striking, and contrary to the expectations generated

[10] Stanley Lieberson, "Language Questions in Censuses" (report prepared for S.S.R.C. Sociolinguistics Seminar, Indiana University, Summer, 1964).

[11] Joseph H. Greenberg, "The Measurement of Linguistic Diversity," *Language*, XXXII (January–March, 1956), 109–15.

[12] Stanley Lieberson, "An Extension of Greenberg's Measures of Linguistic Diversity," *Language*, XL (October–December, 1964), 526–31.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 528.

from the American urban experience, we find something of a decline in H_w in the decades between 1921 and 1961 (Table 1, col. [1]).

One important modification of this result must be considered, namely, changes in H_w may reflect fluctuations in immigration rather than a basic alteration of the linguistic processes of Montreal. Specifically, the component of the population unable to speak either official language rises in recent decades, and much of the drop in communication may reflect this rise. In 1961 immigrants arriving during the preceding five and one-half years comprised 5 per cent of the area's population but accounted for one-half of the population of the entire metropolitan area unable to speak English or French.

The indexes have been recomputed in two different ways: first, excluding all persons unable to speak either official language; second, excluding the foreign-born population entirely. In either case, no appreciable change in the degree of linguistic communication is observed over time. In some comparisons there is a slight rise and in others a slight decline through time (Table 1, col. [2]). Since no discernible trend is found after these adjustments, we can conclude that the decline is due to immigration. At best, however, we do not find a substantial rise in H_w over time, although communication potential has more or less remained constant in the forty years between 1921 and 1961.

Using the extension of Greenberg's measures described earlier, we can measure the probability of communication *between* members of the different ethnic segments of Montreal. We observe a rise between 1921 and 1931 in the chance of British-French interaction in a mutually intelligible language (Table 1, col. [3]). This is not the case in more recent decades—witness the slight decline from 0.6362 in 1941 to 0.6245 in 1961. Moreover, for the entire metropolitan area in 1961, in only six out of ten cases could we expect two people to share a common official language. On the basis of the data available, there is no reason to think that the communication potential between British and French groups in Montreal has been rising.

The British have much closer linguistic links with other ethnic groups in Montreal

TABLE 1

INDEXES OF COMMUNICATION (H) BETWEEN AND WITHIN SELECTED POPULATIONS OF THE MONTREAL AREA, 1921–61

Year	Within Total Population	Within Population Speaking an Official Language	Between Ethnic Groups		
			British		French
			French	Other	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1921*	0.8719	0.8833	0.7552	0 8879	0 7444
1931*	.8752	.8918	.7665	.9042	.7571
1941*	.8598	.8656	n.a.†	n.a.	n.a.
1961*	.8349	.8727	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1941‡	.8294	.8361	.6362	9278	.6830
1951‡	.8222	.8385	.6269	.8849	.6664
1961‡	0 7942	0.8425	0.6245	0 7795	0.6174

* Montreal and Verdun, ten years of age and older.
† Not available.
‡ Montreal, Verdun, and Outremont, all ages.

than do the French (cf. Table 1, cols. [4] and [5]). The closer linguistic communication of other groups in general with the British is a result of the greater affinity of these groups for learning English than for learning French. We shall consider this matter in greater detail later. Because of extensive immigration, we are not inclined to take too seriously the drop in H_b for "other" ethnics between 1941 and 1961.

These results indicate that linguistic cohesion between the major ethnic populations is only moderate, although cohesion within the British and French groups is extremely high. For the metropolitan area in 1961, communication potential within the British and the French ethnic groups is 0.97 and 0.98, respectively. In short, language is a major factor in maintaining ethnic cleavage in the city. We should note, however, that the probability of communication between the French and the British ethnic groups in the Montreal metropolitan area is still nearly three times greater than H_b between Algeria's Europeans and Moslems in the period preceding the Algerian revolution.[14] Other ethnic groups in Montreal have mainly veered toward the English language and the British ethnic population. Their linguistic unity is not sufficiently high to maintain a residual third ethnic force in Montreal. Linguistic unity for the entire Montreal area appears to be static after we take into account the influence of immigration, which tends to depress the H indexes because of the numbers unable to speak either official language.

Official language distribution.—H indexes, being summary measures, may fail to disclose important trends in language usage because different combinations of official-language distributions may yield the same index values. Examination of the basic data indicates that there has been a drop in both the monolingual English and bilingual percentages, accompanied by a rise in the segment speaking French only. For example, Montreal-Verdun-Outremont dropped from 24 to 19 per cent monolingual English and from 42 to 39 per cent bilingual in the twenty years between 1941 and 1961. At the same time, the percentage speaking French only rose from 34 to 39 (Table 2, Panel *A*). These trends hold regardless of the areal basis upon which the comparisons are made.

There are striking differences between ethnic groups in their official-language distributions. The French are far more bilingual than are the British (cf. Table 2, Panels *B* and *C*). Through time it appears that the British population has at least maintained its degree of bilingualism, whereas bilingualism has declined among the French. We should note that the French nevertheless remain more bilingual than the British in 1961.

Other ethnic groups in Montreal occupy an intermediate position between the two leading ethnic populations, but they definitely favor English. They are more likely to speak French than are the British, although an overwhelming segment speak English only rather than French only (Table 2, Panel *D*). Similar to the strengthening of the French language among the French ethnic population observed earlier is a sharp decline since 1941 among other ethnics in the percentage speaking English only and a doubling in the small percentage speaking French only.

It is difficult to account for these trends in a quantifiable fashion since the necessary cross-tabulations are not available. We should recall, however, that there has been a growing movement from rural Quebec to urban Quebec—particularly to Montreal. The fact that rural French Canadians living in more homogeneous settlements are less likely to learn English than are their Montreal compatriots would help explain the drop in bilingualism and the rise in monolingual French-speakers among the French Canadians in Montreal. In 1961, for example, only 9.7 per cent of the French ethnic population in rural Quebec was

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 528.

bilingual. We must note that internal migration probably does not fully account for the decline in French bilingualism, since we have also observed a recent increase among immigrants in their propensity to learn French. It would appear that the French Canadians, although still subordinate to the British in the economic world, have risen somewhat, and this may make knowledge of French more useful than it has been for Montrealers. We are told, for example, of a department store that at one time made no attempt to hire clerks who knew French on the grounds that the French Canadians could not afford to shop in its high-priced store. The bilingual Montreal classified telephone directories are relevant here. Under the English-language category, "Department Stores," there are twenty-eight different listings in 1938. Under the French equivalent, "Magasins à Rayons," we find only four listings. In the 1964 *Yellow Pages*, we find forty-five companies listed under "Department Stores" and forty-nine under "Magasins à Rayons."[15] To be sure, the number listed as true department stores must be taken with a grain of salt; however, it is clear from inspection that all of the major downtown stores are now in both the French and the English listings.

The possibility of distortions in the census data due to French nationalism should be considered as accounting for the decline in bilingualism among French Canadians. We are inclined to minimize this explanation for several reasons. First, this decline was observed before the recent increase in nationalism. Second, the most recent census was conducted before French-

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGE BY ETHNIC ORIGIN MONTREAL AREA, 1921–61

Population and Official Language	Montreal and Verdun, 10 Years of Age and Older				Montreal, Verdun, and Outremont, All Ages		
	1921	1931	1941	1961	1941	1951	1961
A. All groups:							
English only	25.2	25.9	23.7	18.7	23.9	22.1	19.0
French only	21.9	20.5	28.2	32.5	34.0	35.8	39.0
English and French	51.9	52.7	47.8	46.6	41.7	41.1	39.1
Neither	0.9	0.9	0.3	2.2	0.4	1.0	2.9
B. British:							
English only	71.4	71.4	n.a.*	n.a.	70.2	70.6	67.1
French only	0.7	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	1.3	2.0	2.8
English and French	27.9	28.1	n.a.	n.a.	28.5	27.4	29.9
Neither	0.0	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.0	0.2
C. French:							
English only	0.2	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	0.7	1.1	1.0
French only	34.3	32.7	n.a.	n.a.	51.7	52.8	55.4
English and French	65.6	66.8	n.a.	n.a.	47.6	46.1	43.4
Neither	0.0	0.0	n.a.	n.a.	0.0	0.0	0.2
D. Other Ethnics:							
English only	53.3	53.8	n.a.	n.a.	55.9	50.7	44.4
French only	5.0	3.7	n.a.	n.a.	5.3	5.6	10.8
English and French	34.5	35.9	n.a.	n.a.	36.1	37.2	31.4
Neither	7.3	6.7	n.a.	n.a.	2.7	6.6	13.4

* Not available.

[15] Bell Telephone Company of Canada, *Montreal Classified Telephone Directory, July, 1938*, pp. 108, 223. I am indebted to G. L. Long, historian, Bell Telephone Company of Canada, for making this volume available. *Yellow Pages, Montreal, September, 1964*, pp. 291, 552.

Canadian separatism reached its apex. Finally, if a segment of the population knows English but refuses to speak it, then for many functional purposes such people are equivalent to those who know only French.

Considering that in 1961 French was the mother tongue of nearly two-thirds (65 per cent) of the metropolitan population and English the mother tongue of little more than one-fifth (22 per cent) of the population, it is clear that the position of the French language is far from being as strong as we might expect simply on the basis of the composition of Montreal's population. The number speaking French only amounts to 60 per cent of the 1.4 million persons whose mother tongue is French (FMT). The monolingual English population by contrast, amounts to 93 per cent of the 495,000 persons whose mother tongue is English (EMT).[16] For 1961, it is estimated that 28 per cent of EMT British males were bilingual. On the other hand, about 48 per cent of the FMT French males were bilingual.[17] Equally lopsided differences are found for females, although they are of a lower magnitude. In other Canadian cities, where the relative numbers with French and English mother tongues are reversed, French fares far worse as the lesser language than does English in Montreal. In Moncton, N.B., for example, where French is the mother tongue of about a third of the population and English the mother tongue of nearly all the remaining two-thirds, only about 4 per cent of EMT British males have learned French, whereas nearly 90 per cent of FMT French males were bilingual in 1961.

INTERGENERATIONAL MAINTENANCE

If bilingualism is to lead to the demise of one of the languages, then the second language of some bilingual parents must be passed on as the mother tongue of their children. If bilingualism is to be the end product of linguistic contact, then the mother tongue of bilingual parents must be passed on as the mother tongue of their children. To simplify the problem, we will consider three elements in our model of linguistic maintenance.

First, the proportion in each mother-tongue group that is bilingual clearly influences what we might call the "exposure to risk." We observed for the two leading ethnic groups that a far larger proportion of FMT residents learn English than EMT residents learn French. For all fathers of small children in Montreal-Verdun in 1961 we estimate that about 35 per cent of those with EMT have learned French, whereas about 49 per cent of FMT fathers are estimated to be bilingual.[18] In the previous two decades these differences in exposure to risk were even greater. French is subject to a far greater "exposure" than is English in the sense that proportionately more of the French are potential spreaders or carriers of the English language than the English are of the French language. The relative degree of bilingualism among the different speech groups is critical, since it is reasonable to assume that only bilingual parents face an option in the tongue they pass on to their offspring.

Second, we should consider the degree to which each bilingual group passes on the acquired non-mother-tongue language to their offspring, what we might call the "rate of intergenerational language-switching." It is most important that the actual behavior of bilinguals with respect to language transfer be distinguished from the rate of bilingual exposure. The sheer fact that the FMT group is more bilingual than is

[16] This does not mean that 93 per cent of the EMT population speak English only. Many EMT persons are bilingual but are replaced in this figure by people with other mother tongues who, of the two official languages, speak only English.

[17] Lieberson, "Language Questions in Censuses," *op. cit.*

[18] Estimates are based on the official-language distribution of the "other" mother tongue population in 1931 (most recent year for which such data are available) and the assumption that all EMT or FMT persons in Montreal-Verdun retain speaking ability in their mother tongue.

the EMT group does not necessarily mean that a larger proportion of French bilinguals pass on a second language to their children. In fact, it is possible for the two sets of rates to be reversed so that there is a net decline in the language of the linguistic population with the smaller degree of actual bilingualism. This can occur if proportionately more of its bilingual members than of the bilingual component of the other language group actually pass on a second language.

Third, we should examine the *fertility* rates separately for the monolingual and bilingual subpopulations of each mother-tongue group. There can be a higher rate of language-switching among the bilingual segment of a mother-tongue group without a decline in the language if this segment's fertility rates are relatively low compared with those of the monolingual members. In this sense, we must always distinguish between aggregate and individual assimilation. It is possible for individuals to assimilate and yet for their group to maintain itself or to expand in size.[19]

There are additional variables that might be added to this simplified analytical model, such as differentials in mortality and internal and international migration. However, the three elements described above —exposure to risk rate of intergenerational language-switching and fertility—appear to be the major factors to consider in the Montreal situation.

If we compare the mother-tongue distribution of small children (Table 3, cols. [1]–[3]) with that of women in the child-bearing ages (Table 3 cols. [4]–[6]), we find that the higher degree of bilingualism among the FMT population has not led to a net switch to English among the children.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MOTHER TONGUE OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 (ACTUAL AND EXPECTED) AND OF WOMEN IN THE CHILD-BEARING AGES

MONTREAL AND VERDUN, 1941 61

YEAR	CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS (ACTUAL)			WOMEN, 15-44 YEARS			CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS (EXPECTED)		
	English (1)	French (2)	Other (3)	English (4)	French (5)	Other (6)	English (7)	French (8)	Other (9)
1941......... ...	19.8	73.0	7.2	23 9	66 1	10.1	20 4	70 9	8 7
1951........ .	24 8	70.1	5.0	23 0	67 9	9.0	21.2	70 0	8 8
1961	16 5	70.7	12.9	17.3	68 4	14 3	14 5	70 8	14 7
1961 (M.A)*.....	22.6	68.3	9.0	22.0	65 9	12.1	20 2	68 5	11 3

* Entire Census Metropolitan Area.

Note. Cols. (7)–(9) based on ethnic origin of children under five and the relationship between ethnic origin and mother tongue for all males in the area.

In all periods, a larger proportion of small children than of women in the child-bearing ages have French as their mother tongue. In 1951, for example, 67.9 per cent of the women had French as a mother tongue, whereas 70.1 per cent of the children were reported as having French. The position of the English language is somewhat inconsistent, in some decades being slightly better than its rank among women of child-bearing ages would suggest and in other instances poorer (cf. Table 3, cols. [1] and [4]). The erosion of other mother tongues is quite apparent; in each decade their over-all position among small children is weaker than the position among adult women. The net results of our intergenerational analysis indicate that French is not

[19] Stanley Lieberson, *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 8–10.

merely holding its own but is actually gaining between generations.

Before interpreting this finding, it is necessary to consider the differentials in fertility between language groups—particularly since the French have higher fertility rates than the non-French ethnic component of Montreal.[20] As a crude approximation we have determined the mother tongues we would "expect" among children under five years of age knowing their ethnic origins and the cross-tabulation between mother tongue and origin for males in the metropolitan area. Using Westergaard's method of standardization, we derive the "expected" mother-tongue distribution of children under five given in columns (7) through (9) of Table 3.

Several comments are called for before discussing the results. First, we standardized on the basis of males rather than females because ethnic origin in the case of mixed offspring is traced through the male lineage in the Canadian census enumerations. Second, the cross-tabulation between origin and mother tongue is not available for specific age categories. Consequently, the standardization rates incorporate to some extent the very data examined for small children. Since children under five do not comprise a large segment of the population, we are not too greatly hampered by this departure from the ideal.[21] Finally, the available data do not allow for the control of differences in fertility between monolinguals and bilinguals within each ethnic population. This has important implications, which we will discuss shortly.

Controlling for fertility differences between ethnic groups, we find the French language has about held its own (Table 3, cols. [2] and [8]). In both 1951 and 1961, the position of French among children is within 0.2 per cent of the figure we would expect on the basis of the ethnic origins of the youngsters. In 1941, the number of FMT children is even greater than what we would expect on the basis of ethnic fertility differentials. The gain for French in the two most recent decades among children compared to its position among adult women, however, is not due to a net transfer to French among the bilingual parents of Montreal. Rather, it appears largely to reflect the higher fertility rates of ethnic groups with sizable numbers of native French-speakers.

By contrast, ethnic fertility differentials are clearly unfavorable to the maintenance of English. In each period the percentage of children we would expect to have English as a mother tongue falls below the percentage of women in child-bearing ages with this mother tongue (cf. Table 3, cols. [4] and [7]). In the last two decades, however, the English language has more than held its own when we consider the lower fertility of ethnic groups with large numbers of EMT adults (cf. Table 3, cols. [1] and [7]). In 1951, for example, taking fertility into account, we would expect 21.2 per cent of children to have English as a mother tongue whereas actually 24.8 per cent were reported as learning this language first. The excess was more than enough to compensate for lower fertility in 1951 and results in the percentage of small children with English exceeding the percentage of women with this language (respectively, 24.8 and 23.0 per cent). The results for 1961 are inconsistent, depending on whether one includes the entire metropolitan area in the analysis. What is clear, however, is that the net intergenerational switching has been favorable to English but that much or all of the gain is wiped out by the lower fertility rates.

Although the data relevant to the question of whether fertility differentials aid or handicap other mother tongues are inconsistent (Table 3, cols. [6] and [9]), there

[20] The French have higher fertility even with education and income held constant. See Enid Charles, *The Changing Size of the Family in Canada* (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1948), p. 105.

[21] Moreover, where there are any trends through time, the child-bearing ages would probably fall close to the mean for each ethnic group.

is little doubt that other languages in general fail to hold their own. Whether the mother tongues of children (col. [3]) are compared with those of women in the child-bearing ages (col. [6]) or with those expected among children on the basis of ethnic differentials in fertility (col. [9]), the results clearly show a drop in other mother tongues among small children. If anything, the extent of this drop is probably understated, since many small children were either born in a country where English was not spoken or were born in Canada of relatively recent immigrants who had not yet sufficiently mastered one of the official languages to use it for speaking to their children.

It is very difficult to estimate fertility differences between the linguistic subpopulations within each ethnic group. Overall, on the basis of indirect evidence, we would be inclined to guess that the bilingual segment has lower fertility rates. This guess is based on the following facts: First, Enid Charles finds an inverse association between fertility and income within each major ethnic population.[22] Second, there is some evidence that bilinguals tend to have higher incomes than monolinguals within both the French- and the English-speaking populations.[23] This would suggest, although by no means conclusively, that the bilingual segments of Montreal's FMT and EMT populations have lower fertility than their monolingual compatriots. Under such circumstances, the exposure-to-risk rates overstate the danger to the mother-tongue populations of bilingualism.

The intergenerational language-switching rate is more elusive than the two elements of the model considered thus far. Indeed, we do not have available the basic data needed for determining the switching rates for the bilinguals of each mother-tongue group. We do wish to note, however, that if the languages are maintained between generations in a simple two-language-contact setting with some switching between generations, then if fertility is equal it can be shown that actually the bilinguals of the group with lower exposure to risk are experiencing a higher rate of intergenerational language-switching than is the group with the larger percentage of bilingual parents. It is reasonable to assume that, in a bilingual setting such as Montreal, some parents do in fact pass the second language on as their children's mother tongue. Under such circumstances, if the FMT population is more bilingual than the remainder of the population and if switching is equal in each direction, then it follows that the rate of switching is higher for the bilingual non-EMT population than for the bilingual FMT population.

One important consideration in interpreting the maintenance of both English and French through the generations is the fact that men in Montreal are more bilingual than women. This sex difference means that many of the bilingual members of each ethnic group are married to monolingual mates who share only the same mother tongue. Insofar as this occurs, the high incidence of bilingualism is reduced as a contributing force to language transfer, because only one of the mates can use the second language with their children. Sex differences in bilingualism within a largely endogamous population help to maintain the common mother tongue of the mates in the next generation, since this would be the one language that both parents could use with the children.

Of course, marriages across mother-tongue lines are considerably more complex in their possibilities. Marriages between EMT and FMT mates will often involve a cross between Catholic and non-Catholic. If the ties of the Roman Catholic church are strong enough so that frequently mates

[22] Charles, *loc. cit.*

[23] In a current study of want ads in Montreal newspapers, jobs that require bilinguals tend to be concentrated in categories that offer higher income.

will agree to a Catholic education for prospective offspring, intermarriage will not harm French-language maintenance in Montreal, since the Catholic school system is overwhelmingly French-speaking.[24]

COHORTS

Thus far our demographic examination has focused on intergenerational dimensions of bilingualism, namely, the language transferred by bilingual parents to their offspring. At this point, we turn to viewing second-language-learning in connection with the life span of residents of Montreal. The terms "cohort," "longitudinal," and "generational" will be used interchangeably to describe the approach employed. As opposed to the more commonly encountered cross-sectional analysis, a longitudinal study allows us to determine true social change since the linguistic behavior of a population is actually traced through time.[25] By considering where in the life span second-language-learning tends to occur, we may infer the social conditions leading to bilingualism.

There are several serious difficulties involved in tracing the bilingualism of age groups through time. First, we have no way of directly controlling for the foreign-born population in Montreal and cannot readily prevent immigration between decades from affecting the analysis. Similarly, lack of available data prevents the application of controls for emigration and internal migration. The results presented are, therefore, crude cohorts which describe the process of linguistic change by age groups but which do not easily allow for the decomposition of these changes into the contributions that selective migration and mortality may have contributed to the results. With respect to mortality differentials, however, it is unlikely that these would significantly alter the results. We shall have more to say about the influence of immigration later.

Shown in Table 4 are the bilingual proportions by age and sex or the four decades, 1931–61. For 1941–61, the analysis is based upon the combined cities of Montreal-Outremont-Verdun. Since data are not available for Outremont in 1931, the 1941 figures were recomputed for the Montreal-Verdun area alone.

Male Cohorts.—If we assume that the proportion of boys who are bilingual at the age they usually begin school falls somewhere between the proportions for the population under five and five through nine, then we would estimate that less than 10 per cent speak both English and French by the time elementary school is begun. This means that the linguistic heterogeneity of Montreal has a limited effect in introducing bilingualism among boys at an early age. What appears to operate is a steady push in the learning of a second official language during the ages of mass education, some additional gain in bilingualism in the early adult ages, and then a steady decline in bilingualism through the remaining years. Tracing male age groups between 1931 and 1941, for example, we find 4.1 per cent of children under five are bilingual (col. [1]), but ten years later boys ten through fourteen years of age are 22.2 per cent bilingual (col. [2]). Similarly, 18.2 per cent of boys five through nine are bilingual in 1931, but more than half (51.4 per cent) are bilingual ten years later. This result holds

[24] Only two of the fourteen elementary-school districts of the Montreal Catholic School District are English. See Bureau of Statistics, *School Directory, 1963–1964* (Montreal: Montreal Catholic School Commission, n.d.).

[25] Among recent examples of the application of cohort analysis to empirical data are Pascal K. Whelpton, "Trends and Differentials in the Spacing of Births," *Demography*, I (1964), 83–93; Hope T. Eldridge, "A Cohort Approach to the Analysis of Migration Differentials," *Demography*, I (1964), 212–19; Beverly Duncan, George Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., "Patterns of City Growth," American *Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (January, 1962), 418–29; N. B. Ryder, "The Influence of Declining Mortality on Swedish Reproductivity," in *Current Research in Human Fertility* (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1955), pp. 65–81.

up as well for the 1941–51 and 1951–61 comparisons (cols. [3]–[4], [4]–[5]). In addition to the rapid buildup of bilingualism through the teens, there is some increment in the early adult ages.

This surge in bilingualism tapers off for each cohort somewhere in the twenties and early thirties and is then followed by an actual net decline among men in the middle and later years of their life. Men thirty-five and older in 1931 all show declines in bilingualism during the following decade (cols. [1] and [2]). This interdecade decline starts even earlier in the 1941–51 span, with men twenty-five and over in 1941 showing declines in bilingualism ten years later. Indeed, the age at which the decline in bilingualism begins is even earlier by 1961. As we shall see, the decline in the age at which male bilingualism begins to erode is explainable in terms of immigration.

These results suggest that the educational system of Montreal, which requires courses in the official language not used as the language of instruction in the school, meets with success. This success is far from complete, since in most decades about half of the boys fifteen through nineteen are unable to speak both official languages. The decline that follows the school years indicates that economic and occupational forces in combination with internal and international migration fail to fully support or maintain bilingualism among a fair number of males. Once the supports of education and the early years in the labor force are past, ability in both official languages begins to decline. It is as if we were to examine knowledge of algebra by age cohorts over time. We would expect to find a rapid rise through the school ages, followed by a decline after the educational period, since many find little or no need for algebra in either their occupational or their social worlds. In similar fashion, through a fair part of the adult male span, more bilingual speakers lose their knowledge of the second language than monolinguals acquire a knowledge of the second official language.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE BILINGUAL, BY AGE AND SEX, MONTREAL AREA, 1931–61

Age	Males					Females				
	Montreal-Verdun		Montreal-Outremont-Verdun			Montreal-Verdun		Montreal-Outremont-Verdun		
	1931 (1)	1941 (2)	1941 (3)	1951 (4)	1961 (5)	1931 (6)	1941 (7)	1941 (8)	1951 (9)	1961 (10)
0–4	4 1	5 7	5 7	3 3	2 5	4 0	5.6	5.7	3 4	2 5
5–9	18 2	11 3	11 5	9 7	9 9	18 0	11 5	11 8	9 7	9 6
10–14	43 4	22 2	22 6	20 5	22.4	41 4	21.9	22 3	20 1	21 9
15–19	62 4	51 4	51 7	50 6	49 6	54 7	43.1	43 5	44 5	46 7
20–24	67 2	67 1	67 2	64 9	59.4	53 3	51 5	51 7	48 2	44 4
25–34	61 9	68 8	68.8	68 8	59 7	49 0	47 8	48 1	47 8	41 1
35–44	62 2	63 6	63.7	68.1	65 3	44 5	40 9	41 2	45 2	45 5
45–54	59 3	60 3	60 3	62 7	63 6	41 6	35 6	36 0	37 4	42 6
55–64	57 4	53 7	53 8	57.3	57 2	37.1	31.2	31 6	30 8	34 5
65–69	56 4	49 4	49 6	49 7	52 0	34 3	28 0	28 5	26 5	28 5
70+	51 2	42 9	43 3	42 2	44 0	31 2	24 4	24 7	23 5	24 5

Female Cohorts.—Further support for this interpretation comes from examination and comparison of bilingualism among the female age cohorts (Table 4, cols. [6]–[10]). First, we observe that the degree of bilingualism among girls under 15 is very similar to that found for boys of

the same ages. With the exception of ten- through fourteen-year-old girls in 1931, the sex differences are well under 1 per cent. This suggests that the experiences of boys and girls are very similar at these ages so that the net influences of home language, neighbors, mass media, playmates, and early years of formal second-language instruction in the schools are nearly identical. Beginning with the late teens, at the age when formal education ends for many and participation in the labor force begins, we find increasing differences between the sexes in their bilingualism. By the early twenties, the sex differences in bilingualism are considerable. In 1931, for example, 43.4 and 41.4 per cent of the males and females ten through fourteen are bilingual; in 1941, 67.1 and 51.5 per cent, respectively, of males and females are bilingual. Percentage-point differences of about 15 are also found for 1951 and 1961 between males and females in the twenty through twenty-four age category.

The influence of male participation in the labor force and female withdrawal into the home and child-rearing can also be seen in the points at which a net decline in bilingualism occurs as well as in the lower increases in bilingualism among women. In all three interdecade comparisons we find that declines in the bilingual percentage occur at earlier ages for women than for men. This is most striking for the 1931–41 comparisons. Not until we reach men thirty-five through forty-four in 1931 do we find a cohort that declines in the succeeding ten years (62.2 in 1931 and 60.3 in 1941). By contrast, females fifteen through nineteen and older decline in bilingualism by 1941.[26] These differentials are compatible with the contention that the main supports of bilingualism are school and occupational systems, although the reader should be reminded that the evidence is hardly incontrovertible.

[26] Here and elsewhere, graphs have been employed to compare cohorts over time that are in different-size age categories in the two periods.

Immigration.—Unfortunately, limitations in the available data preclude an analysis or weighting of the specific contributions made by such diverse institutional and demographic forces as education, occupational demands, internal migration, and immigration in influencing the bilingualism of cohorts. It is possible, however, to gauge through indirect means the influence of immigration in interdecade changes in bilingualism. There is little need to consider the impact of recent immigration on bilingualism among the younger age groups, since the rapidly rising bilingualism rates run counter to any expectation we might have on the basis of the low bilingualism of recent immigrants.

The decade between 1931 and 1941 affords the easiest test, since there was very little net immigration to Montreal-Verdun. For some age categories in 1941, less than 1 per cent of the population were foreign-born who had arrived in the preceding decade. Recent immigrants (since the 1931 census) were strongest among the thirty-five through forty-four-year-old population, comprising 2.2 and 2.8 per cent, respectively, of males and females in 1941. Even if no immigrants in the preceding decade had become bilingual—which is far from the case—their number would have been too small to account for the interdecade declines in bilingualism that we observe in 1941 among men who were thirty-five and over in 1931 and among women who were fifteen and older. We can conclude that the inferences based on cohort changes between 1931 and 1941 are substantially unaltered by immigration during the decade.

Heavier immigration since World War II definitely influences the cohort patterns described earlier. Among both men and women in the age category thirty-five through forty-four in 1961, about 20 per cent were immigrants who had arrived in Canada during the preceding ten years. For both 1951 and 1961 we have estimated the age-specific bilingual percentages, excluding for each year immigrants first ar-

riving in the preceding decade ("recent immigrants").[27] We shall examine these rates in order to determine whether the inferences made earlier are valid after the effect of immigration is eliminated.

The results, shown in Table 5, indicate that no substantial changes need be made in the cohort analysis presented earlier. In 1951 we find that the decline in bilingualism begins among men who were forty-five and older in 1941 (cols. [1] and [2]). Among women, the decline now begins among those twenty and older in 1941 (cols. [5] and [6]). In 1961, the decline for men starts with those who were thirty-five and over ten years earlier (cols. [3] and [4]). The results for women are somewhat inconsistent; there is a decline for women twenty through twenty-four in 1951 but a rise between 1951 and 1961 among women twenty-five through thirty-four at the beginning of the period. However, a steady decline is observed among women thirty-five and over in 1951.

In brief, the existence of unlearning is still found among the population who were not immigrants to Canada in the intervening decades. The process of immigration tends to lower the age at which bilingualism starts to decline. In other words, the effect of large-scale immigration on cohorts is the same as if bilingualism were to start its decline at earlier ages. The decline among men is more of a middle-age phenomenon, while women tend to begin their decline in bilingualism at earlier ages. This result is, of course, compatible with the earlier interpretation of the institutional forces that maintain bilingualism in Montreal.

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE BILINGUAL FOR SELECTED AGE GROUPS, BY SEX, EXCLUDING RECENT IMMIGRANTS, MONTREAL-OUTREMONT-VERDUN, 1941-61

Age	Males				Females			
	1941 (1)	1951* (2)	1951 (3)	1961† (4)	1941 (5)	1951* (6)	1951 (7)	1961† (8)
10-14....	22.6		20.5		22.3		20.1	
15-19....	51.7		50.6		43.5		44.5	
20-24...	67.2	66.8	64.9	64.7	51.7	49.5	48.2	49.1
25-34....	68.8	72.2	68.8	67.6	48.1	50.0	47.8	46.0
35-44....	63.7	71.2	68.1	71.6	41.2	46.4	45.2	49.0
45-54....	60.3	64.3	62.7	67.5	36.0	38.1	37.4	44.7
55-64...	53.8	58.0	57.3	59.0	31.6	31.1	30.8	35.7
65-69....	49.6	50.1	49.7	53.0	28.5	26.7	26.5	29.3
70+.....		42.5		44.5		23.7		24.9

* Excluding immigrants since 1941.
† Excluding immigrants since 1951.

COMMENT

Racial and ethnic contact is frequently accompanied by the confrontation of peoples who speak different tongues. In the United States, with a few exceptions, we have been able to take more or less for granted the linguistic outcome of contacts with non-English-speaking peoples. Although the experience of the United States is not unique, there are far more complex linguistic situations in many parts of the world. Indeed, Canada is relatively simple

[27] The bilingual percentage for the population, excluding recent immigrants, was obtained through indirect standardization. Using the component of recent immigrants in each group as weights, the ratio of actual and standardized bilingual percentage was applied to each specific age category to estimate the bilingual percentage of the population who had lived in Canada in the preceding decade.

compared to such nations as Nigeria, India, or South Africa.

The examination of linguistic trends in Montreal indicates a process quite contrary to the view of the city as a great mixer and melting pot of diverse cultures. Unlike most American cities, where populations with diverse linguistic origins have moved toward a monolingual status in a matter of a few generations, Montreal has maintained an equilibrium. This equilibrium is similar to that of Switzerland in the sense that it is based on dynamic demographic forces that tend to counterbalance each other.[28] It is a precarious equilibrium, since the exposure to risk is greater among the French ethnic population than among the British.

If we make the assumption that most people will not really master a second tongue unless it is learned at a relatively early age, then second-language-learning is less of a threat to the mother tongue than might otherwise be the case, since English and French languages are able to hold their own as the first language of children, and since much of the bilingualism in Canada does not occur in the very early ages or as a result of informal social contacts. Keyfitz has pointed to the handicaps that bilingual French Canadians face in the upper echelons of management or in white-collar office settings because of their lack of fluency or ease in English, which is often the language used.[29]

The constant replacement of a population through the introduction of new generations means that social change may occur without any individual changes.[30] However, we should not lose sight of the fact that generations may be instruments of conservation. Insofar as new members are socialized by older members, then it is equally possible for the system to maintain itself over time indefinitely as the newcomers who gradually replace the older members are socialized.[31] In the case of Montreal, we witness a social process of second-language-learning in each generation that does not lead to change through the years in the linguistic structure of Montreal. From the perspective outlined earlier, transfer from parents to children and the stage in the life span at which bilingualism occurs are both critical for understanding the outcome of language contact.

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[28] For an excellent analysis of the demographic factors, see Kurt Mayer, "Cultural Pluralism and Linguistic Equilibrium in Switzerland," reprinted in Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *Demographic Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 478–83.

[29] Nathan Keyfitz, "Canadians and Canadiens," *Queen's Quarterly*, LXX (Summer, 1963), 163–82.

[30] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 276–320.

[31] See George Simmel, "Social Interaction as the Definition of the Group in Time and Space," in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), pp. 348–56

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25–34....	68.8	72.2	68.8	67.6	48.1	50.0	47.8	46.0
35–44....	63.7	71.2	68.1	71.6	41.2	46.4	45.2	49.0
45–54..	60.3	64.3	62.7	67.5	36.0	38.1	37.4	44.7
55–64..	53.8	58.0	57.3	59.0	31.6	31.1	30.8	35.7
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The examination of linguistic trends in Montreal indicates a process quite contrary to the view of the city as a great mixer and melting pot of diverse cultures. Unlike most American cities, where populations with diverse linguistic origins have moved toward a monolingual status in a matter of a few generations, Montreal has maintained an equilibrium. This equilibrium is similar to that of Switzerland in the sense that it is based on dynamic demographic forces that tend to counterbalance each other.[28] It is a precarious equilibrium, since the exposure to risk is greater among the French ethnic population than among the British.

If we make the assumption that most people will not really master a second tongue unless it is learned at a relatively early age, then second-language-learning is less of a threat to the mother tongue than might otherwise be the case, since English and French languages are able to hold their own as the first language of children, and since much of the bilingualism in Canada does not occur in the very early ages or as a result of informal social contacts. Keyfitz has pointed to the handicaps that bilingual French Canadians face in the upper echelons of management or in white-collar office settings because of their lack of fluency or ease in English, which is often the language used.[29]

The constant replacement of a population through the introduction of new generations means that social change may occur without any individual changes.[30] However, we should not lose sight of the fact that generations may be instruments of conservation. Insofar as new members are socialized by older members, then it is equally possible for the system to maintain itself over time indefinitely as the newcomers who gradually replace the older members are socialized.[31] In the case of Montreal, we witness a social process of second-language-learning in each generation that does not lead to change through the years in the linguistic structure of Montreal. From the perspective outlined earlier, transfer from parents to children and the stage in the life span at which bilingualism occurs are both critical for understanding the outcome of language contact.

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[28] For an excellent analysis of the demographic factors, see Kurt Mayer, "Cultural Pluralism and Linguistic Equilibrium in Switzerland," reprinted in Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *Demographic Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 478-83.

[29] Nathan Keyfitz, "Canadians and Canadiens," *Queen's Quarterly*, LXX (Summer, 1963), 163-82.

[30] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 276-320.

[31] See George Simmel, "Social Interaction as the Definition of the Group in Time and Space," in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), pp. 348-56.

Subjective Social Distance and Urban Occupational Stratification[1]

Edward O. Laumann

ABSTRACT

Findings from a sample of 422 white men in Cambridge and Belmont, Massachusetts, show that subjective social distance toward occupations is related to one's own occupational and class location. We examine two hypotheses: (1) Persons prefer intimate social relations with others of comparable occupational status or prestige—the so-called like-me hypothesis. (2) Regardless of their own occupational status, persons prefer intimate social relations with others in occupations of higher status—the so-called prestige hypothesis. The "prestige" effect is more evident in social-distance preferences than the like-me effect, although there is also evidence that the like-me effect is present to some extent.

This report is part of a larger study of the extent to which social interaction in the urban environment is affected by occupational rank. The research rests on the assumption that occupation is one of the most important determinants of stratification in the American urban community. Occupation is involved both objectively and subjectively in stratifying the community. Objectively, occupation is one of the crucial determinants of income level and, consequently, of control over material resources. Because of the differential skill and educational requirements for various occupations, occupation also serves to stratify the population in terms of educational attainment, which in turn determines to a great extent the values by which a person lives his life ("style of life"). Subjectively, because occupation is objectively correlated with income and educational attainment, it often serves as an important condensed piece of information (symbol) by which people categorize a person according to their own differential social preferences and expectations. While the larger study focused on the impact of differential occupational status on reported friendship, neighborhood, and marriage relations with persons in other occupations, it also dealt with individual subjective preferences in establishing selected social relationships with members of other occupations. It is to this latter aspect of the study that we shall confine our attention in this paper.

If we may regard "social structure" as a "persistent system of social relationships among social positions" and "social stratification" as a "persistent system of ranking of social positions,"[2] then a "stratified social structure" is one in which there is a tendency for people to confine their intimate social relationships with others of approximately equal rank or status.[3] Following the Warner tradition, we will regard "social class" as the largest group of people whose members have intimate access to one another in terms of such social relationships as marriage, friendship, informal social groups and cliques, and common residence. As Davis and the Gardners observe: "A class is composed of families and social

[1] I am deeply indebted to the Joint Center for Urban Studies of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for providing the financial support and research facilities that made this study possible. I am also indebted to the following people, who provided invaluable suggestions and criticisms of my work: Professors George C. Homans, Charles Tilly, Talcott Parsons, Chad Gordon, Harrison C. White, and Thomas Pettigrew of Harvard University and Professor James M. Beshers of M.I.T.

[2] James M. Beshers, *Urban Social Structure* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 127–58.

[3] Milton M. Gordon, *Social Class in American Sociology* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), pp. 243, 249.

cliques. The interrelationships between these families and cliques, in such informal activities as visiting, dances, receptions, teas, and larger informal affairs, constitute the structure of a social class."[4] Thus, classes are groups of people who interact selectively according to status characteristics that they share or believe they share. The issue of whether social classes exist in a given stratification system in the sense of intimately associating groups with decisive boundaries between adjacent groups must be resolved empirically.[5]

This focus upon the differential social interaction of various social classes or status strata as an important attribute of a stratification system immediately suggests the possible relevance of the concept of social distance for the analysis of such systems, inasmuch as the class structure is here being conceived in terms of the differential degree of social distance and resulting differential interaction being maintained among the various members of the community. An instrument providing for the expression of personal preferences in establishing social relationships with persons of various occupational backgrounds has projective elements that are perhaps more revealing of underlying values and norms in stratification than actual interaction rates—especially insofar as actual interaction reflects alter's as well as ego's interaction preferences. As developed by Bogardus and his students, the concept of social distance has been used almost exclusively as a tool for the social-psychological study of intergroup relations and, in particular, those of ethnic and racial groups. First developed in 1925 and later modified in 1933, the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, comprised of a list of seven social relationships ordered along a dimension of relative intimacy of access to the person, ranging from intermarriage to common citizenship, has done yeoman service in the study of ethnic and racial prejudices.[6] Although Bogardus did suggest as early as 1928 the relevance of his approach for studying social distance among occupational groups, relatively little work has been done in this area.[7] Following Robert Park's usage of the term, Duncan, Tilly, Feldman, and others have studied occupational and ethnic residential segregation using social distance as an intervening interpretive variable.[8]

[4] Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 59.

[5] Cf. Werner S. Landecker, "Class Boundaries," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (1960), 868-77; Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 405-13; Gerhard Lenski, "American Social Classes: Statistical Strata or Social Groups?" *American Journal of Sociology*, LVIII (1952), 139-44; John Cuber and William Kenkel, *Social Stratification in the United States* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1954), pp. 132-56.

[6] See Emory S. Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX (1925), 299-308, for the original version of the scale. See also his "A Social Distance Scale," *Sociology and Social Research*, XVII (1933), 265-71, for the revised form of the scale.

[7] Emory S. Bogardus, "Occupational Distance," *Sociology and Social Research*, XIII (1928), 73-81. One of his students followed his suggestions in a study of college students' social-distance attitudes toward thirty occupations, using the original Social Distance Scale (Forrest Wilkinson, "Social Distance between Occupations," *Sociology and Social Research*, XIII [1928], 234-44).

Only in the recent work of Westie and his colleagues do we again have a serious effort to study social distance among occupations. See Frank Westie and Margaret Westie, "The Social-Distance Pyramid: Relationship between Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (1957), 190-96; Frank Westie and David Howard, "Social Status Differentials and the Race Attitudes of Negroes," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 584-91; Frank Westie, "Social Distance Scales," *Sociology and Social Research*, XLIII (1959), 251-58; and John W. Martin, "Social Distance and Social Stratification," *Sociology and Social Research*, XLVII (1963), 179-86.

[8] Cf. Otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Segregation and Occupational Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, LX (1955), 493-503; Otis D. Duncan and Stanley Lieberson, "Ethnic Segregation and Assimilation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1959), 364-74; Arnold S. Feldman and Charles Tilly, "The Interaction of Social and Physical Space,"

For the purposes of the following discussion, "subjective social distance" will be defined as the attitude of ego toward a person with a particular status attribute (in this study, occupation) that broadly defines the character of the interaction that ego would undertake with the attitude object. The character of the interaction may vary along a dimension of socially defined intimacy. This paper will be primarily concerned with a proposed measure of subjective social distance and some of the principal findings relating to subjective social distance, based on a sample of white male adults living in Cambridge and Belmont, Massachusetts.

To this point in our discussion, we have assumed the validity of the proposition that intimate social relationships tend to occur among persons of equal social rank or status —this may be called the "like-me" hypothesis. Most researchers or theorists of stratification have either assumed or attempted to demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis. There is, however, another body of research and theory, primarily resting on studies of small groups, that finds support for the following proposition: persons choosing others for close relationships tend to name those of somewhat higher socioeconomic status than themselves.[9] For example, Lunberg and Lawsing (1937) reported a study in which the number of sociometric choices received by members of a rural community in Vermont varied with their socioeconomic status—the higher the status, the more choices received.[10] The "prestige" hypothesis would suggest that the higher the status of the occupation, as an attitude object, the less the social distance expressed toward it by the respondent, regardless of his occupational status. Obviously, the like-me hypothesis would lead to quite contradictory expectations, particularly in the case of respondents in lower-status occupations responding in social-distance terms to higher-status occupations.

One possible resolution of these conflicting expectations is that the upward-interaction-preference hypothesis holds only when persons are expressing desired or preferred interaction choices rather than actual interaction choices. In other words, the patterns of subjective social distance will conform to the prestige hypothesis, while the patterns of actual interaction will conform to the like-me hypothesis. Borrowing an analogy from the resultant of forces in physics, one might argue that a person is simultaneously subjected to two "pulls," a prestige pull and a like-me pull, and that his reaction to a given occupation is a resultant of these two forces. The relative strength of these two forces will depend on whether the context is actual interaction choices or preferred interaction choices.

Substantively, then, the paper has two objectives: (1) the description of a scale appropriate for the measurement of subjective social-distance attitudes toward a variety of occupations, and (2) the presentation of data relevant to an evaluation of the prestige and like-me hypotheses.

METHODOLOGY

Sample.—A stratified, area-probability sample of 422 white male residents of Cambridge and Belmont, Massachusetts, was drawn.[11] Under the author's close super-

American Sociological Review, XXV (1960), 877–84; James M. Beshers, Edward O. Laumann, and Benjamin Bradshaw, "Ethnic Congregation-Segregation, Assimilation, and Stratification," *Social Forces*, XLIII (1964), 482–89.

[9] For an excellent review of the relevant literature see Henry W. Riecken and George C. Homans, "Psychological Aspects of Social Structure," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), II, 786–832; also Morton B. King, Jr., "Socioeconomic Status and Sociometric Choice," *Social Forces*, XXXIX (1961), 199–206.

[10] Cited in Riecken and Homans, *op. cit.*

[11] Sampling was conducted in two stages. To get a sample with maximum occupational and status diversity, we first stratified all the 1960 Census tracts in Cambridge and Belmont (parts of the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) into three strata on the basis of the 1960 m[illegible]

vision, interviewers from the Joint Center for Urban Studies of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology saw the sample respondents in their homes during June and July, 1963, for personal interviews averaging an hour in duration. During the interviews, the respondents themselves filled out the Social Distance Booklet (to be discussed below), the principal source of the data in this paper.

The measurement of social distance.—The importance of devising social-distance scales that are appropriate to the contact situation under investigation is strikingly underlined by a review of the efforts to study people's social-distance reactions toward various occupations. In the first study of social distance between occupations, Wilkinson examined the group-distance reactions of 861 students at the University of Southern California toward members of thirty professions and occupations, using the original Bogardus scale.[12] The inappropriateness of asking people whether they would extend citizenship rights (the most extreme Bogardus item) to carpenters or even street-sweepers is obvious. Despite the crudeness of the scale and the primitive nature of her statistical manipulations of the data, Wilkinson was able to show systematic variations in people's reactions to these occupations.

In 1952, Frank Westie began a series of articles describing a set of social-distance scales he had developed to study the variations in white people's social-distance reactions toward Negroes when the occupation of the Negro was varied.[13] His four scales were frankly intended to measure a person's prejudice toward Negroes holding high-, intermediate-, and low-prestige jobs. In a speculative article, Westie pointed out the possibility of using social-distance scales to study social classes as selective interaction systems, but he noted that his scales were probably too insensitive for such a task. His student, John W. Martin, revised his interpersonal social-distance scale to some extent and administered it to 458 ninth- and twelfth-graders in a public high school and university high school in Indiana.[14] Although proving the feasibility of devising such a scale, his study is obviously limited because of the nature of the sample employed.

In the present study, the author devised his own version of a subjective social-distance scale appropriate for the study of distance between occupations on the basis of his analysis (above) of the basic social

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family income of each tract, as follows: (1) lower family-income tracts (below $5,499), which finally included six tracts; (2) middle family-income tracts (between $5,500 and $7,499), sixteen tracts; and (3) upper family-income tracts (over $7,500), eight tracts. Two tracts with populations more than 20 per cent Negro were excluded because we were confining the sample to white males and wanted to simplify the interviewing operation, as were the six tracts that included Harvard, M.I.T., and Radcliffe College because of their predominantly student, non-local-resident populations. Three tracts from each family-income stratum were randomly drawn for inclusion as sample tracts.

A random sample of seventy-five men from each sample tract was drawn from the 1963 Police Lists (lists of the names of all adults living in all legal residences in a given precinct, by street and house number). Every potential sample respondent was sent a letter, under the official letterhead of the Joint Center for Urban Studies, explaining the purposes of the study and encouraging co-operation. Of all those who were contacted and met the sampling criteria, only 15.5 per cent refused to be interviewed.

Both Cambridge and Belmont (contiguous towns) are heavily urbanized areas, well integrated socially and economically into the Boston metropolitan area. Cambridge is a city of 107,716, Belmont a middle- and upper middle-class suburb of 28,715 (1960 Census).

[12] Wilkinson, *op. cit.*

[13] Frank Westie, "Negro-White Status Differentials and Social Distance," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (1952), 550-58; and his "A Technique for the Measurement of Race Attitudes," *American Sociological Review*, XVIII (1953), 73-78; Westie and Howard, *op. cit.*; Westie and Westie, *op. cit.*; Westie, "Social Distance Scales," *op. cit.*

[14] Martin, *op. cit.* For a complete report of his work, see his unpublished Ph D dissertation, "Adolescent Social Distance toward Occupational Status" (Indiana University, 1959).

relationships involved in the definition of social classes, a number of suggestive leads drawn from Westie's and Martin's work, and his own extensive pilot-study and pretest experience with his own scales. The new scale had the following format:

I believe I would like to have a carpenter [or one of sixteen other selected occupations]:

a) as my son-in-law	SA	A	U	D	SD
b) as my father-in-law	SA	A	U	D	SD
c) as my closest personal friend	SA	A	U	D	SD
d) as a person I would have over for supper in my home	SA	A	U	D	SD
e) as a person I might often visit with	SA	A	U	D	SD
f) as a member of one of my social clubs, lodges, or informal social groups	SA	A	U	D	SD
g) as my next-door neighbor	SA	A	U	D	SD

The respondent was asked to circle the appropriate answer (SA, "strongly agree"; A, "agree"; U, "undecided"; D, "disagree"; SD, "strongly disagree") for each one of the seven social relationships. A scale for each of the seventeen occupations was included in the self-administered Social Distance Booklet.

The selection of the seventeen occupations was done with particular care to insure the broadest range of occupations in relative prestige and socioeconomic status. A second criterion of selection was that the occupations should be widely known throughout the occupational structure so that an unskilled worker and a professional man would be equally likely to know at least roughly the nature of the work involved. The occupations chosen, listed in Table 1 in terms of their relative prestige, were randomly listed in the booklet. These occupations are by no means a random sample of the 20,000 occupational titles presently recognized in the United States. We have no way of assessing the impact on the sample's distance reactions of including only widely known occupations. This would be a fruitful area for future research.

Eleven per cent of the sample respondents refused to respond to the questions in the Social Distance Booklet, although they all answered the other questions in the interview. The typical reason for the refusal was that the respondent did not consider a man's occupation at all relevant to his association with him in the relationships specified. For example, one respondent said, "You can't decide by a man's profession—you have to judge people for what they are. I don't walk with my nose in the air." Another 10 per cent filled out the booklet but circled the same answers for all seventeen occupations. When asked why they had done this, the typical reasons were similar to those of the outright refusers. This latter group may also be regarded as refusers. The fact that nearly 21 per cent of the sample saw fit to refuse to answer the questions in the booklet does not necessarily invalidate the scales themselves, inasmuch as a failure to discriminate occupational groups along the lines suggested in the scale is a perfectly valid empirical response.[15] Indeed, given the American ideological emphasis on the equalitarian nature of all men, one might express greater surprise that 80 per cent of the sample were quite prepared to express selective interaction preferences on the basis of occupations. In short, the refusal rate itself is an important datum with regard to American urban stratification.

The first problem in handling the social-distance data was to assign a summary score for each of the seventeen occupations for each individual who answered the ques-

[15] No given occupational group seemed more likely to refuse answering the questions in the booklet than any other. There was, however, strong evidence ($P < .01$) that men forty-five years and older refused more often than younger men. The reasons for this finding are not obvious. The refusals were not correlated with any other socioeconomic variable such as education, religious preference, or ethnicity.

tions. As the first step, the computer constructed Likert scores by assigning arbitrary weights of from "1" for "strongly agree" through "5" for "strongly disagree" for each checked answer for each of the seven relationship items, resulting in a Likert score between 7 and 35 for a given occupation. The item-to-scale correlations ranged between .69 and .93. The item-to-item correlations were also fairly high, ranging between .27 and .69 for "carpenter" and between .57 and .82 for "banker," to mention two examples.[16]

One of the major difficulties of the Likert-type scale is the problem of response set and the tendency of people to make their discriminations within a characteristic "area" of the "strongly agree–strongly

[16] The question whether the items were ordered on an unidimensional scale moving from the most intimate relationships (kinship and friendship), where people would presumably be more "exclusive," to the least intimate relationship of common residence, was only indirectly examined by looking at the intercorrelation matrices. Although there were many scale "errors" in Guttman's sense, the intercorrelation matrices of the item-to-item correlations for each occupation formed rough Guttman simplex patterns, with the lowest correlations observed between the kinship and other items and the highest correlations between residence and the immediately adjacent items. Such a pattern suggests the existence of an underlying unidimensional scale with kinship and friendship at one end and common residence at the other. The middle-items correlations were between the kinship and common-residence correlations in size, differing among themselves by several points in no systematic direction. Apparently, respondents did not differen-

TABLE 1

MEAN SOCIAL DISTANCE Z SCORES BY SELF-IDENTIFIED CLASS FOR SEVENTEEN OCCUPATIONS IN ORDER OF THEIR AVERAGE SOCIAL DISTANCE

Occupations	Upper Class (1)	Upper Middle Class (2)	Middle Class (3)	Upper Working Class (4)	Working Class (5)	Total Sample (6)	[illegible] Kruskal-Wallis Test* (7)	[illegible] Index* (8)
Sample sizes	25	50	105	35	112	327		
Physician	378	378	398	491	420	401	001	92
Electrical engineer	435	422	433	429	437	428	n s	84
College professor	383	407	443	446	457	435	001	84
Top executive	412	419	431	438	454	435	01	90
High school teacher	416	433	450	462	451	446	n s	72
Banker	432	425	457	462	480	455	001	90
Owner manager, small store	464	476	472	452	481	469	n s	43
Bank teller	509	500	486	490	489	487	n s	52
Carpenter	504	506	483	502	494	491	n s.	19
Foreman	500	492	503	515	509	502	n s	53
Garage mechanic	543	543	518	487	503	510	001	19
Machine operator	556	541	530	529	511	522	01	17
Salesclerk	550	540	540	529	525	530	05	39
Truck driver	558	559	535	530	522	530	.01	15
Unskilled construction worker	602	592	594	587	573	581	n s.	07
Janitor	611	596	591	578	579	584	n s.	09
Street-sweeper	636	662	628	627	606	622	n s.	06

* The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks tests whether *k* independent samples are from different populations (see Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956], pp. 184-93). "N s." means non significant by this test.

† See n. 20.

disagree" scale. For example, some people may discriminate among occupations using only the "strongly agree," "agree," and "undecided" categories, while others may use the entire range of categories. Obviously, the social-distance mean scores of these people will vary substantially, despite the fact that they are making the same kinds of status discriminations. Another difficulty with using raw Likert scores is that one cannot tell for a given person where a particular occupation stands with respect to the others in terms of relative social distance without knowing the scores for these other occupations. Finally, from the standpoint of statistical manipulation, it is often desirable to have distributions that are approximately normal. For these reasons, the raw distance scores were standardized by the Z-transformation.

Each individual's seventeen Likert scores were transformed according to the following formula:

$$Z_i = (X_i - \bar{X})/S ,$$

where X_i is one of the seventeen Likert scores, $\bar{X}$ is the mean of a given individual's seventeen scores, and S is the standard deviation of the mean, $\bar{X}$. The resulting distribution of Z scores will have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In order to get rid of the decimal point and negative numbers, the computer multiplied each Z score by 100 and added 500, resulting in a new distribution with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Thus, if a Z score is below 500, the respondent feels relatively close to or near that occupation. If the Z score is 500, then the respondent has his "average" social distance to tha occupation; and if the Z score is above 500 the respondent feels relatively more distan from that occupation than from the othe occupations on the list.[17]

FINDINGS

Table 1 presents the basic data that enable us to evaluate the relative merits of the like-me and prestige hypotheses discussed above. All of the men in the sample who answered the Social Distance Booklet were stratified into five classes on the basis of their own self-identification with a class.[18] The first five columns refer to these groupings—twenty-five men identified themselves as "upper class," fifty identified themselves as "upper middle class," and so on.[19] The upper class's mean social-distance score for physician (which in this case was 378) was obtained by summing the scores of these twenty-five men for physician and dividing by twenty-five. The seventeen occupations are listed in the order of their mean social-distance scores for the sample as a whole (reported in col. [6]). In the row for physician, note that the upper class's mean score is considerably lower than the working class's mean score, re-

tiate very consistently among these middle items. In fact, an examination of the response patterns definitely shows the tendency of respondents to differentiate the kinship, friendship, and residence items from the other items, which were in turn usually answered exactly alike.

For a discussion of simplex analysis, see Louis Guttman, "A New Approach to Factor Analysis: The Radex," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: Glencoe Free Press, 1954).

[17] See J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 489–94, for a more extensive discussion of the implications of this transformation.

[18] Cf. Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949).

[19] The data in Table 1 were also tabulated for the sample broken into five occupational categories on the basis of the respondents' reported occupations: (1) professional and top business positions, (2) semiprofessional and middle-level business occupations, (3) clerical and sales people, small business owners and managers, (4) skilled craftsmen and foremen, and (5) semiskilled and unskilled occupations. The distributions follow roughly the same pattern as those reported in Table 1, thus confirming that objective as well as subjective status position has an important impact on a person's attitude toward various occupations. Since the distributions and results are almost identical, we shall confine the analysis to the subjective class-identification tables.

flecting the fact that upper-class men felt, on the average, relatively closer to physicians than working-class men did. In column (7) in Table 1, we have indicated for each occupation the likelihood of the observed class means differing among themselves as much as they do by chance factors alone. Despite the cautiousness of the test employed, eight of the seventeen comparisons are highly significant, and all the others conform to the ordering that the like-me hypothesis would predict. We can conclude with confidence that a person's class identification has a highly significant impact on his distance reactions to various occupations.

Despite the fact that upper-class men express less social distance from the higher-prestige occupations than middle- or working-class men do, middle- or working-class men express less social distance to these occupations than they do to occupations that are objectively included in their own classes—following the classical equation of the manual occupations with the working class and the non-manual occupations with the middle classes. This point is dramatically illustrated in Figure 1, where the means are plotted for the upper, middle, and working classes. Although one can see that the classes differ with respect to their average social distance to the seventeen occupations, the general trend of the three lines is from the lower left-hand corner to the upper right-hand corner, reflecting the fact that social distance is strongly corre-

FIG. 1.—Mean social distance (*Z* scores) by self-identified class for seventeen occupational stimuli. (The reader should note that the relatively good linear fit in this figure for the three sets of means is in part due to ordering the occupations in terms of their average social distance scores for the sample as a whole. The regression analysis discussed below, however, is based on an independently derived measure of occupational prestige.)

lated to the prestige ordering of the occupations, regardless of the class of the respondent. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that there are real class effects, which conform to the expectations of the like-me hypothesis. One may conclude, however, that the prestige effects are stronger than the like-me effects.

Until now, we have been assuming that the ordering of occupations in Table 1 is according to their relative prestige. This assumption must now be examined. Column (8) in Table 1 presents Duncan's Socioeconomic Index code for the seventeen occupations.[20] This index was constructed on the basis of the occupational-prestige scores obtained in the NORC study of occupational prestige in 1947.[21] Using the Duncan index as a measure of relative occupational prestige, we calculated the regression lines for the five classes where the mean social distance of an occupation (y) is predicted from the Duncan code for that occupation (x). The regression equations for the five classes are as follows:

a) For the upper class, $y = 606.00 - 2.29x$.
b) For the upper-middle class, $y = 603.35 - 2.23x$.
c) For the middle class, $y = 579.63 - 1.72x$.
d) For the upper-working class, $y = 565.68 - 1.34x$.
e) For the working class, $y = 560.65 - 1.31x$.

As one can readily see, the regression slope for the upper class is the steepest. The slopes decline as one proceeds down the class hierarchy.[22] The product-moment correlations for the five classes are —.93, —.93, —.88, —.80, and —.85, respectively. The regression analysis thus affords another way of looking at the differences among the five classes in their patterns of social-distance responses, in the context of their fundamental similarity in the strong relationship obtaining between social distance and prestige.

If one were to draw hypothetical curves for the three classes in accordance with the like-me hypothesis, he would discover that, while the hypothetical curve for the upper class is the same as the empirically found curve, the hypothetical curves for the middle and working classes would differ markedly from the empirically observed curves. On that hypothesis, the middle-class curve would be curvilinear in form, while the working-class curve would be negatively related to the prestige-ordering, moving from the upper left-hand corner to the lower right-hand corner in Figure 1. If only the upper-class and working-class curves were considered, one would observe an X pattern with the two lines intersecting around the split between the manual and non-manual occupations. Note that we do in fact find an X pattern for the empirically observed curves. The middle- and working-class curves cross the upper-class curve approximately at "factory foreman," the highest-status manual occupation, and "bank teller," one of the lower white-collar occupations. It is also important to note that both of these occupations have mean scores roughly equal to 500, which is the mean social distance that a given individual would

[20] Otis D. Duncan, "A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations," in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 109–61.

[21] National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, *Class, Status, and Power* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 411–26.

[22] As Professor Leo Goodman, of the University of Chicago, has kindly brought to my attention, the relationship between the Y-intercept a and the slope b is the same in each of these equations. The interpretation of the results can be based *either* on the a's *or* the b's. For each of the five equations, we have the relationship $b = (500 - a)/\bar{X}$, where $\bar{X}$ is the average of the Duncan scores of the 17 occupations. (Note that the value of $\bar{X}$ is the same for the five equations.) Usually, the relationship between a and b is not exactly the same in different regression equations; but for these data this relationship is fixed by the method of analysis. Thus, the reader is warned not to regard the consistently decreasing values of a (from 606 to 560) as *added* independent evidence (in addition to the consistently increasing values of b from —2.29 to —1.31) concerning the consistent pattern of the data.

have for the seventeen occupations. This intersection point at 500 and at the midpoint of the occupational distribution is statistically necessary, given the way the data have been constructed and analyzed. In short, the precise intersection point is an artifact of the statistical analysis. However, the fact that the three observed mean social-distance scores have the same rank order (the upper-class score is lower than the middle-class score which is lower than the working-class score) for almost all occupations listed to the left of "bank teller" in Figure 1, and that the three observed scores have the same rank order (the upper-class score is higher than the middle-class score which is higher than the working-class score for all occupations listed to the right of "carpenter" in this figure, does seem to lend some support to the thesis that there is, in a certain sense, a "breaking point" at the bank-teller–factory-foreman–carpenter occupations. This "breaking point" is defined here by the consistent rank-order pattern to the left and the opposite but consistent rank-order pattern to the right, rather than as an intersection point of the fitted straight lines (or fitted curves), though admittedly the definitions are not unrelated. This pattern roughly suggests that there is a psychological "breaking point" between the manual and non-manual occupations that might reflect a "class boundary."[23]

The fact that all the classes follow a prestige-ordering of their social-distance reactions might be interpreted as reflecting the American belief in the existence of an "open-class" system rather than a "closed-class" system in which everyone knows "his place" and is not expected to aspire to higher status for himself or his children. The open-class system recognizes the existence of sharp differences in status but encourages the belief not only in the possibility of social mobility but also in the legitimacy and desirability of improving one's status. MacIver and Page suggest the psychological distinction between a "corporate class consciousness" (essentially the class view that identifies one's personal welfare with that of his class and vice versa) and a "competitive class consciousness" (the class view wherein one has an awareness, albeit vague and inaccurate at times, of his place in the class structure, but where he is always ready and willing to leave his class for higher, greener pastures).[24] Westie suggests that a social-distance scale would be particularly useful in establishing the relative prevalence of such psychological orientations. Those people who are upward-oriented in their interaction preferences might be regarded as competitively class-conscious. Obviously, the bulk of the sample must fall into this pattern of social-distance reactions.[25]

The reported patterning of results suggests the general utility of the proposed social-distance measure in future research. A number of comparative questions regarding subjective social-distance patterns in other American cities differing in their industrial and commercial compositions, as well as other industrial countries, are in order. In addition, what is needed is an analysis of the relationships of an individual's pattern of response to the scale and a variety of other attitudinal and be-

[23] Landecker, *op. cit.*

[24] Cited in Westie, "Social Distance Scales," *op cit.*, p. 253.

[25] In order to get some estimate of the proportion of the working class that had a competitive as opposed to a corporate class view, we divided the sample into three class categories (upper and upper-middle class, middle class, and upper-working and working class) and simply counted the number of men who had social-distance scores below 500 (and thus expressed relative closeness) for all three upper and upper-middle class occupations of physician, college professor, and top executive. Given the structure of the social-distance scale scores, there must be scores above 500 to compensate for those below 500. Whereas 84 per cent of the upper and upper-middle class respondents and 71 per cent of the middle class had all three scores below 500, only 64 per cent of the upper-working and working-class respondents had all three scores below 500 ($P < 01$) Nevertheless, a substantial majority of the working class expressed social nearness to these higher-status occupations

havioral variables, including economic and political ideology, personal conceptions of the class and status system, and mobility experiences. Preliminary analysis of materials relating to this latter concern (to be reported elsewhere) suggest a number of promising results.

SUMMARY

Beginning with the basic assumption that occupation is of crucial importance in the stratification of American cities, we have presented some of the findings from a study of 422 white men, relating attitudes of subjective social distance toward a selected list of occupations to the respondents' own occupational and class locations. After describing the construction of a social-distance scale appropriate to the task as defined, we examined two hypotheses: (1) Persons prefer to establish intimate social relationships with other persons of comparable occupational status or prestige—the so-called like-me hypothesis. (2) Regardless of their own occupational status or rank, persons prefer to establish intimate social relationships with other persons in occupations of higher status or rank—the so-called prestige hypothesis.

The analysis of the data provides evidence that the prestige effect is more strongly operative in the context of subjective social-distance preferences than the like-me effect, although there is also evidence that the like-me effect is present to some extent. The results demonstrate the utility of the social-distance measure in stratification research.

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Some Implications of Random Measurement Error for Causal Inferences

H. M. Blalock, Jr.

ABSTRACT

Random measurement errors can lead to faulty inferences by introducing additional unknowns. This makes plausible a number of alternative explanations that should be explicitly noted. One can study the implications of measurement errors by adding measurement error components to causal models. This approach is used in five specific situations: (1) where one is testing for spuriousness or interpreting by means of intervening variables; (2) where independent variables are highly correlated; (3) where there is a developmental sequence; (4) in factor analyses; and (5) where interaction might be inferred.

Sociologists are well aware of the fact that most of our variables are measured with considerable error, and generalizations are usually stated cautiously with this possibility in mind. Yet there has been relatively little study of the *kinds* of effects measurement error produces, and actual analyses and interpretations of data usually presuppose that measurement errors can safely be ignored.[1]

If unknown and uncorrected, systematic or non-random measurement errors can produce almost any kind of distortion, thereby making inference extremely risky. Under certain special circumstances, it may be possible either to reduce the magnitude of systematic errors or to rule them out on probability grounds, even where the direction and magnitude of their effects are unknown. But it will generally be extremely difficult to deal with non-random errors unless their effects can somehow or other be explicitly estimated and corrected. In the present paper, we shall omit any consideration of such systematic errors, confining our attention to measurement errors which are strictly random.

It might be thought that purely random errors usually result in "conservative" inferences in view of the fact that correlations will generally be attenuated in magnitude. For example, in the two-variable case involving X and Y, random measurement errors in either variable will attenuate the correlation between them.[2] Therefore, if an investigator finds a relationship which is statistically significant and moderately large, even with measurement error, he may have added confidence that the true relationship is even more pronounced Hence he is being conservative in inferring a relationship. What about more complex multivariate analyses, however? The same sort of situation might be thought to occur in instances where one is introducing control variables and making inferences on the basis of the behavior of the partial coefficients. But the picture is no longer so simple.

Basically, the problem reduces to the fact that random measurement errors introduce

[1] Most of the literature on measurement error known to the present writer is within the field of applied statistics. For summaries of these materials see J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), chap. vi; and Quinn McNemar, *Psychological Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1949), pp. 127–31 and 276–80.

[2] See Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–50, and McNemar, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–31. It should be noted that whereas random measurement errors in either X or Y will attenuate r_{xy}, the expected value of b_{yx} will *not* be affected by random measurement errors in the dependent variable Y.

unknowns into the system, and the values of these unknowns cannot be easily estimated. As a result, there will be additional models or causal explanations that can also account for the data. These alternative explanations cannot be merely ignored, and an important task is to develop methodological tools which will enable the investigator to become explicitly aware of these alternatives in order that he may deal with them systematically.

There appear to be far too many possible alternative situations to make a simple codification scheme feasible. Instead, we shall make use of a general analytic device, illustrating the use of this technique in the case of five specific causal situations. The approach used will be essentially the same as that suggested in an earlier paper.[3] We merely introduce random measurement errors explicitly into a causal model by distinguishing between the "true" values and the measured values, as though they were completely different variables. The measured value will be taken as caused by (1) the true value, and (2) a number of disturbing influences assumed to produce random fluctuations, the magnitudes of which are unknown.[4]

Linearity and additivity of all relationships will be assumed for the sake of simplicity, although it may be necessary to make suitable transformations in the case of certain types of non-linearity or interaction effects (e.g., multiplicative relationships). Likewise we shall assume that factors not explicitly contained in a given model have essentially random effects on the variables being considered. The use of such simplifications is a heuristic device which makes it possible to concentrate on only one type of complication, in this case measurement errors. As Johnston suggests, it may prove extremely difficult to handle more than one kind of complication at a time.[5]

SPECIFIC CAUSAL SITUATIONS

1. *Spuriousness and intervening variables.*—A simple way to introduce the problem will be to discuss models in which measurement error occurs in an intervening variable, or in a variable producing a spurious relationship between two other variables. Since these situations have been considered elsewhere, however, they will be dealt with only very briefly in the present paper.[6] Suppose we are given either of the models of Figure 1, where Z has been measured imperfectly. The measured value Z' is taken as being caused by the true value plus a number of factors which are unrelated to either X or Y, and which are assumed to create purely random disturbances (as indicated by side arrows, Fig. 1). We are assuming no measurement errors in X or Y, although we have shown elsewhere that purely random errors in either of these variables will not lead to faulty causal inferences in the case of the models of Figure 1, provided Z is perfectly measured.[7]

In both of these models, a control for Z (if perfectly measured) would completely wipe out the association between X and Y, except for sampling errors. The investigator could then infer, correctly, that the relationship between X and Y is not direct, although he would need additional information to choose between the models (a) and (b). Essentially the same argument

[3] H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Making Causal Inferences for Unmeasured Variables from Correlations among Indicators," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIX (July, 1963), 53–62.

[4] For a more complete statement of the rationale for this procedure see H. M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), chap. v. See also Sewall Wright, "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?" *Biometrics*, XVI (June, 1960), 189–202.

[5] Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[6] Blalock, *Causal Inferences*, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

[7] *Ibid.* Random measurement errors in X and Y (measured as X' and Y', respectively) will attenuate the correlations with Z in such a way that the expected value of the partial correlation $r_{x'y'.z}$ will remain zero.

holds more generally in the case of additional variables in the position of Z. For example, if W is also creating a spurious relationship between X and Y, then a simultaneous control for W and Z will eliminate the correlation between X and Y, provided that both W and Z are measured without error.

If Z is measured with error, however, the investigator is actually controlling not Z but for Z'. It can easily be shown that in the case of random measurement error, a control for Z' will *reduce but not eliminate* the association between X and Y in both models of Figure 1.[8] Furthermore, the degree of reduction in this association depends upon the actual amount of measurement error involved. These results are of course consistent with common sense, but we should note that a number of alternative explanations now become rival hypotheses to the models of Figure 1. One possibility is that Z has, in fact, been accurately measured but that there is also a direct causal link between X and Y. Another is that the relationship between X and Y is spurious but that an additional variable W would also need to be controlled.[9] These alternatives are given in Figure 2, where we have assumed perfect measurement in all variables.

2. *Correlated independent variables.*— Situations frequently arise in which the investigator wishes to compare the supposed effects of two independent variables which are themselves highly correlated. Such comparisons are made difficult by the phenomenon of multicollinearity, or the fact that sampling errors of partial correlations become unusually large.[10] But even where the sample size is sufficiently large to assure accurate estimates, random measurement errors can also lead to faulty inferences. Suppose we wished to choose among the three alternative models represented in Figure 3. The curved double-headed arrows connecting X and Z in each instance merely indicate that there is no concern with explaining the correlation between X and Z, although it is assumed that these variables are highly related.

(b)
Z
X
Z'
Y

Fig. 1

First suppose that both X and Z have been perfectly measured. Assuming that the sample size is sufficiently large to ignore sampling error, one could choose among alternatives (a), (b), and (c) by obtaining the partial correlations $r_{xy.z}$ and $r_{zy.x}$. If the former disappeared, but not the latter, we would infer that X is not a direct cause of Y but that Z is a direct cause. Likewise, we would select alternative (c) if $r_{zy.x}$ but not $r_{xy.z}$ disappeared. If neither disappeared, or approached zero, we would prefer the second model.

Now suppose that alternative (a) is actually correct but that Z has been measured inaccurately. The appropriate causal model would then be as indicated in Figure 4, where the measured value Z' is again assumed to be composed of the actual Z

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] A third alternative is that Z is part of a developmental sequence in which Z causes X which in turn causes Y. This possibility is discussed below.

[10] Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-7.

score plus a random element. It can be shown that if the magnitude of the correlation between Z and Z' is less than that between X and Z, then $r_{xy.z'}$ will be numerically larger than $r_{z'y.x}$.[11] Since the investigator will ordinarily not be in a position to estimate the magnitude of $r_{zz'}$, and in fact may ignore the measurement error altogether, he may be led to infer that either of the alternatives (*b*) or (*c*) is preferable to (*a*). In other words, he may infer a direct linkage between X and Y when one does not exist.

For example, the correlations among the variables may be as indicated in Table 1. These data are consistent with the model of Figure 4 since, except for sampling errors, we should have[12]

$$r_{xz'} = r_{xz} r_{zz'} \quad \text{or} \quad .40 = (.80)(.50) \qquad (1)$$

$$r_{xy} = r_{xz} r_{yz} \quad \text{or} \quad .48 = (.80)(.60) \qquad (2)$$

and

$$r_{yz'} = r_{yz} r_{zz'} \quad \text{or} \quad .30 = (.60)(.50) \qquad (3)$$

Since Z will of course not be measured, the only correlations that would be obtained empirically are those which fall to

TABLE 1

	Z	*X*	*Y*	*Z'*
Z . . .	....	.80	.60	.50
X . . .	.80	. . . . .	.48	.40
Y	.60	.48	....	.30
Z'	.50	.40	.30	....

the right of and below the vertical and horizontal dashed lines, respectively. In this particular illustrative example, it is obvious by inspection of this submatrix that the variables X, Y, and Z' are re-

[11] This can be shown by using the predicted relationships $r_{xy.z} = r_{xz'.z} = r_{yz'.z} = 0$ and inserting them in the equations for $r_{xy.z'}$ and $r_{yz'.x}$.

[12] This follows from the fact that the model of Figure 4 predicts that $r_{xz'.z}$, $r_{xy.z}$, and $r_{z'y.z}$ should vanish except for sampling errors.

FIG. 2

FIG. 3

lated by a common factor Z and that $r_{xy.z'}$ is numerically greater than $r_{z'y.x}$. In fact the values of these two partials are .41 and .13, respectively. Thus the correlation between X and Y would only be reduced from .48 to .41 with a control for Z', whereas that between Z' and Y would be reduced from .30 to .13. One might then

Fig. 4

infer that alternative (c) rather than (a) is actually correct.

Here the correlation between Z and its measured value Z' was rather low (.50) as compared with an r_{xz} of .80. Had $r_{zz'}$ also been .80, we can see by symmetry that the two partials would have been identical, and there would have been no reason to prefer (c) over (a). Perhaps alternative (b) would have been taken as most plausible. In any given empirical instance, one may always make use of different sets of presumed correlations with Z, or other variables assumed to be measured imperfectly. If reasonable upper limits on the magnitudes of measurement errors can be estimated, then these values may be used to appraise the compatibility of the obtained data with any given model.

The above example is obviously extreme in several respects. A correlation of .8 between X and Z may be unusually high, although with measurement errors in either or both of the variables there may be no way of accurately estimating this "true" correlation. Likewise, we are apt to have measurement errors in X as well as Z, and these may be of a comparable magnitude. Unfortunately, however, the investigator will seldom be in a position to estimate the actual magnitude of such errors. There will be too many unknowns for a definitive result. Since a high correlation between independent variables will also lead to considerable sampling error superimposed on measurement error, it may prove almost impossible in most instances to disentangle their separate effects on a given dependent variable.

3. *Developmental sequences.*—As Hyman has pointed out, it may be very difficult in practice to distinguish between a developmental sequence, in which a background factor W causes X which in turn causes Y, and a situation in which W is producing a spurious relationship between X and Y.[13] In their simplest forms, these two situations can be represented as in Figure 5. Notice that in both instances W is assumed to cause X, but the real question is whether or not X is a direct cause of Y. If there were no measurement error in any of the variables, and if outside variables did not disturb the picture, then it would be possible to choose between these two alternatives by noting what happens to $r_{xy.w}$. In the case of the developmental sequence a control for W should

Fig. 5

[13] Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 254-63

reduce the partial correlation between X and Y, although not to zero. But $r_{xy.w}$ should vanish almost completely if the relationship between X and Y is spurious because of W. We have already seen, however, that random measurement error in W will mean that the partial will not approach zero in model 5 (b), nor would it vanish if another uncontrolled variable Z were also producing a spurious relationship. In short, if the value of $r_{xy.w}$ is less in magnitude than r_{xy}, but is not reduced to zero, then it will be difficult to distinguish a developmental sequence from other alternatives.

FIG. 6

If we examine the behavior of the partial slope $b_{yx.w}$, however, we note that under alternative (a) of Figure 5, the expected value of $b_{yx.w}$ should be exactly the same as the expected value of b_{yx}.[14] In other words, we do not expect the estimate of the slope to be affected by a control for W under alternative (a), and this will hold true even with random measurement errors in W. This is consistent with one's research aims and with causal expectations. A control for the antecedent variable W should reduce the variation in X, thereby reducing the value of r^2_{xy}, or the proportion of the total variation in Y explained by X. But the causal law connecting X and Y remains the same. In the case of spuriousness, however, the magnitude of the slope should be reduced when W is controlled. Thus by noting whether or not the value of the slope b_{yx} changes with a control for W, we may distinguish between alternatives (a) and (b) even with random measurement error in W.

Now, suppose there is also random measurement error in X, the "independent" variable under investigation. Alternative (a) can now be represented as in Figure 6. Such random measurement error in the independent variable X will produce attenuation in the estimates of the slope b_{yx} as well as in the correlation r_{xy}. In other words the slope $b_{yx'}$ based on the measured value X' will generally be smaller in magnitude than the true slope. Furthermore, the degree of downward bias will increase with the amount of measurement error, relative to the total variation in X. When we now control for W, the expected value of the slope estimate will no longer remain constant. The control for W reduces the variation in X, relative to measurement error, and this will generally (except for sampling error) decrease $b_{yx'}$.[15] In other words, a control for W will reduce *both* the correlation and regression coefficients, and the developmental sequence can no longer be easily distinguished from other situations.

Generally speaking, the reduction in the magnitude of $r_{x'y}$ and $b_{yx'}$ will not be very pronounced in the case of a developmental sequence, as compared with situations in which X and Y are spuriously related.[16] But the relative magnitudes of the reductions of course depend on a number of parameters, many of which will have unknown values. For example, X and Y may

[14] This result can readily be seen by substituting the predicted relationship $r_{wy} = r_{wx}r_{xy}$ into the equation for $b_{yx.w}$.

[15] Using the predicted relationships $r_{wy.x} = r_{wx'.x} = r_{x'y.x} = 0$, it can be shown that except for sampling error $b_{yx'.w} = b_{yx'}[(1 - r^2_{wx})/(1 - r^2_{wx} r^2_{xx'})]$. Hence the magnitude of $b_{yx'.w}$ will be less than that of $b_{yx'}$ except when $r^2_{xx'} = 1$, i.e., when there is no random measurement error in X.

[16] For data showing the sizes of these reductions see H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Controlling for Background Factors: Spuriousness versus Developmental Sequences," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXIV (Winter, 1964), 28–40.

be spuriously related because of W, but measurement of W may be extremely poor.

4. *Factor analysis.*—Since factor analysis is basically a special type of causal analysis involving inferences about unknown factors, it is not immune to difficulties introduced by measurement error. Multiple-factor analysis usually leads to difficult problems of interpretation for reasons similar to those presently under consideration. The use of postulated unmeasured factors means that a large number of plausible alternative models can satisfy the data equally well. When we add to the unknown factors the possibility of unknown measurement errors, these difficulties become even more pronounced. We shall illustrate only in the case of a single-factor model, although the kinds of issues involved can readily be generalized.

FIG. 7

In the single-factor model, a factor F is postulated in order to account for the intercorrelations among a number of measured variables X_i. The causal model can be diagrammed as in Figure 7. Notice, first, that even with perfect measurement of the X_i, there are other models which could also account for these same relationships. For example, X_1 may cause F, which in turn causes the remaining X_i, as in Figure 8. Therefore, any one of the measured variables may be an indirect cause of the remainder through F as an intervening variable. This should immediately put one on guard against assuming that F is a common cause of the X_i merely because the results of a factor analysis give a single-factor solution involving a factor that can be readily identified.

Now suppose there is random measurement error in some of the X_i. This will of course attenuate the correlation of F with those X_i which have been poorly measured. But it will not affect the inference that a single factor is needed to account for the intercorrelations. For example, if X_1 and X_2 have been measured with random measurement error, then r_{12} may be small numerically. But $r_{12 \cdot F}$ should be approximately zero. Thus a control for the factor should still produce a correlation matrix of residuals which are approximately zero.

The question arises, however, as to how

FIG. 8

the factor will be named or identified. Let us imagine two research situations. In the first, X_1 and X_2 have been very poorly measured, whereas in the second the major measurement errors are in X_3 and X_4. In the first instance, then, the factor loadings are apt to be highest on X_3 and X_4, whereas the reverse will hold in the second situation. Even though two investigators may obtain similar unknown F's there is likely to be the psychological tendency to give a name to this common F which reflects the highest numerical loadings. For example, the investigator in the first situation may very well decide to ignore X_1 and X_2 in deciding what to call "his" factor.

Furthermore, we again encounter a situation in which alternative models may equally well account for the results at hand. For example, instead of F being a cause of all the X_i, suppose that X_1 caused all of the remaining variables, with F dropping out of the picture. But X_1 might be measured with random measurement

error. We would then be dealing with the model of Figure 9. If it were possible to measure X_1 exactly, factor analysis would produce a factor with extremely high loadings on X_1. Furthermore, a control for X_1 would wipe out all of the associations among the remaining X_i. But with random measurement error in X_1 this would not be the case. We would have a causal model empirically indistinguishable from that of Figure 7, where F is the cause of all of the X_i including X_1.

Again, difficulties would arise in giving a name to the supposed "factor" in Figure 9. If X_1 were amount of education it is not

FIG. 9

too likely that the investigator would give his "unknown" factor that name, unless measurement errors in X_1 were minimal. Because of the fact that any of the X_i could be in the position of X_1 in Figure 9, one could not rule out the possibility that a given X_i is the common cause of the other variables but that it has been imperfectly measured. Since in one sense this would represent a simpler explanation of the pattern of intercorrelations than would a theory which required one to postulate the existence of an unknown factor, some investigators might actually prefer it. Unfortunately, however, there would be no easy way to decide which of the X_i should be singled out as the cause of all the others.

The same types of arguments of course apply to latent structure analysis and nonmetric factor analysis since essentially the same underlying rationale is involved.[17] In latent structure analysis, for example, one assumes that intercorrelations within latent classes are all zero. Conceivably, however, one might postulate that one of the measured variables (e.g., responses) is a cause of the remainder, rather than assuming the existence of underlying latent classes. To the writer's knowledge most uses of latent structure analysis have involved data where the presumed causal model is quite reasonable, as in cases where the underlying factor is a postulated attitudinal variable and the measured variables are responses. Were latent structure techniques uncritically applied to census data or societal attributes in cross-cultural studies, then models of the form discussed in this section would become rather obvious and plausible alternatives.

5. *Inferring interaction.*—We have noted that random measurement error in X produces attenuation in the slope b_{yx} in the sense that least-squares estimates will tend to underestimate the magnitude of the population regression coefficient. Furthermore, the degree of attenuation increases with the magnitude of the random measurement errors in X relative to the actual variation in X. Now suppose an investigator finds that two subsamples differ significantly with respect to values of b_{yx}. He might then wish to infer an interaction or non-additive effect on the dependent variable Y.

But one of two alternative possibilities is quite plausible. Perhaps there is more random measurement error in X in one of the subsamples than in the other. For example, responses of Negroes may have been less accurate than those of whites. Or, even supposing the same measurement accuracy in the two subsamples, there may be less variation in X in one of the sub-

[17] For discussions of these techniques see P. F. Lazarsfeld, "The Logical and Mathematical Foundation of Latent Structure Analysis," in S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 362–412; and C. H. Coombs and R. C. Kao, *Nonmetric Factor Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955).

samples. Given the measurement error, this would of course have the effect of producing greater attenuation in the subsample having the smaller variation in X. In both of these two situations, there may actually be no interaction effect, but it will be difficult to distinguish these cases from instances where a non-additive model is most appropriate.

Since measurement in the social sciences is generally quite crude, particularly where categorized data are used, one must be on guard against "overinterpreting" his data. In the present context, this refers to a possible tendency to carry the process of specification too far. For example, one may attempt to specify conditions under which a given relationship between X and Y becomes stronger or weaker. In developing a complex theory involving perhaps three or four variables, it is entirely possible to neglect the very simple alternative explanation that differences in relationships found are primarily due to differences in measurement error, combined with differences in variation in X.

IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The above examples should be sufficient to illustrate the main point of this paper, namely that whenever there has been random measurement error in one or more of the variables in a causal system, additional unknowns will be introduced. This in effect means that there will be a larger number of alternative models which cannot be ruled out on the basis of the empirical data. The problem is especially serious in the case of *multivariate* analyses.

While our discussion has been confined to correlation and regression coefficients, exactly the same principles are operative in the case of ordinal and contingency techniques. In fact, it may turn out that distortions produced by measurement errors are even greater in instances where interval scales cannot be assumed. We have shown elsewhere, using artificially constructed data, that the dichotomization of the control variable Z in either of the models $X \leftarrow Z \rightarrow Y$ or $X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y$ introduces sufficient measurement error to make it entirely likely that these specific models will be confused with other alternatives.[18] We have also shown that for ordnial and nominal scales, particularly dichotomies, slope analogues do not behave sufficiently differently from correlation analogues.[19] These preliminary results are by no means definitive, however. Undoubtedly many social scientists prefer the use of ordinal techniques and categorized data in order to avoid regression effects and other possible distortions resulting from the use of interval scales in the presence of obvious measurement errors. Considerable research is needed to evaluate the relative magnitudes of the various kinds of distortions produced by alternative analysis techniques.

Since measurement errors will obviously be present in practically all social research, a major implication is that the investigator should attempt to make explicit those alternative theories or explanations which would also account for the data in question, if measurement error were brought into the picture. The existence of high-speed computers and complex factor-analysis and multiple-regression programs may make it tempting to apply such procedures more or less blindly, without examining carefully the alternatives to a given kind of explanation.

What general lines of attack seem feasible and what, if any, practical rules of thumb can be given the researcher other than the simple dictum, "Avoid measurement errors and be careful!"? No complete survey of the entire literature of the various social sciences and statistics has been attempted. Instead, we shall merely summarize briefly several of the different kinds of approaches that have been used.

1. *Methods requiring assumptions about*

[18] Blalock, *Causal Inferences*, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-55. Four categories for the control variable worked much better than did the use of dichotomies.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 119-24.

error variances.—Measurement error has perhaps been most systematically studied, and the mathematical theory most rigorously developed, in instances where one is in a position to make a series of highly restrictive assumptions about error variances and covariances.[20] Such a priori assumptions are usually completely unrealistic in most sociological applications, however.

2. *Correcting for attenuation.*—Where the relative magnitudes of measurement errors can be estimated through repeated measurement with as few as two measures on each individual, then corrections for attenuation can be applied by well-known procedures. However, such corrections also require the assumption of randomly distributed error terms, which may be violated in the case of techniques such as split-half or test-and-retest. For example, measures of X and Y obtained on the same day by the same interviewer may very well contain common sources of error. If so, one may obtain spuriously high "corrected" measures which, on occasion, yield correlations of greater than unity.[21] In many types of sociological research, even two measures on the same individual may be difficult to obtain.

3. *Grouping techniques.*—Wald and Bartlett have suggested some very simple grouping techniques which, to the writer's knowledge, have not been extensively used in the sociological literature.[22] These techniques also require the assumption of random measurement errors, and there are questions as to the mathematical properties of the estimates so obtained, particularly in the case of small samples. The procedures are so simple, however, that their relevance for sociological research needs to be explored.

4. *Specification of systematic errors.*—Although systematic errors may occur in connection with the measurement of any given variable, it may prove fruitful to attempt to list more general instances in which certain types of errors are especially likely. For example, the possibility of regression effects has been noted by several authors.[23] These effects involve the tendency for measurement errors of extreme scores to be biased in the direction of central tendency.

There are apparently no simple solutions to the problem of measurement error, nor can we give any really adequate rules of thumb or guidelines for those who wish to avoid faulty inferences due to measurement errors. Quite obviously, one should attempt to make use of one or more of the above-mentioned devices where feasible. If reasonable estimates of relative amounts of error can be given, then these should be included in one's appraisal of any particular model relative to competing alternatives, as illustrated above in connection with correlated independent variables.

One important implication should be explicitly noted. Since the seriousness of distortions produced by measurement errors is always relative to the amount of real variation in the factors under study,

[20] See M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, *The Advanced Theory of Statistics* (London: Griffin, 1961), Vol. II, chap. xxix; J. Johnston, *op. cit.*, chap. vi; and L. R. Klein, *A Textbook of Econometrics* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1953), chap. vii.

[21] McNemar, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-61.

[22] See A. Wald, "The Fitting of Straight Lines if Both Variables Are Subject to Error," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, XI (1940), 284–300; M. S. Bartlett, "The Fitting of Straight Lines if Both Variables Are Subject to Error," *Biometrics*, V (1949), 207-42; and Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-65. For a different kind of grouping technique see Blalock, *Causal Inferences*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–62.

[23] See D. J. Bogue and E. M. Murphy, "The Effect of Classification Errors upon Statistical Inference: A Case Analysis with Census Data," *Demography*, I (1964), 42–55; D. T. Campbell and K. N. Clayton, "Avoiding Regression Effects in Panel Studies of Communication Impact," *Studies in Public Communication*, No. 3 (Chicago: Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1961), pp. 53–62; and E. E. Maccoby, "Pitfalls in the Analysis of Panel Data: A Research Note on Some Technical Aspects of Voting," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (January, 1956), 359–62.

it will generally be advantageous to design research so that there will be as much variation as possible in the independent variable(s).

Change studies seem especially vulnerable to measurement errors because of the relatively small variation that can be induced in experimental studies or that usually occurs from one time period to the next. Such change studies often have the advantage of involving minimal disturbances from outside influences, and a maximal control over personality factors and the like. But unless it is possible to produce rather substantial changes in the independent variable(s) within a time span that is usually quite brief, either random or non-random measurement errors may be hopelessly confounded with the effects of the variables under study. Unfortunately, it may turn out to be the case that definitive studies of social change may have to await improvements in the measurement process. This is an additional reason why the question of how to handle measurement error deserves our immediate attention.

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Temporal Aspects of Dying as a Non-scheduled Status Passage[1]

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we conceptualize dying as a non-scheduled status passage, which has led us to consider problems of how the people involved handle its timing. The analysis focuses on temporal aspects of the central issues of (1) legitimating *when* the passage occurs, (2) announcing the passage to others, and (3) co-ordinating the passage.

Our purpose in this paper is to conceptualize dying as a non-scheduled status passage. That is, we see a dying person as passing between the statuses of living and dead according to no man-made or imposed schedule. When study turns to the non-scheduled status passage, timing becomes a crucial problem and raises problems not considered in studies of scheduled passage, which tend to focus on how an occupant gets through the passage and what benefits and deficits he gets out of it.[2] For the non-scheduled status passage, the important questions are how the occupant in passage, as well as those people around him, even know in the first place *when* he will be, and is, in movement between statuses. Further, how do these people define the succession of transitional statuses (which occur between the two principal statuses of living and dead) so as to establish where the person is when in passage, when the next transition might occur, where the next transition will take him, and how the occupant is to act and be treated by others at various points in the passage? Also, what happens when the occupant in passage and those around him have *different perceptions* pertaining to when the passage started and where he is going—and what kinds of interaction are consequent upon these differential perceptions? When differential perceptions of timing exist, then legitimation, announcement, and co-ordination of the passage become problematic, and interaction strategies to handle these issues become crucial.[3] In contrast, how the person in a scheduled status should act and be treated, hence how his passage is legitimated, announced, and co-ordinated, is usually a matter of routine, even ceremonial, consensus.

METHOD

The material for this paper is drawn from a study of how hospital personnel handle terminal patients. The data were collected over a two-year period through

[1] This paper derives from an investigation of terminal care in hospitals, supported by N. I. H. Grant NU 00047. We wish to thank Fred Davis, Howard S. Becker, Jeanne Quint, and Norman Storer for helpful comments and criticisms on an early draft.

[2] For studies of scheduled status passages see Robert K. Merton, George Reader and Patricia Kendall (eds.), *The Student Physician* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Howard S. Becker, Blanche Geer, Everett C. Hughes and Anselm Strauss, *Boys in White* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961); Aaron V. Cirourel and John I. Kitsuse, *The Educational Decision Makers* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); and Barney G. Glaser, *Organizational Scientists: Their Professional Careers* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964).

[3] For a theoretical discussion of some of these questions on status passage see Anselm Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 124–31.

field observations and interviews at a teaching hospital of a medical center, a veteran's hospital, a state hospital, a county hospital, a denominational hospital and a private hospital, all in the San Francisco Bay area. Co-operation was excellent, so that the field-workers were unimpeded and able to range widely. Participant observation is an especially reliable method of data collection when one is interested in sequential interactions within natural situations.[4] It is also the most "adequate" and "efficient" method of obtaining information on many "properties of the same object."[5] In this paper we utilize our data to illustrate theoretical points.

LEGITIMATING THE PASSAGE

A central problem in viewing dying as a non-scheduled status passage is that of who can legitimately determine *when* the passage occurs. This determination typically cannot be left to just any relevant party, but is *the obligation* and *responsibility* of an institutionally designated legitimator: the doctor. He is someone with sufficient expertise, knowledge, and experience to be most able to judge accurately when the patient (the status occupant) is in passage, through what transitional statuses he is passing and will pass, how long a period he will be in each transitional status, and what his rate of movement will be between the transitional statuses. Three interrelated problems of importance for which the doctor is held responsible are (1) defining temporal dimensions of the status passage, (2) timing announcements about the status passage to the patient and to other involved parties, and (3) co-ordinating the passage itself. In this first section we shall discuss the defining of the status passage; in the next the timing of announcements on the passage; and in the following section co-ordinating the passage.

Dying is divided by medical personnel into four death expectations, which we conceive of as the transitional statuses of dying that define the patient's status passage from living to dead: (1) uncertain about death and unknown time when the question will be resolved, (2) uncertain about death and known time when the question will be resolved, (3) certain about death and unknown time when it will occur, and (4) certain about death and known time when it will occur.[6] In defining which dying or transitional status the patient is in and which he is passing to, it is often far easier for the doctor to say whether or not death is *certain* than at what *time* either uncertainty will be resolved or death will occur.

It is easier to establish certainty than time because of the two principal kinds of cues upon which the doctor bases his judgment: physical attributes of the patient and time references made about him. Physical cues, which vary in their severity from those that spell hope to those that indicate immediate death, for the most part establish the certainty aspect of death expectations. As for temporal cues, they have many reference points. A major one is the typical progression of the disease against which the patient's actual movement is measured

[4] Howard S. Becker and Blanche Geer, "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison," *Human Organization*, XVI (No. 3), 31-32.

[5] Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1962, pp. 567-69, 575.

[6] It is important to note the theoretical step forward that we have taken from the two articles by Fred Davis, each of which brought out the notion of differential perceptions: "Uncertainty in Medical Prognosis," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1960, pp. 41-47; and "Definitions of Time and Recovery in Paralytic Polio Convalescence," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1956, pp. 582-87. In the medical prognosis article, Davis discussed the differential perceptions of certainty of prognosis held by doctor, patient, and family. In "Definitions of Time . . . ," the differential perceptions of time of recovery held by these people were discussed. In our study, each participant defines the dying patient situation in terms of both certainty *and* time.

(he is "going fast" or is "lingering"). Another temporal reference is the doctor's expectation about how long the patient will remain in the hospital compared to how long he does remain. For instance, one patient's hospitalization was "lasting longer than the short while" that had been anticipated by the physician. Work schedules also provide a temporal reference: doctors adjust their judgment on whether or not the patient can continue being bathed, turned, fed, and given sedation regularly.

In combination, physical and temporal cues have interesting consequences. Since physical cues are easier to read, without their presence—which helps establish some degree of certainty about death—temporal cues remain rather indeterminate. That indeterminacy is reflected in such phrases as that the patient may die "some time" or "any time." As both types of cues accumulate, they can support each other: for example, a patient's condition becomes more grave as his hospitalization becomes longer. But physical and temporal cues can also cancel each other: thus undue hospitalization can be balanced and even negated by increasingly hopeful physical cues. When cues cancel each other, the more hopeful cue (he is going home sooner than expected) can be used to deny the less hopeful (he looks bad). As physical and temporal cues accumulate in severity and speed, respectively, deniability decreases, while a correspondingly determinate death expectation is gradually established. Then, doctor and staff are less likely to be surprised because of an inaccurate expectation.

While other parties to the status passage (including the patient) are not institutionally designated to define either the patient as dying or his current transitional status, they privately engage in trying to ascertain whether he is in passage and where he is, in order to guide their own behavior. For instance, nurses who have not received information from the doctor will try to read the same cues as he does, but their definitions will usually be imbued with *doubt*, especially when they try to ascertain the temporal dimension of the transitional status that the occupant is in or passing to and the period of time he will be in each status. If the doctor does tell them the patient is in passage and his definition of transitional status disagrees with their own, then they will usually accept his, since he is the responsible expert. However, in some cases of disagreement, experienced nurses will not change their view, since they feel familiar with the timing of this passage. While family and patient may never really believe that the latter is dying unless the doctor discloses the news, after a while they can hardly avoid the temporal cues—such as undue hospitalization—even though they are not expert at recognizing physical cues. Thus they may start suspecting the occurrence of dying however undefined such a status passage may be to them.

When establishing the various temporal aspects of the dying status passage, the doctor, as legitimator, may also set forth the probable sequence of transitional statuses that the patient is expected to follow. While the transitional status-sequence in dying is not institutionally prescribed, many typical ones are known that help the doctor to anticipate a schedule of periods in transitional statuses and rates of movement between them. For instance, there is the "lingering" pattern in which the patient stays in the "certain to die but unknown when" status. Even in this case there are temporal limits to holding on to that status: though the patient is expected to remain for some time, after a while the nurses, doctors, and family may feel that he is taking more time than is proper in dying. Other sequences are the "short-term reprieve," in which the patient seems "certain to die at a known time" but suddenly begins to linger for a while and then dies; the "vacillating" sequence, in which the patient

alternates over and over from "certain to die on time" to lingering; and the "heroic" sequence, in which a patient in the "uncertain, unknown time of resolution" status passes to the "uncertain, known time of resolution" status, while the medical staff heroically tries to save him. This patient may then pass either directly to death or through both certainty statuses first.

ANNOUNCING THE PASSAGE

Since the behavior of others toward a status occupant is temporally oriented[7]—that is, how long he has been in the status, when he will move on to another, what his rate and period of transition will be, and what his next status will be—it is crucially significant that announcement of dying, since it is an unscheduled status passage, be the obligation of the doctor. Only he is institutionally designated both to legitimate and to announce that the patient is dying. For in the end the doctor is the person held socially and perhaps legally responsible for the diverse outcomes resulting from changes in the behavior of the patient, of other parties to the patient's passage, and of the hospital organization occasioned by his legitimating and announcing temporal aspects of the dying. These outcomes can range from being most *beneficial*, as when the doctor announces to the staff that a patient is about to die in order quickly to co-ordinate heroic measures to save him, to being most *adverse*, as when a family, unaware that their relative is dying, is thereby given no time to prepare for his death and may be deeply shocked by the surprise of it, which, in some cases, can cause a family member to have a heart attack. The proper timing of announcements can forestall such surprises.

In view of his responsibility for the effects on all parties of changes in behavior of all parties, the doctor has many decisions to make about to whom, how much and when to announce. In some cases, he is guided, or forced, by hospital rules to make various kinds of announcements (principally to the family who "must be told something") at certain points in the status passage. In some hospitals, the doctor is required at least to legitimate for the medical staff a degree of the certainty dimension of the dying or transitional status by putting the patient on a critically, dangerously, or seriously ill list or by including the information on an admitting card. He will often be reminded of this rule "before it is too late." The patient's being posted on such a critical list usually requires an announcement of dying by the doctor to the family. If they are not on hand, a family member is sent a wire stating that "Your (kin) has been put on the critically ill list, please come at once." The doctor then has a talk with the family. After this announcement, the family is allowed to visit around the clock with the patient. Thus the family's awareness of dying changes its temporal approach to contact with the patient, because the hospital allows relaxation of the temporal aspect of visiting rules. This announcement also allows the family time to prepare for the demise of its relative and time to get estates and wills and other social and personal responsibilities properly in order.

When the patient passes from a dying status to death, only the doctor can pronounce death (a professional as well as hospital rule), and only he is supposed to announce death to the family. These two announcements must be made as soon as possible after death, both to forestall other parties from leaking the news, possibly irresponsibly, and to keep nurses and families fully abreast of developments as they happen so these people can adjust their behavior accordingly.

Since the doctor's responsibility is very great, he is allowed much discretion—unguided by formal rules—on when, what, and how to announce dying to others.

[7] Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks*, *op. cit.*

Short of the critically ill list, which doctors may try to avoid, doctors vary considerably as to whether or not they give nurses information; however, these variations are patterned under certain temporal conditions of the status passage. The temporal and physical cues on the patient's condition may be so obvious that the doctors feel that there is no necessity for informing the nurses about the patient's current and expected status. For instance, the patient is obviously near death, or obviously nothing more can be done for the patient, and now it is just a matter of waiting. Also, the doctor may be quite oblique in telling nurses about dying in the initial uncertainty statuses; but as the patient passes through the certainty statuses, the doctor becomes more direct and explicit about certainty as well as expected time of death. Thus he varies the clarity of his announcements in line with the patient's passage from one transitional status to another.

Some doctors may try to avoid announcing to others altogether; but this is difficult, as we have seen, because these others are defining the dying on their own and basing their behavior on their own definitions. Thus the doctor is forced at points to make sure that the others' definitions are correct, so that their behavior will not result in adverse outcomes for the patient, themselves, or other parties. For example, a strategic passage in dying is from the transitional status of "uncertainty and time of its resolution known" to either of the two certainty statuses. Accompanying this passage is an important change in the goals of nursing care: that from working hard to recover the patient to routinely providing him comfort until death. If nurses perceive the passage inaccurately they can cease trying to save a patient, although he still may have a chance to survive. Therefore, the doctor will make sure the nurses realize that the patient is still in the uncertainty status until he himself is sure all hope is lost. He will often give them a time limit on when they may expect the outcome. If the doctor sees a nurse not wishing to accept the passage from uncertainty to certainty, he may delay telling her it is occurring or has occurred in order to keep her alert to possible reversals. However, if this delay interferes with her providing adequate comfort to the patient, say giving enough pain killers, he will have to tell her that the passage has occurred. Sometimes when a doctor will not stop his attempts to save a patient who is obviously lost, a nurse will have to tell him that the passage has actually occurred. She will tell him that more blood will do no good or that continuing the heart massage is useless. Conversely, often the doctor's actions are enough to announce this crucial passage to nurses: for example, he stops using equipment or giving blood transfusions. If a nurse does not understand and blurts out, "Do something, doctor," she will have to be told, "It's all over" or "There is nothing more to do."

Various temporal organizational conditions can literally wipe out a doctor's announcements if the hospital has no formal provisions for diffusion of information on dying. Thus doctors' announcements often are informal and directed at a few nurses in attendance. If these nurses do not informally pass on the information among themselves, it can be lost in the change of work shift or in the rotation of nurses between wings, wards, or patient assignments; and relevant parties will not be aware that the patient is dying. Dying is not the easiest news to pass on, especially if the doctor is vague or unsure in announcing it. Another organizational condition that may preclude a nurse from being "in" on the informal distribution of information about dying is the temporary assignment of students to a patient. Thus a student may have no idea her patient is dying and may be quite shaken to hear afterward that the patient has died.

Whether or not to announce dying to the patient can be quite problematic since the status passage may be inevitable as well as undesirable. While supposedly the doctor is allowed the maximum of discretion for each patient, it would appear that the professional rule is not to disclose dying to the patient, since surveys show that few American doctors do. Thus the dying patient typically knows neither his true transitional or dying status nor his rate of movement between statuses, and is thereby denied the time necessary to prepare himself for death and to settle his financial and social affairs. He therefore may either complete his status passage unaware that he ever was in passage between life and death or be very shocked almost at the end to discover he is and has been in passage for some time.

The doctor may have several temporal problems in deciding whether or not to disclose a patient's dying to him. Three problems are (1) spending enough time with the patient to judge how he will take the news; (2) timing a disclosure in order not to risk losing the patient's trust in his expertise and responsibility; and (3) deciding how much to tell the patient about the direction, periods of transition, and rates of movement of his passage.

Doctors often do not have enough time to spend with dying patients to make an adequate judgment as to whether or not, say, the patient will become despondent, commit suicide, or actively prepare for death. Under this condition, they prefer not to tell the patient. However, if the doctor realizes the patient is becoming aware that he is dying, the doctor may feel forced to disclose to the patient, and he must time the disclosure just right in order not to risk losing the patient's trust in his care. In disclosing, the doctor will typically leave out the temporal dimension of the dying status, as a way of softening the blow for the patient and perhaps giving him interim hope. The doctor will also avoid details of the illness that may give the patient temporal knowledge about his dying. He also may follow his disclosure with a temporal rationale, such as "You've had a full life," or "Who knows, maybe next week, next month, or next year there will be a drug that can save you." Leaving out the temporal dimension of the dying status also reduces chances of error, since, as we have seen, it is easier to judge certainty than time.

When the doctor decides not to inform the patient that he is dying, several temporal problems of announcement are created for other parties who must deal with the patient. One problem is how to ascertain whether or not the patient actually needs to be told, since he might really have discovered his passage on his own. If the doctor has decided the patient should not be informed, the nurses are not allowed to ask the patient if he is aware he is dying. Therefore, they may engage in endless debates, stimulated by changes in the patient's behavior, as to whether or not he "really knows." These debates may never be resolved and can even last long after the patient has died.

Two other temporal problems created for parties to the dying passage are those of handling unwitting and witting announcements to the patient. They must avoid providing temporal cues to the unaware patient that will clearly indicate he is dying. Because of the nature of his dying, this may be impossible. For instance, when the patient passes from "certain to die—time unknown" to "certain to die—time known," it may be important to move him to a dying room or to an intensive care unit. Implicit in these moves is a timing that indicates quite clearly to the patient that he soon will die. To counteract this realization, some nurses will mention that these spatial moves are done to provide the patient better care, as a way of trying to deny their temporal meaning to him. Another clear temporal cue to the

patient is the appearance on the scene of a chaplain or priest, whom the nurses are supposed to call when the patient is still sentient and on the verge of death. It is difficult to forestall the patient's reading of this cue.

One way nurses avoid unwitting disclosures to a patient is to take a temporally neutral stand in the face of his questions about his condition: they say things like "We all die sometime," or "I could leave here and be killed walking across the street." Another strategy is to maintain, in all talk and work with the patient, a constant time orientation that is linked with his certain recovery. Thus he sees himself being constantly placed in the recovery status.

Sometimes nurses will wittingly break the institutional rule that only the doctor may disclose dying to the patient. In some hospitals, enforcement of this rule is based on legal action as well as less formal sanctions against the person who would disclose against the wishes of the doctor. A navy corpsman told us that disclosure woud be grounds for a court-martial, and a nurse who discloses can lose her job in a hospital or her place in a referral system.

Several temporal conditions, however, may stimulate disclosure by nurses to unaware patients against the doctor's orders. One condition is that the family is with the patient while he is dying, and it is clear to the nurse that if the patient knew what was happening he could then take adequate farewell of his wife and children in such a manner as to benefit all—such as awarding social responsibilities to a son for care of the mother. It is also clear to the nurse that there is no time to convince a doctor of this pressing need for action, and that she must disclose either now or never. An inaccessible doctor may also force the nurse to disclose in order to accomplish an immediate medical treatment. She, like the doctor, may also be forced to tell a patient in order not to lose his trust if he is starting to realize his condition; otherwise, after he is certain enough of dying, not to have acknowledged it to him (or to disclose later) makes the nurse sound "phony." The patient will feel he is being "strung along" and "getting the run-around."

In spite of the doctor's announcement of dying to relevant parties, he cannot actually guarantee the occurrence of a transitional status or death since it is unscheduled. If the passage does not go through as announced, difficulties can be caused between the doctor and family and hospital personnel who might have a stake in the passage being finished and who are making plans accordingly. These parties may not trust the doctor's expertise in future cases. For instance, in an unexpected short-term reprieve sequence, a doctor announced that a patient would die within four days. This patient had no money but needed a special machine during his last days. A hospital at which he had been a frequent paying patient for thirty years agreed to receive him as a charity patient. He did not die immediately but started to linger indefinitely, even to the point where there was some hope that he might live! His lingering created a money problem that caused much concern among both his family and the hospital administration. Paradoxically, the doctor had continually to reassure both parties that this patient—who lasted one and one-half months—would soon die.

CO-ORDINATING THE PASSAGE

Our discussion has indicated that the essential element in shepherding the patient through the dying status passage is co-ordination of the definitions of the passage held by those parties involved, since these parties adjust their behavior according to their definitions. In order to work sufficiently well together, each relevant party must know how the others are defining the passage. It is the doctor's re-

sponsibility to make sure that everyone knows what they need to know at certain points during the status passage so that difficulties do not develop.

Since many people can be involved, diverse sets of patterned differential definitions can be the basis of co-ordination, each with its own mechanisms for shepherding the occupant from one transitional status to another. In this last section we have space to consider only a few temporal aspects of the co-ordination of passage under two patterned conditions: (1) only the doctor and his staff know of the passage; and (2) all parties, including the patient, are fully aware of the passage.[8] These two sets of differential definitions include the two basic alternatives considered by the doctor who is co-ordinating the passage: to tell or not to tell the patient.

Occupant is unaware.—When the patient is unaware that he is dying, the doctor and his staff have considerable control over the passage. However, since the patient cannot purposively help his own passage, his unawareness can present temporal problems to those in control—such as unduly slowing down or speeding up the passage. Some treatments to sustain life do not make sense to a patient who does not know he is dying.[9] He may refuse a medicine, a machine, an awkward position or a diet, thus shortening his life. A temporally oriented tactic to cope with the problem is proffering a momentary transitional status. The patient is delicately rendered a few cues that indicate he might die if he does not agree to the treatment. As soon as he takes the treatment, the proffered dying status is immediately withdrawn, say, by laughing it off. The reverse of this example is also true: an unaware patient may ask for treatment that would needlessly prolong his life into a period of uncontrollable pain or deterioration. Thus he may be denied treatment of this sort. These illustrations show that the patient will be managed by doctor and staff in ways enabling work to go on for the passage, while the patient's awareness remains unchanged despite changes in his transitional status.

Part of working with the unaware patient while shepherding him through his passage consists of talking with him. Therefore, if he is to be kept unaware he is dying, the temporal dimension of this talk must be managed to prevent giving cues. The doctor and his staff will tend to manage their talk with the patient according to the transitional status they define him in and expect him to pass into. One strategy noted above is to use a constant time orientation that refers to one status only. Coexistent with this strategy may be another in which talk is managed on a present-future oriented continuum, so as not to raise a temporal reference for discussion that would lead the patient to suspect and schedule his dying. For example, when a patient is defined as certain to die in a few days, nurses will tend to focus their talk upon the immediate present. They discuss with him current doses of medication for pain relief, ask to fix his pillow, or focus upon matters relevant to his comfort. However, if they do not know when he is going to die, they will extend the temporal range implied in their talk. One nurse thus said, before leaving for a weekend, "See you next week." Another told her patient about his needing another x-ray in two weeks. Similarly, blood tests that will be done next week or the family's visit of next weekend will be discussed. Frequently the nurses cautiously manage such temporal references without clear intent. One young nurse told us how

[8] For a full discussion of these patterns of awareness conditions see Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, "Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (October, 1964), 669–78.

[9] Similarly it is difficult for polio patients who anticipate being cured to take full advantage of rehabilitation programs for the handicapped. Davis "Uncertainty . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 45.

she used to chat with a young patient about his future dates and parties. After discovering his certain and near death, she unwittingly cut out all references to the distant future, because this kind of talk was "inappropriate" for a patient who is to die in a matter of hours or days.

When it is uncertain whether the patient will die but nurses know that a definite answer is soon coming, some will engage in faith-oriented talk about the near future. An example is, "You'll probably be going home soon after your operation." Such statements support the patient's hope about the near future—although they do not actually detail exactly how he is going to live out his life. However, if the nurses are uncertain both about his death and about when the issue will be resolved, then their talk becomes less guarded. They tend to talk of the patient's return to home and work.

Occupant is aware.—Once the patient is told by the doctor that he is dying—and recovers from the shock if the passage is both inevitable and undesirable—he must make the decision either to accept or deny dying. With this disclosure and acceptance or denial, the balance of control over the status passage can shift from the doctor and his staff to the patient.

If the patient *accepts* that he is dying, the doctor and his staff can help to prepare him for the passage on many levels—medical, psychological, social, and financial. And the more active the patient is in his preparation, the more others can help during the remaining time. In this way, the doctor and staff can regain a measure of control potentially lost at the initial disclosure, since they have had experience in helping other patients prepare—some are professional preparers, for example, chaplains and social workers—and the patients accept their aid.

Since the doctor has allowed everyone to know the patient is dying, there may be as much free discussion as people can reasonably take in helping prepare the patient. Family and patient can obtain fairly uncensored information on the latter's condition. The patient can focus his remaining energy on settling his affairs properly before death, instead of trying vainly to get well. One cancer patient whom we observed held off on sedation as much as possible so as to put his financial and social affairs in order with the aid of a social worker. Another told his son about various duties that would befall him as man of the house. One young man tried to get his wife potentially married off to another man who worked in the hospital. Nurses and chaplains do not have to walk on "conversational eggs," but can devote themselves—if they can manage their own feelings—to helping the patient settle his affairs, discuss his past life and coming death, and make a graceful exit from life.

There is a temporal pitfall in this active preparation allowed by the fact that all people are aware. Typically the doctor will give both certainty and time dimensions of the patient's status passage to nurses, chaplains, and social workers, but not to family and patient. Thus patient and his helpers can talk politely past each other temporally; yet problems of preparation may arise. The social worker or chaplain who expects the patient to die in a month might wish to hurry up certain preparations in co-ordination with reviewing the patient's past life, such as, respectively, his making a will or taking up religion. But the patient, left to his own time orientation, may give himself a year or two and be in no rush for either his will or religion.

Acceptance of the passage does not always mean active preparation. The patient can fight dying, no matter how inevitable, and often with the help of others. In this situation, the doctor and his staff lose much control over the passage. For example, the dying patient may reject his doctor and with the support of family go to a quack or marginal doctor who will help him "beat

this thing." One way a doctor can maintain and then regain much temporal control is to permit the patient to go for the "cure" with the idea of keeping a general watch over his physical condition and of preventing premature death. Thus it will only be a matter of time before the "cure" fails and the patient returns to his doctor. If the doctor does not give permission, the patient may be too embarrassed to return after the failure. Indeed, he might take complete temporal control over his passage by scheduling and committing autoeuthanasia (suicide). Other patients will proceed directly to autoeuthanasia as a way of putting temporal order into an interminably unschedulable dying.

If the patient *denies* he is in passage, he sees himself in a living status—recoverable—although the surrounding people see him in a transitional status of dying. Then it is hard, if not impossible, to help the patient in his passage, and much control is lost. The doctor and staff must develop ways to do it unbeknownst to the patient. At the same time, the patient is trying to get the people around him to join in the definition that he will never have to leave his living status. Thus both the patient and the others are trying to obtain shared definitions: the patient to get everyone to deny his passage, the others to get him to accept it.

The dying patient may use several temporal strategies to get others to help deny his impending passage. One we have seen is that the patient thinks up his own time schedule, which can amount to living several years, and then gets nurses and family to engage in this time orientation which becomes, then, circumstantial proof to him that he is really not dying. The patient will also ask the doctor or nurses for explanations of extended hospitalization or slow recuperation in a way that begs for denial that he is dying. Another strategy is a game of temporal polarity—asking an extreme question that may force the doctor or nurse into a denying response. To the question, "Am I getting worse, the medicine is not working?" the staff may have to answer, "Give yourself a chance—medicines take a long time." So, the patient ends up with the idea that he has a long time.

It is also likely that the denying patient's passage will be lonely. Since he has been told he is dying, the staff will expect him to act according to the requirements of this status passage, in contrast to the unaware patient who is expected to go on as before. When he does not, because of his denial, he will frustrate their efforts to relate to him according to how he is supposed to act (he will not let the preparers prepare him). They may give up, leave him alone, and turn to patients they can help. The source of their frustration is the differential defining by the patient, who sees himself as staying in his present recoverable status, and by the staff, who see him in passage toward death. Needless to say, the denying patient is liable to complete his passage with neither preparation for the change in status or understanding of the effect of his dying on others.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Other dimensions of status passage bring our own study into more precise focus. We have been writing about *unscheduled* passage. Another dimension is whether or not a status passage follows an institutionally *prescribed transitional status-sequence.* For instance, many of the ethnographic descriptions of growing up and aging and many descriptions of organizational careers delineate prescribed passages. (Such passages may or may not be precisely scheduled.) Transitional status is a concept denoting *social structural time.*[10] If we ask how a

[10] Transitional status, as a concept for handling social structural time, may be contrasted with the concepts suggested by Moore of synchronization, sequence, rate, rhythm, routine, and recurrence All help us talk of the social ordering of man's behavior, but the Moore concepts lack the re-

social system keeps a person in passage between two statuses for a period of time, the answer is: He is put in a transitional status or sequence of them which denotes a period of time that he will be in a status passage. Thus the transitional status of "initiate" will, in a particular case, carry with it the amount of time it will take to make a non-member a member—a civilian is made a soldier by spending eight weeks as a basic trainee.

Another dimension of status passage is to what degree it is *regulated;* that is, to what degree there are institutionalized operations for getting an occupant in and out of beginning, transitional, and end statuses and keeping others informed of the passage. Rites of passage are instances of such regulated operations. It is notable in the case of dying that the non-scheduled status passage involves both fairly regulated and fairly unregulated temporal elements. An example of the former is that at certain points in the passage the doctor must announce dying to a family member. An example of the latter is the typical problem: When (if ever) does the physician announce to a patient? Together the regulated and unregulated elements of the non-scheduled status passage generate one structural source of differential definitions among parties to the passage. Further dimensions of status passage are to what degree the passage is considered *undesirable,* whether or not it is *inevitable,* and the degree of *clarity* both of the relevant transitional statuses and of the beginning and end statuses of the passage itself.

We believe that it is important to distinguish clearly among such structural dimensions of passage, and among the various possible permutations. Thus dying in hospitals can be located in the following way: the status passage is non-scheduled, non-prescribed, undesirable, and after a point, inevitable. The passage is sometimes regulated but sometimes not, and sometimes relatively unambiguous—except for its end status—and sometimes not.

A crucial step in the study of status passage is to compare different types in order to begin generating a general theory of status passage.[11] Various combinations of the above dimensions provide both ways of typing different status passages and some of the conditions under which the passage is managed. Differences between two sets of these conditions will, therefore, tend to explain why two types of status passages are managed differently.

For example, the *engagement* status passage between the statuses of single and married in America is usually institutionally non-scheduled like dying; but, unlike dying, it is desirable to the parties in passage. Therefore, because of its desirability, the status occupants are their own legitimators of when they are in passage, what the transitional statuses will be, and for how long a period they will be in each one. In contrast, in cases of undesirable or forced engagements, such as found in Europe and Japan among the upper class, the occupants are not their own legitimators.

The *defendant* status passage linking the statuses of citizen to prisoner is an undesirable, scheduled passage. Here we find that the definition of the transitional statuses of sane or insane usually lacks clarity. In contrast to dying, the institu-

quirement of linking a discussion to social structure. They must be applied to it, whereas transitional status requires that the analyst locate his discussion within social structure. We need many such concepts for handling time from a distinctly social structural view. See Wilbert E. Moore, *Man, Time and Society* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), chap. i.

[11] For an example of a general theory based on the consideration of many diverse substantive findings pertaining to an abstract category see Erving Goffman, *Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 147. For a method of generating theory through comparisons of similarities and differences see Barney G. Glaser, "The Constant Comparative Method of Qualitative Analysis," *Social Problems* (ih press).

tional legitimator of these statuses is often not a clearly designated person. Should he be a lawyer, a general practitioner, or a psychiatrist, and if the latter, of what persuasion? Thus the person who would be a legitimator must develop tactics both to make his claim as such "stick" and to have his definition of the defendant's sanity status be accepted by the court. What are the characteristic tactics he uses?

A study of the polio patient provides us with useful comparisons between the *recovery* and *dying* status passages.[12] This recovery passage is also non-institutionally scheduled or the status-sequence prescribed; it is undesirable, and, after a point, inevitable. One difference between it and dying is that the end status, where the passage will lead, is frequently unclear. As a result, the doctor as legitimator is often very chary with information to family and patient both in the hospital and after discharge (even though after a time he may form a clear idea of where the patient will end up. This lack of clear announcements on the end status stimulates the patient and family to engage in a vigorous search for defining cues to just how much better the patient can be expected to get.

There is in Davis' account very little information or analysis bearing upon the co-ordination of people's behavior by giving them correct definitions. The reason is easy to find: while our study was focused upon medical personnel *in* the hospital, his study was focused largely—especially in later phases of the passage to "getting better"—upon the family outside the hospital. The medical personnel would not be so concerned with co-ordinating a passage outside their organizational jurisdiction.

Last, our study of a non-scheduled status passage highlights the usefulness of taking explicit account of the participants' differential concepts of transitional statuses and their timing in the study of *all* types of status passage and consequent behavior. Typically, in the study of scheduled status passage, the sociologist implies that participants operate consensually, not differentially, and behave only according to the institutionally designated timing in status passage.

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[12] Fred Davis, *Passage through Crisis* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).

Status Orientation and Ethnic Sentiment among Undergraduates

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ABSTRACT

Jewish and non-Jewish undergraduates have different inclinations to indorse pro- and anti-Semitic stereotypes, but these tendencies are shown to depend upon their status orientations as well as upon their ethnicity. Jewish students who are "work oriented" or "outspoken" score lower on a measure of Philo-Semitism than those who are "leisure oriented" or "reticent." Among non-Jewish students, the "work oriented" score higher on Philo-Semitism and on a measure of anti-Semitism centered around Jewish students at the college, but they score lower on an estimate of dislike toward Jews in general. The non-Jewish students who are "outspoken" score higher on both anti-Semitism measures.

INTRODUCTION

The research reported here follows a line of previous investigations of associations between status perspectives and prejudice. In a study clearly related to the present investigation, Kaufman found that in a population of 215 middle-class, non-Jewish undergraduates, status concern was more closely related to anti-Semitic attitudes than was authoritarianism.[1] Other examinations dealing with authoritarianism and prejudice as well as with concern over social position also showed that those tending to be dissatisfied with their own statuses were more likely than others to harbor negative sentiments toward members of minority ethnic groups.[2] Utilizing Jewish respondents, Adelson arrived at similar results with Jewish respondents; he found that Jews with assimilative tendencies were likely to have higher anti-Semitism scores than those of Jews who had a stronger ethnic identification.[3]

Several investigations of relationships between mobility and prejudice are also germane to this discussion. Silberstein and Seeman's review of research in this area suggested that the major studies appeared to rest on the assumption that prejudice stemmed from status anxiety based on the implicit proposition that the downwardly mobile subjects were frustrated and the upwardly mobile, insecure.[4] Thus in their own study they differentiated between what they called "mobility orientation," or betterment of position for its own sake, and "achievement orientation," or concern about intrinsic values of positions,

[1] W. C. Kaufman, "Status, Authoritarianism, and Anti-Semitism," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII (1957), 379–82.

[2] T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), esp. p. 476; A. H. Roberts and M. Rokeach, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (1956), 355–58; E. H. Rayne, "Racial Prejudice and Personality Scales: An Alternative Approach," *Social Forces*, XLI (1962), 44–53; L. Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (1956), 709–16.

[3] J. Adelson, "A Study of Minority Group Authoritarianism," in M. Sklare (ed.), *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

[4] F. B. Silberstein and M. Seeman, "Social Mobility and Prejudice," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (1959), 258–64. The studies they reviewed are B. Bettelheim and M. Janowitz, *The Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950); J. Greenblum and L. I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status, and Power* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953).

such as opportunities for freedom of expression and for friendly interaction. They then found that neither upward nor downward mobility, as such, accounted for prejudice. Instead, the crucial factor was attitude toward mobility. The greatest differences in prejudice did occur between the upwardly and downwardly mobile—respectively least and most prejudiced—but only among those who were "mobility oriented," that is, more interested in sheer advancement. Silberstein and Seeman took this finding as a demonstration that prejudice was more nearly a function of subjective perspectives about objective positions than of objective positions themselves.

The present study compares the relation of such perspectives to prejudice among members of both the majority and a minority group, and so it goes a step further than previous, related examinations. Rather than studying the effects of past mobility, however, this research takes into account that its respondents are all quite young. Thus the status-orientation instruments employed here refer to the future, to the kinds of positions the respondents claim they would like to have after they have finished their education.

Indeed, the two status orientations under investigation have been chosen to reflect a number of important aspects of this particular setting. The research population is not only young but also has unusually high social status and attends a college whose graduates are practically assured of at least upper-middle-class adult rank.[5] In a population of this kind, one is hardly likely to find a sizable number of individuals who clearly wish to improve their position but see little hope of being able to do so; in fact, "anomia" items are almost universally rejected by the respondents here.[6] By contrast, one might expect to find a good many who are more sanguine, who look forward to the rewards of the relatively high positions they expect rather easily to attain.

The first status orientation centers around this point. *To those who do concentrate more on the rewards of status we give the name "leisure oriented," as compared to others, called "work oriented,"* who expect to work harder but anticipate that this work will be satisfying in itself. (On an instrument different from the one on which this distinction is based, the leisure oriented were significantly more likely to call attention to the importance of "security," "prestige," and "power" as job criteria: they were significantly less likely to emphasize "independence" and "real responsibility.")

Second, at least in terms of what are approved public statements by individuals, as well as by spokesmen for the college, expressions of prejudice in this setting are considered somewhat reprehensible. Thus the situation is considerably different from one in which prejudiced attitudes are more nearly the norm. Again we refer to Silberstein and Seeman, who, in a West Virginia city some five years ago, found that the desire to voice one's opinions freely even if doing so might threaten one's position was a component of a broader perspective inversely associated with expressions of

[5] In this sample, only 15 per cent of the students came from families whose 1962 income was less than $10,000; less than 15 per cent had fathers whose occupational status was as low or lower than that of supervisory white-collar personnel. A point to be discussed below is that family's class status is an ineffective explanatory variable when applied against most of the attitude measures employed here. One important reason is that students from relatively lower-status families are on their way to higher status for themselves as a result of their attendance at the college. In fact, this setting ranks high in that group of colleges whose graduates' incomes rank just below those of graduates of the "Big Three," i.e., Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, according to E. Havemann and P. S. West, *They Went to College* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952).

[6] Cf. Srole, *op. cit.* There was no significant association in these data between class origin and scores on his anomia scale, or between anomia scores and leisure orientation, outspokenness, or any of the measures of attitudes toward Jews.

prejudice. Here, however, at a time when minority rights are in the forefront of public attention, those who express the greater desire to articulate their own points of view tend to be the more prejudiced. This is the focus of the second status orientation, contrasting the desire to speak out ("outspokenness") with what is called "reticence." The items dealing with this dimension appear in the next section. They strongly suggest that "outspokenness" reflects a greater desire to express even unpopular points of view, while "reticence" reflects a greater concern for remaining silent in order to obtain a desirable status position. Largely as a result of differences between findings of this and previous research, one can easily recognize that the meanings of these terms depend heavily on the context in which they are investigated. Below, for example, we show that they also have to be considered with reference to whether one is a member of the majority or of a minority group.

A similar point about context can be made about this study as a whole, since its results probably cannot be generalized beyond members of upper-middle- and upper-class groups who hold relatively secure positions. For example, some differences in the attitudes of the respondents can be related to differences in their classes of origin, but the associations are not particularly impressive. Class of origin by itself does *not* account significantly for patterns of attitudes toward Jews that exist in either the Jewish or the non-Jewish group. Also, although leisure-work orientation and outspokenness-reticence are not associated with each other to a statistically significant degree, both are associated (at the .02 level) with class of origin. That is, as estimated either by father's income or by father's education, respondents with relatively lower status are more likely to be leisure oriented and to be outspoken. In the former case, some may look forward to the security they will gain by arriving at higher-level positions; in the latter, some may feel, because they have not yet attained a high position, as if they have less to lose by making their opinions known. Still, since the mean income of even the fathers of "lower-status" respondents is more than $10,000 per year, it should not be surprising to find that differences in the statuses of the respondents' families of origin have relatively little direct impact on many of the attitude patterns of the total population here.

With a larger research population, other significant attitudinal differences might nevertheless have appeared between respondents from higher- and lower-status families. A larger population would also have made it possible simultaneously to consider status along with ethnicity and status orientations as determinants of ethnic attitudes. The present data are limited in that there are too few cases for analyzing all four of these sets of variables simultaneously. Therefore the discussion below centers for the most part on differences in ethnic attitudes which relate to differences in the respondents' subjective views of their prospective statuses. Leisure orientation and outspokenness are used as specifying variables in analyzing the attitudes toward Jews of both the Jewish and non-Jewish students in order to demonstrate the proposition that views of ethnic relations are a product both of ethnic affiliation and of personal life-style preferences.

SETTING AND METHOD

The research was carried out at a Northeastern four-year, residential, liberal arts college for men. The college had a student body of around three thousand undergraduates. Because the study has not been replicated, and because some instruments used in it have not been used in the same way among other respondents elsewhere, the limitations of data collected in a single specialized setting obtain here. Similarly,

one cannot arrive at a definite judgment concerning how different the students' attitudes might be in the more "normal" circumstances of extra- or post-college communities.

Systematic samples were drawn from among the Jewish and non-Jewish students at the college. (Though known to the writers, the precise number in each universe cannot be published at the present time. One would not go too far wrong in estimating that about one-sixth of the students are Jewish.) The first sample was based on the best available list—that is, not on an official college compilation, but on one directly derived from it—of those who had identified themselves or been identified by others as being Jewish.

The second was drawn from the college directory after all the students on the "Jewish" list had been eliminated. Questionnaires were distributed personally to 95 Jewish and 105 non-Jewish students. Eighty-one Jewish and 100 non-Jewish students returned forms complete enough to be used in all phases of this study.

The portions of the questionnaire with which the study is concerned are as follows:

1. Three scales were used for estimating patterns of attitudes toward Jews. All items on these scales were responded to along a range from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Each scale consisted of five items, showed a random pattern of response errors, and had levels of reproducibility high enough to indicate that it was tapping a relatively homogeneous and consistent set of attitudes. The scales should most properly be thought of as "quasi-scales," given the small number of items on each. After each item was dichotomized into "accept" and "reject" categories, total scores were calculated in such a way as to run from 0 to 5 on each scale. Also, as a partial check against response set, each scale contained at least one item scored in a reverse direction from the others

The first scale, called "Philo-Semitism," is designed so that high scores represent favorable attitudes toward Jews. One of its items is, "No other people in the world could have gone through what Jews have endured and still survived as a vigorous religious community." Rep. is .90.

The second scale, called 'General Anti-Semitism" (G-A-S), is designed so that high scores represent negative attitudes toward Jews in general. One of its items is, "The Jewish group in the United States would get along better if many Jews were not so clannish." Rep. is .93.

The third scale, called "College-Anti-Semitism" (C-A-S), is designed to have high scores represent antipathetic attitudes toward Jewish students in this setting. An item: "Sometimes I think people would have more respect for Jewish students here if there were somewhat fewer Jewish Phi Betas and somewhat more Jewish athletes." Rep. is 89.

2. A pair of instruments measured status orientations The first is a six-item quasi-scale (Rep. is .88) concerning attitudes about the importance of leisure and comfort. Those endorsing three or more of the items on this scale are considered to be the "leisure oriented"; those who endorse two or fewer, the "work oriented." A scale item is, "I don't want much more from life than to be able to provide comfort and security for my family, along with having time enough to enjoy them."

The second instrument is an index of concern for the free expression of one's opinions. It is scored by adding the responses (1, for strongly agree, to 6, for strongly disagree) to the following items: "I'd turn down a job that might be a real stepping-stone if I knew that the people doing the hiring had the reputation of just wanting someone who would go along with their ideas"; and "I would probable turn down a job that would leave me less room to express my own views on political matters." Those scoring 5 or below on this index (e.g., agreeing with one, mildly agreeing with the other) are referred to as "outspoken."

FINDINGS

One point of interest in Table 1 is the suggestion that ethnic affiliation encourages tendencies to think more highly of one's own ethnic group and less highly of another. Since it is hardly difficult to infer that such phenomena occur among both the Jewish and non-Jewish respondents,

it is more interesting to note that these tendencies take somewhat different forms within each of the groups. We now examine several factors that help to account for some of these differences. Our purpose in the discussion which follows will be to show: (a) that leisure orientation is associated with a particularistic view of ethnic status that emphasizes qualities above performances; (b) that outspokenness is associated with tendencies to deviate from in-group norms; and (c) that demonstrable associations between status orientations and ethnic attitudes vary depending on whether one is considering non-Jewish prejudice or Jewish defensiveness.

TABLE 1

THE EFFECT OF LEISURE ORIENTATION AND OUTSPOKENNESS ON JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH STUDENTS' MEAN SCORES FOR PHILO-SEMITISM, COLLEGE ANTI-SEMITISM (C-A-S), AND GENERAL ANTI-SEMITISM (G-A-S)

	Philo-Semitism	C-A-S	G-A-S	N
Jewish:				
Leisure oriented.	3.8*	1.8	1.3	48
Work oriented.	3.2*	2.2	1.2	33
Outspoken.......	3.2*	2.0	1.3	31
Reticent...... ..	3.8*	2 0	1.2	50
Non-Jewish:				
Leisure oriented..	2.2*	2.6*	2.3*	59
Work oriented .	2.7*	3.1*	1.7*	41
Outspoken......	2.4	3.1†	2.5‡	35
Reticent........	2.4	2.7†	1.8‡	65

* Differences between adjacent groups significant between 05 and .01.

† Differences between adjacent groups significant between .10 and .05.

‡ Differences between adjacent groups significant at less than .01

Earlier, leisure orientation was held to represent a fairly clear interest in gaining the probable rewards of a relatively secure and comfortable social position. Table 1 shows that this outlook is accompanied by different ethnic attitudes in the Jewish and the non-Jewish groups. Among Jews, it is associated with a higher Philo-Semitism score; among non-Jews, with lower Philo-Semitism and C-A-S scores, but with a higher G-A-S score.

As for the Jewish students, it is worthwhile to point out that many forces within American minority-group life have as a main purpose the fostering of a particularistic perspective, encouraging the inculcation and maintenance of a positive—not to say chauvinistic—outlook toward one's own group and its life style, offering support in return for honoring its standards. The utilization of such a perspective can also serve as a rationale in other contexts. Here, for example, it appears to be a means by which Jewish students who are inclined simply to accept a comfortable position of which they seem assured can demonstrate that they have a legitimate right to hold it.

Leisure orientation also reflects particularism among non-Jewish students. In their case, however, it serves to justify their status aspirations rather than those of Jews. Leisure-oriented non-Jewish students have a higher G-A-S score than work-oriented ones but a lower C-A-S score, showing them to be more critical of Jews in general but less critical of Jewish students.[7] Considering the two findings together help to explain why Jewish fellow students tend to be exempted from the negative judgments of leisure-oriented non-Jews. The higher G-A-S score represents a feeling that some Jews are more likely than other people to possess characteristics that make it difficult for those already in high-level positions to accept them, but at the same time the lower C-A-S score implies some reluctance to define as an outgroup the high-status Jews who are already present in the immediate environment of the college community.

Thus, in terms of the differential char-

[7] This finding is an example of "exemption," a concept discussed at greater length in R. M. Williams, *Strangers Next Door* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 337-45. Exemption is most simply defined in terms of the popular expression, "Some of my best friends are. . . ."

acter of what Parsons suggests are two major criteria upon which personal prestige-status rests, leisure-oriented non-Jewish students, more concerned with status accoutrements, are more inclined to express distaste for Jewish *qualities;* work-oriented students, more concerned with accomplishments, tend to be more antipathetic toward Jewish *performances.*[8] In this connection, note also that the leisure oriented have the lower Philo-Semitism score. This scale, like G-A-S, refers more to what Jews in general *are like* than it does to what Jews *do.*

We noted above that respondents labeled outspoken appear more willing to risk negative responses that may result from making their personal opinions known. Thus, since prevalent Jewish values emphasize the worth or quality of the Jewish group as a whole, it is not surprising to find that it is the outspoken Jewish students who are less likely to emphasize those values. The effect of outspokenness among non-Jews, such that those with the higher score also receive the higher anti-Semitism scores, calls for a somewhat more complex interpretation. First, respondents who rank in or above the middle class generally tend to be wary of expressing prejudice openly (perhaps particularly if, like these college students, they are trained to be reluctant to accept verbal generalizations). Second, as noted above, current public norms in this setting run counter to prejudiced statements or discriminatory acts. Private prejudice certainly still exists, but there is now a sense in which those who admit to it have to be prepared to go against a prevailing tide. Table 1 shows that under these conditions respondents who see themselves as more willing to run the risk of expressing unpopular opinions are also more willing to indorse negative stereotypes of Jews.

Summing up the discussion to this point, leisure orientation tends to increase Jewish students' inclination to praise their own group; outspokenness decreases it. Among the non-Jewish students, leisure orientation is associated with higher G-A-S scores, and outspokenness with higher scores on both G-A-S and C-A-S. Outspoken Jewish students depart from the norm of positive valuation of the Jewish in-group, outspoken non-Jewish students from the norm of tolerance for minority out-groups. With these findings and interpretations in mind, we shall attempt to provide a more precise demonstration of how the status orientations discussed here relate to the ethnic attitudes of certain respondents in each of the religious groups.

For example, our conceptions of leisure orientation and of outspokenness lead to the expectation that the *Jewish* students with the highest Philo-Semitism and the lowest anti-Semitism scores will be those who are both leisure oriented and reticent: that is, concerned both with their group's acceptability and with observing its norms. To express this proposition in a more elegant and more general way, one might say that the leisure-oriented and reticent Jewish student group is best described by the following set of observations put forward by Riesman a decade ago:

> The middle and upper-class Negro, Italian, Jew, or Slav is not quite assimilated; he remains identifiably, or in his own feeling, an ethnic. He is kept from complete social participation in the dominant groups by subtle and not so subtle barriers. Meanwhile, veto-group leaders in his own ethnic group come along to urge him to welcome the autarchy thus partially forced on him from outside, to confine his sociability "voluntarily" to his "own" group, and to obey the leisure styles of that group. This, too, is called cultural pluralism, though for the individual it operates to restrict him to single culture.[9]

[8] T. Parsons, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in his *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).

[9] D. Riesman *et al.*, *The Lonely Crowd* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1953), p. 324.

Just as these observations apply better to some segments of minority groups than to others, they do not necessarily have the same degree of validity in accounting for the particular attitude constellations of different segments of dominant groups. For example, it is possible to specify some of the conditions under which certain non-Jewish students will, unlike the majority of their more conventionally separatist co-religionists, receive relatively high Philo-Semitism and relatively low anti-Semitism scores. In operational terms, and in accordance with earlier observations, such non-Jewish respondents may be expected to be both work oriented and reticent. Substantively, they may be expected to be more interested in standards of performance than in maintaining status distinctions based on assumed ethnic qualities, and to accept the norm of tolerance for ethnic diversity.

TABLE 2

COMBINED EFFECTS OF LEISURE ORIENTATION AND OUTSPOKENNESS ON JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH STUDENTS' MEAN SCORES FOR PHILO-SEMITISM, COLLEGE ANTI-SEMITISM (C-A-S), AND GENERAL ANTI-SEMITISM (G-A-S)

	Philo-Semitism	C-A-S	G-A-S	N
Jewish, leisure oriented:				
Outspoken	3.4	2.1	1.3	18
Reticent	4.1*	1.6*	1.2	30
Jewish, work oriented:				
Outspoken	2.8*	1.9	1.3	13
Reticent	3.5	2.4*	1.1	20
Non-Jewish, leisure oriented:				
Outspoken	2.5	2.9	2.7†	22
Reticent	2.1†	2.5‡	2.0	37
Non-Jewish, work oriented:				
Outspoken	2.2	3.4‡	2.1	13
Reticent	2.9†	3.0	1.5†	28

* Differences between horizontally parallel groups significant at about .07 within each religious group.

† Differences between horizontally parallel groups significant at .01 or less within each religious group.

‡ Differences between horizontally parallel groups significant at .02 within each religious group.

The data in Table 2 show that in general these expectations are correct with respect to both the Jewish and the non-Jewish groups. Among Jews, the leisure oriented and reticent have the highest Philo-Semitism and lowest C-A-S scores. Among non-Jews, the work oriented and reticent have the highest Philo-Semitism and lowest G-A-S scores, and, though their C-A-S score is fairly high, it is hardly outstanding.

Although these findings do correspond to expectation reasonably well, any conclusions must remain tentative, for the data are less supportive of several correlative predictions. (It might have been anticipated, for example, that work-oriented and outspoken Jewish students would have the highest C-A-S score, whereas it is the work-oriented and reticent Jewish students who have it instead.) Thus, space limitations, the small numbers of cases in certain categories, and the necessity of resorting to ad hoc formulations in attempting to "explain" unexpected findings combine to suggest that further detailed analyses of the materials in Table 2 would probably not be fruitful. A final general observation does seem warranted, however. Among Jewish respondents, the salience of another's "Jewishness" is lowest for those who are most nearly autonomous —the work oriented and outspoken. Among non-Jews, in contrast, it is lowest for those who are inclined to be conformist—the leisure oriented and reticent. Among the first group, then, one might suppose the presence of a willingness to accept the implications of making independent judgments and of standing alone, without relying on an ascribed group identity or on common group standards. Turning to the second, one would be more likely to infer that there was some reluctance to arrive at any opinion that might possibly be considered deviant. That such different effects could lead to a similar result might then seem a clear indication that Jews and non-Jews brought quite different considerations

to bear on their respective assessments of the social meaning of Jewishness.

CONCLUSION

The findings of this study reflect a situation where Jews have high enough social status to be the peers of non-Jews with whom they are closely associated, and where most non-Jews seem prepared to accept them as such. As we noted near the outset of the paper, there is no way to tell how much these conditions—especially the second one—would exist outside the college community in environments where in-group pressures toward separation would probably be stronger than they are here. Even so, their existence in this setting contrasts sharply with observations about the nature of Jewish identity that were current a generation ago, when writers like Bernard and Lewin, for example, called attention to the prominence of Jewish ethnic ambivalence.[10] Only rarely in these data do the Jewish students appear to be particularly ambivalent about their Jewishness. It is far more accurate simply to state that they vary in terms of the significance they attach to it.

Seen in another light, this variation is an indication that they deal in different ways with their relatively great freedom to pattern their interpersonal relations in terms of their own desires. Certainly most of them know that a mere absence of obvious segregation does not guarantee that there will be no gaps between the majority's explicit rules for, and implicit patterns of, interethnic behavior. Indeed, because so many Jews have been trained to anticipate such gaps, many are inclined to feel that they must probe to be certain that majority group members' acceptance of them is genuine. Then, even if so assured, some may still lack clear guidelines from members of their own group concerning how far they ought to go in cultivating non-Jewish rather than Jewish associations.

More generally, and with reference now to majority attitudes, this study shows that in order to examine a phenomenon like anti-Semitism adequately, it is not sufficient either to consider attitudes toward Jews as a whole, as if most respondents actually thought that Jews constituted a single diffuse category, or to treat issues of status and status concern as if they were the same from one class group to another. Rather, under circumstances where there is a considerable intermixture of Jews and non-Jews (or, for the sake of extending the discussion, of Negroes and whites) who share relatively equal social-class status, there may well be differences in an individual's feelings toward those members of a minority with whom he is closely involved as compared to those members from whom he is socially and spatially more distant. Such differences in attitudes may to some extent reflect actual differences in the characteristics of the observed groups, or they may embody inconsistencies which indicate the presence of still unresolved fears or antipathies on the part of the observer, or they may exist because an individual prefers to denigrate one segment of the minority rather than another as a way of bolstering his own self-esteem. The extent and frequency of such disparities, and the reasons behind them, are all aspects of the nature of prejudice which have yet to be investigated in sufficient detail.

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[10] K. Lewin, "Self-Hatred among Jews," in A. Rose (ed.), *Race Prejudice and Discrimination* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952); J. Bernard, "The Jewish Community: A Study in Social Schizophrenia," in I. Graeber and S. H. Britt (eds.), *Jews in a Gentile World* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942).

COMMENTARY AND DEBATES

Sociological Analysis and Poverty[1]

The subject of poverty in contemporary America received slight attention prior to 1960. Since then, journalists, social philosophers, economists, and others have provided numerous studies ranging from intricate statistical analysis to polemics reminiscent of an earlier era of social protest. Sociologists have contributed very little to this literature.[2]

Although sociological interest in poverty virtually ceased after the Great Depression, many pertinent but limited comments can be found in such areas of research as social problems and social stratification.[3] These observations indicate the general nature of sociological thinking on poverty in recent years. A number of sociologists, for example, were of the opinion that substantial inroads had been made on economic deprivation. Some spoke of the disappearing lower class;[4] some suggested that the "poorer segments [have] been getting a larger slice of the pie than before";[5] and others presented statistics to show that those living on an inadequate income comprised only a small fraction (e.g., 10 per cent) of the population.[6]

Sociologists described the "poor"[7] as a group made up largely of Negroes, immigrants, rural persons, the aged, and various

[1] Parts of this paper are based on my "Economic Deprivation and Lower-Class Behavior" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Buffalo, February, 1964). I am indebted to Llewellyn Gross and Orville Gursslin for their many helpful suggestions.

[2] To date, S. M. Miller has contributed much of the current sociological writing on poverty. See, e.g., his "Poverty, Race, and Politics," in Irving Horowitz (ed.), *The New Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 290–312.

[3] Eleven social-problems texts published between 1956 and 1964 were reviewed. Eight books (two published in 1964) had no comment on poverty, and only one gave an account comparable to those in non-sociological sources. See John F. Cuber, William F. Kenkel, and Robert A. Harper, *Problems of American Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), chap. iv.

[4] Typically, the reference is to changes in the occupational structure. In 1953, for example, Talcott Parsons wrote, "It looks very much as though the traditional bottom of the occupational pyramid was in the course of disappearing" ("A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset [eds.], *Class, Status, and Power* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953], p. 125). (On this, we must note that disappearing from the unskilled employed ranks increasingly means *appearing* in the unemployed ranks.)

[5] Harold Wilensky and Charles N. LeBeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), p. 100; Joseph A. Kahl, *The American Class Structure* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1957), p. 99.

[6] "It appears possible that 7% of the nation's urban families have severe problems of economic need," state Paul B. Horton and Gerald R. Leslie, *The Sociology of Social Problems* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), p. 174. Other estimates are "less than 10% in 1950" (Wilensky and LeBeaux, *op. cit.*, p. 104); 10 per cent or less of American families (Kahl, *op. cit.*, p. 111); 8,000,000 low-income families (under $2,000) in 1954 (Jessie Bernard, *Social Problems at Midcentury* [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1957]). Somewhat closer to the estimates of other specialists is Egon Bergel's figure of 14.5 per cent of American families. It is apparent, however, that he regards only a small part of this group as "really poor" (*Social Stratification* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962], pp. 268–69).

[7] The terms "poverty group" and the "poor" were not used in their observations. By the "poor" we mean that part of the population which has been existing under substandard conditions of life for an extended period of time. By "conditions of life" we mean physical needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. Henceforth, we shall use the term

other categories such as the handicapped, disaster victims, and the "temporarily poor."[8] Speculations on the effects of poverty typically reflected the assumption that "poverty does not cause behavior." The prevalent conception was that although much social pathology is found among the poor, it is not ascribable to conditions of poverty per se.[9] A second view was that the poor get along tolerably well. One writer felt, for example, that persons in the lowest class are not affected as much by unemployment as are those of higher rank.[10] Another observer suggested that for the most part lower-class persons enjoy a happy-go-lucky existence.[11]

It is almost gratuitous to point out that these conceptions of poverty and the poor had little factual basis and are markedly at odds with corresponding accounts in nonsociological sources. Most estimates of the size of the poverty group—even before 1960—fall between 15 and 25 per cent of the population, considerably higher than estimates of many sociologists.[12] Statistics do not support the assumption that the group living in poverty largely consists of Negroes, immigrants, marginal farmers, the aged, and the "temporarily poor." In fact, Negroes represent only *one-fifth* of the poor,[13] about *two-fifths* are rural residents,[14] and *two-fifths* are over 65.[15] Most of the poor are white, urban, native Americans under 65. Of particular import is the evidence that the majority of the poor have been poor for a long time.[16]

Two related questions are suggested by this brief appraisal of sociological treatments of poverty. First, what accounts for the limited amount of attention to economic deprivation in contemporary America? Second, when sociologists have discussed poverty, why have their interpretations differed so greatly from those of other students of the subject? It could be argued that over the years sociologists have remained interested in poverty through research on social pathology and studies of social stratification. In these areas of investigation the lower economic ranges are referred to as "lower status," "low income," or, more typically, "lower class." But what are the empirical referents of these terms? With rare exceptions, research on the lower class, especially in the past decade, deals

"lower class" interchangeably with the "poor" or the "poverty group." Our "lower class" approximates Warner's lower-lower class.

[8] Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; Bergel, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-69. Also relevant are opinions concerning the make-up of the lower class. Hans Zetterberg speaks of a "lower segment of the working class, mostly immigrant or Negro, with large families living in slums who are often employed only in temporary jobs" (*Social Theory and Social Practice* [New York: Bedminster Press, 1962], p. 144). A similar appraisal is given in Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 106.

[9] See Marshall Clinard, *The Sociology of Deviance* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. 101-5.

[10] Ruth S. Cavan, "Unemployment—Crisis of the Common Man," *Marriage and Family Living*, XXI (May, 1959), 143.

[11] Bergel *op. cit.*, pp. 406-7.

[12] Despite Kahl's assertion that "we simply do not have enough information to decide what proportion are actually suffering from poverty" (*op. cit.*, p. 121), a number of reasonable schemes for measuring poverty are available. See Roach, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-13.

[13] Henry Miller, *Rich Man, Poor Man* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 64; *Poverty and Deprivation in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Conference on Economic Progress, 1962), p. 91.

[14] Robert J. Lampman, *The Low Income Population and Economic Growth* (U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Study Paper 12 [86th Cong., 1st sess., December, 1959]), p. 7; H. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[15] Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), p. 87, H. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[16] Mollie Orshansky, "Children of the Poor," *Social Security Bulletin*, XXVI (July, 1963), 12-13; James N. Morgan *et al.*, *Income and Welfare in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), pp. 198, 206-8.

with subjects above the poverty line. Some authors call attention to this, but usually it is up to the reader to provide his own referent of the empirical designation of "lower class." This confusion in terminology has led many investigators to take findings on the working class (upper-lower) for data on the group living at or below the poverty line. Those who make use of the status-frustration hypothesis, for example, commonly refer to empirical studies which seem to provide documentation for the assertion of a high degree of status frustration in the "lower class," ostensibly meaning the lowest economic level. But inspection of the research cited discloses that the subjects are *working class*, not lower class.[17] It is suggested, therefore, that the labels used in research on the lower strata convey the erroneous impression that substantial attention has been given by sociologists to the level of society living in poverty.

The paucity of studies on the poor and the misconceptions of so many sociologists who have had something to say about this group can be traced to a variety of factors. Some of these are a consequence of basic sociological perspectives; others are of more recent origin. Among the latter are conditions of modern social research which increasingly determine the selection of topics to be investigated and the preferred methods of study. Commerical sponsors, for example, are concerned with the behavior of labor and consumer behavior, *not* with the effects of poverty upon behavior. Moreover, the poor are not suitable subjects for the two most prestigious modes of research —the large-scale sample survey and laboratory experiments.[18] In these and similar ways conditions of social research have played a part in deflecting attention from poverty.

A more important source of "sociological lag" with respect to economic deprivation is the view that physical conditions of poverty are not significant determinants of behavior. This minimization of the effects of material aspects of poverty stems from a thesis of cultural determinism which denies a causal role to non-social factors. Cultural determinism with its emphasis on meaning, the symbolic world, and social relations strongly shapes the thinking of most sociologists. The premises of this framework are closely connected with images of man's nature which in turn reflect a comparatively narrow band of human behavior and motives.

THE DOMINANT IMAGE OF MAN

The prevailing sociological version of man is most fully seen in the concept of the social actor. To the sociologist, the actor refers to any human being regardless of his station in life or his place in time. Some understanding of the nature of the actor can be gained by examining the concept of social action. To Max Weber, the founder of social-action theory, the most distinctive feature of human behavior is the presence of meaning. "Meaningful behavior" is usually interpreted as "action" by Weber's translators.[19] Modern theorists lean heavily on Weber, particularly as his work has been interpreted by Talcott Parsons. Allowing for variation in wording, and with some deletion of marginal ideas, most exponents of social-action theory would agree that *action is normatively regulated behavior oriented to anticipated states of affairs such as goals, ends, or objectives.*

From this highly generalized formulation it can be inferred that the actor has a complex inner life, is future-oriented, and

[17] E.g., Albert Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 127; Herbert Bloch and Arthur Niederhoffer, *The Gang* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. 109.

[18] Joseph Veroff *et al.*, "The Use of Thematic Apperception To Assess Motivation in a Nationwide Interview Study," *Psychological Monographs*, CXXII, No. 12 (1960), 12.

[19] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 80.

can evaluate, choose, and plan. Several social-action theorists, particularly Parsons, have discussed the traits of the actor in detail. Parsons' major works are replete with accounts of psychological functioning and mental processes. Because of this emphasis and his influence in sociology, Parsons' descriptions of social-psychological characteristics were used in deriving the following set of properties of the actor.[20]

1. The actor has internalized the common value standards of society.
2. The actor has a stable set of motives.
3. The actor has an elaborate repertory of roles.[21]
4. The actor has sophisticated role skills.[22]
5. The actor has a developed self-system.
6. The actor is capable of complex mental functioning.[23]

These assumptions appear congruent with most sociological descriptions of personality processes and social-psychological functioning. This is not to say that Parsons' entire treatment of the actor, which moves much beyond the above set of assumptions, would be acceptable to all sociologists. Indeed in the past few years there have been several resounding critiques of his views of man's nature. Our concern, however, is not with the adequacy of Parsons' description of the *modal* actor, but with questions such as the extension of his model and the nature of "limiting cases." In brief, our interest is in the applicability of Parsons' scheme to those who live under conditions of poverty.

THE POSTULATE OF EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR THE LOWER CLASS

Fundamental in Parsons' writing is the assumption that *systems tend toward equilibrium*. System parts are seen as contributing to a state of "near-equilibrium" of the total system. "Properties of the actor" are parts of the actor's psychological system. These properties function optimally if the psychological system is imbedded in social and cultural systems which are in states of near-equilibrium. Systems and subprocesses are interdependent. More specifically, according to Parsons, the organismic system contributes necessary inputs for the psychological system which provides the necessary inputs for the actor's interaction with alter. Conversely, a social system tending toward equilibrium facilitates the functioning of the psychological system which in turn optimizes inputs from the organismic system.

These conceptions of the actor's organismic and psychological states as systems in "near-equilibrium" and of action taking place in social and cultural systems tending toward equilibrium may have some value in directing inquiry. Are they appropriate to the lower class? Below are a number of empirical generalizations which describe social-psychological attributes of lower-class persons. In keeping with Parsons' line of thought, these attributes can be seen as subprocesses of the lower-class actor's personality system. They are organized under headings corresponding to the properties of the actor in Parsons' theory.[24]

1. *Value system.*—The behavior of lower-class persons is basically outside the mainstream of cultural regulation. They

[20] We do not hold that these are the only assumptions in Parsons' treatment of the actor. It would seem, however, that most would be included in any alternative list. Indications of their centrality included appearance as leading premises or terminal conclusions, redundancy, prominence in the index, and assertions of significance by Parsons. Documentation of the prominence of these assumptions in Parsons' writing is available from the author.

[21] The concept of "role-set" is also covered by "role repertory" in this usage.

[22] Parsons' discussion of role as "structure" often blurs into a description of role as "process."

[23] Parsons' actor has developed attributes allowing him to compare, select, plan, predict, differentiate, integrate, categorize, generalize, represent, deduct, etc.

[24] Documentation for the following social-psychological characteristics of the lower-class person can be found in Roach, *op cit.*, chap. iv, or by writing the author.

lack identification with their own groups as well as with groups and institutions beyond their immediate circle. Status values play little part in lower-class behavior.

2. *Motivational state.*—Lower-class behavior is more closely related to impulse and immediate feeling than to normative planning. There is little capacity or inclination to defer gratification.

3. *Role repertory.*—Lower-class persons have a restricted repertory of roles. Lower-class men, in particular, have no clearly defined role because of frequent unemployment and minimal involvement in group life.

4. *Role skills.*—Lower-class persons have limited role skills. They lack subtleties in role-playing and have difficulty in shifting perspectives.

5. *Self-system.*—The self-system of lower-class persons is poorly integrated and characterized by weak ego controls. Lower-class persons are not inclined toward introspection and are deficient in ability to conceptualize the self.

6. *Mental functioning.*—Lower-class persons have little energy for, or interest in, new thoughts and ideas. Their level of general psychological functioning is low. They have difficulty in handling abstractions, relationships, and categories. Knowledge of the outside world is hazy; critical decisions are made with little comprehension of alternatives or implications.

It is difficult to see how persons with these types of social-psychological deficiencies meet the requirements of Parsons' model of the actor. Above all, the key postulate of a "system tending toward equilibrium" seems inappropriate, since lower-class persons as marginal actors are unable to provide the "inputs" necessary for the maintenance of "near-equilibrated" social and cultural systems. Following Parsons, impairments in social-psychological processes would reciprocally induce malfunctioning of the personality system and lead to disequilibrating ramifications in the environing social and cultural systems. In short, if one applies the system metaphor to the lower class, the required interpretation would be that of systems in *disequilibrium.*

The literature on the lower class is more consistent with a conception of systems in disequilibrium. Many studies show that lower-class life is ridden with disharmony. Rather than acting as a "protective cocoon" as it generally does for the middle class, the lower-class cultural milieu is an unpredictable and inimical world. And it is in the lower class that the highest incidence of personality disorganization is found.[25]

What is the source of disequilibrium in the psychological and sociocultural systems of the lower class? It is our contention that it comes from inadequate satisfaction of physical needs. Parsons assumes that *the actor's physical needs are met.* Instances where this assumption might not hold are treated as limiting cases.[26] This is a critical flaw in the Parsonian scheme insofar as it is intended to apply to the lower class. Persons whose physical needs are not met lack a *necessary* condition for adequate functioning as social actors. Little is explained, and much is lost, by simply classifying this group as a "limiting case."

This deficiency in Parsons' theory is characteristic of sociological analysis. Material conditions of life are regarded as "givens" or "constants" devoid of causal implications. So long as the middle class is the object of investigation,[27] American

[25] For a review of research on lower-class social and personal disorganization see Roach, *op. cit.*, chaps. iv and v.

[26] Alvin Gouldner, for example, comments that in Parsons' writing "elements in the biological constitution and physiological functioning of man, as well as features of the physical and ecological environment are excluded" ("Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in Llewellyn Gross [ed.], *Symposium on Sociological Theory* [Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1959], p. 246).

[27] If anything, Parsons' model is more pertinent to the *upper*-middle class. Judging from his empirical illustrations, Parsons' actor is usually a professional or businessman.

sociologists need not be concerned with the possibility that behavior is vitally affected by the state of satisfaction of physical needs. Their attention can be focused on what they see as the central problem of middle-class Americans—the threat to, or actual deprivation of, *status* needs.[28] If, however, the object of study is the lower class, then to treat physical conditions of life as "non-causal" is tantamount to erecting a barrier to the understanding of lower-class behavior.

SOME ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The thesis of cultural determinism emphasizes social relations and an image of man whose goal is perceived as the satisfaction of status needs. To be sure, lower-class persons experience status deprivation, but is their fundamental motive the satisfaction of status needs? It would seem that the overriding needs of lower-class persons are physically based and that status deprivation is a secondary affliction for persons whose lives are permeated with the tangible features of an inadequate standard of living.

Sociologcial analysis requires alternative ways of looking upon the phenomenon of poverty and its consequences for behavior. Theoretical perspectives are needed which can facilitate understanding of the part played by material deprivation in the behavior of lower-class persons. A possible framework—one which moves beyond the bounds of social-action theory—is suggested by Maslow's scheme of a "hierarchy of prepotent needs."[29] Maslow postulates a motivational system consisting of physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, self-esteem needs, and self-actualization needs which are organized in a "herarchy of less or greater priority or potency."[30]

> The chief dynamic principle animating the organization is the emergence of less potent needs upon gratification of the more potent ones. The physiological needs, when unsatisfied, dominate the organism, pressing all capacities into their service.[31]

In Maslow's theory, for persons seriously lacking in all need levels, "it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any other."[32] In general, according to Maslow, the higher its position in the hierarchy, the weaker the need. Gratification of higher needs can be postponed longer, they are less urgent subjectively, and they require more "external conditions" for their emergence.[33]

The following is an analytic restatement of Maslow's theory as it applies to the relationship between physical and status needs in the lower-class motivational system.

1. The more the actor is governed by physical deprivation, the less he is governed by status deprivation.
2. The less the actor is governed by status deprivation, the less he is threatened by status deprivation.

With reference to perceived deprivation:

3. The more the actor is threatened by perceived physical deprivation, the less he is threatened by perceived status deprivation.

These generalizations are substantiated in numerous accounts emphasizing the preoccupation of the poor with physical needs and describing how continued existence in poverty leads to brutalization and apathy.[34] The broad picture of the life and ways of the poor that emerges finds support in

[28] Compare Dennis Wrong's contention that "although sociologists have criticized past efforts to single out one fundamental motive in human conduct, the desire to achieve a favorable self-image by winning approval from others frequently occupies such a position in their own thinking" ("The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, XXV [April, 1961], 189).

[29] Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), chaps. v–viii.

[30] *Ibid*., p. 107.

[31] *Ibid*.

[32] *Ibid*., p. 82.

[33] *Ibid*., pp. 147–49.

[34] Roach, *op. cit*., chap. iii.

findings from studies of experimental physical deprivation. Anomalies of behavior occur which are comparable to the behavior of the poor: a contraction of thought and affect, increasing concern with vital needs, and generally, a growing state of malaise interspersed at first with episodes of impulsive, aggressive conduct.[35]

It is clear that Maslow's contributions cannot be regarded as a full-blown theoretical framework from which testable hypotheses can be deduced. Since there are few systems in sociology which meet this criterion for acceptable theory, it would not be reasonable to criticize Maslow on this basis alone. No doubt, greater reservations would be expressed about Maslow's treatment of the causal processes through which physical deprivation affects behavior. Sociologists would contend that to elucidate such processes the "meaning of poverty" must be taken into account. But must causal analysis be restricted to current usage of the concept of meaning?

For most sociologists "meaning" appears to serve as an independent variable. Thus the meaning of poverty is regarded as an independent variable, its overt physical signs as dependent variables. Meaning varies, as indeed it must if it is to qualify as an independent variable. Yet only perfunctory attention is given to the conditions under which the "meaning of poverty" varies. Seen in this way, such conditions—among which are material resources for sustaining life—would be treated as the *independent variable* and meaning the *dependent variable*. Research into this end of the causal linkage (i.e., from poverty to meaning) should cast more light on the nature of the "meaning of poverty" as a mediating process. Whether seen as an independent, intervening, or dependent variable, a clearer interpretation of the "meaning of poverty" is needed. In practice the tendency is to equate its referents with "threats to status." A threat to physical existence is also involved; the meaning of this threat and its effects constitutes a significant component in the meaning of poverty.

Explanations of causal linkages between poverty and behavior in which the meaning concept is not involved are required.[36] Persons who are economically deprived usually also suffer from sociocultural deprivation and personality impoverishment. Sociologists readily agree that these forms of deprivation are interdependent, but what is the nature of this interdependence? Studies of sensory deprivation which have proven valuable to specialists in such areas as learning and motivation, intellectual functioning and psychopathology may offer some leads. These investigations describe the deleterious effects of experiential deprivation on human behavior.[37] Fruitful analogies can be constructed from this research and from sociological studies on the consequences of social and cultural isolation for social functioning.[38]

SUMMARY

Until recently there has been little sociological writing on contemporary pov-

[35] For a review of a number of these studies see Muzafer Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), pp. 420–24.

[36] Note Weber's observation that, "It is possible that things which appear to a given investigator as explicable in subjective terms will in the end turn out to be the product of the laws of non-subjective systems, that is, the meaningful aspect may be epiphenomenal" (Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937], p. 642.

[37] Philip Solomon (ed.), *Sensory Deprivation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

[38] Hallowell Pope, "Economic Deprivation and Social Participation in a Group of 'Middle Class' Factory Workers," *Social Problems*, XI (Winter, 1964), 290–300; Elwin H. Powell, "Occupation, Status, and Suicide," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (April, 1958), 131–39. See Roach, *op. cit.*, for an explanation of linkages between poverty and behavior using analogies from various types of deprivation.

erty. What did exist was markedly out of step with contributions by scholars from other fields. Chief among reasons for this state of affairs is the bias against treating material aspects of economic deprivation as a significant causal factor in social behavior. This bias stems from an inflexible adherence to an image of man suitable to the conditions of life and culture of the middle class but of questionable relevance to the poor. An alternative scheme was proposed in which the conditions and effects of material deprivation are given a more prominent role in causal analysis.

JACK L. ROACH
State University of New York at Buffalo

Comment

The editor has asked me to comment on Jack L. Roach's "Sociological Analysis and Poverty." I propose that the account of the relation between sociology and study of poverty should be carried (by someone) back to an earlier phase and to other countries. The author starts with the statement that "the subject of poverty in contemporary America received slight attention prior to 1960." That is an equivocal statement, by which—from his references—he appears to refer to the 1950's. Whenever sociologists have been interested in poverty, it was in the poverty of their time—of their "contemporary America."

There should be a thorough study made of interest in the nature and amount of poverty. Poverty was a main object of study by the people, whether they were called sociologists or not, who brought modern sociology into being. The survey movement in Britain and North America had as its aim to describe the conditions of life of the urban poor and to find the *poverty line*. The British classics of that genre were the twenty-two-volume *Life and Labour of the People of London*, directed and partly written by Charles Booth in the 1890's, and Seebohm Rountree's *Town Life: A Study of Poverty* (1910). The Springfield and Pittsburgh surveys in the United States were of the same order.

Many of the earlier American sociologists were "social gospel" men; Albion W. Small above all others. But already in him one sees the split which may have led to decline of interest in poverty on the part of sociologists. While he was writing *Between Eras from Capitalism to Socialism,* he was already looking for a scheme of general analysis of human societies; the social gospel, interest in poverty. and other social problems, gave way to emphasis on general schemes of sociological analysis. At the same time, the division between sociology and social work developed. In the end, the social workers themselves—the caseworkers, at least—abandoned their interest in the effects of poverty for a psychodynamic Freudian explanation of the troubles of the poor. It may be—and this in no way runs contrary to anything Mr. Roach says—that as any subject becomes "professionalized" it wants more respectable "clients." *Client* itself is, in this connection, an equivocal word; for the client may be either the object of study, the person on whose behalf a service is performed, or both. The poor are not respectable clients in either sense. Certainly they are of little interest to those who poll potential customers concerning their tastes in cars, clothing, colleges, or even presidents and medicare systems, since their voting rates are low. On these points I do not believe that I disagree essentially with Mr. Roach; I would like him to go further. The choice of topics of study by the various social sciences is itself a most interesting aspect of social science.

While the points concerning the possible effects of "equilibrium" sociology on interest in poverty are well made, I do not find them very convincing. "The tendency

to maintain equilibrium" is a phrase with no meaning unless the system has within it and unless there are in the environment forces which tend to break it up. And, of course, all systems—at least we humans and most of the smaller systems we have about us—do disintegrate eventually. Poverty might be the thing that destroys some social systems, but certainly many societies have maintained their equilibriums for centuries with higher rates and greater depths of poverty than we have in our society. Poverty may indeed have been a necessary condition of many social systems. On the other hand, it appears that at present some of the prime actors in our society are afraid that poverty will upset the apple cart. It might possibly be that the reason it might do so is that the physical misery of the poor is not great enough to keep them from being actors who might play roles. For certainly the poor of New York City and even of Appalachia have more food and better clothing and shelter than those of India and other countries of the Orient. Incidentally, if Negroes compose one-fifth of the poor, it is twice their share; rural residents also are certainly less than two-fifths of the population, as are people over fifty. One's chance of being poor is helped greatly by being Negro, rural, and over sixty-five. God help anyone who combines all these characteristics. The problem of describing and understanding poverty is not that of saying who most of them are but of finding the characteristics which increase the hazard of poverty (age is now said to be the first among them) as well as those characteristics of the American economy and society which tend to keep people in poverty, whether for a short or a long time, and some kinds of people more or less than others. I would certainly agree that to understand the problem we have to learn why anyone is poor and what happens to him when he is.

Mr. Roach seems to believe that the poor do not play roles, have goals, and have self-esteem—or not much—and that they will not have these characteristics until their physical wants are met. Certainly, poverty is want of good food, clothing, shelter, and medicine. But I think the notion that the poor are so different from other people as is suggested by his hypotheses requires some proving—by data gathered by studying poor people. I hope he or someone will gather the data to test his hypotheses. That middle-class bias has limited the vision of sociological curiosity I would not deny; and, as I have said before, our methods of work bring the bulge in the middle into focus, rather than the margins of our society. I am reminded of a remark of a Brazilian colleague. No conscientious Brazilian sociologist can, he said, do other than to study poverty and illiteracy.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

Brandeis University

Reply

Professor Hughes's comments on my paper are well taken, and I concur with most of them. However, several points need clarification.

The time referent of "contemporary America" in my opening remarks is somewhat ambiguous. As might be surmised from the statement, "sociological interest in poverty virtually ceased after the Great Depression," I contend that sociologists displayed little interest in poverty during the 1940's and the 1950's. This is exemplified by the quotation from a 1961 work which appears at the close of this reply.

I agree with Professor Hughes that there are many related issues—determination of the "poverty-prone," identification of the factors keeping people in poverty, and understanding the sources of poverty—which require study, but in addition to discussing the neglect of poverty by sociologists, I focus on the *consequences of the*

material conditions of poverty for social behavior.

Concerning the social-psychological characteristics of the poor, I do feel that the conditions of poverty are inimical to human functioning and that large numbers of the poor have been seriously damaged, perhaps irreparably, by poverty. Correspondingly, it is my belief that the physical wants of the poor are more pressing than their status wants. A first step in rehabilitating the poor (whether this be through job-training programs or "improving their motivation" by counseling) is to secure an appreciable improvement in their standard of living. Most sociologists would agree that the provision of adequate physical necessities is a vital step, yet, paradoxically, the implications of this "vital step" are given little attention in explaining the behavior of the poor.

Professor Hughes refers to the need for data on the "hypotheses" I set forth. Actually the only hypothesis presented concerns the "relationship between physical and status needs in the lower-class motivational system." I hypothesize that the more the behavior of lower-class persons is governed by physical deprivation, the less their behavior is governed by status deprivation. It may be that he is treating as hypotheses the summary statements on the social-psychological characteristics of lower-class persons. These statements, derived from empirical studies, were intended to be seen as empirical generalizations. Whether the data from some of these studies are merely suggestive, and thus questionable, is yet another matter.

As to the possibility of throwing light on today's approach to poverty by evaluating the contributions of an earlier sociology, there are few scholars more eminently suited to the task than Professor Hughes. As recently as 1961 it was claimed that, "Half a century ago American social scientists sometimes focused their attention on such age-old social problems as poverty, slums and delinquency. Today, research interest in these areas has considerably attenuated. Among other things, this testifies to the effectiveness with which they were illumined by an earlier generation's mixture of enthusiasm and scientific skill" (Raymond W. Mack and George W. Baker, *The Occasion Instant—the Structure of Social Responses to Unanticipated Air Raid Warnings* [Washington: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Disaster Research Group, 1961], p. 61).

I suspect that an assessment by Professor Hughes would entertain different conclusions.

JACK L. ROACH

State University of New York at Buffalo

Community Adoption and Implementation of Urban Renewal[1]

Amos H. Hawley's "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success" (*American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1963) presents an attractive alternative to the traditional case-study method of investigating community power structure. By using census data, he is able to advance a general proposition about community behavior and test it for a large number of cities.

Hawley hypothesizes that the greater the concentration of power in a community, the more easily the community can be mobilized to take action. Using the ratio of managers, officials, and proprietors to the total employed labor force (the MPO ratio) as a measure of power concentration, he finds that cities with a low MPO ratio (and hence high power concentration) are more likely to (1) initiate urban-renewal planning, and (2) successfully execute an urban-renewal program. Unfortunately,

[1] The author wishes to thank Robert L. Crain for his helpful suggestions and criticisms of an earlier draft of this note.

these findings may not be valid, for there are several methodological weaknesses in his approach.

THREE METHODOLOGICAL DRAWBACKS

1. *The MPO ratio.*—Although Hawley bases his thesis on the assumption that power "must be exercised through the managerial functions of the subsystems," he employs the number of managerial personnel to indicate the number of functions.[2] To complete the chain, the number of managerial functions is an index of power structure. Thus we have a power pyramid with policy makers at the apex, followed by the managerial functions which are active in implementing policy decisions, and with the number of managerial personnel as measured by the MPO ratio forming the base. Since one would not expect a one-to-one correlation between adjoining sections of this power pyramid, the base should be the *least* accurate index of the number of policy makers in the power structure at the apex.

An impressive number of studies suggest that although power is highly concentrated in some small communities, the larger communities, where economic enterprises are often managed by highly mobile "hired managers" rather than local owners, are likely to have a more diffuse power structure.[3] If MPO ratios are a sensitive measure of concentration of power, they should be lower for smaller cities. Instead, the MPO ratio appears to be independent of city size.[4]

Granted that the MPO ratio is a crude measure of power structure, its use might be justified on the basis that it is the best available measure. The danger, however, of accepting such a loose operational measure of power concentration is that the MPO ratio may be just as good an indicator—if not better—of other factors, for instance, the flight of white-collar workers to the suburbs. Let us examine some of these possibilities.

The lower MPO ratios of cities participating in the urban-renewal program might be attributed to a higher proportion of managerial personnel living in the suburban fringe outside of the municipal boundaries of these cities. Rather than being an index of power concentration, the MPO ratio may reflect the age or extent of dilapidation of the city, which, in turn, may reduce the proportion of managerial personnel living within the city limits. Hawley attempts to eliminate this problem by controlling for metropolitan status (i.e., central city or suburb).[5] This dichotomized control is inadequate as it does not control for differences between older and younger, bigger and smaller central cities.

Besides failing to include those who live in suburbs and work in the central city, the MPO ratio counts many occupations (e.g., railroad conductors, ships' pilots, store buyers, etc.) which do not usually carry the potential for exercising power while excluding others which do (e.g., lawyers, writers, ministers, etc.).[6] There is no reason to believe that the ratio of oc-

[2] Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (January, 1963), 424.

[3] For example, see Paul A. Miller, "The Process of Decision-making within the Context of Community Organization," *Rural Sociology*, XVII (1952), 153–61; Peter H. Rossi and Phillips Cutright, "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting," and Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," both in *Community Political Systems*, ed. Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961).

[4] Hawley finds no significant differences between MPO ratios for cities of 50,000 population or more, and for cities of 15,000–50,000 population (*op. cit.*, pp. 425–26).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 477.

[6] Although Hawley indicates (n. 7, p. 424) that he has used "only managers, proprietors, and officials 'not elsewhere classified'" to compute the MPO ratio, the author has discovered that the average MPO ratios in Table 1 (p. 426) match those of *all* managers, proprietors, and officials (1950 Census, Vol. II, Table 35). Apparently, the "not elsewhere classified" MPO ratios are those listed in Table 5 (p. 431) of the Hawley article.

cupations without power potential (railroad conductors, etc.) to those with it will be constant from community to community.

Implicit in Hawley's argument is the assumption that the decision-making arena is defined by city boundaries. Although this is a realistic operational approach, it ignores (or assumes constant) regional and state influence. State governments exercise considerable power in the decision arena. For instance, the state of Illinois gives full authority to cities to initiate and administer conservation renewal, but such acts are subject to the approval of the Illinois State Housing Authority.[7] At the end of 1959, urban renewal was legally permissible in forty-two states.[8] However, some of these states have reversed their opinion; for example, Florida declared urban renewal unconstitutional in 1952 but reversed this decision in 1959. This may explain why many Florida cities, such as Miami and Daytona Beach, entered but later dropped out of the urban-renewal program. The implication to be derived here is that the outcome of local decision-making with respect to urban renewal is not solely dependent upon the partisans in the local arena.

The ten states which had not legally approved or had reversed favorable legal rulings toward urban renewal in the 1951–60 period are all clustered in the South or West.[9] This raises the possibility that the remaining states (where urban renewal is legally permissible) in the South and West may have political and legal conditions less favorable to the acceptance and implementation of urban renewal than states in the northeast and north-central regions. Since these southern and western states have disproportionately high MPO ratios (see Table 1), the observed relations between urban-renewal success and the MPO ratio may be reflecting differences between states and not community power structure.[10]

One strong question emerges from these points: Is the observed correlation between urban-renewal success and the MPO ratio attributable to differences in community power structure or to spurious correlations with other factors such as the socio-economic status or age of a city?

TABLE 1

MEAN MPO RATIOS WITH FIVE SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED

CONTROL VARIABLES	URBAN-RENEWAL STATUS		
	Execution Stage	Dropout	Never in Program
Age of housing:			
Young	10.1	10.7	12.2
Old	8.2	9.5	9.5
Planning budget:			
Small	8.8	9.3	11.0
Large	9.6	11.3	11.6
Industry:			
Service	10.0	10.9	12.6
Manufacturing	8.1	9.2	9.7
Education:			
Low	8.2	9.8	8.6
High	9.8	10.5	12.4
Region:			
Northeast	8.5	8.1	9.8
North-central	8.5	10.6	10.4
South	9.4	11.0	12.2
West	11.9	12.8	12.6

Source: Hawley, *op cit*, Table 3, p 428

2. *The dependent variable.*—Hawley's dependent variable consisted of three groups: (1) cities that have never been in the federal program, (2) cities that entered but dropped out, and (3) cities that reached the execution stage. This measure

[7] Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, *The Politics of Urban Renewal* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), p. 86.

[8] *Annual Report of the Housing and Home Finance Agency* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951–60).

[9] These were Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming.

[10] Although Hawley controlled for regional differences, this control may not be adequate to catch state differences. This problem has been mitigated (but not solved) by using eight regional controls in the present investigation in place of the four regions employed by Hawley.

of urban-renewal success fails to reflect differences in the magnitude (coverage) and progress (speed of entry and execution) of a city's renewal program. The same measure of success is given to a city whose sole urban-renewal project took eight years to reach execution as to a city of similar size that has executed many projects within half this time.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF HAWLEY'S VARIABLES WITH THOSE USED IN THIS STUDY

Hawley's Variable	Measure Employed Here
Age of housing..	Identical: percentage of houses built 1919 or before
Extent of dilapidation....	Identical: percentage of houses dilapidated
Planning budget	Identical: percentage of operating budget for planning
Government...	Identical: mayor-council, city manager, commission*
Industry.......	Identical: ratio, manufacturing to non-manufacturing payroll
Size of manufacturing plant..	Identical: Average size (employees)
Education.....	Identical: percentage with four or more years college
Size...........	Identical: Log city size†
Metropolitan status.......	Employment-residence ratio
Median income.	Percentage of families with incomes between $3,000 and $10,000
Region........	New England, Middle Atlantic, Border, South, Middle West, Southwest, Far West, and Great Plains*

* Split out as separate dichotomous variables with "1" representing presence of the categorical trait and "0" absence for regression analysis.

† Transformed to three-place logarithms.

3. *The control variables.*—Five of the eleven control variables employed by Hawley are shown in Table 1. This table indicates that with each control, the cities which successfully executed urban renewal have a lower mean MPO ratio than cities which began planning but eventually dropped out of the program, and that the dropouts have a lower mean MPO ratio than cities that have never entered the program. Although holding each of these control variables constant (i.e., by dichotomizing) does not destroy the observed relationship between the MPO ratio and urban-renewal success, there is no assurance that the observed relationship would still hold if all of the control variables were held *simultaneously*. This is an important point, for many of these control variables such as age of housing have a strong correlation with the MPO ratio. This question will now be examined.

RE-EXAMINATION OF HAWLEY'S DATA

Methods of procedure.—Demographic and political data were gathered for every city in the United States with a population over 15,000 according to the 1950 census.[11] Excluded from this sample were the ten states which did not legally approve urban renewal or reversed favorable legal rulings in the 1951–60 period. In all, 765 cities were included in the analysis.

Only three of the eleven control variables used here differ from those employed by Hawley (see Table 2). Instead of measuring metropolitan status by a simple "central city/suburb" dichotomy, the employment-residence ratio (ratio of numbers of jobs in the city in manufacturing and trade to number of residents employed in these industries) was used.[12] The percentage of families with income between $3,000 and $10,000 was substituted for the median income measure used by Hawley because this proportion is more affected by changes in the income distribution than the median figure. Also, eight variables were included

[11] The author is indebted to Amos H. Hawley and Robert L. Crain who graciously provided worksheets and IBM decks from their respective studies of urban renewal and fluoridation, which greatly lightened the clerical work in this study.

[12] Source: *1960 Municipal Yearbook*, p. 92.

to measure region instead of the four variables in the Hawley study.

The MPO ratio and the eleven control variables were then run as independent variables against urban-renewal success in a regression program.[13] The dependent variable (urban-renewal success) also was slightly different from Hawley's because an arbitrary scaling procedure would be necessary to collapse his three categories (cities never in federal urban-renewal program, cities that have dropped out, and cities that have reached the execution stage) into a single dependent variable.

Two alternate ways of measuring urban-renewal success were considered. The simplest is to classify cities in a dichotomy on the basis of whether or not they have ever been in the federal renewal program. A second procedure, more suitable to a regression analysis than a dichotomous dependent variable, is the speed with which a community entered the urban-renewal program. Specifically, this variable is coded as the number of years that a community has been in the urban-renewal program since 1951. Thus a community that has never been in the program would be coded "0," while one that has been in the program since the start would receive a weight of "10." This latter measure, which has a slightly higher multiple correlation (.62) with the set of independent variables than the dichotomous measure (.59), was finally selected as the dependent variable.

Results.—To test the significance of Hawley's thesis, we shall examine the simple and partial correlation coefficients between the MPO ratio and urban-renewal success (see Table 3). Both of these coefficients are in the direction predicted by Hawley: the MPO ratio is inversely related to urban-renewal success. However, this relationship is not very strong. The simple correlation coefficient is only —.21, but apparently this is enough to produce the differences reported by Hawley (given in the last three entries of Table 3) as the range of these three groups (execution, dropout, and never-in cities) is within plus or minus one-half standard deviation from the mean MPO ratio for all cities over 15,000 in population.

Now when all of the control variables listed in Table 2 are held constant, the correlation between the MPO ratio and urban-renewal success shrinks to —.07. This means that when all of the variables that Hawley wished to control for are simultaneously held constant, the MPO ratio explains only 0.5 per cent of the variance in urban-renewal success. Moreover, two of these control variables—log city size and age of housing—are better predictors of urban-renewal success than the MPO ratio (see Table 4). It is quite puzzling why city size did not receive more attention from Hawley. Perhaps this relationship was blurred by his choice of a cutting point—cities of 15,000–50,000 population compared to cities of 50,000 or more.

Table 4 indicates that the MPO ratio is strongly related to high education, average size of manufacturing plant, age of housing, and the employment-residence ratio. These latter two measures support the previous

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL MEASURES RELATING TO MPO RATIO

Measure	Value
Mean	10.5
Standard deviation	3.8
Simple correlation with urban-renewal success	−.21
Partial correlation with urban-renewal success (all control variables held constant)	−.07
Mean MPO ratio for execution stage*	9.0
Mean MPO ratio for dropout cities*	10.0
Mean MPO ratio for cities never in program*	11.0

* From Hawley, *op. cit.*, p. 426 (for cities of 15,000 population and over).

[13] Computer time was supported by the National Science Foundation.

contention that the MPO ratio may be a spurious correlate of other factors like age and socioeconomic status of a city.

The regression program employed lists of independent variables in the order of their importance based on the reduction of sum of squares of the dependent variable attributable successively to each independent variable. Three variables—log city size, percentage of houses built before 1919, and percentage of houses dilapidated—accounted for 8 per cent of the variance attributable to regression. Since these measures have moderate correlations with the MPO ratio (see Table 4), the observed correlation between the MPO ratio and urban-renewal success may be spurious.[14]

TABLE 4

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES (×100)

Control Variables	Dependent (Urban-Renewal Success)	Independent (MPO Ratio)
Log city size	52	−14
Percentage of houses built 1919 or before	25	−34
Percentage with four or more years college	−16	49
Percentage of houses dilapidated	15	−10
Employment-residence ratio	13	−21
Percentage of families with $3,000-$10,000 incomes	13	−00
Average size manufacturing plant	12	−34
Ratio, manufacturing to non-manufacturing payroll	2	−17
Percentage of operating budget for planning	−00	−01
Mayor-council form of government	−07	−16
City manager form of government	−04	24
Commission form of government	14	−08
New England	5	−12
Atlantic	13	−11
Border	−00	6
South	13	−04
Middle West	−11	−09
Southwest	00	13
Far West	−09	19
Plains	−10	7

Two important qualifications should be made. First, statistical assumptions such as that of normally distributed variables are not met. Second, partial correlation coefficients can be very misleading. For example, suppose that the MPO ratio is the best operational measure of power concentration; that is, of all possible measures, it has the highest correlation with this theoretical concept. Now it is very likely that other variables included in the analysis will also have some correlation with power concentration. If these other variables are held constant, the partial correlation coefficient for the MPO ratio will understate its true contribution.

SUMMARY

Although there may be a relationship between Hawley's theoretical concept of power concentration and urban-renewal success, the relationship between his operational measure of this concept—the MPO ratio—and urban-renewal progress is very slight when his control variables are held constant simultaneously. Whether or not the MPO ratio is spurious remains to be established by further inquiry.

BRUCE C. STRAITS

University of Chicago

[14] These measures and other variables not employed by Hawley will be discussed in a subsequent paper.

Reply

I have looked forward for some time to Mr. Straits's critique of my paper. The product, though not lacking in craftsmanship, is less than satisfactory from my point of view. My discontent rests on two grounds: the liberties the author takes with

theoretical and factual matters and the failure to achieve a replication. In speaking of these two points I must rely on memory, for I am living in Bangkok at present and have access neither to my work sheets nor to a copy of the published paper.

An illustration of my first criticism appears in the third paragraph. There the author speaks of a "power pyramid with policy makers at the apex, followed by the managerial functions which are active in implementing policy decisions, and with the number of managerial personnel as measured by the MPO ratio forming the base." Apparently Mr. Straits does not understand that the MPO ratio uses all proprietors, managers, and officials reported in the Census, including those in the top and in the middle of his pyramid, but excluding certain technical specialists who seem not to hold policy-making positions. Hence his sentence concluding that paragraph is unsubstantiated. I fully agree, however, that a more accurate index is easily conceivable. Mr. Straits must have forgotten to include the alternative he had in mind.

Of much the same character is the author's argument for the city-size variable. On page 78 he begins a paragraph with: "An impressive number of studies suggest that although power is highly concentrated in some small communities, the larger communities, where economic enterprises are often managed by highly mobile 'hired managers' rather than local owners, are likely to have a more diffuse power structure." This curious statement is presumably supported by three studies, none of which, unfortunately, contains the kind of comparative material needed for this purpose. There is no argument here for attention to the city-size variable.

I am puzzled by Mr. Straits's contention that I misrepresented the data. Evidently he did not read the code sheets I placed at his disposal. His remarks notwithstanding, special pains were taken in coding only "proprietors, managers, and officials, not elsewhere classified." Now I find myself wondering whether Mr. Straits is not less concerned with replicating a study than with creating straws at which to grasp.

This suspicion grows as I come to the discussion of the influence of state legislation on city powers. I am well aware, and I was at the time of the study, that ten or more states had no urban-renewal enabling legislation. The number of such states changed, however, during the years 1950 to 1959, and as states enacted appropriate legislation or altered their constitutions their cities entered the universe of cities adopted for the study. If Mr. Straits had read my code sheets, he would have seen that cities in Florida appeared only after the constitutional issue was favorably settled in that state.

Turning to the replication attempted by Mr. Straits, his account of what he did is not clear. I refer specifically to his description of the dependent variable, which he defines as "the number of years that a community has been in the urban-renewal program since 1951." But "being in the program" can have various meanings. It can mean (1) years since entering the planning stage, (2) years since entering the execution stage, or (3) years spent in either stage but terminated by withdrawal from participation. Given this source of ambiguity, I wonder whether Mr. Straits's dependent variable is not more than slightly different from mine. I took the position that the variable is a discontinuous one; Mr. Straits assumes it is continuous. It would be interesting to know how he assigned his scale values. Does he contend, for example, that Los Angeles, which spent eight or nine years in the planning stage before it reached the execution stage, should have the same scale value as another city that started at the same time but reached the execution stage seven or eight years earlier? Is a city that spent three years in

the planning stage only to drop out of the program to be equated with another that reached the execution stage in three years? Mr. Straits seems to deal with the association of MPO ratio with years spent in the program, whereas my problem was the association of MPO ratio with a measure of urban-renewal success. The problems are different; the results, therefore, are not comparable.

AMOS H. HAWLEY

National Research Council
Bangkok, Thailand

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?"

February 15, 1965

To the Editor:

I wish to call attention to a minor flaw in Professor Harold Wilensky's very penetrating article, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" (*American Journal of Sociology*, LXX [1964], 137–58). On page 153, a negative correlation between the index of "professional-discipline orientation" and the index of "careerist orientation" is reported ($r = -.27$). This appears to be a statistical artifact which necessarily results from the scoring procedure employed.

Consider an example. Suppose a university professor says that his departmental chairman "should count most" in assessing his performance. Such a professor would receive a contribution of three (3) on the careerist index for his response to the first of the questions used in the construction of that index. By the same token, the highest possible "professional-discipline" score he could receive for his response would be one (1). Here, then, a high score on one index necessarily lowers the score on the other. Under these conditions, the reported r is spurious, and to state that it is significantly different from zero ($p < 0.01$) is not an interpretable statistical statement.

It may well be that spuriousness due to indexes also affects the relationship between professionalism and client orientation which is reported on page 154. In this case, the data reported do not permit more than a suspicion.

My intention is not to detract from the general significance of Wilensky's important contribution to our understanding of professions. My intention is to call attention to a type of error in statistical description which continues to occur in the sociological literature all too frequently. We are forced to rely on indexes in many instances; we should constantly be aware of the possibility of spuriousness in the correlations we compute involving such indexes.

RICHARD J. HILL

University of Texas

Reply

Professor Hill was most gracious in calling the spurious component of these three indexes a minor flaw. My error in phrasing the reference-group question makes it impossible to attach statistical significance to the two small negative correlations—$-.27$ between professional-discipline orientation and careerism and $-.33$ between professionalism and client orientation. Although the error is all too common and in the context of my study minor in its implications, it is inexcusable.

Since recruitment, training, and indoctrination are everywhere imperfect, man

and job never fitting precisely, I assumed that role orientations would typically be mixed, but that the structural conflicts under discussion would be reflected in small negative relationships among the types of orientation. I therefore aimed to permit the respondent to express these mixed views on all questions, including "Whose judgment should count most when your overall professional performance is assessed?" "Are there any others on this list whose judgments should count?" In an overloaded survey interview, this was a clear, quick question, with reasonable face validity, but the scoring necessitated by

TABLE 1

Professional Responses to Things Most Important in a Job	Careerist Responses to Things Most Important in a Job	
	Low (0, 1) (per cent)	High (2, 3) (per cent)
Low (0, 1)	78	100
High (2, 3)............	22	0
Total...............	100 (450)	100 (40)

the form of the question introduces an element of spuriousness of unknown proportions when we correlate individual scores on the indexes.

However, three fortunate facts save the day.

1. The other indicators of these orientations (what things are most important to you in a job, how thoroughly do you read your professional journals) permit the relevant comparisons. A purified index of professionalism based only on responses to these two questions correlates —.14 with a scale of careerist responses to things most important in a job and —.01 with the client-oriented responses to that question. More important, if we examine the fifteen cross-tabulations of single items for which no spurious associations are present, rather than summary indexes, we find small relationships in the predicted direction for eight instances (negative for indicators of careerist versus professional, client versus professional orientations, positive for indicators of the same orientation), no relationship for six pairs of indicators, and only one reversal. For instance, Table 1 is a cross-tabulation of types of responses for one question, dichotomizing four-point

TABLE 2

Professional Responses to Whose Judgment Should Count	Careerist Responses to Things Most Important in a Job	
	Low (0, 1) (per cent)	High (2, 3) (per cent)
Low (0, 1)	54	78
High (2, 3).	46	22
Total...	100 (450)	100 (40)

TABLE 3

Client-oriented Responses to Whose Judgment Should Count	Professional Responses to Things Most Important in a Job	
	Low (0, 1) (per cent)	High (2, 3) (per cent)
Non-client oriented .	65	77
Client oriented	35	23
Total.	100 (392)	100 (98)

scales. All the men who score high in careerism score low in professionalism; 78 per cent of those low in careerism are low in professionalism.

Support for the original formulation—that a professional orientation is slightly subverted by careerism and by a client orientation—is also found in Tables 2 and 3, which are based on responses to pairs of questions. Seventy-eight per cent of the men scoring high on careerism (things most important) score low on professionalism (they do not list colleagues as most

important in judging the quality of professional performance); 54 per cent of those low in careerism are low in professionalism. Thirty-five per cent of those low compared to 23 per cent of those high in professionalism mention clients as a reference group.

Once the spurious element was removed from the indexes, the correlation between client and professional orientations moved from weak (—.33) to negligible (—.01). A reason for this appears in other tables. For instance, of the fifteen combinations possible the one reversal obtained is for the cross-tabulation of client-oriented responses in things most important in a job and professional reference groups. Fifty-six per cent of those who are client oriented (things most important) mention a colleague group as most important in judging the quality of their professional work, as compared to 43 per cent of the men not client oriented. By some measures a client orientation undermines professionalism; by this one it does not.

2. Before I computed the correlations between the summary measures, I had examined a variety of tables involving no spuriousness; they led me to appropriate caution in interpretation on page 153, which contains the main message: "Taking account of the entire range . . . this inverse relationship [between indexes of professionalism and careerism] is not strong, which suggests that mixed types of orientations are typical, consistent with the idea of the interpenetration of bureaucratic and professional cultures."

3. No other result reported in this article or anywhere else is affected by the error. My use of the three indexes to describe and explain differences by occupation and workplace in professionalism, careerism, and client orientation stands.

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Doctor's Degrees in Sociology, 1964

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Robert Grimes Capps, B.S. College of William and Mary, 1950; M.A. American, 1954. "The Primitive Baptist Church in Eastern North Carolina —a Study of the Influence of Secularization."

Lola Marie Irelan, A.B. George Washington, 1955; M.A. American, 1961. "Some Conditions of Association between Child-rearing Values and Patterns of Occupational Preference."

Philip Hilmar Person, Jr., B.S., M.S., Wisconsin, 1949, 1951. "The Relationship between Selected Social and Demographic Characteristics of Hospitalized Mental Patients and the Outcome of Hospitalization."

Albert Lawrence Shostack, B.S.S., City College N.Y., 1944; A.M. Columbia, 1947. "Migratory Farm Labor Crews in Eastern Maryland—a Preliminary Typology."

Jerry Alan Solon, B.A. City College N.Y., 1941; M.A. American, 1951. "Subcultures in a Hospital Outpatient Department: A Study of Differential Patterns of Medical Care."

BROWN UNIVERSITY

Dan Da-Yuan, A B. Spring Hill College, 1957; M.A. City College N.Y., 1959. "The Rural-Urban Continuum: A Demographic Case Study of Taiwan."

Calvin Goldscheider, A.B. Yeshiva, 1961; M A. Brown, 1963. "Trends and Differentials in Jewish Fertility: A Study of the Providence Metropolitan Area."

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (LOS ANGELES)

Shelly E. Chandler, A.B., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1961, 1962. "The Relative Influence of Type of Work and Socioeconomic Status on Occupational Orientation."

Andrew P. Phillips, A.B. California (Los Angeles), 1958. "The Development of a Modern Labor Force in Antigua."

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Douglas F. Campbell, B.A. St. Francis Xavier, 1955; M.A. Catholic, 1962. "Values and Religion among Nova Scotian College Students."

John F. Connors, B.S. Mount St. Mary's College, 1948; M.A. Catholic, 1954. "The Adequacy of Federal Low-Rent Public Housing for Large Families: A Study of Value Conflict within a Social Reform Agency."

Joseph G. Green, Jr., A.B. Harvard, 1945; A.M. Boston, 1947. "Patrick Henry Callahan (1866-1940): The Social Role of an American Catholic Lay Leader."

Sister Mary Ester Heffernan, M.A. Chicago, 1951. "Inmate Social Systems and Subsystems: The 'Square,' the 'Cool,' and the 'Life.'"

Richard C. Leonard, B.A. College of St. Thomas, 1949; M.A. Catholic, 1950. "Community Values in Educational and Occupational Selection: A Study of Youth in Emmitsburg, Maryland."

Sister Mary George O'Toole, B.A. St. Joseph's College (Maine), 1951; M A. Catholic, 1961. "Sisters of Mercy of Maine· A Religious Community as a Social System."

Sister Mary Regis Ramold, B A. Loras College, 1957; M.A. Catholic, 1961. "The Ursulines of Mount St. Joseph: A Religious Community as a Social System."

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Albert D Biderman, A.B. New York, 1947; A.M. Chicago, 1952. "American Prisoners of War in Korea: Reinterpretations of the Data."

Alan Blum, A B. Roosevelt, 1957; A.M. Chicago, 1962. "Family Structure, Peer Culture, and the Learning of Political History."

Lee Braude, A M. Chicago, 1954. "The Rabbi: A Study of the Relation of Contingency Situations to Differential Career Structure."

John David Colfax, S.B. Pennsylvania State, 1958; A M. Pittsburgh, 1960. "The Big-City Voter: A Study of Political Participation in Chicago."

Reynolds Farley, A B. Notre Dame, 1960; A.M. Chicago, 1963. "Negro Cohort Fertility."

Harold Finestone, A.B., A M. McGill, 1942, 1943. "A Comparative Study of Reformation and Recidivism among Polish and Italian Criminal Offenders."

David R. Heise, A.B. Missouri, 1959; A.M. Chicago, 1962. "Effects of Motivation on Word Choice in Verbal Behavior."

R. S. Kurup, B.Sc., M.Sc. Kerala, 1948, 1950. "Recent Trends in World Mortality and Their Implications for a Revised System of Model Life Tables."

Terrance A. Nosanchuk, A B. Wayne State, 1958; A.M. Chicago, 1962. "A Multivariate Analysis of the Acquaintance Process"

Bryan Rees Roberts, B A. Oxford, 1961; A M Chicago, 1964. "The Effects of College Experience and Social Background on Professional Orientations of Prospective Teachers."

Larry Rosenberg, A.B. Brooklyn College, 1954; A.M. Chicago, 1961. "Communication Styles and

Learning: A Factor-analytic Study of Teacher-Student Interaction."

Jose Vazquez, S.B. Puerto Rico; A.M. Chicago, 1961. "The Demographic Evolution of Puerto Rico."

Rodney Francis White, A.B., M.A. Toronto, 1943, 1949. "Female Identity and Work Roles: The Case of Nursing."

Joseph Zelan, A.B., A.M. Chicago, 1954, 1963. "Recruitment in the Legal Profession: A Study of College Student Career Choice."

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

Azmy Ishak Ibrahim, B.A. Alexandria (Egypt) 1955; Dip. Social Sciences, High Institute of Education (Egypt), 1956; Dip. Librarianship, Public (Egypt), 1957. "Process of Group Identification in a Sorority: A Reformulation of Reference-Group Theory."

Daniel T. Valdes, A.B. Adams State College, 1936. "A Sociological Analysis and Description of the Political Role, Status, and Voting Behavior of Americans with Spanish Names."

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Diana Crane, A.B. Radcliffe College, 1953. "The Environment of Discovery: A Study of Academic Research Interests and Their Setting."

Victor A. Gelineau, A.B. Boston, 1949. "Study of Student Volunteers."

Harold S. Goldblatt, B.S. City College N.Y., 1940. "Controversial Teaching, Teachers, and Graduate Schools."

Jane Hauser, B.A. Iowa, 1946; M.A. Columbia, 1947. "The College Admissions Officer: A Study of an Occupation in a Period of Change."

Celia Heller, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1944. "Ambitions of American Youth: Goals and Means of Mobility."

Martin David Hyman, A.B. Princeton, 1955. "Some Attitudinal Behavioral Consequences of Certain Forms of Rank Inconsistency."

Emily Mumford, A.B. Tulsa, 1941. "Interns and Residents in Two Hospital Learning Environments: A Comparative Study."

Yonathan Shapiro, M.A. (Law) Jerusalem, 1953; B.S. London, 1956. "The Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897–1930."

Irving Silverman, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1948; M.A. Columbia, 1950. "Social Control and Mental Health."

Roberta Simmons, B.A. Wellesley College, 1959. "The Effect of Evaluations upon Role-Conflict Resolution: Organizational Experiment Focusing on the Corruption of the First-Line Supervisor."

Christopher Smith, B.S. Springfield College, 1934; M.A. Columbia, 1936. "The Occupational Ladder: A Study of Vertical Occupational Mobility in American Industry."

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Richard Lawrence Means, A.B. Kalamazoo College, 1953; M.A. Cornell, 1959. "Protestantism in American Sociology, 1930-63: A Study of the Relations between Theory, Research, and Historical Sociology."

Clement Joseph Schneider, A.B. St. Louis, 1951. "Adjustment of Employed Women to Retirement."

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Jeanine H. Gavin, B.A., M.A. Bradley, 1954, 1957. "Norm Content and Leadership as a Function of Verbal Reinforcement."

Columbus Hopper, B.A. Furman, 1954; M.A. North Carolina, 1958. "A Study of Conjugal Visiting, Social Organization, and Prisonization in the Mississippi State Penitentiary."

Elisha Monroe Rallings, B.S., M.S. Clemson Agricultural College, 1949, 1950. "A Comparative Study of the Family Situations of Married and Never-married Males."

Robert M. White, Ph.B., M.A. North Dakota, 1955, 1957. "The Tallahassee Sit-ins and CORE: A Non-violent Revolutionary Submovement."

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Rosemary Higgins Cass, B.A. College of St. Elizabeth, 1950; LL.B. Columbia Law School, 1953. "The Effects on Family Life of Mothers in Paid Employment."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dexter C. Dunphy, A.B., M.Ed. Sydney (Australia), 1956, 1961. "Social Change in Self-analytic Groups."

Gordon Allan Fellman, A.B. Antioch College, 1957; M.A. Harvard, 1962. "Indian Socialists and Jayaprakash Narayan: A Study in Political Sociology and Biography."

Joan Ann Levin, A.B. Michigan, 1957; M.A. Harvard, 1959. "Social Status Ambiguity and Residential Location."

Johannas Loubser, B.A. Stellenbosch, 1954. "Puritanism and Religious Liberty: Change in the Normative Order in Massachusetts, 1630–1850."

Leon Hinckley Mayhew, A.B. California, 1956; M.A. Harvard, 1960. "Law and Equal Opportunity: Antidiscrimination Law in Massachusetts."

Rebecca Stafford Vreeland, A.B. Radcliffe College, 1958; M.A. Harvard, 1961. "Organization Structure and Moral Orientations: A Study of Harvard Houses."

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Henry G. Bobtek, B.S., A.M. Illinois, 1951, 1958. "Partitioning of Areas into Subareas: The Problem of a Comparison of Two Procedures."

Bruce Kent Eckland, B.S., M.A. Illinois, 1957, 1960. "A Study of College Dropouts and Graduates Ten Years after Matriculation, with Special Reference to Social Origins and Intergenerational Mobility."

William C. Jenne, B.S. Illinois State Normal, 1953; M.A. Illinois, 1958. "Parental Life Goals for Children."

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Stuart Lee Hills, A.B. College of Wooster, 1955; M.A. Indiana, 1958. "Voluntary Associations and Communicative Integration in a Suburban Community."

Francis O. Okediji, A.B. Ottawa (Kansas), 1960; M.A. Kansas, 1961. "Strangers and Their Social Adjustment on College Campuses: A Study of African Students in Two Midwestern Universities."

Edmund W. Vaz, B.A., M.A. McGill, 1951, 1955. "A Sociological Interpretation of Middle-Class Juvenile Delinquency."

Evangelos C. Vlachos, LL.B. Athens, 1959; M.A. Indiana, 1962. "The Assimilation of Greeks in the United States, with Special Reference to the Greek Community of Anderson, Indiana."

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Jenniev Poulson, B.S. Brigham Young, 1953; M S. Iowa State, 1954. "Factors Affecting the Extent of Goal Agreement between Husbands and Wives."

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Robert Eugene Claus, B.A. Iowa State Teachers College, 1949; M.A. Iowa, 1955. "Consistency of Self-responses on the Twenty-Statements Test of Self-attitudes."

Donald Godfrey McTavish, B.A., M.A. Iowa, 1956, 1960. "The Situs and Industry Components of Occupations: Predictive Utility in Five Surveys."

Joseph H. Meyerowitz, B.A. Chicago, 1953; M.S. Hunter College, 1956. "Sociological Aspects of Early Identification and Special Treatment of the Educationally Retarded Child."

Gilbert David Nass, B.A. Wartburg College, 1952; M.A. Iowa, 1958. "Friendship Formation: An Empirical Test of Balance Theory."

John Wilford Prehn, B.A. Macalester College, 1959; M.A. Iowa, 1960. "Social Mobility through Higher Education and Its Relationship to Internal Migration."

LaFrances Rodgers Rose, B.A. Morgan State College, 1958; M.A. Fisk, 1960. "A Test of Three Stages of Harry Stack Sullivan's Developmental Theory of Personality: Juvenile Era, Preadolescence, and Early Adolescent Stages."

Raymond Louis Schmitt, B.A., M.A. Notre Dame, 1958, 1959. "An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of the Self Concept, the Reference Group, and Ego Involvement on Behavior in the ASCH Situation."

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

Gordon DeJong, B.A. Central College, 1957; M A. Kentucky, 1960. "Human Fertility in the Southern Appalachian Region: Some Demographic and Sociological Aspects."

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Clifton D. Bryant, B.A., M.A. Mississippi, 1950, 1957. "The Petroleum Landman: A Sociological Analysis of an Occupation."

Arthur R. Jones, Jr., B A. Baylor, 1959; M A. Louisiana State, 1962. "Social and Cultural Foundations of Man-caused Forest Fires"

John P. Reed, LL.B, M.A. Illinois, 1953, 1955. "The Effects of Selection Processes on Trial Outcome: An Evaluation of Trial by One's Peers."

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY (CHICAGO)

Rosemary Bannan, A.B Marywood College, 1948, M.A. Catholic, 1950. "Attitudes of Jewish High-School Students toward Religious Groups and Non-Church Members."

Patrick A. U. Opara, A B. St. Joseph College, 1959; M S.I.R. Loyola, 1961. "Social-Area Analysis and Social Participation of the Negro Community of Chicago."

Sister M. Theresita, A B. DePaul, 1939; M A. Loyola, 1959. "A Comparative Cross-cultural Study of Values of Chicago and Lima, Peru, Children by Social Classes."

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Emmert F. Bittinger, A.B. Bridgewater College, 1945; M A. Maryland, 1951. "Realism and Vocational Expectations."

Robert Lee Derbyshire, A.B, M.A. Maryland, 1954, 1959. "Personal Identity: An Attitude Study of American Negro College Students."

Lewis M. Knebel, A.B. Columbia College, 1921; M.A. Columbia, 1944. "College Placement and College Relations: A Study of the Process of Occupational Development."

John M. Wilson, B.J. Missouri, 1954; M.A. Maryland, 1958. "A Sociological Investigation and Comparative Analysis of Patterns of Beliefs of Negro and White Alcoholic Offenders Regarding the Use of Alcoholic Beverages."

Ulysses S. Young, A.B. West Virginia State, 1936; M.A. Pennsylvania, 1940. "The Relation of Social Factors to Mental Syndromes: A Case Analysis of Thirty-seven Negro Mental Patients and Their Families."

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Michael Thomas Aiken, B A. Mississippi, 1954; A M. Michigan, 1955. "Kinship in an Urban Community."

Bashshur Rashid, B.A., M.A. American (Beirut), 1954, 1956. "The Influence of Ecological Factors on Values in the Detroit Area."

John William Smit, A.B. Calvin College, 1957; A.M. Michigan, 1959. "A Matched Group Study of Religious Differentials in Fertility and Family Planning."

Donald Irwin Warren, A.B., A.M. Wayne State, 1957, 1959. "Modes of Conformity and the Character of Formal and Informal Organization Structure: A Comparative Study of Public Schools."

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Paolo Ammassari, A.B., M.A. (equivalent) Florence (Italy), 1958. "Worker Satisfaction and Occupational Life: A Study of the Automobile Worker in Italy."

Paul H. Besanceney, B.Lit. Xavier, 1947; A.M. St. Louis, 1954; S.T.L. West Baden College, 1957. "Factors Associated with Protestant-Catholic Marriages in the Detroit Area: A Problem in Social Control."

Steven E. Deutsch, B.A. Oberlin College, 1958; M.A. Michigan State, 1959. "Skill Level, Social Involvements, and Ideology: A Study of Automobile Workers."

Leo Driedger, B.A. Bethel College, 1954; M.A. Chicago, 1955; B.D. Bethany Seminary, 1960. "Religious Typology and the Social Ideology of the Clergy."

Benjamin J. Hodgkins, B.A., M.A. Michigan State, 1956, 1961. "Student Subcultures—an Analysis of Their Origins and Effects on Student Attitude and Value Change in Higher Education."

Irwin W. Miller, B.A. Calvin College, 1957; M.A. Michigan State, 1960. "Nodular Models: A Technique for Articulating Stratification and Personality Systems."

Robert K. Ordway, A.B. Phillips, 1954; B.D. Garrett Biblical Institute, 1958; A.M. Butler, 1959. "Church Relocation: A Study of Community Adjustment."

Shailer Thomas, B.A. Oberlin College, 1958; M.A. Michigan State, 1960. "An Experiment To Enhance Self-concept of Ability and Raise School Achievement among Low-achieving Ninth-Grade Students."

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Ronald C. Althouse, B.A. Pennsylvania State, 1960; M.A. Minnesota, 1961. "The Intellectual Career of F. Stuart Chapin: An Examination of the Development and Contribution of a Pluralistic Behaviorist."

Alvin Boderman, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1950, 1954. "Feelings of Powerlessness and Political and Religious Extremism."

William R. Burch, Jr., B.S., M.S. Oregon, 1955, 1957. "Nature as Symbol and Expression in American Social Life: A Sociological Exploration."

Paul M. Gustafson, B.S. Northwestern, 1946. "Structural Elements and Organizational Behavior: A Study of Ten Protestant Denominations in Minnesota."

Joseph W. Hernandez, B.A., M.A. Fordham, 1958, 1960. "The Sociological Implications of Return Migration in Puerto Rico: An Exploratory Study."

Noel Iverson, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1958, 1962. "Germania, USA: The Dynamics of Change of an Ethnic Community into a Status Community."

Perry E. Jacobson, B.A. Hamline, 1959; M.S. Iowa State, 1961. "The Dynamics of Interfaith Marriages."

Joseph P. Mundi, M.A. St. Louis, 1949. "Variations in the Opinions, Practices, and Attitudes of Selected Samples of Minnesota Catholic College Students toward Catholicism in America."

Glenn I. Nelson, B.A. St. Olaf College, 1955; M.A. Minnesota, 1960. "Social Change, Reference Groups, and the Self Concept: A Study of Change in Rural Churches."

Thomas V. Philbrook, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1958, 1960. "Industrialization in the Small Community: A Study of Three Newfoundland Communities."

Ira E. Robinson, B.A. Davis and Elkins College, 1949; M.A. Ohio, 1952. "Basic and Improving Inventions in Industry: A Study of the Research Scientists of Minneapolis-Honeywell."

Jack C. Ross, B.S. California, 1949; M.S. George Williams College, 1954. "Traditionalism and Charisma in a Religious Group: Membership Careers and Role Contingencies of Quakers."

Thomas E. Smith, B.A., M.A. Alabama, 1957, 1961. "Social Class and Adolescents' Attitudes toward Adopting or Rejecting Their Fathers' Frames of Reference."

Robert A. Stebbins, B.A. Macalester College, 1961; M.A. Minnesota, 1962. "The Jazz Community: The Sociology of a Musical Subculture."

MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY

Edward Charles Lehman, Jr., A.B., M.A. Mississippi State, 1958, 1963. "Social Participation as Locality Reference-Group Behavior."

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

William Stewart Bennett, Jr., B.A. Denison, 1960; A.M. Missouri, 1962. "Social Characteristics Associated with Functional Psychosis."

Ivan Chapman, A.B., A.M. San Francisco State College, 1954, 1955. "A Comparative Study of Delinquents and Non-Delinquents in Springfield, Missouri."

Booth Buford Rhea, Jr., B.A., M.A. Tennessee,

1951, 1955. "Organizational Analysis and Education: An Exercise in Sociological Theory."

Ram Nandan P. Singh, B.S. Patna, 1951; M.S. Benares H., 1953. "Relationship of Selected Personal Characteristics and Perception Variables to Participation of 4-H Club Members in Boone County, Missouri."

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Audrey Forrest, A.B. Omaha, 1947; M.A. Fisk, 1951. "A Study of Negro Illegitimacy."

GRADUATE FACULTY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

Brigitte Berger, Abitur, Lehrerbildungs (Germany), 1945; M.A. New School for Social Research, 1959. "Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology as a Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge."

Morris L. Fried, B.A. Buffalo, 1951; M.A. New School for Social Research, 1958. "The Shorthand Reporter: A Study in Occupational Sociology."

Robert V. Guthrie, B.A. Gannon College, 1954; B.D. Drew, 1958. "A Sociological Inquiry into the Origin, Nature, and Significance of the Social Creed of the Methodist Church of America."

Elmer N. Lear, B.A., M.S. City College N.Y., 1938, 1941; Ph.D. Teachers College, Columbia, 1951; M.A. Columbia, 1953. "The Legitimation of Resistance: A Case Study."

Deborah I. Offenbacher, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1958; M.A. New School for Social Research, 1961. "Spokesman for the Poor: Concepts of Need and Images of the Needy as Projected in the *New York Times* Christmas Appeal."

Bernard Zvi Sobel, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1955; M.A. New School for Social Research, 1956. "Hebrew Christianity: A Study in the Legitimation of Religious Conversion."

Lung-chang Young, B.A. National Chen-chi (China), 1946; M.A. New School for Social Research, 1958. "Literary Reflections of Social Change in China, 1914-49."

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Boris Karashkerych, A.B. Brooklyn College, 1955; M.A. New York, 1959. "The Postwar Fertility of the American Negro."

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

Jack L. Roach, B.A., M.S.S. Buffalo, 1949, 1954. "Economic Deprivation and Lower-Class Behavior."

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Bert Newton Adams, A.B. William Jewell College, 1954; B.D., Th.M., Southern Baptist Seminary, 1959, 1960. "Interaction of and Attitudes toward Primary Relatives in a Middle-sized Southern City."

Joy Rochelle Gold, A.B., M.A. George Washington, 1958, 1960. "The Effect of Administrative Atmosphere on the Role of the School Teacher."

Albert Corgin Higgins, B.A., M.A. Fordham, 1952, 1956. "Use of Sociometry in the Description of Social Organizations."

Dean Dewayne Knudsen, A.B. Sioux Falls College, 1954; M.A. Minnesota, 1961. "An Investigation of the Social and Familial Relationships in the Life of the High-School Dropout."

Hugh Max Miller, B.S., M.S. North Carolina State College, 1955, 1958. "Teacher Roles and Community Integration."

Donald Dee Smith, A.B. Syracuse, 1955; M.A. Nebraska, 1957. "The Association of Factual Knowledge with Opinions about Social Issues."

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Herbert Barringer, A.B. San Diego State College, 1959; M.A. Northwestern, 1961. "Aesthetic-Theoretical Continuum of Primary and Secondary Social Values in the U.S. and Korea."

David Booth, B.A. Chicago, 1949; M.A. Illinois, 1961. "Status Consituency and Occupational Mobility."

Peter Orleans, B.A. Antioch College, 1958; M.A. Wisconsin, 1960. "Partisan and Nonpartisan Politics in the Metropolis: An Analysis of the Social Contexts of Political Participation."

Kenneth Reichstein, B.A. Syracuse, 1959; M.A. Northwestern, 1962. "The Professional Ethics of Lawyers: A Situational Approach to the Study of Deviation and Control."

James Skipper, B.A. Northern Illinois, 1956; M.A. Northwestern, 1960. "The Social Oblications of Hospitalized Patients: A System Analysis."

James L. Wilkins, B.A. Northern Illinois, 1958; M.A. Northwestern, 1960. "Doublethink."

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Robert H. Vasoli, B.A. LaSalle College, 1952; M.A. Notre Dame, 1953. "A Prediction Scale for Federal Probationers."

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Adolf William Almgren, A.B. Bowling Green State, 1943; B.D., S.T.M. Oberlin College, 1944, 1949. "Concurrence with the Social Creed of the Methodist Church."

Walter Vladimir Bibics, B.A., M.A. Kent State, 1956, 1957. "Assimilation of Yugoslavs in Franklin County, Ohio."

Puthenpeedikayil K. Geevarghese, B.D. Leonard Theological College, 1958; S.T.M. Union Theological Seminary, 1959; M.A. Miami (Ohio), 1961. "Growth and Decline of Small-Town United Presbyterian Churches in Ohio."

Sharad John Malelu, B.A. Michigan State, 1950; M.S. Brigham Young, 1955. "The Anglo-Indians: A Problem in Marginality."

James William Rinehart, B.A., M.A. Michigan State, 1959, 1961. "Mobility, Aspirations, Achievements, and Mental Illness."

Lewis Walker, B.A. Wilberforce, 1959; M.A. Ohio State, 1961. "Matricentricity and Delinquency: A Study of the Relation of Female-based Households to Delinquency and Non-Delinquency among Negro and White Boys."

Thomas William Webb, B.A. Baldwin-Wallace College, 1947; M.A. Michigan, 1952. "Classification of Teachers by Bureaucratic and Professional Normative Orientations to Educational Issues."

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

Robert Blumstock, B.A., M.A. City College N.Y., 1956, 1957. "The Evangelization of Jews: A Study in Interfaith Relations."

John Scanzoni, B.A. Wheaton College, 1958. "Resolution of Role Incompatibility in Church and Sect Clergy Marriage."

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Leroy O. Stone, A.B. Howard, 1960; Ph.D. Pennsylvania, 1964. "Some Demographic Concomitants of Economic Change in Subregions of Puerto Rico, 1950–60."

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Chester A. Jurczak, B.A. St. Mary's College, 1940; M.A. Fordham, 1948. "Ethnicity, Status, and Generational Positioning: A Study of Health Practices among Polonians in Five Ethnic Islands."

Frank J. Rubenstein, B.S. Illinois, 1949; M.S.W. Pittsburgh, 1951. "A Study of Freshman Nursing Students: Role Conceptions."

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Irving Zeitlin, B.A., M.A. Wayne State, 1958, 1961. "Sociological Theory and Method in Karl Marx."

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Carolyn L. Cummings, B.S. Middle Tennessee State College, 1961; M.S. Purdue, 1963. "Social Origins and Success: A Study of the Individual, Social, and Organizational Factors Related to Intra-occupational Mobility among Engineers."

James Hawkins, B.S., M.S. Purdue, 1960, 1962. "The Ward Manager System: A Case Study of the Organization of Hospital Nursing Care."

David E. Willer, B.S., M.S. Purdue, 1959, 1962. "A Theory of Bureaucracy: Rules and Rationality in Ten Work Groups."

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Ruth Black Michaelson, A.B., A.M. California State College (Los Angeles), 1956, 1958. "An Analysis of the Changing Focus of Marriage Counseling."

Billyanna Mary Niland, A.B., D.D.S., A.M. Southern California, 1940, 1944, 1948. "Social Factors Related to Dentistry as a Career."

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Gary I. Schulman, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1959; M.A. Stanford, 1961. "The Two-Step Flow of Mass Communications: A Test of a Reformulation."

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Leo Miller, A.B. Harvard, 1940; M.S. Boston, 1948. "Social Aspects of Schizophrenia."

Robert J. Turner, A.A. Santa Rosa Junior College, 1955; A.B. Sacramento State College, 1957. "Social Structure and Crisis."

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Walter J. Cartwright, B.A., B.D. Southern Methodist, 1943, 1946. "Minority without Ethnicity."

Jess Rollin Lord, B.S. Texas Wesleyan College, 1959; M.A. Texas Christian, 1960. "Management Mortality in Corporate Merger."

Jerry Bowers Michel, B.A. Texas A and M College, 1954; M.A. Texas Christian, 1960. "Legislative Decision-making: A Case Study of Reference Behavior."

Ted Ray Vaugham, B.S., M.A. Sam Houston State College, 1955, 1957. "Group Determinants of Self-Conception: An Empirical Assessment of Symbolic Interaction Theory."

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Henry P. Houser, M.A. North Carolina, 1951. "Institutional Differentiation within the Medical Profession."

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Elmora Matthews, B.A. North Texas State College, 1943; M.A. George Peabody College for Teachers, 1959. "Family and the Community: A Study of the Social Structure of an Endogamous Community with Bilateral Kindred."

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Richard Boyle, B.A. San Diego State College, 1958; M.A. Washington, 1963. "Social Context and Educational Aspiration: Influence of High School and Community on College Plans."

Leroy C. Gould, A.B. Harvard, 1959; M.A. Washington, 1962. "Social Perception of Deviant Behavior."

Joseph Julian, A.B. San Francisco State College, 1958; M.A. Washington, 1961. "Compliance Patterns of Complex Organizations: A Comparative Analysis of Five Hospitals."

Clifford T. Paynton, B.A. Seattle Pacific College, 1957; M.A. Washington, 1961. "Competition and Interpersonal Relations."

George S. Rothbart, A.B. Chicago, 1947; M.A. Washington, 1962. "Social Conflict in a Prison Organization."

Thomas Steinburn, B.S., M.A. Washington, 1951–1959. "Juvenile Delinquency and Patterns of Perception."

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS

Sarah Boggs, B.A., M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1951, 1953. "An Analysis of Crime in St. Louis: A Reconceptualization of Crime Rates and Patterns."

Donald Gair Bushell, A.B. Washington (Seattle), 1956; A.M. Kent State, 1958. "The Origins of Social Stratification."

Henrietta S. Cox, A.B., A.M. Kansas, 1942, 1945. "Value Orientations, Social Class, and Motherhood."

Robert Coit Day, II, B.A. Kenyon College, 1952. "Some Effects of Closeness and Punitiveness of Supervision."

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

Denez Gulyas, A.B., M.A. Kent State, 1951, 1956 "Community Attitudes toward Mental Illness and toward Persons Exhibiting Schizophrenic Symptoms."

YALE UNIVERSITY

Lucy H. Conant, B.A. Radcliffe College, 1947; M.N. Yale, 1950; M.P.H. Harvard, 1957. "Nurse-Patient Relationships in Home Visits."

Charles T. M. Hadwen, B.A. British Columbia, 1955; M.A. Cambridge, 1960 "The Early Stages of Foreign-Student Adjustment."

Robert H. Maisel, B.A. Brandeis, 1956; M.A. Michigan, 1959. "The Mental Patient and His Family: A Study of the Success of Ex-Mental Patients in the Community."

Doctoral Dissertations Newly Started in 1964

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Elliott Krause, A.B. Harvard, 1958; M.A. Boston, 1960. "Crisis and Identity Change."

Jane Ann Moore, A.B. Ohio Wesleyan, 1952; M.A. Boston, 1961. "Social Strain and Culture Conflict in the West African Novel."

BROWN UNIVERSITY

John M. Goering, B.S. Fordham, 1962; M.A. Brown, 1964. "Class Consciousness and the Uprooted."

William H. Groff, A.B. Franklin and Marshall, 1960; M.A. Connecticut, 1962. "A Comparative Analysis of White and Negro Fertility, 1940–60."

Parker G. Marden, A.B. Bates College, 1961; M.A. Brown, 1964. "An Examination of Demographic and Ecological Factors Affecting the Distribution of Physicians in the United States."

James W. Moorhead, B.A. Knox College, 1958; M.A. Northwestern, 1960. "Negro Metropolitan Migration in the United States."

Peter A. Morrison, A.B. Dartmouth College, 1962. "Duration of Residence and Internal Migration: A Stochastic Model."

Henry S. Mount, B.A. Eastern Nazarene College, 1962. "Mothers in the Labor Force."

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

Pauline B. Bart, A.B., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1950, 1952. "Sociocultural Factors in Hospitalized Depressions of Middle-aged Women."

Roy A. Hansen, A.B., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1961, 1964. "Political Behavior of Military Elites: A Case Study."

Will C. Kennedy, A.B. California (Los Angeles), 1959. "Social Organization in Prisons and Inmate Attitudes and Self-conception."

D. Lawrence Wieder, A.B. California (Santa Barbara), 1960; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1963. "An Ethnographic Description of a Newspaper, with Special Emphasis on Problems of Time and Timing."

Don H. Zimmerman, A.B., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1961, 1963. "Rule-following and Task Accomplishment in a Public-Assistance Agency."

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Jesus Elcarte, Ph.D. College de Alsasua, 1942; M.A. Santo Tomas, 1958. "Marital Counseling and the Clergyman: A Comparative Study of Episcopalian and Roman Catholic Clergymen Engaged in Parish Work."

Sister Francis Mary Riggs, B.A. Emmanuel College, 1946; M.A. Catholic, 1960. "Attitudes of Missionary Sisters toward American Indian Acculturation."

Anne M. Rippon, A.B. College of New Rochelle, 1955; M.A. Fordham, 1960. "A Face Study of an Interracial Organization in a Crisis Situation: The Mount Vernon–New Rochelle Chapter of the Catholic Interracial Council."

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

John D. Brewer, B.A., A.M. Chicago, 1958, 1963. "Organizational Patterns of Supervision."

Anthony Costonis, B.S. Boston College, 1958; A.M. Chicago, 1963. "A Study of Decentralization in a Mental Hospital."

Jan Dizard, B.A. Minnesota, 1962. "Social Change and the Family."

Morris F. Friedell, B.S., A.M. Chicago, 1959, 1963. "A Laboratory Experiment in Retaliation."

J. Glenn Hutchinson, A.B. Emory, 1936; A.M. North Carolina, 1939. "Interaction Patterns in Families of Severely Disturbed and Normal Adolescents."

John H. Marx, A.B. Cornell, 1959; A.M. Chicago, 1964. "A Survey of the Professional Behavior of Mental-Health Therapists in One Metropolitan Community."

Jacqueline Masse, B. Dom. Pedagogy, Montreal, 1955; A.M. Chicago, 1962. "Influence of Similarities of Nationality, Tenure, and Location on Social Relationships."

Bhaskar D. Misra, B. Com. Agra, 1953; M. Com. Allahabad, 1955. "Personal and Social Correlates of Male's Attitude toward Family Planning."

John Moland, A.B., A.M. Fisk, 1952, 1954. "Some Effects of the Cross-Pressures of Social Expectations."

Edmund M. Murphy, A.B. Miami, 1959; A.M. Chicago, 1963. "Birth-Order Analysis and Stable Population Theory."

Constance Nathanson, A.M. Chicago, 1958. "Social Structure, Commitment, and Reward in the Role Selections of Professional Women."

James A. Palmore, Jr., A.B. Antioch College, 1962; A.M. Chicago, 1964. "The Chicago Snowball."

Margaret A. Parkman, A.B. Michigan, 1960; A.M. Chicago, 1963. "Identity, Role, and Family Functioning."

Mary Queeley, A.B. Barnard College, 1959; A.M. Chicago, 1962. "Urban Slum School: Its Organization and Instructional Program."

Bryan Rees Roberts, B.A. Oxford, 1961; A.M. Chicago, 1964. "The Effects of College Experience and Social Background on Professional Orientations of Prospective Teachers."

Patricia Denton Wallace, A.B. Berkeley, 1957. "Goal Definition, Role-Orientation, and the Staff Role-Set."

Frank J. Zulke, B.A. Notre Dame, 1959; A.M. Chicago, 1963. "Old Town: The Rebirth of an Urban Neighborhood."

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

Paul Leonard Chassy, B.A. Colorado, 1961. "A Mathematical Analysis of Small-Group Social Interaction."

Carol Mary Copp, B.A., M.A., Michigan, 1956, 1957. "Social Structure, Reference-Group Behavior, and Attitude Change among Student Nurses."

Marvin Jay Cummins, B.A. Colorado, 1958. "The Frameup: A Study of Social Limitations on Meanings."

Jack Lowell Dyer, B.A. Oklahoma City, 1950; M.A. North Carolina, 1952. "Theory of Formal Organizations."

Curtiss Ely Frank, Jr., B.A. Colorado, 1959. "An Experimental Craze in Laboratory Conditions."

Paul Wershub Goodman, A.B., M.S. Syracuse, 1941, 1949. "A Comparison of School Drop-out Rates with Other Community Statistical Measures."

Jon Rolf Kjolseth, B.A. Colorado, 1959. "A Naturalistic Method of Social Grammar for the Teaching of the Spoken English Language to Foreign Nationals."

Norman Rudolph Kurtz, B.A. Wartburg College, 1953. "A Functional Analysis of a Gatekeeping System in an Urban Milieu."

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Rocco Caporale, B.A. Aloisianum College (Milan, Italy), 1950. "The Dynamics of Hierocracy."

Terry N. Clark, B.A. Bowdoin College, 1962. "A la Recherche Perdue: Toward a Sociological History of Empirical Social Research in France, 1850–1914."

Frank Furstenberg, B.A. Haverford College, 1961. "A Comparative Study of Socialization among Blind and Sighted Children."

Gillian Gollin, B.S. London, 1954. "From Star to Steel: A Comparative Study of Social Change in Two Eighteenth-Century Mokavian Communities."

Edward Lehman, B.S. Fordham University, 1956. "Social Mobility and Occupational Deprivation."

Florence Ruderman, A.B. Radcliffe College, 1951. "Birth Control in Medicine."

Eleanor Singer, B.A. Queens College, 1951. "Birth Order and Education."

Robert B. Smith, B.S. Washington, 1958. "Responses to Social Structures: Models Simulating Deviant Behavior."

Mervin Verbit, A.B., A.M. Pennsylvania, 1958, 1961. "Perceived Conformity to Reference Groups for Religion among Jewish College Students."

Rev. Donald Zewe, B.A. Holy Cross, 1944; M.A. Woodstock College, 1951; S.T.L. Weston College, 1957; M.A. Fordham, 1959 "The Influence of the Communal Subgroup on Selected Norms"

Harriet Zuckerman, B.A. Vassar College, 1959. "Patterns of Collaboration in Science: The Nobel Laureates."

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

Willard Douglas Callender, Jr., A.B. Bates College, 1958; M.A. Connecticut, 1960. "A Sociological Analysis of Suicide Episodes."

Cyril Robert Friedman, A.B. Clark, 1958; M.A. Florida, 1960. "Factors Related to Negro Participation and Non-Participation in NAACP."

Elkhanan Lahav, A.B. San Diego State College, 1958; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1960 "Social Factors in the Sociological Interests of Sociology Majors: A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge."

Robert Sherwin, A.B. Wisconsin, 1959; M.A. Connecticut, 1960. "Self Images and Value Orientations in Delinquents and Non-Delinquents"

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Samuel F. Sampson, B.A., M.A. Oklahoma, 1960, 1961. "Exploratory Studies in the Analysis of the Role of Social Relations in Consensus Formation."

DUKE UNIVERSITY

Paul James Baker, B.A. Baldwin-Wallace College, 1960; M.A. Kent State, 1961. "An Analysis of Selected Theoretical Problems in the Work of Howard P. Becker."

Peter Kirby Manning, B.A. Willamette, 1961; M.A. Duke, 1963. "Physicians' Attitudes toward the American Medical Association: A Study in Political Sociology."

EMORY UNIVERSITY

Wan Sang Han, A.B. Seoul National, 1960; M.A. Emory, 1964. "The Aspiration Composite Perception of Opportunity and Anomie."

Jack H. Williams, B.S., M.A. Northern Illinois, 1959, 1963. "Fertility Prospects in Southeastern United States."

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Reynolds Herbert Minnich, B.A. Eastern Mennonite College, 1953; M.A. Cornell, 1958. "A Sociological Study of Two Mennonite Immigrant Communities in Paraña, Brazil."

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Larry Barnett, A.B. California (Los Angeles), 1961; M.S. Oregon State, 1962. "Opinion and Knowledge of Child-rearing Professionals regarding Three Child-rearing Systems."

Karl Bauman, B.A., M.A. Nebraska, 1961, 1963. "Status Inconsistency, Unsatisfactory Social Interaction, and Common Means of Resolution."

Felix Berardo, B.A. Connecticut, 1961. "Internal Migrants and Extended Family Relations: A Study of Newcomer Adaptation."

Jennie McIntyre, A.B. Howard College, 1960; M.S. Florida State, 1962. "The Negro Maternal Family: Its Implications for Theories of Illegitimacy and Role Differentiation."

Stanley Reigber, B.A. Grove City College, 1942; M.S. Florida State, 1962. "Perceptions of Parents and Children Affiliated with the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. as to the Content of Desirable Religious Behavior."

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Dorothy Dohen, B.A. College of Mt. St. Vincent, 1945; M.A. Fordham, 1959. "A Theory of the Development of Nationalism as a Functional Alternative for a Common Religion in a Pluralist Society."

Rev. Jesus Gutierrez, B.A. Pont de Camillas, 1950; M.A. Fordham, 1963. "The Social Structure of the Puerto Rican Community in New York City and Its Relation to Community Solidarity."

Mary Linda Hronek, B.A. Whitman College, 1940; M.A. Minnesota, 1943. "Career Values, Social Structure, and the College Dropout."

Sister Mary Paula Peck, B.A. Radcliffe College, 1952; M.A. Fordham, 1962. "The Cultural Expression of the Experience of Mystical Union."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

David James Armor, A.B. California, 1961. "The Structure of Institutional Influence: The School Guidance Counselor."

Hugh Francis Cline, B.A. Pennsylvania State, 1956; M.Soc. Stokholms Hogskola, 1961. "Determinants of Normative Order in Correctional Institutions."

Joe Richard Feagin, A.B. Baylor, 1960; B.D. Harvard Divinity School, 1962. "Residential Mobility and Urban Social Structure."

Robert Jay Werlin, A.B. Brandeis, 1960. "The English Novel and the Industrial Revolution: Relationships between Literature and Society."

Dorothy Zinberg, A.B. Buffalo, 1949; M.A. Boston, 1958. "Female Friendship Patterns."

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Robert E. Cole, A.B. Hobart College, 1959; M.A. Illinois, 1962. "Rationality in Japanese Industrialization."

Max Raymond Culver, B.D. Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary, 1952; M.A. Illinois, 1955. "Dying in a Hospital."

James W. Harris, B.A., M.A. Illinois, 1960, 1963. "Police Disposition Decisions and Juveniles."

Harry Richard John, A.B., M.A. Illinois, 1958, 1963. "Structural Correlates of Parsons' Types of Deviant Behavior."

Ronald W. Maris, A.B., M.A. Illinois, 1958, 1962. "Religion and Social Integration."

Louis Rowitz, A.B., M.A. Illinois, 1959, 1963. "Community Factors Associated with Faculty Turnover."

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Kurt Robert Durig, A.B., M.A. San Francisco State College, 1960, 1961. "An Analyses of Teen-Age Values."

Ronald A. Hardert, B.A., M.A. Cincinnati, 1960, 1962. "Social Structural Factors Influencing the Urbanization of Kentucky Hill Emigrants Living in a Selected Urban Ghetto."

Gerald Todd Slatin, A.B., M.A. Indiana, 1956, 1964. "The Relationship of Ecological Correlations and Resulting Factor Patterns to Size of Population Unit."

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Irving L. Allen, B.A. Morris Harvey College, 1959; M.A. Iowa, 1961. "The Effects of Cultural Levels in Iowa Communities."

James Allen Black, B.A., M.A. Iowa, 1959, 1963. "Sex Crimes in Iowa: A Sociological Analysis."

Jerrold Buerer, B.A. Luther College, 1960; M.A. Iowa, 1961. "Role Identification and Role Conflict in the Academic Bureaucracy."

Barbara Helen Chasin, B.A. City College, N.Y., 1961. "Reactions to Death: A Study in Functional Narcotics."

Gerald Chasin, B.A. City College, N.Y., 1960; M.A. Clark, 1961. "Status Equality, Attitudinal Agreement, and Self-congruence as Factors in Friendship Choices."

Marion Richard Earnest, B.A., M.A. Drake, 1955, 1956. "Measurement of Alcoholism among Prisoners in the State Penitentiary."

Kenneth Edward Larsen, B.E. Iowa State College, 1947; M.A. Iowa, 1951. "Central Life Interest and Job Performance."

James Hill Parker, B.A. Bates College, 1958; M.A. Chicago, 1961. "Patterns of Consultation: A Study of Public School Professional Employees."

Ronald Wilson, B.A. Wisconsin State College, 1960; M.A. Iowa, 1961. "The 'Health Team' and the Community."

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Everett Laning, B.A. Simpson College, 1953; B.D. Garrett School of Theology, 1957; M.A. Northwestern, 1959. "Clergy and Their Careers: A

Study of Social Cost in the Pastoral Service of Protestant Clergy."

Richard Warren, B.S., M.S. Iowa State, 1952, 1960. "Impact of an Experimental Training Program for Fertilizer Dealers upon the Dealer and His Business Firm."

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Clyde E. Martin, A.B., M.A. Indiana, 1941, 1960. "A Study of the Marital and Coital Histories of Jewish Women with Reference to Cancer of the Cervix."

Leo C. Rigsby, B.S. Texas A & M College, 1961. "An Analysis of Voting Patterns in New York State."

Benjamin Zablocki, A.B. Columbia, 1962. "Social Cohesion in Intentional Communities in North America."

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Jack B. Gibson, A.B., M.A. Wayne State, 1951, 1956. "Factors in Changing Occupational Conceptions among College Students."

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

Ronald Akers, B.S. Indiana State Teachers' College, 1960; M.A. Kent State, 1961. "Professional Organization, Political Power, and Occupational Laws."

Martin Jay Crowe, B.A., M.A. Washington State College, 1956, 1959. "The Occupational Adaptation of a Selected Group of Eastern Kentuckians in Southern Ohio."

Ronald Enroth, B.A. Houghton College; M.A. Kentucky, 1963. "Patterns of Response to Rural Medical Practice and Rural Life in Kentucky: Implications for the Distribution of Physicians."

Charles Garth, A.B. Morehouse College, 1951, M.A. Atlanta, 1956. "Self Concepts of Negro Students Who Transferred or Did Not Transfer to Formerly All-White Schools."

David S. Hall, A.B. Glenville State College, 1959; M.A. Kent State, 1961. "Sociocultural and Personal Correlates of Varying Orientations to Dentistry among Dental Students."

Bruce H. Mayhew, Jr., A.B., M.A. Kentucky, 1961, 1963. "Religion and Fertility in a Negro Ghetto: A Study in Micro-Demography."

Dennis Poplin, B.S., M.S. Utah State, 1961, 1962. "Religion's Influence upon the Vital Processes: Some Evidences from Catholic, Lutheran, and Mormon Counties."

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Majeed Alsikafi, B.A. Baghdad, 1953; M.S. Oklahoma State, 1961. "Career Patterns of Management in Relation to the Labor Union."

Susan H. Drysdale, B.A. Northland College, 1958; M.A. Louisiana State, 1961. "Alienation as a Sociological Concept: A Clarification and Specification of Its Dimensions."

Benjamin Griessman, B.A. Temple College, 1955; M.A. Baylor, 1958. "Patterns of Communication in Forrest and Perry Counties, Mississippi."

Jerome Salomone, B.A. Southeastern Louisiana College, 1959; M.A. Louisiana State, 1961. "Attitudes toward Death."

Marlene Stefanow, B.A., M.A. Saskatchewan, 1961, 1962. "Acculturation of Ukrainians in Canada."

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

George Jarvis, B.A. Brigham Young, 1960. "The Diffusion of the Automobile."

Parthassarathi Mohapatra, B. Laws Patna, India, 1955; M.A. Michigan, 1964. "The Role of Age at Marriage and Child Spacing in Fertility Differentials and Incipient Fertility Decline in a High Fertility Country."

Marven E. Olsen, B.A. Grinnell College, 1957, M.A. Michigan, 1958. "Political Assimilation and Alienation."

J. Gottfried Paasche, A.B. Antioch College, 1961, M.A. Michigan, 1963. "The Role of Formal Organizations in the Desegregation of Southern School Districts: 1954–1964."

William S. Pooler, B.A. Temple, 1958; M.A. Connecticut, 1960. "Social Class and Social Participation in the Urbanized Area."

Jerome Rabow, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1955; M.A. Columbia, 1962. "Organizational Goals and Structure: Comparative Study of the School."

Paul H. Ray, B.A. Yale, 1961. "A Comparative Analysis of Community Research Allocations to Education."

Walter E. Schafer, B.A., M.A. Michigan, 1961, 1962. "Student Careers in Two Public High Schools: A Comparative Cohort Analysis."

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Ann Baker, B.A. Miami (Ohio), 1960; M.A. Michigan State, 1964. "American Indian Marriages in North India."

Richard A. Brymer, B.A., M.A. Texas, 1959, 1961. "Stratification and Alienation."

Eugenio Fonseca, L.L. Madrid, 1957; Cert., Latin American Faculty of Social Science, 1959. "Social Stratum, Relevant and Significant Others, and Levels of Educational and Occupational Aspirations."

Frieda L. Foote, B.S. Evangel College, 1959; M.A. Michigan State, 1961. "Role Stress and Cultural Resources of an Atypical Position Incumbent."

Clark McPhail, A.B. Pasadena College, 1958; M.A. Oklahoma, 1961. "Self-identification within a Specific Context of Experience and Behavior."

Cyrus S. Stewart, B.A., M.A. Michigan State, 1962, 1964. "Theory and Research in Delinquency:

An Examination, Organization, and Interpretation of Recent Literature."

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Dennis Brissett, B.A. Minnesota—Duluth, 1961; M.A. Minnesota, 1963. "Clinical Depression: A Statement of Social Etiology."

Thomas E. Carroll, A.B. Indiana, 1956; M.A. Minnesota, 1958. "The Criteria of Sentencing Utilized by Criminal Court Judges of Dade County, Florida."

Donald Drobac, B.A. Wisconsin, 1957; M.A. Minnesota, 1962. "The Social Psychological Correlates of Trade-Union Identification."

Myrtle Korenbaum, M.A. Brown, 1955. "A Theory of Role Dissonance."

James McCartney, B.A., M.A. Nebraska, 1958, 1959. "The Effect of Sources of Funds on the Direction of Sociological Research."

Jerome Stromberg, B.A. Wheaton College, 1958; M.A. Minnesota, 1962. "Functions and Meaning of Quasi-Kinship."

Gerald Thielbar, B.A. Seattle Pacific College, 1961; M.A. Minnesota, 1963. "Dimensions of Localism and Cosmopolitism."

Anton Turrittin, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1959, 1960. "Alienation and Juvenile Delinquency."

Theodore Vandernoot, A.B. Duke, 1952; M.A. Minnesota, 1954. "A Model for a Simulated Study of the Labor Force."

MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY

Joseph H. Bruening, B.A., M.A. Florida, 1954, 1956. "Midsouth Academic Department Chairmen: A Study of Backgrounds and Interest Patterns."

John Dunkelberger, A.B. Franklin & Marshall College, 1957; M.A. Pennsylvania State, 1959. "Attitude toward Job Mobility among Household Heads in Low-Income Areas of the Rural South."

Jerry W. Robinson, Jr., B.A. Mississippi College, 1954; M.S. Mississippi State, 1964. "Social Classes and Community Involvement."

Tommy W. Rogers, B.S. Mississippi College, 1962; M.A. Mississippi State, 1963. "Differential Patterns of Net Migration into Southern Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas."

Avtar Singh, B.A., M.A. Panjāb, 1947, 1962. "Comparative Village Dynamics."

Kenneth P. Wilkinson, B.S. Louisiana College, 1960; M.A. Mississippi State, 1962. "Leadership in Community Action."

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Vera Kate Andreasen, A.B., M.A. Maryland, 1958, 1959. "Housemothers and Head Residents: A Sociological Study of Their Work."

Rex Randall Campbell, B.S., M.S. Missouri, 1952, 1959. "Prestige of Farm Operators in Two Rural Missouri Communities."

Edgar Ray Chasteen, B.S., M.A. Sam Houston State Teachers College, 1957, 1959. "Factors Influencing Outcome of Election on Public Accommodation Ordinances in Kansas City, Missouri."

Virginia Lee Fisher, B.S., M.S. Missouri, 1940, 1962. "Family Interaction."

Norman Lee Friedman, B.S., A.M. Missouri, 1957, 1958. "The Public Junior-College Teacher in Unified Public School System Junior College: A Study in the Sociology of Educational Work."

Irma Bendel Mathes, B.S., M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1945, 1959. "The Homosexual Culture."

Naginlal Somalal Sheth, B.S.C., Bombay, 1945; M.S. Cornell, 1959; M.A. Michigan, 1960. "Formal and Informal Social Participation as Related to Diffusion of Information and Adoption of Farm Practices in a Village in India."

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Walter Baeumler, B.A., M A. Omaha, 1951, 1961. "Life Cycle and Membership and Participation in Formal Voluntary Associations."

Robert Birge, B.S. Washington State College, 1959; M.A. Washington State, 1960. "Self Concept Differential Associations and Delinquent Behavior."

John Edwards, B.A. Park College, 1960; M.A. Nebraska, 1962. "Socioeconomic Status and Instrumental-Expressive Leadership: A Study of Hierarchal Congruity."

David Janovy, B.A. Wayne State Teachers College, 1956; M.A. Nebraska, 1962. "Adjustment to Retirement and Social Participation in Two Types of Retirement Settings."

GRADUATE FACULTY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

Dennis Bileca, B.A. Bridgeport, 1961; M.A. New School for Social Research, 1963. "Presuppositions of the Social Workers' World View."

Abraham S. Blumberg, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1942; L.L.B. Columbia, Law School, 1946. "The Criminal Court: An Organizational Analysis."

Samuel Brady, B.A., M.S. Louisville, 1950, 1952. "The Patterns of Suburban Drinking Behavior as Seen in Upward-mobile Suburban Families Undergoing Certain Social Stresses and Conflicts."

Victoria Cranford, B.A., M.A. New School for Social Research, 1953, 1956. "The Role of Social Change in Contemporary American Intergenerational Conflict."

Hansfried Kellner, Abitur Waldorf-Schule (Stuttgart), 1957; M.A. Connecticut, 1962. "Dimensions of the Individual's Conception of Social Reality Arising within Marriage."

Angel Federico Nebbia, Diploma National University of the Littoral (Argentina), 1956; M.A.

New School for Social Research, 1960. "Structural Differentiation in Interpersonal Relations."

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

Charles M. Barresi, B.A., M.A. Buffalo, 1953, 1959. "Property Values and Social Values: A Study of the Real Estate Business."

Mark C. Kennedy, B.A., M.A. Texas, 1951, 1953. "The Culture of Capitalism and the Division of Labor."

Richard J. Ossenberg, A.A.S. (Retail Trade), B.S., M.A. Buffalo, 1955, 1959, 1961. "The Development of a Strategic Ideology in a Bicultural Society: Canadian Immigration Policy and Its Consequences."

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Anne L. Boland, B A. Marywood College, 1946; M.S. Columbia, 1948. "Staff Consensus in a Psychiatric Unit of a General Hospital."

Irwin Gerber, B A , M.A. New York, 1958, 1959. "Behavioral Characteristics of Patients as Perceived by the Staff of a Mental Hospital."

Edwin Hertz, A.B., M.A. Hunter College, 1961, 1963. "A Case Study of a Reform Democratic Club."

Roy O. Manning, B.A City College N.Y , 1958; M.A. New York, 1961. "A Typology of the Relation between Crowds and Movements."

Edward Sagarin, B.A., M.A. Brooklyn College, 1961, 1962. "The Deviant Association and the Association of Deviants: A Study of the Mattachine Society of New York."

John M. Schram, B.A., M.A. New York, 1953, 1958. "Formal Logic as a Social Phenomenon in the Western World."

Aradyth Stimson, B A. College of Wooster, 1951; M.A. New York, 1960. "Marital Interaction and Satisfaction: An Exploration of Problem-solving Behavior."

John Stimson, B.A., M.A. New York, 1951, 1959. "Husband-Wife Similarity, Agreement, and Family-planning Success."

Harold Yahr, B.S. City College N.Y., 1953; A M. New York, 1960. "Aspects of Organization Structure and Organizational Efficiency."

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Charles Norman Alexander, Jr., A.B. Alabama, 1961; M.A. North Carolina, 1963. "Aspects of Structural Perception."

Satoshi Ito, A.B. Long Beach State College, 1960; M A. North Carolina, 1963. "Value Correlates of Occupational Choice among Southern High-School Males"

Father James Edward Kelly, A B., M.A. Notre Dame, 1954, 1961. "Catholic Fertility and Family Patterns."

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Claire Gilbert, B.A. Northwestern, 1962. "Community Power Studies. Why the Differences in Findings?"

Kenji Ima, B.A. Whitman College, 1959; M.S. Oregon, 1962. "Uncertainty and Work Organizations."

Ruth P. Simms, B.A. Talladega College, 1958; M A. Northwestern, 1962. "Migration Experience and Involvement in Women's Voluntary Associations in Accra, Ghana."

Martin S. Weinberg, B.A. St. Lawrence, 1960; M.A. Massachusetts, 1961. "Sex, Modesty, and Deviants."

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Sister Roseanne Murphy, B.A. Mount St. Mary's College, 1959; M A. Stanford, 1962. "A Study of Change in Religious Communities of Sisters"

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

David Garvin Cartano, B.S. Iowa State, 1957, M S. Ohio State, 1961 "Social Organization and Stress: A Study of a Spontaneous Colonization in the Interior of Colombia, S.A."

William Loren Flinn, B S., M S. Ohio State, 1960, 1961. "Functional Relationships among Migrant Family Structures and Social Subsystems in Urban Areas of Colombia, S.A."

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

John Koval, M S. Oregon, 1960. "Students of Science and Engineering: A Comparison of Two Pre-occupational Subsocieties"

Calvin Larson, M S. San Jose State College, 1960 "A Comparative Study of the Leadership Structures of Two Oregon Communities"

Scott McNall, B A. Portland State College, 1962 "Religion in a Political Sect."

Andreas Maris Van Blaaderen, M.A. Oregon, 1963. "Some Causes and Consequences of Variation in Age-Sex Composition of the Population in Urban Settlements."

William Zwerman, M A Cornell, 1962 "A Morphology of Occupational Choice. A Preliminary Test."

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

James Francis Rooney, B A. Gonzaga, 1953, M S W California, 1959 "Friendship Relationships and Reference-Group Orientation of Skid-row Men."

Benjamin Singer, B A Wayne State, 1961; M.A Pennsylvania, 1964. "Racial Factors in Psychiatric Intervention."

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

P. K. B Nayar, B.A. Travancore (India), 1952. "Value Conflict in Developing Societies."

Edmund M. Ricci, B A , M Litt Pittsburgh, 1956,

1958. "Some Determinants of Professional Work-Role Conception and the Division of Labor in Complex Organizations."

Donald R. Van Houten, B.A. Oberlin College, 1958. "Opportunity and Influence: A Study of Medical Leadership in Community Hospitals."

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Howard N. Boughey, Jr., B.A. Columbia College, 1959; M.A. Brooklyn College, 1962. "Sociology of Architecture."

Yunshik Chang, B.A. Seoul, 1958; M.A. British Columbia, 1961. "Population in the Early Modernization."

John Knodel, B.A. Duke, 1961. "Demographic Analysis of Baby Boom."

Barry Sugarman, B.A. Exeter, 1960; M.A. Southern Illinois, 1962. "Mobility, Achievement, and Education."

Ian Isaac Weinberg, B.A. Exeter College, Oxford, 1961. "The English Public Schools."

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Harold Charnofsky, B.S., M.S. Southern California, 1954, 1958. "Research on Occupational Role Theory Related to the Professional Baseball Player."

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

Victor Berndt Streufert, A.B. St. Johns College (Kansas), 1951; M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1957. "Forms of Religious Behavior Alternative to Sect-Type Activity among Southern Appalachian Migrants in the Uptown Community of Chicago."

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Thomas L. Conner, B.A. Stanford, 1962. "Continuous Disagreement and the Assignment of Self-Other Performance Expectations."

Barbara K. Foley, B.A. Kansas, 1961; M.A. Stanford, 1963. "An Experimental Study of Social Exchange."

Hans E. Lee, A.B. Michigan, 1953; A.M. Iowa, 1955; A.M. California (Berkeley), 1961. "A Mathematical Study of Decision Processes."

Gordon H. Lewis, A.B., M.A. Stanford, 1960, 1961. "Expectations, Performances, and Evaluations."

James C. Moore, B.A. Colorado, 1959; M.A. Stanford, 1961. "General Status Characteristics and Specific Performance Expectations."

Robert E. Muzzy, B.A. Washington, 1958; M.A. Stanford, 1962. "Experimental Test of Some of Heider's Balance Propositions."

Francis W. Nichols, Jr., B.A. Long Beach State College, 1961; M.A. Stanford, 1963. "Status Equilibrium and Organization of Communication Networks."

Paul T. Takagi, A.B. California, 1949; M.A. Stanford, 1963. "Evaluation Systems and Deviations in an On-going Authority Structure."

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Howard M. Bahr, B.A. Brigham Young, 1962; M.A. Texas, 1964. "Racial Differentiation in American Metropolitan Areas."

Jerry Kenneth Benson, B.A. Baylor, 1959; M.A. Texas, 1963. "A Study of Anomie, Alienation, and Social Structure."

Cora Ann Martin, B.S. Texas Women's, 1949; M.S. North Texas State, 1963. "Some Aspects of Socialization to Parental Values."

Michael Thomas Micklin, B.A. Western Washington State College, 1961; M.A. Michigan State, 1962. "Reference Behavior and Differential Fertility among the Urban Proletariat in Guatemala City: A Comparative Study."

Charles Tittle, B.A. Ouachita Baptist College, 1961; M.A. Texas, 1963. "Attitude Measurement and Prediction of Behavior: An Evaluation of Four Scaling Techniques."

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Richard Austin Carlton, B.A. Toronto, 1961. "The Role of Education in the Social Mobility of English-Canadians and French-Canadians in a Northern Ontario Community."

Thomas Robert Maxwell, B.A., M.A. Toronto, 1940, 1952. "The Role of the French Ethnic Middle Class in Developing a Sense of Group Identity among the French Ethnic Population of Toronto."

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Charles R. Chandler, B.A. North Texas State, 1958. "Mexican-American Social Movement in Texas."

Ben Gorman, B.A. Tulane, 1957. "Fundamentalism and the Frontier."

William W. Pendleton, B.A. Wofford College, 1958; M.A. Tulane, 1962. "Middle-Class Mobility and Values: A Study of the Urban-Industrial Transition in Cali, Colombia."

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

David Leslie Brewer, B.S. Brigham Young, 1957; M.S. Purdue, 1959. "An Analysis of Some Problems Related to Changing Racial Norms in Utah."

Helen M. Crampton, B.S., M.A. Utah, 1961, 1963. "The Acculturation Rate of the Mexican-American in the Salt Lake City Area."

Jalil Mahmoudi, B.S. Iran, 1941; M.S. Utah State, 1961. "Sociological Aspects of the Bahai Faith."

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Raymond C. Rymph, B.A. Grinnell College, 1957; M.A. Vanderbilt, 1960. "Commitment and Exploitation."

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (ST. LOUIS)

Harry Gyman, A.B. Temple, 1951. "The Relative Importance of Altruism, Obligations, and Sanctions in Interpersonal Exchanges."

Edgar I. Patterson, B.A. Kansas City, 1958; M.A. Kansas, 1961. "Client Reactions to a Prepaid Group Medical-Care Plan."

Sanford Silverstein, B.A., A M. Illinois, 1952, 1953. "Social Change and Political Support: Saskatchewan Provincial Elections, 1964–66."

Timothy Sprehe, B.A., Ph.L., St. Louis, 1961, 1962; M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1963. "Professional Values and Belief Systems of Sociologists."

Charles Thomas, B.A., M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1950, 1961. "Robsart: A Case Study of Culture Change in a Restricting Habitat."

Sasha Weitman, B.A. Brandeis, 1960; M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1962. "The Demand for Equalities and the French Revolution of 1789."

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

James Hackler, B.S. California, 1952; M.A. San Jose State College, 1959. "A Sequential Model of Deviant Behavior."

Luther Jansen, A.B., M.A. Washington, 1941, 1942. "Study of Family Integration and Cohesion."

George Kupfer, A.B. Seattle Pacific College, 1957; M.A. Washington, 1962. "An Exploratory Study of Middle-Class Delinquency in Diverse Community Settings."

Mary Sheldon, A.B., M.A. Missouri, 1958, 1960. "The Scientist in Industry."

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

Joseph J. Lawrence, B S. John Carroll, 1959; M A. Washington State College, 1955 "Non-Participation of Negroes in Civil Rights Activities in a Small Northern Community."

Doris Y. Wilkinson, B A. Kentucky, 1958; M.A. Western Reserve, 1960. "The Single-Parent Family Structure: Adolescent Alienation and Delinquency Proneness."

YALE UNIVERSITY

M. Harvey Brenner, B.A. City College N Y, 1962. "Economic Conditions, Urbanization, and Mental Disorders."

Peter J. Burke, B.A. Massachusetts. 1961. "Aggression and the Formation of Primary Groups."

Edward P. Friedman, B.A. Oberlin College, 1961. "Friendship Choice and Clique Formation in a Home for the Aged."

Robert W. Hetherington, B A. Saskatchewan, 1961. "Medical Care in a Social System."

Robert D. Rossel, B A. Kansas State College, 1961. "Organizational Structure, Position, and Organizational Ideology."

Howard F. Taylor, B.A. Hiram College, 1961. "Structural Balance and Tension in the Two-Person Group."

John P. Weiss, B A. Bowdoin College, 1961. "The Awareness of Social Change."

BOOK REVIEWS

The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. By MICHEL CROZIER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. 320. $7.50.

I expect this book to become a standard reference in the fields of organizational analysis, public administration, and sociological theory. The author is an empirically oriented sociologist who has formulated meaningful new theory in the course of his research. His painstakingly empirical examination of two examples of French bureaucracy, a clerical agency and an industrial monopoly, leads him to construct a bridge between conflict and the theory of organizations, which is traditionally conflict-free. Power and conflict are integrated with organization theory in order to explain organizational inertia and, by implication, organizational change. His theory seems to flow from the empirics, and his analysis continuously interrelates with his cases. Yet it is the development of theory, rather than the description of behavior, that makes this book significant.

Crozier's work involves at least four important departures from the conventional literature of organization and social theory. (1) Power is directly introduced into the main body of analysis. (2) Conflict is viewed as a source of stability. (3) A systematic explanation of organizational rigidity is put forward. (4) Internal organizational processes are related to the larger cultural and social setting.

For the most part, power has remained outside the domain of organizational theory, which has traditionally emphasized either the science of rational decision for goal achievement or the social and psychological factors that condition co-operation. Crozier, however, takes power as his central concern. He defines power as the ability of a person or group to obtain from other persons or groups behavior that was not previously required. Thus, power stems from individuals or groups rationally attempting to fulfil their diverse and conflicting goals.

One crucial aspect of power is the resolution of unformalized behavior into rules that set participant behavior in predictable patterns. Groups constantly attempt to codify that which is uncertain so as to regulate tasks and functions in their own interest. This results in the continuous and cumulative transformation of areas of uncertainty into regulated patterns. Such things as the formal structure of authority, the allocation of tasks, technological change, seniority, and group ideology become regulated by the groups in organization. In this manner an organization becomes a structure of established rules and procedures. Participants carve out privileges and construct them into obligations which constrain the behavior of others, thereby creating a kind of sovereignty for themselves.

Conflict is always a relation bounded by the established routines and codified domains of organization; therefore it appears mainly where rules are ill-defined. Conflict is resolved by codification. In conventional literature the disequilibrating aspects of conflict are most frequently stressed and systems in conflict are assumed to be unstable. Crozier does not see conflict as dysfunctional. The self-interest of organizational groups moves toward order, arranging organizational relations into set patterns and formal rules. Hence, organizational pathology arises not from the disorder of conflict but from the rigid rules and defined domains that conflict helps create.

A bureaucratic organization is unable to adjust to new circumstances by a change in pattern. Its pathology is that of order and certainty. In bureaucratic organizations uncertainty is continuously resolved into impersonal formal rules either by centralized decision-making or by the activities of power-seeking groups. Faced with intricate rules which order relationships within groups, administration often seeks its goals by trying to bypass these rules. It does this by centralizing increasingly larger sectors of activity. The groups in turn react by accentuating the rules that give their own activity autonomy and stability. In this way bureaucracy builds cumulative inflexibility until some outside event or

internal crisis forces new adjustment. When faced with external pressures, unable to adjust, bureaucracy finds its internal strains increased until resolution is achieved by crisis. Crisis is a common means in bureaucracy to bring about adjustment to change. The main mechanism of change in bureaucratic organization is periodic overhauling from above and periodic overhauling is basic to bureaucracy.

The value of Crozier's powerful and systematic analysis of the internal logic of organization is not matched by his discussion of organization as a cultural phenomenon. This discussion, occupying almost a third of his book, is enjoyable but overly general and impressionistic. He explains French bureaucracy by linking it to national traits. The French do not form groups; therefore informal groups in organization are weak and lack cohesion. The French are somewhat alienated but creative people, individuals who reject co-operative group action. They protect themselves against formal authority by avoiding direct face-to-face relationships. These cultural tendencies reinforce the organizational development of impersonal rules but surround the rules with freedom which permits great individual creativity. Crozier finds here a connection between the macrocultural characteristics and micro-organizational behavior. Thus, significant social change at the macrocultural level parallels organizational change—periodic crises force a centralized authority to try to effect change in a highly balkanized and actively resistant society.

Crozier's book goes far beyond the mere application of the clinical method to the study of two French governmental agencies. It offers a theory of organizations and an approach to organizations in society. It is not equally successful in all its ramifications, but new paths are not easily broken. One is left with the feeling that he has read a book churning with ideas, not all of which are systematically explored. For example, one would want to understand more fully the contexts in which conflict creates uncertainty by breaking down established rules and procedures, or the means through which central authority reorders bureaucracy in times of crisis. Finally, the book is not particularly well written or well balanced. The earlier empirical section is much too long and often unnecessarily tedious. These are small defects in a book that develops important ideas in a new, thoughtful, and provocative manner.

SHERMAN KRUPP

Queens College, City University

Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity. By ROBERT L. KAHN, DONALD M. WOLFE, ROBERT P. QUINN, J. DIEDRICK SNOEK, and ROBERT A. ROSENTHAL. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. 470.

Social scientists at the University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research have ranked among the important contributors to the study of organizational behavior. Their past research contributions have emphasized the application of survey research techniques to the study of leadership, productivity, and organizational change.

The research reported in *Organizational Stress* represents a new departure in organizational studies for the Institute A product resulting from the collaboration of members of the Survey Research Center and the Research Center for Group Dynamics, this study deals with the effects of role conflict on individual tension, satisfaction, and self-esteem. It works with a wide range of variables, both organizational and individual, and several important research methods. The use of clinical, survey, and personality-measurement approaches to role conflict and the concern for the interrelation between personality and social structure mark a departure from the simpler and also less sophisticated research efforts of this group at the Institute.

The objectives of the study are (1) to describe the prevalence, nature, and effects of role conflict and ambiguity; (2) to explain the origins, causes, and consequences of these conditions; (3) to modify existing normative theory on organizational practices in light of the study's results.

The authors utilized a national sample and an intensive population of fifty-three role sets (defined as a "focal person" and his "role senders") at varying status levels and in different organizational settings. The subjects completed personality tests and responded to survey-type and to more open-ended interviews.

This reviewer applauds this study mainly

for formalizing an investigation that relates personality and organizational phenomena. The findings show that dynamic processes within the individual mediate the effects of environmental pressures. For instance: "A positive association exists between degree of objective role conflict and the intensity of conflict as experienced by the focal person. There is also a tendency for those who are high on neurotic anxiety to experience more intense conflict than do those who are more stable and integrated ($p < 0.05$). But . . . the situation may not be so simple as this. Among persons low in anxiety proneness, no significant difference in experienced conflict is found between conditions of high and low role conflict" (p. 251).

The study, however, contains several weaknesses: (1) discontinuity between concepts and measures (role conflict is operationally defined as the desire of role senders for change in the focal person, without weighting consistency among role senders or salience of the role sender in relation to the focal person); (2) obscurity of meaning and causality (static statistical association, no matter what the variables are called, does not contain the foundations of causal explanation); (3) an inadequate grasp of the nature of anxiety and emotional disturbance (reports on experienced tension and the results of personality scales cannot be taken to indicate pathology. These data nowhere reflect in either quantity or quality the misery of neuroses and borderline states); (4) reluctance to introduce developmental concepts or a time dimension (there is nothing self-evident, for research purposes, in the proposition "that social psychological factors in the contemporary environment have major effects on the physical and psychological well-being of the person" [p. 7]); (5) dubiousness of certain interpretations of clinical data (the complaints of a supervisor who had been demoted do not seem to reflect a condition in the here and now of the individual who "is at times virtually overcome with ambiguity" [p. 79]).

The concluding chapter of the book states some of the implications of research for management. One idea worthy of more discussion among managers is to "minimize the requirements for coordination between positions and groups; in other words, treat every coordinative requirement as a cost, which it is" (p. 394).

In addition to the suggested changes in conceptions of organizations presented in this last chapter, I would add another. The authors state, "To understand and predict a man's behavior on the job, we must ask to what other jobs his is connected . . . and what is the nature of the connecting bonds" (p. 389). To this I would add (for purposes of research as well as practice): Where is the individual in the job going in terms of his developmental life themes and personal history? The beauty of the concept of role is in its potential for relating personality *and* social structure.

ABRAHAM ZALEZNIK

Harvard University

The Managing of Organizations: The Administrative Struggle, Vols. I and II. By BERTRAM M. GROSS. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xxviii+463; xx+467–971. $19.95.

Bertram Gross's two-volume study of administration is a daring piece of work. The reader inevitably compares this study with the works of Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon because it is in the tradition of a grand synthesis. Gross himself draws the reader into this comparison through his prefatory remarks and the organization and style of these two volumes. The study must then be reviewed in comparison with other works as well as on its own merits.

If anyone is prepared to set out an action-theory approach to administration like that of Chester Barnard, Gross is the man. He brings to the study of administration firsthand experience in government service, in academic administration, and in reflective thinking of the academician. Gross is committed to the development of the new profession of administration because, out of his experience, he finds the role of administration crucial to curing the alleged ills of dehumanization that follow along with large-scale organizations. There is no turning back the clock in Gross's eyes but instead the challenge of making organizations work for man in humanistic, psychological, and materialistic senses.

Gross wants his two volumes to help the practitioner as well as guide the researcher in the yet uncharted areas of an action theory of administration. He seeks to achieve this

enormously difficult objective by presenting in Volume I an historical review of contributions to administration from the sages to the contemporary social scientists, from the Bible to the *American Journal of Sociology*. Gross is schooled in this range of materials. The man has read as well as acted, and Volume I reflects his erudition.

Volume II is the effort at synthesis with the concept of *purpose* at the core. Purposes are commitments to action to bring about some desired situation in the future (p. 469). From this broad concept of purpose Gross organizes Part V around a "global matrix" of purposes, including satisfaction of interests, output, efficiency, and organizational viability.

Gross concludes Volume II with a look into the future. Here he prescribes for an administered society. The prescriptions include the democratization of organizations using countervailing power, distributed authority, and involvement in task. He sets forth the need for a science of administration based on empirical research. And, finally, he discusses the place and problems of formal education in the development of administrators.

The study is daring, the scope broad, and the vision impressive. The question remains: Does it come off? No specialist in the study of organizations will be pleased with what Gross has done. The sociologist will feel quite uncomfortable with the treatment of organizational structure, authority, and role. The psychologist will be pained at the oversimplified conception of motivation, at the uncritical discussion of Maslow's need-hierarchy theory, at the absence of a dynamic perspective on human motivation and development as applied to occupations and career in organizations. The mathematician, economist, and accountant will likewise bristle at the surface treatment of their special contributions to the study of decision, the use of resources and information flow.

The man of affairs, the practitioner, also faces considerable difficulty in the contents of the book. The historical perspective of Volume I will be of considerable interest in its specification of the richness of the field of administration. The synthesis in Volume II leaves much to be desired. The fault is in the organization around purpose instead of around action. When all is said and done, Gross ignores his objective of an *action theory* of administration. The concept of purpose is too static as it is elaborated in Part V to do justice to the type of problem Gross set out to solve. One gets the feeling that there is too much cataloging of words and too many static and unused typologies. The book seems in many respects more like a dictionary of administration than like an explanation.

While I was reviewing this book, my mind kept returning to the question of the place of synthesis in the development of a field, call it administrative science, organization theory, or whatever. No one would quarrel with the idea that efforts at synthesis are extremely important. Nor would anyone do less than admire the courage of qualified people, like Bertram Gross, who are willing to tackle the job. The question comes down to the timing of the synthesizing work. Is there a sufficient empirical foundation in the field to make syntheses workable? Are the tools of theoretical work good enough to permit abstraction that is truly explanatory?

For my money, I suppose I still bet on the combination of middle-range theory and empirical work, on partial attempts at synthesis in relation to particular problems rather than on global efforts. But the question of where any of us place our bets in the strategy of research is governed ultimately by the rules of free choice and competition. No one will prejudge the effort at global synthesis. We will study the work, learn from it, and decide whether the author has pulled off the heroic task of unifying a complex and pluralistic field.

ABRAHAM ZALEZNIK

Harvard University

Organizational Authority: Superior-Subordinate Relationships in Three Public Service Organizations. By ROBERT L. PEABODY. New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xii+163. $5.50.

Peabody elegantly meshes an exploratory analysis of the sociological literature about authority with descriptive, systematic findings obtained from his observational and interview work in three small governmental organizations: an elementary school, a public-welfare agency branch office, and a municipal police department. This monograph, constituting Peabody's doctoral research, builds effectively

upon the half-century of speculation and research on authority by students of organizations in industry and government (the latter including such varying institutions as the military, prisons, and mental hospitals).

By emphasizing the convergence of the traditional literature about organizations (as from Weber and Gulick) with the human-relations approach—the approach of "organizations without people" with that of "people without organizations"—Peabody builds, in chapters i and ii, coherence for two important streams of scholarly work. In this work he develops a multifaceted continuum of authority, embodying such contrasting organizational characteristics as a formal-informal, rational-non-rational, and impersonal-subjective, in order to place his three subject organizations on a scale running from temporary voluntary groupings through such total institutions as prisons. When Peabody devotes subsequent sections to such focused topics as responsibility (chapter v), the acceptance of authority and the implementation of decisions (chapter vi), and the bases of authority (treating legitimacy, position, competence, and person in chapter vii), he again reviews the extant literature, sometimes with annoying redundance (chapter vii is reprinted with little alteration from the *Administrative Science Quarterly*). It is disappointing that the author did not choose to incorporate these latter three reviews of partial scope with the earlier reviews (chapters i and ii) into a final integration in chapter viii, which gives his "Conclusions." We are left with a series of juxtaposed analyses, not tightly articulated with his opening chapters.

The field work, which is reported on in chapters iii–vii, involved some twenty, twenty-three, and thirty-three individuals, constituting the entire personnel of the school, the welfare office, and the police department. The systematic findings obtained in interviews averaging about an hour in length are presented descriptively in a series of tables, which then are described verbally in the text with concrete, vivid excerpts from the research notes. But only in two cases (Tables 4, 5) are these excellent data employed in cross-tabulations, exploring the relations of members' focus on internal vs. external authority to their level (superior-subordinate) in the organization.

Although a number of times Peabody uses the notion of variables-on-continua most effectively (Figs. 1, 5), his theoretical enterprise with respect to interrelating variables is limited almost always to mere "teasers." Thus he hypothesizes in chapter iii that "the higher the individual job satisfaction, the greater his propensity to accept authority in the organization" (p. 48), and he promises empirical results in chapter vi. Yet in that chapter one finds that Peabody has failed to correlate his measures of job satisfaction (Question 4, from the Questionnaire presented in the Appendix) with measures of perceptions of the exercise of authority (Questions 7 and 8). Despite his excellent and intensive review of the literature, only on occasion does Peabody knit his own findings closely with those obtained by others—as when he notes a "somewhat surprising" result in the police department that "skill in human relations was singled out more frequently than any other basis of authority" and that "police officers also placed much greater emphasis on such skills than did social workers or elementary-school teachers" (p. 128). He comments, "These findings also seem to support Janowitz' conclusions that in militarylike establishments skill in interpersonal relations rather than technical competency is emphasized as the basis of authority" (p. 129). Why does a scholar who so admires the meticulous, systematic theory integration completed by Blau and Scott in *Formal Organizations* backslide in the analysis of his own materials? The "Conclusions" of chapter viii are even more disappointing, inasmuch as his comments relate only loosely to the insightful conceptual developments presented earlier—and at times degenerate into urbanities reminiscent of traditional speculation, such as the assertion that "dilemmas appear to be endemic to organizational life" (p. 140).

But it is unfair to criticize Peabody for failing to do what he never aspired to do; he carefully notes that his "study is *exploratory* rather than *explanatory*" (p. 46, italics his). When the monograph is viewed in disciplinary perspective, one gains hope that our colleagues in the field of government soon may begin producing empirical works which match those being written by the industrial and institutional sociologists. Just as the political scientists are now operating with much sophistication in the study of voting behavior, after the manner pioneered by Lazarsfeld and Berelson, so one anticipates that they will soon make as significant contributions to the study of organiza-

tional behavior. It would seem that this well-focused monograph by Peabody, grounded in empirical data, is a harbinger of good things. Perhaps the new generation of political scholars will cease the undisciplined, redundant speculation of the past and join with social psychologists and sociologists in studying governmental organizations in a manner befitting the important methodological advances achieved in the past quarter century.

HAROLD GUETZKOW

Northwestern University

Modern Organizations. By AMITAI ETZIONI. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. vii+120. $3.95.

With this fine study the field of sociology of organization takes another firm step forward. The field is fortunate in having a first-class textbook for the basic undergraduate course (P. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations*), several fine collections of readings, and an increasing number of advanced theoretical studies for graduate students. However, a clear need existed for a brief statement describing the main currents and perspectives of the field for students of the first course in sociology. That need has now been met. In 116 pages of text, Etzioni has written an excellent introduction to the study of organizational behavior.

The book is brief but not superficial. The three chapters that describe and analyze the classical scientific-management perspective, the human-relations approach, and the orientation of Max Weber and his students are "must" reading and are alone worth the price of the book. Succeeding chapters present the author's well-known approach to the problem of control, discussions of the relationships between administrators and professionals and between organizational members and their clients and other problems.

It is a reviewer's prerogative to find faults, and the following especially concerned me.

1. A vexing problem for organizational analysis is careful definition of the unit of study. Etzioni avoids the issue and defines organized systems in the now-established fashion as "social units deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals." In so doing, however, he tends to treat "simple" organizations such as small clubs and fraternities together with "moderately complex" systems such as small colleges and department stores and "highly complex" systems such as General Motors and the United States Army, which contain vast sets of intricately interlocked suborganizations of the "simple" and "moderately complex" type. I wish that Etzioni had at least spelled out this problem for the student at the outset. Precise definition of the units of study constitutes a fundamental step for the systematic advancement of any field of study.

2. Why is it that the organization closest to home gets the shabbiest treatment? The university is the victim in this volume of rather stereotyped handling. For example, its goals are defined simply as teaching and research. Not only is such a definition unenlightening, it is not even consistent with the author's earlier definition of organizational goals as "that future state of affairs which the organization as a collectivity is trying to bring about." In addition, it is highly confusing. Is authoring a book such as *Modern Organizations,* designed primarily as a teaching aid, to be defined as "teaching" or as "research"? The author would have been better off to have discarded the traditional distinctions between teaching and research and differentiated instead between various ways in which universities produce, develop, and disseminate ideas of various kinds. The danger is not, as Etzioni indicates, "that the university will respond to pressures to give more money and attention to teaching and less to research" (p. 85). Instead, I think a much more serious problem lies in the tendency to focus heavily on the rapid production of new ideas and techniques and thereby discourage intensive and careful development of existing lines of inquiry. Thus, the university becomes the victim of short-term, marketplace considerations. In addition, there exists the serious tendency to stick to the old, established ways of disseminating knowledge rather than attempting to implement new ones which carry with them high risk.

A final sentence will completely exhaust my allotment of words: I liked *Modern Organizations* and thoroughly recommend it.

OSCAR GRUSKY

University of California, Los Angeles

Integrating the Individual and the Organization. By CHRIS ARGYRIS. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. xii+224. $5.95.

Chris Argyris is a scholar who has spent a very full fifteen years of professional life in the study of organizations. In his newest book he summarizes and appraises his own work and that of others. He says in effect, "Here is where I now stand on theory and research in organizations." Thus, this book is an end product of the theoretical structure and the research experiences of Argyris—writer of *Executive Leadership* (1953), *Organization of a Bank* (1956), *Personality and Organization* (1957), *Understanding Organizational Behavior* (1958), *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Behavior* (1960). This is truly *Personality and Organization,* revisited with a new purpose. He says his primary objective is to present his *preliminary thinking* and *theorizing* about how organizations might be *redesigned* to take more fully into account the energies and competences that human beings have to offer.

Part I restates his theoretical position, especially setting forth basic postulates about the individual and the organization. The basic questions continue to be the same: How does the individual achieve "psychological success"? How does a lack of congruency develop between individual needs and organizational demands? What are the unintended consequences that develop from these incongruencies? More attention is given than heretofore to the differences which spring from the lower and higher levels of the organization.

Part II examines the problems of defining and specifying organizational effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Here he defines essential properties of organization as (1) the pattern of parts, (2) the maintenance of the whole through the interrelatedness of all parts in the pattern, (3) the achievement of goals or objectives, (4) the adaptation to change within the organization, and (5) the adaptation to the external environment. From this base he constructs a mix model which marks out six dimensions stressing, on the one hand, the difference between interrelationship and, on the other, the dominance of individual parts over the whole (or the neglect of these parts to consider the whole). In the search for organizational structure that best fits the needs of individuals and the organization he suggests at least four different types which might be mixed in the same organization to fit appropriate kinds of decisions. These are the pyramidical structure, the modified formal organizational structure, power according to functional contribution, and power according to inevitable organizational responsibilities. Appropriate leadership styles to fit these various structures are indicated.

Parts III and IV are concerned with the specifications for redesigning the personnel and managerial policies appropriate for greater organizational effectiveness and for more "psychological success" for more individuals.

After thorough examination, traditionalists will be glad to learn, the pyramidical structure is recognized as necessary but it is proposed that it be utilized only where it fits certain kinds of routinized decisions or specific conditions pertaining to the needs of the organization or of the individual. It is suggested that other forms of organization are more effective in achieving innovation and bringing greater personal commitment.

In dealing with the individual, emphasis is placed upon commitment, growth, participation, and individual control and responsibility. The organization is to seek alternate structures and decision rules to fit differing problem-solving requirements and to provide for the "psychological success" of the participants. Leaders are to learn how to assume different leadership roles appropriate to the changing situations and the employee is to seek psychological success through new opportunities of commitment presented to him by the redesigned structure.

It is easy to stand back and say that this set of ideas is too idealistic. Argyris is sensitive to this criticism—so much so that he constantly reminds the reader that the mix model is a preliminary model and research is needed to fit all the pieces together if there is to be a demonstration of validity. He says he is concerned with the need of organizations (especially large ones) to remain viable and strong when changes are needed and innovation in product and organization is required.

This reviewer is not prepared to say that there are gaping flaws in the psychological assumptions or overidealistic conceptions of organizational redesign. The growing convergence of men like Likert, McGregor, Shepard, Bass, Bennis, Blake and Mouton, Burns and Stalker, Barnes, Litwak, and Argyris himself (for bibliography and review

see pp. 182–191) indicates that a thought stream has emerged. It will not be diverted as long as researchers have the opportunity to probe for the conditions which validate or falsify the theoretical assumptions. Meanwhile, Argyris has probably done the best job of stating the psychological assumptions that are presumed to support the whole analysis of the organizational structure. Others have outlined the differing structural alternatives with more clarity—Likert, for example, in *New Patterns of Management.* What Argyris has done best is to take his psychological training and turn it on the relationship between individual and organization. Here his sociological training enables him to look constantly at the interrelationship between the two. In the process he has reexamined his thinking and in this book he challenges the reader to do the same for himself.

DELBERT C. MILLER

Indiana University

The Advertising Man in London Advertising Agencies. By JEREMY TUNSTALL. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1964. Pp. 288. 30*s.*

Jeremy Tunstall, whose previous book, *The Fishermen,* gave a detailed sympathetic picture of a hazardous lower-class occupation, has now turned his attention to the sophisticated middle-class occupation of advertising. Aside from its intrinsic fascination, advertising is, as Everett Hughes points out in his Foreword, an occupation where measurement of success is most difficult and where people operate under extreme uncertainty. An insightful sociological study of advertising would be of real importance in the study of occupations, but unfortunately such a book remains to be written.

This study is a major disappointment even when judged on its author's own grounds. As Tunstall describes his data-gathering, he worked for three months in an advertising agency and interviewed forty-five advertising people. The study is based almost entirely on the existing literature which consists of the British advertising trade press plus some how-to-do-it texts written by agency people. Naturally, the absence of hard data is not surprising, but compare this to the method used in Tunstall's earlier book. To study fishermen, he spent two years in Hull, made three sea voyages, conducted 220 interviews, and also tried a mail questionnaire. Clearly much greater effort was expended on fishermen whose jobs are much less differentiated than are advertising roles.

Only the first third of the book deals with advertising people, while the remainder concerns itself with a necessarily superficial description of market research, public relations, and marketing. Fruitful comparisons could have been made between people in these fields and those in advertising, but this has not been done.

Given the lack of data, one looks for fresh insights to redeem the book, but they are not to be found. Unlike his earlier work, where he is clearly on the side of the fishermen, here Tunstall is strongly antipathetic to advertising and advertising people. A brief quotation from the book illustrates its tone:

> Few people with creative or intellectual talent of the highest order go into advertising, and even fewer stay long; the scope and the rewards available in literature, politics, and in industry are incomparably greater. Far from the advertising industry gobbling up the flower of the nation's young minds, the low educational and intellectual level of agency personnel is regarded as a major problem by the industry's official organizations.

One suspects that it is primarily this lack of sympathy which has led the author to mistake the distorted image found in speeches and press releases for the reality of the occupation.

SEYMOUR SUDMAN

National Opinion Research Center
University of Chicago

The Poor Pay More: Consumer Practices of Low-Income Families. By DAVID CAPLOVITZ. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. xvi+220. $5.50.

This book began as a piece of commissioned research by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University. The client was a group of settlement houses in New York; their problem, the consumer practices of the people in low-income housing projects, who were apparently spending their money unwisely, running up huge (for them) debts,

getting poor value for their money, and, worse, getting into trouble with the law, which was called in to repossess property, to garnishee salaries, and in general to deprive them of whatever joy they may have gotten from their unwise purchases.

But it is much more than a piece of commissioned research; it is a book, and as valuable and rich a study of the life of the modern poor as any I know. The techniques are those pioneered at the Bureau of Applied Social Research. A sample of people in the low-income projects was selected and questioned at great length on their consumer practices and their consequences. This technique was supplemented by an exploration in depth, conducted with great intelligence and extensive knowledge, of the whole economic and legal setting of their lives. Thus, chapter iii, "The Merchant and the Low-Income Consumer," based on interviews with merchants in these areas is an amazing and hilarious description of practices just this side, and the other side, of legality of which I think most sociologists and many social workers are only dimly aware. A chapter on the consequences of missed payments and one of conclusions demonstrates a detailed knowledge of how the subjects make contact with the law—and many do—and contains many valuable suggestions on how these disastrous encounters might be reduced, or at least the odds somewhat evened. In other words, David Caplovitz, because he was not content simply to stand behind his questionnaire and report it, but searched out the entire ambience of his problem, has given excellent value for the settlement houses' money and come up with a book that will undoubtedly stand as an important description of the life of the poor in the 1960's, alongside the classic works of reportage and analysis of the turn of the century.

In a brief review one can only list some of the findings. The first is that, as the title asserts, the poor do pay more. The poorer families literally pay more for the expensive appliances (television sets, phonographs, washing machines) than do less impoverished families. The size of the expenditures is astonishing: 46 per cent of families with income under $3,500 pay more than $300 for television sets; 49 per cent pay more than $230 for washing machines. There is little relationship between expenditure and income. The Puerto Ricans are those most committed to traditional shopping practices—that is, the local store and the peddler, rather than the department store and the mail-order house.

Exploitation is revealed as a complex affair. The door-to-door salesman who may sell the items of reputable manufacturers actually "exploits" the customers more mercilessly than their regular peddler or local merchant who may sell shoddy merchandise at a high price. The former, once the papers are signed, decamps and leaves the customer to the mercy of collectors and city marshals and the courts, and these make no concession for a missed payment. The regular peddler or local merchant will remain in contact with the customers in his neighborhood, and concern for public opinion and his public image keeps him from abandoning them to collection agencies. The Negroes have in some ways the most up-to-date shopping practices—more of them shop outside the area, fewer of them refrain from using credit. But despite this modernity, their incomes are not high enough to avoid trouble.

Caplovitz makes the excellent point that the relations between the customers and the local merchants and peddlers are based not only on the ignorance and lack of experience of the customers, but also on their powerful desire for consumer goods, which they cannot get in the more reputable stores because of their poor credit ratings. Thus they pay more and are often aware of it. But it is striking that, impoverished as they may be by general American standards, they have property to be repossessed, salaries to be garnisheed, and the Welfare Department to stand—ultimately—behind their debts. Under these circumstances, they are rather better credit risks than the regular commercial system allows, and their exploitation is not inevitable. Indeed, one is impressed in reading Caplovitz' tables by the degree to which their poverty is not simply a consequence of low income but is itself maintained by the pattern of unwise credit purchasing. Many of his subjects become responsible for thousands of dollars of repayments for goods that were worth only a few hundred dollars and whose functions could have been well fulfilled for less than that.

Anyone concerned with the various programs, research, and action dealing with poverty will find this book invaluable.

Nathan Glazer

University of California, Berkeley

Too Many Americans. By LINCOLN H. DAY and ALICE TAYLOR DAY. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964. Pp. ix+298. $4.95.

Unwanted Workers: Permanent Layoffs and Long-Term Unemployment. By RICHARD C. WILCOCK and WALTER H. FRANKE. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. xi+340. $6.95.

Problems of population growth and long-term unemployment in the United States must be faced by complacent Americans during the decades ahead. The Days argue that continued increase at its present rate will almost double our population by the turn of the century. Such a development if it occurs will transform the lives of Americans as amount of income increases and quality of life declines. More people means, among other things, more land needed for housing and transportation and less space available for farming, recreation, and aesthetic purposes.

Signs of what our children can expect are already with us. Almost all of the East Coast from Maine to Central Virginia has become an extended megalopolis consisting of decayed central cities surrounded by ill-planned suburbs connected by expressways lined with billboards and assorted junk catering to humans with the gustatory and reproductive appetites of rabbits. Part of this population increment has already fled west. In California, not only the fruit groves of the south but the best wine country in the north are being leveled and replaced by housing tracts and freeways. Every man must have his car and his castle, and America contains a plethora of kings.

Accompanying this blight will be competition between housing, school, water, road, industrial, and recreational authorities fighting for their respective shares of scarce resources while air and water pollution provide the backdrop. Can we afford fecund prosperity? Expenditures involved in the construction of educational, water, and other community services will continue to soar as state and local units struggle to make provisions for their respective populations. The Days believe that the expense will be great, but not nearly so dear as the price we will have to pay in human freedom, as the federal government increasingly intervenes in state and local affairs in order to rescue both from financial and organizational bankruptcy.

Why Americans are reluctant to deal with these problems can be partially explained by religious values. The authors do an excellent job of analyzing Catholic and other views opposed to the regulation of population growth. In so doing, they convincingly reject a variety of arguments, including positions which associate growing size with prosperous times and military virility.

Perhaps the only serious weakness consists of the major solution suggested to solve the population problem. Aside from palliatives such as ready access to birth-control information for anyone who seeks it, the authors prefer changes in American values on ideal family size rather than the active participation of the federal government as the principal agent of stabilizing our population at approximately 200 million. By stressing the voluntary character of such a change and de-emphasizing the role of government, the authors consciously avoid recommendations which would offend the Catholic hierarchy, even though the Days would undoubtedly find some support among that large section of lay Catholics who use contraceptives. Perhaps the authors' timidity explains why they have ignored population-control programs developed by peoples such as the Japanese. Interestingly, the latters' government has been able to translate the idea of an optimum of 90 million people into reality through an extensive birth-control program based largely upon the dissemination of contraceptive information and subsidization of complementary activities. Why can't American sociologists suggest something similar?

Ironically, just at the historical moment when population threatens to grow so as to create serious problems in providing employment for young adults, the mass industries are automating and thereby creating jobs for some but eliminating occupations for others: the unwanted workers. Wilcock and Franke focus primarily on the consequences of five plant shutdowns associated with automation in the meat-packing industry. They present case-study material based upon interviews with manual workers who faced terminal layoffs in five middle-sized cities located in either the Midwest or the Great Plains. The authors were to a large degree concerned with the following question: when workers were displaced, what personal and other factors determined whether they remained unemployed or found work? The authors observed that rate

of long-term unemployment for these workers was relatively high for long periods in each city, but particularly within certain categories: females, Negroes, older people, the lesser educated, and the unskilled. Negroes in particular faced severe unemployment, although they were younger than comparable whites and (except in one city) had recieved more years of schooling. To make matters worse, once in the ranks of the long-term unemployed, it was almost impossible for them to find work, regardless of age and education.

The search for a job produced other interesting results. Friends and relatives frequently provided information leading to work, while the state employment services, companies, and unions seldom helped. Moreover, when jobs were found, they generally offered less pay, status, and security, but demanded longer work weeks.

Although Wilcock and Franke's study is rich with statistical details and insightful conclusions, it nonetheless seems faulty in three important respects. First, the authors uncritically accept statistical measures of unemployment used by the federal government, even though the latter has expressed doubts as to their validity. Second, they fail to use measures of alienation and unrest which might be related to structural considerations such as race and employment status. Third, they needlessly reject the opinion that long-term unemployment is basically structural, in the sense that the long-term jobless don't know about, can't get to, are not qualified for, or will not accept available jobs. Instead, they view prolonged unemployment as flowing from a serious lag in aggregate demand. This view contradicts both the authors' earlier recommendations for more extensive job-retraining programs and their subsequent analysis of European experiments designed to deal with structural unemployment. Oddly enough, they conclude their study by ignoring the European programs and explicitly preferring a set of monetary and fiscal policies which "can more realistically and with less violence to the private sector" lead to low levels of prolonged joblessness. But isn't this simply more of what we have already experienced, and hasn't such caution failed to reduce the number of unemployed? After all, we are living in a period when trends in both long-term economic growth and extended unemployment roughly parallel one another.

On the whole, however, this is an excellent study, and when read in conjunction with the Days' book, it raises an important question. What are we going to do with the increased number of people, especially when this problem can only heighten our already pressing unemployment situation?

John C. Leggett

University of California, Berkeley

Sécurité Sociale et conflits de classe. By Centre d'Études des Relations Sociales. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1962. Pp. 166. New Fr. 8.85.

This book presents an essentially historical analysis of the French Health Service and of its progressive extension to different social groups.

The attitudes of each group are studied in great detail. The authors show how the numerous forms of opposition encountered have contributed to shaping the present complexity of the French social-security scheme.

Two basic factors, status and economic motivation, can apparently explain most of the hostility shown by various social groups. Most of the time, status requirements are shown to be only a screen for more prosaic financial interests (as in the case of the managerial group), but the financial interests of a professional group can be at times in contradiction with what its members consider as the requirements of their status. Thus, the "Sécurité Sociale" against which the medical profession is still stubbornly fighting has in fact allowed a substantial rise in the total amount of the profession's income.

Thus the greater part of the work deals with the past and present motivations of the different social groups and offers an explanation of the present situation.

With regard to future developments the authors are more timid. Aspirations of the various groups are briefly described at the end of each chapter, but the authors avoid taking too definite a position and preserve the cautious attitude of "observers." Indeed, some scheme for partial improvement is put forward which would allow for more effective

and more efficient participation of the workers. However limited such suggestions may be, they have the merit of being realistic.

MICHEL CROZIER

Centre de Sociologie Européenne
Paris

The Social Ecology of Metropolitan Boston, 1960. By FRANK L. SWEETSER. Boston: Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, 1962. Pp. 240. $4.68.

Patterns of Change in the Social Ecology of Metropolitan Boston, 1950–1960. By FRANK L. SWEETSER. Boston: Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, 1962. Pp. 159. $3.49.

The first of these volumes summarizes tabulations found in the 1960 census-tract bulletins for the Boston and Brockton Standard Metropolitan Areas. For each of 471 tracts Sweetser calculated forty variables such as the percentage of the tract's population aged 14–17, percentage foreign born, the sex ratio, the fertility ratio, percentage of the labor force unemployed and percentage of adults with a college education. The Shevky-Bell indexes of urbanization/familism and of social rank were calculated for every tract. The results are shown in extensive tables but 160 maps are also included to illustrate the tract-by-tract distribution of the variables.

Similar tabulations were made for 1950, and the volume concerning change from 1950 to 1960 compares the characteristics of individual tracts for these dates. Changes in 22 variables were analyzed for each of 441 comparable tracts. Again the results are presented in elaborate tables and numerous maps.

Although these volumes contain a vast amount of data concerning the distribution of social and economic variables in the Boston area, Sweetser fails to interpret or summarize these data in a coherent manner. Rather than perceiving ecological patterns, he seems overwhelmed by the wealth of statistics, and his comments either are confusing or point out the obvious. For instance, he notes that the percentage of total population aged 6–13 is high in suburban tracts but low in the central city, leading him to conclude that women in the suburbs are child-oriented. Since the percentage of women in the labor force is greater for city than for suburban tracts, Sweetser holds that "philoprogenitiveness" characterizes suburban women while city women are job-oriented. Another conclusion is that Boston "clearly ascended a peg or two on the social rank ladder" from 1950 to 1960, for the mean Shevky-Bell index of social rank rose 6 per cent. However, the average tract declined 8 per cent in degree of urbanization from 1950 to 1960, for the urbanization/familism index fell.

During the decennial period the percentage of population working at white-collar jobs or with college educations rose most rapidly in the innermost tracts of the city and in the outermost suburban ring. The largest increases in Negro population occurred not near the Hub, but toward the outer edges of the central city. Sweetser discovered, but does not explain, this peculiarly interesting pattern, and rather than presenting the values of these variables for the different zones, he shows only indexes of relative change, making it difficult to understand the patterns of change. His uncritical use of simple regression and his avoidance of multiple or partial regression models severely handicap his ability to interpret the data.

Material in these volumes may prove useful to certain Boston public-health, school, city-planning, and real-estate officials, but the attempts to explain ecological patterns are not comparable to either the numerous earlier studies of Boston or the many contemporary studies of metropolitan communities.

REYNOLDS FARLEY

Duke University

Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa. Edited by JOHN MIDDLETON and E. H WINTER. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. viii+302.

Witchcraft (together with witch-hunting) is one of those tantalizing institutions like marriage and religion; it appears to be common to all societies yet assumes such diverse forms that the student wonders whether the term is really a meaningful rubric or is, instead, merely an artifact of Western languages and culture. Among the essays here collected,

Mary Douglas' vivid account of the Lele leads the reader toward the notion that witch-hunting is universal, as her description arouses memories of the convulsions that wracked the United States after World War II. The Lele have participated in at least seven millennial movements during the past half-century, each designed to eliminate sorcery once and for all and thereby to bring the community into enduring peace and prosperity.

Yet, if there is this similarity to social processes in Europe and the United States, there is also a profound difference (as F. L. K. Hsu has argued elsewhere). Running through these accounts may be discerned the common themes (or model) recognized by Evans-Pritchard and compactly restated by Gluckman. Unfortunately, the editors of this book, being preoccupied with their own social-structural refinements, do not choose to summarize this model, although the brief Foreword by Evans-Pritchard notes that misunderstandings and misconceptions about witchcraft can still be found, not only in popular thought but also in learned works. Among these African and other societies of similar world view, sickness is seen as caused by witchcraft that has been provoked by interpersonal tensions. When sickness (or similar calamity) strikes, it is interpreted by these folk as the consequence of a malicious action by some being. Somewhat oversimplified, we may say that the responsible being may be visualized as either an ancestral (or natural) spirit, acting to maintain the basic norms of the universe; or it may be a fellow human being, acting to maintain his social position and status in the face of a threat; or it may be a malevolent human being, perversely acting on counter-moral principles. Within the local community, diagnoses of the nature of the responsible being will vary, depending on the closeness of the speaker to the afflicted person (the closer the emotional tie between speaker and afflicted, the more likely the sickness will be regarded as an unprovoked attack by a malevolent being). Professional (disinterested) advice as to the source and occasion of the malicious attack is often useful and supplied by diviners. Locating the source is not simply a matter of theodical interest—here the editors go astray along with many theorists—but rather a practical concern so that the attack may be remedied and future ones prevented.

The editors and publishers of this volume are to be congratulated for bringing us such a meaty set of data about the peoples of a particular region. While the essays differ in quality, nearly all are written with a felicitous combination of ethnographic familiarity and theoretical sophistication. We would have enjoyed more discussion by all contributors of the changes accompanying intercultural contact and industrialization. Some tidbits are tantalizing: John Beattie tells us that a recent and awesome spirit appearing among the Bunyoro is apparently an incarnate army tank; and T. O. Beidelman says that Kaguru accuse one talented individual of augmenting his income as a motor repairman by bewitching lorries as they pass. The value of the book is increased by the presence of an index that covers all the essays and by the bibliographies that some of the authors have appended to their contributions. The contributors and peoples not already mentioned include Jean Buxton, Mandari; Robert F. Gray, Mbugwe; G. B. W. Huntingford, Nandi; Jean La Fontaine, Gisu; Robert A. LeVine, Gusii; John Middleton, Lugbara; E. H. Winter, Amba.

We honor the editors for their role in creating this volume, while judging their theoretical efforts to be labored. In particular, Winter's structural predilections blind him to the import of the data presented in the volume. Noting that the fear of witches is a divisive force in the local communities of the Amba, he struggles with the query as to why this fear should then be so prevalent. Yet he himself notes that sickness (and other calamities) is prevalent among them, and a student need not be a member of the culture-personality school to accept the proposition that ailments (and accidents) have some or even major roots in interpersonal tensions, so that any belief system relating the two has some pragmatic validity. Moreover, insofar as their fear of witchcraft causes the Amba (or members of similar peoples) to moderate their aggressive actions—or withdraw from situations where tension is growing high—it serves a useful function in maintaining a harmonious structure for local action.

MURRAY AND ROSALIE WAX

Emory University

The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana. By POLLY HILL. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Pp. xv+265. $10.00.

This book, by a British Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Economics of the University of Ghana, describes and analyzes the process by which a small group of energetic and profit-conscious Africans established a cocoa-growing "industry" which eventually made Ghana a primary producer and one of the most prosperous of the new African nations. These pioneering entrepreneurs lived in a group of towns upon the Akwapim Ridge behind the capital city of Accra, and they adopted a pattern of migration westward into a heavily forested area to purchase land, clear it, and establish farms during the 1890's. Constant reinvestment in land rather than immediate consumption of the profits marked them as "capitalists" in the classical sense.

The author, after almost a decade of devoted and industrious interviewing, and by making ingenious use of maps prepared by the Department of Agriculture for quite different purposes, has produced a study which she says "is primarily designed for those who are interested in the recent economic history of West Africa and Ghana in particular." But, as Meyer Fortes points out in his short lucid foreword, Miss Hill has also made "a major contribution to the anthropological study of West African social structure."

Fortes uses the author's findings to score a point on what he calls "the development experts" whom he charges with having "repeatedly and uncritically" insisted that traditional kinship structures hamper capital accumulation and are "a serious obstacle to economic progress." The data in this one case *do* refute the orthodox view. (Studies of more highly urbanized areas might *not*). Fortes is making a sound assessment of Miss Hill's work when he states, further, that she has refuted "some of the most time-honoured clichés about such issues as communal land tenure, the mis-called 'extended family,' and the alleged lack of foresight and thrift among tropical peasants." The Calvinistic Basel Mission had influenced the area profoundly by the time the first 80 pounds of cocoa were exported in 1891. Miss Hill mentions the work of the Mission but makes no attempt to assess the extent to which the internalization of the "Protestant Ethic" may have been a factor in the burgeoning of what she calls "rural capitalism" among the Akwapim people.

For those who have but little interest in Ghanaian geography and the minutiae of land transactions, maps, and genealogical records, it might be most rewarding to proceed directly to the chapters on "The Company" and "The Family Land" (after the Fortes foreword, of course). Together they constitute an illuminating exercise in what Fred Eggan calls "controlled comparison," being a study of the differences in patterns of land purchase and utilization of patrilineal and matrilineal migrants who come from the same ecological setting.

The entire 219 pages of text, divided into eight chapters separated from one another by 131 pages of detailed appendixes, is worth reading, but only the hardy—or the devoted—are likely to see it through. Yet Miss Hill's stylistic idiosyncrasies and the self-conscious discussion of her unorthodox research procedures have a charm of their own and an aura of honesty which may evoke enough admiration to outweigh the exasperation.

ST. CLAIR DRAKE

Roosevelt University

Caneville: The Social Structure of a South African Town. By PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, with the assistance of EDNA MILLER. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1964. Pp x+276. $6 95.

Gordon Allport comments on the jacket of this book, that for him the finding of central importance "is the essential inadequacy of a policy of benevolence and gradualism in the face of an unfavorable and hostile government." There is a certain poignancy in the Caneville Experiment, that it represents an attempt by a leading sugar company to create "a perfect sugar undertaking in an ideal multi-racial community," and that nevertheless it reproduces in microcosm the structure, discrimination, and tensions of the wider South African society.

The study of multiracial communities in South Africa has been inhibited by the immense complexity of the cultural and social divisions, and the intricate manner of their interweaving, and perhaps by some tendency

to direct research toward subordinate groups. *Caneville* is the first rounded study of a multiracial small town in South Africa, and the smaller canvas illumines many aspects of the general pattern of race relations. After a brief description of the town, the cultural diversities among and between the racial groups are analyzed, and some interesting hypotheses offered in regard to acculturation. The pride taken by Indians in their traditional culture is contrasted with the shame experienced by Africans in theirs, and the suggestion offered that the shame-pride aspect affects the *selection* rather than the *rate* of acculturation: the shame reaction leads to the adoption of the superficial, outward, material symbols of the dominant culture, followed later by the deeper aspects of that culture, whereas the pride reaction reverses the sequence, self-consciously preserving outward symbols of the traditional culture, even though acculturation in depth has already taken place.

The remaining chapters deal with the structural aspects. In the "Power System," van den Berghe discusses the mechanisms of the company's political control over the town ("Bread and Circuses," "Family Affair," "Co-optation," and "Control of Potential Opposition"), and the nature and consequences of the company's paternalism (such as the divorce of leadership and power). The chapter on the economic system presents a picture of conventional South African discrimination in employment and comments on its dysfunctions. The status system is analyzed in terms of color castes and of stratification, including classes, within each color caste, a procedure the author justifies by the argument that because of the racial differential, objective criteria of class status are meaningful only within each of the three color castes. "More abstractly, straight convertibility of class status from one racial group to another is not possible, because the racial groups are themselves hierarchized" (p. 192). Following a description of race and ethnic relations in Caneville, van den Berghe draws together some of the conclusions with predictive relevance in the chapter on Caneville in transition. He argues that South Africa and Caneville are characterized by a lack of value consensus, and develops the paradox that this arises both from cultural pluralism and from acculturation. And he sees within the Caneville Experiment the seeds of its own destruction, the paternalism being incompatible with the industrial context.

The many complex strands of the argument are simply and skilfully handled, extending our knowledge and understanding of community structure and race relations.

LEO KUPER

University of California, Los Angeles

Urban Land Use Planning. By F. STUART CHAPIN, JR. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963. Pp. xv+397. $6.95.

This book is a general introduction to urban land-use planning with special emphasis upon the theories and methods involved in such planning. The book appears to have been written with one eye on the general (professional) reader and the other eye on graduate courses in land-use planning in city and regional planning programs in universities. It is divided into three parts entitled "Land Use Determinants," "Tooling Up for Land Use Planning," and "Land Use Planning" itself. Part I, on theory, describes a variety of studies bearing on urban land use. Economic determinants are considered first, then attention is switched to more sociological determinants. The studies and ideas described are mainly the classic ones of Burgess, Hoyt, Firey, etc. Part II, on "tooling up," describes various segments of urban life that are particularly relevant for planning, and especially for projecting trends into the future. Primary consideration is given here to employment and population. Many alternative methods of forecasting time series in these areas are at least mentioned. Part III, on land use planning itself, takes the reader through various phases of a planning operation.

This book contains little that is of direct utility to the sociologist. The literature surveyed has also been surveyed elsewhere (urban sociology texts and ecology texts, for example) and the author makes no attempt to present new data or research results. On the other hand, the literature survey is ably accomplished in this book. For this reason some teachers might find the book to be a good source for students who want an overview of work done on urban land uses. These comments certainly are not meant to be deroga-

tory; the author obviously was not writing for a sociological audience.

The book should be of great value to the sociologist who is specifically interested in the planning process itself. In its pages are to be found an excellent yet simple description of this process. Chapin is a superior author who uses the English language very skilfully to accomplish his objectives. The sentences are short and to the point, and the paragraphs are coherent and orderly. The student (and/or the lay reader) should have no difficulty in following the arguments presented. Indeed, if anything, the book is *too* well written (if that is possible) in the sense that one may gain the impression that generating and executing a plan is a relatively smooth operation with few obstacles either in the form of hostile elements within the community or in the form of unknown consequences of the elements in the plan. Chapin certainly does not intend to create this impression, but the very fluency of his style is such that that image tends to emerge.

I heartily recommend this book to those who are seeking a sound introduction to urban land-use planning.

THEODORE R. ANDERSON
University of Iowa

The Housing Environment and Family Life. By DANIEL M. WILNER, ROSABELLE PRICE WALKLEY, THOMAS PINKERTON, and MATTHEW TAYBACK. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. 338. $7.50.

Political myths die hard under the impact of research findings. For a half-century the proponents of public housing have based their advocacy in large part on the beneficial effects of good housing on the health, happiness, and civic responsibility of inhabitants. Since the thirties, social research has shown that the anticipated benefits of moving slum dwellers into good public housing have been at best minuscule and at worst non-existent. The present volume adds mightily to this general conclusion, its considerable weight due to the elegance of the research design employed. Yet the rationale for public housing will probably not feel the impact of its findings, no matter how strongly these results argue for a shift to other grounds (e.g., a matter of right rather than of benefits to health).

Outside of the social-psychology laboratories there are few controlled experiments in the behavioral-science fields. Wilner *et al.* have conducted one of the most thorough approximations to a controlled experiment that has yet to appear in the literature. The basic design of their study was to contrast families who entered a public housing project in Baltimore in 1955 with families who had applied for public housing but were not assigned to such accommodations. Both "experimental" and "control" families were followed by successive interviewing waves (11 in all) through 1958. Approximately 1,000 families, one-third "experimental" and two-thirds "control," were included in the study. All families were Negro, since the public housing project involved was all Negro. Despite the considerable mobility of both experimental and control groups, the attrition in both groups was kept to an amazingly low level.

Interviews with the families covered a variety of topics: morbidity, personal and family relations, relations with neighbors, self-conceptions and aspirations, and "style of life," among others. Results indicated that, although there was some slight advantage in morbidity experience among younger persons (under 35) in the public housing environment, by and large there were no appreciable differences between the two groups. Concerning other differences, few reached the level of statistical significance, although the direction of differences generally favored those in the public housing environment. Those in public housing especially liked their environment and public housing children did better in school than those in the private sector of the housing market.

Wilner *et al.* have produced a study which will undoubtedly be cited as much for its methodology as for its substance. We now know more definitively that changes in housing environments do not produce, at least in this historical period, dramatic changes in the levels of physical and social-psychological well-being. We also know that it is possible for careful and painstaking social scientists to do the kind of research that the texts in research methods hold up as standards.

However, the question still remains as to what is the relationship between man and his housing. Is there a housing environment which is most conducive to the best functioning of

a family and the best fulfilment of personal goals or is housing just another material artifact in man's environment, like his clothes, on which a great amount of attention is focused but which is of relatively minor consequence in his life?

PETER H. ROSSI

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University of Chicago

Two Years after the College Degree. By BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, INC. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963. Pp. x+335. $1.75 (paper.)

This volume reports the results of a 1960 survey of June, 1958, college graduates. The study was designed to gather information on the relationship between collegiate training and post-college educational and occupational pursuits. To this end June, 1958 graduates were asked questions pertaining to their undergraduate and graduate education, their employment status as of 1960, and their social background characteristics. In addition, respondents were asked five questions gauged to measure how useful they felt their college training had been in the performance of their job.

From a listing provided by the U.S. Office of Education, registrars at 1,321 degree-granting institutions were contacted. Each registrar was asked to forward the names and addresses of a 20 per cent random sample of June, 1958, graduates. Over 64 per cent of the 66,200 names so obtained eventually responded to the mailed questionnaire. While there was no way in which the sampling procedures of the cooperating registrars could be checked directly, estimates based upon the obtained sample closely parallel known parameters provided by the U.S. Office of Education. Furthermore, the exemplary analysis of non-response presented in the Appendix on Sampling suggests that the findings of the study were not systematically biased by non-response.

The authors take every advantage of their large sample to present statistical findings in great detail. The bulk of the report is devoted to the presentation of data. The text itself covers only ninety-nine pages, of which thirty-six are devoted exclusively to the presentation of tables and charts. Fifty-eight additional tables are distributed through the remaining sixty-three pages of text. The detailed statistics appended to the text cover an additional 205 pages. These data suggest that most college graduates find satisfactory employment in occupations which are related to their undergraduate fields of specialization, and that they typically feel that they have profited occupationally from their college education. Again, the large sample enables the authors to show in detail how consistency between study and work is patterned differently in different fields.

As the authors are careful to note, many of the questions which may be posed of the relationship between collegiate training and post-college employment are difficult to approach with survey data. Even in those jobs for which a college education is unquestionably useful it is very difficult to determine whether a college education is more useful than four years of experience in the job. Similarly, from a study of this type it is difficult to determine the extent to which a college education serves the older student as a means by which he can effectively erase past occupational failure from his job history. These, as well as many other questions concerning the uses to which students put a college education, were necessarily beyond the scope of the study. Nonetheless, this volume does provide the sociologist with a useful compendium of reliable statistics on many of the relationships existing between the type of collegiate training undertaken by an individual and the type of occupation which he is likely to enter. As such it constitutes a valuable addition to the growing literature on the occupational significance of higher education.

FREDRIC TEMPLETON

Survey Research Center
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Health and Demography in Kentucky. By THOMAS R. FORD. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1964. Pp. xxiii+150. $3.50.

Resources and People in East Kentucky: Problems and Potentials of a Lagging Economy. By MARY JEAN BOWMAN and W. WARREN HAYNES. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press

(for Resources for the Future, Inc.), 1963. Pp. xxiv+448. $10.00.

These two volumes have little in common except their shared concern over the welfare of Kentuckians. Ford has produced a brief, routine description of Kentucky's demography that is little more than a gloss on readily available official statistics. The medical implications of the data, as presented herein, are strained and so generally thin that the book is unlikely to detain for long anyone delving into the interrelations among demographic and health factors. The maps are welcome, however; and the book is a convenience item for readers averse to grappling with census tables.

The Bowman-Haynes opus is a superb achievement—a felicitously written, wonderfully illustrated discourse based on exhaustive research—that can be heartily recommended even to readers with only the flimsiest interest in East Kentucky's insoluble problems or to those wearied by the recent spate of literature on a much-studied region. This is, in short, a model analysis of a region's economy, and of much of its sociology and human geography to boot. The richness of the contents can be barely hinted at in a brief review. The principal themes of the environmental setting, the historical perspective, spatial isolation, interaction, and "de-isolation," the history and potentialities of farming, forestry, and manufacturing, the demographic structure, educational problems, developmental strategies, and, above all, the coal industry are dealt with vigorously and imaginatively. It might have been prudent, however, to have issued as a separate publication the quite technical account of the coal economy that takes up the last third of the volume, utilizing here only the summary findings. Particular praise is due chapter xii, an incisive summary of the problems and prospects of East Kentucky.

The authors are gloomy over the economic and social outlook. The employment gap in coal seems certain to grow worse rather than better; possibilities for farming, forestry, manufacturing, tourism, or massive government bounty are much too meager for a still rapidly growing population, despite the energetic programs initiated by local and national agencies. The authors quite properly stress the importance—and difficulties—of upgrading education in an area whose major exports may indefinitely remain people and coal.

Although this is as honest, penetrating, and sympathetic an account as is likely to appear of this most desperate of American regions, the writers temporize on two basic, sticky issues. They avoid indorsing a program of family limitation for a region whose high fertility is wildly at odds with local opportunity; and they never ask themselves the politically indecent but economically compelling question of why any population should be allowed to remain in East Kentucky. The ruthless early twentieth-century exploitation of forest and mine that brought in the great bulk of settlers was not, it is now clear, essential to the national welfare. Is the indefinite subsidization of a stranded population with federal and state funds necessary or wise?

WILBUR ZELINSKY

Pennsylvania State University

The Psychiatric Professions: Power, Conflict, and Adaptation in a Psychiatric Hospital Staff. By WILLIAM RUSHING. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. 267. $6.00.

This volume reports on a study of the professionals, other than psychiatrists, working in a university department of psychiatry, and is based upon interviews and observations. A major theme of the author's is that mental hospitals of the therapeutic variety, being relatively new, are organizations in the process of institutionalization. He cogently argues that the concept of role is of limited value in understanding the mental hospital, and he builds his analysis on alternative sets of concepts. Foremost is the concept of the power strategy, which refers to acts designed to "influence the behavior of another, but an act that is *oriented to* rather than in *conformity with* institutionalized normative orders." Then he utilizes Homans' concept of cost, and assesses various power strategies in terms of the costs incurred or avoided by the actors. Finally, he makes a distinction between instrumental and expressive orientations of conduct in the organization of his data.

In the first part of the book the author devotes a chapter each to the recreational therapist, social wrokers, psychologists, and nurses working in the psychiatric wing. With

many illustrations and considerable detail, these chapters focus upon the power strategies employed by these professionals in their efforts to perform their instrumental tasks. As Rushing describes the scene, it is the psychiatrists and psychiatric residents who are the chief objects of these attempts to influence. He found that the recreational therapist and the social workers expended considerable energy in "implementing strategies," power strategies that must be repeatedly enacted in order to influence the other. Both these groups also used unsuccessful "structural" strategies—attempts to have formal rules promulgated that would prescribe psychiatrists' actions. On the other hand, the psychologists, whose diagnostic functions were routinized by formal rules, did not usually find such strategies necessary. The deferential actions of nurses were termed "maintaining" strategies, attempts to influence physicians without directly challenging their authority and thereby disrupting the nurse-doctor relationship. Analyzing these strategies in terms of costs, he concludes that implementing strategies, which occur under conditions of lesser institutionalization, are cost-inducing. Structural strategies, which substitute formal rules for informal power strategies, are cost-reducing. The maintaining strategies, designed to influence while maintaining an institutionalized relationship, are cost-preventing. Relating these findings to the process of institutionalization, the author states that under conditions of minimal institutionalization, implementing strategies abound; then structural strategies are introduced to stabilize relationships and reduce costs; once relationships are institutionalized, cost-preventing maintaining strategies are adopted.

In the remaining chapters, the author goes back over the same territory in terms of expressive orientations of the actors. He finds each of the professional groups suffering some degree of expressive deprivation at the hands of psychiatrists. He observes that the same strategies that obtain instrumental results do not necessarily bring prestige and recognition of professional competence, and he concludes that other kinds of strategies are necessary to institutionalize the expressive normative order.

The impact of the book is marred by the author's pedantic, repetitive style. Another distracting feature is the author's predilection for milking every possible generalization out of his data. The worst example of this results from his misinterpreting psychologists' statements that "one just has to do one's best" in the face of lack of recognition. From this, he generalizes that organizational members are most motivated to produce under some degree of expressive deprivation. It is to the author's credit, however, that he presents sufficient data and description for the reader to take issue with some of his interpretations and generalizations.

The weakest element in his analysis is his linking of typologies of power strategies with cost accounting. The evaluation of the costs of any strategy is, the author himself admits, highly slippery. The same act can be cost-inducing or cost-reducing to different actors, or at different times to the same actors. He thinks the case of the psychologists, who experience fewer difficulties in carrying out their diagnostic tasks by virtue of routinized referrals, is support for his hypothesis that formal rules cut costs. Using his own data, it could as well be argued that the routinization of diagnostic referrals entailed enormous costs for psychologists. Not only were they compelled to carry out a function most of them did not value highly at some sacrifice of other more valued activities; the formal rule institutionalized a *service* relationship which was essentially galling to the psychologists. This example also illustrates the difficulties of distinguishing between instrumental and expressive orientations when studying professions. Rushing classifies the promulgation of rules of procedure in the realm of the instrumental. At the same time, however, such rules imply the attitudes that the actors are expected to have toward one another.

A more general underlying problem is the author's assumption that mental hospitals are in the process of institutionalization. They certainly are not highly institutionalized, but there is no good reason for thinking that they ever will be. Hospitals, like many places where professionals work, entail work which is not easily rationalized and routinized, and the nature of the work is always changing, in pace with changing scientific knowledge. Furthermore, new kinds of specialists may be expected to continue to make their appearance, and old specialties to change. None of these considerations would support an expectation

that these institutions will become more institutionalized. Perhaps we should recognize that new kinds of organizations, not like the bureaucracies known to previous generations of sociologists, are here to stay. In reading Rushing, one detects a subtle bureaucratic itch: the pervasive sense that the trouble with these places is that people are not responsive enough to the needs of the organization, and that what is needed to mitigate their suffering is more clear-cut roles and formal rules. This certainly is not what the professionals want, and it may even be very bad for the institution as a whole—if one can decide who represents the interests of the institution.

In any case, Rushing's description of the plight of other professions trying to make their way in a psychiatric domain is important for sociologists interested in occupations and professions and for studies of the relations between professions and institutions. His delineation of different kinds of power strategies is exciting and should be applicable to the less routinized aspects of organizational behavior in general.

RUE BUCHER

University of Illinois

Social Approaches to Mental Patient Care. By MORRIS S. SCHWARTZ, CHARLOTTE GREEN SCHWARTZ, MARK G. FIELD, ELLIOT G. MISHLER, SIMON OLSHANSKY, JESSE R. PITTS, RHONA RAPOPORT, and WARREN T. VAUGHAN, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. 341. $8.75.

This book is the work of the Task Force on Patterns of Patient Care which was established by the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health. Completed too late to be included in the Joint Commission series, the book was nonetheless submitted in draft form for use in preparation of their final report, *Action for Mental Health.* The senior authors are relatively well known for their work in the area of sociocultural study of patient care.

There can be no doubt that the sociocultural approach to mental illness is an exciting and promising development. This is not a movement of the future; it is upon us. One can hardly find a mental hospital superintendent who has not heard of concepts like the "therapeutic milieu," "open-door policy," "continuity of care," "ward government," and the many other social approaches to treatment covered in this book. The slowness of American hospitals and clinics in implementing these approaches is an expression of predictable conservatism. I am personally more impressed by the appeal these methods have to mental health professionals than by their resistance to change. The fact is that without the armamentarium of techniques enumerated in this book, psychiatry would have pitifully little in the way of a positive program of treatment for the mentally ill.

The book is comprehensive, offering sections on out-patient, in-patient, and ex-patient care. I read nothing new or startling in it. The approaches covered have all been tried and written about. As the authors point out several times, however, the approaches described have seldom been properly evaluated. It is one thing to be swept up in a wave of enthusiasm for reform and quite another to soberly apply validity checks to the new programs and go through the less exciting process of assessment.

The main virtue of the book as I see it is its comprehensiveness. Its main defects are its wordiness, frequent redundancy, and length. It escapes from the general level of turgid exposition in chapter xii which poses an eloquent statement of the problems of the conventional medical-psychiatric model of mental illness and a clear delineation of an alternative —the sociocultural or sociological model. This chapter rises above what precedes and what follows in terms of clarity, and it will be difficult for even the most skeptical reader to discount. Interestingly, the book closes on this note with what might be taken as the authors' prescription for the future:

> It should be pointed out that to reorganize in the form of a mental health center is to perpetuate the conventional medical model which conceptualizes disturbance as "illness," labels persons as "patients," and helps them by "treatment" directed and controlled by professionals who are physicians. A more radical reconceptualization and departure from this model might be entertained and experimented with. Some of the phenomena now labeled "mental illness" might be viewed as psychosocial disabilities, help for which might mean placing the disabled person in the role of "student" or "trainee." Help might be given by persons skilled in psychodynamic and sociodynamic processes, consisting of attempts to reeducate and resocialize per-

sons by way of interpersonal and group interactions in specified milieus. A resocialization center thus might be one type of social system for helping certain kinds of psychologically or socially disturbed or inadequate persons. The assumption would be that experiences in the center could contribute significantly to improving and expanding the trainees' psychic-emotional-social life. The center's focus would be on the "emotionally disturbed" person as a social being whose difficulties require various kinds of social contexts, interpersonal experiences, and role demands, all developed with his needs in mind. A further assumption is that such participation might counteract and correct previous socialization (or lack thereof) and change the nature of the trainees' motivations, affective life, self-conceptions, attitudes toward others, and social skills [p. 307].

LEO LEVY

Illinois Department of Mental Health

Psychiatry and Religion. By SAMUEL Z. KLAUSNER. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xvi+299. $6.95.

The alliance of psychiatry and religion to battle human misery is both relatively recent and somewhat problematic for the bulk of psychiatrists and clergymen. In this long-awaited report, Samuel Klausner analyzes the orientations of participants in the "religio-psychiatric movement" through an extensive review of the literature of the movement and a case study of one of the larger clinics that has brought together clergymen and psychiatrists in therapeutic endeavors.

The bibliographic review was limited to "writings bridging the fields of religion and of psychiatry in their concern with mental or spiritual health." Works that subsumed religion under a psychiatric or psychological heading, and those that viewed emotional disturbances solely from the point of view of religion were eliminated, as were inspirational writings. The final listing of more than 1,300 items was thought to approach the universe of items in all languages which had been published in the field through 1957. Not surprisingly, nearly three-fourths of this literature was published in the United States. Outside the United States the movement seems most vigorous in countries that are both industrial and Protestant. Of the total bibliography more than half the items—selected partly at least on the basis of accessibility—were abstracted and classified.

Ministers contributing to the literature of the field frequently report feelings of personal ineffectiveness in their professional roles; many also comment on the discrepancy between actual and ideal religious values. While fewer psychiatrists express dissatisfaction with their own effectiveness, a substantial proportion of those represented in this literature are concerned with the effectiveness of psychiatry as such and with inconsistencies between religious and psychiatric values. The movement appears to attract "younger ministers, who are more exposed to a universalistic-performance culture, and older psychiatrists, who tend to be attracted to particularistic-quality relationships." As so often happens when professionals with similar objectives but different approaches work together, there is some tendency for members of one group to take the other as a reference group, though not to the point of giving up their own membership group.

The literature reflects not merely the nonconformists, striving to bring about a change in relationships between religion and psychiatry, but also the militant conformists who seek to preserve the integrity of their profession as they view it. Their strategies and their affiliations are examined. One major difficulty, however, is that published items are the unit of classification and the same individual may be classified as a militant conformist on the basis of one article and a nonconformist on the basis of another. Indeed, a firm grasp of detailed relationships is often precluded by virtue of the author's inability to specify with sufficient precision the various ingredients in a given cross-classification.

The most interesting part of the volume, to this reviewer, is the case study of the origins and functioning of the Religio-Psychiatric Clinic in New York City. Discussion groups involving psychiatrists and clergymen at the clinic wrestled with a number of questions formulated to elicit personal values, attitudes toward staff-client relationships in therapy, intraprofessional relationships, and role relationships between psychiatrists and ministers. Excerpts from the verbatim transcripts of these sessions highlight the dilemmas of both professional groups. They also suggest

that the relationship between professional affiliation and classification on the "pattern variables" may be less clear-cut than is assumed in the main analyses based on the literature.

Despite some methodological shortcomings and a style of presentation so methodical as to make for rather dull reading, this careful, painstakingly documented volume should afford a useful point of departure for subsequent work. The extent of acceptance or rejection of psychiatric insights in religion, of religious values in psychiatry, and of collaboration between the two sets of professionals would seem to depend very largely on the phrasing of the insights and values and on the institutional forms that collaboration may take. Klausner's work should help provide a basis for phrasings that can be presented to adequate samplings of clergymen, psychiatrists, and the general public. Then we shall have a better notion of the dimensions of this movement to integrate the approach of the church with that of psychiatry in attempting to deal with human unhappiness deriving from phenomena called sin, guilt, or mental illness.

John A. Clausen

University of California, Berkeley

Social Change and Prejudice. By Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. 337. $5.95.

There is no gainsaying that research in the behavioral sciences lacks continuity and synthesis. One notable effort to facilitate comprehensive and intensive investigation in the area of intergroup prejudice was made through the Studies in Prejudice project sponsored by the American Jewish Committee after World War II. The committee included such eminent studies as *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) and *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans* (1950). These two publications stimulated a vast amount of research in the same and similar theoretical veins and were subjected to considerable critical review on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Although this research has enhanced our appreciation of the psychology and sociology of prejudice, it has not produced a unified theory of the etiology of prejudice.

Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz have essayed the difficult, but professionally commendable, task of reappraising their *Dynamics of Prejudice* research in the light of subsequent related studies, and they have succeeded admirably. Their format—which other authors and publishers could well emulate to promote integration of research findings and refinement of theory—devotes approximately 100 pages preceding the reprinted *Dynamics of Prejudice* to (1) an analysis of recent trends in prejudice, (2) a reassessment of the effects of social mobility on prejudice in terms of research since their original study, (3) a reexamination of the psychology of prejudice, with special attention to new developments in the psychoanalytic concept of ego functions, and (4) a discussion of the role of personal and social controls in the prevention and reduction of prejudice, including some suggestions for social policy. Thus the authors are afforded a rare opportunity: to review, in effect, their own book. It is remarkable therefore that their review is singularly free of any professionally unbecoming defensiveness or apologetics.

An impressive body of research evidence is cited to sustain the theoretical premises of the original study of World War II veterans in Chicago. The downward trend in prejudice in the United States during the past fifteen years, which the authors document by various polls, is linked to such social changes as higher levels of education and "broadening of the middle strata." There has been widespread corroboration of their finding that downward social mobility and rapid upward mobility are closely associated with prejudice. The emphasis upon social influences in ego development and functions in the study was welcomed by sociologists and is now much more widely shared in psychoanalytic circles.

The concept of an authoritarian personality syndrome is rejected; the psychological mechanisms related to prejudice are viewed from the perspective of the interaction of personal and social controls. Bettelheim and Janowitz view the prejudiced as more likely to be in opposition to the values and institutions of society whereas researchers for *The Authoritarian Personality* stressed the subscription of the authoritarian to conventional values, at

least at a conscious level. In this connection it is rather surprising that Bettelheim and Janowitz do not attempt to relate their idea of deprivation to the recent research and theory on alienation and anomie.

The value of this study seems to have increased with age. If its propositions continue to be validated by the research of the next decade it will deserve (another) supplemented reprinting.

JAMES G. MARTIN

Northern Illinois University

Race Riot at East St. Louis: July 2, 1917. By ELLIOTT M. RUDWICK. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii+300. $6.00.

The accumulation of data and the development of theory in collective behavior depend significantly upon the execution of case studies of specific episodes. Often these studies must be made after the fact. Elliott Rudwick has performed a difficult task and made a valuable contribution in describing the East St. Louis race riot forty-seven years after its occurrence. His work fills a serious gap in the history of racial violence in the United States. Never before analyzed by sociologists in the way that the Chicago and Detroit riots were, the East St. Louis riot outranked both as measured by the number of deaths.

This study not only has historical value but is timely in its relevance to current developments in race relations. It presents striking evidence that, despite the passage of nearly a half-century, the conditions out of which race riots emerge remain remarkably similar. There is the accelerated migration of Negroes from country to city and from South to North, and the white backlash as whites feel or imagine the competition of the migrants for jobs, for housing, for recreational facilities, for *Lebensraum* in general. There is the fear and antipathy generated among whites by Negro political participation and civil-rights activities. Finally, there is the crucial factor of the attitudes of government and law-enforcement officials. Inefficiency, venality, and prejudice on their part create situations in which racial tensions are expressed in violent action.

Rudwick documents the existence and exacerbation of all these conditions in East St. Louis in the years preceding the riot. Drawing on official records as well as on newspaper accounts, he describes in great detail the events of the "long hot summer" of 1917. Events of that summer show that race riots did not break out without warning fifty years ago any more than they do now. By the same token, politicians were as unwilling to heed the warnings then as they are now.

The analysis of the aftermath of the riots is a study in deceit and buck-passing. Both white and Negro defendants in criminal trials attempted to justify their actions by proving the existence of a conspiracy by the other side. Employers blamed unions and unions blamed employers for creating the tensions that led to the riot. There is evidence that both were guilty of using the Negro migrants as pawns in their struggle with each other.

After analyzing the proximate causes and the aftermath of the riot, the author examines the antecedent conditions as far back as 1910. He shows how the state of labor relations, the increase in Negro migration, the "tradition of rotten politics," and the absence of both integrity in, and respect for, law enforcement, all nurtured racial tensions while weakening the external constraints on violence.

In the final chapter, the similarity in the patterns and backgrounds of race riots in East St. Louis, in Chicago, and in Detroit is noted. Extension of this analysis to the riot-torn cities of 1964 would probably suggest that very little of what might have been learned from these historic tragedies has been used in meeting the current racial crisis. The historic parallels are not only remarkable but frightening. Not even the "white backlash in the North" is new, and in 1917 Southern white leaders expressed the same glee at the exposure of "Northern hypocrisy" that some are voicing today!

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Erratum

In "Occupational Segregation in a Metropolitan School System," by Albert Lewis Rhodes, Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Otis Dudley Duncan (*AJS*, LXX [May, 1965], 682–94), through an editorial error, two manuscript pages were numbered incorrectly and were printed out of order. The passage in question, beginning with the first full paragraph on page 691 and ending on page 693 at the heading "Discussion," is correctly printed below.

Although the residential pattern of occupational segregation for Negroes does bear some resemblance to that of whites, this pattern is not preserved in the occupational segregation of Negroes within their separate school system. In Table 9 one can detect a certain resemblance between the Negro and the white segregation patterns by tracts. (The tract data for "Negroes" actually are limited to figures for non-whites in census tracts with four hundred or more non-white inhabitants.) The Negro school data, however, show little trace of occupational segregation. The explanation no doubt lies in the peculiar territorial organization of Negro schools: Fifty-one per cent of all Negro seventh- and eighth-graders go to one school in this district and 49 per cent of all Negro pupils in grades 9–12 attend one Negro high school in this district. Another school serves one-fourth of the seventh- and eighth-graders. The rest of the junior high school pupils attend ten smaller schools, five of which are one-room schools in the urban fringe. The other half of the senior high school pupils are evenly divided between two schools, one in the city system and one which serves all pupils outside the central city. This arrangement of school districts all but eliminates segregation by occupation within the Negro system.[25] Thus the correlations in Table 7 between indexes of dissimilarity based on the school data and the residential data for Negroes are actually negative, though very low in absolute value. It seems unlikely that this result is due to a peculiarity of the residential pattern of Nashville Negroes, for that pattern correlates .63 with the one observed in Chicago[26] (Table 7, line 7), and the indexes of dissimilarity between occupations generally run higher for Nashville than for Chicago.

Residential segregation by occupation, therefore, was not reflected in school segregation by occupation in the Negro system as it was organized in 1957. Yet we can indicate a significant feature of the association between class and color which turns up in both the residential and the school data. In the 1960 employed labor force of the Nashville area, 16 per cent of the male workers were Negroes. Negroes were underrepresented in both white-collar and higher manual occupations, over-represented in lower manual occupations.

Now, let us imagine a sociometric process in which each white chooses a friend at random from the white occupation distribution of the entire metropolitan area and each Negro similarly chooses at random from the Negro occupation distribution. The result, shown in the second panel of Table 8, would be that less than 2 per cent of all pairs in which both members are white-collar workers are Negro, while nearly one-half of all homogeneous lower-manual pairings would be Negro. Quite apart from any tendency of actual choices to be socioeconomically homogeneous, the marginal distributions themselves tend to produce a highly disproportionate number of Negroes among lower-class peer groups. Much the same result obtains for schools. Moreover, if we require the random choices to be within tracts or within schools the picture is only slightly altered (bottom panel of Table 8).

[25] Tau_b is .01 for both junior and senior high schools regardless of whether one uses nine or twelve occupational categories.

[26] Duncan and Duncan, *The Negro Population of Chicago*, p. 295.

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Segmentation of Radicalism—the Case of the Protestant Campus Minister[1]

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ABSTRACT

Every organization has its "radicals"—persons who may disrupt internal affairs, but who may also anticipate needed changes as the organization's environment changes. Viable organizations, therefore, have structures for both containing and using radicalism, typically through segmentation. If radicalism is to be "used" as well as contained, there must be procedures whereby it can influence the organization. The Protestant campus ministry, as a segmentation of radicalism, has several consequences for Protestantism, and it illustrates a number of the social-structural channels through which these consequences flow.

INTRODUCTION

In pursuit of their goals, all organizations face a dilemma: how to adapt to changing environments without sacrificing organizational integrity. The dilemma may be thought of as a problem in balancing the commitments of members to the purposes of the organization, on the one hand, and to (their roles in) the organization's structure, on the other. Too inflexible a commitment to the organizational structure by some members can result in the defection of other members who claim that the goals have been forsaken. Too inflexible a goal commitment, however, can produce insensitivity to changing pressures, with a resultant lowered ability to achieve the organization's goals.

Whether viewed as a conflict between means and ends or between idealism and compromise, the dilemma is real. Organizations grow, die, barely struggle along, or change into other entities; and each response reflects some degree of viability. Viability, as an attribute of any organization, refers therefore to its degree of stability in the face of change.

Church organizations do not escape the dilemma. They have goals to achieve and personnel variously committed to those goals. They have environments to adapt to and an identity to maintain. That many of their goals are otherwordly may make it difficult to define "adaptation" and "commitment," but viability is no less a property of religious organizations. Indeed, the voluminous literature on church and

[1] This paper may be identified as publication No. A-50 of the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley. It is based on data from two studies, one of campus ministers by Hammond, with the support of the National Institutes of Health (Grant M-6179) and the Danforth Foundation, the other of parish ministers by Mitchell, with the support of the Russell Sage Foundation. Though independently carried out, the two investigations were planned to contain many items in common, most of which are shown in Table 1 below. Full reports on the two studies are in process: Hammond, "Clergy on Campus: A Study of a Developing Occupation," and Mitchell, "The Professional Protestant."

sect attests to the importance of the dilemma for these organizations. In general, it seems, there have been two responses, neither of which yields optimum viability: the sect response, which maximizes goal commitment at the expense of adaptation, and the church response, which adapts at the expense of goals.

Forces toward breakdown or disintegration can come, then, from the outside in the form of environmental pressures or from the inside in the form of redefined goals, changes in role commitment, or efforts to alter the organization's boundaries. Inside pressures for change might be called "radicalism," and agents for such change "radicals." In every instance they are potential threats to organizational integrity, but they may also anticipate needed adaptation. The viable organization, therefore, finds room for its radicals, but typically does so by segmenting them, thereby minimizing disruption that radicals might create without sacrificing their potential insights by excluding them altogether. A common feature of organizations is thus the differentiation of radicals—a social structure serving two functions: a "safety valve" function of draining off dissidence and a "leavening" function of providing a source of new ideas.

Many organizations have social structures that function in these two ways, whether recognized or not. They may be called "research-and-development groups" in industrial corporations, "institutes" at universities, or "war colleges" in the military. In churches, the safety valve and leavening functions are typically served by such structures as monasteries, seminaries, and special orders. Our purpose in this paper is to discuss another of these structures—the ministry to higher education. We shall argue that for Protestant churches the campus ministry serves as an organizational device for segmenting radicals. Although that is not its manifest purpose, it siphons off potentially disruptive personnel, thus serving the safety-valve function; and, especially, it contributes to organizational change, thus serving the leavening function.

These consequences are not automatic, however; the channels through which they flow can also be identified. Following a discussion of the organizational effects of the campus ministry, therefore, we shall comment on a number of structural mechanisms which permit segmentation to serve the organization.

THE CHURCHES' DILEMMA

At least since Troeltsch's monumental work on the impact of religious ideology on church structure, the organizational importance of many mansions in the religious house has been recognized. It is now generally recognized that church organizations atrophy unless regularly renewed but that the forces for renewal may also destroy. An *organizational* problem for religion, no less than for other organizations, is therefore one of segmenting the radical element, thereby containing and using it. The medieval church, in Troeltsch's words, "controlled this [radical] tendency by allowing it to express itself in the formation of new Religious Orders and confraternities."[2] At the same time "from this ascetic class the primitive Christian energy once more radiates fresh vitality into all merely relative approximations to the Christian standard."[3]

MacMurray, who goes so far as to claim that the two forces of modernity—the Renaissance and the Reformation—stem from the medieval pattern of monasteries, says of them:

> It is here that the creative forces of the spiritual life are to be found; and here that the ferment of Christianity is most powerful and most difficult to deal with. If the will to

[2] Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, trans. Olive Wyon (2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 701. See also pp. 237–45, 700–703.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

power in the church is to maintain itself, it must suppress the spiritual creativeness within its own bosom. . . . The function of the monastic system [therefore] is to segregate the creative forces which would seek to realize Christianity and in so doing destroy the dualist structure of society.[4]

The medieval church, in other words, is cited as an example of a viable religious organization. "The church of the thirteenth century was relatively successful in finding a place . . . for the expression of the radical-individualizing tendencies of Christianity."[5] But, as Yinger and other observers of church and sect are quick to point out, the *degree* to which religious organizations "contain and use" their radicals is variable. They differ in their provisions for meeting the safety valve and leavening functions.

It is commonly observed, for example, that the proliferation of religious divisions is far more extensive under Protestantism than under Catholicism. . . . Protestantism, with its greater emphasis on individual experience . . . encouraged the development of *different* religious structures. Catholicism reflects the variations in religious needs *within* its pattern.[6]

THE CAMPUS MINISTRY AS A RADICAL SEGMENT IN PROTESTANTISM

Though by no means the only Protestant social structure for segmenting radicals, the campus ministry is one that has consequences, we shall argue, which exceed its numerical size. Dating from the turn of the century as a self-conscious separate ministry, the churches' work on college campuses has grown steadily. Currently it contains about 1,300 full-time workers, which is about 1 per cent of the ministerial force of the ten denominations supporting almost all of the full-time campus clergy. Although many schools of higher education, especially junior colleges and teachers colleges, are without campus ministers, large private or state universities may have as many as a dozen, and increasingly the small liberal arts colleges are hosting chaplains. Some of these persons are employed by the school as worship leaders, religious counselors, and teachers. The great majority, however, are employed by a denomination (or a regional division thereof) and, as directors of "foundations" ringing the campuses, administer programs that include study groups, social events, theological discussions, social action, and so on.

Evidence that the campus ministry contains "radicals" is seen in the comparison of results from two studies, one of parish clergy, the other of their campus counterparts. The data on campus ministers were collected in the Spring, 1963 by mail questionnaire sent to all known full-time Protestant campus clergy. The return from this population universe was 79 per cent for an N of 997. The parish-minister data were collected three years earlier, by mail questionnaire sent to a 10 per cent random sample of eight denominations which are members of the National Council of Churches. Smaller samples were taken of two non-member denominations. The return rate in this study was 68 per cent for an N of 4,077. The projected reports cited in the first footnote contain full discussions of the samples.

Table 1 contains evidence of radicalism. There it can be seen that, relative to parish ministers, campus clergy are more liberal in their attitudes toward labor unions and the UN, more critical of their denominations, more favorable toward ecumenical affairs, better educated, and have wider interests. These data are convincing. Although too cumbersome to show in tabular form, the differences are maintained across ten denominations and, within denomina-

[4] John MacMurray, *The Clue to History* (London: SCM Press, 1938), pp. 155–56.

[5] J. Milton Yinger, *Religion in the Struggle for Power* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1946), p. 21.

[6] J. Milton Yinger, *Religion, Society and the Individual* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 134. (First emphasis added.)

tion, across three age groups.[7] This latter point is especially worth emphasizing because, although the "radicalism" of campus ministers might be widely acknowledged, it might also be attributed solely to their youth. Yet, in fact, campus and parish ministerial differences persist in all age groups.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF CAMPUS MINISTERS AND OF PARISH MINISTERS WHO AGREE WITH VARIOUS STATEMENTS

Statement	Campus Ministers (N=997)	Parish Ministers (N=4,077)
Political attitudes:		
1. Strongly approve of the purposes of the United Nations	73%	57%
2. Strongly approve of the purposes of the AFL-CIO	21	11
Breadth of interest:		
3. Regularly read *Christian Century*	67	33
4. Regularly read *Christianity and Crisis*	44	6
5. Very interested in news of national and international affairs.	75	62
6. Very interested in news of own denomination	35	68
7. Very or quite interested in news of other denominations	57	68
The church and social action:		
8. Would very much like to see church-sponsored examination of major ethical issues*	66	57
9. Agree own denomination is too conservative in the field of social action	53	17
Ecumenical attitudes:		
10. Agree own denomination is not sufficiently ecumenical-minded	42	10
11. Strongly approve of the National Council of Churches	51	42
12. Strongly approve of the World Council of Churches	59	44
Miscellaneous:		
13. Agree own denomination does not have clearly defined policies	27	15
14. Have a Bachelor of Divinity degree	84	65
15. Have a Ph.D. degree	13	2
16. Choose, as closest to own belief regarding the Bible, "An infallible revelation of God's will"†	8	24

* The question to campus ministers read ". . . see greater social action by Protestants."

† Other options: "Inspired by God, but subject to historical criticism," and "a great history of religious experience, but not necessarily inspired by God." These two were chosen by 84% and 7%, respectively, of campus ministers, by 70% and 3%, respectively, of parish ministers.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMPUS MINISTRY

Because of the differences between campus and parish ministers in attitudes and values, some consequences of their being a campus ministry can be inferred. Here are several which seem to have strategic importance for organized Protestantism:

1. *More persons are recruited and kept in the ministry than otherwise would be.*—Probably any increase in the diversity of jobs offered by an organization will attract and hold more diverse persons, but careers in education and religion have a special affinity. The job anticipated by the second largest number of seminarians, for example (the largest number expect to be parish ministers), is teaching.[8] An investigation of 111 former ministers discovered that no fewer than 72 were "teachers or adminis-

[7] With three age groups in ten denominations, a total of 480 comparisons are possible. Of these 480, 89 per cent reveal the difference contained in Table 1 and 11 per cent do not, although a quarter of this last group involves cells containing fewer than ten cases.

[8] See the study of 17,565 seminarians by K. R. Bridston and D. W. Culver, reported in *Seminary Quarterly*, V (Spring, 1964), 2.

trators in universities, colleges, or public schools."[9] Campus ministers report that, were they to leave the campus ministry, they would prefer (by a two-to-one ratio) full-time teaching over the parish ministry. Not only does the campus ministry represent a different career possibility for clergymen, therefore, but also an especially important one. An educational occupation that is contained *within* the church and that can be pursued without forsaking a "call" stands to attract and hold persons who might otherwise be in education *outside* of the church.

2. *Radicals are removed from the parish structure.*—Campus posts not only represent an *added* attraction to persons who otherwise would not enter the ministry but also serve as locations for ministers who might otherwise leave the parish. More than seven in ten campus clergy have experience in a parish setting. Leaving, of course, is not always a result of conflict, but Table 1 makes it clear that those who leave are more radical than those who stay, and radicalism does explain some of the moves. One campus minister, for example, had been a parish minister in a border state and intended to remain so. But he was "eased out" by his superior over the question of civil rights. Rather than continue with the tensions created by this man, his administrator urged him to take his denomination's ministry at the state university. Another told of his inability to communicate liberal theology to primarily non-college-educated congregations. He then asked to be assigned a campus ministerial post.[10]

[9] H. G. Duncan, "Reactions of Ex-Ministers toward the Ministry," *Journal of Religion*, XII (1932), 101–15.

[10] Examples are from case interviews with campus ministers. A similar problem is discussed by Marshall Sklare in *Conservative Judaism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955). He speaks of the difficulty faced by seminarians who are trained by the churches' best intellects only to be sent into parishes with no provision for fulfilling their intellectual aspirations.

Insofar as these ministers' experience is common, it suggests that liberal agents are removed from parish settings. Thus the campus ministry not only provides a "retreat" for dissident clergymen but also supplies some insulation for the larger segment of the church—insulation from potential disturbance. If the foregoing is essentially true—that an outlet is created for ministers frustrated by the constraints of the parish—then the *extent* to which this is true should differ by denomination according to their degree of constraint. Churches in which "radical" sentiment is relatively rare have greater need for an outlet. To test this hypothesis we have classified denominations by the proportions of parish ministers expressing certain liberal-conservative attitudes. This classification serves as a measure of the constraint a liberal may feel. A comparison of the answers by campus and by parish clergy to various items indicating criticism of the church reveals that in more restrictive denominations the difference is greater between the two groups. For example, in the United Church of Christ (a denomination in which liberal sentiment is common), campus ministers, compared with parish ministers, are more critical, by 15 per cent, of their denomination for being too conservative in social action. In contrast, Missouri Synod Lutheran campus ministers are 53 per cent more critical than are *their* parish counterparts. Table 2 supplies the evidence on three such issues for all ten denominations.

Table 2 does not indicate however, that radicalism (defined above as "inside pressures for changing the organization") is less of a factor in liberal denominations. It merely means that, for them, radicalism regarding *political-theological* issues is less of a factor in creating conflicts. Were the data available, they would probably indicate that campus ministers in politically and theologically liberal denominations are radical in other ways, perhaps in regard to ecclesiastical arrangements, salaries, or

routine parish duties. The point is that a campus ministry segments "radicals," providing them with a legitimate base and insulating them from the parish.

3. *The campus ministry serves to sustain radicalism.*—If the short-run consequence of removing some persons to the campus ministry is to leave the parish structure less radical, probably the long-run effect is quite the opposite. One reason for such a speculation stems from the known differences in radicalism between academic communities and the general public.[11] The campus minister, surrounded by university personnel and having a clientele that remains perpetually young, is in a location that nurtures and sustains intellectualism in general and perhaps radicalism (as defined here) in particular. Certainly it supplies him with a context in which questioning traditional procedures is less frowned upon. Insofar as this radicalism is linked to the "intellectualist–anti-intellectualist" conflict in Protestantism (which Niebuhr has maintained is its primary theological conflict),[12] the campus ministry may represent a strategic realignment of forces within the church. Seminaries no doubt remain the commonest battleground for this issue, but the creation of still more university-based positions might well have a radical effect on how the issue is fought.

4. *Radicalism is returned to the church through ministers who themselves return*

TABLE 2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DENOMINATIONAL CONSTRAINT AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CAMPUS (C) AND PARISH (P) CLERGY IN THREE ISSUES INDICATING CRITICISM OF THEIR DENOMINATIONS

Denominations Ranked by Degree of Constraint*	Percentage Who Criticize Their Denominations for: Being Too Conservative in Social Action			Not Being Ecumenical Enough†			Not Having Clearly Defined Policies†			No. Cases		Percentage of Parish Ministers Who Strongly Approve of the	
	C	P	Difference	C	P	Difference	C	P	Difference	C	P	UN*	WCC*
Least:													
United Church	22	7	15	12	6	6	27	30	− 3	71	228	61	54
Disciples	70	17	53	46	13	33	45	39	6	32	291	60	50
Episcopal	50	28	22	29	17	12	26	19	7	125	467	65	38
Presbyterian, USA	28	9	19	10	5	5	7	4	3	113	585	54	48
Methodist	37	9	28	49	10	39	27	15	12	273	1,566	57	44
Lutheran	66	16	50	54	7	47	26	8	18	79	273	57	43
American Baptist	77	19	58	70	16	54	63	25	38	68	330	49	33
Presbyterian, US	69	20	49	68	16	52	37	6	31	43	188	40	33
Southern Baptist	77	20	57	48	17	31	29	9	20	133	62	36	5
Most:													
Mo. Synod, Lutheran	71	18	53	65	14	51	3	1	2	31	87	19	2

* Denominations are ranked on the basis of *parish* ministers' combined strong approval of the United Nations and the World Council of Churches. Greatest approval = least constraint. Had different items from Table 1 been used, the ordering of denominations would change but little.

† Percentages are non-weighted averages of the three age groups (20–29; 30–39; 40+) in each denomination.

[11] For example, compare the civil libertarianism of social scientists, community leaders, and the general public as reported in P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. Thielens, *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 391–92, and S. A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), pp. 40–43.

[12] H. Richard Niebuhr, D. D. Williams, and J. M. Gustafson, *The Advancement of Theological Education* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

to the parish.—The turnover of campus ministers is quite high, estimated at 14 per cent annually. The majority of those who leave go back into a local parish, although some move to college teaching, hospital chaplaincies, church administration, and so forth.[13] Granted, the more conservative are more likely to return to the parish, but even these persons' answers to the items of Table 1 are far more radical than those of parish ministers. Furthermore, not only conservatives return to the parish. It is reasonable to speculate, therefore, that those resuming parish duties are more likely to serve as agents of change in the church because (1) they are more radical to begin with than ministers who never were campus ministers and (2) they come from their campus ministerial years having had that radicalism supported.

5. *Radicalism is returned to the church through campus ministers' clients who become church members.*—Given the difference between campus and parish clergy in such matters as those contained in Table 1, it probably is the case that campus ministers' influence on the church via their clients is a radical one. It is true that little is known of the effects on the clients of campus ministers. But we reason as follows: most, if not all, of the persons *who become church members* following campus ministerial contact are of two kinds. First, there are students from active church backgrounds whose attitudes will more nearly reflect a parish ministerial viewpoint. Insofar as their attitudes are altered, they will probably change in the radical direction. Second, there are persons who, because of their radical attitudes, would not affiliate with the church were it not for campus ministerial contact. Both cases represent additions to the radical sector of church membership.[14]

6. *Radicalism is returned to the church by campus ministers' greater leadership potential in radical causes.*—At mid-twentieth century, two of the major forces impinging on the church are the civil-rights movement and the move toward ecumenicism. Either issue stands to force organizational change. The campus ministry has been disproportionately involved in both movements, a fact not widely known among church laymen and known hardly at all by the public.

In the case of civil rights, Chaplain Coffin of Yale and Reverend Klunder (campus minister to Cleveland colleges) have been visible examples owing to the one's early arrest and the other's death under the tracks of an earth mover. These are only two instances, however; many of the clergy—Protestant and Catholic, Christian and Jew—involved in protest demonstrations are ministers on campus. The reason their activity is greater than that of parish ministers is easily understood. They are more radical to begin with, it is true, but also they are more strategically located in that they have immediate access to a major source of manpower for many demonstrations: college students. The recruitment and training of these students frequently have been under the auspices—or at least with the counsel—of the religious ministry on their campuses.

Whereas the civil-rights movement challenges the church at the level of goals, ecumenicism not only challenges goals but also is a rather direct threat to denominational integrity or organizational boundaries. That it may prove to be an organizational necessity if such goal challenges as civil rights persist only accents the

[13] Estimates are based on answers to questions asked of campus ministers regarding where they *would* go if they leave. See also Donald Bossart, "Leaving the Campus Ministry" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1963), in which it is reported that 50 per cent of former campus ministers are in parish work. This is more than double the proportion going into any other occupation.

[14] The disconfirming cases—persons made so radical by campus ministerial contact that they leave the church and others who react to campus ministers by becoming less radical—we assume are rare. This is only assumption, however.

leavening function of those persons in the church who are at the ecumenical forefront. In disproportionate numbers here, too, campus ministers have been active.

Visser'T Hooft, as the first (and until recently only) general secretary of the World Council of Churches, had his ecclesiastical experience in European student work, and this fact has often been noted.[15]

Less dramatic but organizationally more significant is the fact that his is no isolated case.

> It is . . . to the student Christian movements . . . that tribute must be paid for aggressive and radical ecumenical pioneering. Existing in the different countries of Europe, Britain, the United States, and the Far East . . . [they] met together on a world basis, and kept in contact with each other through their speakers and their literature. Not a part of the churches officially, the student Christian movements . . . have regarded themselves in both a spiritual and a functional sense as close to the churches, indeed as the representatives of the church on the university campuses of the world. Free from ecclesiastical control, with the imagination stimulated by the intellectual climate of the great universities and the small colleges as well, they have been able to point the way. . . . It is from the student movements that some of the greatest of ecumenical leadership has come and continues to come.[16]

This account has the value of focusing on more than the motivation for ecumenicism; it suggests the importance of facilities such as communication networks and available candidates for leadership through which motivation can be channeled. And this, it seems, is where campus ministers have entered. They have been in a position to assume leadership, and they have had ecumenical experience and prior access to communication networks across denominations.

Some reasons for this availability and experience are clear. First, many campus ministers are chaplains to entire student bodies and therefore cannot appropriately restrict their ministry to persons of their own denominations. Second, like that of the military chaplaincy, the campus ministry's situation has spawned change in an ecumenical direction when, for example, it has felt the need to relax rules for giving and receiving communion. Third, many of the (especially monetary) concerns of parish administration are minimized because they are assumed by college administrations or regional or national offices of the denomination. Fourth, the very lack of structure for many campus ministers encourages interdenominational co-operation, for example, in negotiations with college administrators over matters such as visitation privileges in dormitories, obtaining church preference lists at registration time, and so forth.[17]

In brief, campus ministers, as seen in Table 1, are less interested than are parish ministers in news of their own denominations but more interested in and more concerned with the purposes of the National and the World Council of Churches. As in

[15] "Certainly his experience in the World's Student Christian Federation stood him in good stead, giving him personal contacts and the knowledge of how to take initiative" (Mackie, in R. C. Mackie and C. C. West [eds.], *The Sufficiency of God* [London: SCM Press, 1963], p. 8). On the history of ecumenicism see also R. S. Bilheimer, *The Quest for Christian Unity* (New York: Association Press, 1952); R. Rouse and S. Neill (eds.), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954); Robert Lee, *The Social Sources of Church Unity* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960).

[16] Bilheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82. "By 1895 the Student Christian Movements . . . had already coalesced in the World's Student Christian Federation. This was the movement which was destined to produce the great bulk of leadership of the modern ecumenical movement . . ." (Rouse, *in* Rouse and Neill [eds.], *op. cit.*, p. 341).

[17] Thus, fully 70 per cent of campus ministers would like to see "the merger of various denominational campus ministers on the same campus whenever possible." The propensity for the campus ministry, from its beginnings, to be interdenominational is discussed in Clarence P. Shedd, *The Church Follows Its Students* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 67, chap. v.

the case of civil rights, however, campus ministers not only *favor* the changes implied but their segmentation puts them in a better position to *act* on those changes.

STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN THE SEGMENTATION OF RADICALISM

Control over channels of communication in an organization are of crucial significance if that organization is to contain and use its radicalism. In the case of the safety-valve function, expression of radicalism is restricted to places and times where it is thought to be least disruptive, in other words, where communication can be allowed to go unpunished. Physical isolation —in monasteries, for example—is perhaps the clearest device of this sort. (Of course, the "isolation" must be rewarding or else it is more likely to be defined as punishment.) Provision for selective target audiences along with selectively decreasing visibility to other audiences would seem to be the structural mechanisms through which the safety-valve function operates. Examples include a monk charged with translating esoteric palimpsests, a researcher in industry or university assigned to laboratory or institute, or a campus minister permitted his radicalism in the particular company of academics and young adults. In each case, one result from the organizational standpoint is the selective segmenting of potentially disruptive communications.

But if the structural devices for providing an outlet for radicals (so their commitment is maintained and their communication is selectively directed) are readily understood and practiced by many organizations, the structural means whereby the segment leavens the whole are not. The case of the campus ministry suggests several mechanisms, however, whose applicability would seem to extend beyond church organizations.[18]

Here again the focus is on communication, but this time on its use more than on its containment. The first mechanism is quite obviously a *recruitment* mechanism. Called "co-optation" in some contexts, or quota hiring in others, the practice of attracting more heterogeneous personnel, if only by offering a wider range of positions, is one device for seeing that innovation is more likely *brought into* the organization.

A second structural device for enhancing the leavening function of radicals is implied in the term "segment"—radicals are clustered for mutual reinforcement. Among ministers on campuses with more than one minister, for example, fully 86 per cent report at least weekly contact with one another. A series of separate questions relating to formal and informal relations with clergy of their own and other denominations was asked of the *parish* ministers, although here the time period was not a week but a month. Sixty-five per cent reported that they met informally with clergy of their own denomination at least once a month, whereas the second highest percentage, 57 per cent, was reported for informal contact with clergy of other denominations. (The respective figures for formal contacts are 51 per cent for own denomination and 38 per cent for other denominations.) It would seem clear that parish clergy have less contact with one another than do campus clergy.

Medieval monks were located *together* in monasteries, and research scientists typically *collaborate* in their "isolated" divisions. Whatever may be the difficulty of sustaining "deviance" alone is alleviated to some extent by regular interaction with others likewise predisposed to innovative thoughts.

The campus ministry exemplifies a third

[18] A similar discussion, although in different terms, is found in Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy Which Permit Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (1961), 177–84. Litwak identifies several "mechanisms of segregation," procedures "by which potentially contradictory social relations are co-ordinated in some common organizational goals."

structural mechanism: the routine location of the radical segment in or alongside populations with particular characteristics. Whether intended and/or recognized or not, the alignment of radical clergymen with the university community serves to maintain the former's propensity to change. The practice of locating professional schools in universities would seem to be another example of the importance of this mechanism, as would its antithesis—the practice of isolating novitiates from any contact other than with planned echelons of the parent organization.

A fourth mechanism for increasing the probability that a radical segment will have a radical effect is the designing of a position with freedom from routine duties, which is to say freedom from the *usual* constraints impinging on other sectors of the organization. Campus ministers, like junior executives sent to training institutes, would probably object to the statement that their duties are *less*. The significance, therefore, is that the duties are *different* and may include the tasks of leading civil-rights protests or assuming ecumenical leadership. The fact, for example, that most campus ministers need not assume major responsibility for their salaries but may rely upon the denomination's support quite clearly allows them certain extraordinary freedoms that the great majority of parish ministers do not have. The effort to "serve" college populations is at least not contingent upon evoking their financial support.

The radicalism of the campus ministry is used through a fifth structural mechanism which might be called the "circulation of radicals." Granted, in the case of campus ministers, the habit of returning to the parish after a term of serving higher education is not typically anticipated by either the church administration or the campus clergyman, and yet this is the path usually followed. As such, it is structurally analogous to a corporation's practice of electing board members regularly from all its divisions, or of a university's "handing around" its administrative offices to persons from various disciplines. The chance of infusing new ideas increases with the circulation of different types of individuals.

The sixth mechanism is similar to the fifth in that carriers of radical communication are circulated. However, in this case the circulation is of the *clients* of radicals and not of the radicals themselves. The argument was presented above that the impact of the campus minister on would-be church members in most cases would have to be radical, given the differences between campus clergymen and their parish counterparts. The *content* of those differences is irrelevant to the operation of the mechanism, provided only that differences systematically exist. In similar fashion, the mechanism operates in the case of executives-in-training who circulate from department to department thereby being influenced (to the extent that they are) by agents representing various concerns within the organization, all potentially different from each other and from the concerns of current executives. Likewise, the practice of relegating children to elementary instruction from unmarried females, of Catholic young people to college instruction from members of certain orders, or professional trainees to academic rather than to practitioners in an apprentice-craftsman relationship, all exemplify the circulation of clients. The result, as in the case of the other mechanisms identified, is an increased probability that use will be made of a radical segment.

It should be clear from the discussion that the mechanisms through which the "leavening" function operates are not contingent upon particular substantive communications. If an organization typically moves in a certain direction, a "radical" element is any element that would alter that direction. The discussion of these last few pages, then, might be useful in ex-

plaining the *inability* of an organization to adapt, just as it might explain the opposite.

CONCLUSION

Every organization has its potential "radicals"—persons whose commitment to the organizational structure and/or its goals is unusual. Just as these persons can be disruptive if located randomly throughout the organization, so also can they be prophetic. If there exist structures for their segmentation, however, radicalism is more likely to be contained and also more likely to be used. Such segmentation not only serves as an escape valve for disruptive forces, therefore, but also may serve as a source of organizational change.

The mere isolation of the radical segment (perhaps epitomized in imprisonment) can do no more than serve the escape-valve function, however. Simple banishment, firing, or defrocking removes the radicals, but it does not allow use of their possible leavening effect. For this function to operate, certain mechanisms must be associated with segmentation so that radical communication can flow back into the organization. The campus ministry illustrates both these functions—the safety valve and the leavening—and it illustrates also a number of the mechanisms by which they operate. These include devices such as heterogeneous recruitment, mutual reinforcement, location of the radical segment alongside populations with known characteristics, freedom from usual duties, circulation of radicals, and circulation of the clients of radicals.

It is unnecessary to argue that the Protestant campus ministry is only functional, and not at all dysfunctional, for Protestant denominations. The future is contingent on other factors than just the segmentation of radicals. If the analysis here is correct, however, that future will have resulted in part from the presence of the campus ministry—a radical segment with consequences for its parent organization.

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Affluence and the Worker: The West German Case

Richard F. Hamilton

ABSTRACT

Contrary to theories in West Germany and other western societies about a blurring of class lines, the evidence shows a substantial income gap between manual and non-manual categories, no perception of trends toward equality seen by the respondents, and an increase in the differences in consumer-goods ownership. At equivalent income levels the workers' consumer behavior and political choices match the behaviors of less-well-off workers rather than those of the middle class.

Contemporary speculation in numerous West European countries and in the United States has claimed the existence of a trend toward a "blurring of class lines," that, in other words, the manual-non-manual cleavage in these countries either is becoming or has already become a thing of the past. Implicit in these statements is a rather specific definition of "class," one focusing on differences in the possession of consumer goods or, more broadly, of a "style of life."[1]

Underlying this "blurring" process, it is said, is a long-term trend toward income equality. The link between income and "life style" characteristically is not made explicit. Moving from the simplest to the more complex of the possibilities we have:

1. The assumption that everyone "wants" the goods in the "basic package." They are prevented from having them only by a lack of income.

2. The view that all "wants" are learned. In this case it is assumed that learning experiences are present or at least are frequent enough to permit a massive "conversion." The affluent workers learn new wants through the mass media or through more frequent personal association with the middle class. Mass-produced clothing hides the background differences, making interclass contact easier, thus easing further learning of middle-class values. Residential moves, particularly the move into a "better district" made possible by the income rise, bring workers into the middle-class milieu.

3. The view of this paper is that wants will reflect the values of primary groups and that as long as the newly opulent workers are located in working-class primary groups, affluence will have the consequence of an embellished working-class style rather than an imitation of a middle-class one. In other words, the basic hypothesis of this paper is that even on achieving a high income level, well-off working-class groups will have life styles more closely resembling the style of less affluent workers than that of middle-class groups.

As against the argument of the two previous views, this is to say that middle-class wants are not "natural," that not only lack of income stands in the way of such an "achievement" but lack of incentive. As for the associational patterns and the residential mobility, for reasons it is not possible to detail here we are assuming that such cross-class contacts will be minimal and

[1] See Hans Paul Bahrdt, "Die Angestellten" and "Die Industriearbeiter," in Marianne Feuersenger (ed.), *Gibt Es Noch Ein Proletariat?* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1962), pp. 15–24, 25–33; Horst Krüger (ed.), *Was Ist Heute Links? Thesen und Theorien zu einer politischen Position* (Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1963); and Helmut Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart* (4th ed.; Stuttgart: F. Enke Verlag, 1960), pp. 218–42. Also by Schelsky and pertinent to the present theme are *Die Skeptische Generation: Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend* (Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1957), pp. 218–24, 387–97; *Schule und Erziehung in der industriellen Gesellschaft* (Würzburg: Werkbund Verlag, 1962), pp. 14 ff.; and "Gesellschaftlicher Wandel," *Offene Welt*, No. 41 (1956), esp. 65 ff.

that *intra*-class association will continue to be the most frequent pattern. To put this still another way and to indicate what is *not* being said, this means that the "labor aristocracy" is not being "bourgeoisified." They are not middle-class, defined in terms of life style. Aside from their markedly different work conditions, away from the job they are also clearly distinguishable by their different consumption preferences.

METHOD

A secondary analysis of West German studies allows us to assess some of these claims.[2] In order to make the comparison of the working and middle classes as clear as possible, we have examined those whom we refer to as the "core cases." These are married male heads of households who are employed and under age sixty. In effect this amounts to holding constant a number of factors which vary independently. Upper-class individuals were also excluded so that in our "middle class" we have the following groups: (1) the middle and small independent businessmen together with independent handworkers, (2) the non-managerial (*nichtleitende*) employees, and (3) the non-managerial civil servants.

FINDINGS

On the question of actual income differences little need be said. Substantial differences in income were obvious in the 1959 study, only one-fifth of the workers earning over the middle-class median.[3] Much of this income overlap results from comparison of high-income skilled workers in big cities and industrial areas (which are also high cost of living areas) with the "poor" middle class in small towns and rural locations. In other words, if we made place-specific comparisons, the amount of overlap would be considerably less. Many of those in the low-income middle class are young persons who have substantial chances for advancement in the course of their careers.

Whether the remaining income overlap represents a "trend toward blurring" cannot be established with the data at hand. The minimum presentation of data needed to show a trend is a "before" and "after" comparison with a difference between them that is larger than could be expected by chance. The general practice has been to show income overlap in the recent experience and to make the assumption of a smaller overlap at a previous time. Probably a significant segment of the working class has always overlapped the middle class in point of view of income. Whether

[2] The main study on which the following is based was a quota sample within randomly selected areas done for the Forschungstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik, Köln, by the Institut für Demoskopie in 1959. A full statement of the procedure may be found in G. Schmölders, "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer aus dem Arbeitsverhältnis abgeleiteten Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer: Bericht über eine im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Sozialordnung durchgeführte Untersuchung" (hereinafter cited as "Umgang mit Geld") (Cologne, 1961), p. 165. (Mimeographed.) Further information and findings from this study are to be found in the book by Schmölders *et al.*, *Umgang mit Geld* (in press).

This and other studies were made available to the present author by the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Köln. The writer wishes to thank the Institut and especially Frl. Iris Brüning for their aid and assistance.

[3] Ordinarily a quota sample would be impossible for this purpose since, as compared to random samples, such procedure has recognized biases. This "recognized bias," however, makes this sample still of use inasmuch as we know the direction of bias. Since the very poor are characteristically *underrepresented* in such samples, our findings of a large income gap to the disadvantage of the worker can be viewed as a minimal statement—the actual gap must be even larger than that reported here.

Should there still be doubts as to this procedure, a later, unpublished study (1961) by Schmölders using random procedures shows the same general finding. Unfortunately the occupations are classified somewhat differently and do not allow the presentation of a similar table. The principal difficulty in getting comparable occupational categories is that it is impossible to separate the managerial from the non-managerial white-collar workers. For this reason we have used the 1961 study only to support assertions about the causal role of income per se. This study, for short the "Vermögensbildung" study, was carried through for Schmölders by the DIVO Institut, Frankfurt am Main, in April 1961.

the amount was more or less than the one-fifth discovered here cannot be stated in the absence of adequate evidence from some previous time. For what it is worth, both recent favorable experience and the perception of a favorable income trend in the future vary directly with current earnings. If these perceptions are accurate, then the current trend is one moving away from, rather than toward, equality and blurring.[4]

On the question about trends in "style-of-life" differences a more conclusive answer is possible. A second 1959 study may be compared with an earlier (1953) UNESCO study, thus allowing us to make some statement about the life-style trends.[5] Both studies asked about ownership of automobiles, refrigerators, cameras, and telephones. Since the percentage of the population owning these items increased considerably in the six years separating the two studies, a simple test of the thesis of collapsing or blurring of differences is made possible.

TABLE 1

OWNERSHIP OF FOUR STANDARD-OF-LIVING ITEMS IN 1953 AND 1959 BY CLASS

Year	Average Percentage Owning the Four Items				
	Middle Class	N	Working Class	N	Percentage Difference
1953....	31	369	10	387	+21
1959....	51	185	17	247	+34

Sources: See n 5.

The comparison shows the differences in life style between the classes to have *increased* during this period, just the opposite of the conventional prediction (Table 1). This finding shows the basic fallacy of the conventional view which treats the middle class as a "have" group, presumably possessing all basic items in the "package." On the basis of this assumption, the only possibilities would be either continuation of the existing differences or a "catching up" on the part of the workers. The actual state of affairs in 1953, however, was that *both* categories were "have nots," a fact which made a third alternative possible, namely, increased differentiation.

The trends, therefore, do not support the thesis of "blurred" life styles. We may push the analysis one step further, however, by raising a "what if" question. What would happen if workers and middle-class persons had comparable incomes and were thereby enabled to maintain the same consumption standards? Would workers with high incomes behave like comparable middle-class persons? We may give some answer to this question by examining the behavior of

[4] The basic findings in support of this claim are as follows:

PERCEPTION OF PAST AND FUTURE INCOME CHANGE BY CURRENT INCOME

Monthly Income of Head of Household	Percentage Saying	
	Since 1954 Things Going "Markedly Better"	Income Will Increase in Next Twelve Months
Under DM. 300	15	13
300–399	30	23
400–499	30	26
500–599.	28	29
600–699	34	29
700–799	50	38
1,000 or more	60*	40*

* Based on a small number of cases.

Source: Gerhard Schmidtchen, *Umgang mit Geld: Tabellenband* (Allensbach: Institut fur Demoskopie, 1960), Table A-49. (Mimeographed.) These percentages are based on all respondents. The numbers on which the percentages were based are not reported.

If the "increased blurring" thesis were valid, given the current working and middle-class incomes, the percentages would have to vary inversely with current income.

[5] The 1953 UNESCO study was directed by Erich Reigrotski. For further information see his *Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1956).

The *Mittelstandstudie* of 1959 was conducted under the direction of Professor René König. The IBM cards from this study were made available by the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung.

those workers who are currently well-off and see whether or not they follow middle-class consumption patterns.

The available studies presented a number of possibilities for testing these alternative theses. The 1959 study, to begin, constructed a Durable Goods Consumption Index based on ownership of various standard items. For present purposes the position of the middle class and workers on this Index was examined with subdivisions into high, medium, and low income groups (Table 2). It may be seen by looking at the ratio of high-low durable-goods consumption that the best-off workers are much closer to the moderately well-off working-class group than to the comparable well-off middle-class group. In fact, it may be noted that they have a lower consumption level than even the middle-income group of the middle class. Roughly the same holds when we look at the middle-income workers who resemble the poorer workers more closely than they do their counterparts in the middle class.[6]

TABLE 2

DURABLE-GOODS CONSUMPTION INDEX BY CLASS AND INCOME

CONSUMPTION INDEX (%)*	MONTHLY INCOME (DM)†				
	Middle Class		Working Class		
	(A) 500 to 800 (N = 76)	(B) 800 or More (N = 59)	(C) 500 or Less (N = 69)	(D) 500 to 800 (N = 112)	(E) 800 or More (N = 49)
High	21	42	4	13	18
Low	7	7	45	26	20
Ratio High·Low	3	6	0 09	0 5	0 9

* "High" is having six or more of fifteen consumer items "Low" is having three or fewer. Those having four or five constitute a "middle" category which has been omitted here

† The low income middle class group has only sixteen cases and has therefore been omitted

Source. Schmölders, "Umgang mit Geld"

Examination of possession of the more obvious luxury items showed that at any given income level the middle class had the superior position in all cases (1961 data). This superiority was also found with respect to modern and expensive household items such as electric stoves, refrigerators, etc.

In respect to some items the working class tends to have the less desirable of two alternative possibilities. Where, for example, the middle class owned an electric sewing machine, the working class typically had a tread machine. Where the middle class had an electric washing machine, the working class tended to have a manual one. Where the middle class had an electric stove, the working class had a coal stove. Where the middle class had an automobile, the working class tended to have either a motorcycle, a motorbike, or a motorscooter. Data from the 1959 study showed, in addition, that with income held constant the middle class bought more expensive automobiles than the working class.

In all of these comparisons, it is to be seen that the working class avoids major luxury-goods consumption. Where it is a question of household goods, the workers tend to buy the less expensive or older

[6] For purposes of simplicity, in the following textual tables we will be comparing the workers in Column (*E*) with those in Column (*D*) and with the middle-class group in Column (*B*). Then, for additional confirmation, we will compare the workers in Column (*D*) with those in Column (*C*) and the middle class in Column (*A*).

product when there are equivalent possibilities present.

By contrast, it is of interest to note that in the case of two relatively expensive items, television sets and electric record players, the workers either equalled or exceeded the level in the middle class. It appears that this "home entertainment" orientation ranks relatively high on the scale of working-class values whereas there is a relative devaluation of it by the middle class.[7]

By way of summary, we may describe the middle-class home as having many luxury items, the "best" in household necessities, and an automobile. It also appears likely that entertainment takes place more frequently outside the home. The working-class home, by comparison, is more sparsely embellished with luxury items. Housework is done with the aid of older equipment. There is obviously less possibility for family outings, and it appears that record playing and television-viewing constitute a major form of entertainment.[8]

In the light of these findings, the familiar mode of analysis which views the groups in a society as located on an income continuum is clearly inadequate. The finding of substantial differences in consumption choices even where earning power is the same shows that "class" is a phenomenon of differing sets of values which are independent of income. Income, from this perspective, enables the various groups of earners to realize markedly different goals.

Another sphere in which pronounced differences in the meaning of income are found is in the area of savings and investment. The 1959 study probed closely for such details as whether respondents had a bank account, had made a tax declaration, had borrowed money from a bank, had bought stocks or bonds, etc. On the basis of these questions, respondents were classified as having had much practice in money matters, some practice, or little. The results shown in Table 3 make it strikingly clear that even at equivalent income levels, the workers have minimal experience with investment. Again the well-off workers are little different from their poorer occupational peers in respect to their knowledge of these matters.

Workers show a marked liquidity preference. When asked whether they would rather have their earnings deposited directly in their account or whether they preferred a direct payment, the workers were overwhelmingly in favor of the latter regardless of the level of their earnings, as shown in the table at the top of page 149.

[7] The same finding with data from other countries is to be found in Gilbert Mathieu, "La réponse des chiffres," *Les Temps Modernes*, Nos. 196–97 (September–October, 1962), 401–58, and in Mark Abrams and Richard Rose, *Must Labour Lose?* (London: Penguin Books, 1960), p. 43. See also Ferdynand Zweig, *The Worker in an Affluent Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), chap. xx, and David Caplovitz, *The Poor Pay More* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 37–38.

[8] To the best of this writer's knowledge there has been no direct presentation of this finding in the literature on mass-media attention. The scattered, impressionistic statements and the indirect indicators strongly suggest much greater working-class attention to television and radio than is the case with the middle class. There is no mystery involved in this finding. It is obvious that those with lower levels of "literary training" will prefer the oral and visual media which allow them easier "access." Books, newspapers, and magazines are, for the most part, objects for middle-class attention.

One additional indication of the different values appears in connection with the use made of vacation time. Even when income is controlled, the workers are less likely to make vacation trips than are the middle-class groups (see tabulation).

House Heads Earning DM. 600 or More per Month	Non-managerial Employees and Civil Servants	Workers and Farm Laborers
Percentage having made four or more vacation trips in last five years	43	24

Source: G. Schmölders, *Daten zur wirtschaftlichen Situation des Mittelstands* (Cologne: Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialökonomik, 1962). (Mimeographed.) Data are from his "Umgang mit Geld." The numbers on which the percentages were based are not reported.

PERCENTAGE PREFERRING DIRECT PAYMENT OF INCOME

Occupation	Family Income per Month (DM.)	
	Less than 600	More than 600
Employees (non-managerial).......	65	57
Civil servants (non-managerial).......	37	29
Workers	95	91

Source: Schmidtchen, *op. cit.*, Tables A 2, A-3

concern with secrecy in money matters within the middle class, as shown in the following table:

PERCENTAGE WITH BANK ACCOUNTS WHO REFUSED TO GIVE INFORMATION ON AMOUNT OF HOLDINGS

Monthly Income (DM.)	Middle Class	Working Class
500 or less.........	23 (23)	7 (59)
500 to 800	20 (78)	10 (120)
800 or more.. ...	21 (91)	5 (65)

Note. *N* is given in parentheses
Source. Schmölders, "Vermogensbildung"

TABLE 3

INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE AND SAVINGS BY CLASS AND INCOME

Experience and Savings	Monthly Income (DM.)				
	Middle Class		Working Class		
	500 to 800 (N=76)	800 or More (N=59)	500 or Less (N=69)	500 to 800 (N=112)	800 or More (N=49)
Experience in financial matters:					
Much practice*....	21%	37%	4.0%	5%	7.0%
Some practice......	54	49	14.5	31	26.5
Total.............	75	86	18.5	36	33.5
Put money into savings:					
Regularly	23	28	12.0	10	10.0
Frequently	20	16	10.0	17	17.0
Total......... ...	43%	44%	22.0%	27%	27.0%

* "Much practice" indicates experience in six or more areas. "Some practice" means experience in four or five areas in which questions were asked.
Source Schmölders, "Umgang mit Geld"

It is of interest, too, that even in attitudes toward their savings there appears to be a difference in orientation which again runs throughout all income levels within the working class and is markedly at variance with the middle-class pattern. This is shown in the pattern of the "non-responses" to the question of how much money they had in savings. A fifth of the middle class refused to answer this question, whereas among workers the highest refusal rate was one-tenth. It appears that there is more

In part the difference in level of "technical proficiency" in the use of money stems from the enormous differences in education between the two classes (see Table 4), in part from the differences in informal information channels through which such knowledge can be gained. The "blurred-differences" thesis, in the light of these findings, is shown to contain an extremely unrealistic assumption as to the ease with which values can be acquired. It overlooks the important "technical"

dimension of modern society, in other words, the extent to which formal schooling is necessary for the acquisition and retention of a middle-class position.

It might well be argued that it is this educational difference which accounts for many of the behavioral differences. Even here, however, education proves insufficient to account for the observed pattern, since at the same level of schooling there are still sizable differences in behavior, such as in reading and radio listening. The only effective comparison is of those who finished *Volksschule* (i.e., eight years of school) and did not go beyond, as only 2 per cent of the workers went beyond that level and only 15 per cent of the middle class were below it. Since age also affects the reading and listening habits to be considered here, we have separated both classes into old and young subgroups. The basic finding is that in a number of selected cultural and technical areas the middle-class *Volksschule* graduates pay considerably greater attention than do those from the working class (Table 5). Increased education, apparently, is not going to eliminate these cultural differences which, in effect, determine "access" to certain events. Clearly, informal educational lessons acquired in the job milieu and in connection with the family background play a considerable role in encouraging or hindering the development of such interests.

One more finding is of relevance to the general topic under consideration, namely, the relationship between income and politics. An implicit assumption of the "blurred-lines" thesis is the notion that poverty and radicalism are causally related. If we take support for the Socialists (SPD) to be the "farthest left" of the political choices offered, it will be noted that this assumption is not clearly supported. As shown in Table 6, while SPD support has a clear inverse relationship with income in the middle class, in the working class the connection is highly erratic. In fact, if we look at the variations which do appear, we find the highest percentages of SPD support among the best-off workers.[9]

TABLE 4

EDUCATION BY CLASS AND INCOME

Head of Household's Education	Monthly Income (DM.)				
	Middle Class		Working Class		
	500 or 800 (N=76)	800 or More (N=59)	500 or Less (N=69)	500 to 800 (N=112)	800 or More (N=49)
Elementary	58%	46%	91%	93%	96%
Middle	37	39	9%	7%	4%
Gymnasium or higher	5%	15%	....	....	....

Source: Schmolders, "Umgang mit Geld.'

[9] This accords with previous findings for West Germany which are considered at length by Juan Linz, *The Social Bases of West German Politics* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1959), chap. ix. For a similar treatment of the relationship of income and politics among French workers, see Richard F. Hamilton, *The Social Bases of French Working Class Politics* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1963), chap. viii. Inversions of the usual expectations also appear in Sweden and Norway. See S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 239–40. For further analysis of the skill-politics relationship, see my "Note on Skill and Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIX (Fall, 1965).

CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusions may be summarized as follows:

1. Contrary to much popular opinion in West Germany, there are considerable differences in the income of workers and middle-class groups, the latter having a decisive edge. Unfortunately, no statement of the income trends may be made on the basis of the surveys used in this report. As far as the *perception* of the trends by the groups themselves is concerned, there appears to be no sense of movement in the direction of a "levelled middle-class society" (Schelsky's expression). On the other hand, our data do show clearly that the trend in possession of various consumer goods is one of increased differences.

2. Even at the same income levels, considerable differences exist in the uses made of one's revenues. Workers apparently place less value on "status symbols," more value on home entertainment devices. Working-class radio-listening and book-reading habits show a lower cultural level even in comparison with middle-class groups of like education. Workers are considerably less skilled in the investment of their income than are comparable middle-class groups and appearently have different values in regard to the "form" in which income is to be received and retained. Worker politics, contrary to conventional expectations, also show no clear variation with income; achievement of a "middle-class" income level does not lead to political conservatism. In fact, the political difference between the classes is greatest at this high income level.

TABLE 5

RADIO-LISTENING AND BOOK-READING BY AGE AND CLASS, AMONG MALES WHO COMPLETED VOLKSSCHULE ONLY

	Under 35		35–60	
	Working Class (N=73)	Middle Class (N=27)	Working Class (N=76)	Middle Class (N=62)
Percentage listening to programs on the radio:				
Economic affairs	8	55 5	13	22 5
News comments	23	37	37	48
Cultural	1	15	4	13
Opera	11	26	14	19
Chamber music	......	15	3	11
Percentage reading books:				
Technical (job-related)	23	44	18	29
History	12	22	22	26
Classics	3	11	5	13
Modern literature	5	15	8	11
Biographies	20	37	28	34
Read none or almost no books	37	11	45	27

Source: Konig, *op. cit.*

TABLE 6

POLITICS BY INCOME AND CLASS (1961)

Class	Percentage SPD of the Two-Party Vote					
	Monthly Income (DM)					
	500 or Less	N	500 to 800	N	800 or More	N
Middle	50	22	41	51	31	68
Working	63	70	60	143	70	74

Source: Schmolders, "Vermogensbildung"

DISCUSSION

Contemporary discussion of working-class "affluence" and attitudes appears to err in a number of respects. The most important error is in the assumption that income plays a unique causal role in determining attitudes and behavior. We have shown that where income is identical, the attitudes and behavior of the two classes still show considerable divergence. These findings suggest (although they by no means conclusively prove) the importance of primary group experience as the major determinant of values and behavior. This revision of the current style of theoretical orientation suggests that working-class income can undergo a considerable increase without the presumed "dependent" behaviors showing any notable change. This means that if equality of income were ever to appear, marked differences of outlook would still remain and would persist long into such an era of universal affluence.[10]

The points made in this article are, to be sure, not exceptionally striking. The basic point, that values will reflect primary group experience, is, after all, a primary assumption of the sociological viewpoint. What is remarkable in much of contemporary social-science literature is that this assumption has been forgotten and an unsupported "economic" assumption has taken its place.

The finding that the income differences have not disappeared and that "class" involves sets of primary group pressures does not mean that we need to revert to a "primitive" Marxist model of society. The thesis of "increasing misery" quite clearly no longer stands. What we must reckon with in modern societies is a working class which, while not poverty-stricken, is still not coterminous with the middle class. All the manifestations cited here would support the claim that the persons in the occupations discussed constitute separate populations which have, for the most part, independent and relatively autonomous values. To understand the behavior of this group we must therefore make empirical enquiry as to the nature of their values, their sources, and their supports.

The erroneous conclusions appear to have been arrived at through, first, observing the fact of increased income (particularly of some very special incomes far above the group's median), and, second, *imputing* motives to the holder of the income. Sociologists and anthropologists have long been familiar with ethnocentrism, a phenomenon characteristic of peoples. The present phenomenon is a related one, although in this case it is the characteristic of a class. We could call it "class-centrism," its principal manifestation being the attribution to other classes of the motives of one's own class.

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[10] I have made the same point with supporting data for the American scene; see my "The Income Difference between Skilled and White Collar Workers," *British Journal of Sociology*, XIV (December, 1963), 363–74, and my "The Behavior and Values of Skilled Workers," in Arthur Shostak and William Gomberg (eds.), *Blue-Collar World* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

From Commercial Elite to Political Administrator: The Recruitment of the Mayors of Chicago[1]

Donald S. Bradley and Mayer N. Zald

ABSTRACT

The changing social and political characteristics of Chicago's mayors are used as an index of the transformation of the political structure and the necessary qualities needed for election. Four "periods" in the recruitment of different types of mayors are found and explained in terms of changes in Chicago's composition and community structure. The four periods are labeled by their dominant features as (1) commercial elite, 1837–68; (2) transition mayors, 1869–75; (3) personal machine versus party machine, 1876–1930; and (4) political administrators, 1931–65. These periods are contrasted with those found by R. A. Dahl in New Haven, Connecticut.

The urbanization and industrialization of American life have had a profound impact on the operations of political institutions and the elements of political power. This political transformation has occurred not only on the national scene but in the structure of local politics as well. There have been changes in the strength and structure of local political, social, and economic elites and in the political coin necessary to win office. While this statement is almost a truism, it is difficult to find valid data which concisely summarize the changes in social structure, politics, and the linkages between them. Indexes of political transformation that reveal underlying changes in community structure and composition are needed.

Our study follows the lead of R. A. Dahl who uses an analysis of the salient features of the life histories of mayors in New Haven, Connecticut, as evidence for shifts in the distribution and differentiation of political resources from 1789 to 1961.[2]

Dahl finds that the social and occupational backgrounds of New Haven mayors fall into three main groupings: (1) "the patricians," well-educated, legally trained men from well-established New Haven families, who dominated the political field from 1784–1842; (2) "the entrepreneurs," heads of the largest and most prominent New Haven industrial and commercial firms who, whether or not they had high social standing, consistently were elected to the office of mayor from 1842–99; and (3) the "ex-plebes," men from working-class and ethnic backgrounds who capitalized on an arithmetic of ethnic composition and were able to be the major figures in politics from 1899 on. Dahl sees such a man as Richard Lee, mayor since 1953, as possibly the first of "the New Men"; men who build on an ethnic base but also have a wider base of support through advocating such good-government policies as community redevelopment.

To explain these shifts in recruitment Dahl focuses on the relative advantages and disadvantages possessed by the various

[1] We are indebted to the Center for Social Organization Studies and its director, Morris Janowitz, for criticism and financial support. A small grant from the Social Science Research Committee, Division of Social Sciences, University of Chicago, helped in the early stages of the study. A critical reading by R. W. Hodge was also of great help.

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[2] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 1-81.

groupings within the community for gaining important political positions. He does not deal with the motivation to participate in politics. In order to understand the historical shifts in local political elites it is necessary to deal with changes in both the distribution of the resources of political power and the value of political participation for the various social groups, for these are separate aspects of recruitment to political office.

We have used the social characteristics of Chicago mayors as the basis for an analysis of the changes in the political and social structure of Chicago. As compared with New Haven, Chicago has had a more dynamic and restless growth. While New Haven had an established and cohesive elite at the time of its incorporation as a city, the groups that were to make up Chicago's elite migrated there as it grew into a transportation and trading center; where New Haven grew slowly and incorporated a few major ethnic groups, Chicago grew rapidly and assimilated a multitude of diverse immigrant groups. Thus, we were led to expect a rather different pattern of recruitment to the office of mayor. Our central purpose is to present an analysis of the changes in recruitment in Chicago. In order to highlight the differences between the two communities, comparison with New Haven will be reserved for the conclusions.

From a host of biographical sources we gathered information on the social background and political careers of each of the thirty-nine Chicago mayors. By comparing the backgrounds of each of these individuals, we established patterns of common characteristics. The mayors grouped into four periods, which we have labeled according to their most salient characteristics.[8] Changes in the patterned characteristics from one period to another are interpreted in terms of shifts in the social, economic, and ideological conditions of the city. The names and dates of election of the mayors, arranged by the periods to which we have assigned them, are presented in Table 1. In Table 2 we present summaries of the social and occupational backgrounds and of the political background and careers of the mayors of each period.

I. THE ELITE OF COMMERCIAL EXPANSION: 1837–68

In 1830 Chicago was only a small trading post with a population under 100. As the frontier was pushed further west, Chicago rapidly became a transportation and trading center. The businessmen who were most prominent in this economic development commanded respect, prestige, and economic resources; they dominated the political scene and, to some extent, other institutional areas of community life. From 1837, the date of Chicago's incorporation, to 1868 the mayor, whether Whig, native American, Democrat, or Republican, was likely to be a leading businessman, highly active in political affairs and active in the affairs of his religious denomination.

A. SOCIAL, OCCUPATIONAL, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The speculative fever that characterized the economic development of Chicago at this time led most of the leading citizens to participate in several kinds of economic enterprise at the same time. More than half of this first group of mayors was engaged in between two and four occupations. For instance, a man might be a practicing lawyer, a land speculator, and a forwarding agent.

The first nineteen mayors represent the commercial, transportation, and building interests related to the growing economy. Real-estate speculation and investment were sources of income for at least eight of the first nineteen mayors; eight were associated with the merchandising and trading activi-

[8] We recognize that precise dating of periods is risky, but it helps organize reporting of the shifts in recruitment. More important than the dates are the underlying trends.

ties of the city; at least six were active in the development of railroads; three were in banking and building; and four were practicing lawyers. Almost all were extremely prominent in the business world. As Pierce observed, "Indeed, only two of the twenty-seven men running for the office between 1848 and 1869—Isaac L. Milliken, a blacksmith [and self-taught lawyer] and Timothy Wait, a barkeeper—had not attained enviable standing in the business life of the city."[4] Like most of the early migrants to Chicago all but three of these nineteen men came from New York or New England and all were born in the United States.[5]

Although we do not have complete information on the religious and educational background of this group, the available evidence indicates that it was almost entirely Protestant or non-religious. Furthermore, several of this group were instrumental in the organization of their denominations in Chicago. Raymond, Lloyd, Sherman, and Boone were either founders or prominent supporters of their respective congregations. By and large these men did not have extended formal education. Only three—Curtiss, Boone, and Wentworth—can indisputably be said to have had a college education. Although Morris and Milliken were qualified lawyers, their educational backgrounds are in doubt, for a college degree was not one of the requirements for admission to the bar.

The political careers of these mayors reveal extensive political participation. As a group, they had held substantially more offices than the group which immediately follows them. All but five of the commercial elite had anywhere from one year (Lloyd) to twelve years (Wentworth) of experience in some type of public office. After the mayoralty all but two (Ramsey and Rice) went on to serve in other positions.

Although these men were active in

TABLE 1

MAYORS OF CHICAGO AND THE YEARS IN WHICH THEY WERE ELECTED,* BY CHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS

Period	Mayors
Commercial elite (1837–68)	Ogden, 1837; Morris, 1838; Raymond, 1839 and 1842; Lloyd, 1840; F. C. Sherman, 1841, 1862, and 1863; Garrett, 1843 and 1845; A. Sherman, 1844; Chapin, 1846; Curtiss, 1847 and 1850; Woodworth, 1848 and 1849; Gurnee, 1851 and 1852; Gray, 1853; Milliken, 1854; Boone, 1855; Dyer, 1856; Wentworth, 1850 and 1860; Haines, 1858 and 1859; Ramsey, 1861; Rice, 1865 and 1867
Transition mayors (1869–75)	Mason, 1869; Medill, 1871; Colvin, 1873; Hoyne, 1875†
Personalized politics versus party machine (1876–1930)	Heath, 1876‡ and 1877; Harrison I, 1879, 1881, 1883, 1885, and 1893;§ Roche, 1887; Cregier, 1889; Washburne, 1891; Hopkins, 1893; Swift, 1885; Harrison II, 1897, 1899, 1901, 1903, and 1911; Dunne, 1905; Busse, 1907; Thompson, 1915, 1919, and 1927; Dever, 1923
Political administrators (1931–65)	Cermak, 1931; Kelly, 1933,‖ 1935, 1939, and 1943; Kennelly, 1947 and 1951; Daley, 1955, 1959, and 1963.

* Terms were for 1 year 1837–62, two years 1863–1905, four years from 1907 on.

† Hoyne never took office. Colvin refused to yield seat because of change in election procedure.

‡ Special election.

§ Harrison assassinated, Hopkins elected at special election.

‖ Cermak assassinated, Kelly elected at special election.

[4] Bessie L. Pierce, *A History of Chicago* (3 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1937, 1940, 1957), II, 305. This work was an indispensable aid to our study.

[5] *Ibid.*, I, 174.

TABLE 2*

SUMMARY OF SOCIAL, OCCUPATIONAL, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS, BY CHRONOLOGICAL PERIODS

	Commercial Elite (N=19)	Transition Mayors (N=4)	Personalized Politics vs. Party Machine (N=12)	Political Administrators (N=4)
Social and occupational background:				
Occupations:				
Multiple occupational practice†	10	....	1	1
Real estate and building	2	....	2	....
Grain and meat processing and packing, and merchandising	5	....	....	....
Wholesale and distribution, Chicago area	....	....	4	1
Law and judiciary	2	1	3	....
Newspaper	....	1	....	....
Career government service	....	....	....	2
Other	....	2	2	....
Education:				
Less than ten years	5‡	....	....	....
High school	3§	1	5	3
College	1	2	1	....
Legal training	4‖	....	5	1
No information	6	1	1	....
Religion:				
Protestant	17	2	6	....
Catholic	....	....	3	3
Other	....	....	....	1
No information	2	2	3	....
Age at arrival in Chicago:				
0–15	1	....	1	3
15–29	10	1	7	1
30+	8	3	2	....
No information	....	....	2	....
Membership in social elite of modal mayor# (impressionistic rating)	Yes (social elite not highly organized)	Yes	Yes**	No
Economic standing of modal mayor at time of first election (impressionistic rating)	Highest	A level below the highest	A level below the highest	Medium-medium high
Political background and experience:				
Party affiliation:				
Democrat	11	....	5	4
Republican	4	2	7	....
Whig	3	....	....	....
Other	1	2	....	....
Mean age at election (years)	36	57	48	54
Mean length of residence before election (years)	13	23	28	49

* The detailed table which this table summarizes has been deposited as Document No. 8387 with the ADI Auxiliary Publications Project, Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, Washington 25, D.C. A copy may be secured by citing the document number and remitting $1.25 for photoprints or $1.25 for 35-mm. microfilm. Advance payment is required. Make checks or money orders payable to Chief, Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress.

† These men were involved in several lines at once. Almost all speculated in land, two combined this with banking, one was a medical doctor, a contractor, and in banking. Several were also active in railroads.

‡ Includes "very little," "village school," "district school," and "public school."

§ Includes one "superior education for his time."

‖ Two of these four lawyers were "self-educated."

No social registry before 1880.

** Catholics not in social registry.

TABLE 2—*Continued*

	Commercial Elite (*N* = 19)	Transition Mayors (*N* = 14)	Personalized Politics vs. Party Machine (*N* = 12)	Political Administrators (*N* = 4)
Political experience prior to election:††				
Alderman	9	....	4	1
Other positions:				
From local system	8	2	9	3
Non-local	2‡‡	....	....	....
No previous position or no information	5	2	3	....
Over-all judgment of prior political experience of modal mayor	High	Low	Moderate	High
Number of mayors serving different lengths in office (including two and more terms):				
1 year	10	§§	....	....
2 years	8	2	6	1
3 years	....	1	1	....
4 years	1	....	2	....
5–7 years	....	....	....	....
8 or more years	....	....	3	3
Later political office (aside from being re-elected mayor):††				
Alderman	4	....	....	....
Other local-based elections	10	....	2	....
No information or no other known position	7	4	10	4
Summary judgment: Amount of office-holding after mayoralty	High	Low	Low	Low

†† A mayor could have been both an alderman and held other positions. Therefore, some mayors have been recorded twice

‡‡ Two of the first group of mayors had been members of their state legislatures before moving to Chicago.

§§ See Table 1, n. †.

politics, none dominated the mayoralty for long periods, as we find happening later in the century. Even though there were no legal restrictions on the number of consecutive terms that one could serve, of the nineteen mayors only four held office for two consecutive terms and none for more than that. On the one hand, long terms in office would not have been consonant with the maintenance of economic and other interests. On the other hand, given the size of the community in its early days, the office of mayor may have had mainly honorific rather than central career importance.

The small size of the community also means that most of these men must have had extensive business dealings with each other and have known one another quite well. This homogeneity of background did not always result in a common approach to the policies of city administration. In fact, Dyer and Chapin were members of the same firm, but they ran on opposite party tickets. Although some differences in viewpoint may have existed, in Chicago, as in other new commercial towns,[6] the views of the commercial elite were stamped on the administration of the city.

The evidence presented above suggests that these first mayors were part of a "multi-institutional" elite; active in political office both before and after being

[6] See Richard C. Wade, *The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis* ("Phoenix Book" [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964]), esp. chap. iii, pp. 72–101.

mayor, heading the largest economic enterprises, and active in school and religious activities, these mayors were the leading figures in the community. They attained their position, not by virtue of family background, but through economic achievement.

B. CHANGES IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

The population of Chicago grew from 4,000 in 1837 to 29,000 in 1850 to 120,000 in 1860. As the town grew, forces developed to displace the original commercial elite from their position of both economic and political dominance. Before discussing those forces we must account for a peculiarity in the recruitment of the early mayors: Of the mayors from 1837 until 1870 all but Rice arrived in Chicago between 1833 and 1837. What accounts for the "entrenchment" of these early arrivals?

A partial explanation is found in the depression of 1837, which ruined many of the businessmen who had made fortunes during the preceding speculative era. The "panic" also served to change the character of the people who continued to come to Chicago; the speculator and the bankrupt merchant left—1838 is one of the few years in Chicago's history that reveals a decline in population—and in their place came the laboring immigrant. Those who stayed and consolidated their positions found themselves in economic ascendancy with the return of prosperity; those who came later found themselves competing against an entrenched and active group of commercial leaders who also were active in politics and dominated the political scene.

Several factors led to the eventual economic and political decline of the commercial elite, however. First, the original business leaders were eclipsed by later arrivals who built large industrial, trading, and meat-packing firms. Second, requirements developed that made the office of mayor less desirable for the businessman. Third, political resources became available to other groups within the community.

The original commercial entrepreneurs of the city had a dominant position during the 1840's, but in the 1850's and 1860's they began to be economically obscured by later arrivals.[7] By the end of the 1860's they had lost their position of economic supremacy. Such firms as Wadsworth, Dyer, and Chapin were obscured by the growth in Chicago of Armour and Company; the Chicago Packing and Provision Company; and Libby, McNeill, and Libby; and others. The new leaders of business did not replace the old commercial elite in politics, however; in part because they did not choose to run for office.

The office of mayor became a less desirable sideline occupation for a businessman as the scope of competing firms was enlarged and more energy and time were required to maintain a commanding position in the business community. Also, to be mayor in an era when the pioneer work of building the physical plant and establishing an order for the growing city was complete was a less valuable financial investment than it had been in the early days when various city improvements in transportation, sanitation, and waterworks could not but benefit economic interests founded on real-estate and commercial holdings.

At the same time, the growth in the physical size of the city and the expansion of public services made the elected officials responsible for more duties, requiring full-time attention to public office. The increase in municipal expenditures from approximately $45,000 in 1848–49 to over $6,000,000 in 1868 indicates the tremendous growth in municipal complexity. Duties formerly performed by private enterprises were taken over by the administrative authorities of the city.[8] This extension of city services and the increased

[7] Pierce, *op. cit.*, II, 77–117.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

responsibility of the mayor for the performance of these functions made the office an all-engaging activity.

Furthermore, the proliferation of public services extended governmental responsibility into areas where it conflicted with the interests of some segments of the business community. The business leader in office found it increasingly difficult to resolve his business interests and his public responsibilities, and businessmen found they could buy advantages from the developing ward bosses of the city council. All of these developments—the increased attention demanded by commercial and public activity, the decreasing necessity for active political involvement, and the conflict of interest between the two roles—tended to make the mayoralty less desirable to the leading business notables.

At the same time there was a decline in the political resources of the economic dominants. Specifically, there was a lower popular estimation of the virtues and attainments of the businessman. The commercial elite had dominated the political scene despite rapid changes in the community composition. The city census of 1843 listed almost 30 per cent of Chicago's population as foreign-born, and by 1850 this figure had risen to 52 per cent. Until 1870, in spite of its numerical superiority and with only minimal residence requirements for voting, the foreign-born population of the city continued to support the Yankee businessman year after year.[9] The only explanation of this support seems to be that they believed they too would be the beneficiaries of the rapidly expanding wealth of the city.[10] The rise of labor consciousness, growing public concern over the extent of graft and spoils in public office, and the growing awareness of a divergence of business and public goals all worked to undercut the ideological legitimation of the commercial elite.

II. TRANSITION MAYORS: 1869–75

In 1869, with the election of Rosewell Mason, a change occurred in the social background of the mayors. Supported by radical labor and pledged to the restoration of official morals, Mason no longer typifies the commercial elite. During this short period an interlude occurs between a business-dominated political scene and one controlled by charismatic and party leaders.

This period is characterized by political unorthodoxy, conflict between public moralists and advocates of personal liberty, a high degree of party irregularity, and the formation of successful independent parties. Both the disarray of the regular parties and the need for total unity following the fire of 1871 required men who could build a coalition outside of normal channels. The mayors of this period were generally older men with few local political commitments who had high standing in the community.

The type of individual chosen to serve during this period of transition and political conflict had less commitment to the economic growth of Chicago than did the entrepreneur of the preceding period. It is true that Mason and Colvin represented large transportation concerns, but they were managers rather than owners; all of the nineteen previous mayors had been more or less self-employed. Furthermore, the

[9] With the incorporation of the city in 1837, in addition to an age requirement and a residence requirement of at least six months, there was a requirement that the voter have the status of householder or have paid a city tax of not less than three dollars. The property qualifications were eliminated in 1841 and the naturalization requirements were clarified in 1843, when it was explicitly stated that persons could vote whether naturalized citizens or not. This was not changed until 1871 when naturalization was made a condition of registration (A. A. Lavery [ed.], *Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes* [Chicago: Bendette Smith Co., 1944], p. 28).

[10] Ethnic politics began to play some role quite early. The charge was made that "the Irish entirely controlled" a local election of 1840 (Ogden to Edwin Crowell, August 31, 1840, *Ogden Letter Books*, II, 494).

organizations employing them (Mason was employed by the Illinois Central Railroad and was a well-known civil engineer and Colvin was the resident agent of the United States Express Company) were oriented to a much wider area than just that of Chicago.

That the mayoralty was not the prerogative of the leaders of commerce in this period is also indicated by the election of Joseph Medill (editor and owner of the *Chicago Tribune*) and Thomas Hoyne (lawyer and jurist). Although wealthy, Medill did not hold a position in the commercial, industrial, or financial activities of the city comparable to that of the previous mayors. Wentworth, the figure of the first group of mayors most analogous to Medill, in that he owned a newspaper, was also active in real estate, banking, and railroad development. Medill, on the other hand, was completely committed to managing and editing the *Tribune*. Apparently, Hoyne had no active connection with the business community.

The average age of the transition mayors was older than either the preceding or the following groups of mayors. At the time they became mayor the mean age of the first nineteen mayors was forty-one while that of transition mayors was fifty-seven. Of the first nineteen, only two (Dyer and Rice) exceeded the age of the youngest of the second group (Medill). The transition mayors were older in average age than the subsequent two groups (forty-eight and fifty-four, respectively).

Although these mayors were older than their predecessors they had more limited local political involvements. Hoyne and Medill were active in state and national politics, but neither took the usual route to becoming mayor, that is, via the aldermanic position. Moreover, neither Mason nor Colvin had any prior political experience in the city and at the end of their terms of office they discontinued political participation.

How can we account for the selection of these mayors? The disarray in politics had led to the rise of independent parties such as the reform-minded Citizens' Ticket and the labor and ethnic-based People's Party. The "Union-Fireproof" ticket (headed by Medill) was a response to the fire. For finding a candidate that was acceptable to the diverse parties and elements of the community, who could be more acceptable than highly respected older men who had not become identified with the local political issues?

After the election of 1879 the Republicans were convinced that they could elect one of their own candidates and that a bipartisan coalition was not necessary. Thus, party politics returned to their more usual course, the reform elements of the Citizens' Ticket went over to the Republicans, and many of the ethnic elements of the People's Party returned to the ranks of the Democratic party. The transition period was ended.

III. PERSONAL MACHINE VERSUS PARTY MACHINE: 1876–1930

Disunity, self-interest, and apathy characterized the business, labor, and middle-class elements of Chicago during this period. A lack of clear numerical preponderance and a high degree of social mobility prevented a clear victory by any one class or ethnic group. Whereas in other major cities strong machines developed, political factions controlled the various regions and groups of Chicago. The distribution of political resources in the community was such, however, that when the city-wide office of mayor was at stake it took more than these local allegiances to elect a candidate. Because of its "payoff" in patronage and political influence, the office of mayor was the focal point of activity for the politicians of all factions of both parties.

Given these conditions, there seemed to be two chief routes of ascent to the office of mayor during this period: through long and careful service to the party and

through charismatic or vote-getting abilities. On the one hand, a potential mayor could extend the range of his influence until he became head of one of the party factions or he could be chosen because he epitomized party loyalty and respectability in reform periods. On the other hand, there were the two Harrisons and Thompson—upper-class notables who came to power because they could at the same time mobilize party support and, through personal qualities, appeal widely to the diverse groups of the community.

A. SOCIAL, OCCUPATIONAL, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Even though commerce and industry were growing rapidly, the period from 1880 to 1930 did not see the election of any businessman from the major industrial companies, department stores, or banks which came to dominate the Chicago economy. Legal practice, wholesaling, and real-estate management were the major business connections of the twelve mayors elected during this period. A larger proportion of these than of the previous mayors had legal training (five out of twelve as compared to six out of twenty-three); and, whereas many of the first group of mayors had been involved in shipping and milling grain or were in general merchandising, only one of these mayors was a merchant. Three of the mayors in this period were practicing lawyers and judges; five were involved primarily in the distribution of coal, paint and wood, and machinery; three were wealthy real-estate owners and operators; and one, Cregier, was a mechanical engineer and former city engineer. Both real estate and law permit an easy transition to and from public office; thus running for public office was more feasible for many of these men than for the heads of major companies.

Even the men whose businesses demanded much time differ from those who were mayors in previous eras. In several instances the political activities of these businessmen seem to be more important than their business careers. For instance, Hopkins was active in Democratic politics from his arrival in 1880 organizing several annexation movements. He was one of the organizers and early presidents of the Cook County Democratic Club; chairman of the Democratic County Committee in 1889; delegate to the Democratic National Conventions of 1892, 1900, and 1904; and ofttime chairman of the Democratic State Committee. Although he held office for only a short time, he had much more than a passing interest in politics. The same prolonged involvement is true of Busse and Swift. Not only were the mayors of this period not the leaders of the business community but politics and party work were a major part of their lives. Furthermore, five of them were identified with the large Irish and German populations of the city.

All but three of the mayors between 1880 and 1931 had obtained enough social standing and financial success to be listed in the social directories of their periods. Their educational attainment was considerably greater than that of the previous mayors. Of the twelve mayors between 1880 and 1931 six had received college educations, and of the remaining six we know that five graduated from high school. (Of the nineteen mayors of the first period only four had a college education.)

Most of these men had long service in their party, and several were heads of factions. Hopkins, Swift, Busse, and Dunne all worked up to power from unpromising beginnings. Using position in the business world and ethnic communities, each gradually extended the range of his influence over party workers and supporters until each became head of one of the party factions. Once in a position to concoct schemes and negotiate treaties, each was able to parlay his political strength into the mayoralty. The success of these mayors in the party was dependent on political generalship, and their election success was a result of the

superior working of their respective party organizations.

Heath, Roche, Cregier, and Dever also spent considerable time in the service of their parties. They differed from the former group, however, in their positions within the parties. None was the head of a party faction; rather each was a party supporter. They were chosen as candidates because of their party loyalty and because of their respectability. They pacified the occasional reform or businessman groups that organized to fight the party bosses.

Although the Yankee businessman and the members of first-generation ethnic groups sought and obtained office, the most successful candidate was the charismatic social leader. During this fifty-five-year period, the two Harrisons and Thompson held the office of mayor for a total of thirty-one years and when not in office were a force to be reckoned with. In a sense the history of the mayoralty of this period is the story of these three individuals. Although quite different in their administration of public office, the Harrisons and Thompson were successful because they could appeal to a wider variety of groups than could their opponents.

Chosen to run initially for minor posts because of their silk-stocking respectability and financial standing, both the senior Harrison and Thompson showed remarkable ability as campaigners. While Harrison, and especially his son, were less raucously flamboyant than Thompson (and were never as involved in scandals), all three had oratorical skills, a sense of showmanship, and an ability to adapt to their audience. Their personal following enabled them to jump to the top of their parties without serving long apprenticeships. Because of their city-wide following they were relatively independent of the political fiefs making up the respective party organizations.

B. CHANGES IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

Between 1876 and 1931 Chicago developed into a great central manufacturing center and one of the principal agricultural clearing houses in the country. From virtually complete destruction in the fire of 1871, Chicago became the showplace of the 1893 Columbian Exposition. These radical rearrangements in the economic and physical structure were paralleled by extensive migration to the city and a reordering of its population composition. In the 1890's extensive numbers of Poles, Bohemians, Russians, and Italians arrived, following the Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians. By 1920, 70.6 per cent of the population was either foreign-born or of foreign parentage. Finally, in the early 1900's the influx of Negroes increased.[11] The high rate of economic growth, the extent of vertical mobility, and the rapid movement of large numbers of people to and from the city prevented stable political organizations and traditional groupings.[12]

Of the groupings that arose out of this economic development, the most effectively organized and *potentially* the most influential was the business element. Able to control newspapers, campaign funds, propaganda, and the services of political leaders, they could play—when they cared to act together—an important role in the political game. They seldom, however, chose either to act, or, when they did act, to do so in concert. There was conflict between commerce and industry and railroads and real-estate operators and public utilities. There was also conflict within each of these groups and between them and the public, which

[11] Helen R. Jeter, *Trends of Population in the Region of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927). See also Paul F. Cressy, "The Succession of Cultural Groups in Chicago" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1930); Pierce, *op. cit.*, III, 20–64; Charles E. Merriam, *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 134–77.

[12] See Merriam, *op. cit.*, and Lincoln Steffens, *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), pp. 422–29, for a description of the political system at this time.

felt that its interests had been subordinated to narrow economic goals. Both factors, the lack of group solidarity and the lessening of social legitimation, prevented the business elite of the community from exerting control over the political scene.[13]

The numerically most powerful group, labor, was not notably successful in political participation. Organized in the 1870's and 1880's under the pressures of an expanding labor force, recurring unemployment, rising food prices and falling wages, and the injustices of child labor, the labor movement was beset by strife resulting from the issue of radicalism versus trade unionism. General prosperity between 1887 and 1892 brought quiet to the labor front and a degree of rapprochement within the labor movement. The insecurity of this rapprochement led the leaders who feared the effects of politics upon the unity of their trade-union organizations, to discourage union participation in political contests. Even when this policy was abandoned, as it was in the mayoralty campaign of 1919, lack of solidarity made labor's efforts in politics unsuccessful.

At the same time, the very diversity of ethnic groups prohibited any one group from dominating the scene. The cleavages in the ethnic composition of the community presented natural lines along which political power could be organized. Capitalizing on the neighborhood segregation of their countrymen, and their own ethnic identification, political bosses appeared who were supreme in their own bailiwicks. Chicago politics became more and more controlled by several party organizations able to distribute patronage and to obtain large campaign funds.[14]

[13] There is some evidence to suggest that the Republican party was more influenced by the business element of the city than was the Democratic party. Every one of the Republican mayors elected during this period could be found listed in the executive directory of their time, in contrast to the Democratic candidates, only one of whom was listed.

[14] Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–98.

The diversity in the community structure did not totally exclude businessmen from political participation; the time had passed, however, when an individual could be elected merely on the basis of his standing within the business community. Thus, Harrison was able to defeat a movement in 1881 to nominate in his stead candidates of the highest prestige in the business world, such as Levi Z. Leiter, George L. Dunlap, and Cyrus McCormick, and he defeated the Republican John M. Clark, a leather manufacturer, who had the backing of five hundred leading businessmen.

Although the first-ranking businessmen were not elected, several considerations lead to the conclusion that ethnic identification, while important, was not sufficient to insure election to the office of mayor. Such identification had to be paired with some business success. Roche, Hopkins, Dunne, and Dyer were all only one or two generations removed from Ireland. (Of these four, three were sufficiently wealthy to be listed in the elite directory for the mid-1880's, a precursor to the Social Register.) Busse, an influential leader of the Republican party and quite prosperous, represented the large German population in Chicago. Even when business success was paired with factional strength and ethnic identification, however, the flamboyant appeal of Thompson and the Harrisons could dominate such candidates.

The election of Anton Cermak as mayor in 1931 brought an end to the Thompson era and represented the ascendancy of a party machine that was unparalleled in the history of the city. From a position at the beginning of the depression in which the balance between the two major parties in Chicago was fairly even (seven of the last twelve mayors had been Republicans), the political complexion changed such that by 1936 the Democrats were in complete control of all the governmental agencies within the territorial limits of the city of Chicago. Henceforth, the Democratic party machine was the decisive force in the selec-

tion of elected officials. No longer could the competition between the two parties or the divergent factions within them be used as a lever for political success. The route to public office was now limited to ascendancy through the party's ranks.

IV. POLITICAL ADMINISTRATORS: 1931–1965

In many other cities the economic crisis and the community disorganization that resulted from the depression led to the introduction of political reforms and the election of rabidly antimachine candidates. In Chicago, however, the effect of the depression was to weld together the political resources of the community into the all-powerful Democratic machine. Thus, at a time when the Tammany Hall machine of New York and the Republican machine of Philadelphia were meeting severe reverses, Chicago was embracing an organization of unparalleled strength.[15] Consequently, that individual able to rise to the top of the organization or chosen by the machine to run for the office was elected to the mayoralty. Under such conditions the mayors of this period had to be, above all else, strongly connected to the local Democratic party structures.

A. SOCIAL, OCCUPATIONAL, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The four men who held office between 1931 and 1965 started from rather modest beginnings. They had little formal education—only Daley had college training; the others had a high school diploma or less—and started near the bottom of the occupational hierarchy—Cermak in the coal mines of Illinois, Kelly as an axeman for the Sanitary Department, Kennelly as a laborer in a warehouse, and Daley as a stockyard cowboy.

With the exception of Kennelly, the mayors after 1931 started fairly low in the party organization and served in a variety of elective positions (Cermak spent thirty-three years in elective office) before becoming mayor. Even Kennelly, who has been characterized as an outsider, had a long history of political involvement as a commissioner to the Lincoln Park Board and as a member of the Chicago Park District.

None of these four mayors was among the top leaders in the industrial, commercial, or financial activities of the city (although Cermak's banking and real-estate holdings placed him at the head of his ethnic community of Lawndale). They were not social notables, and none of them appeared in the elite directory of his time.[16] They had demonstrated administrative and managerial abilities, however. For instance, Kelly had been head of a large public-service agency, president of the South Park Board of Commissioners, and heir apparent to the machine; Daley had been the Illinois Revenue Director and Clerk of Cook County. All had shown ability to organize and direct large organizational structures. They were political rather than economic entrepreneurs.

The religious and ethnic identification of most of the Democratic mayors from Hopkins on reflects the domination of the party by Irish Catholics. With the exception of the Harrisons and Cermak, all of the Democratic mayors from 1893 to the present have been first or second-generation Irish Catholics.

Cermak, the only foreign-born Chicago mayor and, besides Busse, the only mayor to fall outside of the old-stock American,

[15] Harold F. Gosnell accounts for the ascendancy of the Chicago machine by referring to an "unfavorable press situation, a lack of leadership, and the character of the party division at the beginning of the depression" (*Machine Politics: Chicago Model* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937]).

[16] This lack of representation of the "silk stocking" element is also reflected in the city council. Of the thirty-four aldermen on the council in 1900, five were listed in the *Chicago Social Directory* for that year. By 1935, of the fifty men who sat on the council, not one was listed. This lack of representation of the "better class" has continued so that in 1965 there is still no alderman to be found in the listed elite of Chicago.

English, Scottish, or Irish groups, was able to obtain success as spokesman of the "wet" vote and the other ethnic groups making up the Democratic party. His organization and consolidation of the party, however, enabled the Irish to gain consolidated control after Cermak's death.[17]

A long and intimate participation in the life of Chicago became increasingly important for political success. Each of the ten mayors from Swift to Daley had resided in the city for more than twenty-eight years. Of these, five had been born and raised and a sixth raised in the city. The requisite sensitivity to the issues and social arrangements of the community, the necessity of an extensive network of informal social and business connections, and the lengthy party apprenticeship made residence in Chicago an imperative for political leadership.

B. CHANGES IN COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

What led to the rise of the political administrators? We must look at the motives for participating in politics. Judging from the social standing of a number of the aldermen and mayors of the pre-1930 period, political participation was accepted as a legitimate activity for the well-to-do. The activities of the "gray wolves" and the "boodle boys" during the era of the Harrisons, the open protection of a wide-open city during the Thompson period, the breaking of scandal after scandal, and the general circus atmosphere under which the political campaigns were run all led to the destruction of any social prestige that had been attached to office-holding and cast political participation in a negative light.[18] Many social and business leaders refrained from mingling in the rough and tumble of politics. Private welfare and philanthropy offered a much more respectable way of performing one's civic duties.[19] Busily engaged in building up their fortunes, fearful of alienating the populace with an unpopular political stand, and finding it much more profitable to buy the political favors they needed, the business and social elite stood at the sidelines of the political game. Furthermore, movement to the suburbs removed many of them from political scene.[20]

Even those of the economic and social elite who stayed and wished to participate would have had to do so through the party organization, for the party machine, with its mobilization of the working-class vote, financial resources, and hard core of party workers, could afford to pick its candidate from within the organization.[21] The ward

[17] Alex Gottfried, *Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962).

[18] The following volumes give colorful, if at times overly journalistic, accounts of the history of Chicago's political and social reputation: John Bright, *Hizzoner Big Bill Thompson, an Idyll of Chicago* (New York: J. Cape & H. Smith, 1930); Fletcher Dobyns, *The Underworld of American Politics* (New York: privately printed, 1932); Lloyd Lewis and Henry Smith, *Chicago: The History of Its Reputation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929); Merriam, *op. cit*; William H. Stuart, *The Twenty Incredible Years* (Chicago. M. A. Donahue & Co., 1935).

[19] Much of the motivation dynamics operating in Chicago is similar to that found by Lynd and Merrill in Middletown (Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrill, *Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1929], p. 421).

[20] William R. Gable, "The Chicago City Council: A Study of Urban Politics and Legislation" (unpublished Ph D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953), p. 10.

[21] It should be noted that, while the socially and economically advantaged moved out of the city and into the suburbs, their places were taken by the migrants from the agrarian areas of the North and South (chiefly southern Negroes and whites), immigrants from Puerto Rico and other Latin American countries, and occasional immigrants from Europe. Thus the often-predicted changing class character of urban politics and the resulting decline in machine dominance has been postponed in Chicago. See Part V of Edward C. Banfield (ed.), *Urban Government: A Reader in Administration and Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961); especially relevant in this regard are Samuel Lubell, "The New Middle Class" (pp. 301-8) and Frank J. Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution in Patronage" (pp. 308-17).

committeemen constituted the core of the party machinery. They controlled the selection of candidates for public office as well as the operation of the election machinery that elects the candidates. In order to become boss of the party one had to have the backing of the principal ward bosses of the inner city. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the ward bosses giving support to a leader whose identifications were with the inner-city wards.

Once chosen and in office, however, the mayor possessed a great deal of the coin upon which the machine is built—patronage. This resource made the mayor independent of the ward bosses and the ward bosses dependent upon him. This partially accounts for the coincidence of the mayor and the party boss being one and the same. The mayor, however, never gained complete independence—witness Kennelly's defeat when he tried to run without the support of the regular party organization in 1955—but must always have some measure of support from the ward bosses.[22] Faced with the necessity of centralized leadership, the ward bosses have chosen to follow individuals with working-class backgrounds, intimate knowledge of Chicago and the party organization, Irish Catholic identification,[23] and demonstrated administrative ability. The popular and charismatic qualities that had enabled the Harrisons and Thompson to dominate the political scene during the 1890's and 1920's would in 1950 only hinder their political aspirations. The kind of leader produced by the organization was, above all else, a political executive.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions can best be stated by comparison and contrast with those presented by Dahl for New Haven:[24]

1. In New Haven a long and settled history prior to incorporation led to the selection of mayors from among the patrician families—families of long and established social standing; these mayors had had legal training and extensive education. In comparison, Chicago's first mayors were drawn from its commercial leaders, regardless of family background, who were caught up in the growth and speculative investment of the community. This came about partly because Chicago's "old" families were almost non-existent but also because the commercial elite represented the driving force in the new community.

2. After 1842, New Haven's patricians gave way to the leading entrepreneurs, whether recruited from the commercial or from the industrial elite, who were to hold sway until 1900. Chicago's commercial elite were followed in the 1860's and 1870's by the transition mayors, men picked as a compromise because of the disunity and chaos of party alignments. While not unsuccessful in their occupational or social pursuits, they represented neither the commercial elite nor the local politically active.

3. In New Haven, the entrepreneurs were succeeded around 1900 by the ex-plebes, representatives of the city's recent new arrivals. In Chicago, beginning about 1880, two types of men were recruited, social notables with wide popular following and highly politically involved businessmen: men who had status in the business com-

[22] Our analysis draws heavily on Edward C. Banfield's *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961).

[23] A comment on the success of the Irish: both in the city council and in the party hierarchy, the religious similarity between the Irish and the other nationality groups (the principal ethnic groups in the Democratic party, in descending order of importance, were the Poles, Italians, Bohemians, Lithuanians, Slovaks, and Greeks) and the fact that in a city which has no one single ethnic group in a clear majority, the Irish upset the community balance least, made the Irish Catholics the most logical and acceptable candidates. As one investigator quotes a politician: "A Lithuanian won't vote for a Pole, and a Pole won't vote for a Lithuanian. A German won't vote for either of them, but all three will vote for a 'Turkey' [Irishman]" (Martin Meyerson and E. C. Banfield, "A Machine at Work," in Banfield [ed.], *op. cit.*, p. 136).

[24] Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-64.

munity, but were not from the largest firms or factories; men who had both business, political, and ethnic (Irish or German) connection. While the "ex-plebe" or at least the ethnic, label might fit some of them, ethnic politics seem not to have been as dominant a feature in their election as in that of New Haven's mayors. The diversity of ethnic groups and of the community prohibited giving the simple label of ex-plebe to these men, or to the period, until 1930.

4. Finally, with Cermak, the dominance of the Democratic party machine began. While the new mayors are "ex-plebe," the driving force in community politics becomes the machine, and the style of the mayor becomes that of the political administrator. The machine and city politics had become a full-time career. While a business career parallel to a political one is not impossible in this era, it becomes more and more unlikely.

Dahl suggests that politics and recruitment to the mayoralty may be in a period of transformation in New Haven. Ethnicity is declining as a major criterion of political success; instead Dahl hypothesizes, the "new men" will be those who, by a concern with the fate of the city, expand their political base to the self-interested downtown businessmen and the social-welfare professional. The "new men" expand their support from ethnic organizations by becoming the leaders and initiators of programs of physical and social city renewal.

The parallel with Chicago is difficult to find. As Banfield notes, in a community as diverse as Chicago there is little development of the conditions for consensus supporting a widespread attack on city problems. In such a situation the mayor is more a referee than a combatant in the resolution of the issues facing the city.

There is a parallel of another sort, however. Even though the patronage available to Chicago mayors allows the machine to function with less concession to reform than in other cities, as in other cities there has been a transformation of the posture of its political administrator. Thus, to quote the political slogan of Mayor Richard J. Daley, "Good government is good politics."

With the assimilation of foreign immigrants, the rise of social-security measures, the introduction of civil service, and the transformation of the occupational and educational structure, the only significant source of political support in the traditional patronage-welfare exchange is the Negroes, and even they are becoming increasingly concerned with the ideological dimensions of politics.

Given this transformation of the urban setting, the present mayor of Chicago, like those in Philadelphia, New Haven, and Detroit, must represent the process of collective betterment and not the process of machine greed. A new ethos of "the good of the community" becomes dominant and shapes the administration of the mayor.

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Comte's Changing Sociology

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ABSTRACT

The significance of Comte's sociology has in the past been attributed to his effort to formulate a scientific approach to social data. This view is inadequate. While Comte's early sociological ideas represented an effort to create a predictive science of progress, as a result of his confrontation with the problems of industrialism and with trends in conservative social thought, his orientation changed. He sought to deal with social disorganization and solidarity. In so doing, he developed a new sociology.

I

The historical significance of Comte's sociology has never been a matter of particular controversy. His work has usually been regarded as an early step toward an empirical science of society, where we find the application of scientific method to social phenomena united with a theory of scientific and social progress. The unifying element—common enough in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century thought—was his assumption that man's intellectual history was a steadily progressive development which would finally culminate in the extension of scientific method from nature to human society and culture. However imperfect his execution of the idea may be judged to have been, the significance of his work has generally been seen to lie in the effort to define the social fact and the laws of social movement scientifically.[1]

It is also commonly held, and correctly so, that this is true largely of Comte's earlier thought, that his later ideas moved in rather a different direction. With few exceptions, the social theory associated with his Religion of Humanity has seemed to sociologists less a significant aspect of their discipline's history than a denial of its scientific spirit. Most of all in British and American studies, the tendency has been studiously to avoid serious examination of his later thought.[2]

Yet this approach has yielded an inadequate view of both Comte's sociology and the social situation in which it developed. In reality, his entire conception of sociology changed radically as a result of his confrontation with two important facts of early nineteenth-century life. One was the Industrial Revolution and the debate over its social effects; the other was the challenge to ideas of scientific and social progress embodied in the conservative thought after the French Revolution.[3]

[1] A few of the studies that adopt this view are H. Gouhier, *La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la formation du positivisme* (3 vols.; Paris, 1933–41), II, 5–62; L. Levy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Comte*, trans. Beaumont-Klein (London, 1903), p. 260; and A. Saloman, *The Tyranny of Progress* (New York, 1955), pp. 58–62. Sociologists, though often more sensitive to Comte's "organismic" ideas, still tend to the same attitude. See, e.g., D. Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (Boston, 1960), pp. 63–65.

[2] There is no worthwhile study in English of Comte's later work. The best study is P. Arbousse-Bastide, *La Doctrine de l'éducation universelle dans la philosophie d'Auguste Comte* (2 vols.; Paris, 1957).

[3] The impact of conservative ideas on early nineteenth-century social thought has been treated well by R. Nisbet, in "The French Revolution and the Rise of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* (1943), pp. 156–64; and in "Conservatism and Sociology," *ibid.* (1952), pp. 167–75. There is no coherent treatment of the early debate over industrialism in France; there are scattered materials in the standard histories of socialism and the working-class movement. It is the non-socialist sources that are more interesting and less studied. See P. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York, 1921), pp. 6–37; E. Martin St.-Léon, *Histoire de corporations des métiers* (Paris, 1897), pp. 510–663; M. Elbow, *French Corporative Theory, 1789–1948* (New York, 1953), pp. 16–32.

Comte began with a naïve, mechanical, and utopian conception of sociology and its object in inevitable scientific and social progress. As a result of his confrontation with the implications of industrialism and conservative ideas, he gradually evolved a more complex, non-mechanical, and markedly less utopian conception of sociology and its object in social solidarity. One very striking result of that movement was his virtual abandonment of the evolutionary and methodological ideas associated with his early thought. Another result, even less recognized, was that he developed a novel and substantial approach to industrialism and its social consequences. In effect, his changing sociology represents the first effort to take serious sociological account of the phenomenon known as industrialism. The development of his sociology is thus of particular interest in the history of that science. It is of more general interest as an important step in the evolution of the metaphors and concepts still employed to understand and criticize industrial society.

II

From its inception, Comte's sociology embodied a basic tension, characteristic both of his work and of the general intellectual situation in post-Revolutionary France. From the Enlightenment and the French school of liberal economic thought he had absorbed the conviction that a golden age of science and industry lay in the immediate future of European society. There all knowledge would be humanized and positivized, purged of the misleading transcendental fantasies of religion and metaphysics. The confusion which marked all prescientific thought would be supplanted with the careful procedures of mature empirical science. At the same time, society would be totally industrialized. Industrial production, inherently a peaceful and co-operative form of social organization, would transform Europe into a vast and entirely harmonious workshop, centrally directed by humane financiers. Oppression would be replaced by co-operation, war by peace, conflict by harmony. As a result, the clash of opinion and power would cease. In an age of intellectual certainty and social harmony, political conflict and domination would have little or no place. Both the state as an instrument of domination and otherwordly aspirations would evaporate. In science and industry men would concretely manifest their mastery of self and nature.[4]

All that remained in the 1820's was for some member of the European scientific community scientifically to describe and reveal the means of attaining this new age. Again in the tradition of the Enlightenment, Comte called for the creation of a predictive science of human progress. "The proper object of political science . . . is a general determination of society's future."[5] He proposed a new "social physics," to reveal the steps lying between Europe and the new order, which would allow a rational calculation of the action best suited to effect the transition. Taking societies as social wholes, he sought to examine their historical development in order to construct a proof of inevitable progress and a prediction of its future course. Society-in-motion was the chief social fact, and sociology was a weapon in the service of progress. It was a scientifically demonstrable program, a theory of social practice.[6]

At the same time, however, Comte also accepted the most significant and widely

[4] Comte, *Opuscules de philosophie sociale* (hereinafter cited as "*Opuscules*") (Paris, 1883), No. 2, pp. 5–62. Comte's early ideas on industry can be found in a series of essays entitled *L'Industrie III*, on which he collaborated with Saint-Simon; they date from 1817, and have been published in *Évolution originale d'Auguste Comte* (hereinafter cited as "*EO*"), ed. T. Mendes (Rio de Janeiro, 1913), pp. 93–162. (All translations mine)

[5] *Opuscules*, No. 3, p. 186.

[6] Comte's first efforts toward a science of history lie in two fragmentary essays of 1819: "Ce que c'est la politique positive"; "De la division qui a existé jusqu'à présent entre la morale et la politique" (*EO*, pp. 447–54).

diffused element in the conservative reaction against science, social reform, and revolution. It was from Saint-Simon that he first absorbed the notion of society as a community of communities, constituted and sustained not by the rational assessment of self-interest, but rather by a body of communal values and beliefs. In the conservative view, here was the key to both social theory and practice. To grasp the common beliefs of a society was to penetrate to its very essence. Alter or dissolve that and you have changed or destroyed society itself.[7]

In his earliest writings (1817–22) the tension between these two elements was latent and only slowly rose to the surface. Since he equated the advance of science and industry with social progress, it seemed natural at first to represent their solvent effects upon earlier stages of European society as necessary and even happy consequences of man's evolution. In 1820 he regarded the dissolution of the *ancien régime* as a prerequisite of progress and a bright promise of the future.[8]

Two years later he took a somewhat more serious view of the question. Europe was deep in a fundamental crisis, resulting from the dissolution of an entire historic system of religious and social values. While science and industry had dissolved the old order, neither was yet sufficiently organized to supplant what had been destroyed.[9]

In 1824 Comte read the Traditionalists for the first time, with the consequence that his view was marked with a more acute sense of crisis. Society had been stripped of its constitutive element, and thus in political life "there remains no other expedient [for governments] than force or corruption."[10] A centralized, mechanical, and despotic state expanded into the void left by the breakdown of common values and intermediate associations. In individual life the absence of any social norms promoted the emergence of an autarchic individualism. Society, he argued, was in a state of continuing inner warfare; "social sentiment, searching vainly [for] some fixed and exact notion of what constitutes the common good . . . finishes by degenerating into a vague philanthropic intention, incapable of having any real influence."[11]

The critique was penetrating—it is still classical—and was drawn in substance from the literature of Traditionalism. Yet it was entirely typical of Comte's early thought that he should see the solution purely in science. The point he labored to make in the essays of the 1820's was that an entire new system of scientific ideas had developed, and lacked only a science of society to be complete. Once sociology was established, European civilization would once again rest on the solid ground of a common intellectual culture.[12]

Comte was thus in the curious position of arguing that science would cure the very disease it caused. The source of this paradox is not obscure. His sociology had initially been conceived as a proof of the inevitable advance and future triumph of science. Yet his attention had partly shifted from demonstrating progress to reconstructing consensus. Since there had been no corresponding shift in the structure of sociology, the new science was pressed into the service of both causes at once.

This tension was sharpened by his development, in this same period, of a new view of industrialism. While he did not suddenly abandon his earlier position, he did articulate some serious reservations. In particular, he came to regard the industrial division of labor as a mixed blessing. By the mid-1820's he was familiar with critics of the new economic order, and

[7] See works by Nisbet cited in n. 3.

[8] *Opuscules*, No. 2, pp. 5–59.

[9] *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 88.

[10] *Ibid.*, No. 5, pp. 251–52. On the Traditionalists see Gouhier, *op. cit.*, III, 333–34.

[11] *Opuscules*, No. 5, pp. 247–48.

[12] *Ibid.*, No. 3, pp. 120–24.

agreed with many that increasing specialization of function forced individuals to "a more and more limited point of view . . . animated by increasingly special interests."[13] By itself this view was not unusual, for it only echoed concerns over the psychic impact of the division of labor in industry dating back at least to Adam Smith.[14] However, Comte came to the problem precisely at the time he was first digesting the conservative analysis of social disorganization and plea for the reconstruction of organic social cohesion. Thus, in 1824–25 he approached industrialism, having clearly in mind the idea of solidarity so prominent in Traditionalist thought. The result was that he moved from a consideration of the impact of specialized labor on the worker's psyche to reflections on its general social effects. He concluded that the industrial division of labor would result in men's inability to grasp "the relation of [their] special activity to the totality of social activity.[15] Social fragmentation would therefore proceed apace with the industrialization of European society; "what sociability gained in extent it lost in energy."[16] By 1825 Comte had concluded that social disorganization was an inevitable consequence of industrialism. The bright promise of a spontaneously integrated and harmonious social workshop had suddenly faded.

His immediate response had nothing to do with sociology. Comte called for new institutions, "having as their special purpose to recall to a general point of view minds disposed always to diverge, and . . . activities which tend always to deviate." A new spiritual power would be required to promulgate the new system of scientific ideas in forms accessible to the European masses. It would provide a comprehensive moral government, guiding thought and action always to the common good.[17]

The lack of any apparent connection between this proposal and Comte's sociology of progress is the clearest evidence of his dilemma. While the new spiritual power occupied a substantial portion of the essays of 1824–25, it plainly had no foundation whatever in his sociology. The form and content of the sociology of progress were not congruent either with the new problems which had drawn Comte's attention, or with the solution he began to elaborate. This was to be expected, for the very assumptions underlying his early sociology had been called into serious question. Having begun with the idea that Europe stood on the threshold of a scientific and industrial utopia, he had come to see in science and industry fundamental threats to the basis of society itself. It was not simply the sociology of progress, but his unexamined assumption of the compatability of science and industry with the reconstruction of organic solidarity which had been directly undermined. His interest had shifted without his sociology following suit.

III

Although Comte was reluctant to admit the subsequent changes that his thought underwent, he was not unaware of them.[18] Gradually the structure of his social theory moved into focus with his new concerns.

Regarding science, he finally arrived at the view that a new system of communal ideas could not be based on science as he had earlier understood the term. Though initially he had conceived science as an ordered body of knowledge which repre-

[13] *Ibid.*, No. 5, p. 266. Gouhier, III, 110–57.

[14] *Wealth of Nations* (2 vols.; London, 1892), II, 301–8. Comte was familiar with Smith; see *EO*, pp. 573–74.

[15] *Opuscules*, No. 5, p. 266.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 267–68.

[18] See, e.g., Comte's letter to a Dr. Audiffrent, from 1857, published in *Auguste Comte Méconnu* (Paris, 1898), pp. 293–94. There Comte wishes he had never published the *Cours de philosophie positive*, which is usually regarded as his most important work. He clearly expressed the view that it seemed inconsistent with his later work.

sented nature only insofar as it could be known empirically, Comte changed the concept until it came to mean a constructed body of poetic fictions, teleological myths, "laws," all intended not to offer an empirical and objective representation of nature but rather to foster a generalized sense of universal community. Once he had adopted the conservative idea that the common experience of belief and communal emotion was the elementary social bond, he could hardly long persist in the search for a purely scientific system of communal beliefs. His original positivism had been sacrificed to the requirements of organic solidarity.[19]

The notion of a new spiritual power and this transformation of science required some justification. Here the three-stage law was worse than useless, for it expressed his earlier conviction that not only religion and metaphysics but myth and poetry as well would be supplanted by pure positive science. The law of man's increasing objectivity could hardly be employed as the rationale for a sudden increase in his subjectivity, particularly at the very moment when Europe was supposed to be moving into an age of wholly positive thought. The sociology of progress, which was nothing but an elaboration of the three-stage law of increasing objectivity, would be an inadequate theoretical foundation for these new ideas.

The problem was sharpened by Comte's growing conviction that even a new system of spiritual government would be inadequate to account fully for social solidarity. Reconstruction would require more than a new doctrine and a new spiritual power. It would be necessary to go deeper and to reveal the elementary forms and processes of social life in which solidary relations arose.[20]

The combination of these difficulties led Comte to sketch the outline of a wholly new sociology in 1838. "Social statics" would analyze the "conditions of social existence," seeking a "positive conception of social harmony," a determination of the basis of social cohesion.[21] This new science would delineate the sources of the "fundamental solidarity among all the parts of the social organism."[22] By defining the various involuntary sources of solidarity, social statics would reveal the matrix within which *voluntary* sources of solidarity might be established, thus providing a theoretical basis for the new spiritual power.[23] Statics would therefore provide exactly what was missing in Comte's work thus far—an account of the nature and sources of social solidarity.

His discussion began on the conviction that the roots of most major social problems sprang from the egoistic drives generated by the pure necessities of sustaining physical existence. All activities aimed at satisfying these necessities must be self-regarding. Consequently, as long as practical concerns dominate man's life, as long as the mastery and transformation of the environment is a primary need, egoism will present a serious problem. This, Comte argued, becomes clear if social life is envisioned with the burdens of productive activity omitted. If nourishment, shelter, etc., were abundant and free, "then the great problem of human life would be resolved spontaneously." Such was the case because the dominance of egoism was due only to the "constant stimulus of physical needs. Deprived of such a stimulus [we would] particularly develop the only in-

[19] Comte's views changed slowly over a period of nearly twenty years. His later views are best summed up in *Synthèse subjective* (Paris, 1857), pp. 3–25. The changes can best be seen by contrast with some of his earlier pronouncements, where science is specifically characterized as a perfectly objective view of reality, in which the facts and generalizations cannot be altered or arranged to suit man's emotional or practical needs; see *Cours*, III, 187–88. For an excellent general treatment of these changes see J. Delvolvé, *Réflexions sur la pensée Comtienne* (Paris, 1932).

[20] *Système de politique positive* (4 vols.; Paris, 1895), II, 3.

[21] *Cours*, IV, 231, 251.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 251–52.

stincts which allow a perfectly limitless, almost universal expansion . . . the sympathetic feelings."[24] In this ideal model of labor-free existence neither science nor industry would exist, for both arise to satisfy material needs. In their stead men would follow their inclination toward artistic play. "Actions would be transformed into games, which in place of preparations for practical life would constitute simple modes of expression and exercise." Men would devote themselves to "festivals, to express and develop the common affections."[25]

This juxtaposition of play and production has led some to argue that Comte regarded human labor as objectionable, or, what amounts to the same thing, merely an aspect of the world of necessity soon to be overcome by history's inexorable advance.[26] Yet he saw no end to productive activity and, what is more important, saw in it certain distinctly social tendencies. It is the need to produce which gives rise to the division of labor, that is, to production of a specifically social character. The division of labor, he insisted, was "eminently suited to develop . . . the social instinct, by spontaneously inspiring in each a just sense of close dependence toward all others."[27] He saw an intimate reciprocal relation, where specialization intensified solidarity, which in turn allowed further differentiation and growth. Indeed, the proliferation of work and more specialized skills meant that "*social organization tends increasingly to rest upon an exact appreciation of individual diversity.*"[28] From this point of view, then, the division of labor stimulated a fuller development of individual personality at the same time as it deepened and extended solidarity.

Comte's treatment of productive activity was thus paradoxical. Although production arises to meet the demands of physical necessity, and always has a specifically egoistic character originally, it is precisely the productive process through which egoism is sublimated into social sentiments, and in which the burdens of physical necessity are lightened. Concerning the ideal model of a labor-free society, Comte had commented: "The irresistible needs which our activity must serve being personal, our practical life at first cannot display any other character . . . exciting the selfish while it represses the sympathetic development."[29] His point was simply that such a model was only ideal—emancipation from natural necessity and the sublimation of egoism could never occur spontaneously. They could only take place as a result of the productive process; they were the consequence of labor, not its denial. The notion of a labor-free society was a utopia only in a purely formal sense. It served as an ideal type designed to illuminate reality.[30]

[24] *Système de politique positive*, II, 142.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 144-45.

[26] This point of view has been most clearly expressed by Frank Manuel in *The Prophets of Paris* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), esp. pp. 294, 313. See also J. Lacroix, *La Sociologie d'Auguste Comte* (Paris, 1956), pp. 82-100. For comments, see n. 30, below.

[27] *Cours*, IV, 421. There is no hint in any of Comte's work regarding the source of this, one of his most novel ideas. However, in 1821 Saint-Simon published (with Comte's aid) *Du Système industriel*, in the Preface to which he noted that in an industrial society men depend on others less as individuals, and more upon the mass of society. It may be that that was the germ of Comte's view.

[28] *Cours*, IV, 426. (Italics mine.) The similarity to Émile Durkheim's defense of the industrial division of labor against critics of specialization is striking. Durkheim himself has been alone in seeing this (*Division of Labor in Society*, trans. G. Simpson [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, n.d.), pp. 402-9.

[29] *Système de politique positive*, II, 149.

[30] Manuel takes a peculiar tack on this question. He argues that for Comte labor was merely "part of the transitional world of necessity from whose letters the man of the future would be freed." Comte was "skeptical of the meaningfullness of this outer-directed activity [labor] in changing man's inner being" (*op. cit.*, p. 313). Yet the whole point of Comte's argument as summarized above is precisely the opposite. What appears to lie at the root of Manuel's view is his desire to represent Comte as an almost fantastic utopian. Manuel

The paradoxical quality of Comte's discussion was highlighted by his continuing contention that along with the solidarity-producing effects of the division of labor there would inevitably be some contrary consequences. It was probably as a direct result of the idea that socialized labor in itself would never generate sufficient solidarity to sustain society that he pushed the study of social statics further. His two main objects of inquiry were family and political relationships.

In the family, he argued, "man really begins to leave behind his pure personality, and first learns to live for others . . . it constitutes an indispensable preparation for social life."[31] The family presented the fundamental process common to all levels of human association. There, purely egoistic individual drives are transformed into the stuff of sociability by virtue of the active co-operation which family life demands. "It is only in these . . . intimate relations that labor first makes us appreciate sufficiently the obligation and satisfaction of living for others. [In] larger associations . . . the same necessity . . . tends to the same general results."[32] Thus, analysis of the family is crucial because it is the elementary social unit, and "the natural laws of all human association should be explained first regarding the most basic form."[33] The family presents a prototype of the various social processes—present in all varieties of association—in which sociability is imprinted on the primary egotistic human materials.

Comte's analysis of those processes centered on four types of relation and sentiment which developed in the family and ramified throughout society: paternal, filial, conjugal, and fraternal. The last of these he regarded as a "simple attachment" which constituted the most elementary and universal form of social affection. This relation, and the sentiment it generates, are most easily expanded beyond the family and are elementary to the development of social solidarity: they furnish a direct link between family and society. The filial relation, on the other hand, reaches across generations, producing "veneration," which extends solidarity beyond the merely contemporary forms of social relationship. It is the source and prototype of tradition. The paternal relation, which originates in affection for offspring, provides another "natural transition between the ties of the family . . . and the connections of society."[34] Through such extra-familial relations as apprenticeship it is transformed into a generalized social sentiment. Finally, in the conjugal relation Comte saw embodied the highest type of social sentiment, which finds clearest expression in the woman's cultivation of altruistic love. In its pure form such feeling is unattainable for anyone engaged in productive labor. In woman's love Comte saw the clearest approximation of pure altruism, and thus it represented the least adulterated form of social sentiment.

The family, then, was a training ground for the various sentiments which form part of the ground of social solidarity. To each of the relations and sentiments developed therein, there "corresponds a similar affection outside . . . with a similar effect."[35]

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writes that Comte was a "dry, obsessively precise mathematics teacher" who threw "his textbooks out the celestial windows, and abandoned himself to the Italian operas" in his social theory (*ibid.*, p. 294). The result of this interpretation is, among other things, a mistranslation of Comte. When Comte wrote, regarding the model of a labor-free society, that we must "apprécier ce que deviendrait alors notre existence intellectuelle" (*Système de politique positive*, II, 142), Manuel translates "evaluate what our intellectual existence *will be*" (*op. cit.*, 194). Thus, Comte's conditional becomes the future tense, which of course makes it seem that Comte was proposing, rather than supposing. To my mind this throws serious doubt on Manuel's view.

[31] *Cours*, IV, 399.

[32] *Système de politique positive*, II, 150, 170.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 202. For Comte's entire discussion of this subject, see pp. 170–202.

As in the case of productive activity, Comte's interest lay in the processes through which elementary egoistic drives are transformed into the sentiments and relations productive of social solidarity. The family was a prototype; Comte had elaborated "in the most elementary case . . . the positive ideas . . . which will suffice for the whole of society."[36]

Finally, he sought to consider the social grounds of involuntary authority. The discussion was a far cry from his earlier utopianism, for now political domination and the state were accepted as natural aspects of all association, rather than being regarded as ephemeral forms of social life destined to decay with the advent of industrialism. Force, he now argued, was a fact of social life and a constitutive element in all association. Relationships involving some forms of domination were essential to group function, arising from various inequalities which will always persist. Such relationships—which Comte referred to generally as government—arise spontaneously "following the development [of] the separation of social functions."[37] They emerge first in the various groupings of social functions; such groupings naturally "give rise, in each group, to its particular government, which on a small scale controls and directs." More extensive government arises from the combinations of these elementary forms, culminating in what came to be known as the state.[38] Thus, secular government, Comte's "temporal power," arises from all forms of social activity, and lends direction and coherence at every level of human association. As society expands and grows more complex, such functions become increasingly large and necessary. The state is merely an organic extension of political relationships inherent in any social group. At the same time, Comte argued that the existing European state system, characterized by large territorial units, standing armies, immense bureaucracy, and mechanical administration, should not serve as a model for political organization. He found the ideal pattern in the smaller city-state, whose size, coherent population, and social compactness made it appear a more viable and cohesive political unit. The oppressive mechanisms of modern bureaucracy were less likely to flourish in smaller, more highly integrated social groupings.[39]

This concluded Comte's account of the various involuntary sources of social solidarity. It remains only to say that it was still axiomatic with him that all practical activity required moral control and regulation. The highest aspect of social specialization would be the distinction between secular and spiritual government, which was, of course, the foundation of the new spiritual power. It would offer moral guidance designed to reinforce all the existing sources of solidarity, by promulgating a social morality designed to inculcate altruistic sentiments.[40] Comte held out hope that at some time solidarity might become so intense as partially to replace power in the constitution of society, and thus he looked forward to a possible diminishment in state activity. Yet he did not forget that productive activity in an industrial age entailed competition as well as co-operation, division as well as solidarity. Man's distinguishing characteristic was the creative transformation and mastery of nature, and therefore domination of some sort would be an inevitable aspect of human existence.

IV

The changes in Comte's thought amounted to a new view of sociology and its objects. The science was no longer grounded in a deterministic theory of inevitable

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 194–95.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 294–95.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 297–98.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 304–6. Manuel argues (*op. cit.*, pp. 305–6), however, that Comte was fanatical for centralized organization, and had no appreciation of the significance of intermediate association. Since the assertion is made with no evidence, and in view of Comte's vehemence in precisely the other direction, Manuel's view is dubious.

[40] *Système de politique positive*, II, 351–52.

historical advance, but rather in a quest for the grounds of social solidarity. His early view of society as merely the locus of "a general and combined action"[41] was supplanted by a much more subtle and complicated view. The object of sociology was no longer a mechanical series of inexorable periodic advances in science and society, but rather it was the processes typically constitutive of society itself. As a result, Comte's early social dynamics—the sociology of progress—was relegated to a minor role in his final conception. Since the fundamental processes underlying social structure and change had been identified, and the normal course of their development analyzed in social statics, all that remained for the sociology of progress was to determine the small variations of pace and direction which would arise in different social settings. Comte still held to the idea of social progress and still conceived dynamics as a predictive science, but it was no longer the theoretical basis of sociology. Social dynamics progress could be viewed only "as the development of an order already defined." It was of purely practical interest, and had no theoretical importance.[42] Indeed, in his later work Comte's interest in history centered much more in the area of tradition as a source of transgenerational solidarity than in any theoretical aspect.[43]

In Comte's new view, then, it was the determinants of solidarity, not determined historical progress, that were the focus of attention. It was for that very reason, however, that his speculation moved even beyond the formal limits of sociology itself. That science, he argued, grasped solidarity and the processes in which it arose as collective manifestations. The facts proper to sociology, therefore, lay in the various *social transformations* of human sentiment and activity. He came increasingly to feel, however, that this omitted two significant aspects of the analysis of social cohesion: the original materials which in society are transformed into the stuff of sociability, and individual variations in the effects of social process. Both of these would by definition be beyond the reach of a science of the social and collective. Therefore he proposed the creation of a new science—*La Morale*—and sketched in its outlines. It would, in the first place, determine and analyze the specific elements in human nature which undergo transformation in social existence. *La Morale* would reveal the superior force of selfish over altruistic drives, and document the dominance of irrational over rational impulses. Second, it would seek to understand the impact upon individuals of variations in social and organic conditions.[44] While sociology dealt with the social transformations of man, this new science would consider his original constitution. While sociology dealt with collective manifestations, *La Morale* would consider individual variations. In its outline, then, the new science was at once a classical study of human nature and a groping toward psychology.

Comte's conception appears confused, and because of his death he never had the opportunity for any clarification. What is important is that in contrast to all his earlier pronouncements, where facts of an individual or non-social character are by definition impossible, Comte came to see such things as essential to the analysis of solidarity.[45] If nothing else, this is evidence both of the seriousness of his interest in solidarity and of the extent to which it changed the basic forms of his social theory.

[41] *Opuscules*, No. 3, p. 81.

[42] *Système de politique positive*, II, 1–4, 471; III, 3–5. However, Comte had earlier written that "social organization should not be considered, either in the past or the present, isolated from the state of civilization" (*Opuscules*, No. 3, p. 114).

[43] *Système de politique positive*, III, 2.

[44] *Ibid.*, II, 435–37; IV, 230–35.

[45] Earlier he had written that "the scientific spirit forbids regarding human society as being actually composed of individuals" (*Cours*, IV, 398).

Finally, it is necessary to assess Comte's position on the question of industrialism itself. In general, his work represented an effort to reconcile the idea of an industrial society with his vision of organic community and social solidarity. His ideas unfolded against a background in which these two views were sharply polarized. The liberal economists' argument that society was a field for free productive and commercial activity had been self-consciously and distinctly opposed to the conservative conception of society as a grouping of semi-autonomous, solidary communities. For the liberal, these communities—the intermediate associations—could only impede production, trade, and expansion of industry, and the free play of man's competitive aggression. The conservative critics of industrialism and liberal economic thought agreed that this had been the case, and added only that it should be so in the future as well. These associations, solidary and quasi-independent, they saw as the veritable fabric of society; their function, among others, was to restrain and perhaps stifle industrial production and conflict. To the liberal ideal of specialized labor, competition, and a high degree of economic freedom, the conservatives had juxtaposed the ideals of social cohesion, order, and co-operation, embodied in organic communities. The liberals exalted individual economic freedom and man's conquest of nature; the conservatives exalted social solidarity, finding in it the ground and determinants of human growth.[46]

Comte self-consciously sought to avoid approaching the problem of industrialism from an economic point of view, for he regarded that as a narrow and unfruitful perspective. Rather, as Durkheim recognized, Comte aimed to deal with the problem from a specifically sociological point of view, to approach it in terms of that science's most fundamental concept—social solidarity.[47] As a consequence he was forced to synthesize elements from both traditions and thus to transform some of the basic concepts in question. He rejected the conservative attack on the division of labor, arguing that it was a fundamental source of co-operation and solidarity. Similarly, he moved beyond the liberals' purely economic conception of society and the division of labor and argued that, far from being a simply economic phenomenon, the specialization of work gave rise to a fuller differentiation and development of personality. Perhaps most significantly, he rejected the view held on both sides that the essence of a commercial and industrial society was a free-ranging competitive egoism. Socialized labor, by its very nature co-operative and solidary, and intermediate associations seemed to him the mechanisms in which egoistic drives were transformed into the stuff of social life; the ground of social and economic diversification was not egoism, but rather the social institutions and processes in which solidarity arose. In the Comtean sociology, industrialism and the division of labor no longer stand opposed to organic community and the realization of individual personality but, instead, close to their very source. Therein lies the uniqueness both of his sociology and of his approach to the problem of industrialism.

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[46] For the views of the conservatives see n. 3, above. Perhaps the best summary of the liberals' ideas can be found in one of E. Allix's many articles on the period: "J.-B. Say et les origines de l'industrialisme," *Revue d'économie politique* (1910), pp. 303–13, 341–63.

[47] Durkheim is, to my knowledge, alone in seeing this as the very essence of Comte's sociology (see his *Division of Labor*, pp. 62–63).

The Contribution of Voluntary Organizations to Community Structure

Ruth C. Young and Olaf F. Larson

ABSTRACT

Data supplied by leaders of forty-three organizations in a small community permitted an analysis of the relationship of organizational prestige to structural attributes such as formal organization, program characteristics, internal and external contacts, stability-change functions, and the primary relations of members. In general, the higher the prestige, the more complex an organization's structure. However, medium-prestige organizations showed a special elaboration of social and other group-integrative activity. Findings suggest that high-prestige organizations embody the main institutions of the community and tie the community into the wider state and national social structure by channeling information into and out of the community. Such an interpretation of the nature of community organizations depends upon use of the organization rather than upon the family or individual as a unit of analysis.

When voluntary organizations are considered as units contributing to the total structure of communities, a whole series of questions follows. Is there a prestige hierarchy among organizations, and is it independent of the prestige of the individuals who are members? What is the relationship, if any, of such secondary organizations to primary social relations? What is their role with respect to external community relations, to internal stability, and to change? While the context in which these questions are examined is admittedly a single, small New York community, they are nonetheless of such a general nature that findings attest to the value of studying groups as such rather than the conventional method of making inferences about groups largely from the characteristics of the membership.

METHOD

The principal source of data was a series of structured interviews[1] conducted with at least one major officer of each of forty-three formal organizations in a New York community of about 2,300 persons. An organization was defined as a named group which had a meeting place in the community and at least fifteen members.[2] The initial discussion about size and prestige includes some thirty more organizations which did not meet the two defining criteria. The organizations studied included churches; school-centered adult groups; out-of-school organizations for youth; agricultural and business organizations; fraternal, athletic, and other social groups; women's clubs; and homemaking groups.

The schedule asked the informant to report on the organization as a whole. Most of the questions were factual, but others involved judgments. In particular, each officer was asked to name and rank the five

[1] These interviews were collected by Harold R. Capener, who originally used them in another study. See his "A Study of Organizational Processes in an Experimental Community Approach to Extension Program Planning" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1951).

[2] Based upon male heads and homemakers, included in a complete enumeration of the community, who reported membership. At least fifteen members were required by the larger structural analysis of which this study was a part. See Ruth C. Young, "Community Structure and Individual Integration: A Test of the Group Effect Hypothesis in Neighborhoods and Formal Organizations" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1958). This thesis was based on data collected in several New York State communities in a study directed by Olaf F. Larson. See his "Research for Experimental Community Projects in New York," *Rural Sociology*, XV (1950), 67–69.

most important organizations in the community. Each choice was assigned a weight of from one (for the lowest ranking organization) to five, and the total score was computed. When the informants gave generic categories like "church" or "school," the scores for particular churches were all combined with the score for "church." This procedure may have inflated the standing of some particular churches, but, in general, it reflected more accurately the actual categories of thought used by the informants.

The resulting prestige rank of organizations is the criterion variable against which the many other organizational characteristics are compared. The prestige variable derived from the pooled estimates of all officers lays claim to representing the social reality of the community reflected in statements by articulate representatives of the organizations.

THE "J" CURVE OF ORGANIZATIONAL PRESTIGE

Figure 1 shows the curve derived from plotting the prestige scores by the number of organizations with given scores. (This figure is based on more than seventy organizations, those that do not as well as those that do meet the criteria.) The result is a *J* curve of organizational prestige quite similar to the curves based on sociometric choices. The top organizations with scores from 120 to 58 were: church, village business club, farm and home extension organizations, school and related organizations, a particular youth organization, and the farm fraternal clubs. Falling in a second category scoring from 57 to 16 were the patriotic and service organizations and all but one of the youth organizations. The low prestige group scoring 15 or less contained fraternal groups and local women's clubs. Organizations with a zero score were excluded from the remainder of the analysis. In this respect the analysis was biased against the hypotheses of the study as detailed below.

The significant difference between the high-prestige organizations and the rest is that they represent what most persons think of as the main institutions of the community: religious; economic, both commercial and agricultural; family, and youth training and education.

The distribution of organizations by size of membership formed a similar *J* curve.[3] The membership data were independently derived from the answers to a schedule administered to male heads of households

FIG. 1.—Number of organizations or organizational types.

and homemakers at the same time as the organization study and are therefore independent of the estimates of prestige.

The two variables are related: 50 per cent of the high-prestige organizations had fifty or more members, as compared with 36 per cent of the medium and 18 per cent of the low prestige. It is to be noted, however, that while low-prestige organizations tend to be small, not all high-prestige or-

[3] The *J* curve of organizational size was previously noticed and discussed by F. Stuart Chapin in his "The Optimum Size of Institutions: A Theory of the Large Group," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII (March, 1957), 449–60.

ganizations are large. This suggests that certain organizations accrue large memberships because they are important to the community, rather than the reverse.

Another correlate of prestige is the age of the organization. Among high-prestige organizations, 60 per cent are twenty-five or more years old, in contrast to 55 per cent for the middle category and 34 per cent for the low-prestige organizations. These relations of prestige to age and size may be regarded as something of a validity check on the criterion variable in that they also reflect organizational importance.[4]

STRUCTURAL CORRELATES OF ORGANIZATIONAL PRESTIGE

Formal structure and programs.—In general, high-prestige organizations show greater formality and elaboration of structure than middle- or low-prestige groups, but at the same time they are more specialized in their program. For instance, the high-prestige organizations have an average of 11.3 officers, while the medium prestige average 8.1 and the low prestige 5.1. The findings with respect to number of committees are roughly similar: high-prestige organizations average 3.5 committees, medium prestige 3.6 committees, and low 0.9. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, the organizations differ with respect to the functions performed by the committees. The predominant functions are administrative for the high-prestige groups, service for the medium prestige, and entertainment for the low prestige.

TABLE 1

COMMITTEES CLASSIFIED BY PRESTIGE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND BY DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

Prestige of Organizations	No. of Committees	Percentage of Committees by Main Duties			
		Administrative	Service	Entertainment	Total
High	70	50	23	27	100
Medium	40	25	50	25	100
Low	11	18	27	55	100

The informants also gave their judgments of the main purposes of their organization, taken as a whole. The first-named main functions are tabulated in Table 2 according to the main common-sense categories that emerged from the responses.

The greatest proportion of high-prestige organizations have a religious function, followed by homemaking and agricultural functions; among the middle-prestige organizations the greatest proportion have a social function; the low-prestige groups are spread over agricultural, religious, and social functions. In addition to what may be considered a contrasting value emphasis in the three categories, the degree of concentration of their emphasis differs with prestige. Among the high-prestige organizations

[4] Mhyra S. Minnis has reported a prestige ranking of women's organizations in some ways comparable to this one. She used four types of data in arriving at her over-all judgment of five degrees of organizational prestige. The data types were: residential area; occupation of husband or, if single, of women members; education; and the social prestige or reputation of the organization. The last was based on the reports of officers in the organizations including items on type of organization, date of founding, how membership is secured, frequency of newspaper publicity, etc. Although her analysis is mainly concerned with the characteristics of the members in the five prestige levels and although she does not separate prestige from the characteristics of the organizations, her results are generally congruent with those of this study. See her "Cleavage in Women's Organizations: A Reflection of the Social Structure of a City," *American Sociological Review,* XVIII (1953), 47-53.

TABLE 2

ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED BY PRESTIGE AND BY FIRST-NAMED CHIEF FUNCTION PERFORMED

Chief Function	Prestige of Organizations (%)		
	High ($N=20$)	Medium ($N=11$)	Low ($N=12$)
Agricultural	20	....	33
Religious, moral	40	27	42
Homemaking	30	....	....
Youth education	5	....	....
Economic	5	....	....
Social	....	73	25
Total	100	100	100

65 per cent report only one important function, while 18 per cent of the middle and 30 per cent of the low-prestige organizations have only one. Much of the evidence, however, shows that high-prestige organizations may in fact perform multiple functions but have developed a more general way of characterizing the main purpose of the organization (i.e., "religious") so that the many special functions are subsumed. For example, churches do support programs for youth, charity, community development, etc.

Relations with other organizations and the community.—Leaders of organizations were asked to describe the relations of their organization with others in the community. Their replies were classified with respect to whether the organization originated action for other groups, received directions, or had no relation. The distribution is shown in Table 3. The high-prestige organizations are the originators of interorganizational activity. The low-prestige organizations have no relation or tend to receive stimulation, while the middle-prestige organizations tend to stand apart from other organizations or to originate activity. Only one organization co-operated with any other. A similar pattern is indicated by the classification of organizations with respect to the direction of their efforts. Some 50 per cent of the high-prestige organizations are outer-directed toward non-members, in contrast to 0 and 8 per cent, respectively,

TABLE 3

ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED BY PRESTIGE AND BY TYPE OF RELATION WITH OTHER COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Prestige	N	Type of Relations with Other Organizations			
		Originates (%)	Receives or Co-operates (%)	No Relation (%)	Total (%)
High	20	50	10	40	100
Medium	11	27	9	64	100
Low	12	8	42	50	100

for the middle- and low-prestige categories. The latter direct most of their efforts inward toward their own members. Other indications of efforts and ability to influence the community are reflected in the presence of a membership committee (50, 27, and 0 per cent for the three categories) and the presence of a program for teaching the young (50, 18, and 17 per cent for the three categories).

The high-prestige organizations hold more ritual programs that are open to the public, as one might expect from the fact that churches account for about half of the high-prestige organizations, but they do not maintain their position with respect to social programs open to the community at large. When it comes to dances, bingo, plays, fairs, and the like, the medium-level

organizations (which include the fraternal groups) are busier than the others. Thirty per cent of the high-prestige organizations hold some such open social function at least occasionally, while 63 per cent of the medium-prestige and 58 per cent of the low-prestige groups do so.

The same variant pattern is apparent when the organizations in the several prestige levels are classified according to whether they at least occasionally perform charitable services for the community. The medium-prestige organizations are somewhat more likely to perform community services, such as raising money for the fire department, and are quite a bit more likely to be concerned with the welfare of individuals.

It appears, then, that the middle-prestige organizations are not simply paler editions of the high-prestige organizations but are concerned with different functions—social, charity, and fraternal. In addition, they have the greatest number of age-sex requirements for membership, a characteristic that goes hand in hand with activities that require homogeneous groups for their success.

Relations outside the community.—Outside affiliations imply a flow of communications from a state or national office, and perhaps once a year the local groups provide feedback by sending delegates to a convention or "workshop." In contrast, the purely local groups are not attentive to, controlled by, or stimulated by an outside body or staff of specialists, nor are they directly connected to the national society in other ways. High-, medium-, and low-prestige organizations differ in respect to outside affiliation; the proportions with affiliation are 100, 82, and 33 per cent, respectively, for the three categories.

Stability-change functions.—The responses concerning activities and programs were classified according to four types of changes introduced by organizations: general changes introduced into the community as a whole, such as a new swimming pool; new practices introduced to individuals or families; establishment of new units of existing organizations, such as a new scout troop where one already exists; and finally, improvement of the organization's own physical plant. The distribution of these introduced changes by prestige is given in Table 4.

TABLE 4

ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED BY PRESTIGE AND BY TYPE OF CHANGES INTRODUCED INTO THE COMMUNITY

Type of Changes Introduced	Prestige of Organizations (%)		
	High (N=20)	Medium (N-11)	Low (N=12)
General for community as whole*	25	18	....
Individual practices*	35	....	8
New units of existing organizations*	50	27	25
Improvement of own property*	5	9	8
Sponsors no change of any kind	5	54	58

* An organization can introduce more than one type of innovation. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and columns do not add up to 100 per cent. Each is a proportion of the total number of organizations which are high, medium, or low prestige introducing a given type of change.

The high-prestige organizations lead the others in the proportion introducing some type of innovation and with respect to general community innovations, new practices, and new units. They are almost matched by medium-prestige organizations in the introduction of community-wide innovations. One may question the quality

or beneficial effect of the changes, but it is the high-prestige organizations, representing the main institutions, that most often engage in innovative activity in the community setting.

If new people bring new ideas, the high-prestige groups should have more ideas available. While 70 per cent of the leaders of high-prestige organizations stated that they had officers who had moved into the community in the last five years, only 27 per cent of the medium- and 17 per cent of the low-prestige groups had newcomers as officers.

It does not follow that the low-prestige groups are therefore more stable. The findings that the high-prestige groups are older and have more ritual activities have already been reported. The question, "Does this organization tend to place the same people in the same jobs repeatedly?" obviously does not put an organization in a favorable light. Yet the high-prestige organizations acknowledge this type of stability more frequently than the other two categories (75 per cent as compared to 45 and 42 per cent). The high-prestige groups have both more change and more continuity in their leadership.

PRIMARY RELATIONS IN SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS

The organizational attributes discussed so far are ordinarily considered "secondary" because that term is used to refer to the formal, impersonal relations of groups to their members and implies organizational formality, impersonality, and complexity. But in this modern rural community the formal organizations *contain* primary relationships as well. It is not simply a matter of primary and secondary relations existing side by side in separate structures; the finding of this study is that primary relationships are most likely to occur among people who participate in the high-prestige organizations.

Such a conclusion is suggested initially by the data on opportunities for family participation. The high-prestige organizations are much more likely to offer opportunities for family participation (60 per cent), while only 18 per cent of the medium-prestige and none of the low-prestige groups make such provisions. The medium- and low-prestige groups provide a pattern of individual rather than family participation.

More direct evidence of the presence of primary relationships operating in the context of secondary groups is presented in Table 5. By using the independently collected survey data, which included information on family visiting choices, it was possible to compute the proportion of people named by the members of a given organization as "most visited" who were also members of that organization. The proportions naming fellow members are divided into three categories as shown.

TABLE 5

ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED BY PRESTIGE AND BY VISITING CHOICES AMONG MEMBERS

Prestige	N	Percentage of Most Visited Choices among Members			
		Under 30	30–49	50 and Over	Total
High	20	10	52	38	100
Medium	11	18	82	0	100
Low	12	83	17	0	100

Then the proportion of organizations in each prestige group that fell into each of these three categories was calculated. The result is clear: The high-prestige organizations have a good proportion with a membership-visiting overlap of 50 per cent or over, a category in which the medium- and low-prestige organizations are not even represented. The medium-prestige organizations show up strongly in the middle category. The low-prestige organizations are composed of members who tend not to visit each other very often. Admittedly, the larger size of the high-prestige organizations increases the chances that personal friends will be found within the boundaries, but the other prestige categories have compensating advantages, such as the social emphasis of the medium and the possibilities for greater interaction in the small or low-prestige groups. If any variable should be considered explanatory, it is prestige and its correlates.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Taking all these findings together, what general picture of voluntary organizations do they suggest? First and foremost, there is evidence that those in the best position to know—the officers of the organizations—discriminate among organizations with respect to their "importance." It turns out that the most important organizations are those that embody the main institutional or value constellations of the community. They particularly fit Chapin's definition of nucleated institutions,[5] but because of their more general significance and wider connections outside the community they also embody most of the meaning usually ascribed to institutions in the more diffuse sense. Thus, when the officers report on these organizations, they are reporting, to a large degree, on the structure of social meanings that are maintained and upheld by the community as a whole.

The high-prestige organizations, which are central to this structure of meaning, are the largest and oldest and appear to serve as links between the community and the wider society. By their affiliation with state and national centers, and through them with other communities, they receive a stream of ideas, information, and innovations and perhaps help to integrate one community with another. Thus, the information stored in many other communities and organizations is potentially available, and what is actually received is passed on to the rest of the community by way of the large memberships of high-prestige groups, their more active public influence, and through ties to other organizations within the local community. These high-prestige organizations are specialized in the sense that the work of their relatively elaborate and carefully administered structure converges on a delimited sphere of activity, but the greater number of subgroups they contain or foster, and their encouragement of family participation, indicate that the over-all goal may be attained by a variety of avenues. The high-prestige groups not only appear to introduce change but also, through continuity of leadership, ritual performances, and general institutional "weight," as indexed by their persistence as organizations, exercise a stabilizing function in the community. They are, then, the gatekeepers of change. They are also characterized by close ties of friendship among their members.

A middle-prestige group appears to differ in type and function. These are the specialized age-sex clubs with a strong program emphasis on socializing and entertainment and with another emphasis,

[5] Chapin defines nucleated institutions in terms of four criteria: common reciprocating attitudes of individuals and their conventionalized behavior patterns; cultural objects of symbolic value; cultural objects possessing utilitarian value; a code of oral or written symbols preserving the institution's specifications. Nucleated institutions are attached to a restricted locus by means of property ownership. See F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American Institutions* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1935), pp. 13–23.

possibly by way of integrating themselves into the community, on charitable services. These groups do not represent major institutional areas, they have selective memberships, and their relations with other groups in or out of the community are restricted. They make few efforts to influence anyone, and their expressed and apparent program is entertainment. What is of considerable theoretical interest in these groups is that, *in toto,* their characteristics nullify the interpretation of the prestige hierarchy as a simple dimension in all respects. They are generally "medium" in their organization, as compared with the high and low groups, but they are variant in accentuating another dimension: a combination of fraternalism, ritual (but different from that of the churches), activity orientation (as in athletics or other high interaction types of entertainment), and a delimitation of organizational interest to the group itself. It may be that they have sacrificed organizational flexibility and adaptation to group integration and enhancement of membership prestige.

The low-prestige organizations are marginal in most respects and have little in common except their lack of recognition. This lack of position in the prestige structure is accounted for in two ways. Some of the groups are fraternal groups or church auxiliaries which are dying out. Others are ephemeral clusters which are just getting started but probably will not go very far beyond thinking up a name for themselves. Some of these groups may be innovative, despite the findings of this study, but in general they represent tiny and transient subcultures.

Taken as a whole, this structure of voluntary organizations and its associated web of social meanings is quite a different way of viewing the community from that to which years of household surveys have accustomed us. This approach emphasizes the group as a unit of analysis rather than the individual and considers the consequences of thinking about communities as an organized structure of social meanings and relationships rather than as a collection of individuals who possess social characteristics.[6]

When the focus is on the community structure as such, it becomes easier to deal with communities defined other than by the territory they occupy. One can imagine finding communities within larger cities by an analysis of the institutional structure derived from reports of the officers of organizations. Even spatially separate organizations may be considered a part of the "community" if they are included in a particular prestige hierarchy. Moreover, in those communities where territory is coterminous with interaction patterns, that fact should show up in the organizational analysis.

Studying a community through its institutional organization permits the analysis of dimensions not available through a study focused on individuals. Such dimensions include the total pattern adjustment of organization, hierarchies, organizational complexity, growth, stability, innovation, ritual, and relations to the state and nation. Still another implication of this institutional approach bears on the possibility of generalizing about communities. When the data consist of family reports, it is difficult to say anything general about communities. In contrast, this analysis suggests at least one generalization that may hold for all communities. It is that they all have a prestige-complexity hierarchy of organizations in which high-prestige groups embody community institutions, while the medium-prestige groups elaborate integrative activities. Obviously, the present data do not test this generalization, but a general knowledge of American communities supports the proposition as an encapsulation of a widespread pattern.

Ultimately, this analysis assumes that communities are collection and processing structures for information obtained from

[6] Another paper will deal with the relations between voluntary organizations and social class.

a much larger information pool to which they also feed back information.[7] But the formal organization located in a community is not simply a link in a wider network. In a more abstract sense, taken as a structure of social meaning, it serves as a frame of reference with which the members of organizations and their families can make sense out of their own activity and the environment. By providing sets of cognitive categories, vocabularies of motives, and stereotyped judgments, it organizes individual activity in relation to other efforts that may be occurring far away and completely unknown to the people of a particular community. In an era of vast urban interpenetration of communities—a process that operates concretely through networks of formal organizations—an approach to community structure that stresses these ought to advance our understanding.

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[7] Two authors have recently discussed this "information" conception of community. See Morris Freilich, "Toward an Operational Definition of Community," *Rural Sociology*, XXVIII (1963), 117-27, and Charles L. Cleland, "Characteristics of Social Systems within Which Selected Types of Information Are Transmitted," *Rural Sociology*, XXV (1960), 212-18.

Women's Sexual Responsiveness and the Duration and Quality of Their Marriages[1]

Alexander L. Clark and Paul Wallin

ABSTRACT

The relationship between wives' sexual responsiveness and the quality and duration of their marriages was investigated with questionnaire data obtained from a sample of women in the early and the middle years of marriage. It was found that in marriages described as positive in quality there tended to be an increase in wives' sexual responsiveness during approximately the first five years of marriage, while marital relations characterized as negative were associated with decreased responsiveness in the later years of marriage.

This article reports a study of the relation between women's sexual responsiveness and the quality and duration of their marriages. Like other research on factors accounting for differences among wives in their ability to experience orgasm in coitus, the present study deals with an important problematic aspect of American marriage.

Although data are lacking for representative samples of women in any stratum of American society, the findings of Kinsey and his collaborators,[2] of Terman,[3] and of Burgess and Wallin[4] suggest that perhaps as many as a fifth to a fourth of middle-class American wives never or infrequently have orgasm in their marital intercourse. Since for most wives gratification and orgasm are closely associated,[5] it may be presumed that in many American marriages women are failing to enjoy an experience that the sexual interest of their husbands tends to make a persistent part of their lives. For some of them the experience probably is at best merely tolerable and for others it is very likely a source of recurrent tension and frustration.[6]

Women's lack of sexual gratification has repercussions for their husbands as well as for themselves. In a culture that stresses the equality of marital partners and the right of both to sexual enjoyment, it is to be expected that husbands will tend to suffer some guilt in urging an activity they know is not pleasurable to their wives.[7]

[1] This is one of a group of articles reporting studies of questions relating to the sexual behavior of men and women in the early and middle years of marriage. We are grateful for support given the research at various times by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Committee for Research in Problems of Sex (National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council), the Social Science Research Council, and the University Research Institute, University of Texas. We are particularly indebted to Professor Ernest W. Burgess, under whose direction the data of the present study were collected.

[2] Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, and Paul H. Gebhard, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1953), pp. 346–408.

[3] Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (hereinafter referred to as "*Psychological Factors*") (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938), p. 300; "Correlates of Orgasm Adequacy in a Group of 556 Wives," *Journal of Psychology*, XXXII (1951), 117.

[4] Ernest W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, *Engagement and Marriage* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1953), p. 670.

[5] Paul Wallin and Alexander L. Clark, "A Study of Orgasm as a Condition of Women's Enjoyment of Coitus in the Middle Years of Marriage," *Human Biology*, XXXV (May, 1963), 134.

[6] For illustrations of this in individual cases, see Burgess and Wallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 684–85.

[7] For individual instances of this reaction, see *ibid.*, p. 671.

Added to the guilt, and accentuating it, may be feelings of inadequacy engendered in husbands by the thought that the fault is or could be theirs.

These observations suggest the grosser impact on men and women of an imbalance in their sexual relationship, which, initially at least, is occasioned by the inability of wives to experience orgasm in intercourse. It remains for future research to document the extent of the impact and to detail the more subtle ramifications of this imbalance for the psychic well-being of husbands and wives and the character of their marital relationship.

The prior research which bears most directly on that reported in this article is the Kinsey study of females with its finding that the ability of wives to experience orgasm increases with the duration of marriage.[8] The present study goes beyond the work of Kinsey and his collaborators in that it takes into account the quality of marriages as a condition that qualifies the relation between the duration of marriage and the extent of women's responsiveness. It is also methodologically sounder, as is indicated below in the review of the Kinsey data.

The Kinsey finding is derived from women's reports of how soon after marriage they had their first coital orgasm and their estimates of the proportion of coital relations in which they had orgasm in the first, fifth, tenth, fifteenth, and twentieth years of marriage. Although the data on first orgasm undoubtedly entail some degree of error of recall, on balance they support the assumption that orgasm in marital intercourse does not occur as a matter of course for the female, as is presumably the case with the male. While half of the wives in the Kinsey sample had experienced orgasm in the first month of marriage, a third had not after six months, and a quarter had not done so by the end of their first year of marriage.[9]

Kinsey's data on women's frequency of orgasm in successive years of marriage offer further support for the supposition that marital orgasm is a contingent event.[10] For wives who had been married between one and twenty years the percentage not having any orgasm declined steadily from 25 to 11, and the percentage having it in all or most of their relations increased from 39 to 47. This finding on the association between orgasm and the duration of marriage is, however, somewhat inconclusive since it is based on data for women who differed in the number of years they had been married. Establishing a trend on this basis implies a homogeneity of the group with respect to factors affecting sexual experience through time that may not be warranted or, at least, cannot be taken for granted. The research reported below is free of this objection, since the data on orgasm frequency were obtained at two points in time from the same group of women.

HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE

At the time of marriage there are unquestionably marked individual differences between women in the facility with which they can have an orgasm in intercourse. In large part these differences probably

[8] Kinsey *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 383–84, 408.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 408. Terman reports that of 658 wives in his 1938 study who provided the information (about a hundred did not), "orgasm was experienced by 161 (24.5 per cent) at the first intercourse; by 175 (26.6 per cent) after days or weeks; by 169 (25.7 per cent) after 1 to 11 months; by 105 (16.0 per cent) after one or more years; and by 48 (7.1 per cent) never" (*Psychological Factors*, pp. 306–7).

[10] Kinsey, *loc. cit.* Although Terman reports that 16 per cent of the wives in his 1938 study did not have their first orgasm until one or more years of marriage he nonetheless asserts that "if orgasm is not established within the first year of marriage it is likely never to appear" (*Psychological Factors*, p. 389). He also states at this point that "a wife's ability to experience orgasm does not improve with increasing length of marriage." This conclusion is based on data (Table 135, p. 190) that are in error in indicating that the proportions of responsive and unresponsive wives in the entire study group were approximately the same.

result from dissimilarities in the complex of events that determine women's attitudes to, experience with, and knowledge of, the state of sexual arousal and its climactic potential.

Whatever their premarital histories, however, it is likely that the majority of middle-class American women come to marriage with a deeply rooted cultural conception that relatively uninhibited arousal is entirely appropriate only in a relationship characterized by the mutual love and respect of the sexual partners. Since it is also culturally indicated that marrying is right and proper only when couples have such a relationship, most wives—at least in the early period of marriage—probably perceive their situation as allowing for, and sanctioning, the free play of their sexual impulses.

Under these circumstances, women with a low threshold for responsiveness may be able to achieve orgasm as soon as they marry or shortly thereafter. Those having a high threshold at marriage, however, are faced with a task that may take much longer, since orgasm for them may necessitate a change in deep-seated attitudes and feelings about arousal in coitus.

In either case, it is a reasonable assumption that the conditions for increasing women's responsiveness are more apt to be met in marriages that approach the cultural ideal—in which the mutual love of husband and wife makes them more concerned with one another's needs and happiness. Conversely, it may be presumed that marriages which from their inception, or subsequent thereto, lack the quality of mutuality of love and its concomitants, tend to prejudice the likelihood of women being highly responsive at the outset of marriage or of their becoming so later. For women readily able to be responsive when they marry, such relationships, failing as they do to meet the cultural specification of the appropriate context for responsiveness, may be expected to have an inhibitory effect; for the women who must "learn" to become responsive these marriages clearly do not provide the optimum "learning" situation.

Thus, it may be concluded that women's responsiveness is influenced by the quality of their marriages.[11] This proposition has implicit within it the following hypotheses, which are tested in the present study, on the relation of women's responsiveness to the duration of their marriage: (1) Women whose marriages possess the positive quality set forth in the preceding discussion will tend to be relatively high on responsiveness and to become relatively more responsive with increased coital experience. (2) Women whose marriages deteriorate in quality will tend to become less responsive. (3) Women whose marriages improve in quality will tend to become more responsive. (4) Women whose marriages are persistently negative in quality will tend to remain relatively low on responsiveness.

SAMPLE AND DATA

The data of the research were collected as part of a larger project, the earlier stages of which are described elsewhere in detail.[12] In its first phase the project was concerned with 1,000 engaged couples. When restudied after a few years of marriage, 602 husbands and wives, independently of one another and under supervision, filled out questionnaires that yielded the data of the present research relating to the early years of marriage. The data relating to the middle years of marriage were obtained in a similar manner between 1956 and 1958 for 428 of the 602 couples who had been studied in the early years of marriage. Shrinkage in the size of the group from the early to the middle years was due largely to inability to locate couples, the divorce of some, and the deaths of others.

[11] Presentation of an alternative view of the relation between these two variables is deferred to the end of the article, where its implications for the findings of the research can be better evaluated.

[12] See Burgess and Wallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-57.

The couples were volunteer participants and received no monetary payment or counselling.[13] The great majority were urban residents; all were white and native born. The average age at marriage was 25.7 for the men and 23.9 for the women. At the time of the middle years study, three-fourths had been married between 17 and 19 years and, except for a few, the others had been married for 16 or 20 years. About 5 per cent were childless, two-thirds had two or three children, and most of the remainder had one or four. More than half the men and women were Protestant, about a fourth Jewish, and approximately a tenth were Catholic. Twelve per cent of the husbands and 8 per cent of the wives had no religious affiliation. Only a very small proportion of the total group never attended religious services. The educational level of the couples was high, with all but 18 per cent of the husbands and 30 per cent of the wives having had some college instruction; 37 per cent of the husbands and 20 per cent of the wives had training at the graduate or professional level.

Sexual responsiveness.—The measure used in the present research was women's reports of their frequency of orgasm. The data for the early years were obtained by the question, "In sexual intercourse do you experience an orgasm, *i.e.*, a climax of intense feeling followed by a feeling of relief?" The response catgories were: "never," "sometimes," "usually," "always."[14] The question used in the middle years was essentially the same, although it differed slightly in its phrasing and had five rather than four response categories.[15] It was worded as follows: "In what proportion of your sex relations with your husband do you have an orgasm (that is, reaching a climax of intense feeling which is followed by a pretty sudden feeling of relief and relaxation)?" The possible answers were: "in all our sex relations," "in most," "in some," "in a few," "in none."[16] Since in both the early and the middle years only a small number of the wives described themselves as "never" having orgasm, it was not possible to make meaningful use of these wives as a separate category in the analysis. They, therefore, were combined with those who reported that they "sometimes" had orgasm—the "none," "few," and "some" responses of the middle years being similarly treated—to comprise the women who will be referred to hereafter as the "unresponsive wives." Women giving the "always" or "usually" response in the early years—"all" or "most" in the middle years—were combined into a single group for data analysis. This is the group referred to, from here on, as the "responsive wives."[17]

[13] During the engagement phase and in its later stages the Burgess-Wallin longitudinal study was not centrally concerned with questions regarding sex and almost certainly was not thought of in this vein by the couples participating in it. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that the self-selection of the couples could have prejudiced the findings relating to the present study.

[14] The percentages of wives giving the various responses were: "always," 23.4; "usually," 49.3; "sometimes," 21.9; "never," 5.3.

[15] See n. 16 for evidence of the comparability of the measures of responsiveness in the early and middle years.

[16] The percentages of wives giving the various responses were: "in all our sex relations," 13.0; "in most," 52.7; "in some," 22.7; "in a few," 7.8; "in none," 3.8.

[17] The number of wives who stated they "usually" had coital orgasm and the number saying they "always" did (and the equivalent responses of the group in the middle years) was large enough to permit treating them as separate groups in the analysis. There is some evidence, however, that these groups are not distinct with respect to their responsiveness. Interviews with about 125 wives in the early years of marriage revealed that some wives who characterized themselves as "always" having orgasm meant that they always could do so, if they wished to. This may also have been true of the wives who indicated they "usually" had orgasm in intercourse. The interviews suggest that on occasion wives will have intercourse to satisfy their husbands and not be sufficiently aroused to desire an orgasm for themselves, especially if it requires effort on their part. For this reason, women giving the "always" or "usually" response

Limitations of space prohibit a review of the evidence on the accuracy of wives' reports of their orgasm frequency. It can be said, however, that an intensive analysis by Clark of the data of the early-years study provided no ground for seriously questioning the reports. This analysis compared the orgasm frequency of wives as estimated independently by couple members.[18] It also tested the assumption that in reporting on their responsiveness wives may have been influenced by the "social desirability factor" to present themselves in a more favorable light.[19]

The "quality" of a marriage.—This complex variable, probably multidimensional in character, has been represented

in the early years ("all" or "most" in the middle years) were combined into a single group.

The fact that in the middle years wives were asked to rate their responsiveness in terms of five response categories in contrast to the four response categories of the early-years study provides ground for the objection that the measure of responsiveness in the two periods is not strictly comparable. It could be argued that, other things being equal, *fewer* women would answer "all" or "most" if given five response alternatives (the middle-years measure) than would answer "always" or "usually" as two of four response alternatives (the early-years measure). To test the validity of this objection, the authors used the two forms of response categories, randomly distributed, with nine identical questions in a questionnaire filled out by some 450 female undergraduates. The questions dealt with various aspects of sexual attitudes and experience. In general, no systematic or statistically significant differences were found between the proportion of respondents who answered "always" or "usually" on the four-response categories form and the proportion answering "all" or "most" on the five-categories form. Most germane here were two questions that asked for an estimate of orgasm frequency. Sixty-two per cent ($N = 218$) answered "always" or "usually" (rather than "sometimes" or "never") and 60 per cent ($N = 222$) answered "all" or "most" (rather than "some," "few," or "none") to the question, "From what you know of your present sexual feelings, after you have been married a year in what proportion of your sexual relations do you expect to have an orgasm?" Similarly, to the question "Would you estimate that most middle-class wives have orgasm in their relationship with their husbands?" 70 per cent ($N = 230$) answered "all" or "most" given five response alternatives, and 69 per cent ($N = 219$) of those responding to the four-response form answered "always" or "usually." These findings can be regarded as presumptive evidence for the comparability of the measures of wives' responsiveness in the early and middle years.

[18] The husbands' and wives' reports of wives' orgasm frequency were in agreement in 82 per cent of the cases in placing the wives in the responsive or unresponsive grouping. Furthermore, analysis of the data suggests grounds for assuming that, in the 18 per cent of the couples in disagreement, wives' reports are more likely to be correct than those of the husbands. See Alexander L. Clark, *A Study of Factors Associated with Wives' Sexual Responsiveness* (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1960), pp. 15–32.

[19] A major criticism of studies investigating certain concomitants of marital satisfaction has been that some respondents may answer questions with what they consider to be the socially desirable response rather than with the response "really" descriptive of their experience, attitude, etc. See Albert Ellis, "The Value of Marriage Prediction Tests," *American Sociological Review*, XIII (December, 1948), 710–18, and Allen L. Edwards, *The Social Desirability Variable in Personality Assessment and Research* (New York: Dryden Press, 1957). Thus, it might be objected that a spurious correlation between marital satisfaction and sexual responsiveness is produced by wives who more or less wittingly represent themselves favorably in terms of these two variables, when in fact they are sexually unresponsive and or maritally dissatisfied. Unfortunately, a direct test of the social-desirability hypothesis is not feasible; it is not possible to assess the character of sexual experiences apart from people's reports of these experiences. However, an indirect test of the hypothesis was made. From the questions asked the respondents of this study a number were selected for which there appeared to be a more or less obvious socially desirable response. The absence of an association between wives' answers to these questions and their reports of their sexual responsiveness could be interpreted as support for the assumption that most wives gave valid answers to the questions asked them. The finding of a relationship, on the other hand, would lead one to suspect that the social-desirability factor *might* be affecting respondents' answers to the questions asked and, consequently, be consistent with the interpretation that a positive association between marital satisfaction and sexual responsiveness is spurious.

The items selected to test the plausibility of the social-desirability hypothesis were wives' ratings of their sense of humor, willingness to take re-

above as modifying the relation between the duration of marriages and wives' responsiveness. In the present research the variable connotes the extent to which a marriage is characterized by mutual love, sensitivity of the marital partners to one another's needs and feelings, and a concern by both with the maximization of each other's gratifications in their relationship. Since the study included no relatively direct measure of the quality of a marriage, thus conceived, an indirect measure that was available for both the early and the middle years was resorted to. This measure

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGES OF SEXUALLY RESPONSIVE WIVES*

MONTHS MARRIED	MARRIAGE QUALITY		ALL MARRIAGES
	Positive	Negative	
1-36.....	65 (29)	61 (33)	64 (62)
36-47.....	76 (156)	71 (189)	73 (345)
48-59.....	84 (50)	60 (50)	72 (100)
60+.....	91 (33)	69 (62)	77 (95)

* The number of wives is given in parentheses.

is the score obtained by wives on a series of items manifestly requiring them to register the extent of their general satisfaction with their marriage.[20] The distribution of these scores was dichotomized as closely as possible to the median. Wives scoring above the median were presumed to have marriages of positive quality and those scoring below the median were presumed to have marriages of negative quality.[21] This use of the "marital satisfaction" scores rests on the assumption that middle-class wives in contemporary American society are likely to judge their marriages as satisfactory to the degree that they perceive them as having the characteristics we have subsumed under the rubric of quality. The stress in the ideology of American marriage on such factors as the equality of husband and wife and the mutuality of their love provides the justification for this assumption.

FINDINGS

When first studied after marriage the project couples differed in the number of years they had been married. The data secured at that time make it possible to examine the relation of wives' responsiveness to variation in the duration of marriages in the relatively early stages of matrimony and then to observe the nature of the relation when account is taken of the quality of the marriages.

The data presented in the third column of Table 1 are consistent with the conclusion of the Kinsey study that women's responsiveness increases with the duration of marriage. In the present study, 13 per cent more of the wives married five years or longer than of those married under three years fall in the responsive category.

The data of the first two columns of the table indicate rather strikingly, however, that of itself the passage of time offers women no assurance of becoming more responsive. Whether having intercourse hundreds of times through the years will enhance their chances of experiencing orgasm

sponsibility, selfishness, and jealousy. Also considered were wives' reports of the extent of their attachment to their parents, amount of conflict with parents, and ratings of their parents' marital happiness. None of the items yielded a better than chance prediction of wives' reports of their sexual responsiveness. It should be noted, however, that this finding does not conclusively invalidate the social-desirability hypothesis, since the influence of the social-desirability factor may be less operative with ratings of one's personality than with reports of one's marital relations.

[20] None of the items refers to sexual gratification or to any aspect of the sexual relationship. The items may be found in Burgess and Wallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 488–89. (Items 22, 24, and 26 are not included.) The scoring of the items was somewhat different from that reported on pp. 809–10 but yields essentially the same ranking.

[21] Unfortunately, no evidence can be offered for the reliability of the scores. The validity of the scores can be argued for only in terms of the manifest content of the items on which they are based.

appears to be related, in the manner suggested earlier, to the quality of their marriage. As can be seen in Table 1, when women are classified by the quality of their marriage a consistent association between responsiveness and the length of the marriage is found for wives having a more positive marital relationship,[22] but not for those whose marriages are of relatively negative quality.[23] Given marriages of positive quality, the proportion of women who are responsive increases steadily from 65 per cent (among those married under three years) to 91 per cent (among those married five years or more). This contrasts sharply with the experience of women whose marriages are of negative quality: in these marriages there is no consistent increase through time in the proportion of wives who are responsive.

The data of Table 1, therefore, can be viewed as supporting the central hypothesis of the present research, namely, that the association between women's responsiveness and the number of years they have been married is related to the quality of their marriages. This finding, however, is for marriages the great majority of which were still in their early years. To consider what happens as marriages move from the early years to the middle years, with the accompanying change or stability in their quality, we turn to the data of Table 2.

The 397 wives represented in Table 2 are those of the larger group (reported on in Table 1) who could be reached for study in the middle years of marriage,[24] when most of them had been married between seventeen and nineteen years. Table 2 shows how these women are distributed on the basis of the quality of their marriages in the early and middle years. It will be noted that although the quality of the majority of the marriages was either positive (116) or negative (139) in both time periods, the quality of the others changed—in roughly equal number—from positive to negative (67) and from negative to positive (75). With regard to change in sexual responsiveness, we find that 69 of the 290 wives who were responsive in the early years were unresponsive in the middle years and that 64 of the 107 unresponsive wives of the early years were responsive in the middle years. In order to consider the association between change in marital

TABLE 2

CLASSIFICATION OF 397 WIVES BY THE QUALITY OF MARRIAGE AND SEXUAL RESPONSIVENESS IN THE EARLY AND MIDDLE YEARS OF MARRIAGE

Early Years	Quality of Marriage		Middle Years	
N	Early Years	Middle Years	Percentage Responsive	Percentage Unresponsive
Unresponsive:				
22	Negative	Positive	36	64
15.......	Positive	Negative	47	53
49......	Negative	Negative	35	65
52......	Positive	Positive	52	48
Responsive:				
53. ...	Negative	Positive	79	21
52	Positive	Negative	65	35
90......	Negative	Negative	68	32
95... . .	Positive	Positive	88	12

[22] The pattern of association is similar but of smaller magnitude for the 195 of these wives who were subsequently reinterviewed during the middle years of marriage. The percentages who were responsive in the four periods of the early years were: 73 (married less than 36 months), 79 (36–47 months), 84 (48-59 months), 89 (60 months or more).

[23] This was also the finding for the 233 of this group of wives who were reinterviewed in the middle years. The percentages who were responsive in the four periods of the early years were: 54 (married less than 36 months), 68 (36–47 months), 57 (48-59 months), 76 (60 months or more).

[24] The N of 397 is 31 less than the total number of cases (428) involved in the percentages of the two preceding footnotes because (1) a few of the wives failed to report their orgasm frequency in the middle years and (2) some of them could not be scored on the marital-satisfaction scale since they failed to answer all the questions.

quality and change in sexual responsiveness, Table 2 classifies wives as responsive or unresponsive in the early years and indicates the relationship between change in the quality of their marriages and change in their sexual responsiveness from the early to the middle years of marriage. Thus organized, the data allow for the further evaluation of the hypothesis that the quality of marriage influences the relation between length of marriage and the sexual responsiveness of wives. The data of Table 2 make it possible to test a number of inferences from the hypothesis as to the consequence for responsiveness of change or stability in the quality of marriages.

The first inference is that wives whose marriages remain positive in quality will be relatively high on responsiveness in the early years of marriage and become more so in the later years. Turning to the data of Table 2, it can be seen that the expectation for this group of wives is confirmed, since 88 per cent of those responsive in the early years remained responsive in the middle years and 52 per cent of those who were unresponsive in the early years were responsive in the middle years. In comparison with all the other groups this group of wives had the smallest proportion who were unresponsive in both periods and the largest proportion responsive in both periods. Moreover, the group whose marriages remained positive in quality had the lowest percentage of wives who were responsive in the early years and unresponsive in the middle years. Consequently, it may be concluded that wives whose marriages retain their positive quality have the greatest probability of a continuing sexual responsiveness throughout the years of marriage.

The second and third inferences from the hypothesis concern women the quality of whose marriages changes through time. We consider first the women who were unresponsive in the early years of marriage. The expectation was that wives whose marriages changed from negative to positive would become more responsive than wives whose marriages deteriorated in quality from the early to the middle years. This expectation was not confirmed. Indeed, whereas 36 per cent of the early unresponsive wives whose marriages improved were sexually responsive in the middle years, 47 per cent of those wives whose marriages changed from positive to negative became responsive in the middle years. This finding is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis.

A third inference from the hypothesis may be assessed by considering the women who were sexually responsive in the early years of marriage and whose marriages changed through time. For these women, the expectation is that those whose marriages deteriorate in quality are more likely to be sexually unresponsive in the middle years than women whose marriages improve in quality. This expectation is borne out by the data of Table 2. Looking at the women who were responsive in the early years of their marriage we note than 35 per cent of those whose marriages declined in quality became unresponsive in the middle years compared with 21 per cent of the wives the quality of whose marriages improved.

In marriages that are consistently negative in quality—which brings us to the final inference—it was anticipated that the proportion of responsive wives would remain relatively low or possibly decline. The data of Table 2 reveal that 65 per cent of the women in these marriages who were unresponsive in the early years remained unresponsive in the middle years. Further, if wives were sexually responsive in the early years and if the quality of their marriages was negative in both the early and in the middle years, about one in three (32 per cent) was unresponsive in the middle years of marriage. Comparing all the wives whose marriages were consistently positive in quality with all those

whose marriages were consistently negative, we can compute from Table 2 that the former group had the highest proportion who were sexually responsive in both the early and the middle years of marriage (72 per cent) and the smallest proportion who were responsive in neither period (9 per cent), while the latter group had the highest proportion who were unresponsive in both periods (23 per cent) and the smallest proportion who were responsive in both periods (44 per cent).

The data of Table 2 provide support for three of the four inferences they were used to test. Wives having consistently positive marriages were shown to have a greater probability of being responsive in the middle years than those whose marriages were consistently negative. The former group gained in responsiveness to a greater extent than did the latter group; the latter group decreased in responsiveness to a greater extent than did the former group. Finally, in accordance with expectation, wives whose marriages deteriorated in quality showed a greater decrease in responsiveness than did wives whose marriages improved in quality. The inference completely lacking in confirmation was that pertaining to a relatively greater increase in responsiveness for wives whose marriages improved in quality from the early to the middle years than for wives whose marriages deteriorated from the early to the middle periods. Contrary to what was anticipated, the latter group increased in responsiveness to a greater extent than did the former group, though the number of cases in both groups was quite small.

It appears from these findings, taken together with those of Table 1, that wives whose marriages are consistently positive in quality are increasingly likely to be sexually responsive *particularly up to the time they have been married about five years*. Although a shift from negative to positive in the quality of marriages is not accompanied by any significant increase in the responsiveness of the wives in these marriages, the shift does appear to reduce the likelihood of their becoming unresponsive if they were responsive to begin with. On the other hand, the findings indicate that if wives are responsive in the early years of marriage and there is a deterioration in the quality of their marriages that this may be accompanied by a decrease in responsiveness, as is the case with marriages of consistently negative quality. In most instances this decreased responsiveness is almost certainly a consequence of the cultural norm which proscribes a woman from "giving herself" in a relationship which here has been designated as negative in quality. The negative quality of a marriage thus can inhibit women's responsiveness even when a pattern of responsiveness has already been established.

The research reported in this article indicates two major reservations that must be attached to Kinsey's conclusion that women's sexual responsiveness increases with the duration of their marriages. First, the findings of the present research indicate that responsiveness tends to be associated with duration only for marriages which are positive in quality in the relatively early years of marriage. Second, contrary to what is suggested by the Kinsey data, the present research indicates that, through time, women can become less responsive as well as more so.

Reference must be made to an alternative view to that set forth in this article of the relation between women's responsiveness and the quality of their marriages. In this view, responsiveness is said to influence the quality of a marriage rather than to be influenced by it. While we grant that the quality of many marriages may be influenced by the responsiveness of wives,[25]

[25] See, for example, Paul Wallin and Alexander L. Clark, "Religiosity, Sexual Gratification and Marital Satisfaction in the Middle Years of Marriage," *Social Forces*, XLII (1964), 303-9.

in our judgment the more accurate representation of the relation of the variables is to say that each influences the other, that is, that they are mutually interdependent. From this perspective, of course, only experimental manipulation of the variables would permit a conclusive evaluation of the hypotheses dealt with in our study, with their specification of the quality of marriages as a condition of wives' responsiveness. But this was not the design of our research, and we therefore have not demonstrated that a change in the quality of their marriages will *effect* a change in women's responsiveness. It should be emphasized, however, that this does not detract from the validity of the implications of our research for the assumption that increased participation in intercourse through the years tends to make women more responsive. For we have shown that, up to a point, increasing responsiveness tends to be *associated* only with marriages of positive quality and that in some marriages the responsiveness can even decline.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Power Transformed: The Age-slow Deliverance of the Folk and Now the Potential Deliverance of the Nations from the Rule of Force. By R. M. MacIver. New York: Macmillan Co., 1964. Pp. 244. $5.00.

These reflections by one of the few grand old men of American sociology are welcome. They are distilled from studies of the political process that have preoccupied the author for more than fifty years, as well as from a lifetime involvement in public affairs. Though this book cannot be ranked with MacIver's earlier classics, *Social Causation, Community, The Web of Government,* and *Society,* everything that comes from his pen is worthy of attention.

In the first part of the book, "The Miscalculations of the Mighty," MacIver provides a kind of informal capsule history of the modern world from the late Victorian age to the age of overkill. This account of public events is interlarded with but too infrequent references to some of the high points of his private career. The stress here is on the miscalculations and the mismanagement of the affairs of nations by vainglorious, short-sighted, or just plain wicked statesmen. Neither the first world war nor the rise of Hitler was inevitable, argues MacIver—no Hegelian he. Both could have been avoided had there not been "diplomatic bankruptcy" in the first instance and criminal blindness to the real character of the Hitler regime in the second.

In the second part, "The Great Historical Trends," MacIver undertakes an examination of the notion of power and an assessment of the secular trends in the transformation of the power bases within and between nations. He distinguishes between functional, free, and arbitrary power. *Functional* power is power specifically assigned or intrusted or at least assented to for the performance of a particular function, whereas *free* power denotes power to act in ways not limited by assigned function. *Arbitrary* power, finally, means the abuse of functional power to serve the interests of the power-holder in ways that are inconsistent with the functions assigned. It is power deflected from its functional purpose.

MacIver distinguishes a variety of sources of power and argues against a view that would locate the source of all power in force and coercion. Organization, armed might, professional ability, personality factors, artistic or technological skills can all serve as bases of power. But they must all be seen as but intermediate conditions in the attainment of ends, since they can become effective only if there is the will to employ them.

Despite the conspicuous failings and crimes of the mighty which have marked so much of modern history, MacIver clings to a guardedly optimistic interpretation of long-run trends. The range of sheer physical coercion has been curtailed within the nations as the process of democratization has undermined regimes where authority owes no responsibility. Everywhere "the supporters of the old at length lose ground, and the diagonal of change advances amid the strife of loyalties." And on the international scene as well, the portent and menace of the hydrogen bomb and the emergence of the New Nations from colonial domination may lead to international arrangements where the "climactic form of physical coercion, the violence loosed by the great state, would cease to be a controlling factor in international affairs." No one can predict, MacIver thinks, that the trend of liberation from arbitrary power will continue; but it is permissible to indulge in a modicum of optimism.

MacIver, nurtured on the *common sense* philosophy of his native Scotland, is no prophet of doom. Though he is acutely aware of the follies of mankind, he yet clings to a tempered and cautious belief in the perfectibility of man and his society.

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The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. By Morris Janowitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. vii+134. $4.50.

In a brief book of not much more than one hundred pages, Janowitz has done a re-

markable job of analyzing the role of the military in the political development of the new nations. The central question to which he has addressed himself is how the characteristics of military institutions and personnel affect their activities in the processes of modernization and democratization. Put somewhat differently, he proposes to clarify the broad issues involved in the current polemic about the role of the military in political and social modernization. Are they as unmitigated a menace to democratization as some argue? Or are they among the only reliable agents of orderly sociopolitical modernization, as others would claim?

The virtue of Janowitz' book is that it turns these questions into testable propositions about the different patterns of military-political relations in the new nations. He generalizes from data on fifty-one countries in Asia and Africa. He relies primarily on published materials, but in addition he interviewed American scholars who have had experience in these nations, and foreign students while they were in residence in the United States who have served in the armies of these nations.

Janowitz classifies these nations into five groups according to the place of the military in politics: (1) authoritarian-personal regimes, (2) authoritarian-mass party regimes, (3) democratic-competitive regimes, (4) civil-military coalitions, and (5) military oligarchies. In the first three types the military occupy, respectively, a symbolic, instrumental, or subordinate role; in the last two they are involved in politics as coalition partners or as dominant components. Janowitz finds the particular history of military organization, the length of time since independence, and the level of economic development of relatively little utility in explaining these different civil-military patterns. He argues instead that in all the new and modernizing nations the military and the socio-political context in which they operate tend to have common characteristics, resulting in a high potential for military involvement in politics and making that involvement unstable and problematical.

The authoritarian-personal regime, as in Ethiopia and Saudi-Arabia, according to Janowitz, seems certain to be swept away by virtue of its inability to modernize, and to be supplanted by a military or civilian-military leadership. In the authoritarian-mass party regime the military is balanced by civilian police and party cadres. This appears to be a viable non-military regime with modernizing but not democratizing potentialities. The democratic-competitive regimes are those in which civilian supremacy is maintained by virtue of the persistence of Western colonial traditions and the effectiveness of civilian institutions and power groups. The role of the military in these regimes seems to be dependent on their cohesion and effectiveness in promoting modernization. The civil-military coalitions are those in which the civilian groups are in power because of the assistance of the military. This type of regime is inherently unstable and often is succeeded by military oligarchy, properly speaking.

Janowitz proposes a theory of the role of the military in the new nations containing the following propositions: The basic reasons for the high potential for political involvement by the military lie in its control over instruments of violence, its ethics of public service and national identification, and the experience of its officers in managerial tasks. These factors explain the greater initial political capacity of the military in comparison with other skill groups. In the new nations the *military establishment is recruited from the* middle and the lower-middle classes. This fact and the content of military education contribute to an innovative outlook toward modernization. At the same time the authoritarian structure of military organization and of military communication produces military elites with little skill or experience in the bargaining, coalition-making, and demagogic patterns of democratic politics. In addition military elite groups tend to bring with them strong nationalist and sometimes puritanical attitudes which make them distrustful of the moral ambiguities and equivocal solutions of the political marketplace. The actual intervention of the military into politics generally follows the collapse of efforts at creating effective democratic institutions. It does not seem to follow the formation of authoritarian mass-party regimes. The persistence of military regimes is dependent on their ability to build a political apparatus outside the mili-

tary establishment but under its direct domination.

In considering the question of the effectiveness of military oligarchy in contributing to modernization and democratization, Janowitz turns to Shils's concept of tutelary democracy. He suggests the dangers of indoctrinating the military with the ideal of political neutrality. If they are to perform the role of political umpire, intervener, or even custodian of political power, and if the purpose is to give to this intervention a tutelary democratic content, then military training and indoctrination must take these roles into account and stress positive commitment to a modernizing and democratizing process.

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Great Aspirations: The Graduate School Plans of America's College Seniors. By JAMES A. DAVIS. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. xxvi+319. $8.95.

Drawing upon the responses of almost 34,000 June, 1961, graduates of 135 colleges and universities throughout the United States, Professor Davis describes their backgrounds and their plans for postgraduate study. Data are presented concerning the role of "motivation" and of finances in the postponement or eschewal of such study as well as the roles of such factors as race, sex, religion, type of home town, and marital status.

The characteristics of various graduate fields are described by the kinds of students they recruit. Past academic performance and the quality of students' undergraduate college, the characteristics they seek in an ideal job, the values they bring with them, and the manner in which they propose to finance their graduate work are considered in great detail and with considerable analytic ingenuity. In brief, all of the ingredients are here for making this *the* basic reference work on postgraduate education recruitment patterns—but the attempt is only partially successful.

The presentation is marred by an excess of unfortunate details. The author often errs in confusing the frequency with which an answer is given by the students and the intensity of feeling associated with that answer. Discrepancies between tables and text and between tables themselves occur with distressing regularity. In at least one instance a portion of the table has been omitted completely. Descriptions of basic parameters such as age, sex, and race are based on a subsample (introducing an unnecessary source of sampling error) when the same distributions might have been derived from other runs using the total sample. At least one table intermingles entries based on both a total weighted sample of 56,664 and a random subsample of 3,397, making comparisons within the table considerably more difficult. At one point, use of the reduced sample leads to conclusions based on a difference of a single case out of a total of fifteen, where use of the total sample would have provided a considerably more stable base.

The author's stress on percentage comparisons occasionally leads him to overlook the import of his data in terms of his declared interest in predicting supplies of specialized manpower at the national level. Thus he concludes at one point that the talent loss is "not shocking" since a large percentage of the men in medicine and the sciences with good academic records go on to graduate work. He forgets that his data show eight times as many students going into education as into medicine. Yet there are more education students in the top fifth of the index who are not going on than all the potential medical students who are.

It is especially unfortunate that a book of such potential utility should have been so poorly produced. An important topic, a comprehensive questionnaire, a large and carefully drawn sample from a crucial population, sophisticated analysis and novel presentations of the data—all these features lose much of their value when the reader is repeatedly forced to question whether the conclusions are sound or spurious, whether it is the table or the text that is in error. Since this is but the first of several reports promised by the National Opinion Research Center on the basis of these data, it is to be hoped that greater care will be taken in the production of the others.

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Religion and Career: A Study of College Graduates. By ANDREW M. GREELEY. (A Publication of the National Opinion Research Center.) New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963. Pp. xiv+267. $5.00.

This volume reports the findings of a study of the relationship between religion and career plans, using data gathered in NORC's 1961 study of college seniors. This part of the larger study grew out of Fr. Greeley's reactions to discussions and studies which indicated that Catholics may differ from non-Catholics in intellectual interest and orientations. He seeks to ascertain if this is true.

Greeley's major conclusions can be summarized as follows: (1) Catholics do not differ from Protestants in values and behavior related to careers in general, and scholarly careers in particular, though both differ from Jews. (2) They differed in the past, but this was due to their immigrant status and peasant background, not to Catholicism. (3) These differences have now been eliminated, in part by deliberate efforts by Catholic educators who cultivate interest in graduate studies, and in part by acculturation of the Catholic group. (4) Catholic colleges are no longer intellectually inferior to non-Catholic. (5) Ethnicity still makes a significant difference among Catholics in these matters. (6) Apostasy seems linked with interest in the academic life, with intellectualism often serving as a substitute religion. (7) The practice of Catholicism and attendance at institutions of higher learning, whether Catholic or not, are not incompatible, as shown by the fact that frequency of attendance at Mass is higher among Catholic students than among Catholics generally.

The casual reader will probably find Greeley's analysis and conclusions quite convincing, but the more careful and critical reader may well develop serious reservations. To begin with, he is likely to develop doubts about the adequacy of the sample for Greeley's purposes. The sample was drawn for NORC's study of the class of 1961, and Greeley seems to have given little thought to the problems involved in adapting this sample to his special purposes. In particular, no attention seems to have been given to the possibility that normal sampling error might have produced distortions in the small subsample of Catholic institutions which enrolled more than half of the Catholic students in this sample.

A careful check, utilizing data graciously supplied by Greeley, indicated two kinds of sampling bias. First, the graduates of Catholic schools are overrepresented; though they numbered only 9 per cent of the class of 1961, they constitute 13 per cent of the weighted sample. Second, the oversampling of graduates of these institutions is more pronounced in the better Catholic schools than in the poorer. This combination of biases goes far in explaining many of Greeley's more surprising findings, and indicates the need for revision of a number of his conclusions. For example, the first of these biases helps explain why 53 per cent of the Catholics in the sample were attending Catholic institutions, a fact which puzzled Greeley himself. As he states (p. 74), other evidence indicated the true figure to be roughly 45 per cent. When correction is made for the overrepresentation of Catholic schools, one finds that this study yields a figure of 43 per cent. A recognition of these biases also helps explain why it is that Catholic colleges seem as productive of future scholars as non-Catholic schools in this study, despite the fact that their graduates received NSF, Woodrow Wilson, and other national awards at only half the national rate (calculated from Cass and Birnbaum's *Comparative Guide to American Colleges*). Finally, a recognition of these biases casts serious doubt on many of Greeley's conclusions, such as his assertion that Protestants are underrepresented in the ranks of those going on to graduate school while Catholics are represented in proportion to their numbers (p. 30). If one makes corrections for the sampling errors and adds a control for race, these conclusions are exactly reversed.

A second major weakness stems from Greeley's reluctance to use controls, even when his analysis clearly demonstrates their need. For example, he makes more than thirty comparisons between Catholics who attended Catholic high schools and colleges and Catholics who attended non-Catholic institutions. Despite the fact that the former were much more likely to come from high status families (60 per cent versus 42 per cent; in part at least a by-product of the oversample of students in the better Catholic schools), and despite the demonstrated relevance of familial status to career plans, no control for status is ever offered. In the case of Protestant-Catholic

comparisons, occasional controls for status are provided (though ironically these are shown to be unnecessary in this particular sample), but no control is ever introduced for region of residence or proximity to college, despite the fact that Greeley's initial tables show that Protestants and Catholics differ considerably in both respects. Forty-three per cent of the Catholics lived within commuting distance of college compared with only 27 per cent of Protestants, and only 6 per cent lived in the South compared with 25 per cent of the Protestants. This latter fact is important since the South, with 31 per cent of the nation's population, has only 18 per cent of the openings for graduate students and a median income only 70 per cent that of the rest of the nation. If costs are a factor in decisions about graduate school, and if the opportunity to live at home is a factor in costs, controls for these two variables would seem essential.

A third serious weakness is due to the author's failure to relate his findings to those of other studies. While a few are noted briefly, most are ignored, and the uninformed reader is left with the impression that there is little other relevant research, especially of a kind that might contradict Greeley's conclusions. One would suppose that at least some mention would be made of the work of Rokeach, McClelland, and Donovan, to name but three. This is, of course, a common failing in survey research, but not an endearing one.

Finally, in a study designed primarily to show that American Catholicism is now contributing its proportionate share of the intellectual leaders of tomorrow, one would expect the analysis to be focused on that portion of the class of 1961 from which such leaders are most likely to come—namely, the brightest and best trained males who are going on in the arts and sciences—and on those questions which are most relevant to scholarly careers. Instead, a random cross-section of the basic sample of 33,700 respondents is studied, and often, it seems, a random cross-section of the questions. Thus the study unhappily sacrifices depth in its treatment of the central problem in order to achieve a less valuable breadth of coverage.

For all its limitations, however, this is an important study. The subject with which it deals has far-reaching theoretical and practical implications. Furthermore, I believe that this book contains some important and neglected insights. In particular, there is good reason for thinking that American Catholics and their church are changing in certain significant ways which merit sociologists' attention, and we are greatly indebted to Greeley for focusing on this. While one may doubt that the magnitude of these changes is as great as he claims or their explanations always those he offers, his judgments about the nature and direction of the changes seem generally sound.

In the introduction we are told that NORC plans further surveys of the class of 1961. One would hope that in future publications on the relation of religion to careers, Greeley and the staff of NORC will give greater attention to the important methodological and interpretative problems noted above so that we may all obtain a clearer understanding of this intriguing subject.

GERHARD LENSKI

University of North Carolina

Elites and Society. By T. B. BOTTOMORE. London: Watts & Co., 1964. Pp. v+151. 15*s*.

Mannheim has suggested that values, theory, and data do not operate with any great degree of independence. Indeed, their interconnections would seem especially important in political sociology, where collective points of view abound. Although subgroup bias obviously lurks behind professional patter on neutrality, perhaps a science of politics is nonetheless possible, for its essence derives from collective replication sponsored by opposing schools engaged in dialogue over the crucial subjects of power, development, and equality. Today, the principal contenders on these three matters can be found within either the elite-pluralist or the neo-Marxist school. Bottomore has aligned himself with the latter and has focused on seven problems central to dispute: (1) Who are the elites and how do they arrive? (2) Are the formulations of "a governing elite" more useful than the neo-Marxian conceptions about "ruling class"? (3) How is the circulation of elites related to political conflict? (4) Have the intellectuals, managers, and/or bureaucrats superseded the upper class in the West and the Party in the East? (5) What are the origins, goals, and functions of the elite in the new nations? (6) When the intellectual descendants of Schum-

peter narrowly define democracy in political terms, what do these analysts omit by *ignoring* the impact of economic inequality on political participation? (7) Is automation creating conditions which favor more representative democracy and greater economic equity?

Bottomore dwells on these problems so as to make explicit the threads between theory, evidence, and values. His presentation within each of seven essays seldom departs from a pattern. After posing a problem, he first elaborates the views of a principal spokesman found within the elite school. He then introduces modifications of theory to strengthen the formulation. After a fair presentation, he disassembles the argument, notes its logical weaknesses, points to the unconvincing character of the data, and isolates flaws in the group's perspective. He then proceeds to amass counter-information and explanatory theory. For example, the author notes the way in which Pareto's treatment of the circulation of the elites has been superseded by the more refined accounts of Mosca, Kolabinska, Pirenne, and Schumpeter. Unfortunately for the elite school, even when Pareto's principal peers and students have realized logical clarity, Bottomore demonstrates that they have mishandled evidence, often confusing historical illustration with scientific data. Having noted weaknesses in their logic and method, the author then proceeds to point out their collective intellectual bias. Because elite theorists wish to present society in the best possible light, they often overestimate the amount of upward mobliity. Actually, quantitative materials gathered by S. M. Miller—no elitist himself—and others indicate that the upper strata—however defined—recruit almost exclusively from the middle and upper classes. The latter favor their own.

Bottomore has written a classic. But like all masterpieces, it contains imperfections. Why, for example, does his discussion of the new nations fail to refer to the quite different analysis of Daniel Bell? Again, why has he labeled Lasswell and Nomad enemies of socialism simply because they have noted the propensity of revolutionary intellectuals once in power to abscond with it along with prestige and wealth? Nomad's cynicism would seem to be both justified by recurrent events and expressed through radical theory. In the case of the latter, Nomad has observed that the masses have doggedly carried on the struggle against those intellectuals who have passed from revolutionary counter-elites to ruling class. Nomad has formulated a general *evolutionary* theory which holds that the lower classes over the millennia have won, lost but gradually accumulated greater freedom and equality through thousands of struggles directed against their former champions (and the latter's successors). From a long-term point of view, permanent revolt thereby becomes an endemic condition within the lower classes as they wage their uneven and unending struggle against intellectuals transformed into administrators and utopians remodeled into ideologues. Clearly, Nomad's approach rejects elites as world movers, consequently runs counter to the precious formulations of most elite theorists, stresses the strength as well as the credulity of the lower classes, and thereby proves compatible with a socialist perspective. In fact, Nomad's views may well insulate us against a modicum of naïveté concerning our own motives.

JOHN C. LEGGETT

University of California, Berkeley

Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. By CLIFFORD GEERTZ. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Pp. xx+176. $4.00.

This interesting book, written by an anthropologist, takes an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of Indonesian society. The author skilfully integrates historical, political, economic, biological, geographical, cultural, and social data, although he tends to see his study as basically "cultural ecology." The author addresses himself to Indonesia's unequal distribution of population, its social and economic dualism, and its agricultural and social involution.

Geertz deals with two eco-systems, Inner Indonesia (Java) and Outer Indonesia (the other islands). The former centers on wet-rice culture (with high population density) and the latter centers on swidden agriculture (with low population density). He analyzes the peculiar impact of each system upon the social, cultural, political, and economic life of the people. His analysis of the socioeconomic nature and implications of wet-rice culture is sophisticated and replaces some of the earlier

anthropological analyses of this type of agriculture. The microecology of the flooded paddy field and the swidden plot and its relationship to social, economic, and political developments are fascinating. Geertz shows how the Dutch encouragement of sugar production intensified the utilization of the rice terraces in Java. The eco-system of the rice terrace allows an ever increasing number of the people to exist on an undamaged habitat, thus encouraging labor-intensive techniques. The masses of Java were bound to their rice terraces. The population expanded rapidly, and capital was not accumulated for the development of industrialization and urbanization. On the other hand, in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, the world demand for rubber, coffee, and other commercial crops adaptable to the ecology of these areas brought contract labor, capital-intensive policies and a true proletariat, thus creating a dualism in the social, economic, and political life of Indonesia.

Populous Java has become a rural and non-industrial mass society. Seemingly definitive cultural patterns failed either to stabilize or transform themselves into new patterns. They continue to develop by becoming internally more complicated (involution). In Java traditions survived among the peasantry but social, political, and religious involution occurred. Geertz compares the Javanese community to the American suburb, that "other formless human community . . . with . . . a richness of social surface and a monotonous poverty of social substance."

The author points to Japan as a wet-rice culture that because of national policies of capital accumulation (agricultural taxes) developed industry and avoided the agricultural and social involution that still binds Java to a static economy with an ever increasing population, poverty, and dispirited community life.

GEORGE A. THEODORSON

Pennsylvania State University

Social Change. By RICHARD T. LAPIERE. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965. Pp. vii+556. $9.50.

The most basic of all distinctions in social theory lies between holism which analyzes social life in terms of the primacy of some more-or-less complex social entity (society, positivistic organicism, class-divided social epochs, Marxian forms of conflict theory, social systems, sociological functionalism) and elementarism which analyzes social life in terms of some presumed basic unit (symbolically structured acts, symbolic interactionism, meaningful social acts, social action theory, innovative and repetitive acts, pluralistic behaviorism). LaPiere's *Social Change* belongs to the second category. It is the latest version of a Pluralistic Behavioral theory of change Though LaPiere acknowledges indebtedness only to H. G. Barnett his argument is deeply imbedded in the tradition extending back through F. Stuart Chapin, H. F. Ogburn to F. Giddings and E. A. Ross on to Gabriel Tarde

Like his predecessors, LaPiere (despite appropriation of some functionalistic terminology) rejects all holistic approaches to social life and locates the crux of change and stability in innovative or repetitive acts that in turn (like Tarde) rest on accordant or discordant ideas and beliefs. Tarde started a major tradition with his insistence that innovations must be repeated to become socially significant and this is affected by properties of the social milieu. In accord with this tradition LaPiere, with various of his predecessors, distinguishes between innovators, advocates, and adopters and seeks to identify properties of the social medium (such as tradition and vested interests) which affect the adoption of innovation. Three general social conditions are isolated by LaPiere: stable congruence, static incongruence, and dynamic incongruence; only the third is thought to facilitate change.

Various of LaPiere's predecessors sought to formulate a series of theories of social change on the basis of these or equivalent notions. Such was Tarde's attempt to distinguish between epochs of custom and fashion imitation and to formulate laws of imitations such as the flow from complex to simple societies, from upper to lower classes, and from city to country. So too, was Ogburn's distinction between material and non-material culture and the notion of the progressiveness of innovations in the first and consequent culture lag of the second. Chapin accepted a modified culture-lag hypothesis and conceived of cycles of varying scope and range in non-material culture together with a keying of leadership forms to the cycle of change.

LaPiere's reluctance either to work with the

theories of his predecessors or to identify his own, leaves one uncertain as to how to construe the masses of empirical material that he assembles and discusses often in a rather elementary manner. Some of Tarde's generalizations are repeated but are not systematically examined or extended. A chapter is devoted to the rejection of the culture-lag hypothesis, while in dozens of discussions of various phases of social life the first stage in a presumed cycle of change is traced to innovations in the material culture. LaPiere's evaluations, in fact, are often more clear than his theories. It is quite evident, for example, that he dislikes Freudianism, Marxism, beatniks, the welfare state, and bureaucracy. He likes individualism, the middle class, laissez faire social theories, and most professionals.

LaPiere insists that "the theory upon which the following analysis is based . . . for reasons of personal preference is kept more implicit than explicit" (p. vii). In a discipline often criticized for its brassy cheek, we are surely confronted here with a phenomenon of rare charm. While LaPiere seems to have fathered the latest offspring of an old and revered family of theory, he proposes to keep his debutante concealed in the cloakroom during her coming-out party.

DON MARTINDALE

University of Minnesota

Change in Medieval Society. Edited by SYLVIA L. THRUPP. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Pp. 324.

Medieval history is, as one might expect, the last stronghold of conservative traditionalism in historiography, though a minority of medievalists have long tried to break out of the established inclosure of subject matter, interpretation, and methodology. The selection of articles (ranging in date from 1908 to 1963) that Sylvia Thrupp has made is clearly an attempt to consolidate the advances made thus far by this minority and to prepare for further progress. Its chief concern is with social structure and change in the North European Middle Ages (A.D. 1050–1500) and especially with the "middling and lower ranks of people."

It is not altogether easy to define the pattern of this volume more precisely. It is divided into sections called "Communities," "Reformers," "Careers, Rank and Power," "The Communication of Ideas," "Money," and "Views of Society," but the reason for these subdivisions is not always evident. The only obvious common denominator of the articles is that they escape from the traditional net of narrative political history, legal or administrative description, or simple ideological generalization. But what unites them is a concern with "unorthodox" subject matter rather than with new interpretations. Several articles are straightforward and unambitious descriptions or expositions—for instance, L. Larson on the "Household of the Norwegian Kings in the 13th Century" or J. Yunck's note on the medieval satires of Rome. (The point is made that they may represent "a widespread and often conservative reaction to economic change not clearly understood," but that is all.) Some are by traditional scholars. All are written lucidly, often with the characteristic modest elegance of an ancient field of scholarship, but with the exception of C. Cipolla's concise "Currency Depreciation in Medieval Europe," E. Miller's "State and Landed Interest in France and England," and Howard Kaminsky's excellent "Chiliasm and the Hussite Revolution," the contributors show little awareness of the other social sciences.

Consequently the quality of the articles is uneven. A few are genuine pathfinders and openers of new horizons: Marc Bloch's superb analysis of a legal dispute between some peasants and their lords, F. Graus' unfortunately too summary "The Late Medieval Poor in Town and Countryside" (part of the author's pioneer work in the use of medieval literature for social analysis), or Kaminsky's study of chiliasm. Some are not so much new, as popularizations of important specialized fields of research, for example, O. von Simson's analysis of the Gothic cathedral as a symbolic "model" of the medieval universe. Most are excellent pieces of history, but not always of great relevance to anyone except other medievalists.

The volume fulfils its object, which is to illustrate "the liveliness of research." But it does not seem to this reviewer to do full justice to the transformation that has already been achieved in the study of the Middle

Ages (and especially of the economic, social, and intellectual evolution). The editor has regrettably been too modest to include any contribution of her own.

E. J. Hobsbawm

Birkbeck College, London

Culture and Social Change. By William F. Ogburn. Edited and with an Introduction by Otis Dudley Duncan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. xxii+360. $7.50.

Duncan's thoughtful selection of William F. Ogburn's papers makes available to sociologists the lifework (in compact form) of a man who, perhaps more than anyone of his generation, changed the face of our discipline. For, Ogburn represents not only the liberation of sociology from biology through the concept of culture but also our scientific coming of age through the statistical analysis of empirical data.

The collection consists of twenty-five papers and excerpts from books arranged under four rubrics: social evolution, social trends, short-run cycles, and methods. A topically arranged bibliography of Ogburn's scientific writings covering almost a half-century of professional endeavors is also included.

As Duncan's organization of the materials makes clear, Ogburn was concerned with what he called "big ideas." Moreover, the collection succeeds admirably in communicating the focused quality of Ogburn's scientific prolificity: He made his theoretical contribution in 1922 with his classic, *Social Change,* and spent the rest of his professional life spelling out in empirical terms what he considered to be his contribution to the study of social change—the solution of the problem of social evolution in terms of the concepts of invention, accumulation, and adjustment. Yet, his lively mind ranged widely from general considerations of the social sciences and sociology to social psychology. Despite Ogburn's insistence on methodological circumspection, method always remained simply a means for the production of scientific knowledge about society, just as theory without data always remained an anathema.

Duncan's Introduction stands as a model of exegesis, the tone of which will perhaps be most appreciated by Ogburn's students, who always knew that they were in the presence of a scientist and gentleman. Finally, the editor's lucid interpretation of Ogburn's concept of "culture lag" is an added bonus.

Published in a series, "The Heritage of Sociology," which proposes to present enduring sociological contributions that have had "a long term impact on research, scholarship, and public policy," this volume certainly achieves its aim. With the encouraging renaissance of interest on the part of sociologists in the study of social change, the collection will probably become a standard item in all sociological libraries.

Harold W. Pfautz

Brown University

The Family. By William J. Goode. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii+120. $3.95 (cloth); $1.50 (paper).

Designed, apparently, for the upper-division student in courses in the sociology of the family. this unique book consists of just ten chapters and 120 pages. A volume of readings (242 pages) edited by Goode is designed to supplement this brief text.

The Family is not subdivided into sections but apparently is intended to deal with the principal aspects of family life. The chapters are: "The Family as an Element in Social Structure," "Biological Bases of the Family," "Legitimacy and Illegitimacy," "Mate Selection and Marriage," "Forms of the Household," "Organized Descent Groupings," "Role Relations of Spouses and Parents in Society," "Stratification," "Dissolution of Family Role Systems," and "Changes in Family Patterns."

Goode does not claim that it is a book on family theory, but it could lay some claim to what Professor Zetterberg terms "theoretical sociology"; that is, it aims at statements possessing a wide level of generality. These are attained primarily through cross-cultural generalizations, which form the principal content of the book.

The author provides both descriptive and analytical statements. In general the descriptive statements appear well grounded whereas the causal inferences here, as in most sociological analyses, lack the type of research support to be convincing. In general, good use is made of relevant research, although at points

available research is not employed. For example, he repeats the oedipal idea of dominant attachments to the opposite-sexed parent (p. 78), whereas sociological research has repeatedly found a closer attachment of both sexes of children to the mother. Again, he poses the question whether children suffer more from homes characterized by high levels of conflict or by divorce (p. 102), and cites research done in 1950 and 1953, failing to cite a considerable body of research directly to this point since 1956.

Despite some limitations, this is a knowledgable book reflecting the writer's research experience and broad acquaintance with cross-cultural data. It raises many interesting questions and marshals facts and attempts deductions with respect to them. The outcome of attempts at causal inference will not convince the experienced researcher but, of course, it is not a research monograph. Goode avoids some common problems in that his communication is good. There is neither oversimplification nor any attempt to impress the reader by abtruse conceptualization. The book is remarkably value-free, even in dealing with such matters as illegitimacy.

In the compact 120-page package, this book must be regarded as an experiment in family textbooks. An obvious use is with an extensive book of readings. To the adventurous, it provides an opportunity to employ monographs with a short, inexpensive text. How satisfactory such combinations will prove must, of course, be determined in the classroom.

F. IVAN NYE

Washington State University

The Modern Family. Revised edition. By ROBERT F. WINCH. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964. Pp. xviii+782. $8.25.

Keeping essentially the same format he used in the first edition, Professor Winch has refined and elaborated the structural-functional approach in his analysis of the family. By his own admission, the analysis is mostly functional, but he does make relevant structural analyses and has incorporated within his framework many salient ideas from social psychology, psychology, psychoanalysis, and cultural anthropology.

This edition is over half again as long as the first and differs from it in that Winch has greatly elaborated his theoretical underpinnings. Furthermore, he has strengthened this textbook by calling upon more recently developed conceptualizations, such as those emanating from role theory, and, without casting aspersions at the first edition, he has made available practically all of the relevant recent research findings to better substantiate his position and has done so more systematically, with more continuity, and with greater integration than in the first edition.

He begins by giving the student a thorough grounding in the basic concepts and definitions of his conceptual scheme. The essence of the latter is couched in three assumptions: (1) The five basic societal functions (reproductive, economic, political, socialization-education, and religious) must be carried on for any society to survive. (2) Every society has some set of differentiated positions and roles related to these functions. (3) There are individual-serving functions associated with the society-serving functions (p. 20). There are certain *core relationships* which carry out these functions, and corresponding elaborations of these are referred to as basic *societal structures*.

In addition to the replacement function of the family, an individual-oriented function of providing a sense of "immortality" or intergenerational continuity is included. The corollary functions of the family are position-conferring, emotional gratification, and nurturance and control. This is the skeletal outline that Winch intricately and fully elaborates to the theoretical conclusion *"that the power of a societal structure is positively correlated with the number of functions it carries out"* (p. 20). Also, the highly functional family builds bonds of cohesion, promotes identification (through control of resources), and produces a stable family. The cohesiveness of the less functional family depends on love and is unstable. He is careful to state this as a matter of degree.

It is upon this basis that Winch sets out to cover the standard topics of family textbooks. He applies his theory to a family of great functionality (the traditional family of Chinese peasantry), and, in contrast, to one of little functionality (the Kibbutzim of Israel). For the next three sections, he brings evidence to bear upon the removal of functions from the family. He vividly demonstrates the greater economic independence of

family members, the parents loss of control over resources, and the consequent reduction of the parents' power to control family members. Educational and religious specializations help reduce the interdependence of family members; status-conferring is more a function of the economic structure than of the family structure, and, except in the upper classes, parents seem to be losing control over resources, thereby decreasing the functional relationship with offspring and affecting identification.

The next section deals with the socialization process, and it is here that Winch brings many of his arguments to bear upon the implications of identification and the perpetuation of values from generation to generation. He presents a vivid elaboration of this process and its meaning from a functional point of view, and he does so by using the best of psychoanalytic thought combined with the sociological and social-psychological.

The next two sections are standard and include love, mate selection, complementarity, marital relations, and family disorganization.

Apart from its clarity, thoroughness of analysis, objectivity, and complete readability, the major contribution of this text is Winch's attempt to analyze the family with a consistent conceptual theme. Although he falters occasionally, this is more likely due to a lack of data than to the functional point of view, although it too fails to come up to expectations. It is probably this lack that Winch himself feels, for after bringing all the data to bear on the atomism of the family and its increasing lack of functionality, he nevertheless infers that the family will be around for some time. One could only hope, after such an excellent explanation of family process and structure, that Winch had the courage of his scientific convictions. However, all in all, this is a fine book and should enjoy a healthy career.

EDWARD Z. DAGER

Purdue University

Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict. By WILSON RECORD. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964. Pp. xv+237. $5.95.

In this short book Wilson Record details the hostile relations between the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Communist Party (CPUSA). Record's thesis is that, "given the objectives and methods of the two organizations, it was inevitable that they would clash; for in the end one could succeed only to the detriment of the other." The book is part of the "Communism in American Life Series" commissioned by the Fund for the Republic under the general editorship of Clinton Rossiter.

In examining the interaction of the NAACP and the CPUSA, Record attempts to use both historical and sociological methods of analysis. The organization of the book is historical, however, and the book emerges primarily as a case study of the CPUSA's unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate or destroy the NAACP. The theoretical framework presented in chapter i consists of an analysis of the differences in structure, ideology and goals of the two organizations. Chapters ii–vi treat the interaction of the two organizations during specific time periods selected "with reference to changes in the CP line." For each period the author describes the CPUSA program with respect to Negroes, assesses the NAACP's structure and its status among Negroes, and then analyzes specific confrontations between the two organizations. In a brief but interesting concluding chapter Record points out that both organizations have been beset, albeit in different ways, by a fundamental dilemma: how to adapt to change in the established order. This dilemma has forced abandonment of self-determination as the keystone of CP racial policy and has led to its virtual demise. The NAACP has prospered over-all and is seen as capable of solving its dilemma because its approach via legalism is entirely compatible with the non-violent, direct-action methods of the newer protest organizations.

As a systematic analysis of Communist infiltration tactics the book is hampered by the time-period mode of organization and it lacks the depth of analysis which characterizes Selznick's *The Organizational Weapon.* However, Record thoroughly documents the vacillations in CP policy regarding Negro protest and clearly depicts the opportunism manifested by the party in attempting to use race organizations and issues to further its own extra-national ends. The theoretical framework advanced to facilitate the analysis of

organizational interaction is straightforward and of considerable utility, but it is not brought to bear in a sufficiently systematic manner in the analytic chapters. Moreover, the book's general sociological value is severely limited by the author's failure to utilize the literature pertaining to organizations in general and to the CPUSA and the NAACP in particular.

Record writes clearly, and often metaphorically, with the result that one can read the book rapidly. The book contains an index but no bibliography is provided.

DONALD L. NOEL

University of Washington

They and We: Racial and Ethnic Relations in the United States. By PETER I. ROSE. New York: Random House, 1964. Pp. 177. $1.95 (paper).

Peter Rose has written a well-organized and very readable summary of major characteristics and trends in race and ethnic relations in the United States. In six compact chapters he surveys and often critically evaluates social-science information on American minority-group behavior, immigration and the integration of immigrants, the meaning of cultural pluralism and intergroup tensions, the nature of prejudice, patterns of discrimination, and minority reactions to discrimination. A brief but abundantly footnoted appendix reviews principal research trends in the area.

They and We has a heavy intergroup-relations emphasis. Ecological and demographic perspectives on race and ethnicity in America are absent. The materials covered are largely in social psychology (the dynamics of prejudice) and social history (of immigrant and other minority groups—American Indians, Negroes, Jews, Latin American, etc.). However, it is not, as the author points out, a blueprint for change.

One of the most valuable chapters is the last one, on minority-group reactions to discrimination, in which the author sketches the major types of reactions among Negroes under a four-fold scheme of submission, withdrawal, avoidance, and integration. In the process some timely information on the civil-rights movement is presented.

This is a concise introductory text. Each of us might wish for greater coverage in one or another area. But on the whole Rose has chosen judiciously and spoken succinctly on major issues. *They and We* should fit smoothly, with supplementary reading materials, into undergraduate courses on race and ethnic relations.

JACK LADINSKY

University of Wisconsin

The Conduct of Inquiry. By ABRAHAM KAPLAN. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. xix+428. $8.00.

In the opening paragraph of this carefully written, humane, and intellectually liberalizing book the author offers as his declaration of scientific independence the autonomy of scientific inquiry: "the principle that the pursuit of truth is accountable to nothing and to no one not a part of that pursuit itself." Truth has no fixed boundaries. "In the one world of ideas there are no barriers to trade or travel. Each discipline may take from others techniques, concepts, laws, data, models, theories or explanations—in short, whatever it finds useful in its own inquiries." From these broad domains and those of methodology, experiment, measurement, statistics, and values the author weaves his labyrinthian themes.

More than others who have dealt with problems similar in kind and scale Kaplan discusses logic-in-use, the explicit formulation of which becomes a reconstructed logic. Along with the pursuit of truth, logic treats of "the operations of the human understanding" and it treats these operations evaluatively. "The question of how we ought to think surely depends on what happens when we do think in a certain way, or what *would* happen if we did." When logic is used non-valuatively, in the sense of "the logic of the Unconscious" or "the logic of the Radical Right," the author prefers to speak of cognitive styles which may be illogical in varying degrees, or in one respect or another. But in any case "scientists are logical when they do what they are doing well as scientists." Logic-in-use may precede and be superior to its own reconstruction. A

reconstructed logic may influence or become the logic-in-use. It is itself, in effect, a hypothesis, an idealization of scientific practice. It shows us what the logic of science would be if it were extracted and refined to utmost purity. Paralleling the increasing use made of formal logic and mathematics, six cognitive styles in behavioral science are identified—literary, academic, eristic, symbolic, postulational, and formal.

In this eminently reasonable book the author patiently sifts what seem to be the more intelligible modes of understanding from those which are less intelligible. Affirmation and denial are nicely balanced with qualified nuances not unlike rays which illuminate, at least for today's brief period, some recess of scientific obscurity. Systematic thinking is enriched with vignettes of wit and wisdom. Thus, the identification of scientific method with preferred techniques is called the law of the instrument: "Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding." Discussion of the progress of science provides the occasion for suggesting that "the questions the scientist puts to nature and the answers she gives have the form of a Platonic dialogue, not an Aristotelian treatise; we do not know just what has been said till we have done—and then new questions crowd in upon us." On generalization and uniqueness we are reminded that "every particular is representative—the problem is always to ascertain what it represents." Commenting on scientific conservatism, Kaplan notes that "the scientist usually attaches a greater loss to accepting a falsehood than to failing to acknowledge a truth." He then mentions the proposal by Cartwright "that perhaps the only sensible definition of 'basic research' is that which has low probability of success, but which yields an enormous payoff when it is successful."

As though talking to sociologists who regard observation as the bedrock to which all theory is beholden, the author cities Hanson's delightful phrase, "there is more to seeing than meets the eyeballs." Worthy of repeating are his own remarks on the properties of observation and their confusion with what we suppose we have observed: "Instead of A causing B, it may be our observations on A that cause B, as is illustrated by the famous Hawthorne experiments, where changes in the productivity of workers under varying conditions were at last understood to have resulted just from the fact that the workers knew they were subjects of investigation. Or, A may produce only our observation of B, which would otherwise occur without being observed, as is illustrated in the apparent increased incidence of psychosis in modern urban life, which may be attributable only to the higher frequency with which it is diagnosed and and reported. Or, our observation of A may cause our observation of B, as in the attempt to assess the effect of psychotherapy by using the appraisals made by the patients themselves. Or, our observation of A may be necessary to the observation of B, although in fact it is B that causes A—illustrated in the relation between the manifest and latent content of a dream from the standpoint of the dreamer. Like all skilled performances, observation is by no means as simple as it looks."

LLEWELLYN GROSS

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Society in the Mind: Elements of Social Eidos. By CHARLES MADGE. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. 158. $4.50.

Who nowadays reads Comte? Well, the professor of social science at the University of Birmingham does for one, and this little book furnishes proof. In his introduction, Charles Madge confesses that the book had cost him a good deal to write. I hasten to affirm his extraordinary success in passing along the cost, to this reviewer at any rate. Although the book is nicely written and has the great advantage of containing a mere 158 pages (including index and front matter), the reader seriously intending to discover what the professor has to say staggers away from this little volume baffled and exhausted. Yet, on second thought, the exhaustion and bafflement may come from reading the book within the limitations of an inappropriate idea system or *eidos* as Madge (following Bateson) prefers to call it. I suspect, though Madge never really makes himself completely clear on this or any other point, that we have here an experiment in the substitution of aesthetic "thoughtways" for what he calls rational-technical ones, and that readers with a penchant for Pre-Raphael-

ite watercolors will derive real enjoyment from the leisurely and uncritical perusal of this whimsical little book.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first, Madge propounds an updated version of Comte's "law of three stages." Archaic thought (concerning the constitution of which he appears to have some difficulty in making up his mind) is followed by a period in which thought is dominated by the moral teachings of a few outstanding figures. Aristotle and Plato, in this view, as much as Lao Tse, Buddha, or the Hebrew Prophets, are teachers of morality. The changeover from the first to the second variety of *eidos* results from democratization attendant upon the diffusion of techniques for the production of cheap iron. The "yoke of morality," it would appear, was made of iron.

Skipping over such obviously "moral achievements as Roman roads and Roman law, Madge makes the second axial period take place in the seventeenth century, when the stage of rational-technical *eidos* that dominates our present thinking begins to come into its own. The heroes of this period are not Newton ("the last of the magicians") but the scientific popularizer Fontenelle and his heirs and successors. All of this provides an altogether more pleasant, not to say much briefer, alternative to the *Positive Philosophy*. Certainly, Madge has not practiced "cerebral hygiene" to produce it, and (pp. 51–52) he provides a lengthy footnote enabling comparison of his views with those of his distinguished predecessor. For, when all is said and done, who nowadays, besides Professor Madge, would actually want to read Comte himself?

Unlike Comte, Madge is not satisfied with rational-technical *eidos* as the stage to crown (or perhaps to end) all stages. Part 2 is concerned with feelings of unease with rational-technical *eidos* as expressed by such writers as Marx, Freud, Pareto, Mannheim, and (of all people) the ubiquitous Parsons. I cannot help but believe that Stuart Hughes' brilliant *Consciousness and Society* still gets nearer than anyone else to saying the definitive words on this general subject, but Madge's discussion (particularly in chapter ii) is worth looking at for the charming anecdotes with which it is dotted.

Part 3, finally, presents a program for mapping a "social structure of social eidos." Although the idea is a good one it is not original and nothing new or surprising is proposed. I should like to see something like this program put into effect, but confess my failures to be impressed by program notes for an unwritten symphony. Fleetingly, and right at the end of the book, Madge seems to suggest that carrying out this program would have an effect on social *eidos* roughly analogous to the effect that a psychoanalysis might have on the individual. It would liberate a new worldview about to be born—perhaps the "aesthetic eidos," whatever that might be.

Any trenchant criticism of the extant view of society and of the world should endear itself to those who are not too smug to be aware of their blinkers. Which of us would knowingly wish to commit the sin of "*eidolatry*"? Madge's desultory if pleasant play on words and ideas, unfortunately, does not strike me as a step in any direction. Like Freud, I believe that progressive changes in thought (or, for that matter, in aesthetics) come only by an extension of the realm of reason, not by its supercession. But then, *de gustibus non est disputandum*.

GEORGE K. ZOLLSCHAN

Providence Youth Progress Board

Bohemian versus Bourgeois: French Society and the Man of Letters in the Nineteenth Century. By CÉSAR GRAÑA. New York: Basic Books, 1964. Pp. xv+220. $5.95.

Among other things, the middle class has served as a reference point for the reaction of intellectuals. The writer has been particularly sensitive to the bourgeois way of life. In France, especially, important writers have for over a hundred years rejected the middle class. In *Bohemian versus Bourgeois* César Graña analyzes the beginnings of literary discontent as it occurred in France in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The social conditions that were conducive to the reaction of writers are discussed in the first section of the book. These conditions were the emergence of a dominant middle class; the disappearence of the traditional forms of literary sponsorship; the advent of industrialization, technology, popular government, and social utilitarianism; the concentra-

tion of cultural life in the cities; and intellectual unemployment. The result was a tradition of literary defiance which continues to provide inspiration for the modern writer in both Europe and America.

Most writers, no matter how harshly they have attacked the bourgeoisie, have had their origins in the middle class. In an attempt to create a new order, a group of Parisian writers and artists in the middle of the nineteenth century established a unique style of life. Graña shows that this basic bohemian manner reflected the romantic movement, that is, incorporated the ideas of self-expression and genius, the rejection of general causality, the sense of alienation of the literary man, the feeling of hostility of society to sensitivity, and the notion of the intolerable burden of daily life. In short, the bohemian represented the denial of everything characteristic of the middle class.

While the successful writers have not been satisfactory bohemians, they have nevertheless been influenced by the bohemian ideology. This is particularly true of the three writers, Stendhal, Flaubert, and Baudelaire, that Graña discusses in the second section of the book. Through the use of letters, journals, and incidental writings, the author demonstrates the despair and rebellion of these writers. In the final section Graña briefly documents the history of literary assault on modern society.

My criticisms of Graña's book are primarily the result of ideas provoked but not covered by the book itself. Further investigation of the literary reaction to the bourgeois could include such issues as the realistic aspect of the romantic response; the reaction of the writers who defended bourgeois standards; the change in the concept of the hero in the writings of those who rejected the middle class (see Giraud's *The Unheroic Hero in the Novels of Stendhal, Balzac and Flaubert*); and the continuity in the treatment of alienation and the human predicament in the modern French existential writers, Camus in particular. Also greater consideration could be given to the analysis of the poetry and fiction of the writers.

Although Graña does not test or develop any sociological theories, he has given us an excellent sociological analysis of the relation between the social conditions and the literary productions of a particular time period. Finally, one may draw the conclusion that the efforts of other intellectuals—sociologists certainly included—could benefit from an awareness of the tensions of being both isolated and involved in society.

RICHARD QUINNEY

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Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance. By JACK W. BREHM and ARTHUR R. COHEN. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xiv+334. $7.95.

During his years at Minnesota and Michigan, Festinger developed and nurtured his ideas about discrepant cognitions—dissonance—until it culminated in the book, *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (1957). Two of his most loyal disciples from his Minnesota-Michigan days, Jack Brehm and the late Arthur Cohen, have collaborated to produce a sequel—*Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance.* It is, however, no mere elaboration on Festinger. The authors bring to this volume a full measure of their own inventive ideas in a prolific series of experiments and in their own theoretical extensions.

First a few words about the organization of the contents. The book contains fifteen chapters grouped into five parts labeled: "Theoretical Introduction," "Review of the Evidence," "Extensions of the Theory," "Dissonance Theory and Other Theoretical and Empirical Models in Psychology," and finally, "Implications and Conclusions." In addition, there is a rather extensive bibliography of articles and books relevant to the theory, most of them (about 80 out of 125) published since 1956. Many unpublished dissonance experiments, not available elsewhere, are given in detail.

The scope of topics which the concept of cognitive dissonance covers is breathtaking. The experiments range from gambling to eating grasshoppers, from cheating to choosing appliances, from decision-making to desegregation. Cognitive dissonance has been used to explain phenomena in sensory psychology, clinical psychology, social psychology, and sociology. To find one principle to account for such a dazzling array of diverse topics would indeed be intoxicating—if it were correct.

When we look at the evidence accumulated to support the concept, however, we find that

it is marred by flaws. The methodology of some experiments is faulty, the analysis of results is at times misleading, and the experiments are sometimes open to alternative explanations. The authors acknowledge many of the inadequacies in their data collection, analysis, and interpretation, but nonetheless conclude that since "the theory has by and large *predicted* the results of these experiments" (p. 311), these inadequacies are largely irrelevant in the final evaluation of the theory. Unfortunately, it is possible for a reader to use cognitive-dissonance theory and arrive at predictions that are sometimes opposite to those of the authors. This indeed may be the principal weakness in the theory—one is not always certain of the direction of the prediction. Thus it is not really legitimate to disregard methodological errors in summarizing the evidence or evaluating the theory.

Sociologists may be attracted to the simplicity of the cognitive dissonance formulation in explaining such complex phenomena as indoctrination and desegregation (pp. 269–98). Probably the most interesting aspect is the discussion of the possible effects of choice and commitment on "attitudes, ideology, and subsequent behavior." Other sociologists, however, may find that cognitive dissonance is all too reminiscent of a concept such as *Group-mind* —it explains so much that it ends up explaining very little. In any event, the book will probably arouse both interest and controversy among sociologists as it has done among social psychologists.

NATALIA P. CHAPANIS

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A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. By RICHARD M. CYERT and JAMES G. MARCH. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963. Pp. v+332. $11.00.

At some point in the recent history of the social sciences, economics apparently ceased to be defined as a "behavioral" science, despite the fact that as a discipline it is largely concerned with human behavior. The surviving behavioral sciences are, presumably, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. A fast-growing stepchild, organization theory, belonging to none of these disciplines and yet stealing from all of them, has as yet no clearly established home address in social scienceland but, presumably, may one day qualify as a behavioral science. This puzzling segregation of economics seems, surprisingly, to have been cheerfully accepted both by the behavioral scientists and the other-than-behavioral scientists.

Into this picture is projected a book called *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.* One's immediate reaction to the title is to assume that the oligopolists from the behavioral side of this imperfectly competitive social science world are trying to increase (decrease?) competition by marketing a product substitute for the economist's familiar theory of the firm. Actually, it is not clear just how to tag this work. Economists will surely disavow it as economic theory. Neither is it sociology, anthropology, nor psychology. Since concepts and terms from all these disciplines are used by Cyert and March, perhaps it belongs under the heading of organization theory. But the authors indicate (p. 18), with regret that organization theory as presently conceived is of little value to their theory of the firm.

What, then, does the book deal with and what are its primary theoretical antecedents? It deals with oligopoly—the imperfectly competitive market situation—where "organizational slack" often exists in the firm. Under perfect competition, organizational slack (resulting from under-exploitation of the environment) would not exist. Perfect competition, the authors argue, is a rare and special case and, unfortunately, the only one with which the classical theory of the firm is competent to deal. They cite a number of economists who share their view that a more useful theory of the firm is needed (as well as some who do not share this view).

Throughout the book the authors frequently criticize the traditional theory of the firm. They single out Milton Friedman as the most potent protagonist of this theory. They object to traditional theory because it makes the unrealistic assumption of omniscient rationality on the part of the firm. Noting that Friedman brushes aside this criticism with the argument that if the theory predicts well, realism isn't necessary, they charge that "his" theory has not been put to the test of predictive potency except on an aggregative basis. Their own theory, they admit, cannot be tested on an

aggregative basis but permits computer simulation of price and output decisions of a specific firm if the house rules of that firm are previously known.

The theoretical antecedents of the proposed theory are mixed, but the one that shines through most strongly is learning theory, from individual psychology. At least the model of the firm that the authors develop behaves as an entity, as does the model of the goal-directed, economizing, and learning individual. Terminology is even borrowed directly—"aspiration-level," "memory," "search." Of course, economics and psychology have always been hand-in-glove, in one way or another, with classical theory leaning on such psychological terms as "wants" and "utility."

The authors modify the individual learning model in two ways. They make it into a decision-making coalition model and they focus it on price and output decisions of the business firm. This decision-making model ignores much of the usual subject matter of organization theory—such as role structure and communications structure (and how they are devised and changed), how and why individuals are attracted to and leave the organization, and the influence of external affiliations. Because it ignores decision-making on matters of structure and membership, the model has many of the qualities of abstraction and unrealism (to sociologists at least) that the authors, themselves, find in the traditional entrepreneurial theory of the firm. They concede this, but believe the model justifies itself because of its predictive power. They thus make common cause, ideologically, with Friedman.

Cyert and March present some interesting examples of computer simulation of firm behavior. Starting with a specific firm and using its key theoretical variables, they attach the firm's own coefficients, predicting subsequent price and output decisions rather successfully (although their test data are admittedly meager). They then set up a general model of price and output determination for an N-firm oligopolistic market. The sensitivity of the firm behavior to certain of the specified internal parameters is also tested in a special duopoly (two-firm market) case, on the computer. The authors' interest in this latter test stems not from comparison of behavior with a real-world criterion but from being able to show progressive adaptation (through learning rules built into the model) of the behavior of the hypothetical firms to specified external market changes.

The book has a somewhat disjointed air to it, for several reasons. In the first place, some of the chapters are rewrites of earlier articles by the authors. Other chapters involve collaborators and, in some cases, independent authors. Continuity and economy in presentation are thus sacrificed. Methodological and theoretical appendixes have their usual tangential character enhanced by their involving still other collaborators. However, the book is not simply a symposium grab bag. Its loosely coupled character reflects what the authors freely admit to be the rough and tentative nature of their "theory."

The appeal of the behavioral theory to the individual reader is likely to depend on the degree to which the authors' assertions as to how individuals in firms really behave accord with the reader's own observations. If one's experience in observing business behavior leads him to believe that executive groups are typically internally bargaining coalitions, in which conflicting goals (share of market, profit, production stability) are not explicitly mediated (p. 270), in which efficient schemes of transfer pricing are likely to be bypassed in favor of negotiated rules of thumb (p. 276), and in which wage and stockholder payments are apt to be determined as much by traditional rules of the firm as by market forces (pp. 276–77), then this theory will hit home. Still unexplained by the theory are such matters as why the rules are what they are and in what direction they might be expected to change. Other exogenous variables are the determinants of executive aspiration levels and the organization structure of the firm (and, hence, the makeup of the bargaining subgroups in the coalition).

Since the old theory and the new cannot be (or are not) put side by side on the empirical test track, the non-economist is likely to find it difficult to assess the significance of the new theory. It seems to share the alleged weaknesses of traditional theory—lack of realism and lack of amenability to empirical testing of its predictive power. It is also a less parsimonious explanation than traditional theory, with less generality. One is strongly inclined to accede to the authors' suggestion that the two theories be regarded as complemen-

tary, although their interrelation remains to be described. Thus, despite the competitive tone of much of the book, the authors end up seeking coalition.

The book should be read by behavioral scientists because of its powerful and thorough exposition of decision-process analysis which has become the hallmark of work done at Carnegie Institute of Technology, and because of the description of computer simulation of decisions, which has also been a notable product of the same institution.

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Soziologie des Betriebsklima. Studien zur Deutung empirischer Untersuchungen in industriellen Grossbetrieben. By LUDWIG VON FRIEDEBURG. ("Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie," Vol. XIII.) Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1963. Pp. 143.

Manager in Mitteldeutschland. By KARL VALENTIN MÜLLER. ("Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Empirische Soziologie," Vol. II.) Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1962. Pp. 200.

Soziologie des Betriebsklima is a sequel to Volume III of the Frankfurt series, *Betriebsklima,* which reported a 1954 survey by the Institute of Social Research on "plant climate" and work satisfaction in the Mannesmann steel and mining concern. The present study is a follow-up in three respects: (a) It puts the earlier work in the context of the American, English, and German literature. (b) It discusses the methodological adequacy of questionnaire and interview techniques. (c) It relates the concept of "plant climate," which is usually used in a positivistic and manipulative fashion, to a critical theory of mass production and mass society, thus "making up" for the fact that the earlier study had been relatively unrelated to the Institute's major theoretical concerns.

Friedeburg summarizes, and sides with, the older critiques of the human-relations approach but focuses on an exploration of the paradox that wages remain manifestly important to the workers, even though survey responses seem to indicate that work satisfaction is more dependent on non-economic factors. The author accepts the explanation that wage complaints have an important symbolic function: they appear more "objective" to the parties involved than grievances about treatment by supervisors, for example. If this is true, higher wages will not change basic interpersonal causes of dissatisfaction. However, such a subjectivist interpretation does not resolve the paradox. Friedeburg argues that work satisfaction must be seen in an historical perspective. Today job security, better personal treatment, and democratization of authority relationships are more important than in the earlier stages of industrialization, but wages have remained a basic issue between labor and management. Manipulations in the human-relations tradition cannot succeed for long. The objective conditions must be bettered in order to satisfy the workers; this will produce a more satisfactory "plant atmosphere," which in turn can mitigate labor-management tensions. Hence, *Betriebsklima* has a mediating function inside as well as outside the plant.

Friedeburg's analysis is useful for American readers as a summary of the German postwar literature and a measured attempt to make such intraplant research relevant from the viewpoint of a post-Marxian theory of the affluent society.

In a fashion, the second study reflects work satisfaction negatively, since it derives its data from industrial managers and military officers who fled from Communist Germany. There are puzzling aspects to this publication, which is titled "Managers in Central Germany" on the book cover and "The Managers in the Soviet Zone" on the title page. The author, full professor at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, complains acrimoniously about lack of financial support for his study, which therefore is offered as a "torso." One reason for this lack of support may lie in his nationalist-conservative rhetoric. Old-style elitism is involved when we read that "according to the empirical knowledge of our science, very little justification can be attributed" to Communist hopes for recruiting a sufficient number of capable professionals from the lower classes: "We know that the inadequacy of hereditary equipment for certain intellectual tasks cannot be remedied through education and drill" (p. 197).

The study is something of a secondary analysis of data which Western screening com-

mittees assembled on managers, teachers, officers (and rank and file); the military men crossed over between 1951 and 1953, but it is not clear how many of the other data are of more recent origin. The study has a limited usefulness insofar as it provides information on age, family background, mobility, regional origin, professional training, political participation, and job performance. However, it does not transcend the level of modest descriptive statistics, and its major theoretical authority is James Burnham.

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Structural Anthropology. By CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS. Translated by CLAIRE JACOBSON and BROOKE GRUNDFEST SCHOEPF. New York: Basic Books, 1963. Pp. xvi+410. $10.00.

Claude Levi-Strauss' "structure" may seem to many an alien and strange thing; to action-theorists it will not. Action-theorists interested in primitive societies must welcome *Structural Anthropology* as one of the rare great works of contemporary social-anthropological analysis. Brilliantly inexact, Levi-Strauss has transfigured inexactitude; a vice of many, it is one of his virtues—a *technique*. Refusing to hope for "structure" in the empirical order, he leaves the empirical and abstracts and formalizes into pattern, into "code." Not action-theorists alone will welcome this work: any analyst appreciative of the panache of genius will find Levi-Strauss' artistry and verve astounding.

What is this thing called "structure"? Levi-Strauss refers fairly consistently to structural linguistics to give form to his concepts; for sociologists, perhaps, reference to what has come to be called a "cybernetic model" may be more communicative. Systemic interaction includes two "hierarchies," an energic one and an informational one, conceived as counter "flows." Information controls energy and energy is the condition for the actualization of information. This is the sense of Levi-Strauss' "structure": it is information, ultimately, a "code." Not interested particularly in what is but rather in what gives form to and controls what is. Levi-Strauss searches for the formative codes of interaction. These he calls "structure."

David Schneider has accused him of a peculiar "reductionism," of reducing to the cognitive. Others may sense this, too; but I do not. It is true that Levi-Strauss does not consider the conditional energic hierarchy and seems almost wholly concerned with analysis of the informational components of interaction; but this is his concern and he has with fair precision defined it. He chooses to use a term—"structure"—that others have used in senses different from his; his alternative was the creation of a neologism. It is true that for Levi-Strauss structure is symbolic, but this need not mean that he has thrown the "affective" out of theory, as symbols are multireferential and can be differentially cathected. (He may be considered especially removed from informational reductionism by the fact that the greatest energic reductionist of them all, Karl Marx, has had a formative influence on his work.)

There is, however, a worrisome element in what Levi-Strauss does—or, perhaps better. what he does not do. He has not yet defined with any precision at all the rules by which he selects and manipulates data. His concepts. it seems to me, are clear (as clear, at least, as any of our concepts are); his purpose, his end-in-view, is clear; and the results of his analyses are clear and convincing—but there is his disquieting panache. He seems almost to use it as a magician's wand. Levi-Strauss "brings it off," but I cannot help muttering "by the skin of his teeth" and wondering "how does he do it?" By what criteria—sensitivity alone? insight?—does he select as "significant" this fact, rejecting that fact? There is artistry. at least, in what he does, and there may well be science; but we are justified, I think, in asking Levi-Strauss to write his Rules, his Methodology.

Nevertheless, however justified we may be in asking Levi-Strauss for more, he has given us much already. His publishers have done American scholarship an important service by bringing *Structural Anthropology* into English. May we begin to hope for *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* and *La pensée sauvage?*

CHARLES ACKERMAN

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Politics of Change in Latin America. Edited by JOSEPH MAIER and RICHARD W. WEATHERHEAD. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xxi+258.

This is an interesting and valuable book, published for the twin purposes of honoring Professor Frank Tannenbaum of Columbia University and of presenting a group of useful essays on contemporary Latin America. The book is peculiarly significant because most of the chapters deal with problems—social, economic, and cultural changes in the Americas, with some attention to their political implications—of urgent current concern among social scientists. Much present-day thinking about the processes of change is gathered here in sufficiently accessible form to be used widely and appreciatively by students of change in the western hemisphere.

Each of the editors has contributed a chapter, and the other essays have been supplied by a generally distinguished company of Latin Americanists. As is almost inevitably true of symposiums, some of the essays are better than others; but in this case none of the others is really bad. The thirteen contributions are organized into four parts. The first two parts consider internal problems in Latin America, the third focuses on Brazil, and the last examines the international scene with emphasis on the Alliance for Progress. Especially solid essays have been contributed by Robert J. Alexander of Rutgers University on the emergence of modern Latin American political parties; and by Gilberto Freyre, the celebrated dean of the analysts of the social problems of Brazil, on the bases of that country's society.

So far as the specific countries are concerned, the book takes a general view of the Americas, with only Mexico and Brazil singled out for separate and comparatively intensive treatment. The two chapters on the Mexican Revolution, one by the Mexican educator and writer Daniel Cosío Villegas and the other by Stanley R. Ross of the State University of New York, are particularly interesting, at least as much because of the contrast between them as because of what either essay says as a unit. The historical process of the Mexican Revolution has been such that, until World War II, basic changes had been in such fields as land reform, reduction of foreign investment, and curtailment of the role of the Roman Catholic church, whereas postwar developments have drifted from those concerns to such enterprises as economic development and industrialization. In his essay, "The Mexican Left," Cosío Villegas takes the view, common among Mexican intellectuals, that the current "rightist tendency" in the Revolution is to be regretted and the country needs a "new Left." Regarding the Revolution as a species of unfinished symphony, Cosío Villegas is largely concerned with ways and means of guiding it back to its prewar fold. On the other hand, Ross, dubbing Mexico's "The Preferred Revolution," assigns a high value—especially in a cold-war context—to the preservation of the country's present middle course.

The Brazilian part of the book is composed of three essays, the first being that by Freyre. The second, by Charles Wagley, the Columbia University anthropologist, is based on a number of new community studies essentially similar in type to those that initially gained him fame. The last, by Anthony Leeds of the University of Texas, is, from a political standpoint, the most interesting of the three. Called "Brazil and the Myth of Francisco Julião," the essay attempts, with considerable success, to set the political problem of the northeastern coast within the complex perspective of the sprawling total Brazilian picture. The over-all effect is healthful—Julião and the northeast remain serious problems, but they are fresh, new, and valid when adjusted to the scale of the entire nation.

The last part of the book, dealing with foreign-policy problems, is also composed of three chapters. The first, by Maier, concerned with the effect of the race problem in the United States upon Latin America, does not quite come off. It is easy to agree with Maier that the problem is important, but he offers us no system of analysis, quantitative or otherwise for studying it or assessing its magnitude. The other two essays deal with the Alliance for Progress. One, by Germán Arciniegas, the celebrated Colombian intellectual and statesman, is largely psychological in character, emphasizing the propaganda advantage of words like "alliance" and "progress" over such formerly used terms as "aid" and "assistance." Finally, Victor L. Urquidi, the able Mexican economist, offers the challenge of hard-hitting economic analysis of

what the Alliance for Progress may, and may not, be expected to accomplish in stimulating economic development in the participating countries.

Politics of Change in Latin America, dealing in uneven fashion with vital contemporary problems, seldom strays from questions of fundamental significance and is, on balance, an addition of some value to the growing literature on social, economic, and political change in the Americas.

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An Anatomy of Kinship: Mathematical Models for Structures of Cumulated Roles. By HARRISON C. WHITE. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963. Pp. ii+180.

The first thing to get clearly in mind about this book is the fact that it is really a book about kinship terms, genealogy, and marriage classes but not otherwise a book about kinship roles or kinship relations or kinship systems. An American Catholic addresses his sire and his priest by the same term, "father." A Kariera addresses his son and his brother's son by the same term, "*maiñga*." Neither speaker supposes that use of a common relationship term implies identity of social roles. Throughout chapter i, Harrison White speaks frequently about kinship roles and kinship structures, rarely mentioning kinship terminology. Yet Axiom IB (p. 10), on which all the work of the chapter rests, is nonsense if we are talking about the distinctions in social roles and social structures that differentiate the behavior of a Kariera father toward his biological son whom he nurtures and trains on one hand and toward his classificatory "son," toward a stranger whose kinship linkages prove him to be also *maiñga*, on the other. Axiom IB reads: "The tree of kinship roles must be such that all persons who are alters (have equivalent roles) with respect to one person as ego must be alters with respect to any other person as ego." The term *alter* "describes the identity relation ego perceives between two persons in the same role with respect to ego; for example, Mac and Sam, two father's brothers, have identical roles in ego's view." Consider also Bob, the youngest brother of both Mac (the eldest) and Sam; Bob is the father of Jim and the husband of Helen. Now if Axiom IB is to hold, Sam must also be Helen's husband, and he must also be Jim's father. This follows since to Mac both Sam and Bob are younger brothers. It is one thing to posit a system in which Helen calls Bob and Sam by the same kinship term, and another to posit a polyandrous system where both are functional equivalents as husbands. I know of no society where polyandry is obligatory rather than merely optional. In any society where it is possible for Sam as middle brother lawfully to marry Barbara while Bob as youngest brother may marry Helen, without Helen's marrying Sam or Barbara's marrying Bob, then Axiom IB is violated. Thus, in terms of actual human kinship role systems, Axiom IB is unheard of and makes sense only if we confine our attention strictly to kinship *terms*, not concerning ourselves about actual social roles of people addressed or referred to by the same kinship term.

The second thing to get clearly in mind about this book is that it is an anatomy of kinship only in the sense that a treatise on the gall bladder is a human anatomy. The claims of its dust jacket give another impression, which White's preface and introduction say nothing to dispel. The book is indeed a treatise on kinship terminology, but only on a minor, if interesting and important, branch of the subject. It confines its attention to closed systems in which among other things (1) every member of the society refers to every other member by one or another kinship term and (2) the system of kinship terms thus used designates a particular group from which and only from which a particular member can lawfully select a marriage or sex partner. Systems like this are widespread among Australian aborigines but elsewhere are rare and unusual.

The third thing to get clearly in mind about this book is that it is primarily concerned with mathematical-model-building. I once heard R. Duncan Luce reply, when asked when he thought mathematical models would have definite application to actual social systems, "Give us a thousand years." The tree diagrams which are the topic of chapter i are not applied to any particular actual kinship system. The matrix algebra models which are the topic of

chapter ii are in the third chapter applied to several actual systems, but only one, the Kariera, corresponds properly. And White himself concedes that the Kariera data on which he relies are incomplete and untrustworthy (p. 95). Two-thirds of the book is about models per se and only one-third about the application of some of them to actual social systems.

The book would be easier to use, and safer to recommend to students, if White had done his homework on kinship. He might have taken greater pains to keep kinship roles and kinship terms sorted out in his mind if he had studied Kroeber's famous paper on classificatory kinship terms. And if he had studied the classic analyses of kinship terminology by Spier and Lowie, he might have been more modest about his own contribution, which suffers by comparison and does not as he suggests (p. 3) excel in rigor and system. But even more important, if he had looked into contemporary componential analysis, he would have found sophisticated anthropologists using equal rigor, equal system, and far greater clarity and elegance to attack the whole problem of semantic classification. White's book is in fact more of a contribution to semantic classification than it is to sociology, but nowhere in the work is that fact suggested. White seems unaware of such fellow laborers in the vineyard of semantic classification of kinship terms as Lounsberry, Goodenough, Conklin, Wallace, Atkins, Burling, and Frake.

The usual mathematical tools of the componential analyst are simple plane diagrams which require no mathematical training—not even geometry or algebra—to understand. White's matrix models, on the other hand, require a grasp of matrix algebra to follow. Ordinary high school algebra (linear and quadratic equations) will not help the reader, White's claim to the contrary notwithstanding.

Do White's equations tell us anything useful or interesting about closed systems of kinship terminology which cannot be more effectively communicated by other means? I don't think so. But I do think that the relationship diagrams of chapter iii, which mathematically resemble componential analysis, are indeed helpful. He points out, for example, that the traditional four-section model of Kariera kinship, the Kariera people's own model, is inadequate. We need an eight-section model, which White provides for us. Rather than use matrix algebra to define the Kariera kinship terms precisely, I believe this can be done more effectively in componential terms. A male-speaking ego's *maeli*, for example, appears to be simply a male member of ego's section at a distance of $2n$ generations from ego, where n may be positive or negative, but must be an integer other than zero. (White rashly speaks of "clan" instead of "section," which will not endear him to the brethren.) Nevertheless, naïvely and without instruction White does so well at semantic classification that I believe we can hope for some important work from him after he reads up on the subject. (He might well begin with the analysis of Kariera kinship by Romney and Epling in the *American Anthropologist*, LX, 59–74.)

To sum up, I cannot recommend either chapter i or ii to sociologists or anthropologists since in my opinion neither adds to our knowledge or understanding of kinship terminology or marriage relationships. I am not qualified to pass on their mathematical models as such; perhaps models men may find them interesting. Chapter iii constitutes a useful collection of analyses of several actual systems of kinship terminology and marriage classes.

RAOUL NAROLL[1]

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Incest. By ÉMILE DURKHEIM and ALBERT ELLIS. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1963. Pp. 168. $4.95.

Incest is a slim volume containing two essays. The first and larger one is by Émile Durkheim on "The Nature and Origin of the Incest Taboo." The second is by Albert Ellis on "The Origins and the Development of the Incest Taboo."

Durkheim traces the origin of the incest taboo to the ritualistic, religious-dominated practice of exogamy, the rule that prohibited sexual union between members of the same clan. The clan is defined as a group of individuals who were related because they were bearers of the same totem. The totem is the

[1] Oswald Werner contributed valuable comments and suggestions to this review, for whose shortcomings I alone remain responsible.

ancestor and the god-protector of the clan. In its earliest form, membership in the clan was determined through the female. Durkheim believes that all societies passed through the clan stage or were born from societies which had previously passed through it.

The rule of exogamy had its origins, according to Durkheim, in primitive man's abhorrence and fear of blood, especially menstrual blood. Contact with blood was taboo. Thus the women of the clan, who were perceived as carriers of the totem's blood, were taboo for all men in the clan. Not only were the women taboo as sexual objects but Durkheim believed that a religious fear prevailed in all contacts with women in the clan, and that all relationships between men and women of the same clan were reduced to a minimum. Contacts of sexual character were most strongly excluded because to have had sexual relations with a woman of the same clan meant that the man had contact with blood whose terrible properties were passed on to him. He thus became dangerous both to himself and to others.

When totemism disappeared, and with it the special relationship of the clan, exogamy became the cohesive force of the new types of familial units which were formed and which rested on other bases. Through gradual evolution, the prohibitions against endogamy were limited to smaller and smaller units up to the present time, when marriages between ascendants and descendants and between brothers and sisters are the only ones that are strongly prohibited. But just as the clan was the center of religious life and all relationships within the clan had something of a religious nature about them, so did the concept extend to the family. Sexual relationships were classified as profane and had to be contracted elsewhere.

Durkheim traces from the practice of exogamy all sorts of habits and beliefs which are now part of our moral temperament. Long after the totemic beliefs that had given birth to exogamy were extinguished, the mental states that they incited remained. Thus he explains the origin of the incest taboo.

In this essay on "The Origins and the Development of the Incest Taboo," Albert Ellis reviews and evaluates Durkheim's theory in the light of the other explanations that have been offered about the origins of the incest taboo. He devotes about a paragraph each to Freud's belief that the incest taboo stemmed from sexual jealousies and from the guilt reactions of sons against hostile feelings toward their fathers; to Malinowski's explanation that the incest taboo was established because incest is incompatible with family life and would disorganize its very foundations; to Leslie White's theory that incest would sabotage the high degree of mutual aid and co-operation among different family groups that is necessary for the maintainance of human life; and to several other theories.

In considering Durkheim's explanation. Ellis says that it is important to ask a prior question, namely, why did the deep-seated religious-superstitious ideas and rituals which Durkheim claimed were the basis of exogamy arise? Where did these sentiments come from? Ellis finds his answer in his belief that man is born with a biological tendency to create, to perpetuate, and to regulate his sexual-social behavior by religiously inspired rules. He presents twenty-one points to strengthen his discovery that man is innately "a highly irrational, religious-superstitious animal who invariably more or less defeats himself by his own crooked, indiscriminating, often inflexible thinking."

Having arrived at this image of man, Ellis concludes his criticism of Durkheim's theory on a positive note—"he could well have been right." The reviewer's conclusions are less positive. Durkheim's essay is both interesting and suggestive but his belief that the practice of exogamy and the basis for that practice explain the pervasiveness of the incest taboo is not convincing. Ellis's essay adds little to persuade one of the validity of Durkheim's theory.

RITA JAMES SIMON

University of Illinois

March to Calumny. By ALBERT D. BIDERMAN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1963. Pp. 306. $5.95.

March to Calumny is a polemic against those who claim that there was wholesale collaboration by American prisoners with their Communist captors during the Korean War, and that this unprecedented misbehavior revealed alarming weaknesses in our national character.

Biderman focuses his polemic primarily against the assertions of Eugene Kinkhead which appeared first in a series of articles in the *New Yorker* magazine and then in a single volume entitled *In Every War But One* (1959). Kinkhead's assertions which according to Biderman contained the most extensive elaboration of the thesis for which his book was intended as an antidote, were widely quoted in many magazines and newspapers throughout the country. One statement which gained particularly wide currency was that "almost one out of every three American prisoners in Korea was guilty of some sort of collaboration with the enemy" and that "one in every seven was guilty of serious collaboration." Kinkhead and others concluded from their evaluation of the performance of American prisoners in Korea that there are basic weaknesses in army discipline, in the character of American youth, and in basic American social institutions. One of the specific changes that they recommended as a remedy for the weakness in army discipline was an abandonment of the democratizing innovations in service policy that followed World War II. For strengthening the character of American youth they recommended "a specific understanding of the differences between our way of life and the Communist way of life—and in the blunt, old-fashioned spirit, a firm regard for right and an abiding distaste for wrong. . . ."

In *March to Calumny,* the author sets as his primary task that of isolating and evaluating specific errors regarding the Korean prisoner-of-war history that gained that greatest currency and in his opinion represented the most serious distortions from fact. The issues on which Biderman concentrates his attack are (1) that one in every three Americans was guilty of some sort of collaboration; (2) that no American escaped from captivity; (3) that the death rate among prisoners which is estimated at a minimum of 38 per cent was higher than in any other war and that a good part of it was due to the ignorance and callousness of the prisoners themselves; and (4) that the behavior of army prisoners compared invidiously with those of other services or nationalities.

One piece of evidence which Biderman cites to discount the assertion that one out of three American prisoners was a collaborator is a report from the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War which stated that investigations of alleged prisoner misconduct gave a total of 192 or 4.3 per cent, out of 4,428 returned prisoners as the maximum possible number of misbehavior cases. Biderman also makes the point that behavior that appeared as collaboration in most instances served another and very important function. He interprets such behavior as making broadcasts for the Communists, signing their names to petitions, and including propaganda themes in their letters home as the prisoners way of letting their families and the outside world know that they were still alive, and not as signs of weakness or sympathy for Communist ideology.

On the second point, that no Americans escaped once they were captured, Biderman cites the army casualty reports in which 647 men were listed as "returned to military control from missing in action—escaped."

On the reasons for the high death rate, Biderman points out that a distinctive feature of the Korean war was that an overwhelming proportion of the Americans who were prisoners of war were captured very early during the war and had to live through the severest conditions in order to survive. In previous wars, the bulk of prisoners was generally taken during the period when the armies were in the state of collapse that generally precedes the termination of conflict, or were spread out throughout the duration of the conflict. Death rates among Americans in Korea are comparable with death rates among those groups of Americans in previous wars who were also prisoners during the periods when prisoner treatment and physical environment were at their worst. For example, of the American prisoners captured at the beginning of World War II in the Philippines, 60 per cent are believed to have died.

March to Calumny is a significant book because it deals with an important problem. In the past, most accounts of the behavior of prisoners of war were concerned primarily with details of atrocities against the prisoners by the enemy. But after the Korean war the stories that appeared in the mass media about American prisoners almost always left the reader with negative impressions of their behavior. The soldiers were pictured as weak, disloyal, poorly disciplined, and ill prepared for survival under captivity. Kinkhead and others

who wrote in this vein warned of the far-reaching implications of the prisoners' behavior for American society. They recommended basic changes in military as well as civilian institutions. As he has done in his other writings on the behavior of captives, Albert Biderman in *March to Calumny* has marshalled evidence that persuaded this reviewer of the falsities and distortions in much of the earlier writings about the Korean prisoner-of-war history.

RITA SIMON JAMES
University of Illinois

Local Government and Politics in Uganda. By FRED G. BURKE. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. xii+274. $7.50.

Comparative studies of community politics are just beginning to be made in this country. For those in the vanguard of this effort, Fred Burke's work will be doubly welcome. Focusing on three "localities" in the new Ugandan nation, Burke analyzes and compares their political systems in terms of five social structures that are assumed to be relevant to the maintenance of local order and integration: (1) authoritative decision-making, (2) recruitment and role definition, (3) accountability and consent,(4) sanction and coercion, and (5) resource procurement and allocation. Insights produced by this arrangement of the data take on additional significance by virtue of Burke's self-conscious methodological stance, which is later (pp. 239–46) used to develop a rough typology of local political systems. Burke thus offers a method as well as the substance produced by its use.

An inquiry of this kind conducted in a foreign culture is particularly welcome, for it provides a tonic against the tendency of many American community researchers to avoid analysis of cultural presuppositions that are taken for granted by scholar and subject alike. Burke, an American in Uganda, can take nothing for granted. Indeed, an important facet of his approach consists of explicating cultural beliefs which, though implicit and unexamined in the minds of his subjects, appear to Burke as crucial determinants of political behavior. Analysis of these beliefs enables the author to reveal the considerable extent to which locality politics are dominated by traditional values and loyalties that frequently clash with the requirements of a British-imposed "modern" governmental structure. His chapter on the Bukedi district—in which there are seven distinct tribes located in six different counties—is recommended reading for anyone who may be inclined to minimize the difficulty of implementing political change in an area dominated by a variety of tribal cultures and tribal loyalties. By showing us political systems in explicit relationship to cultural contexts, Burke gives a valuable lesson.

Despite these virtues, the book falls short of the logical and analytic rigor to which Burke aspires. For one thing his definition of "locality," based as it is on territory, does not distinguish the unit he wants to study from other governments which are similarly defined. Nor does Burke appear to appreciate the distinction between functions and structures or functional and structural requisites. Much of his analysis rests upon an implicit model of the structural requisites of British local government. He fails to make this model explicit, however, with the result that contrasts between it and the "locality" systems become haphazard, repetitious, and in the end, less powerful than they might have been. A similar lack of precision characterizes his generous use of terms associated with his "structural-functional method." I count at least four different meanings given by Burke to the adjective "diffuse," for example, not to mention innumerable cases of adverbial usage.

But over all, Burke's shortcomings seem to me to be less significant than his considerable achievement in providing a close look at the fascinating and immensely complicated process of political change in one African country. Students of American and African politics will profit from reading it.

THOMAS J. ANTON
University of Illinois

The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence. Edited by L. A. FALLERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xxvi+414. $6.40.

This valuable interdisciplinary analysis of an intriguing and significant society illustrates the ready utility of the "area study" technique

when it is employed by scholars at least as interested in people and their society as in disciplinary *finesse*. *The King's Men* is a product of the East African Institute of Social Research and has been edited with impressive cogency and direction by Lloyd Fallers. Although three disciplines are represented by the five major contributing authors, the presentation of data and the conduct of analysis are offered with a sense of intellectual community yielding little irrelevant *esoterica* and much genuine agreement about what happened and what is happening in Buganda.

The subtitle *Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence* suggests the political focus of the volume. This is wholly appropriate; politics are perhaps the most interesting feature of Buganda society. Not only is the transition to independence of significance, but the nature of the leadership of the *Kabaka*—the Ganda chief—has long fascinated social scientists. *The King's Men* offers a wealth of information and considerable controlled discussion of this and related matters.

In a terse but rich chapter, Wrigley describes the changing economic structure of Buganda and carefully outlines the interaction between Buganda imperialism and Ganda social structure. Assisted by Kamoga, Musoke, and Elkan, Fallers provides three chapters of elaborately sensitive discussion of social stratification and mobility in traditional and modern Buganda. Southward analyzes leadership at the village level and its role in translating policies into meaningful local enterprise. Although his frustratingly imprecise use of the "West" and "Western-type" as contrasts obscures some of Doob's findings in a psychological study of leaders, followers, and attitudes to authority, his work handily complements his colleagues' in this central area. Richards outlines traditional patterns of authority and updates them in a discussion of current political behaviour. Her Epilogue remedies an omission in the body of the material—some examination of the relationship of Buganda with Uganda and contemporary African political movements.

The omission is significant and betrays the Ganda, not the authors. Once an imperial people, still enjoying some fruits of their conquest and booty, the Ganda possess traditions of politics and self-conceptions which have made strenuous the acceptance of the real and valid existence of other peoples. Accustomed to the reflexes of Empire, the British were acceptable though frequently intractable. But the demands of community with persons outside the complex system of fealty, reward, and tradition which the *Kabaka* both dominates and reflects have created considerable difficulties for the Ganda. Not only European imperialists find postcolonial equality difficult to accept and understand.

Some comparative discussion of possible common factors in postimperial societies of various backgrounds might have been useful. And this possibility might have been further explored: that Ugandan and Bugandan participation in international bureaucratic activity can be the functional equivalent of colonialism inasmuch as it and the accompanying "international demonstration effect" induce comparable distortion and strains within local society.

It will be interesting to restudy Buganda in a few years. Richards observes change already in Ganda political perceptions as there is a reaction to Uganda nationalism and the broader forces of Pan Africa. How flexible societies can be (even those studiously and proudly inflexible) would be interesting to know; Buganda should provide fine case material. And whenever further study of Buganda is undertaken it will find a sturdy basis in this tutored, meaningful contribution to our knowledge of East Africa.

LIONEL TIGER

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Unions in Emerging Societies: Frustration and Politics. By SIDNEY C. SUFRIN. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. vii+124. $4.50.

Because of their weakly articulated structures and chaotic systems of internal administration, trade unions in developing countries have been neglected by students of social change. Yet, as Sufrin shows in this slim volume, unions play a crucial role in a great many of the "new" countries. Recent events on the African continent in the two Congo republics and in Dahomey have illustrated the strength of unions in local situations.

The author begins his analysis by examining

the activities of Western unions. His model is heavily based on American trade union experience and includes European unions only peripherally. The activities of Western unions are mainly consumptionist (as they have been called by Isaac Deutscher) and underdeveloped unions differ primarily in their heavier orientation toward politics and government for the solution of union problems. Sufrin discusses the contradictions as unions seek to continue consumptionist activities against a background of economic development in the new nations. At the same time, governments are forced to orient themselves toward unions not only to control them but also because of their need for roots in weakly institutionalized political systems.

Sufrin attempts to construct a theory of labor organization in underdeveloped countries by summarizing the work of Moore and Feldman, John T. Dunlop, Clark Kerr and his colleagues, and others. No theory emerges from this discussion of a variety of commentators on development; indeed, the interjection of Udy's types of preindustrial production organizations reflects the lack of integration in the attempt since it is unrelated to the discussion. Thus no systematic theory is presented around which a case study—on Pakistan—can be examined.

Sufrin summarizes the labor situation in Pakistan briefly. As he points out, Pakistani labor statistics are "scanty and unsatisfactory," and this is illustrated by substantial discrepancies in membership figures and numbers of registered unions in 1955 in Tables II and IV (originating in Pakistani sources). Sufrin incorrectly refers to the structure of the Pakistani unions as "industrial," although most students of union structure would call these "house" unions since they organize all workers employed by a single employer irrespective of occupational differences. The distinction between house and industrial unions is significant since the units which are aggregated are different and this produces different loci of power and organization.

Close to half of the book is devoted to reproducing and updating an annotated bibliography originally published in 1961.

WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND

Cornell University

When Caste Barriers Fall: A Study of Social and Economic Change in a South Indian Village. By DAGFINN SIVERTSEN. New York: Humanities Press, 1963. Pp. 141. $4.00.

This book is based upon field work conducted during 1957–58 in Thyagasamuthiram (TM), Tanjore District, Madras. The author, connected with the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, is concerned with what he observed was the successful action taken by an organized group of Sudras (low castes) and Pariahs (Untouchables) against Brahman landlords of the village. Through a strike launched at a strategic moment in the harvest cycle, the association was able to achieve substantial wage gains for the laborers. The author suggests that although this association may have been started through efforts of communists residing outside the village, its struggle was effectively primarily because of the changing socioeconomic relationships within the village.

To substantiate this, the author devotes almost three-fourths of his study to the careful presentation of observations and statistical data relating to intercaste behavior, land ownership, the system of cultivation, and income and employment patterns. Fourteen useful tables are given (although, regrettably for comparative analysis, they lack percentage figures).

Included in the prolific statistical data is little indication of the rate of change over time. Sivertsen does observe, however, that "traditional relationships of domination-subordination are gradually being replaced by contractual employer-employee relations"; that Sudras are buying out Brahman lands; that courts now tend to favor tenants over Brahman landlords in suits over rent arrears (this situation would appear unusual in comparison with the conduct generally attributed to lower courts in this respect in India). In the course of his study, the author also mentions other facts that reflect the capacity of the low castes to defy the traditional authority of the Brahman: the general atmosphere of anti-Brahmanism permeating the South; most of the Brahman landlords live outside the village, thus minimizing face-to-face contact; Sudras do large-scale borrowing mainly from non-residents, thus minimizing their dependency upon Brahman landlords; some Sudras had enough economic power to offer leases of

their own lands to others threatened with loss of leases if they joined the association. The Brahmans' economic and political strength within TM was limited even despite their formal alliance with wealthier estate landlords of neighboring villages.

These facts are especially important to note, for in comparison, other case studies have indicated that where one caste in a village is more dominant than are the Brahmans in TM, where political resources are more cumulative, and where economic disparities are more extreme, lower castes tend to lack leverage by which they can gain concessions from the traditional power holders.

One wishes that Sivertsen had analyzed more deeply the methods used both by the outside organizers and the indigenous leaders for the large-scale mobilization of low-caste and untouchable support; and that he had detailed the nature of attitudes and aspirations of those who participated (and those who did not) in the strike. Nonetheless this study may be considered a very useful contribution to the growing literature documenting the differential conditions under which social, economic and political change is taking place in village India today.

One can only hope that the author can revisit the village, to observe, for instance, whether caste barriers have fallen further; whether the strike was more than an isolated incident; and what effect a statutory village *panchayat*—not established at the time of the study—may be having upon the process of socioeconomic change.

PHYLLIS J. ROLNICK

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A New Maori Migration: Rural and Urban Relations in Northern New Zealand. By JOAN METGE. ("London School of Economic Monographs on Social Anthropology," No. 27.) New York: Humanities Press. Pp. x+299. *37s. 6d.*

The Maori of New Zealand are recent arrivals in the city. According to Joan Metge, their migration has been viewed, like that of other peoples, as a social problem to be solved eventually by assimilation. Her research indicates, however, that the rural communities of the Maori are by no means so isolated, stable, and traditional as to be antithetical to urban centers, that migration from them to cities is part of an established pattern and involves little cutting of ties, and that the Maori are unlikely to lose their identity as an ethnic group.

She makes her case convincingly by describing Maori life in a rural area in the far North and in Auckland. She presents a wealth of detail about the demography, economic organization, kinship system, leadership, and community solidarity of rural and urban dwellers. Yet her account fails to be engrossing for a number of reasons, some of which she herself mentions. She has been scrupulous to safeguard her informants' anonymity, at the cost of vividness in her report. Not having won the full confidence of the proud and sensitive people she studied she both writes as an outsider and avoids topics about which the Maori are especially defensive. Though aware of the inadequacies of old conceptual frameworks for interpreting her data, she is diffident about developing a new one. She tells little about the sentiments and actions of New Zealanders of European stock toward the Maori, although she implies a comparative lack of prejudice and discrimination toward a coloured group by an Anglo-Saxon one that is intriguing. She is also niggardly with comparisons between the situation of the Maori and that of other newly urbanized people.

Metge's book, a revised version of her doctoral thesis, is so competent in many respects that it is to be hoped she will return to her topic again and more boldly.

JEAN BURNET

University of Toronto

Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation. By RICHARD L. SKLAR. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. xi+578. $12.50.

Nigeria is now probably the best documented of the new African states. That this is so is largely to the credit of Richard Sklar, and perhaps only those familiar with the problems of field research in Africa can really appre-

ciate the prodigious amount of work that has gone into this volume. Although his avowed interest is "the distribution and the exercise of power within and among political parties" (p. 207), any future study of any aspect of the political process in Nigeria will find a great deal that is relevant here.

However, the main strength of this book is also its major weakness. In a sense Sklar has been far too modest. In his Preface he remarks (p. v) that

> I have shied away from any rendering of Nigerian politics which imposes a burden of interpretation on the actual data beyond what they can reasonably sustain. For the most part, I have been content to set forth the pertinent data and documentary evidence in the hope that their accuracy will survive the test of further research.

In fact, it may be suggested that a far greater burden of interpretation could have been laid upon a lesser amount of data. We are often in danger of forgetting the main themes of the book because we have to grapple with the great quantity of evidence used to support them. In the midst of detailed descriptions of events at the national, regional and local levels we tend to lose sight of the important general questions: what constituted "political power" in Nigeria in 1951–58, the central period of this study? Who wielded it, and to what effect? How were these questions affected by the interrelationship between the three levels of activity mentioned above? The author discusses all these problems, but he could have directed our attention more rigidly toward them. We would thus have been in a better position to evaluate his judgments in his final, most important chapter, "The Social Basis of the Party-Power System"; some of them, such as "In Nigeria, the power exercised by leaders of the major political parties would appear to derive mainly from the class and communal foundations of those parties and their unofficial ancillary structures" (p. 501), are central to the whole book.

It may be asking too much to demand a mass of new material *and a* fully developed series of general propositions. At this stage Sklar has probably performed his greatest service in making available so much detailed information. The fact that he has at the same time gone a considerable distance toward synthesizing it into a series of theoretical postulates on the nature of Nigerian politics is an indication of our debt to him.

K. W. J. Post

University of Birmingham

Myth and Cult among Primitive Peoples. By Adolf E. Jensen. Translated by M. T. Choldin and W. Weissleder. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. x+349. $8.75.

Language barriers mark off fairly isolated communities of scholars. The work of German-speaking anthropologists and historians of religion has only little contact with similar work in English, and the Anglo-American tradition is even more isolated from what goes on in other language communities. Thus it is of considerable interest that one of the major works of a leading German student of religious anthropology is available in translation. The uninitiated will find himself in a new world. Most likely, his first reaction will be one of distrust and even horror, for many of the rules that have become standard in his own community are violated. It should be noted in this connection that European (or at least continental) studies traditionally raise fundamental problems of human existence and emphasize venturesomeness and suggestiveness rather than caution and solidity. In any case, the reader will find much that is new both in the facts presented and in the methods followed. That should, properly attract than repel him.

The theses of the study can be divided into three groups: historical, structural, and philosophical or psychological—all of which are combined in what (following Frobenius) is designated as a morphological approach. Although pure historical considerations are downgraded, the basic historical thrust is so strong that for American readers it will probably draw most interest. Jensen's own first-hand research has been focused particularly on cultures characterized, on the economic scale, by root-crop cultivation. Among these, he finds forms of the divine which he calls *Dema* deities. These are of the culture-hero type; they die (are killed) at the end

of the mythological period and then live on in animate or inanimate objects. They are not personally present as are the deities of polytheistic religion, but are actualized in ritual which is empowered by the sacred past. From the ritual killing of this culture stratum bloody sacrifices have developed. High-god religion, centered in sky deities, Jensen finds most typical of cattle-breeding culture, including the Nilotic culture, which he has compared to the life of ancient Israel in the *Festschrift* for Paul Radin. Beliefs in spirits are similarly differentiated according to cultural developments. The rigidities of Graebner's and Schmidt's systems are rejected, he implies, by later German scholarship, but not the very principle of the culture area or culture-historical approach.

On the inner structure of cult, Jensen insists that the feature of genuine religion is the remembrance of a primordial past and the imitation of divine deeds. He places very little emphasis on the conception of ritual as itself powerful. Magic, including Shamanism, he interprets as an applied phase of religion. Since the essence of religion is non-purposive, such an application is, for him, a degenerate form. Other degenerate categories are: etiological myths, the notion of sacrifices as gifts, and the belief in spirits of certain kinds. Such phenomena are repeatedly stated to be secondary continuations and developments of elements that were vitally important in an earlier stage. Even assuming that the historical reconstruction is correct a thoroughgoing structural approach would ask for their later function. His operational analysis, indeed, marks, in the reviewer's opinion, no significant progress beyond Malinowski's *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. (He never refers to this work—although he often comes to similar conclusions—or to the theories of Boas, Evans-Pritchard, Hubert Mauss, E. O. James, Kroebre, Nadel, Redfield, or, for that matter, to the theories of his colleague G. Mensching, although he shows a fairly thorough acquaintance with empirical work both in German and in English. His discussion of theoretical construction is indeed surprisingly weak for a systematically oriented work.)

The most original (in the sense of unusual) aspect of the study appears in the psychological or philosophical discussions. Jensen assimilates the mythological category of a remembrance of primeval events to the historical perspective of a memory of creative moment in the human race. He believes that whatever has deep meaning in religion is the effect of especially creative persons upon their immediate and more distant followers. The religious person's memory motif is thus justified by the fact that there have indeed been periodic outbursts in the history of mankind to which one can refer back. The ordinary person has imagination of a sort (such as represented in images) but not of a profundity to equal that of the great, even though the latter may be anonymous. Modern society, however, he insists, is relatively more mobile and less dependent on the past than are the "petrified" primitive communities, for whom religion has too often reached the stage of an applied phase. Although the reviewer cannot agree with some of the reasoning employed, Jensen's emphasis on the non-purposive character of creative acts is well supported by other investigators. Whether modern man is more open to that kind of creativity is doubtful; in fact, modern man's inherent superiority is denied by Jensen in his fight against K. T. Preuss's theory of the *Urdummheit* (primal stupidity) of primitive man. Jensen might, however, have pointed out that civilized society possesses sufficient institutional complexity to permit the development and retention of more elaborate and presumably more incisive thoughts than is possible in primitive groups. (Thus the higher theologies of the great religions are largely non-purposive, even though popular religion is often quite applied.)

For American students of society and culture, Jensen's work may well be counted as the book of the year, despite reservations that everyone will have. The richness of the work can only be hinted at here; its major value may even lie in its details rather than in its theory. The delineation of the *Dema* concept is a particularly important contribution.

MARTIN J. BUSS

Emory University

Interest Groups in Italian Politics. By JOSEPH LA PALOMBARA. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. xv+452. $8.50

A vivid childhood memory keeps the sight throughout one spring and summer of a new field, lately woodland, being brought into cultivation. Boulders and stumps still infested the field, but how carefully were they located, marked for later action, and thus a difficult and perilous task was made manageable.

One has similar feelings after reading Joseph La Palombara's *Interest Groups in Italian Politics.* This is a pioneering effort aimed at discovery. New ground is broken and brought under intellectual care and cultivation.

It was not necessary to determine the existence of interest groups in Italian politics. That was known and, to some extent, was demonstrable. Utilizing in combination both old and newer methods of analysis, La Palombara has joined together the techniques of reading about a problem, direct observation of overt phenomena relating thereto, questionnaire research, and the interview in depth of knowledgeable persons.

There emerges what might be called a topographic map of the terrain of Italian politics in terms of overt interest groups, rather some of the major ones since admittedly only a portion of them could be studied. Thus industry, agriculture, labor, and Catholic Action groupings receive by far the greatest amount of attention.

The interaction of these groups with political party, Parliament, its committees, the ministries and the over-all bureaucracy receives deserved consideration and is discussed in a number of chapters. Each of these is well executed, full of perceptive insights, with a need to balance the evidence for or against a claimed role for each of the major interest groups. The principal ones may be noted as follows: *Confindustria* for industry and commerce, the so-called Direct Cultivators and the *Confagricultura* for agriculture; the *CGIL* (Italian General Confederation of Labor) and the *CISL* (Italian Confederation of Workers Unions) for labor, *Catholic Action* and its subsidiary groups for the role of the Catholic element in Italy.

Developing a taxonomic approach to interest group activity, La Palombara uses the concept of *clientela* relationships and *parentela* contacts as the device by which to typify efforts of the major interest groups. The former would best be illustrated by the relationship of the *Confindustria* to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce or the Direct Cultivator in the field of agriculture. The *parentela* would cover a wide range of activities and interactions of groups largely in terms of personal contacts or relationships. If the reviewer rightly understands this, and here the prime example would be the nexus between government, party, bureaucracy, and the Catholic Action.

This is a basic and informative book upon which later scholars will be able to build. Author and publisher are to be congratulated upon such an achievement.

CHARLES W. SHULL

Wayne State University

Intermarriage: Interfaith, Interracial, Interethnic. By ALBERT I. GORDON. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. Pp. xi+42[illegible]. $[illegible]

This is an extensive treatment of significant phases of intermarriage in contemporary America.

The term "intermarriage" is applied to marriages between persons whose religious, racial, or ethnic backgrounds are or were different, either prior to or after marriage. Interfaith marriages are shown to occur frequently, but interethnic marriages are by far the most common. Interracial marriages are relatively rare, about 5 of every 10,000 marriages. It is the author's hypothesis, supported by a study of attitudes of 5,407 college students, an extensive review of relevant literature, and interviews-in-depth of selected intermarried cases, that (1) intermarriage will increase, with the greatest increase occurring in interethnic marriages, the next greatest in interfaith marriages, and the lowest among different racial and color groups, and (2) the increase will take place because of, in addition to the general factors making for intermarriage, the changes taking place in four special areas: (a) the rapidly increasing rate at which young people are attending college, (b) decreasing religious distinctions, (c) the lower-

ing of color bars within our nation and internationally; and (d) the general decrease in parental authority.

In the study of student attitudes a questionnaire ultimately requiring 231 items of information was employed, and data were processed by computers. Attitude questions and modified social-distance scales dominated the approach.

The students appeared (relatively) receptive to all forms of intermarriage except interracial. The author's stand is, however, admittedly strongly negative, although certainly not without some qualification. He carefully notes disagreements with his stand in the literature, in the student responses, and in the cases, as well as in some current religious positions. The latter arise during the concise and well-documented presentation of the various Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish positions. The goal of universal brotherhood, while fully acceptable as such, is seen as not attainable though the breaking down of racial, cultural, religious, and ethnic differences, and ignoring these differences through intermarriage is held so to damage religion, personality, and children, in particular, that possible gains appear insignificant in comparison to losses.

This reviewer would consider the author's conclusions and recommendations to be rather short-run and restricted. The author seems largely to have ignored the potential rewards of intermarriage. Under his definitions, all marriages are intermarriages, inasmuch as all individuals come from more or less varied backgrounds. Where, then, should the line be drawn? It has been observed that, almost without exception, when differing categories of people (racial, religious, ethnic, etc.) have come into contact, individuals have fallen in love, and married if possible. In almost all cases either one or both sides has objected and tried to prevent the union or, failing that, has placed obstacles in the way of the couple's happiness later on. Which of the opposing forces—interpersonal love or group boundary maintenance—should one come ultimately to support. Gordon seems to value institutional stability beyond individual freedom of choice and action, accommodation beyond assimilation, and categoric loyalty beyond interpersonal attachment.

One suspects that these and other of the author's values were formed some time a and that they have remained relatively u affected by the materials accumulated for t volume, a statement intended to detract n at all from this thoroughly instructive a stimulating book.

RAYMOND PAY

University of Georgia

Innovation in Education. Edited by MATTHE B. MILES. New York: Teachers Colle Columbia University, 1964. Pp. 689. $8.7

The genesis of this work was a facul seminar in which numerous scholars we brought together to undertake the "systemat conceptualization of innovation and chan processes in American education."

As is often the case with such seminar and the published materials which by the wa are bound to follow, there is a great di crepancy between the initial idea and the en product. This is not a "systematic concep tualization of innovation and change process in American education." Rather it is th compilation of papers submitted by a variet of people who may or may not have bee directly concerned with problems of educa tional innovation.

It should be noted that the editor does make noble attempt at handling an impossible situa tion by seeking to place the various contribution into some meaningful theoretical framework As might have been anticipated, he falls fa short of this goal and, to his credit, conclude that we still have a long way to go in under standing the processes by which innovations are introduced and maintained within a particular social system.

This is not to suggest that this book cannot be of value. On the contrary by its eclectic nature it does offer something to almost everyone. Certainly those in the field of education can get a better idea of how behavioral scientists view educational institutions and those who work in and run these institutions. For the behavioral scientist this could be a handy reference guide to what we are doing in this field and what we feel are the dimensions of the problem.

Perhaps the greatest value of this book is that it makes clear the lack of understanding

and insight that exists between the sociologist and those people involved in the day-to-day operation of our schools. This lack of awareness is reflected for example in the attempt to treat the teacher in much the same way as any other individual would be studied in the process of innovation behavior. The fact that the teacher may not have or want the right (or power or authority) to either reject or accept an innovation is not dealt with in any sufficient fashion.

From the discussions of the methodology to employ in studies of educational innovation there is further evidence that sociologists have not been "in" our public schools for many years. If we were, we would spend more time dealing with innovations on innovations that can only be noted by continuous observation of a particular school system. In other words it is essential that the investigator deal with the diffusion of an innovation over time and not rely on one-shot research.

DAVID GOTTLIEB

Michigan State University

Creativity: Progress and Potential. Edited by CALVIN W. TAYLOR. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964. Pp. 241. $6.95.

The broad aims of this book are two-fold: to summarize current knowledge about creativity and to identify certain research leads and needs.

The book consists of chapters dealing with: "Predictors of Creative Performance," by C. W. Taylor and John Holland; "Education and Creativity," by E. Paul Torrance; Environment and Training for Creativity," by J. H. McPherson; "Criteria of Creativity," by H. E. Brogden and T. B. Sprecher; and "Some Knowns, Needs, and Leads," by Calvin W. Taylor. In addition, there is a rather extensive bibliography dealing with creativity and its various components.

The book does make a valuable contribution to researchers since it identifies what is known in the field of creativity as well as indicating potential research areas.

The shortcomings of this work are ones that might have well been anticipated. First, we get no clear indicators as to what is meant by "creativity" and how this factor is to be differentiated from intelligence, non-conformity or just plain rebellious behavior. Second, little attempt is made to deal with the possibility that the dimensions of creativity may differ for different kinds of activities. There is the constant theme that the chances are good that creativity in art as well as in science is pretty much related to the same kinds of individual and structural factors—yet the empirical evidence presented would not support this notion.

Third, and finally, the argument used for getting at the "hidden talent" and creative people in our society is somewhat disturbing. It is not so much that the creative can bring us outstanding works of art, literature, music, and intellectual beauty. Rather, the need is based on the international-survival argument. The editor of this work is concerned about a "creativity gap" and feels that only with the identification and nourishment of this elite will we be able to compete as a nation. My own preference would be for the cultivation of individuals to develop a creative approach to the resolution of international conflict.

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Michigan State University

Sociology of Childhood. By OSCAR W. RITCHIE and MARVIN R. KOLLER. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Pp. x+335. $5.00.

As the subdivisions of sociology become more specialized, the textbooks become more limited in scope. Ritchie and Koller, accordingly, limit themselves to the child of twelve years and under. With socialization as the central concept, the authors seek to "explore the structures and processes whereby children move to take their place in society" (p. viii). But socialization—and this shows something of the authors' approach—is more than a process, for ideally it also "provides care and protection, health and security and full opportunity and encouragement for the creative development of every child as he grows toward adult maturity" (p. 24).

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The coverage is broad with three main sections. One, "Social Settings for Childhood," covers such topics as stratification, religion,

education, and family functions (among which are helping to solve problems and providing pleasant family living). Another, "Means and Models for Socialization," includes discussions of the self, parents as models, peer groups, play, and parent supplements. The third, "Hazards, Obstacles, Potential Difficulties in Socialization," discusses symbol-learning, autonomy, deviance, and the "sensitive areas" of sex, race, and religion.

The book is pitched at an elementary level. Subjects are not covered in any depth; points do not follow a logical sequence; concepts are vaguely defined; and problems are simplified. The treatment, for example, of children in primitive societies is blithely summarized in less than a page and a half. It is also implied in the illustrations cited that childhood is best understood by reference less to research than to everyday conversations and incidents.

The authors are liberal and humanitarian in values and do not hesitate to intersperse their advice. "It is vital," they say, "for girls to receive an appropriate amount and special kind of sex-education" (p. 155). They say in introducing one section that the section "can or may clarify problems confronting American parents as they attempt to handle data concerning race on a more objective level" (p. 249). Occasionally the authors indulge in whimsy, remarking for example that three qualities which would "remove or reduce the hazards associated with culture symbolism" are patience, pondering, and pain (p. 231).

In sum, this volume presents a most simplified and idealized version of the sociology of childhood. It may well interest and teach a kind of sociological perspective to undemanding undergraduates; but it offers little to the student who is interested in the subtleties and complexities of social analysis or who seeks to go beyond a statement of traditional values and the commonplace.

FREDERICK ELKIN

York University

The Townsend Movement: A Political Study. By ABRAHAM HOLTZMAN. New York: Bookman Associates, 1963. Pp. 256. $5.00.

This study of the movement for Townsend plan legislation concentrates upon the political activities of Townsend and the organization he led. More than two-thirds of the book consists of analysis of Townsend plan legislation and its fate in the House and the Senate during the 1930's the activities of Townsend in the presidential elections of that decade, and the role of the Townsend movement as a pressure group in state elections. This intensive preoccupation with the organizational and legislative role of the movement makes it a frustrating and ultimately disappointing study.

In his initial chapter the author tells us that this book is about the role of the aged in American politics. The problem posed is why in the United States the aged have assumed an important role not existing in the politics of other countries. Both in the Introduction, by Wilbur Cohen, and in the final chapter we are told that the Townsend movement was highly significant in American politics because it led to the passage of Social Security legislation and brought about a new definition among elderly people of themselves as a political group. Yet this crucial question is lost in the detailed analysis of a pressure group seeking to pass a relatively specific solution to the problems of being old in America. The author refers to the movement as a failure because its legislative objective was never achieved. Yet it did seem to have a great impact in dramatizing the position of the aged and, in this fashion, creating a new dimension in American interest groups. How did this come about? How did the Townsend movement influence the Social Security legislation? How did it achieve an impact on the perspectives and expectations of the elderly?

In the process of political analysis the author has made some worthwhile contributions to an understanding of a pressure group that did many wrong things. It functioned with inefficiency, rewarding enemies and punishing friends. It lent support to third parties when the electoral pull of the organization was limited. The central factor was Townsend, whose own political radicalism was constantly fought and limited by the membership he represented. How he managed to maintain the leadership of the organization despite this is a question on which we are given little light.

In the course of analyzing the Townsend movement and its relation to American third parties, Holtzman has some important things

to say about the conservative nature of American radicalism. These really help us understand that similarity between left and right in the ideologies of American radicalism is bedeviling the centrist social science of today. Despite its disappointing failure to shed much light on the politics of old people, this study is recommended to those interested in American political process.

JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD

University of Illinois

Demography, Vol. I, No. 1. Edited by DONALD J. BOGUE. Chicago: Population Association of America (1126 East 59th Street), 1964. Annual subscription rates: members of Population Association and International Union for the Scientific Study of Population Problems, $4.50; non-members, $7.00.

Rightly or wrongly, in the United States demography is generally considered to be a sociological specialty. This tradition creates several problems, one of which is that in matters relating to publications demographers must look primarily to sociology journals. They are not treated unfairly by editorial policies; but only a limited amount of space in these journals can be devoted to any particular sociological specialty, and I suspect that many editors and readers are somewhat less than fascinated by demographic research.

However serious the problem may be, this journal promises some relief. Accordingly, this review focuses on what the journal offers as a publication outlet. But the reader should be warned that the reviewer has no connection with the journal and, therefore, my comments should not be construed as a statement of editorial policy. Further, this first issue may not be representative of what is to follow.

Whatever faults it may have, this new journal avoids the narrow classical conception of demography. In this respect it is far more relevant to sociology than is the British journal, *Population Studies*, or the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*.

At least seven of the thirty-one articles deal primarily with phenomena other than those such as mortality, fertility, migration, and censuses. For the most part, these articles report studies of subjects traditionally identified with human ecology (in this issue primate cities, metropolitan areas, urban population structure, suburbs, functional classification of cities, commuting, and ecological indices).

The more purely "demographic" articles achieve a good balance in coverage: census and census data, studies of particular countries and regions, population projections, demographic measures, spacing of births, family planning, contraception and fertility control, abortion, migration, population estimates, characteristics of families, educational trends, and the training and recruitment of demographers.

The only major shortcoming in coverage is the absence of papers on demographic theory. This omission may serve to confirm the stereotype of demographers as "hard-nosed unimaginative types," but it is subject to a more realistic interpretation. In comparison to sociological "theoreticians," demographers labor under a special handicap—many of their ideas are testable. A more formidable barrier to the proliferation of theory scarcely can be imagined; and, consequently at any point in time demography's theory barrel may be dry. In any event, the editor did not succumb to the demand for theory by publishing another rehash of Malthus, and for this we should be grateful. However, as I see it, this issue would have been improved substantially by at least one article on needs and problems in the formulation of demographic theories.

JACK P. GIBBS

University of Texas

The Student in the Age of Anxiety. By FERDYNAND ZWEIG. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. 224.

Ferdynand Zweig's study is a descriptive account of the values and aspirations of a sample of students whom the author interviewed at two British universities. Since their opinions were intended to be somewhat typical of the opinions of British students in general, they were chosen from Oxford and Manchester to represent an Oxbridge and a Redbrick University.

This study provides some insights into the effects that two very different types of university education can have on student atti-

tudes. The attitudes of the Oxford students reflect a more intensely self-contained student world than do those of the Manchester students. Thus the Oxford students show a greater alienation from their family and home neighborhood. They are more ready to criticize and be skeptical about existing institutions, such as religion, and are more likely to want a glamorous job career. They are also more anxious and introspective than the Manchester students. Zweig points to two factors that seem to produce these differences. One is a social-class difference. The predominantly upper-middle-class origins of the Oxford sample are seen to encourage a greater independence of attitude than do the mainly lower-middle-class origins of the Manchester group. The other factor is the organization of the two universities. At Oxford little attention is paid to formal examinations or courses, and students are encouraged to depend heavily on each other, both socially and intellectually. At Manchester, on the other hand, examinations and lectures take up a great part of the students' time. This, together with the greater proportions of students living at home or in the city, lessens the chance of student life in Manchester becoming a world of its own.

Besides showing such contrasts, Zweig comments on similarities between the two groups on certain political and personal attitudes. However, the inadequacy of his approach becomes more apparent when he discusses these similarities. For the study is marred by a lack of any substantial attempt at analysis. We are presented with a very static picture of the opinions of a body of university students. No life-history material or comparisons between students at different stages of their university careers help illuminate the relative importance of university and home background as factors affecting the opinions of these students. Despite the allusions to differences in the two student cultures, no attempt is made to analyze the conditions within and without the university that determine the biases and values of each culture. Consequently the significance of the differences and similarities between the two student groups in political and personal attitudes is unclear. We are given no theoretical reasons to relate the attitude trends shown to structural changes in either the British university or British society. Thus this study is an interesting introduction to the nature of British higher education but makes little contribution to a sociological understanding of its problems.

Bryan R. Roberts

University of Chicago

Statistics on Delinquents and Delinquency. By Walter A. Lunden. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1964. Pp. 304.

Here are, in a single volume, primary statistical data on delinquents and delinquency. As the author indicates, "The pages do contain information not available except in the official publications of the respective cities, states and countries." That is a concise description of this text, a compilation of simple, descriptive statistical data taken from primary sources.

In this endeavor, the author has done well in describing the extent and nature of delinquency in the United States and in fifteen other nations in the Western hemisphere and Japan, as depicted in official statistical reports compiled by local, national, and international agencies. The simple, descriptive statistics are presented in the form of more than two hundred graphs, charts, and diagrams, and illustrate the usual "vital" statistics on delinquencies,—age, sex, race, education, parental and personal, marital status, etc. In addition, statistics are presented on training schools, complete enough to include ratio of staff to inmates, prior experience of staff, and other statistics describing staff characteristics.

The author explains the increase in delinquency in terms of anomie and goes on to describe the various sources of statistical data on delinquency and the validity and reliability of such data. This text will attract lay readers as well as professional correctional personnel, as it is written in a non-technical style.

The advantages of this text are to be found in the presentation of past and current statistical data on delinquency, and a description of the primary statistical sources.

The disadvantage of a compilation of this kind is that it tells us nothing about delinquents and delinquency after its publication. Thus, one will still be required to seek out primary source data on delinquency.

William Nardini

D.C. Dept of Corrections

Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis. By ROBERT C. NORTH, OLE R. HOLSTI, M. GEORGE ZANINOVICH, and DINA A. ZINNES. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963. Pp. 182. $2.95.

There are at least two major strategies for the quantitative study of international relations. The first involves a "macro" approach within which hypotheses are formulated in terms of variables assessing properties of the international system as a system. The second involves a "micro," more psychological approach, within which hypotheses are formulated in terms of variables assessing the behavior of national decision-makers The authors define "international crisis" in the macro tradition (a situation wherein issues of conflict overwhelm mechanisms for coping with conflict [p. 5]), but in their own works they have chosen to study international crises primarily by the micro approach. Rather than choosing to assess directly such system properties as the intensity of conflict issues or the adequacy of coping mechanisms, they have chosen to study verbal and written statements of relevant foreign-policy decision-makers using a number of affective and cognitive dimensions. In the appendixes to this book, the authors present a number of illustrative hypotheses involving such variables as the decision-makers' perceptions of frustration, their level of tension, and their expression of hostility.

Having chosen this approach to the study of international crisis, it becomes extremely important to devise methods for (1) obtaining an unbiased sample of decision-makers' statements, (2) translating these statements into degrees of intensity on the relevant dimensions or variables, and (3) analyzing patterns or relationships among these variables. The purpose of the book is to present a number of rules and techniques for accomplishing these objectives. It begins with a discussion of sources, sampling problems, and preliminary content-analysis coding. Next, three methods of scaling unit statements in terms of their intensity on a desired dimension are presented, including the *Q*-sort and a modification of the semantic differential. The final section of the book includes a very brief discussion of factor analysis and presents another method for assessing "distances between" or covariation of a number of variables over time.

Numerous applications of these methods, drawn from the authors' study of international relations, are presented throughout. This book should be of interest primarily to those concerned with the quantitative study of international relations; and in particular to those interested in approaching such study by way of the perceptions and actions of foreign-policy decision-makers.

ANDRE MODIGLIANI

University of Michigan

Teoria delle classi sociali. ("Theory of Social Class") By GIULIO BOLACCHI Rome Edizioni Ricerche. 1963. Pp xi + 257. L 3 000

The chief value of this book lies in the excellent critique that Bolacchi offers of the social-class theories of Weber, Sorokin, Parsons, and Dahrendorf. His discussion of these scholars is all the more useful because he extracts the class theory of each by examining his general sociology, and in so doing Bolacchi achieves a degree of theoretical coherence and continuity that is rare in sociology.

While finding in each theory elements that are central to a general theory of social classes, the author dismisses all four on the basis that they fail to treat social power as an element independent of status. And this amounts to saying that they are theories of stratification rather than of class. Specifically, Bolacchi argues that the four theories fail to give power an autonomous characterization and to establish this phenomenon as a primary sociological category. To do so, one must dissociate the concept of power from that of status and explicate the former as a dynamic category connected to an interest of the individual rather than to his status.

Not even Dahrendorf saves himself from Bolacchi's criticism, for the author argues that, although Dahrendorf makes use of concepts like "manifest interest" and "latent interest," his concept of power is ultimately tied to a "status or social situation" that emerges from an authority structure. This implies that the dynamics of conflict are reduced to a pure and simple circulation of personnel in positions of superordination and subordination, while class interest becomes mere "role-interest."

Bolacchi's own strategic concept is found in "deviant power," namely that type of social

behavior which tends either to accelerate or to delay the dynamic processes operating within social structures. Proceeding in this direction, he then suggests that two basic classes exist in society: one is the class of those who have an interest in a modification of the legitimacy bases of the society and, therefore, of the structures of legitimate power; the other is the class of those who oppose such modification.

More concretely, a "social class" denotes not a "social situation," but an "individual situation" common to a number of individuals motivated by a common interest, "of which *all* are conscious and for the satisfaction of which their 'conscious' common action is indispensable." What we seem to have here, therefore, is an exaggerated restatement of Marx's concept of class *für sich*.

In the light of this, it is difficult to imagine why Bolacchi has failed to bring Marx directly into the discussion. Indeed, in the only instance in which he is considered, it is only to assert briefly that Marx "considers social class as an aggregate of individuals having a similar status." What is Bolacchi trying to say? He insists on viewing social class as a group of individuals who, "regardless of their social status or situation," have a common interest and are capable of engaging in concerted action designed to alter a social structure, or to defend its persistence.

Does this really differ from other theories of classes, say, Marx's? In my view, it differs only in the fact that an important analytical desideratum is lacking in Bolacchi's conceptualization, namely the specification of the actual interests that impel to one or the other of the two basic types of class action. "Interest" and "deviant power" viewed in the abstract are hardly indicative of an actual human situation. We would like to know what a struggle interest is linked to and what specific and concrete interest a deviant action is a means for. It is these actual problems that lead other scholars into the social situation. And it is only here that one encounters such concrete interests as the acquisition of the means of production, of property, of authority, etc.

Despite these limitations, Bolacchi's book constitutes one of the happiest events on the Italian sociological scene in recent years.

JOSEPH LOPREATO
University of Connecticut

The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest. By J. ALLEN BROYLES. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. Pp. 169. $4.50.

Broyles' book is excellent for the general reader taking a first look at the John Birch Society. This detailed and rational treatment is refreshing and should serve to fill information gaps left by many biased and journalistic accounts of the Society.

Broyles does a skilful job of describing the Society's history, organizational structure, leadership, and dogma. He presents some of its historical connections to the McCarthy era, the emergence of Robert Welch as "founder," the origins of the Society, and the jobs and beliefs of its organization men. Broyles carefully describes some ways in which Welch and local leadership try to arouse, inform, and recruit citizens through chapter organization. He interviewed several chapter leaders and describes several local meetings in detail.

Broyles' account is not very useful to social scientists attempting to discover bases for the existence of the Society. He attempts no sociological analysis, making only passing reference to rapid social changes and modernism. He spends only a few pages on the psychological appeals of the Society, mentioning dogmatism and tracing similarities between Rokeach's concepts and Welch's pronouncements. Brief references also are made to religious fundamentalism, status frustrations, resentment toward modernism, and the quest for self-righteous certainty. However, these concepts and assumptions are not pursued either theoretically or empirically.

Broyles' account is also limited by his narrow empirical focus upon leadership of the Birch Society. With no data on a comparison group available, he cannot explain why some "frustrated, self-righteous" individuals join the John Birch Society, while others are attracted to other superpatriotic groups. In his explication of the dogma of the Society, as expressed by the Society's national and some local leadership, there are no data presented on the extent to which rank-and-file Society members, or even portions of the non-aligned American public, may agree with this official ideology.

In some recent interviews we found that superpatriotic extremists, some of whom were members of the John Birch Society, depart from the American consensus most markedly in their views that: Communists have sub-

stantial influence not only in the government, but in both political parties; the NAACP is "definitely" infiltrated by Communists; and there are no important differences between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, they differ in that they have a high level of information and are actively involved in politics. More hard data are needed for an adequate understanding of the phenomena of American superpatriotism in general and the appeals of the John Birch Society in particular. This book, however, is an important step in the worthwhile direction of rationally exploring the social-psychological dynamics of political issues in America.

RICHARD SCHMUCK and MARK CHESLER

University of Michigan

Managerial Behavior. By LEONARD R. SAYLES New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964. Pp. ix+269. $6.95.

Managerial Behavior is an analysis of the manager's role in modern, large-scale, business organizations. The book differs from many of the earlier works on management in that it does not deal extensively with either the manager as supervisor and user of authority or the manager as decision-maker. Instead, it is concerned largely with the manager as he deals with other managers and tries to anticipate and avoid occurrences which might disrupt the work of his unit. Sayles suggests that the principal burden of management is co-ordination, by which he means the job of maintaining the regularity and continuity of the work process. And he further suggests that as a result of the complex division of labor in modern business organizations co-ordination is secured not primarily by managers acting in their hierarchical capacities in their own departments and work groups but rather through their external relations with fellow managers whose operations are tied in with their own.

These are important observations about the workings of complex organizations, ones that can stand to be reiterated even though they are becoming fairly familiar (thanks to Sayles himself among others). But an important contribution of this book is that it begins to go beyond these initial observations to systematically identify and analyze some of the major types of horizontal relationships among managers and to trace the implications of this view of co-ordination for a variety of problems such as the role of professionals in organizations and the utility of the method of management by results. In his analysis, Sayles isolates seven types of relationships (workflow, trading, service, advisory, auditing stabilization, and innovation) and discusses the problems, conflicts, and managerial tactics they involve. Of particular interest are his discussions of the problems arising from the combination of different types in the same person's role and of the tendencies for relationships to change from one type to another as managers try to maintain a balance of demands in which they initiate more than they receive. Much of the book, it might be noted, is written from the interactionist viewpoint which this last example implies. In addition Sayles' analysis includes a consideration of the manager's "monitoring" activities (his methods of keeping himself posted on possible sources of trouble) and a short chapter on the manager as leader or supervisor, considering him variously as his subordinates' director helper, and representative

As it stands, the book provides many leads for further thinking and research, often in areas that have barely been touched But it might have provided more than this. Sayles states in the Preface that the analysis is the result of several years' research in a large manufacturing company in which seventy-five "lower-and middle-level" managers were observed and interviewed. It is therefore rather disappointing to find in reading the book that with the exception of one chapter (out of fourteen) there is no concentrated or systematic analysis of these data and that there is little attempt to show the bearing of the data on the ideas presented except as casual illustration. This format not only deprives us of data in an area where they are scarce but also, in many cases makes it unclear which of the author's statements are based on his research, and so have at least some empirical support, and which give us his unsupported assumptions, research hypotheses, and personal recommendations for better management. Finally by giving so little idea of the data on which he developed his ideas, or even the kinds of managers he studied, Sayles makes it considerably harder

than it need be for those of us who might like to investigate some of his conclusions further in future research. It is to be hoped that he will eventually fill the gap by publishing a more complete account of this work.

JOHN D. BREWER

*University of California
Los Angeles*

Pattern in Organizational Analysis: A Critical Analysis. By SHERMAN KRUPP. New York: Chilton Co., 1961. Pp. xiv+201. $5.00.

This book proceeds under the thesis that theory influences perception of reality and may develop into ideological positions about reality. Ideological developments, coupled with a theory's built-in blinders to free observation, may, then, operate to perpetuate and seemingly bear out the validity of the theory. The author investigates these issues in Taylor's scientific management theory, the human relations approach, organization theories of Mary Parker Follett, Chester Barnard, and Herbert Simon, and small group studies. His method consists of a set of analytic rubrics which are used to categorize structural dimensions of theories. The result is a picture of emphasis on internal features of work organizations to the detriment of external forces that impinge on these organizations, on harmony to the detriment of concern with conflict, and on the perspectives of management to the detriment of interests which differ from those of management but are, nonetheless, present within organizations. These judgments are hardly new. But the author is mainly concerned with showing that the internal structure of a theoretical system can be a self-perpetuating mechanism of bias, rather than fully pursuing the consequences of particular biases.

Two traditions converge in Krupp's book: the gnawing problem of finding adequate models for dealing with conflict and the metascience tradition of critical examination of scientific effort. Concerning conflict, the author disparages the "harmony bias" in current organismic social-system theories. Doubtless there is truth in this point. But conflict theorists appear to be inoculated against systemic formulations—Mr. Krupp is a victim of the disease he himself describes.

The place of metascience in the world of science is a curious one. In its positive aspect it provides clarification of scientific effort under the sharp scalpel of logic. Negatively, it is latter-day scholasticism and a continuing source of beguilement to the underdeveloped sciences. One of its lures lies in its analytic posture—its exposure of bias and limitation in any one perspective. Krupp has learned this lesson well. But for a practicing scientist there are limits to the usefulness of analytic chastisement. To be sure he must be willing to disagree with others; but there comes a time when he must take a plunge. When Krupp finally takes a plunge—a very gingerly plunge, in the last seventeen pages, in favor of focus on bargaining processes and "authority-and-power" theory—this reader was so inured by the posture of dissent that it became impossible to become a convert.

FRED E. KATZ

University of Missouri

Population Mobility within the United States. By HENRY S. SHRYOCK, JR. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, 1964. Pp. x+470.

This is a definitive account of internal migration in the United States, particularly for the 1940's and 1950's. It describes the data in full, assesses them judiciously, and extracts from them a wide range of substantive conclusions.

Net migration can be inferred from any pair of censuses by subtracting from the number of persons found in an area at the second date the number present at the first date, and subtracting also the natural increase. If one breaks down the count by a characteristic, say sex, one finds net movement separately for males and females. Some indication of the gross movement of which this net is the resultant is obtained by noting the number of persons living in a given state but born outside it, and the number born in it and living outside it. This measure of gross movement unfortunately confounds time periods and neglects places of intermediate residence. Closer to the mark is a census question, such as that of 1950, asking people where they were living at a fixed date one year earlier. This very close approximation to gross movement suffers only from the fact that the year in question may not be typical; 1949–50 seems

to have been characterized by somewhat lower mobility than the average of the postwar period. The normal migration channels were dammed up, especially for non-whites, in the year or two before the 1950 census.

The assessment of the principal data in objective fashion was made possible by the Post Enumeration Survey taken with the 1950 census. This showed, for instance, that the persons who were enumerated in the census but did not respond to the migration question (luckily only 1.7 per cent) had a decidedly higher amount of migration than those who did respond. Intracounty movement seems to have been understated by the latter. However, on the whole the census question is shown by the Post Enumeration Survey and the Current Population Survey to provide thoroughly usable data.

To sum up the rich harvest of results in a few words is not easy. One American in five changes house every year, and this proportion varies little through good times and bad, at least in the postwar period. About two-thirds of the movers go to some other house within the same county; the one-third who go outside their county are about equally divided between movers to another state and to another county within the same state. The net movement among regions is very much less than the gross. In 1949-50 whites moved from the North Central region to the South, while non-whites moved from the South to the North Central region. Not only does the West show a high proportion of immigrants from other regions, as is well known, but its residents have also a high propensity to make short moves within the region. Males move more than females in general, but females are more precocious and constitute a higher proportion of movers in the youngest adult years. An age profile with peaks in the infant ages and in the early twenties characterizes all groups of movers.

The two shortcomings of this book are noted by the author himself. One is the fact that the material of the 1960 census is not taken into account. The volume of data being produced and the time required to sift it through make it almost impossible for a book to be completely up to date even at the moment of its appearance. The other shortcoming is the absence of testing for such hypotheses as those of Ravenstein and Stouffer. The development of a simple but comprehensive theory may be more difficult today than it was when travel was harder and changes of residence were dominated by the movement from farm to factory.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

University of Chicago

Family: Organization and Interaction. By BERNARD FARBER San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. xvi + 536. $7.00.

Sociological textbooks have been replaced to some extent by annotated collections of readings in recent years. For lecturers often prefer not to be tied down to another person's theoretical scheme. The main problem in compiling these collections is that there are now so many studies and tag-ends of theory to choose from that it is difficult for an editor to select the most appropriate passages, and even more difficult for him to show in short introductions just why they were chosen and what his thinking on the subject has been. These collections, then, often prove to be stimulating to the good student but bewildering to the indifferent one.

Textbooks often go to the other extreme and squeeze the relevant data into an inflexible theoretical framework. This method has the advantage of providing a guide that permits even slow-witted students to feel that they have been introduced to something that makes sense instead of to a lot of unrelated bits of information.

Farber's text on the family is a good example of a careful and consistent presentation of theory and data on a subject that has been so widely studied that it presents the author with an almost unmanageable lot of studies from which to choose. His main theoretical contribution lies in his application of the "orderly replacement" approach to the study of family life. Part I is concerned with a crosscultural analysis of variations in family organization. Part II looks at the question of orderly replacement and permanent availability in the American contemporary family from its institutional angle. Farber's main question in this section is "What are conditions under which the family as an institution . . . persists through generations?" Part

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III focuses on the family as a "group" and suggests the ways in which family interaction affects orderly replacement. Here he asks, "How does interaction among family members hinder or facilitate orderly replacement of family culture in the succeeding generation?" His conclusions are: "The major factor interfering with orderly replacement in contemporary society seems to be an increasing tendency toward permanent availability of adults for marriage with any cross-sex adult in the society."

Throughout the text Farber supports and clarifies his "orderly replacement" approach by critically comparing it with the theories of other students. Burgess' companionship family and Parsons' functional-differentiation theory receive particular attention. Unfortunately very little comparative data are brought in to help the student get a more objective view of his own family system and so help him to assess the changing family spectrum more effectively. And there are few excerpts from case studies to enliven the somewhat dry bones of family behavior which are left after this system is treated in a strictly theoretical fashion.

It is probably fortunate that Farber's style of writing is not easy to follow, for this will make students concentrate on his theory instead of allowing their minds to wander down the fascinating emotional lanes that much data on the family suggest. Nor does Farber waste words, for he pays his reader the perhaps misplaced compliment of being able to do his own summarizing, and so able to fit the host of ideas presented in each chapter into the neat framework of the original theory. This is perhaps the one technical criticism of the book. For one cannot help feeling that the average undergraduate will find this task a little beyond his ability unless assisted by a good lecturer. Some of the chapters do indeed have summaries, but not all. There is no final summarizing chapter to help draw the theory to a successful close.

Perhaps because of this, Farber's text is one that will certainly challenge the lecturer as well as the good student. Its well-reasoned theoretical framework should give a new and refreshing direction to future family study.

AILEEN S. ROSS

McGill University

Suicide: A Sociological and Statistical Study. By LOUIS I. DUBLIN. New York: Ronald Press, 1963. Pp. viii+240. $8.00.

This book is a revision of Dublin's earlier book, *To Be or Not To Be*. The major and most valuable part of the book is the presentation of suicide rates and trends in different countries; the chief concern, however, is with the United States.

For the most part, suicide rates are following their customary course: an excess of males over females with the reverse for unsuccessful attempts; increasing rates with age, especially for males; a higher rate for whites than for Negroes; decreasing rates for the four categories of divorced, widowed, single, and married; and variations according to occupations and religious affiliation.

The former wide difference between urban and rural rates has almost disappeared, with the urban rate declining during the period from 1929 to 1960 to approximately the level of the rural rate. Dublin attributes the decline to improved economic conditions. A sociologist might have other suggestions: the increase of the urban Negro population with its typical low rates, and the transition through two generations of foreign nationality groups to Americanized culture.

Dublin reviews the occurrence of suicide among primitive peoples and in Asia where such forms of institutionalized suicide occur as the suttee in India and hara-kiri in Japan. Suttee has all but disappeared and hara-kiri has declined. Since both these forms of suicide were deeply imbedded in the culture and served cultural and psychological purposes, the study of their decline and of possible substitutes to serve the same purposes would be worthwhile.

In the United States the trend of rates has fluctuated with national crises, being low during periods of war and prosperity and high during depressions. Another type of crisis appears in European Jewish history—periods of persecution with phenomenally high rates.

Chapter xviii, "Emotional Factors in Suicide," seems to the reviewer to be the weakest in the book. In this chapter Dublin steps outside his area of specialization and, apparently as an attempt to round out his discussion, reviews psychiatric and psychoanalytic theories. His presentation is clearly stated but is unsupported by facts and is not integrated

into the masterly presentation of factual material in the major portion of the book.

The array of rates and trends suggests many sociological studies that would be worth pursuing: why trends vary in adjacent countries; why rates vary from three to thirty per 100,000 population in cities in the United States; why Negro rates are consistently lower than white rates; why urban rates have declined to the level of rural rates; and so on. Sociological and psychological studies are badly in need of integration. Sociological factors seem to set the stage that determines high or low rates; but psychological factors must explain why certain people commit suicide and others within the same sociological setting do not.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Northern Illinois University

Racketville, Slumtown, Haulburg: An Exploratory Study of Delinquent Subcultures. By IRVING SPERGEL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. xxiv+211. $5.00.

Research into delinquent conduct has tended to oscillate between the goal of a single unitary theory that would encompass all violative conduct by juveniles and the goal of a typology of youthful offenders. Perhaps the greatest merit of Cloward and Ohlin's application of Merton's anomie theory resided in their attempt to combine both objectives, to derive rigorously a typology of delinquent subcultures from a limited set of theoretical assumptions. The author of this study, in turn, has endeavored to apply this typology through inquiry into the delinquent norms prevalent in three highly contrasting types of local community within a large metropolis. The exigencies of description required modifications of Cloward and Ohlin's categories, two of which may be noted. What they had designated as the criminal subculture Spergel divides into the racket and the theft subcultures. He does not regard the drug-users in the three areas as exemplifying a differentiated retreatist subculture but rather as a variant of the racket, conflict, or theft subcultures. He emerges with a coherent depiction of each of these three sets of delinquent norms and shows how closely articulated they are with many other cultural and structural characteristics of their respective local areas.

The very cogency with which Spergel is able to establish such connections between subculture and milieu raises an important issue. The particular constellation of delinquent norms found in a given neighborhood appears to be as much a response to certain idiosyncratic features of the latter as it is to uniform pressures originating at a distance from the environing social structure. Extrapolating from this study, one could not delimit or predict, through applying the theory, the actual range or makeup of delinquent norms which might be found in the various local areas of a large metropolis This does not imply the rejection of anomie theory as applied to delinquency, it does raise questions as to its role in inquiry and as to its possible limitations. The author does not deal with such issues since he is concerned almost exclusively with the implications of his findings for programs of delinquency control.

A second issue has to do with the implications of the finding that the rates of delinquency in each of the three areas were approximately similar despite the great variation in prevalent types of delinquent norms This leads the author to make an analytical distinction between delinquent orientation and delinquent acts. However, it is possible that such a finding may have other implications as well. If one can assume that such rates are indexes of the total volume of delinquency in each area, the question then arises as to whether or not there is a more basic uniform set of forces producing approximately the same incidence of delinquency in all three areas. Again the issue of the relationship between a typology of offenders and a unified theory of delinquent conduct is raised. Because it suggests a number of important theoretical issues in the study of delinquency and because it advances empirical description of delinquent norms, this is a useful and timely study.

HAROLD FINESTONE

McMaster University

CURRENT BOOKS

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ERRATUM

The *Journal* regrets an error in the comments by Bruce C. Straits ("Community Adoption and Implementation of Urban Renewal") which appeared in its July, 1965, issue. The second line (col. 2) on page 82 should have read "82 per cent . . ." instead of "8 per cent . . ." as reported.

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Occupational Assimilation as a Competitive Process[1]

Robert W. Hodge and Patricia Hodge

ABSTRACT

Insofar as Negroes and females compete with white males for jobs and are willing to accept wages below those demanded by white males, the incomes of the latter group will be adjusted downward by the competitive process. Regressions over detailed occupations of white male income on white male education, proportion Negro and proportion female for all occupations and within each major occupational level support this hypothesis, consistently indicating that white male income is negatively associated, net of education, with the proportion female and proportion Negro in an occupation. These cross-sectional results, augmented by a longitudinal analysis, suggest that discriminatory policies against females and Negroes are not due solely to prejudice but also to the attempts of occupational groups dominated by white males to avoid competition from minority workers.

Wherever and whenever labor is supplied to the marketplace by a socially identifiable and distinct group at less than the going price, competition for jobs between sectors of the labor force ensues, and wage rates show a downward trend as employers' demand for the labor of lower-cost suppliers increases and their demand for suppliers at the going rate dwindles. Of course, these effects may not follow if the workers supplying labor at lower rates are not perfectly substitutable for those supplying it at the going market price For example, a white employer's taste for discrimination may lead him to hire Negroes, females, and other identifiable minorities *only* at a rate sufficiently below the going rate for white workers to offset the price he places upon his taste for discrimination or his reasons—whether arising from prejudice or not—for regarding labor supplied by minorities as but imperfectly substitutable for that supplied by the majority. Under these circumstances, that is, when employers have a taste or a preference for discrimination, some groups may supply labor at a cost less than the majority merely to place themselves on a basis for equal opportunity for employment vis-à-vis the preferred group. Under such conditions, differential wage rates and/or opportunities as between sectors of the labor force would have little discernible effect on the wage rates of the preferred group and could well become a rather permanent

[1] The research reported here was begun in conjunction with a U.S. Public Health Service grant RG-5667, "Occupational Classification for Vital Statistics Use," to O. D. Duncan The computations were made and the report drafted while the senior author was, respectively, a National Science Foundation Fellow and a recipient of a Research Training Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council All these sources of support are gratefully acknowledged. Further, our gratitude is extended to our many colleagues whose mixed reactions to earlier versions have shaped this paper, but especially to Peter M. Blau, whose incisive comments have made us his intellectual debtors. We assume, of course, all responsibility for any errors of fact and interpretation that may remain.

fixture of the labor market. But, apart from the employer's potential taste for discrimination, there are additional reasons why one sector of the labor force may supply labor at a lower cost than another. Prior to more extensive labor-management legislation, "scabs" would break walkouts not, presumably, because they did not find the demands of strikers attractive, but because their circumstances were more dire than those of the striking workers. Their condition—often as unemployed or recent immigrant workers—provided no base from which they could demand working hours, conditions, and wages sought by strikers, and hence arose their willingness to work under terms objectionable to the majority or to strikers. In short, some groups find the conditions of work less negotiable than others because their backlog of savings or pattern of debts or job skills do not allow them the flexibility of other groups. When such groups supply their labor at a lower cost, they may well lead to the deterioration of the working conditions enjoyed by other groups. When, in addition, such groups are socially identifiable, they may engender prejudice toward themselves in much the same manner that "scabs" acquired the hatred of union members and sympathizers.

It has long been recognized that prejudice has served as a barrier to the occupational assimiliation of Negroes, women, and other minority groups into the labor force. However, antiminority sentiments may not fully explain discriminatory policies. If, for whatever reason, minority elements are placed into competition with the majority, discriminatory practices may be introduced for purely economic motives. As tariffs are often raised to protect highly priced domestic services from lower-priced foreign competition, so discriminatory barriers may be raised to protect a majority of workers or even a controlling minority from competition with groups prepared to supply labor at lower costs. And the parallel between tariffs and some forms of economic or occupational discrimination does not end here. Just as tariffs do not necessarily indicate anti-foreign sentiments, so some discrimination may flow from protectionist policies rather than from racist ideologies. But, even though economic motive may prove an incentive for discrimination, just as it proves a rationale for tariffs, it does not follow that discrimination is justified, even economically. For, as in the case of tariffs, the economic interests of particular groups, individuals, firms, or industries do not necessarily coincide with those of the body politic.

The above remarks suggest that racist attitudes and other manifestations of prejudice are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to explain the persistence of segregationist policies and the maintenance of discriminatory policies. This is not to deny the vital role that attitudes play in minority-majority relations. It is to say that, before we can place group and individual feelings into their proper place, we must also consider possible economic bases of discrimination, particularly attempts to protect one's corner of the labor market and of the opportunity structure. It is also to suggest that the etiology of prejudice may lie partially in the transformation of what were, at one time, motives of an economic kind.

Amid the protest movement of the 1960's, there is some danger of being misinterpreted in pointing to possible nonprejudicial bases for discrimination. Therefore, let us be clear that what may flow from economic interest need not serve the moral interest of either a society or its constituent groups. Our aim here is merely to demonstrate that there is more than prejudice to be overcome for the Negro, the Jew, the female, and other identifiable minorities before they can achieve equal status in the labor force. The historical record of the past two decades testifies to this assertion. During that period, the record of opinion polls has shown a nearly linear decline in anti-Negro and pro-

segregationist attitudes.[2] Yet, the objective record of the Negro's attainment in residential and occupational assimilation—even after controlling for educational attainment—has not, during the same period, shown a similar improvement.[3] But if progress in racial attitudes can be made independently of economic and ocupational assimilation, recourse must be made to other variables if the maintenance of discriminatory practices is to be explained.

To recapitulate, we have suggested that, at least in part, discriminatory policies may be induced by the economic interest of certain groups in protecting themselves from competition with workers willing to accept or unable to demand conditions of employment fully commensurate with those enjoyed by the discriminating body. In particular, we suggest that Negro and female workers stand in such a competitive position vis-à-vis white male workers. Insofar as they can be substituted for white male workers without serious consequence to the employer, the demand for white male workers will be relatively more elastic, since labor costs can be cut by employing these minorities at lower wages. Consequently, white male workers can expect lower incomes when exposed to competition with females and Negroes and may attempt to secure their positions by promoting discriminatory policies among employers through threat of work-place dissension or by advocating discriminatory action through employee organizations. Such instances of discrimination can be understood without reference to attitudes of superiority and the entire syndrome of prejudice; the identifiability of the minorities in question and the economic incentive of the majority are sufficient motive for such actions.

[2] The best evidence on this point is summarized by Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B Sheatsley, "Attitudes toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, CCXI (July, 1964), pp. 16–23.

[3] The record of occupational assimilation through 1950 is most comprehensively treated by Nathaniel Hare, "Changing Occupational Status of the Negro in the United States" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962). Hare's materials have been recently updated to 1960 in an investigation of the Negro's economic status; see Paul M. Siegel, "On the Cost of Being a Negro," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXV (Winter, 1965), pp. 41–57. By far the most comprehensive documentation of the high degree and great stability of residential segregation will be found in Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965).

DATA AND METHODS

The proposition advanced above proves to be elusive because it is difficult to effect an empirical test, uncontaminated by the discriminatory barriers to occupational advancement imposed upon Negroes and females. We can illustrate this problem with some preliminary calculations. Over 418 detailed occupations, we find the correlation between the proportion of *white males* with incomes of thirty-five hundred dollars or more and the square-root percentage Negro to be −0.67. The income measure is correlated −0.16 with the square-root percentage female. Since the income measure pertains only to white males, one cannot explain these findings by arguing that the income measure is contaminated with the incomes of Negroes and females who are paid less. Nevertheless, the findings provide little support for our contentions, since Negroes, and to a lesser extent females, are concentrated in lower-paying occupations. Hence, there would be no way of choosing between the suggestion that white male workers were receiving lower wages because of competition with Negroes and females and the obvious inference that Negroes and females are concentrated in low-status occupations.

We can refine these results by introducing education as a control variable. Since the concentration of minority groups at low levels in the occupational structure is partly a function of their inferior educational attainment, taking account of education may remove contamination resulting from differential occupational attainment of Negroes and females. Holding con-

stant the percentage of white males with four or more years of high school completed, we find the partial correlation between the square-root percentage Negro and the previous income measure is —0.43. The corresponding partial correlation between income and the square-root percentage female is —0.34. Although these correlations tend to support our contention that white male incomes, even after controlling for education, are less when competition with Negroes or females is experienced, the results are not wholly convincing. The suspicion still exists that Negroes and females gain entry to jobs in which the return upon an educational investment is less than that expected from the total income-education relationship over all occupations.

If the relationships discussed above prevail at each major occupational level, one would be more secure in interpreting the negative correlations of the Negro and female variables with white male income as being a result of competition. By looking at relationships *within* major occupation levels, the effect of the inferior occupational attainment of Negroes and females is largely eliminated. Therefore, over the detailed occupations comprising each of the major occupation groups of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, we considered regressions of the form:

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3$$

where X_1 = the percentage of the *white* male experienced civilian labor force who have completed four years of high school or more; X_2 = the square-root percentage Negro of the male experienced civilian labor force of an occupation; X_3 = the square-root percentage female of the experienced civilian labor force of the occupation, and Y = the percentage of *white* male experienced civilian labor force with income of thirty-five hundred dollars or more (of those reporting). These regressions are computed within each major occupation group, the units of analysis being the detailed occupations comprising the major groups. In addition to the considerations noted above, these regressions will allow us to identify the precise levels of the occupational structure at which white male income is affected by the racial and sexual composition of occupations.

The data from which the variables were constructed are based on a 3¼ per cent sample of the experienced civilian labor force.[4] Of the 446 detailed occupations identified in the original source of data, 21 were excluded from the analyses because they were based on a total male sample of less than one hundred persons. In addition, 6 farm occupations and a residual category of "occupation not reported" were deleted from the study, leaving 418 occupations for the statistical analyses.

In Table 1 the means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables are presented by major occupation group. From the totals for all groups, it will be seen that the variables have means less than the midpoint of their respective ranges. (It should be remembered that we are dealing with the square-root percentage Negro and the square-root percentage female. Consequently, their ranges are restricted between zero and ten.) Also, the standard deviations tend to be large relative to the means, which in conjunction with the previous observation implies that the variables are skewed to the right. The situation for the Negro and female variables appears much the same within major occupation groups as for the total, although the skewness is not so marked at the lower occupational levels. Clearly, the square-root transformation, by reducing the variances proportionally greater than the means, attenuates the skewness of the two compositional variables. As expected from the known cor-

[4] These and all other data used in this paper are derived from the decennial *Censuses of Population*, 1940–60.

relation of occupation with income and education, the latter two variables are skewed to the left at the higher occupational levels and skewed to the right at the lower levels. Fortunately, the variances of these two variables, especially education, are less within the groups whose means deviate farthest from the midpoint of the range of the measures. The skewness of these variables within major occupation groups is, therefore, not so marked as one might expect.

Conventional linear-regression analysis is not invalidated by lack of normality if the dependent variable is normally distributed about the regression surface. Unfortunately, cursory inspection of the total regression suggests that this is the case only in the roughest sense. The statistical tests performed below are suspect, therefore, but the consistency of the findings suggests that normalization of the variables would not invalidate the results.

One other remark is in order before proceeding to a discussion of the findings.

TABLE 1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR TOTAL AND MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS, UNITED STATES, 1950

Major Occupation Group	Y Percentage of White Males with Incomes of $3,500 or More	X_1 Percentage of White Males with Four or More Years of School	X_2 Square-Root Percentage Negro of Male ECLF*	X_3 Square Root Percentage Female of Total ECLF*	No. of Occupations
Means					
Total, all occupations	33.5	39.4	2.4	3.5	418
Professional	56.5	82.8	1.3	4.1	54
Managerial	57.9	56.0	1.1	3.3	58
Sales and clerical	37.3	53.3	1.7	4.8	50
Craftsmen	41.9	30.9	1.7	1.8	72
Operatives	21.3	27.2	2.6	4.0	113
Service and private household	14.7	26.6	3.7	5.5	28
Laborers	10.1	17.9	4.5	2.6	63
Standard Deviations					
Total, all occupations	22.6	24.1	1.6	2.4	
Professional	18.4	11.1	0.9	2.5	
Managerial	14.9	14.2	0.6	1.6	
Sales and clerical	18.6	20.2	1.0	2.7	
Craftsmen	17.2	12.2	0.9	1.4	
Operatives	12.0	12.5	1.2	2.6	
Service and private household	11.5	10.6	2.1	3.3	
Laborers	6.6	5.0	1.2	1.2	

* Experienced civilian labor force.

The measures of income and education used here are rather unusual, and some researchers might prefer the more commonly adopted means or medians. However, means are not readily computed from the grouped data presented in the original source. More important, however, is that by adopting proportions we will be in a position to estimate "individual" relationships from our "ecological" regressions over occupational groups.

INCOME OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The salient results from the multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 2. The partial regression coefficients (net of education) for the Negro and female variables on white male income are, with but a single exception, negative. The lone deviant case occurs among occupations classified under "laborers, except farm and mine," where the square-root percentage Negro exhibits a positive but statistically insignificant relationship to white male income. At every other major occupational level, white males in the aggregate tend to receive lower incomes in those detailed occupations where Negroes and females are more frequent comembers. While this generalization holds even after controlling for the aggregate educational attainment of white males, there are variations between occupational levels in the general pattern that merit special comment.

At most occupational levels, females stand in direct competition with males. The jobs held by females are not, by and large, uniquely suited for women and could be filled by males. To be sure, we think of some occupational tasks, such as perform-

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSES OVER DETAILED OCCUPATIONS RELATING PERCENTAGE OF WHITE MALES WITH INCOMES OF $3,500 OR MORE TO PERCENTAGE OF WHITE MALES WITH FOUR YEARS OF HIGH SCHOOL COMPLETED OR MORE, SQUARE-ROOT PERCENTAGE NEGRO AND SQUARE-ROOT PERCENTAGE FEMALE, FOR TOTAL AND MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS, UNITED STATES, 1950

Major Occupation Group	Regression Constant	X_1 Percentage of White Males with Four or More Years High School	X_2 Square-Root Percentage Negro of Male ECLF*	X_3 Square-Root Percentage Female of Total ECLF*	Multiple and Zero-Order Correlations
	Regression Coefficients in Raw-Score Form				$R^2 r_{123}$
Total, all occupations	32 09	.49**	−4 82**	−1 85**	63**
Professional	7 74	.80**	−8.44**	−1 68**	.74**
Managerial	35.93	.60**	−4 55	−1 98*	.48**
Sales and clerical	28 27	.57**	−4 39	−2 87**	.61**
Craftsmen	49.75	.22	−7.41**	−1.08	.23**
Operatives	27 22	.01	−0 83	−0.97*	.05
Service and private house	11 61	.56**	−1.68*	−1 00*	.62**
Laborers	1.98	.55**	0 53	−1.66**	.23**
	Regression Coefficients in Standard Measure				$r^2 r_1$
Total, all occupations	....	.52**	− .34**	− .20**	.50**
Professional	....	.48**	− .39**	− .23**	.48**
Managerial	....	.57**	− .19	− .21*	.39**
Sales and clerical	....	.62**	− .23	− .41**	.41**
Craftsmen	....	.16	− .40**	− .09	.11**
Operatives	....	.01	− .08	− .21*	.01
Service and private house	....	.52**	− .31*	− .28*	.40**
Laborers	....	.42**	.10	− .31**	.12**

* Experienced civilian labor force.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

ing secretarial work, operating a beauty parlor, and waiting on tables in inexpensive eating establishments, as peculiarly suited to women. However, men are by no means excluded from those infrequent pursuits in which females comprise the majority of the labor force. Indeed, the general male dominance of the occupational sphere is evidenced by their ability to land the more lucrative jobs, even in those occupations where women are dominant. Operating an exclusive beauty salon, serving tables in a fashionable restaurant, designing high-fashion clothes, and acting as private secretary to a V.I.P. are roles often filled by males, despite the general dominance of women within the specific occupational lines under consideration.

This competitive stance of males and females in the world of work suggests that at all occupational levels we might expect the proportion of females to affect the incomes of white males. Inspection of Table 2 reveals that with but one exception this is the case. Only among the detailed occupations falling under the rubric "craftsmen, foremen, and kindred" does the square-root percentage female fail to be significantly related to white male income, net of education. Since many of the specific occupations at this level require some years of apprenticeship, occupational requirements form a natural protective barrier against competition from females. Thus, the middle-aged woman returning to the labor force after an interlude of child-bearing and child-rearing may find it difficult to follow a skilled trade without special training, whereas she might readily be employed as a routine machine tender or operative. Even if she should choose to acquire special skills before reentering the labor force, secretarial or other clerical training would normally require a smaller investment of personal resources than would a craft apprenticeship. These considerations, coupled with the fact (see Table 1) that females represent a smaller average proportion of craft occupations than any other major occupation group, suggest that there is little if any competition between males and females at this level. That aggregate white male income in craft occupations is not responsive to what are, at most, minor variations in the proportion female is therefore not startling.

Unlike females, Negroes do not stand in direct competition with white males at all occupational levels. Several factors combine to affect job allocation along racial lines. Where the clientele of an occupation is racially segregated either through residential segregation or from customs of prejudice directly, at least the employees in direct contact with the clientele are often of the same race. Thus while one does not ordinarily know the skin color of the baker of bread purchased, one does ascertain readily the skin color of its retailer. Consequently, among those occupations classified as "managers, officials, and proprietors" or "clerical and sales workers" one expects to find little effect of racial composition upon white male income. That this is indeed the case (Table 2) bears testimony to the frequent observation that Negroes and whites tend to develop separate but parallel occupational hierarchies, particularly at the lower white-collar levels. Thus, while the society does not collectively proscribe Negro-white retail relationships – indeed, in a free-market economy such a proscription could not occur– our data suggest that the separation is complete enough to minimize interracial occupational competition at this level.

We recognize, of course, that as a result of the very recent history of the civil rights movement, many jobs previously not open to Negroes have become available to them, and often in positions of high visibility to the public. However, this is an occurrence of the last few years and should not apply to the relationships examined here which refer to conditions obtaining in 1950 and to a limited extent in 1960.

The observations above might be equally well applied to "professional services" and such service occupations as barbers and bartenders. However, the classical "free professions," such as medicine, law, and dentistry, represent only a relatively small number of fifty-four "professional, technical, and kindred" occupations studied here, with the result being a significant negative relationship between the square-root percentage Negro and the income of white males. Although the thirty service occupations studied are heavily punctuated with occupations "reserved only" for Negoes such as "bootblacks" (of which approximately two-thirds are Negroes) or in which little interracial competition occurs because of segregated clienteles, such as "barbers, beauticians, and manicurists," interracial competition can still be found in the majority of the service occupations under consideration. "Waiters and waitresses," with 27 per cent Negro among the male labor force; "elevator operators," with 20 per cent Negro; and "janitors and sextons," with 30 per cent Negro, are the examples that come to mind. Again, the expected relationship between racial composition and white male income is exhibited by the data presented in Table 2.

Although the proportion Negro among "craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers" is low and its variance over the detailed occupations within the major category is slight (see Table 1), a fairly close relationship between the square-root percentage Negro and white male income is observed among craft occupations. In view of the relative effectiveness of craft unions in securing member benefits and the tendencies of such associations to adopt discriminatory practices, particularly in the South, this finding may seem anomalous. Under these circumstances one would expect white male craftsmen to be relatively immune from competition with minority groups. Our suggestion is that discrimination may be a more powerful explanatory factor at this occupational level than at others. If Negroes are selectively admitted to unions representing those craft occupations that are low-paying and, therefore, less attractive to whites, the observed relationship would be expected.

A cursory examination of materials from 1950 lends support to this interpretation. The proportion of Negroes who are in occupations closely connected with the construction industry is higher than in other types of industries among the category "craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers." What appears to characterize these jobs especially is a high degree of seasonality, which, of course, reduces total income regardless of hourly wage rates. In addition, Northrup[5] argues that in the antebellum South, the construction industry was dominated by Negroes; it was the only industry in which Negroes held many skilled positions. After the Civil War, however, the proportion of Negroes in this industry declined steadily. Table 3 shows the percentage Negro of all male workers in construction-related occupations among "craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers" in 1950. Dewey, in an illuminating article on patterns of Negro employment in the South, writes of this concentration of Negroes in construction industries:

> The explanation probably lies in the employment conditions peculiar to the industry. Local supplies of building labor are highly inelastic in the short run, while the volume of construction varies greatly from year to year and even from month to month. At the same time Negro workmen can acquire the building skills working on small jobs around the Negro community; so that, at times of peak activity, the larger contractors find it both possible and expedient to take them on rather than import skilled whites from outside the area. One may also note that the work groups in the building trades tend to be of short duration, often lasting no longer than a single construction project.[6]

[5] Herbert R. Northrup, *Organized Labor and the Negro* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), pp. 17–21.

[6] Donald Dewey, "Negro Employment in Southern Industry," *Journal of Political Economy*, LX (August, 1952), p. 284.

The reader will note in Table 3 that there is considerable variation in the percentage Negro within the occupations considered here as being related to the construction industry. We cannot here make an extended analysis of the reasons for it, but we should note that it is probably conditioned not only by the relative seasonality of the work among these occupations but also by the history of Negro employment within these occupations, especially within the South, and by the historical policies toward Negroes of the various unions involved. Northrup discusses these points at some length.[7]

Controlling for educational attainment among craft occupations has little effect upon the result discussed above, since one of the consequences of effective unionization is to enhance the independence of formal education and income. The low zero-order correlation of 0.33 between the income and education variables among craft occupations is consistent with this intrepretation.

The failure of the Negro variable to exhibit a significant relationship with white male income, net of education, among the detailed occupations classified under the rubrics "operatives and kindred workers" and "laborers, except farm and mine" results from its low zero-order association with white male income. The zero-order correlation of the square-root percentage Negro with the percentage of white males with incomes of thirty-five hundred dollars or more is only —0.11 for operative occupations and 0.02 among laboring occupations. Since Negroes are heavily concentrated in these two occupational levels, it seems likely that they have been more successful in gaining entry into the industrial unions organizing these occupations than into the craft unions. Insofar as this is the case, competition between white males and Negroes would not be revealed in cross-sectional comparisons, since the wage rates of *both* groups would be fixed by union pay scales.

By and large, then, the pattern of statistical significance observed for the Negro variable lends credibility to the competition hypothesis: it is insignificant where there is reason to believe that separate white and Negro occupational hierarchies have developed and where, consequently, competition could not take place.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE NEGRO IN SELECTED CRAFT OCCUPATIONS, MALE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, 1950

Detailed Occupation	Percentage Negro of Total
Total, male experienced civilian force	9.0
Total, for craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	3.8
Construction-related craft occupations	6.6
Brickmasons, stonemasons, and tile setters	11.3
Cement and concrete finishers	27.1
Cranemen, derrickmen, and hoistmen	6.7
Excavating, grading, and road machine operators	3.2
Foremen, not elsewhere classified, construction	1.5
Inspectors, not elsewhere classified, construction	0.4
Painters, construction, and maintenance	5.3
Paperhangers	11.1
Plasterers	17.0
Plumbers and pipe fitters	3.4
All other craft occupations	3.2

Operatives and laborers, however, remain a notable exception to this generalization and provide testimony against the hypothesis of competition that is not easily dismissed. This is particularly so because semiskilled and unskilled factory jobs represent levels of employment from which Negroes are excluded neither by reason of their formal education nor by reason of social etiquette (except in the South). For the moment, we only note this exception, taking up a longitudinal analysis of operatives in the pages below.

The results in this section are reasonably

[7] Northrup, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–47.

clear, and there is little if anything about them that would lead one to reject the competition hypothesis, since both the Negro and female variables are inversely related to white male income, net of education, at most major occupational levels. The consistency of a set of data with a hypothesis does not, of course, constitute a proof of it. We have, for example, ignored the factor of geographical concentration, which we now examine briefly before summarizing the cross-sectional evidence.

INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION

Up to this point, we have attempted to remove the gross effects of income discrimination and occupational segregation from our analysis by taking white male income as the dependent variable and by restricting our analyses to major occupation groups. Also, we have tried to eliminate social background factors by controlling for education. Yet the inverse relationship between white male income and the Negro and female variables persists despite these refinements. One other factor, however, still stands as a possible intervening variable accounting for the association observed between the income and the Negro variable. It is well known that Negroes are geographically concentrated in the South and that the incomes of whites and Negroes alike tend to be lower in the South than elsewhere in the nation. Thus, if occupations with a large proportion of Negroes are concentrated in the South and those with a small proportion Negro are concentrated in the North, we might expect to find an inverse association between white male income and our Negro variable solely on the basis of the association both have with southern residence. Although southern geographic concentration could hardly explain our results pertaining to the proportion female, it could account for the results pertaining to the effect of racial composition on white male income.

Of all the major occupation groups, the findings for service workers are perhaps most prone to explanation by reference to the geographic concentration of the Negro. Most service workers, with the obvious exception of law enforcement officials, exercise little if any control over co-workers and/or clients in the course of performing their job. Here, particularly, racial etiquette proscribing Negroes from control or supervision of whites is of little account, and Negroes are able to find employment in most service occupations. In addition, we may note that many of the now specialized service occupations involve duties traditionally performed by Negroes in the plantation system, and consequently in the South there exists some tradition for Negro performance of service functions. Thus, among service occupations especially, the factor of Southern concentration is salient and may largely mitigate the observed association between the Negro and income variables.

To examine this possibility we constructed another variable: the percentage of the male experienced civilian labor force residing in the census South. Over the twenty-eight service occupations previously considered, this measure of Southern concentration is correlated −0.23 with our previous measure of income and +0.52 with the square-root percentage Negro. This is precisely the pattern of zero-order correlations required to reduce, if not fully explicate, the observed zero-order association of −0.65 (over the same twenty-eight occupations) between the income and Negro variables. Nevertheless, the partial correlation of the Negro variable with income remains significantly negative after controlling for Southern concentration. Adding our previous education measure in a multiple-regression framework does not alter the situation: the multiple correlation of income with the education, Negro, and concentration variables is 0.76; the partial regression coefficients (in standard form) of income on the edu-

cation and concentration variables are, respectively, +0.42 and +0.18; for the Negro variable the partial regression coefficient is −0.54, still negative and fully as large as originally observed when the percentage female rather than the concentration variable was included.

The foregoing results for service occupations clearly imply that controlling for southern geographic concentration will not explain away the influence of the Negro variable in any simple and obvious way. Indeed, the only surprise that appears in the analysis is the reversal in sign of the southern concentration variable after controlling for the education and Negro-composition measures. We have no ready explanation for this finding. Without further investigation of regionalism, largely irrelevant in the present context, further interpretation of this relationship cannot be supported.[8]

The cross-sectional evidence reported up to this point is largely consistent with the hypothesis of competition. The results cannot be explained away by the lower earnings of Negroes and females because the dependent variable pertains only to the income of white males; they cannot be explained away by the training and education of Negroes and females, because educational attainment has been controlled; they cannot be explained away by geographic concentration of the Negro because at one critical occupational level—service work—controlling for concentration has little effect; and, finally, they cannot be explained away by any gross process of occupational segregation because the results are obtained *within* major occupational groups. The only obvious alternative to admitting that competition with Negroes and females may depress white male wages is to assert that, within every major occupational level, processes of segregation allow females and Negroes to find employment largely in those occupations where income is rather less than expected on the basis of the income-education relationship within the major occupation group. The data do not allow us to reject the possibility of such a detailed process of segregation, but we know of no area of institutional life in which such general processes as occupational segregation are so effective in the small.

ANALYSIS OF CHANGE: THE CASE OF OPERATIVES

The analyses within major occupational groups and the brief examination of southern concentration of occupations complete the types of cross-sectional evidence we can bring to bear upon the hypothesis that competition with females and Negroes may depress white male wages. In the space remaining, we illustrate with a single example the kinds of arguments that can be made from change data. In 1940, the Census did not publish all of the information used in our 1950 cross-sectional analysis, and what was published was tabulated by intermediate rather than by detailed occupation. Our focus is upon thirty-five intermediate occupational titles which are specified under the major occupation group "operatives and kindred workers" and which remain for analysis after several combinations are made to achieve comparability between 1940, 1950, and 1960. Four reasons dictated our choice of focusing upon the intermediate titles comprising "operatives and kindred workers." First, the major occupational level is one at which whites and Negroes can potentially compete for jobs. Second, the number of intermediate titles identified—thirty-five after making combinations to achieve comparability—is sufficient to support correlation analyses within the major occupation group. Third, our previous cross-sectional analyses revealed that education

[8] We should note that in the South, Negroes are not able to compete meaningfully with whites owing to extensive racial segregation and discrimination in most areas of collective life. Ideally, the analyses performed in this paper should be restricted exclusively to the non-South, but extant tabulations do not permit such a separation.

does not influence white wages at this level, so we are relieved of the necessity of introducing an additional control variable. And fourth, our previous cross-sectional analysis failed to confirm our hypothesis about the effects of competition at this level.

In order to make statistics from 1940, 1950, and 1960 as comparable as possible, we are not able to use the full richness of the 1950 and 1960 materials. As an initial step we selected in each of the three years a point on the income distribution for the given year for *all* males such that approximately 50 per cent of the male experienced civilian labor force (with earnings in the preceding year) would fall above and 50 per cent would fall below the cutting point. These actual percentages were then compiled in each year for each of the thirty-five occupations under consideration. As a second step, the actual income percentages defined in each year were standardized for color by the method of expected cases. This was done in order to eliminate the effects of color on income, since for 1940 it is not possible to compile income figures pertaining only to white males. The standardization was done for 1950 and 1960 to maintain comparability with the 1940 data.[9] A third and final step involved establishing the least-squares linear regression of the 1950 color-standardized income figure on the 1940 color-standardized income percentages and the corresponding regression of the 1960 measures on the 1950 measures. The residuals from these two regression equations were then calculated and serve as our indicators of relative income change between 1940 and 1950 and between 1950 and 1960. By the nature of their construction, these measures of the relative change in the income of our thirty-five operative occupations are statistically independent of the value of the standardized income figures at the beginning of each decade over which we are measuring change. We regard this as a convenient property of change measures, especially in the present problem, but space does not permit thorough discussion.[10]

Our measure of change in color composition is quite simple. For each of the thirty-five operative occupations we took the difference in percentage non-white between 1940 and 1950 and between 1950 and 1960. Thus, for example, 7.8 per cent of "filling station and parking lot attendants" were non-white in 1940, and 8.9 per cent were non-white in 1950. The difference of 1.1 (=8.9 −7.8) per cent represents our measure of change in color composition for this occupation between 1940 and 1950.

The first and most obvious manner of analyzing these change data is to relate changes in color composition between 1940

[9] The standardization is for color (non-white-white) rather than race (white, Negro, other) because of limitations imposed by existing data. (In 1960, about 92 per cent of the non-white population was Negro, so for practical purposes we can regard the standardization of income for color as equivalent to a standardization for race.) In performing the standardization, expected income figures (E) were derived by weighting the observed color composition of each occupation by the percentage of whites and non-whites in the total experienced civilian labor force with incomes exceeding the cutting points for each year. (The cutting points were one thousand, twenty-five hundred, and four thousand dollars for 1940, 1950, and 1960, respectively.) Using "universe" rates for the whole labor force rather than for operatives only was again dictated by limitations of the 1940 data. The standardized rates were computed by taking the difference between the actual and expected incomes for each occupation and then (for computational convenience) adding a constant to this difference which was equal to the percentage of all operatives with incomes in excess of the temporally specific cutting points.

[10] The basic problem with most measures of change is that they exhibit regression toward the mean, which implies that units initially high on a measure tend to be somewhat lower at the next observation, while initially low observations tend to rise toward the mean. Various ratios and the percentage increase are especially subject to this difficulty. By definition our residuals bear no *linear* relationship to initial observations.

and 1950 and between 1950 and 1960 to changes in relative income in the corresponding periods. We find a correlation of −0.06 between income changes and shifts in color composition during the period between 1940 and 1950. That this correlation is in the right direction is of no account, for there is no reason to believe that it is different from zero in any sense, statistical or otherwise. Were it not for the peculiar characteristics of the war years, this relationship would constitute quite strong evidence against the supposition that competition between whites and Negroes curtails the expansion of white male wages or earning power relative to other occupations. However, we believe that further investigation of the particular pattern of Negro migration during the war years and their assimilation into defense industries operating under antidiscriminatory clauses in federal contracts would explain in large part the outcome of our change analysis for the decade 1940–50. For, with the return to normalcy in the 1950's, we find a significant inverse relationship between the relative changes in income among operative occupations and increases in the percentage Negro. The correlation is −0.40, a zero-order association significant at the .025 level. Thus, in the decade 1950–60 the evidence is quite consistent with the hypothesis that, in those occupations which showed enhanced white-non-white competition, rises in income failed to keep pace with income in those occupations evidencing less competition.

Before one falls into the neatly contrived trap of interpreting these change results as substantial evidence in favor of our hypothesis about the alleged effects of competition, a fundamental indeterminacy in these relationships must be pointed out. We have no way whatsoever of knowing from the change results whether shifts in racial composition led relative changes in income or whether shifts in income led changes in color composition. The negative relationship can be generated in two distinct ways: Negroes can move into an occupation and wages subsequently decline or, to the contrary, wages may initially decline and *then* Negroes are allowed to move in. One process is that of competition and the other of segregation. All we can say about the change analysis is that it is consistent with the hypothesis about competition; it does not constitute evidence for it.

Let us look at our material in yet another way which may allow us to reject our hypothesis about competition. According to that hypothesis, changes in the color composition of an occupation *must* induce changes in the relative income of incumbents. Now, if we found very high interdecennial correlations between our 1940 and 1950 and between our 1950 and 1960 color-standardized measures of income it would imply that apart from secular trends there was very slight change in the *relative* incomes enjoyed by males in our thirty-five operative occupations. If, in addition, we found positive, but much lower interdecennial correlations in the proportion non-white in these occupations it would mean that there were *appreciable* changes in the relative percentage non-white among the occupations under consideration. But, according to the hypothesis about competition, changes in the color composition of an occupation must induce changes in the income of incumbents, at least insofar as competition of the sort we are discussing takes place. Thus, the particular pattern of correlations we have posited, a pattern that indicates great stability in relative income and great change in color composition, would provide very strong evidence *against* the hypothesis that competition leads changes in relative income. But, on the other hand, it would be perfectly consistent with the counter hypothesis that income changes lead changes in color composition. For it could well be that the appreciable changes in color composition were simply resulting

in greater segregation or concentration of Negroes in lower-paid occupations.

It turns out that both the proportion of non-whites and color-standardized income measures remain very stable over time, at least for the thirty-five operative occupations under consideration. Between the 1940 and 1950 measures of color-standardized income we find a correlation of 0.96, while a correlation of 0.93 holds between the 1950 and 1960 income variables. The corresponding interdecennial correlations involving the proportion non-white in an occupation are in both cases 0.93. Thus, we find the data consistent with the competition hypothesis, even though it is clear that they could have provided grounds for its rejection.

In both our refinement of various cross-sectional analyses bearing on the hypothesis of competition and in our treatment of longitudinal data, we attempted to generate evidence that would, in whole or in part, prove inconsistent with the hypothesis that white earnings and wages are adversely affected by competition with minority groups. For the moment let us admit that competition as well as processes of occupational segregation are important influences which generate the inverse relationship between the proportion Negro or female in an occupation and white male or color-standardized income. Then we might inquire about the relative importance of these two forces. Very briefly, we can tackle that problem with the change data we have previously used. If, in the main, changes in relative income lead changes in color composition so that *segregation* is the primary causal element, then we ought to be able to predict changes in racial composition between 1950 and 1960 with our measures of relative income changes between 1940 and 1950 and between 1950 and 1960. If, on the contrary, the primary direction of causation is from changes in composition to changes in relative income so that *competition* is the primary causal element, then we ought to achieve even better predictions of relative income changes between 1950 and 1960 from changes in color composition between 1940 and 1950 and between 1950 and 1960. The relative magnitudes of the two suggested multiple correlations will indicate which causal channel tends to dominate, granting at the outset that both are operative. The difference between the two suggested multiple correlations is not large, but, if anything, it suggests that competition is the more important causal element. Thus, our data are once again consistent with the competition hypothesis.[11]

DISCUSSION

As a preface to some concluding remarks, we want to make it perfectly clear that the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses we have discussed do not *prove* that the competition between majority and minority groups depresses the relative wages of the former. Rather, we have presented a series of findings which even after extensive refinement are *consistent* with that hypothesis. One must remember that our longitudinal analysis was restricted to one occupation group and should be extended to others. Also, one must consider the fact that while all of our arrangements of the longitudinal data are conceptually distinct, they are not mathematically independent. But, nevertheless, having examined both longitudinal and cross-sectional data in a variety of ways and still lacking any substantial evidence *against* an hypothesis, one begins to build up confidence in the relationship under scrutiny. Although we are prepared to consider any further data that

[11] The multiple correlation of 1950–60 changes in the percentage non-white with our income measures for the two decades—1940–50 and 1950–60—is .42. Relative changes in income between 1950 and 1960 have a multiple correlation of .56 with changes in racial composition 1940–50 and 1950–60. Both results are, individually, highly significant. We have not tested the significance of the difference between the two multiple correlations because (1) the difference is in favor of the competition hypothesis and (2) even if the difference proved statistically significant it is too small to bear much substantive interpretation.

may come to light, we are for the present also prepared to assert that competition with minority groups probably has deleterious effects upon the economic condition of the majority. Where competition has in fact occurred, it may serve to reinforce existing prejudices. Where it has not concretely occurred but is threatened, it may serve as an economic incentive to continue discrimination. Until there is evidence to the contrary, we are obligated to regard competition as one of the important economic bases of discrimination and to recognize that, while there may be some net economic gain to the whole society in abandoning discrimination, there might be an appreciable net loss to some sectors in achieving full equality.

In interpreting the results of this paper, one must also be careful to recognize that, just because competition and its probable deleterious effects are factors in discrimination, it does not necessarily follow that the magnitude of these effects is large in an economic sense, especially *at the individual level*. Here we have only attempted to demonstrate that they are systematic by adopting the expedient of comparing occupational aggregates. Further research should explicitly attempt to evaluate the probable cost in money equivalents of competition to white males and other groups (other things being equal) under the condition of full equality.

While this paper was not devised to calculate costs directly, the regression equations presented in Table 2 provide some testimony that they are not unduly large at the individual level. Regarding the female and Negro variables as exogenous ones, we may use our "ecological" regressions over occupational groups to estimate the association at the individual level between education and income among white males working in occupations with different sex and racial compositions.[12] For example, among service occupations, we estimate that 68 per cent of white males who completed high school earned thirty-five hundred dollars or more if they worked in an occupation with *no* Negroes or females, while 56 per cent of the same group earned thirty-five hundred dollars or more if they worked in an occupation with the mean square-root percentage Negro and female. The difference of 12 (=68−56) per cent does not seem large and provides a little evidence that the costs of competition are not substantial even if its effects are systematic. The regressions within the other major occupation groups lead to much the same conclusion, because the estimated influences of the Negro and female variables are about as substantial at the service level as at any other major occupational level, and at the service level the means and variances of both the Negro and female variables are relatively large.

In conclusion, we make reference to a recent statement appearing in a popular magazine: "Many of the less skilled and informed workers genuinely fear that as the Negro gains education and training, he may be willing to 'work for half the pay' and thus take the white man's job and lower wage standards."[13] Such fears, if we are to believe the comparative occupational statistics analyzed here, have some objective basis owing to the adverse effects of competition on particular occupational groups. Such fears, however, are not rooted in attitudes of racial superiority or other feelings of prejudice. But even though these fears have an economic basis rather than a prejudicial one, they may still prove

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[12] In estimating individual correlations from the ecological regressions reported herein, it is necessary to take into account two exogenous variables. The techniques involved are only an obvious generalization of the case where one exogenous variable is involved. The latter case is treated in detail by Leo A. Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (July, 1959), pp. 610-25.

[13] Herbert Harris, "The Riddle of the Labor Vote," *Harper's Magazine*, CCIX (October, 1954), p. 45.

a powerful incentive for continuing discrimination and become a barrier to the attainment of full equality by Negro and female workers long after racial and sex prejudice—now on the decline—have come to rock bottom. Those who feel that antidiscrimination legislation is unnecessary because it cannot affect basic prejudices are advised to the contrary. Perhaps we cannot legislate prejudice, but we can devise legal proscriptions of specific acts of discrimination. Continued legal guarantees of basic rights and freedoms in the labor market (such as embodied in the 1964 Civil Rights Act) may prove necessary if economic fears—and this paper suggests they are both genuine and objectively based—are not to prove a basis for prolonging discriminatory policies.

National Opinion Research Center
and
Population Research and Training Center

Assimilation of Chinese in America: Changes in Orientation and Social Perception[1]

Stanley L. M. Fong

ABSTRACT

The assimilation orientation and social perception of 336 Chinese college students were studied. The psychometric findings supported the thesis that as Chinese become progressively removed from their ancestral culture and in greater contact with the dominant American culture they show a concurrent increase in their assimilation orientation and in their internalization of American perceptual norms. The indexes of progressive removal utilized were generation, citizenship, residence area, and social groups. The Westernized Chinese from British Hong Kong, many of whom were foreign students constituted a unique group. They were highly internalized, by Western standards, but the least assimilation-oriented.

The assimilation of minority groups in America has been viewed, traditionally, from the sociological perspective. Psychological changes, attitudinal and behavioral, are doubtlessly woven into the process of social assimilation and will be examined in this paper. Several psychological aspects will be studied as they apply to the Chinese in America undergoing various stages of assimilation.

One psychological facet is assimilation orientation. This attitudinal continuum may be described as the extent to which minority members are favorably disposed toward accepting a style of life that is conducive to all aspects of assimilation. For the more assimilation-oriented members, social and cultural interests, and identity and allegiance, lie predominantly in the host society rather than in the ethnic community or Old Country. They may consider themselves more as Americans than as Chinese, Jews, Negroes, etc., and desire fuller social participation in the larger society. In contrast, the least assimilation-oriented members are those who wish to confine themselves to their ethnic enclave in America either through indifference to or rejection of the majority society.

A second factor, reasonably independent of the above, is acculturation. It encompasses the degree to which ethnic minority members have actually learned and acquired Western values and patterns in their behavior. The ways in which people express their emotions and interpret the facial expressions and bodily gestures of others are instances of such psychological features. These expressive styles vary among cultural groups and are liable to be misinterpreted by members of another, alien culture. As an illustration, in traditional China, girls were admonished, "Do not show your unhappiness easily and do not smile easily—and do not let your teeth be seen when you smile."[2] Such reserved

[1] This article is based on a thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in psychology at San Francisco State College, 1963. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Harvey Peskin for his advice and invaluable assistance throughout this study. Dr. Curtis D. Hardyck and Dr. Theodore R. Sarbin, University of California, made their Stick Figures Test readily available and gave generous support. Mrs. Elinor Krasnow and Mr. Phillip Duel, University of California Computer Center, provided computer programs for the analysis of the data. Dr. Bela O. Baker, Dr. David Freeman, Dr. Donald Lim, Mr. Zanvel Klein, and Mr. Sanford Autumn also gave helpful assistance in various stages of this project. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Western Psychological Association Convention, 1962.

[2] Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt, 1940), p. 172.

expressions, one suspects, have often been misperceived by Western eyes as shyness or disinterest, on the one hand, or as the stereotypic inscrutability of Orientals, on the other. Conversely, the more spontaneous and outgoing Westerner may have been misperceived by the old Chinese as being impulsive, emotional, and bold. Several studies, in fact, have indicated that Chinese and Americans do vary in their interpretation of emotions displayed in photographs of each other.[3] Thus, the prototypical emotional expressions, gestures, and movements of a culture may be hallmarks of more pervasive, latent, and indigenous cultural characteristics.

The accurate recognition of the emotional expressions of the American culture is, then, a signal cognitive achievement for minority members strongly influenced by non-Western norms and ways of thinking. The task is yet all the more difficult in that the nuances of such non-verbal expressions are often so subtle that individuals, even native Americans, cannot readily describe them or, perhaps, even be consciously aware of them. Thus, mere familiarity with the English language, or explicit conventions of dress, etiquette, etc., is no guaranty that the expressive behavior of Americans will be substantially understood. Once achieved, however, the alteration of the minority members' own physiognomic motility may follow suit. Adams has observed the changes in the facial expressions and mannerisms of Orientals in Hawaii.[4] He feels that "it is not so much that they have been taught by Americans or that they have copied from Americans as it is that they have been exposed to a social situation of a certain sort and that there has been an inner transformation natural to the situation and a corresponding outward expression."[5] It seems that through social (e.g., role) interaction with members of the host culture, ethnic minority members may spontaneously and unwittingly learn to reciprocate these behaviors and come, in turn, to make the proper interpretation of the emotional expressions in others of the host society. To this process whereby the qualities (i.e., traits, norms) of the host culture become ingrained into the psychological makeup of minority members, the term *internalization* will be applied.

The guiding thesis of the present study is that as individuals of Chinese descent become progressively removed from the influence of traditional Chinese culture and in greater contact with the host culture, they will show a concurrent increase in their assimilation orientation and in their internalization of Western cultural norms. Progressive removal may be operationally defined in terms of such sociological indexes as generation level, citizenship status, area of residence, and ethnic composition of social groups.

A second hypothesis is that Chinese from modern Asian cities, where Western influence has made much inroad, such as Hong Kong, will show a greater degree of internalization than Chinese from other regions of China or even some of the Chinese generations born in America. The basis of this hypothesis is that the Chinese in America have not become integrated as rapidly as many other ethnic minority groups. This state of affairs may be partly due to antioriental sentiment and discriminatory practices, particularly prior to World War II, on the one hand, and to the plethora of social institutions in the

[3] H. S. May, "A Study of Emotional Expression among Chinese and Americans" (unpublished M.A. dissertation, Columbia University, 1938); W. Edgar Vinacke, "The Judgment of Facial Expressions by Three National-Racial Groups in Hawaii: I. Caucasian Faces," *Journal of Personality*, XVII (June, 1949), 407–29; W. Edgar Vinacke and Roberta W. Fong, "The Judgment of Facial Expressions by Three National-Racial Groups in Hawaii: II. Oriental Faces," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XLI (May, 1955), 185–95.

[4] Romanzo C. Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii: A Study of the Mutually Conditioned Processes of Acculturation and Amalgamation* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1937).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

ghettos which militate against the assimilation of its members, on the other.[6] Paradoxically, many seaports in Southeast Asia during the past fifty years have become modern urban centers and more Westernized than most Chinese ghettos in America, which are usually located in slums.

While Chinese from urban centers in Asia have internalized Western culture to a large extent, many of them are foreign students from Hong Kong who must anticipate returning to their homeland. The third hypothesis is, therefore, that the assimilation orientation of the Hong Kong Chinese would be the lowest. This pattern does not apply to the majority of the other Chinese born in Mainland China for they have, in general, migrated earlier to America with their parents and plan to remain permanently in America, especially in view of the political situation in China.

METHOD

SUBJECTS

The subjects were 336 Chinese college students, all living in America, and consisted of 57 first generation (China-born), 121 second generation, 133 third generation, 22 fourth generation, and 3 fifth generation. Those subjects whose parents differed in their generation status were classified in relation to the higher of the two parental statuses, for example, the son of a first-generation mother and a second-generation father was classified as third generation.

Of the 57 first-generation subjects, 24 were either born or had lived largely in Hong Kong before coming to America. In the treatment of results, the Hong Kong group was separated from the remaining members of the first generation because of the hypothesized differences between these two groups of subjects. The median length of residence of the Hong Kong group in America was four years and that of the remaining members of the first generation, nine years; this difference was statistically significant at the .05 level. Of those born in America, 160 were from California, 55 from Hawaii, and 44 from other states. There were 158 males and 178 females. The mean age was twenty-one years.

Each subject received three forms, consisting of the Personal Data Form, Assimilation-Orientation Inventory, and Stick Figures Test. These forms were filled out anonymously and returned by mail. It is estimated that 75 per cent of the questionnaires were returned.

PERSONAL DATA FORM

The Personal Data Form contained actuarial items such as age, sex, generation, citizenship status, place of residence, and ethnic composition of one's social groups. The sociological indexes could be arranged in an order of progressive removal, such as from first to fifth generation, from parents both being aliens to both being native-born citizens, from residing mostly in China to living predominantly in white neighborhoods, and from having mostly China-born friends to having mostly Caucasian friends.

In general, the items in the Personal Data Form were presented in multiple-choice form. Whenever subjects selected more than one multiple-choice answer in the Personal Data Form or defined themselves, in the blank space provided, in a manner that could not be readily classified into one of the given alternatives, they were omitted from that particular analysis.

ASSIMILATION-ORIENTATION INVENTORY

In past research, scales for measuring assimilation have been based largely on sociological and anthropological indexes. They have been aimed primarily at the older immigrant population and seem un-

[6] Rose H. Lee, *The Chinese in the United States of America* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960); Stanford M. Lyman, "The Structure of Chinese Society in the Nineteenth Century" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1961).

suitable for the present task of discriminating among the native-born Chinese.[7] In order to assess the focus of the subjects' social, cultural, and nationalistic interests, an attitude inventory was constructed. This Assimilation-Orientation Inventory, presented to the subjects under the title of Social-Opinion Inventory, consisted of 195 true-false items. Some of these items were modifications from Kwan,[8] and the rest were devised by the present investigator.

All of the 105 true-false items in the inventory were keyed as the investigator thought a highly assimilated Chinese would respond. In this rational construction of an assimilation-orientation scale, he was often guided by findings and observations reported in the research literature.[9] This scale construction, of course, was accomplished before the period of data collection. The score for each subject on the inventory was simply the number of items on which he responded as a hypothetically fully assimilated person would.[10]

An informal clustering indicates at least four types of items. Samples of each type follow, with each item keyed accordingly:

Cultural interests:

1. Chinese may adapt themselves to the American society in order to earn a living, but they must stay together as a group to preserve their own culture. (False)
2. The best thing for the Chinese in the United States to do is to associate more with the Americans, adopt the American culture, and identify themselves as Americans. (True)

Social interests:

3. In general, a Chinese would have more fun with other Chinese than he would have with Caucasians. (False)
4. It is better that Chinese date only Chinese. (False)
5. It is easy for me to act natural (be my usual self) when I am with a new group of Caucasians. (True)

Nationalistic sentiments:

6. I don't have any particularly strong feeling of attachment to China. (True)
7. I always think of myself as an American first and as a Chinese second. (True)

Social prejudice:

8. Many Caucasians are not prejudiced. (True)
9. Caucasians make an Oriental feel very conscious of his racial background. (False)

STICK FIGURES TEST

For this project, the Stick Figures Test[11] was selected as a recognition test of the expressive modes of the American culture. The test consists of a series of forty-three simple line drawings of human-like stick figures; they were drawn by an artist to represent a wide range of expressive and attitudinal states (see Fig. 1). The figures vary only in pose or posture in a manner that allows various emotional states to be attributed to or projected onto them. The subject must, therefore, base his perceptual response exclusively on gestural and postural cues, since stereotyped attributes of physique, clothing, social status, and race are unavailable. Thus, unlike the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory above, the Stick Figures Test provides no clear cue to the socially desirable or "correct" response.

For each figure in the test, the subject is instructed to select one of five adjectives (empirically tailored to each figure) which

[7] Paul Campisi, "A Scale for the Measurement of Acculturation" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1947); Kian M. Kwan, "Assimilation of the Chinese in the United States: An Exploratory Study in California" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1958).

[8] Kwan, *ibid.*

[9] Campisi, *op. cit.*; Kwan, *op. cit.*

[10] The scoring key and all the items in the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory may be found in Stanley L. M. Fong, "The Assimilation of Chinese in America: Changes in Orientation and Social Perception" (unpublished M.A. dissertation, San Francisco State College, 1963).

[11] Theodore R. Sarbin and Curtis D. Hardyck, "Conformance in Role Perception as a Personality Variable," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, XIX (April, 1955), 109-11.

best describes his judgment of the emotion or attitude being expressed. A blank space is also provided for each figure, to be filled in when none of the adjectives adequately describes the subject's impressions. For each figure, a modal response (i.e., the most frequently chosen adjective) has been determined from a large Caucasian-American sample of college students.[12] The score for a subject on the test is simply the number of stick figures on which he gives the modal response.[13]

Hardyck[14] states that the test was constructed to measure "the degree to which members of a . . . social group share similar perceptions, cognitive organizations, and affective tendencies, under conditions where there is not stipulated or imagined social demand or pressure to conform to a given pattern or outlook." Such "communality," as defined by Hardyck, is assumed to develop out of the shared experiences of the group members and is perpetuated without any conscious attempt to do so. The degree to which these communal norms have not been absorbed or internalized should, in turn, reflect the individual's alienation from the modal American community, on the one hand, and his atypical experiences and early contact with a different value system, on the other. It would follow that people who come from another culture and who are in various stages of removal from it, as Chinese in America, may also be expected to show wide disparity on this test.

FIG. 1

Assessment research on Caucasian-American samples indicates that subjects displaying a high modal American response also show personality-functioning commensurate with the mature American prototype. High agreement with the modal pattern of the Stick Figures Test is positively related to psychometric scales showing the following personality traits: tactful, dependable, responsible, co-operative, resourceful, effective, independent, well informed, insightful, good judgment.[15] These findings show decisively that the test is not a measure merely of compliance but of the mature socialization of an individual in American society. On the basis of such

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] In general, the adjectives in the test are simple, like those shown in Fig. 1. There is a possibility, however, that a low score on the test may be a result of a subject's limited English vocabulary and not of low familiarity with Western expressive norms. To minimize this possibility, definitions of the more difficult words, taken verbatim from the *American College Dictionary*, were included in the test booklet. In addition, to assess the influence of language facility on test performance, seventeen Chinese who had not attended college were given the Stick Figures Test. They were matched for generation, sex, and age with seventeen college students. No significant difference on the test was obtained between these two groups. In addition, no significant differences existed among groupings based on the academic standing of the college subjects; i.e., freshmen, sophomores, juniors, seniors, and graduate students did not differ significantly from each other on the test. Hence, the results did not seem to be confounded by a vocabulary factor. Except for this college versus non-college comparison, the non-college subjects were omitted from further analysis.

[14] Curtis D. Hardyck, "Communality: A Definition and Criteria for Measurement" (unpublished manuscript, 1957).

[15] *Ibid.*, Sarbin and Hardyck, *op. cit.*

assessment research for Caucasian-American samples, the Stick Figures Test may reasonably be said to reflect the affective-cognitive implications of the internalization of socially valued attributes.

RESULTS

The sociological indexes of progressive removal that yielded significant results on the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory and Stick Figures Test are presented in Table 1. They are the following: generation level, parents' citizenship status, area of residence, and ethnicity of one's intimate friends. For each of these dimensions, the scores of the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory and Stick Figures Test have been expressed in terms of mean ranks to comply with the statistical test that was used to evaluate their significance. The Kruskal-Wallis *H* test involves ranking the scores of all subjects, on each test, and the differences among the mean ranks of two or more groups of subjects are statistically evaluated.[16] In all cases, a

[16] A significant *H* by the Kruskal-Wallis *H* test indicates that the differences in the mean ranks among all subgroups are beyond chance expectancy. Since this test evaluates only the statistical significance of the differences among mean ranks without regard to any hypothesized order of the differences, the statistical significance of the results obtained in this study is somewhat underestimated. At the present time, however, there is no statistical test available that assesses jointly the significance of the differences among sample means and the predicted order of their differences. For a clear exposition of the Kruskal-Wallis *H* test, see Sidney

TABLE 1

MEAN RANKS OF ASSIMILATION-ORIENTATION INVENTORY AND STICK FIGURES TEST

Indexes of Progressive Removal	Assimilation-Orientation Inventory	Stick Figures Test	Group Size
Generation:			
First	132.9	114.0	33
Second	167.4	166.7	121
Third	184.3	180.3	133
Fourth	209.0	166.7	22
Fifth	232.3	192.2	3
Hong Kong	89.7	186.4	24
	$H=28.9$***	$H=13.4$*	....
Parents' citizenship status:			
Both aliens	101.5	134.6	33
One alien, other naturalized	154.2	149.1	60
Both naturalized	162.3	178.5	89
One naturalized, other native-born	198.3	192.5	52
Both native-born	188.8	169.9	102
	$H=26.7$***	$H=10.6$*	....
Residence:[a]			
In China	73.5	103.7	36
In Chinatown	141.8	138.7	24
Near Chinatown	136.9	140.7	64
Away from Chinatown	158.3	150.9	38
In white neighborhood	163.0	155.2	124
	$H=34.4$***	$H=11.3$*	....
Intimate friends.[b]			
China-born	52.9	108.6	32
American-born Chinese	151.7	145.5	214
Caucasians	172.3	160.8	40
	$H=45.4$***	$H=7.6$*	....

[a] Where one has lived most of one's life.
[b] Whether mostly China-born, American-born Chinese, or Caucasians.
* Significant beyond the .05 level.
*** Significant beyond the .001 level.

lower mean rank refers to a lower psychometric score.

The various subgroups in each sociological category, as mentioned, are arranged in an order of progressive removal, for example, first to fifth generations. The results generally reveal that the mean ranks on both the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory and Stick Figures Test increase in direct correspondence to this order of progressive removal, that is, mean ranks tend to increase as subgroups go up the progressive-removal continuum. On the indexes of generation level and intimate friends, the mean ranks of subgroups on the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory fell exactly in the expected order, with each subgroup showing a higher mean rank than the preceding one. On the indexes of area of residence and, again, intimate friends, the mean ranks of subgroups on the Stick Figures Test fell precisely in the expected order. In the remaining categories, no more than one of the component subgroups departed from the trend on either psychometric test; such deviations were usually slight inversions in scores between adjacent subgroups, and within chance variation. The results, therefore, generally supported the first hypothesis that assimilation orientation and internalization increase with progressive removal from the ethnic culture.

The Hong Kong subgroup, treated separately from the other members of the first generation because of the expectation of differences, had the second-highest mean rank among the various Chinese generations on the Stick Figures Test. This evidence supported the second hypothesis that the Hong Kong Chinese have internalized Western cultural norms to a greater extent than other members of the first generation. But perhaps of equal interest is that their scores were higher than all the American-born generations, except for the fifth, and were comparable to American norms.[17] At the same time, the assimilation orientation of the Hong Kong group (according to the Assimilation-Orientation Inventory) is *lower* than any of the other groups, including the remaining members of the first generaiton. The results thus supported the third hypothesis – that the Hong Kong group, although highly internalized (by the Stick Figures Test), would be the least assimilation-oriented.[18]

DISCUSSION

The assimilation process involves a host of psychosocial as well as sociological transformations. Some of the changes in attitude and perception have been empirically explored here. The study shows that the social and cultural orientations and sentiments of the Chinese shift gradually from the ethnic subculture to the larger American community. As the American society becomes a positive reference group, its norms and values begin to guide, as well as modify, the perspectives and behavior of the Chinese. Indeed, according to the Stick Figures Test, the Chinese are acquiring a psychological predisposition to perceive the social gestures of others as Americans do. In arriving at this common mode of perception, it seems evident that they may have also incorporated yet broader cognitive and emotive patterns of the prevailing American climate. Consistent

Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 184–94.

[17] Hardyck, *op. cit.*

[18] Doubtless, some of the foreign-born Chinese who were classified into the non Hong Kong group were also highly Westernized, since they too came from modern cities, such as Shanghai and Macao. But the number of subjects from these various Westernized seaports was small in comparison to the Hong Kong aggregate. Furthermore, the subjects from the various areas in China were not more elaborately differentiated in this study because objective methods were lacking for assessing how Westernized are the various cities in Asia. For this essentially exploratory study, the classification of Chinese into Hong Kong and non Hong Kong groups seemed practical, useful, and heuristic

with this view, Abel and Hsu[19] have found that the nature of the emotional control of the Chinese, traditionally known for their "inscrutability," has altered in favor of the expressiveness and spontaneity indigenous to the American scene. As an outcome of internalizing Western modes, the Chinese are inevitably losing their traditional values of reticence, formality, and constraint in interpersonal behavior.

It is not surprising, then, that the American-born Chinese are often regarded with mixed feelings by the overseas Chinese because the former "have similar physical characteristics and yet are different."[20] On the other hand, the American-born have sometimes regarded the China-born as being too "Chinafied," as one Americanized subject put it, or "Chines*ee*," as another one expressed it. On college campuses across the United States, the American- and China-born usually segregate themselves into different congeniality groups, where the idiom of intimate talk is English in the native-born circle and the Chinese tongue in the other. Even among the China-born, there is a tendency to splinter into subgroups based on considerations of geographic origin and dialect, but such distinctions are less conspicuous than the basic breach between the American-born and China-born. In fact, the disparity between the American- and China-born is sometimes formally recognized and institutionalized on the college campus; two Chinese student clubs may exist, one for the American-born, another for the China-born. Attempts to merge these two groups of Chinese have been singularly unsuccessful.[21]

The social distance between these two classes of Chinese students may stem from a nucleus of disparity in interests, values, ideals, attitudes, behavioral propensities, and so on. The psychosocial vicissitudes need to be studied and major axes of conflicts identified. Moreover, Chinese individuals, in assimilating Western life and attitudes, may also have internalized some of the prevailing negative ethnic stereotypes toward their own minority group. Some may even regard their ethnic identity as an impediment to further mobility and attempt to disassociate psychologically from Chinese groups. Thus, it seems fruitful to look at the psychosocial correlates of assimilation, as well as the sociological ones, to attain greater insight into Chinese life in America and into the forces that have rent them into a variety of disparate groups. These intra-ethnic disparities and discords, doubtlessly existing in other minority groups,[22] need to be examined as integral phases of the social psychology of assimilation.

Further studies can pursue various issues raised by the present research. With the two psychological dimensions, assimilation orientation and internalization, a model of minority prototypes can be constructed and essential characteristics examined. As a beginning, one would conceive of a two-factor typology, based on highs and lows of each dimension: (1) those Chinese who are high on both assimilation orientation and internalization, (2) those who are low on both of these dimensions, (3) those who are low on assimiliation orientation but high on internalization (such as the Hong Kong group in the present study), and (4) those who are high on assimilation orientation yet still low in internalization (such

[19] Theodora M. Abel and Francis L. K. Hsu, "Some Aspects of Personality of Chinese as Revealed by the Rorschach Test," *Rorschach Research Exchange and Journal of Projective Techniques*, XII (September, 1949), 285–301.

[20] Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

[21] See *ibid.*, esp. pp. 396-404.

[22] See E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Collier Books, 1962); Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper & Row, 1941); and Seymour Parker, "Ethic Identity and Acculturation in Two Eskimo Villages," *American Anthropologist*, LXVI (April, 1964), 325-40.

persons may consist of semiacculturated second-generation members who are in cultural conflict with their immigrant parents and have rejected, in a compulsive manner, their ethnic identity for the marginal American one). The underlying makeup of these types of Chinese can be assessed empirically. This multivariate model is a reasonable approach for future research because it moves toward a conceptually sophisticated plan on which the sociological and psychological essence of the Chinese minority may be examined in depth.

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Power Structure and Membership Dispersion in Unions

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ABSTRACT

The form of political organization in local unions varies with the spatial distribution of members and the size of membership but relatively independently of such indicators of bureaucratization as age of the organization and uniformity of members' occupations. Spatially concentrated members are associated with "democratic" forms of political organization, while spatially dispersed members are found with "oligarchic" forms. Large memberships also promote "democracy." But size of membership and spatial concentration of members are inversely related. In the universe their influences tend to neutralize one another and obscure their direct associations with "democracy."

This paper reports a study of factors that determine the form taken by the political organization of local labor unions.[1] In this study, it was found that the spatial distribution of members largely supersedes other explanations of the form taken by political organization. With almost unvarying regularity local unions with members sufficiently spatially concentrated to permit informal communications were found to be "democratic" organizations, while those with members so dispersed as to impair such communications were found to be "oligarchic." While size of membership also influences form of political organization, its effect is obscured by an inverse correlation with spatial concentration of members. Other processes, such as age of the organization and uniformity of occupations, perhaps act through rather than independently of the spatial distribution of members to determine the form of political organization.

In the present study the data consist of factual materials representing each of a random weighted sample of sixty-five local unions with widely varying national affiliations, but with headquarters in Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. The data were gathered through structured interviews with at least one high-ranking official of each organization.

While the spatial distribution of members, as it affects communications, has been considered relevant for political outcomes, often it has received casual rather than systematic attention,[2] or it has been completely ignored while the effects of other conditions have been studied. Instead, it is the historical process of bureaucratization in such mutual-benefit associations as labor unions that has been widely evaluated as having central importance for an understanding of the forms taken by political

[1] Revision of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August, 1963. Through the generosity of Peter M. Blau the field work for this study was supported by a Ford Foundation Fellowship in Business Problems. I wish to express my warm appreciation for the critical assistance and counsel of Peter M. Blau, Peter H. Rossi, Arthur L. Stinchcombe, and Henry D. McKay. Joel Seidman provided valuable guidance during initial phases of the study, orienting me to the literature and through the maze of problems inherent in any attempt to study labor unions.

[2] Joseph Kovner and Herbert J. Lahne, "Shop Society and the Union," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, VII (October, 1953), 3–14; Joel Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh, and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo, *The Worker Views His Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 195, 207; Seymour M Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, *The Local Union* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953); George Strauss, "Control by Membership in the Building Trades," in *Unions and Union Leadership*, ed. Jack Barbash (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), pp. 176–92.

organization.[3] However, this natural-history or bureaucratization model of the life of the local union imposes some strain upon existing data of reported studies. Some local unions appear to elude such a theoretical mold but fall easily into another. There, the presence of "democratic" or "oligarchic" forms of political organization seems to be closely dependent upon the extent to which there exist informal face-to-face communications which accompany work settings that facilitate social interaction among members.

Some exploration of the association between the bureaucratization and social-interaction models, considered simultaneously with the form taken by the political organization, is pertinent. Within the limits imposed by cross-sectional data on a sample of sixty-five local union organizations, the following sections of this paper attempt just such an examination of the issues posed by the literature. Three independent variables derived from the bureaucratization or historical model are considered: age of the organization, uniformity of members' occupations, and size of the membership. The independent variable introduced to represent the social-interaction model is the spatial distribution of members. The dependent variable, the form of political organization, is a measure of the distribution of power between high and low-ranking local officials in each local union organization. The assumptions underlying the introduction of this "power-distribution score" as an indicator of form of political organization require some preliminary discussion.

If one were to assume as the criterion for the presence of "democratic" forms "one set of political leaders in office: and . . . one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office,"[4] then with few exceptions local unions in this study did not have "democratic" political organizations. It is largely because of the absence of institutionalized oppositions, which contend for control of elective offices, that labor unions are referred to as "oligarchic" organizations. Kerr has suggested that "if organizations where the supreme power is retained by the members and which are reasonably responsive to membership desires may be called 'democratic' then unions may be and many are democratic."[5] It seemed that Kerr's less stringent definition might appropriately be applied to measure the presence of "democratic" or "oligarchic" organization.

Responsiveness might be inferred from the distribution of influence over day-to-day decision-making among levels of official local-union leadership. If low-ranking officials, such as committeemen and stewards who were in close daily contact with the members, had the larger share of influence over day-to-day decision-making, the probability that decisions reached represented membership desires would be high. Then unions could be considered as probably "democratic" in form of political organization. On the other hand, if influence over day-to-day decision-making resided entirely with top-ranking officials, such as executive officers who had less

[3] E.g., Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949); Lipset *et al.*, *op. cit.*; Will Herberg, "Bureaucracy and Democracy in Local Unions," *Antioch Review*, III (Summer, 1943), 405–17; Joseph Shister, "Trade-Union Government: A Formal Analysis," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LX (November, 1945), 78–112; Seymour M. Lipset, "The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical Statement," in *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, ed. Monroe Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles H. Page (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 82–124; Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther* (New York: Random House, 1949); Sayles and Strauss, *op. cit.* The more general and now classical formulation is, of course, that of Max Weber as found in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), esp. pp. 214–15.

[4] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 45.

[5] Clark Kerr, *Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1957), p. 18.

daily contact with the members, the probability that decisions reached represented membership desires would be low. These unions could be considered as probably "oligarchic" in form of political organization.

The power-distribution score serves as an indicator of the responsiveness to membership's expressed interest and, thereby, of the form of political organization. Among eight task areas it measures the mean level of local official leadership at which day-to-day decisions are made. The eight task areas are: (1) management's discipline of workers for poor work quality, (2) management's discipline of workers for infringement of work rules, (3) insurance inquiries, (4) personal problems of members which interfere with the work-role performances, (5) health and safety on the job, (6) personal problems of members which are not job-connected, (7) consumer problems such as wage assignments and garnishments, and (8) grievances.

In the interviews, for each task area respondents were asked, "Who does most of the work?" The replies to this question provided the raw data from which the power-distribution score was computed. Where a reply indicated that responsibility rested entirely with top-level officials (executive level officers) a task area was given a score of 1; where responsibility was shared between top and lower-level officials (committeemen, stewards, etc.) the assigned score was 2; and where responsibility rested entirely within lower-level official ranks the score was 3.[6] Within each of the sixty-five unions the task scores were summed and a mean was computed. The resulting mean official level of influence over day-to-day decision-making could be considered an index of form of political organization.

Since a work setting where members are spatially widely dispersed requires some delegation of authority for making decisions to high-ranking officials, the power-distribution score might be tautological, a measure of membership dispersion rather than the intended indicator of form of political organization. The validity of the score as an index of form of political organization thus required some investigation. According to Michels,[7] "democratic" organization is associated with a more rapid turnover of persons in high-level elected offices than is "oligarchic" organization. The correlation between the power-distribution score and years of tenure in office of the interviewed respondents, all of whom were high-ranking local-union officials, was significant although not high ($r = -.313$, $P < .05$). Thus, the power-distribution score could reasonably be employed as an indicator of form of political organization in local unions. High scores could be taken as evidence of the presence of "democratic" forms, and low scores could indicate the presence of "oligarchic" forms. With the distribution dichotomized at the mean, twenty-seven of the local unions in the sample had scores within the "democratic" range (over 1.56), while the remaining thirty-eight organizations had scores within the "oligarchic" range (under 1.56).

FINDINGS

Three independent variables derived from the natural-history model of bureaucratization were considered: age of the organization, uniformity of members' occupations, and size of the membership. Before presenting the findings, a hypothesis is introduced for each of these variables, predicting the direction of its association with form of political organization. The observed association follows, first without

[6] The task areas were equally weighted. The organizations in the sample were not equally engaged, either in intensity or kind, with activity in all eight of the task areas, and the computation of the power-distribution score does not take these sources of variation into consideration. These sources of variation are discussed in some detail in my "Welfare Activity in the Local Union" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962).

[7] Michels, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-2.

and then with, the spatial distribution of members—a condition of the social-interaction model—held constant.

AGE OF THE ORGANIZATION

In generalized accounts of the history of labor unions it is held that during early periods wide membership participation, little differentiation of officers' roles from those of members, and a rapid turnover of persons in elected offices assure the presence of more "democratic" forms of political organization. But during later periods when institutionalization and bureaucratization take hold, membership interest and participation decline, elected officials begin to perpetuate themselves in office, and the union begins to assume a more "oligarchic" form of political organization. Stated in the form of hypothesis, the older the age of a local union, the more "oligarchic" its political organization. At issue is the question, "Does the association between older age and the presence of 'oligarchic' forms of political organization hold equally among unions where there is ample opportunity for wide membership participation in daily face-to-face communications and among unions where the opportunity to participate in such communication is limited?"

Variables.—For the independent variable, age of the organization, the local unions in the sample were classified as established during the *early* period (those chartered or recognized prior to 1930), the *middle* period (those first recognized as official collective-bargaining agents by management between 1930 and the end of World War II), or the *late* period (those officially recognized as collective-bargaining agents by management subsequent to Wold War II). The three age classes roughly coincide with three major periods in the history of the American labor movement.

The second independent variable, the spatial distribution of members, is an index of the extent to which the work setting can be expected to facilitate face-to-face interaction, or the emergence of informal communications networks that involve most of the members. Thus, presence of interaction or of communications networks is not measured directly but is inferred from the spatial distribution of the members. This variable may be described as forming a continuum. At the spatially concentrated extreme are organizations with members employed in one-plant industrial settings; at the spatially dispersed extreme are organizations whose members are employed in industries so structured that most of the workers must rotate fairly continuously among shops, jobs, and employers within a geographical space of at least several square miles. While the concentrated cases at least potentially represent the presence of collectivities, the dispersed ones essentially represent aggregates of persons. For purposes of the present paper, the local unions in the sample have been assigned to one of two classes: those with spatially *concentrated* members (one- to five-plant organizations), and those with spatially *dispersed* members (ten or more plants through organizations consisting of scattered individual members engaged in rotational types of employments).[8]

Findings.—In the total sample the older the organization, the more "oligarchic" its political organization (Table 1). However, when the spatial distribution of members is held constant the association between age and form of political organization disappears: neither among unions with spatially dispersed members nor among those with spatially concentrated members does the power-distribution score vary with the age of the organization.

These data on the relationship between the age of the local union and the form of its political organization cast some doubt upon the plausibility of the hypothesis that the presence of "oligarchic" forms is directly a function of the age of the organ-

[8] There were no local unions in the sample with members distributed among six to nine plants.

ization. Instead, and more directly, the form taken by the political organization appears to be a function of the extent to which the work setting facilitates the emergence of informal communications networks that involve most of the members.

TABLE 1

VARIATION IN POWER-DISTRIBUTION SCORES BY AGE OF ORGANIZATION AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS

Spatial Distribution of Members	Age of Organization		
	Early Period	Middle Period	Late Period
Dispersed:			
Mean score	1 33	1 41	1 27
N	(20)	(7)	(2)
Concentrated:			
Mean score	1.80	1.79	1 77
N	(1)	(17)	(18)
Total:			
Mean score	1 26	1 68	1.72
N	(21)	(24)	(20)

Rows*

Dispersed	$H = 1\ 86$, d.f. 2, $P > 05$	
Concentrated	$H = 0\ 00$, d.f. 2, $P > 05$	
Total	$H = 10\ 93$, d.f. 2, $P < .05$	

Columns†

Early	$T = 9\ 0$	$P < .05$
Middle	$T = 43\ 5$	$P < .01$
Late	Not tested	

$\chi^2 = 33.6$, d.f. 2, $P < .01$, $r = 72$

* Wallis and Kruskal's analysis of variance test, which depends upon a comparison of ranks See Helen M Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference* (New York. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1953), pp 436-38

† T is the value for entering the tables to determine level of significance in White's sum of ranks test employed here when the number of cases for either of the two treatments was less than eight. Colin White, "The Use of Ranks in a Test of Significance Comparing Two Treatments," *Biometrics*, VIII (1952), 33-44.

Cook County, Illinois, from which the sample of local unions was drawn, is an old one in the history of the American labor movement. During the early period of this history, labor unions here and elsewhere were established predominantly among persons in spatially dispersed employments. Only later were unions maintained among workers in spatially concentrated settings (Table 1). At least for Cook County, and perhaps more generally, the appearance of "oligarchic" forms of political organization has been incorrectly attributed directly to bureaucratization through age of the organization. The common occurrence of "oligarchic" political organization in the old local unions is perhaps better attributed directly to their spatially dispersed memberships, and perhaps only indirectly to bureaucratization through age of the organization.

UNIFORMITY OF MEMBERS' OCCUPATIONS

It is widely held that unions of workers organized on a craft basis (with members in relatively uniform occupations at one skill level) frequently exhibit more "oligarchic" forms of political organization than those organized on an industrial basis (with members in diversified jobs and occupations at varying levels of skill). The common occurrence of "oligarchic" forms of political organization in craft unions has been considered an outcome of a more intensive bureaucratization than is found among industrial unions.[9]

The work of some students suggests a possible alternative explanation of the form of political organization in craft unions. According to their reported research findings, the form of political oganization may vary, independently of bureaucratization in craft unions, with the extent to which the setting facilitates the possibility of informal communications among the members. For example, among workers in building-trades unions, Strauss has observed more "democratic" forms of political oganization when the work setting is a relatively small city.[10] Informal communications during leisure hours counter the effect of the dispersed work setting which prevents communications during working hours. In a similar vein, Lipset, Coleman, and Trow stressed, for the form taken by the political organization, the differential consequences of both the way in which the organization of the work enhances or re-

[9] Howe and Widick, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

[10] Strauss, *op. cit.*

stricts opportunities for day-to-day informal communications among members and the association among members during leisure time.[11]

At issue, then, is the question, "Does the association between craft organization and the presence of 'oligarchic' forms of political organization hold equally among unions where there is widespread membership participation in daily informal communications and among unions where membership participation in such communications is limited?" If the social-interaction model provides the more proximate explanation for the form taken by a local union's political organization, then among unions organized on a craft basis those with spatially dispersed members will have "oligarchic" forms of political organization, while those with spatially concentrated members will have "democratic" forms.

Variables.—One additional independent variable, the uniformity of the members' occupations, is introduced here. Local unions that represent "workers performing a single, specified kind of job"[12] and/or specialties thereof are referred to as occupationally *uniform*. Those that represent workers "in a majority of the industrially related jobs found in a given area of production"[13] are referred to as occupationally *diverse*. Use of the terms "occupationally uniform" and "diverse" implies the presence of a continuum of wider variability than is associated with the use of the dichotomous designations "craft" and "industrial." Twenty-five of the local unions could be designated as occupationally uniform. The remaining forty organizations were occupationally diverse.

Findings.—In the total sample, local unions with members in uniform occupations are more likely to have "oligarchic" forms of political organization than those with members in diverse occupations (Table 2). When the spatial distribution of members is held constant within each occupational class, uniform or diverse, there is little variation either in the spatial distribution of members or in the power-distribution scores. Uniform occupation of members is notably associated with the spatial dispersion of these members, while diversity of occupation is closely associated with spatially concentrated members. Among unions with members in uniform occupations, the power-distribution score does

TABLE 2

VARIATION IN POWER DISTRIBUTION SCORES BY UNIFORMITY OF OCCUPATIONS AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS*	UNIFORMITY OF OCCUPATIONS	
	Uniform	Diverse
Dispersed		
Scattered		
Mean score	1 13	1 75
N	(13)	(1)
Ten or more plants		
Mean score	1 24	1 57
N	(9)	(6)
Concentrated		
Two to five plants		
Mean score	1 67	1 91
N	(3)	(11)
One plant		
Mean score	.	1 73
N		(22)
Total		
Mean score	1 24	1 76
N	(25)	(40)

ROWS

Scattered	Not tested
Ten or more plants	$T = 55 \quad P < .05$
Two to five plants	$T = 19 \quad P < .05$
One plant	Not tested
Total†	$z = 6.29, P < .01$

COLUMNS

Uniform	$H = 2.34, P > .05$
Diverse	$H = 1.94, P > .05$

$\chi^2 = 35.88$ d.f. 3, $P < .01$, $r = .74$

* To demonstrate the extreme association between uniformity of occupations and spatial distribution of members, the latter variable was expanded to four classes

† Mann Whitney sum of ranks test employed here when N_1 and N_2 each consists of eight or more cases. Walker and Lev, *op. cit.*, cited in Table 1, pp. 434-35.

[11] Lipset *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[12] Scott Greer, *Last Man In* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 24.

[13] *Ibid.*

not vary significantly between spatial-distribution classes. However, the mean score for unions with members in uniform occupations and spatially concentrated, two- to five-plant settings (1.67), lies within the "democratic" range. Among unions with members in diverse occupations, again there is little variation in power-distribution scores between spatial-distribution classes, but in this latter case all the means lie within the "democratic" range.

The data do suggest that with spatially concentrated members both craft and industrially organized local unions tend to remain "democratic." Within any given spatial distribution class, however, the form of political organization is more "democratic" among unions organized on an industrial basis.

The findings on the relationship between the uniformity of the occupations of the members and their spatial distribution, for the form taken by the political organization, do not provide unequivocal support for either the bureaucratization or the social-interaction explanation of form of political organization. Another possible explanation, discussed briefly in the Summary and Discussion of this paper, refers to the differential professionalization of work roles, as between members of craft- and industrially organized unions.

SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP

It has been held that unions with large memberships tend to be more "oligarchic" in their form of political organization than those with smaller memberships. According to this proposition large memberships (much as spatially dispersed ones) limit the chances for communications among members and between members and officers. With communications impaired, officers become separated from the membership and gain control of the organization. Seidman has claimed that it is the middle-sized one-plant organizations, those with not more than a few hundred members where the level of communications between members and officers is high and the stake in office of elected officials is low, that assume the most "democratic" forms of political organization.[14]

Faunce recently reported that he found democracy to be associated with large memberships numbering thousands of persons, rather than with middle-sized memberships.[15] It is notable that Seidman[16] introduced with middle-sized memberships the presence of one-plant (spatially concentrated members) work settings. On the other hand, Faunce did not consider the spatial distribution of members among unions with large memberships. Kovner and Lahne, who focused their attention directly upon the effect of that spatial distribution of members found with one-plant settings, did not introduce the size of the membership.[17] At issue here, then, is the question, "Does size of the membership act independently or with the spatial distribution of members to influence the form taken by the political organization of local unions?"

Variables.—The new independent variable introduced here is the size of the membership. By number of dues-paying members, the unions in the sample were classified as either *small* (250 or fewer members), *medium* (251–1,000 members), or *large* (over 1,000 members). There were thirty-two small, fifteen medium, and eighteen large organizations in the sample.

Findings.—In the total sample of organizations, the form of political organization does not vary with size of membership (Table 3). When the spatial distribution of members is held constant within each

[14] Joel Seidman, "Democracy in Labor Unions," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXI (June, 1953), 221–31.

[15] William Faunce, "Size of Locals and Union Democracy," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (November, 1962), 291–98. Lipset *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 364–90, noted that the larger the membership, the greater was the interest in national-level union politics.

[16] Seidman, *op. cit.*

[17] Kovner and Lahne, *op. cit.*

of the three size classes, the mean power-distribution score lies within the "democratic" range when members are spatially concentrated but within the "oligarchic" range when members are spatially dispersed.

Each of the two variables, size of membership and the spatial distribution of members, appears to be independently and directly associated with variation in the power-distribution score. Thus, within both spatial distribution classes, concentrated and dispersed, the power-distribution scores increase directly with size of membership. However, within the spatially dispersed member class, the mean scores for the three size classes remain within the "oligarchic" range. Within the spatially concentrated member class the means for the same size classes lie within the "democratic" range.

A direct correlation between size of membership and spatial dispersion of members obscures a direct correlation between size of membership and "democracy." Both larger size and spatial concentration appear to promote democracy, but since the two are inversely related, their influences tend to neutralize one another. Hence, Faunce's observation of a direct association between large memberships and the presence of "democratic" forms of political organization in local unions holds only if dispersion is controlled. Contrary to Seidman's observation, moreover, once spatial concentration is controlled, unions with large memberships are likely to have even more "democratic" forms of political organization than those with middle-sized memberships.

TABLE 3

VARIATION IN POWER DISTRIBUTION SCORES BY SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS

Spatial Distribution of Members	Size of Membership		
	Small (Under 251)	Medium (251–1,000)	Large (Over 1,000)
Dispersed			
Mean score	1.18	1.11	1.40
N	(7)	(7)	(15)
Concentrated			
Mean score	1.67	1.88	2.41
N	(25)	(8)	(3)
Total			
Mean score	1.57	1.52	1.57
N	(32)	(15)	(18)

Rows

Dispersed $H = 7.96$, d.f. 2, $P < .05$
Concentrated $H = 5.74$, d.f. 2, $P < .05$
Total $H = 0.70$, d.f. 2, $P > .05$

Columns

Small $z = 25.88$ $P < .01$
Medium $z = 3.87$ $P < .01$
Large $z = 17.93$ $P < .01$
$\chi^2 = 17.8$, d.f. 2, $P < .01$, $r = .52$

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

With data from a random-weighted sample of local union organizations, this study attempted a consideration of the relative merits of a number of propositions about social forces that shape the form taken by the political organization of local unions. These propositions were derived from two theoretical models of explanation, the natural-history or bureaucratization model and the social-interaction or informal-communications model. Three propositions drawn from the natural-history model were examined: *(1)* the older the age of a local union, the more "oligarchic" the form taken by its political organization; *(2)* the more uniform the occupations of the members of a local union, the more "oligarchic" its political organization; and (3) the larger the size of the membership of a local union, the more "oligarchic" its political organization. An alternative proposition, drawn from the social-interaction model of explanation, stated that the form taken by the political organization in a local union varies with the extent to which the work setting permits face-to-face interaction or the emergence of an informal communications network that involves most of the members.

For each of the propositions drawn from the natural-history model, the direction and extent of association between corresponding operationalized independent variables (age of the organization, uniformity of members' occupations, and size of membership) and the dependent variable (form of political organization) were examined directly. Then an index that represented the extent to which the work setting facilitated the formation of informal communications networks—the spatial distribution of members—was introduced as an alternative independent variable and held constant. With this procedure it was possible separately and then simultaneously to examine the relative merits of the two models of explanation of the form taken by the local union's political organization.

The indicator employed to represent the dependent variable, the form of political organization, was termed the "power-distribution score." It was assumed that organizations with larger increments of available power concentrated in the hands of low-ranking officials who are in close daily contact with members are more responsive to membership's expressed interest, and therefore are more "democratic," than organizations where power is concentrated in the hands of a few high-ranking officials who are at some remove from the members.

As a measure of the form of political organization, the power-distribution score may appear to be tautological. In organizations with widely dispersed members, the locus of decision-making about many day-to-day union tasks, from which the score is derived, may have to be relegated to a few high-ranking officials. Or, if the members have been organized on a craft basis, some day-to-day problems may be resolved by the members themselves, through professionalization of the work role.[18] The power-distribution score does not take into account the extent to which union tasks may have been incorporated into the occupational roles of the members. In such cases, power might well be distributed between individual members and high-ranking officials, rather than within the intermediary range among lower-ranking official representatives of the members such as committeemen and stewards. The power-distribution score assumes that labor unions are more likely to have "democratic" forms of political organization if power is concentrated among intermediary officials. Thus, professionalization of work roles, with power distributed between members and top-level officials rather than at the intermediary range, may well account for the observation in this study that within any spatial-distribution class craft unions have lower power-distribution scores than industrial unions. Despite these and possibly other qualifications, the power-distribution score correlated inversely with tenure in office of high-ranking officials, by definition a measure of "oligarchic" form of political organization. It thus seemed reasonable to assume some validity for its capacity to indicate form of political organization.

Findings of the study strongly suggest that the social-interaction model provides the more proximate explanation of the form taken by the political organization in local unions. Whether young or old organizations, or with members in uniform or diverse occupations, or with small or large memberships, local unions with spatially concentrated members are more likely to have "democratic" than "oligarchic" forms of political organization. Given the same conditions but with spatially dispersed members, local unions are more likely to have "oligarchic" than "democratic" forms of political organization.

In unions with spatially concentrated members the chances for the formation of an informal communications network that involves most of the members are enhanced. Through the presence of a communications

[18] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production: A Comparative Study," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (September, 1959), 168–87.

network, observability is high. High observability constrains role performances[19] of members and officers to conformity with normative prescriptions of contracts and constitutions. Where such conformity is high, a local union tends to remain "democratic" with respect to form of political organization.

In unions with spatially dispersed members the chances for the formation of an informal communications network that involves most of the members and officers are severely impaired. With the absence of communications networks observability is low. Low observability reduces the constraint upon members and officers to conform with normative prescriptions of contracts and constitutions. Deviation from prescribed role behavior then is widespread. Administrative responsibilities are assumed by or relegated, by default, to high-ranking officials whose activities in large measure remain unknown to the members, just as those of the members remain largely unknown to the officers. Where conformity with normative prescriptions of contracts and constitutions is low, a local union tends to assume an "oligarchic" form of political organization.

Two effects suggest, possibly, why bureaucratization has been so widely held an explanation of "oligarchic" political organization. There is, first of all, the complex relationship between the spatial distribution of members, uniformity of their occupations, age of the organization, and form of political oganization. In the Chicago and Cook County universe from which the study sample was drawn, most unions with spatially dispersed members, as well as those organized on a craft basis. were established during early periods in the history of the American labor movement (prior to 1930). Also, organization on a craft basis is closely associated with spatially dispersed members. Hence, the common appearance of "oligarchic" forms of political organization has been attributed to bureaucratization through either organizational age or craft-union structure. But findings of the present study indicate that the association between "oligarchic" form and either age or a craft basis of organization is only indirect, through the spatial dispersion of the members of these older and craft unions and without extensive bureaucratization.

Perhaps widespread adherence to the notion that bureaucratization and "oligarchic" control in unions are related may be attributed to the negative relationship between size of membership and spatial concentration. Large size of membership and spatial concentration of members both promote "democracy." But in the universe these two variables are inversely related to each other. Because of this inverse relation, in the universe their influences tend to neutralize one another and thus obscure their direct associations with "democracy."

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[19] Suggested by Rose Laub Coser's discussion of "Insulation from Observability and Types of Social Conformity," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (February, 1961), 28-39.

Structural Effects and Interpersonal Relationships[1]

Ernest Q. Campbell and C. Norman Alexander

ABSTRACT

It is proposed that structural effects be analyzed with a two-step model that employs structural variables to predict the relevant characteristics of an individual's social environment and then explains his behaviors in terms of a social-psychological theory whose predictions take these conditions of the social environment as given. Data on the educational aspirations of adolescents are consistent with this analytic approach: The average socioeconomic status of high schools is directly related to the college plans of students at each status level and, also, to the status of those they select as friends. However, the relationship between school status and college aspirations virtually disappears when the statuses of the individual and his friends are held constant.

Ever since Durkheim pointed out the importance of social facts, sociologists have generally felt justified in asserting that the social climate exerts influence upon the behaviors of individuals. Frequently, however, problems that arise with the attribution of causal influence to these structural and contextual variables have been ignored or dealt with casually. Just as we oppose a reductionist tendency to make inferential leaps from the traits or characteristics of individuals to the behavior of larger groups, and even whole societies, so must we take care to avoid any simplistic notions of direct, unmediated "structural effects."

The value systems and normative milieus of the larger social structure typically influence the behaviors of individuals through transmission and enforcement by certain *specific* others for any given individual. In Inkeles' cogent comment, "All institutional arrangements are ultimately mediated through individual human action."[2] In short, it is necessary to consider the position of the individual within the social structure—defined in terms of his specific relationships to other members of the collectivity—before attributing causal relevance to characteristics of the total collectivity. While this general statement may appear rather obvious, the implications that follow from it are sometimes overlooked.

Rather than proceed directly from characteristics of the larger system to the behavioral responses of individuals, it is more appropriate to apply a two-step model for the purposes of causal inference. This involves, first, social-psychological theory, which deals with the individual's response to a *given* social situation, and, second, theory at the structural level, which deals with the determination of that given social situation by characteristics of the larger social system. We must keep in mind the fact that the actor responds to that segment of the total system which, for him, is perceptually important and salient; rarely does he (inter-) act with reference to the system as a whole.

Thus, more sophisticated analyses of "structural effects" must take into account

[1] Based on data secured during conduct of Grants M-04302 and MH-08489, National Institute of Mental Health, Ernest Q. Campbell, Principal Investigator. The Graduate Fellowship Program, National Science Foundation, freed the time of the second author for work on this paper, an assistance gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to Charles Federspiel for statistical consultation.

[2] Alex Inkeles, "Personality and Social Structure," in R. K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 251.

both steps in this causal chain—moving from the characteristics of the total system to the situation faced by the individual due to the effects of these characteristics and then from the social situation confronting the individual to his responses to it. In this manner we hope to achieve greater theoretical understanding of the causal processes involved and, perhaps, contribute to the integration of social-psychological and structural theory. It is the purpose of this paper, then, to interpret the nature of certain structural effects by linking them to a systematic social psychological theory.

SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL LEVELS

A number of theorists have developed relatively similar and systematic theories to account for interpersonal influences among the members of a collectivity and to explain how consensus emerges through interpersonal attractions.[3] Since the basic propositions are common to the theories of Festinger, Heider, Homans, and Newcomb,[4] we shall assume a sufficient familiarity with them to justify the following statement of only those hypotheses specific to our immediate purposes: (1) The greater the attraction of a person, *P*, to another, *O*, the more likely he is to come to be similar to *O* with regard to *X*—where *X* represents those values, behaviors, and attitudes that are perceived to be of importance and common relevance. (2) The greater the similarity of a person, *P*, to another, *O*, with regard to *X*, the more likely he is to come to be highly attracted to *O*.

Blau, on the other hand, has dealt with structural effects, demonstrating that an individual with attribute *X* may manifest different behaviors—in behavioral areas related to *X*—as a function of the distribution of *X* in the collectivity.[5] However, Blau shows only that this analytic variable, the distribution of *X*, *may* influence the behaviors of the individual independently of his own value on *X*; he does not provide a rationale for predicting the direction or nature of differences nor specify when and under what conditions these effects are likely to occur. The question of how it comes about that structural characteristics lead to an accurate prediction of personal response inconsistent with predictions based on personal attributes is unexplored.

Two recent studies by Simpson and Wilson[6] find interpersonal and structural influences on the aspirations of high-school students. Simpson shows that the higher the reported socioeconomic status of an individual's best friends, the higher his own aspirations are likely to be, holding parental influence constant. Wilson finds that the larger the proportion of middle-class students in a high school, the greater the likelihood that students of a given socioeconomic stratum have high educational aspirations.

Although Wilson's emphasis is structural and Simpson's interpersonal, both of these studies may be interpreted in terms of balance-theory predictions based on interpersonal influences. At the social-psychological level, it has been shown that the educational aspirations and attainments of an individual's friends influence his own aspirations and achievements apart from

[3] C. Norman Alexander, Jr., and Richard L. Simpson, "Balance Theory and Distributive Justice," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXIV (Spring, 1964), 182-92.

[4] Leon Festinger, *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Chicago: Row Peterson & Co., 1957); Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); George Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1961); Theodore M. Newcomb, *The Acquaintance Process* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961).

[5] Peter M. Blau, "Structural Effects," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (April 1960), 178-93.

[6] Richard L. Simpson, "Parental Influence, Anticipatory Socialization, and Social Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (August, 1962), 517-22; Alan B. Wilson, "Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 836-45.

the status of his parents.[7] Since mobility and educational aspirations are directly related to the socioeconomic status of a student, we should observe that the educational aspirations of an individual are directly related to the status of his friendship choices, holding his own status constant. This is precisely the relationship found by Simpson.

In order to explain Wilson's findings at the structural level in these terms, it is necessary to assume only that friendship choices are randomly distributed in the system. As the average socioeconomic status in a school rises, the more often will individuals at each status level choose friends of high status—simply because there are proportionately more of them available to be chosen. We can then explain the observed association between the average status of a school and the educational aspirations of its students in terms of the intervening variable of interpersonal influence by an individual's friends. Whether we regard the relationship between average school status and student aspirations as spurious will depend, of course, on the theoretical assumptions we make about the nature of these relationships. Before discussing these possibilities, however, we will present certain data relevant to the points being raised.

DATA ANALYSIS

In connection with a larger study,[8] questionnaires were administered to 1,410 male seniors in thirty high schools in the eastern and Piedmont sections of North Carolina. Each respondent was asked the following question: "What students here in school

TABLE 1

CORRELATIONS AMONG SCHOOL STATUS, FRIENDS' STATUS, AND COLLEGE PLANS OF HIGH-SCHOOL SENIORS—BY PARENTAL EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Parental Educational Level	Zero-Order Correlations			Partial Correlations		N
	School Status with College Plans (1)	Friends' Status with College Plans (2)	School Status with Friends' Status (3)	* (4)	† (5)	(6)
Both parents college	.10	.15	.49	.03	12	172
One parent college	.16	.29	.36	06	.26	183
Both parents high-school graduates	.15	.28	.50	01	.24	147
One parent high-school graduate	.07	.19	.34	.01	.18	178
Neither parent high-school graduate	.14	.31	.40	.02	.28	295

* School status with college plans, holding friends' status constant.
† Friends' status with college plans, holding school status constant.

[7] C. Norman Alexander, Jr., and Ernest Q. Campbell, "Peer Influences on Adolescent Aspirations and Attainments," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (August, 1964), 568–75.

[8] "Normative Controls and the Social Use of Alcohol," National Institute of Mental Health Grants M-4302 and MH-08489. Questionnaires were administered to 5,115 seniors of both sexes in sixty-two high schools. The sample in this paper includes only males in the thirty high schools that met the following criteria: (1) more than 15 males responded; (2) more than 95 per cent of the males gave their names; (3) more than 90 per cent of the males completed the questionnaire; (4) more than one-third of the males planned to go to college. The fourth criterion resulted in the elimination of only one school which would otherwise not have been eliminated. The criterion was included because there are certain data available only for those adolescents who plan to attend college.

of your own sex do you go around with most often?" Up to two choices were coded for each case, a choice being considered codable if directed to another member of the high-school senior class who returned a signed questionnaire.[9]

Students were divided into five status levels according to the educational attainment of their parents.[10] Next, each of the thirty schools in the sample was assigned the average status of its students, that is, we arbitrarily assigned weights (from 1 to 5) to the five status levels and, treating this as an interval scale, computed a mean value for each school. For convenience, we shall refer to this measure as "school status." Finally, the average (mean) status of friends was determined for each respondent by this same arbitrary weighting of parental educational levels. Thus, we have three measures for each respondent: his personal status, his friends' status, and the status of his school. In addition, his college plans were determined by his response to the question: "Realistically, do you expect to go to college this coming fall?"

First, we shall examine the correlation between the status of the school and the proportion of individuals at each status level who plan to attend college. A positive value will be consistent with the structural effect reported by Wilson. Second, we shall examine the association between the status of an individual's friends at each personal-status level and the percentage who plan to go to college. A positive relationship will support Simpson's findings. When both of these expectations are confirmed, we shall determine whether there is a direct association between the average status of a school and the tendency of individuals at each status level to choose friends of high status. Confirmation of this hypothesis would suggest that the influence of friends may be an intervening variable that mediates the association between average school status and college expectations. Then we will examine at each of the five personal-status levels the partial correlations between (*a*) friends' status and college plans with school status controlled and (*b*) college plans and school status with friends' status controlled. We expect the relationship between school status and college plans to disappear in this analysis; but the relationship between college plans and friends' status should remain strong despite controls on school status. If this is the case, we shall argue that a two-step model is required for proper interpretation of structural effects phenomena, and we shall present this model.

The correlation coefficients pertaining to these expectations are presented in Table 1. It is apparent from inspection of column (1) of this table that, following the conceptions of Blau and Wilson, there *is* a structural effect: at each of five personal-status levels, the association between average school status and college plans is positive. Similarly, column (2) supports Simpson's findings: within each personal-status level there is a positive association between college plans and the status level of friendship choices. And in column (3) we see that persons at every status level are more likely to choose high-status friends when there are relatively large numbers of high-status persons in the system. Thus, school status is related to the individual's college plans; so is the status of his friends; and the status of friends chosen by those at each status level is related to the status of the school.

We come now to the basic question of interest: Is there a relationship between school status and the college plans of individuals at each status level apart from

[9] We coded only two choices per case in order to maximize information about the respondent's interpersonal relationships and to minimize the loss of cases who selected a limited number of friends.

[10] The status levels and their arbitrary weights were as follows: (5) both parents went to college; (4) only one parent went to college; (3) neither parent went to college, but both graduated from high school; (2) neither parent went to college, and only one graduated from high school; (1) neither parent graduated from high school.

the effects of interpersonal influence that are indicated by the status of friends? The answer to this question should be negative if our hypothesized two-step model is correct. In other words, we expect only negligible variation to be explained by school status when friendship status is held constant. The partial correlations presented in column (4) of the table show that this is precisely what occurs. By contrast, when school status is held constant, the relationship between college plans and friends' status remains strong, as revealed in the partial correlations in column (5) of Table 1. These two sets of partial-correlation coefficients support the inference that the structural effects of school status are best conceived of as due to the interpersonal influences of an individual's significant others.

DISCUSSION

Given knowledge of an individual's immediate interpersonal influences, the characteristics of the total collectivity provide no additional contribution to the prediction of his behaviors in these data. Thus we have no indication that an important structural effect exists independently of interpersonal influences. So little additional variation is explained by school status that we could easily regard the remainder as due to our inability to involve in the analysis *all* of the relevant interpersonal influences (e.g., the individual's additional friends of the same sex, his friends of the opposite sex, his "ideal" referents in the system, etc.).

On the other hand, we would support as reasonable the expectation that there are structural factors that determine the orientations of individuals to others having particular characteristics. This is why we want to stress the use of a two-step analytical model. Social-psychological theories specify the conditions under which individuals respond to *given* characteristics of their social environments. But research on "structural effects" is required to permit a specification of the conditions under which certain structural variables produce these relevant characteristics of an individual's social environment, the characteristics that furnish the "givens" in social-psychological theories. Then, with knowledge of structural variables, we should be able to specify when individuals will orient themselves toward specific types of others, and then use the characteristics of their significant others to predict their behaviors.

It is well established that the values and attitudes of individuals are shaped by and emerge from their continued interaction in social situations and that significant others are particularly influential in these processes. We are also convinced that there are certain regularities in the frequency with which particular types of individuals are chosen as focuses of interaction in certain social situations; and we believe that these regularities could be predicted from knowledge of relevant characteristics of the collectivity as a whole. However, until there is specification of the correspondence between structural variables and the proclivity to relate to particular types of persons in the collectivity, it is not possible to speak in causally relevant terms of structural effects on individual behaviors—inasmuch as these seem due to intervening interpersonal influences.

We must raise also the possibility of a direct causal link between individual behaviors and characteristics of the total collectivity. Here we are asking whether it may be that values of the total collectivity constitute behaviorally relevant expectations toward which the individual orients himself. The crucial question, but one to which our data cannot provide an answer, is this: Is there a school-wide value system toward which the individual is oriented and upon which he bases his behaviors apart from the immediate influences of his particular significant others? That is, measures of the values held by individuals in a given system neither confirm nor deny

the independent existence of a collective value system. In order to say that *X* is an influential system value, we have to know that people in the system perceive it as such and act accordingly. Lacking evidence that participants perceive the existence of system-wide values and norms, researchers cannot draw firm conclusions about their effects; and we do not establish the existence of such perceived value systems with analytic structural variables. We therefore are not prepared to deny the potential influence of collectivity value systems, though we do assert the necessity for their independent measurement.

SUMMARY

We have worked toward the integration of social-psychological and structural theory, and we believe that this has important implications for research dealing with structural effects. We have argued that the normative influences of the distribution of an attribute within a collectivity are best explained by a two-step model. This perspective suggests a research strategy that first employs structural variables to account for the psychologically relevant characteristics of an individual's social environment and then explains his behaviors in terms of a social-psychological theory whose predictions are based on given conditions of the social environment. It also argues that the norms and value systems of collectivities are not appropriately assessed by analytic measures.

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On the Multivariate Analysis of Three Dichotomous Variables[1]

Leo A. Goodman

ABSTRACT

Taking Yule's coefficient, Q, as a measure of the intensity of association in a 2×2 contingency table, Costner and Wager recommend in a recent article in this *Journal* that the statistical significance of the difference between the values of Q calculated for two different 2×2 tables can be tested using the usual χ^2 test for the second-order interaction in a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ contingency table. They note that the calculation of this test is tedious and time-consuming when a desk calculator is used, and they recommend the use of high-speed electronic computers for carrying out this test. In the present paper, we shall present a much simpler test of the statistical significance of the difference between two Q's. The test presented herein can be calculated rapidly even by hand. In addition, we shall present other statistical methods particularly suited to the analysis of the difference between the intensity of association in two (or more) contingency tables. The methods presented here can be used to study the relationship between two dichotomous variables when a third dichotomous variable is taken into account, or more generally the relationship between two polytomous variables when a third polytomous variable is taken into account.

Having calculated Yule's coefficient, Q, as a measure of the association in one 2×2 table, how should we test whether this value of Q differs in a statistically significant way from the corresponding value of Q calculated for a second 2×2 table? More specifically, how should we test whether the measure, Q, of the association between work satisfaction (high or low) and social approval from supervisors (high or low) when calculated for females is statistically significantly different from the corresponding value of Q calculated for males? This kind of question was considered recently by Costner and Wager,[2] and they recommend that the usual χ^2 test of zero second-order interaction in a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ contingency table can be used to answer this question. In their article they describe in detail an iterative procedure for the calculation of this test which they note is both tedious and time-consuming when a desk calculator is used, and they invite the reader to use instead a computer program prepared for the IBM 709 for calculating this test. In the present article we shall introduce a much simpler procedure for testing whether the difference between two Q's is statistically significant. In addition, we shall examine other problems pertaining to the analysis of the association in two 2×2 tables and more generally to the analysis of two (or more) contingency tables having two (or more) rows and two (or more) columns. The methods developed in the present article can be used to study the conditional association between two variables when a third variable is taken into account; that is, when a third variable is "held constant."

A SIMPLE TEST FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO "Q's"

Let us begin by reconsidering one of the hypothetical examples considered earlier by Costner and Wager. This example pertains to the relationship between the following three dichotomous variables: work satisfaction (high or low), social approval from supervisor (high or low), and sex (male or female). The data are reproduced in Table 1.

Costner and Wager note that the data in Table 1 form a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ table, and that

[1] This research was supported in part by the Army Research Office, Office of Naval Research, and Air Force Office of Scientific Research by Contract Nonr-2121(23), NR 342-043, and in part by Research Grant NSF-GP 3707 from the Division of Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences of the National Science Foundation.

[2] Herbert L. Costner and L. Wesley Wager, "The Multivariate Analysis of Dichotomized Variables," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXX (1965), 455–66.

the usual χ^2 test for second-order interaction in this table yields a chi-square value of $X^2 = 31$, with 1 degree of freedom. Since the ninety-ninth percentile for the tabulated chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 6.63, an observed value of $X^2 = 31$ is, of course, statistically significant. Having obtained a statistically significant X^2, Costner and Wager then conclude that the measure, Q, of the association between work satisfaction and social approval from supervisors when calculated for females is statistically significantly different from the corresponding value of Q calculated for males. Their calculation of X^2 was based presumably either on the iterative procedure described in detail in their article or on the high-speed electronic computer program to which they refer. We need not describe again these procedures here. We shall now present instead a simpler test.

In the following 2×2 contingency table, we shall let a, b, c, and d denote the frequencies observed in the corresponding cells of the table. For this table, the estimated

a	b
c	d

value of Yule's coefficient is given by the formula

$$q = \frac{ad - bc}{ad + bc}, \qquad (1)$$

and its variance can be estimated consistently by the statistic[3]

$$s^2 = (1 - q^2)^2 \left(\frac{1}{a} + \frac{1}{b} + \frac{1}{c} + \frac{1}{d}\right) / 4 . \qquad (2)$$

Thus, for the 2×2 table (pertaining to the association between work satisfaction and social approval from supervisors) for the females in Table 1, the value of q is $q_1 = .822$, and for the 2×2 table pertaining to the males it is $q_2 = .571$, the estimated variances are $s_1^2 = .00067$ and $s_2^2 = .00106$, respectively. The estimated variance of the difference $q_1 - q_2$ is $s_1^2 + s_2^2$. Let Q_1 denote the numerical value of Yule's coefficient calculated as a measure of the association in the 2×2 population tableau pertaining to the female population, and let Q_2 denote the corresponding value for the 2×2 population tableau pertaining to the male population. A test of the null hypothesis that $Q_1 - Q_2 = 0$ (i.e., a test of whether $q_1 - q_2$ differs significantly from zero), can be based on the fact that the asymptotic (large-sample) distribution of the statistic

$$W^2 = \frac{(q_1 - q_2)^2}{s_1^2 + s_2^2} \qquad (3)$$

is the chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom when the null hypothesis is true. For the data in Table 1, $W^2 = 36$. Since the ninety-ninth percentile for the tabulated chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom is 6.63, an observed value of $W^2 = 36$ is statistically significant. We conclude, therefore, that q_1 and q_2 differ significantly from each other.

In the case considered above, the conclusion we reached using W^2 is similar to the

TABLE 1

HYPOTHETICAL DATA DESCRIBING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORK SATISFACTION, SOCIAL APPROVAL FROM SUPERVISOR, AND SEX

	Work Satisfaction			
	Females		Males	
	High	Low	High	Low
Social approval from supervisors				
High	950	50	550	450
Low	650	350	250	750

[3] See, e.g., M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, *The Advanced Theory of Statistics*, *Vol. 2* (London: Charles Griffin & Co., 1961), p. 540.

The usual tables of reciprocals can be used to facilitate the calculation of the reciprocals in formula (2). See, e.g., Table 29 in R. A. Fisher and F. Yates, *Statistical Tables for Biological, Agricultural and Medical Research, Sixth Edition* (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1963).

conclusion reached by Costner and Wager using X^2, but the calculation of W^2 presented here is much simpler than the calculation of X^2 recommended by them. The procedure presented above also has the advantage that it can be readily modified to provide confidence intervals for the difference $Q_1 - Q_2$. Our estimate of $Q_1 - Q_2$ is $q_1 - q_2$. Since the large-sample distribution of $q_1 - q_2$ is normal with a mean of $Q_1 - Q_2$ and a variance estimated consistently by $s_1^2 + s_2^2$, we can obtain, say, 95 per cent (approximate) confidence intervals for $Q_1 - Q_2$ by calculating the following two confidence limits:[4]

$$L = q_1 - q_2 - 1.96\sqrt{(s_1^2 + s_2^2)}\,,$$
$$U = q_1 - q_2 + 1.96\sqrt{(s_1^2 + s_2^2)}\,. \qquad (4)$$

For the data in Table 1, our estimate of $Q_1 - Q_2$ is $q_1 - q_2 = .25$, and the 95 per cent confidence limits for $Q_1 - Q_2$ are $L = .17$ and $U = .33$.

Note that our 95 per cent confidence interval for $Q_1 - Q_2$ (i.e., the interval from L to U) based on the data in Table 1 does not include zero, and the test of the null hypothesis that $Q_1 - Q_2 = 0$ which was presented earlier in this section would reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of significance. It is easy to see that the 95 per cent confidence interval based upon L and U will include zero if and only if the test based upon W^2 leads to the acceptance of the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of significance.

[4] The numerical values of -1.96 and $+1.96$ appear in formula (4) because the probability is .95 that a normally distributed variate (with zero mean and unit variance) will lie between -1.96 and $+1.96$. If the desired confidence level were different from .95, the numerical values of -1.96 and $+1.96$ would be changed accordingly. The two-sided confidence interval presented here can be modified in a straightforward fashion to provide instead one-sided confidence intervals, and similarly the test based on W^2, which is a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that $Q_1 - Q_2 = 0$ against the alternate hypothesis that $Q_1 - Q_2 \neq 0$, can be modified to provide instead one-sided tests.

The usual tables of square roots can be used to facilitate the calculation of the square root in formula (4). See, e.g., Table 27 in Fisher and Yates, *op. cit.*

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

For the females in Table 1, the odds are 950 to 50 that someone receiving high social approval from supervisors will also have high work satisfaction, and the odds are 650 to 350 that someone receiving low social approval from supervisors will have high work satisfaction. The ratio of these two odds is 10.23. In other words, the odds for high work satisfaction for those receiving high social approval are 10.23 times the corresponding odds for those receiving low social approval. This ratio is called the odds ratio, and we shall denote it by f. Thus, for the 2×2 contingency table,

$$f = \frac{a/c}{c/d} = \frac{ad}{bc}\,. \qquad (5)$$

The following two formulas show that there is a very simple relationship between f and the measure of association, q, considered in the preceding section:

$$q = \frac{f-1}{f+1}\,, \qquad (6)$$

$$f = \frac{1+q}{1-q}\,. \qquad (7)$$

Formulas (6) and (7) indicate that knowledge about the value of f for a 2×2 table is actually equivalent to knowledge about the value of q. In particular, the f's calculated for two 2×2 tables will be equal if and only if the corresponding q's calculated for the two tables are equal. Thus, instead of comparing q's, as was done in the preceding section, we may prefer in some cases to compare the corresponding f's. Since each f is an odds ratio, it seems natural in comparing the f's obtained for two 2×2 tables to calculate their ratio. Thus, for the 2×2 table (pertaining to the association between work satisfaction and social approval from supervisors) for the females in Table 1, the value of f is $f_1 = 10.23$, for the 2×2 table pertaining to the males it is $f_2 = 3.67$, and the ratio is $r = f_1/f_2 = 2.79$. In other words, the odds ratio pertaining to the relationship between work satisfaction and social ap-

proval from supervisors for the females is 2.79 times the corresponding odds ratio for males. Is this ratio statistically significant? We shall now present a simple method for answering this question.

Denoting the natural logarithm of f by h, the variance of h can be estimated consistently by the statistic[5]

$$s_h^2 = \frac{1}{a} + \frac{1}{b} + \frac{1}{c} + \frac{1}{d}. \qquad (8)$$

Thus, for the 2×2 table (pertaining to the association between work satisfaction and social approval from supervisors) for the females in Table 1, the value of h is $h_1 = 2.33$, and for the 2×2 table pertaining to the males it is $h_2 = 1.30$; the estimated variances are $s_{h_1}^2 = .0254$ and $s_{h_2}^2 = .0094$, respectively.[6] The estimated variance of $h_1 - h_2$ is $s_{h_1}^2 + s_{h_2}^2$. Note that $h_1 - h_2$ is equal to the natural logarithm of the ratio r of f_1 and f_2. For the data in Table 1, $r = 2.79$ and $h_1 - h_2 = 1.03$. Let F_1 denote the numerical value of the odds-ratio in the 2×2 population tableau pertaining to the female population, let F_2 denote the corresponding value for the 2×2 population tableau pertaining to the male population, let $R = F_1/F_2$ and let H_1 and H_2 denote the natural logarithms of F_1 and F_2, respectively. Then $H_1 - H_2$ is equal to the natural logarithm of R. A test of the null hypothesis that $H_1 - H_2 = 0$ (i.e., a test of whether $h_1 - h_2$ differs significantly from zero) can be based on the fact that the large-sample distribution of the statistic

$$Z^2 = \frac{(h_1 - h_2)^2}{s_{h_1}^2 + s_{h_2}^2} \qquad (9)$$

is the chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom when the null hypothesis is true. Since $H_1 - H_2 = 0$ if and only if $R = 1$, this test based on Z^2 is also a test of the null hypothesis that $R = 1$; that is, that $F_1 = F_2$. For the data in Table 1, $Z^2 = 30$. Since the ninety-ninth percentile for the tabulated chi-square distribution is 6.63, an observed value of $Z^2 = 30$ is statistically significant. We conclude, therefore, that $h_1 - h_2$ differs significantly from zero, and that $r = f_1/f_2$ differs significantly from 1.

We noted earlier herein that $F_1 = F_2$ (i.e., that $R = 1$) if and only if $Q_1 = Q_2$. Thus a test of the null hypothesis that $R = 1$ is also a test of the null hypothesis that $Q_1 = Q_2$. In the case considered above, the conclusion we reached using Z^2 is similar to the conclusion we reached using W^2: for females the association between work satisfaction and social approval from supervisors is significantly different from the corresponding association for males. Having concluded that the association for females is significantly different from the association for males, how shall we measure or estimate the magnitude of this difference? If we compare the association in the 2×2 tables for females and males using the difference between Q_1 and Q_2, the confidence intervals described in the preceding section can be used to estimate $Q_1 - Q_2$. On the other hand, if we compare the association in the 2×2 tables using the ratio R of the odds-ratios F_1 and F_2, a different method for obtaining confidence intervals is needed. We shall now present a method for obtaining confidence intervals for R.

We begin by first finding confidence intervals for $H_1 - H_2$, which we had noted earlier was the natural logarithm of R. Our estimate of $H_1 - H_2$ is $h_1 - h_2$. Since the large-sample distribution of $h_1 - h_2$ is normal with a mean of $H_1 - H_2$ and a variance estimated consistently by $s_{h_1}^2 + s_{h_2}^2$, we can

[5] See, e.g., R. L. Plackett, "A Note on Interactions in Contingency Tables," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological)*, XXIV (1962), 162-66, and Leo A. Goodman, "Simultaneous Confidence Limits for Cross-Product Ratios in Contingency Tables," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological)*, XXVI (1964), 86-102.

The usual tables of natural logarithms can be used to calculate h. See, e.g., Table 20 in Fisher and Yates, *op. cit.*

[6] All numerical calculations presented in this article were made using more significant digits than are given above. The results were then rounded off to fewer digits for the sake of simplicity of exposition.

obtain, say, 95 per cent (approximate) confidence intervals for $H_1 - H_2$ by calculating the following two confidence limits:

$$L_h = h_1 - h_2 - 1.96\sqrt{(s_{h_1}^2 + s_{h_2}^2)}\,,$$
$$U_h = h_1 - h_2 + 1.96\sqrt{(s_{h_1}^2 + s_{h_2}^2)}\,. \quad (10)$$

For the data in Table 1, our estimate of of $H_1 - H_2$ is $h_1 - h_2 = 1.03$, and the 95 per cent confidence limits for $H_1 - H_2$ are $L_h = .66$ and $U_h = 1.39$. Since $H_1 - H_2$ is the natural logarithm of R, any estimate (or confidence limit) for $H_1 - H_2$ can be translated into an estimate (or confidence limit) for R by using the usual table of natural logarithms in, so to speak, inverted order. Thus, an estimate of 1.03 for $H_1 - H_2$ corresponds to an estimate of 2.79 for R.[7] Similarly, the 95 per cent confidence limits of $L_h = .66$ and $L_h = 1.39$ for $H_1 - H_2$ correspond to confidence limits of $L_r = 1.94$ and $U_r = 4.02$ for R. An alternative method for calculating these values of L_r and U_r is to use the following formulas:

$$L_r = \frac{r}{k}\,, \qquad U_r = rk\,, \qquad (11)$$

where r is the ratio of f_1 and f_2 (defined above), and where k is calculated using the natural-logarithm table in inverted order with the natural logarithm of k equal to $1.96\sqrt{(s_{h_1}^2 + s_{h_2}^2)}$.[8]

Note that our 95 per cent confidence interval for $H_1 - H_2$ (i.e., the interval from L_h to U_h) based on the data in Table 1 does not include zero, our confidence interval for R (i.e., the interval from L_r to U_r) does not include 1, and the test of the null hypothesis that $H_1 - H_2 = 0$ (i.e., that $R = 1$) which was presented earlier in this section would reject the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of significance. It is easy to see that the 95 per cent confidence interval for $H_1 - H_2$ will include zero if and only if the confidence interval for R includes 1, and this will happen if and only if the test based upon Z^2 leads to the acceptance of the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level of significance.

SOME COMPARISONS

The odds ratio f defined in the preceding section is sometimes called the cross-product ratio. The following measures of association are functions of f: (1) Yule's coefficient of association Q (or q); (2) Yule's coefficient of colligation Y (or y); and (3) the natural logarithm h of f.[9] Equation (6) shows how q is related to f, and the following equations show how y and h are related to f:

$$y = \frac{\sqrt{(f)} - 1}{\sqrt{(f)} + 1}\,, \qquad (12)$$

$$h = \log f\,, \qquad (13)$$

where $\log f$ denotes the natural logarithm of f.[10] We see from equations (6), (12), and

[7] Using more significant digits, an estimate of 1.026 for $H_1 - H_2$ corresponds to an estimate of 2.790 for R. In other words, 2.790 is the number which is such that its natural logarithm is 1.026. Since $h_1 - h_2$ was equal to the natural logarithm of $r = f_1/f_2$, the estimate $h_1 - h_2$ of $H_1 - H_2$ corresponds to the estimate r of R. Thus, we can calculate r from $h_1 - h_2$ using the natural-logarithm table in inverted order or we can calculate r directly from f_1 and f_2. The latter procedure is, of course, simpler.

[8] We used the natural-logarithm table in inverted order (or equivalently a table of the exponential distribution) when we applied the method that translates L_h and U_h directly into L_r and U_r, and also when we apply the alternative method (formula [11]) since k is calculated from this table.

[9] We shall use the symbols q and y for the estimated values of Q and Y, respectively, calculated from a 2 × 2 contingency table describing data from a sample. For further comments on Q and Y see, e.g., Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications" and "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications. II: Further Discussion and References," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XLIX (1954), 723-64, and LIV (1959), 123-63. An operational interpretation of Q is given on pp. 747-50 of the 1954 article by Goodman and Kruskal, and an operational interpretation of Y is given on p. 125 of their 1959 article.

[10] The usual definitions of Yule's coefficients of association and of colligation, which appear in many statistics textbooks (see, e.g., G. Udny Yule and M. G. Kendall, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* [London: Charles Griffin & Co., 1950]), may look to the reader somewhat different from eqs. (6) and (12) above. Eq. (6) actually provides an alternative but equivalent definition of Yule's coefficient of

(13) that if the value of f in a 2 × 2 table is known, then q, y, and h can be calculated without recourse to any other information about the 2 × 2 table. Furthermore, if the value of q (or y or h) in a 2 × 2 table is known, then the value of f can be calculated. Knowledge about the value of f in a 2 × 2 table is equivalent to knowledge about the value of any of the other three measures listed above or of any other monotonic function of f. In particular, if two 2 × 2 tables have equal f values, then the two values of h calculated for these tables will be equal, the two values of Yule's coefficient of association will be equal, and the two values of Yule's coefficient of colligation will be equal.

The odds ratio f and the other three measures listed above can be characterized in the following way: For the 2 × 2 table, if a measure of association is a function of the proportion of the observations in the first row of the table that fall also in the first column and of the proportion of observations in the second row that fall also in the first column, *and* if this measure is invariant when the rows are relabeled as columns and vice versa, then it must be a function of f.[11] A somewhat different characterization of these measures is the following: If a measure of the association in the 2 × 2 table is not influenced by the relative sizes of the row *and* the column marginal totals, then it must also be a function of f.[12]

Since knowledge about the value of f in a single 2 × 2 table is equivalent to knowledge about the value of any monotonic function of f, the measures of association f, q, y, and h all measure, in a certain sense, the same aspect of association in the table, though each of these four indexes makes use of a different scale for measuring this one aspect of association. The index f tells us what is the relative magnitude of the odds (a, b) compared with the odds (c, d) (see formula [5] and related comments in the preceding section). The index q tells us what is the difference between the probability that two individuals (chosen at random from the 2 × 2 table) will be in the same order with respect to the two (ordered) classifications of the table (given that they are not tied with respect to either classification) and the probability that the two individuals will be in the opposite order with respect to the two classifications.[13] Though f and q provide direct answers to two different specific questions about the association in a single 2 × 2 table, equations (6) and (7) indicate that the answer to either one of these two questions can be used (without recourse to any other information) to obtain the answer to the other question. In this sense, the questions are equivalent. Similarly, the specific questions to which the indexes y and h provide direct

association (which is usually defined by formula [1] above), and eq. (12) provides an alternative but equivalent definition of his coefficient of colligation. These equations show that both of Yule's coefficients are simple functions of f.

[11] See A. W. F. Edwards, "The Measure of Association in a 2 × 2 Table," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (General)*, CXXVI (1963), 109–14, and Goodman, "Simultaneous Confidence Limits . . . ," *op. cit.*

[12] In other words, suppose that in the 2 × 2 table we make a transformation on the cell entries n_{ij} (i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2) of the form

$$n_{ij} \rightarrow s_i t_j n_{ij} ,$$

where s_i and t_j are any positive numbers (i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2). If the measure of association is invariant under transformations of this form, then it must be a function of f.

[13] See Goodman and Kruskal, 1954, *op. cit.* This article also noted that q is a measure based upon optimal prediction of order. It measures the relative decrease in the probability of incorrect predictions when predicting the order of two individuals (chosen at random from the 2 × 2 table) with respect to one of the (ordered) classifications of the table in the case where the order of the two individuals with respect to the other classification is not observed and in the case where the order of the two individuals with respect to the second classification is observed and taken into account (given that the two individuals are not tied with respect to either classification). This interpretation of q follows from the results presented in the Goodman-Kruskal article and it is also discussed by Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (1965), 341–52.

answers are different from each other and are different from the specific questions to which f and q provide direct answers, but they are all (in a certain sense) equivalent.

The tests based upon W^2 and Z^2 presented in the preceding sections herein were both tests of the same null hypothesis (viz., that $Q_1 = Q_2$, $H_1 = H_2$, $F_1 = F_2$), but the tests differ in that the first one was based upon the difference between the observed q's, and the second one was based upon the difference between the observed h's (or equivalently upon the ratio of the f's). The general method of constructing these tests could also be used to provide other tests of this same null hypothesis based upon the difference between the observed y's or upon the difference between the observed f's.[14] Which tests should be used? This will depend upon which measures of the difference in the intensity of the association in the two tables are of interest in studying the particular problem at hand.[15] Is interest focused on the relative magnitude of the odds ratio f_1 compared with the odds ratio f_2? If so, we would calculate the ratio of the two f's (or the natural logarithm of this ratio, which is equal to the difference between the two h's), and then use the test based on Z^2. On the other hand, for each separate 2×2 table interest may be focused more directly on q as a measure based upon optimal prediction of order (rather than upon f as a measure of the relative magnitude of the odds), and if the difference between the q index in one table and the q index in the second table is of interest, we would use the test based on W^2.

For the 2×2 table, all the measures of association mentioned above (viz., f, q, y, h) are symmetric with respect to the two variables pertaining to the rows and columns of the table. In other words, all of these measures remain invariant when the rows of the 2×2 table are relabeled as columns and vice versa.[16] However, they are not the only measures that are symmetric. The ϕ coefficient is a different measure of association (one of the traditional measures of association in a 2×2 table) that is also symmetric with respect to the two variables pertaining to the rows and columns of the table. (Its square is the mean square contingency ϕ^2.) It is, however, quite different from the other measures referred to above.[17] In particular, it is not a monotonic function of f. Knowledge about the value of ϕ in a 2×2 table is not equivalent to knowledge about the value of f (or q, y, or h).

When two 2×2 tables have equal f-values, they need not have equal ϕ-values. Thus, none of the tests presented earlier

[14] A test based upon the difference between the observed f's was presented by A. Berger, "On Comparing Intensities of Association between Two Binary Characteristics in Two Different Populations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, LVI (1961), 889–908, and by Goodman, "On Methods for Comparing Contingency Tables," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (General)*, CXXVI (1963), 94–108.

[15] It is possible to show that the various tests referred to above all have the same large-sample test efficiency when the usual concept of test efficiency (i.e., the Pitman-Noether concept) is applied. This concept provides us with an approximate measure of the power of a test in large samples when the alternate hypotheses under consideration are close to the null hypothesis. If the alternate hypotheses are close to the null hypothesis, then all of the tests referred to above will be approximately equivalent in large samples. However, if the alternate hypotheses are not close to the null hypothesis (or if the samples are small), these tests can lead to quite different results, and their exact power can be quite different depending upon particular alternate hypotheses under consideration.

[16] Because of this, the various tests described above are also symmetric with respect to the two variables pertaining to the rows and columns of the 2×2 tables. In addition, the test based upon Z^2 and the usual chi-square test of second-order interaction in a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ table (i.e., the χ^2 test described by Costner and Wager) are symmetric with respect to all three variables. (The third variable pertains here to the layers in the $2 \times 2 \times 2$ table; e.g., in Table 1 the third variable is sex—male or female.)

[17] The interested reader can compare the operational interpretation of ϕ (given on pp. 125–26 of the 1959 article by Goodman and Kruskal) with that of Q and Y referred to in n. 9. Note also that while the numerator of q (as defined by eq. [1] above) is the same as the numerator of ϕ (as usually defined), the denominator of q is less than the corresponding denominator of ϕ, except in the extreme case where $|\phi| = 1$. Thus we see that $|q| > |\phi|$, except in the extreme case mentioned above.

herein can be used to test the null hypothesis that the ϕ-values are equal in the two 2×2 population tables. A test of this hypothesis was presented by Goodman in an earlier publication.[18] The general form of this test is similar to that of the other tests described above, but the details are different. We need not repeat these details here. As earlier herein, the test procedure can be readily modified to provide a confidence interval for the difference between the ϕ's in the two 2×2 tables pertaining to the corresponding populations. The general form of this confidence interval will be similar to that of formulas (4) or (10), but the details will be different.

We noted earlier that q, y, and h are monotonic functions of f, and that the aspect of the association in a single 2×2 table that is measured by f is, in a certain sense, equivalent to the aspect measured by q, y, or h. Because of this equivalence, in comparing two 2×2 tables we find that $f_1 = f_2$ if and only if $q_1 = q_2$, $y_1 = y_2$ if and only if $h_1 = h_2$, etc. We also noted earlier that $h_1 - h_2 = \log (f_1/f_2)$ and that the index $h_1 - h_2$ is a monotonic function of f_1/f_2. Because of this relationship, the index $h_1 - h_2$ measures an aspect of the difference in the intensity of the association in two tables, that is, in a certain sense, equivalent to the aspect measured by f_1/f_2. The index f_1/f_2 measures the relative magnitude of f_1 compared with f_2, and this aspect of the difference in the intensity of association in two tables is quite different from the aspects measured by the indexes $q_1 - q_2$, $y_1 - y_2$, or $f_1 - f_2$, though any of these measures can be used to provide tests of the same null hypothesis (and these tests will be approximately equivalent in large samples if the alternate hypotheses under consideration are close to the null hypothesis). On the other hand, not only does the index $\phi_1 - \phi_2$ measure an aspect of the difference in the intensity of association in the two tables that is different from the various aspects measured by the other indexes considered above, but the test based upon $\phi_1 - \phi_2$ tests a null hypothesis that is different from the null hypothesis tested using the other indexes, and the results obtained with this test can be quite different from those obtained with the other indexes (even when the samples are large and the alternate hypotheses are close to the null hypothesis tested with $\phi_1 - \phi_2$).

Let us now consider what has been called the Dorn-Stouffer-Tibbitts-Goodman (DSTG) method of analysis.[19] For two 2×2 tables, the DSTG method tests whether the index

$$\theta = \frac{a}{(a+b)} - \frac{c}{(c+d)} \qquad (14)$$

calculated for one of the 2×2 tables differs significantly from the corresponding index for the second 2×2 table. The index θ is different from all of the other measures mentioned earlier herein, though it is not unrelated to these measures.[20] This index estimates the difference between the conditional probability that an observation in the first row will fall also in the first column and the conditional probability that an observation in the second row will fall in the first column. While all of the other measures mentioned earlier in this article were symmetric with respect to the two variables

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[19] This method was presented in Goodman, "Modifications of the Dorn-Stouffer-Tibbitts Method for 'Testing the Significance of Comparisons in Sociological Data,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (1961), 355–63. It is a corrected and modified version of a method of comparison suggested earlier in Harold F. Dorn and Samuel A. Stouffer, "Criteria for Differential Mortality," *Journal of American Statistical Association*, XXVIII (1933), 402–14, and in Clark Tibbitts and Samuel A. Stouffer, "Testing the Significance of Comparisons in Sociological Data," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (1934), 357–63.

[20] For an operational interpretation of θ, see pp. 129–30 in Goodman and Kruskal, 1959, *op. cit.* See also W. J. Youden, "Index for Rating Diagnostic Tests," *Cancer*, III (1950), 32–35, and Robert H. Somers, "A New Asymmetric Measure of Association for Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (1962), 799–811. The interested reader can compare the various interpretations of θ given in these articles with the interpretations of the other measures cited herein.

answers are different from each other and are different from the specific questions to which f and q provide direct answers, but they are all (in a certain sense) equivalent.

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[18] See Goodman, "On Methods for Comparing Contingency Tables," *op. cit.*

[19] This method was presented in Goodman, "Modifications of the Dorn-Stouffer-Tibbitts Method for 'Testing the Significance of Comparisons in Sociological Data,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (1961), 355-63. It is a corrected and modified version of a method of comparison suggested earlier in Harold F. Dorn and Samuel A. Stouffer, "Criteria for Differential Mortality," *Journal of American Statistical Association*, XXVIII (1933), 402-14, and in Clark Tibbitts and Samuel A. Stouffer, "Testing the Significance of Comparisons in Sociological Data," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (1934), 357-63.

[20] For an operational interpretation of θ, see pp. 129-30 in Goodman and Kruskal, 1959, *op. cit.* See also W. J. Youden, "Index for Rating Diagnostic Tests," *Cancer*, III (1950), 32-35, and Robert H. Somers, "A New Asymmetric Measure of Association for Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (1962), 799-811. The interested reader can compare the various interpretations of θ given in these articles with the interpretations of the other measures cited herein.

pertaining to the rows and columns of the 2×2 table, the index θ is not. It corresponds more to a measure of a regression slope than it does to a measure of correlation.[21] The index θ is not a monotonic function of f or a monotonic function of ϕ. Knowledge about the value of θ in a 2×2 table is not equivalent to knowledge about the value of f (or q, y, or h) or equivalent to knowledge about the value of ϕ.

When two 2×2 tables have equal f-values or equal ϕ-values, they need not have equal θ-values. Thus, none of the tests proposed earlier can be used to test the null hypothesis that the θ-values are equal in the two 2×2 population tables. Since the null hypotheses tested by the tests discussed earlier are different from the null hypothesis tested by the DSTG method (viz., that the θ-values are equal in the two population tables), the results obtained with the earlier tests can be quite different from those obtained with the DSTG method. In situations when the index θ is of interest, where attention is focused on the difference between the conditional row-wise (column-wise) probabilities of an observation falling in the first column (row), and where two 2×2 tables are to be compared, we would recommend that the DSTG method be used to make this comparison. This method can also be used to obtain confidence intervals for the difference between the θ's in the two 2×2 tables pertaining to the corresponding populations.[22]

The tests discussed in this section analyze various aspects of the difference in the intensity of the association in two 2×2 tables. The difference in the intensity of association in these tables can be interpreted in terms of the "interaction" between three dichotomous variables. For example, if in Table 1 the association between work satisfaction and social approval from supervisors is different for females than for males, we would say that there is interaction between the three factors: work satisfaction, social approval, and sex. A somewhat different way of expressing this point is to say that the "effect" of social approval on work satisfaction depends upon sex; or that work satisfaction is influenced by a "social approval effect," a "sex effect," and an "interaction effect of sex and social approval." The index $h_1 - h_2$ measures the interaction effect of sex and social approval on work satisfaction when it is assumed that the logarithm of the odds (i.e., the log-odds) that there is high work satisfaction is written as a sum of a social approval effect, a sex effect, and an interaction effect (plus a constant); that is, when it is assumed that the odds that there is high work satisfaction are written as a product of a social approval effect, a sex effect, and an interaction effect (times a constant). The index $\theta_1 - \theta_2$ measures the interaction effect of sex and social approval on work satisfaction when it is assumed that the probability that there is high work satisfaction is written as a sum of a social approval effect, a sex effect, and an interaction effect (plus a constant). When we test whether $h_1 - h_2$ differs significantly from zero we are testing whether the log-odds for high work satisfaction can be expressed simply in terms of the two additive main effects (social approval and sex), with the interaction of these effects nil; that is, we are testing whether the odds for high work satisfaction can be expressed

[21] The index θ can be interpreted as the slope of the linear regression of the variable pertaining to the columns of the 2×2 table on the variable pertaining to the rows, when the two columns (rows) pertaining to each variable are assigned scores of zero and one, respectively. The measure ϕ can be interpreted as the Pearsonian correlation coefficient between the two variables scored as above. Applying the usual theory of linear regression, we find that the slope (i.e., the index θ) will not remain invariant when the dependent variable (in this case, the variable pertaining to the columns) and the independent variable (i.e., the variable pertaining to the rows) are interchanged, and that the product of the two different slopes obtained by this interchange is equal to the square of the correlation coefficient (i.e., the measure ϕ^2). Thus, the geometric mean of the two θ's obtained by the interchange of rows and columns is equal to ϕ.

[22] For further details, see Goodman, "Modifications of the Dorn-Stouffer-Tibbitts Method . . . ," *op. cit.*

simply in terms of two multiplicative main effects. When we test whether $\theta_1 - \theta_2$ differs significantly from zero, we are testing whether the probability of high work satisfaction can be expressed simply in terms of the two additive main effects, with the interaction of these effects nil. Thus, we would apply a test based upon $h_1 - h_2$ (or, equivalently, upon f_1/f_2) if we thought that the odds for high work satisfaction might be affected in a multiplicative way by the two main effects. We would apply a test based upon $\theta_1 - \theta_2$ (i.e., the DSTG method) if we thought that the probability of high work satisfaction might be affected in an additive way by the two main effects.

THE MEASUREMENT OF PARTIAL ASSOCIATION

The methods presented in the earlier sections herein can be used to study whether the conditional association between two dichotomous variables (e.g., work satisfaction and social approval of supervisors) is affected by a third dichotomous variable (e.g., sex). We have presented methods for estimating the effect of the third variable on the conditional association between the first two variables, and for testing whether this effect is nil. If we can assume that the effect is nil, then the measure of the association in the first 2 × 2 table (i.e., the table corresponding to the first category of the third variable) and the measure of the association in the second 2 × 2 table (i.e., the table corresponding to the second category of the third variable) both provide estimates of the conditional association between the first two variables when the third variable is "held constant," and a weighted average of these two estimates would serve as a measure of the partial association between the first two variables when the third is held constant. For example, taking the index h as the measure of the association in a 2 × 2 table, a weighted average of h_1 and h_2 calculated from the two 2 × 2 tables would serve as an estimate of the partial association.[23] In particular, in calculating the weighted average we would weight h_1 and h_2 inversely to their estimated variances $s^2_{h_1}$ and $s^2_{h_2}$, respectively. Thus, when there is no effect of the third variable on the conditional association between the first two variables, our estimate of the partial association would be

$$h(1, 2 \mid 3) = w_1 h_1 + w_2 h_2 , \tag{15}$$

where

$$w_1 = (1/s^2_{h_1}) \Big/ \sum_{i=1}^{2} (1/s^2_{h_i}) = s^2_{h_2}/(s^2_{h_1} + s^2_{h_2})$$

and (16)

$$w_2 = (1/s^2_{h_2}) \Big/ \sum_{i=1}^{2} (1/s^2_{h_i}) = s^2_{h_1}/(s^2_{h_1} + s^2_{h_2}),$$

and where the symbol $h(1,2 \mid 3)$ denotes the partial association between the first two variables when the third variable is "held constant."

In the situation where we can not assume that there is no effect of the third variable on the conditional association between the first two variables, the index described by formulas (15) and (16) will not be suitable as a measure of partial association. When the third variable does have an effect on the conditional association between the first two variables, then h_1 and h_2 will be estimates of population parameters that differ in magnitude (i.e., the conditional association pertaining to the first category of the third variable will be different from the conditional association pertaining to the second category of the third variable), and in order that a weighted average of h_1 and h_2 be meaningful as an index of partial association the weights that are used should be directly related to the population of interest. Thus, if we are interested in a population

[23] The method presented in this section can be applied not only when h is taken as the measure of association, but also more generally. When an index other than h is used to measure the association, the remarks presented here in terms of h can be directly translated in terms of the other index.

in which there is an equal number of individuals in each category of the third variable, one way of obtaining an index of partial association that has a clear meaning for this population would be to weight each category equally; that is, in this case the simple average of h_1 and h_2 would serve as a measure of partial association. More generally, when a weighted average of h_1 and h_2 is used as an index of partial association in the case where there may be an effect of the third variable on the conditional association between the first two variables, the weights that are used should be equal to the relative frequency or the relative importance of the categories of the third variable in the population of interest (where "relative importance" is defined in a way that is relevant to the problem at hand).[24]

THE ANALYSIS OF POLYTOMOUS VARIABLES

The methods presented above are suited to the analysis of three dichotomous variables. We shall now discuss briefly the situation where some of the variables of interest are polytomous rather than dichotomous; that is, where some of these variables classify individuals into more than two categories (e.g., high, medium, and low categories).

While Yule's coefficient, Q, measures an aspect of the association between two dichotomous variables, the Goodman-Kruskal coefficient gamma (γ) is a generalization of Q which measures an aspect of the association between two polytomous variables, where for each variable there is an underlying order among the categories of the polytomy. If one of the variables classifies individuals into α categories and the other variable classifies individuals into β categories, then the association between the two variables is described by the $\alpha \times \beta$ cross-classification table, and the coefficient γ is a summary measure of an aspect of the association in this table. Let g denote the estimate of γ calculated from an $\alpha \times \beta$ contingency table describing data from a sample. In order to compare two (or more) contingency tables, methods have been developed by Goodman and Kruskal for testing whether the values of g calculated for these tables are significantly different from each other.[25] They also provide methods for obtaining confidence intervals for the difference between the values of γ pertaining to two different tables, and these methods can be readily extended when comparing more than two tables in order to provide simultaneous confidence intervals for all contrasts among the values of γ pertaining to these tables. These methods can be used to study the conditional association between two polytomous variables (each consisting of ordered categories), when a third polytomous variable (either ordered or not) is taken into account.

In situations where an index other than γ is more relevant as a summary measure of the association in the $\alpha \times \beta$ table (e.g., when the variables pertaining to the $\alpha \times \beta$ table do not consist of ordered categories), the general methods of inference presented by Goodman and Kruskal for comparing two (or more) contingency tables can be applied to the values of the particular index of interest calculated for these tables. These methods and those referred to in the preceding paragraph can be applied whenever a single index (not necessarily γ) can serve as an appropriate summary measure of the association in the $\alpha \times \beta$ table, and in these situations they provide tools for studying the conditional relationship between two polytomous variables (each either ordered or not) when a third polytomous variable (either ordered or not) is taken into account.

In some situations, a single index may not be altogether adequate as a complete summary measure of the intensity of the

[24] See Goodman and Kruskal, 1954, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of partial association using measures based on weighted averages and also measures based directly on probabilities of incorrect predictions. The latter measures can be readily interpreted in terms of probabilistic models of predictive activity, but we shall not go into these details here.

[25] Goodman and Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications. III: Approximate Sampling Theory," *Journal of American Statistical Association*, LVIII (1963), 310–64.

association in the $\alpha \times \beta$ table. We may prefer instead to study the association in the $\alpha \times \beta$ table in more detail, and our interest may focus upon various parts of the $\alpha \times \beta$ table; for example, on the various 2×2 subtables that can be formed from the $\alpha \times \beta$ table by considering the cell entries in particular pairs of columns and in particular pairs of rows. For each of the 2×2 subtables the odds ratio f (or one of the other measures equivalent to f) can be calculated as a measure of the association in the subtable, and various aspects of the association in the $\alpha \times \beta$ table can be summarized by the set of values of f (that is, the vector of f-values) calculated for the 2×2 subtables formed from the $\alpha \times \beta$ table. Methods for analyzing this set of f-values calculated for the subtables of an $\alpha \times \beta$ table, for comparing the set of f-values pertaining to one $\alpha \times \beta$ table with the corresponding set of f-values pertaining to a second $\alpha \times \beta$ table, and more generally for comparing the sets of f-values pertaining to a number of $\alpha \times \beta$ tables, have been presented by Goodman in earlier publications.[26] For situations where the index f is not as appropriate as, say, θ (see formula [14]) as a measure of association, he has also provided in a separate publication methods for analyzing a set of θ-values calculated for the 2×2 subtables of an $\alpha \times \beta$ table, and these methods can be readily extended to study the differences between the sets of θ-values pertaining to a number of $\alpha \times \beta$ tables.[27] Various hypotheses about the kinds of conditional association that may or may not be present between two polytomous variables (when a third variable is "held constant") may be analyzed using these techniques.

The problem of measuring the partial association between two polytomous variables when a third polytomous variable is taken into account corresponds to the problem of finding a single index (or vector) that summarizes, in some sense, the "average" conditional association in a number of $\alpha \times \beta$ tables. In the preceding section, we described how this could be done when the three variables were dichotomous; that is, when the "average" conditional association in two 2×2 tables was of interest. These methods can be readily extended to the case where the variables are polytomous. We leave these details to the interested reader.

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[26] See Goodman, "Simultaneous Confidence Limits . . . ," *op. cit.*, and "Simple Methods for Analyzing Three-Factor Interaction in Contingency Tables," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, LIX (1964), 319-52.

[27] Goodman, "Simultaneous Confidence Intervals for Contrasts among Multinomial Populations," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, XXXV (1964), 716-25.

From Mafia to Cosa Nostra

Robert T. Anderson

ABSTRACT

The old Mafia of Sicily was a pre-industrial peasant institution. Its organization was intimate and diffuse. It now operates in the highly urbanized and industrialized milieu of the United States. As an urban, industrial institution it has evolved into a different kind of organization. The real and fictive kinship ties of the old Mafia are still utilized among fellow Sicilians and Italians. But these ties are now subordinate to bureaucratic ones as defined in terms of specialization, a hierarchy of authority, a system of rules, and impersonality.

Sicily has known centuries of inept and corrupt governments that have always seemed unconcerned about the enormous gap between the very rich minority and the incredibly poor majority. Whether from disinterest or from simple incapacity, governments have failed to maintain public order. Under these circumstances, local strong men beyond reach of the government, or in collusion with it, have repeatedly grouped together to seek out their own interests. They have formed, in effect, little extra-legal principalities. A code of conduct, the code of *omertà*, justified and supported these unofficial regimes by linking compliance with a fabric of tradition that may be characterized as chivalrous. By this code, an "honorable" Sicilian maintained unbreakable silence concerning all illegal activities. To correct abuse, he might resort to feud and vendetta. But never would he avail himself of a governmental agency. Sanctioned both by hoary tradition and the threat of brutal reprisal, this code in support of strong men was obeyed by the whole populace. The private domains thus established are old. After the 1860's they became known as "Mafias."[1]

As an institution, the Mafia was originally at home in peasant communities as well as in pre-industrial towns and cities. (Sicilian peasants are notable for urban rather than village residence.) The Mafia built upon traditional forms of social interaction common to all Sicilians. Its functions were appropriate to face-to-face communities. Mafias persist and adapt in contemporary Sicily, which, to some extent, is industrializing and urbanizing. Mafias also took root in the United States, where industrialization and urbanization have created a new kind of society, and here, too, they have persisted and adapted. But can a pre-industrial peasant institution survive unchanged in an urban, industrial milieu? May we not antici-

[1] Giuseppe Pitrè, *La famiglia, la casa, la vita del popolo siciliano* (Palermo: Stabilimento Tipografico virzi, 1913), I, 289–91; George Wermert, *Die Insel Sicilien in volkswirtschaftlicher, kultureller und sozialer Beziehung* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer [Ernest Vohsen], 1905), pp. 397–402, 437; Gaetano Mosca, "Mafia," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1933), X, 36; Margaret Carlyle, *The Awakening of Southern Italy* (London: Oxford Press, 1962), pp. 111–12; Jerre Mangione, *Reunion in Sicily* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 74; Francis M. Guercio, *Sicily, the Garden of the Mediterranean: The Country and Its People* (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), p. 69; *Time* (August 15, 1960), p. 25; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), p. 40; Antonino Cutrera, *La Mafia e i mafiosi: origini e manifestazioni, studio di sociologia criminale* (Palermo: Alberto Reber, 1900), p. 177; Norman Lewis, "The Honored Society," *New Yorker* (February 8, 15, 22, 1964).

pate major modifications of structure and function under such circumstances? The available evidence on secret organizations, though regrettably incomplete, inconsistent and inaccurate,[2] suggests an affirmative answer. The Mafia has bureaucratized.

Formal organizations of a traditional type, whether castes in India, harvesting co-operatives in Korea, monasteries in Europe or other comparable groups, normally change as they increase the scale of their operations and as their milieu urbanizes.[3] They often simply disappear, and their surviving activities are taken over by other institutions. In the Japanese village of Suye Mura, for example, Ushijima finds that work formerly done by co-operative exchange is now done by wage labor.[4] Alternatively, however, these traditional associations may survive by being reconstituted as rational-legal associations or by being displaced or overlain by such associations, as castes in India, traditionally led by headmen and councils (panchayats), are now being reconstituted by the formation of caste associations.[5] The substitution of rational-legal for traditional organization is of world-wide occurrence today.[6] Because models of rational-legal organization are almost universally known, and because modern states provide the possibility of regulating organizations by law, bureaucratization rarely occurs now by simple evolution. The Mafia is one of the few exceptions. Because it is secret and illegal, it cannot reorganize by reconstituting itself as a rational-legal organization. Yet it has changed as it has grown in size and shifted to an urban environment. Analysis of this change assumes unusual importance, because the Mafia is a significant force in modern life and because, as a rare contemporary example of the reorganization of a traditional type of association without recourse to legal sanctions, it provides a basis for comparison with potential other examples. Much of the present controversy about the Mafia, particularly about whether such an organization exists in the United States, is the result of confusing a modern, bureaucratic organization with the traditional institution from which it evolved.

THE TRADITIONAL MAFIA

A Mafia is not necessarily predatory. It provides law and order where the official government fails or is malfeasant. It collects assessments within its territory much as a legal government supports itself. While citizens everywhere often complain about taxation, these Mafia exactions have been defended as reasonable payment for peace. The underlying principle of Mafia rule is that it protects the community from all other strong men in return for regularized tribute.[7]

To illustrate, the Grisafi band of the Agrigento countryside, led by a young, very large man called "Little Mark" (Marcuzzo Grisafi) formed a stable, though illicit, government that oversaw every event in his area for a dozen years (1904–16). An excellent marksman, he was able by

[2] As Hobsbawm has pointed out, information about the Mafia, and especially quantitative and detailed information, does not meet standards normally set for institutional analysis. It is, after all, a secretive criminal organization. But while one cannot speak as authoritatively as one would like, this type of organization does need to be considered by social theorists, both as an important kind of institution and as a powerful force in Sicily and elsewhere. Hobsbawm, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[3] Peter M. Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 36; Robert T. Anderson, "Studies in Peasant Life," *Biennial Review of Anthropology* (1965), ed. Bernard J. Spiegel (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press) (in press).

[4] M Ushijima, "Katari in Suye Mura—Its Social Function and Process of Change," *Japanese Journal of Ethnology*, XXVI (1962), 14–22.

[5] Robert T. Anderson, "Preliminary Report on the Associational Redefinition of Castes in Hyderabad-Secunderabad," *Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers*, No. 29 (Fall, 1963), 25–42.

[6] Anderson, *op. cit.*

[7] Cutrera, *op. cit.*, p. 116; Gavin Maxwell, *Bandit* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), pp. 31–33; Mangione, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

his strength and with the aid of four to eight gunmen to guarantee freedom from roving bandit and village sneak alike.

On a larger scale, between approximately 1895 and 1924, a group of eleven villages in the Madonie Mountains were also ruled by a Mafia. The head and his assistants had private police force of as many as 130 armed men. A heavy tax resembling official annual taxes was imposed upon all landowners. As with the Grisafi band, this Mafia was not a roving body of terrorists. Their leaders, at least, were well-established citizens, landowners, and farmers. While they might mount up as a body to enforce their tax collections, they stayed for the most part in their homes or on their farms. They assumed supervision of all aspects of local life, including agricultural and economic activities, family relations, and public administration. As elsewhere, the will of the Mafia was the law. The head, in fact, was known locally as the "prefect" ("*U Prefetto*").[8]

Although not necessarily predatory, Mafias seem always to be so, despotisms possessed of absolute local power. Many in the band or collaborating with it may find it a welcome and necessary institution in an otherwise lawless land. But multitudes suffer gross injustice at its hands. No one dares offend the Mafia chief's sense of what is right. The lines between tax and extortion, between peace enforcement and murder, blur under absolutism. Many would claim that the Agrigento and Madonie *mafiosi* were mostly involved in blackmail, robbery, and murder. An over-all inventory of Mafia activities leaves no doubt that it is a criminal institution, serving the interests of its membership at the expense of the larger population.[9]

In organizational terms, the Mafia is a social group that combines the advantages of family solidarity with the membership flexibility of a voluntary association.

The most enduring and significant social bond in Sicily is that of the family.[10] Its cohesiveness is reinforced by a strong tendency to village endogamy. Only along the coast, where communication was easier, was it common to marry outside of the locality. The tendency to family endogamy further included some cross-cousin marriage.[11] Family bonds are not necessarily closely affectionate ones, but the tie has been the strongest social relationship known. It is the basic organizational group both economically and socially, functioning as a unit of production as well as of consumption.[12]

Family ties often bind members of the Mafia together. The Mafia of the Madonie included two sets of brothers, as did the core membership of the Grisafi group. Not only are members of the Mafia frequently concealed and aided by their families, but their relatives commonly speculate on their activities and profit from them so that a clear line cannot be drawn between the criminal band on the one hand and the circle of kinsmen on the other.[13]

[8] Cesare Mori, *The Last Struggle with the Mafia*, trans. Orlo Williams (London: Putnam & Co., 1933), pp. 113, 130–33, 165–67, 179.

[9] Mori, *op. cit.*, 130–33; Cutrera, *op. cit.*, p. 116; August Schneegans, *La Sicilia nella natura, nella storia e nella vita* (Florence: G. Barbera, 1890), p. 291.

[10] Pitrè, *op. cit.*, p. 30; William Foote Whyte, "Sicilian Peasant Society," *American Anthropologist*, XLVI (1944), 66; Giovanni Lorenzoni, *Inchiesta parlamentare sulle condizioni dei contadini nelle provincie meridionali e nella Sicilia*," Vol. VI: *Sicilia* (Rome: Tipografia nazionale di Giovanni Berlero, 1910), p. 462.

[11] At the turn of the century an explicit preference existed for cross-cousin marriage. Such marriages, forbidden both by secular and canon law, were actually rare. But more remote consanguineous relatives did marry, and more commonly (one marriage in a hundred) than in most other parts of Italy. Figures for marriages between affinal kin are not available (Lorenzoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 464, 467; Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 66; Vincenzo Petrullo, "A Note on Sicilian Cross-Cousin Marriage," *Primitive Man*, X, No. 1 [1937], 8–9).

[12] Pitrè, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–39; Salvatore Salomone-Marino, *Costumi ed usanze dei contadini di Sicilia* (Palermo: Remo Sandron, 1897), pp. 5–10; Lorenzoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 462, 469–73.

[13] Mori, *op. cit.*, pp. 130, 166, 172, 218; Wermert, *op. cit.*, 398; Gaston Vuillier, *La Sicile, impres-*

Family ties have a certain utility for organizing social action. Brothers are accustomed to work together. They possess a complex network of mutual rights and obligations to cement their partnership. The father-son and uncle-nephew relationships, equally enduring and diffuse, possess in addition a well-established leader-follower relationship. Cousins and nephews may be part of the intimate family, and it has been suggested that the children of brothers are especially close as indicated by their designations as *fratelli-cugini* (brother-cousins) or *fratelli-carnale* (brothers of the flesh).[14]

The family has one major drawback as a functioning group: its membership is relatively inflexible. Typically, family members vary in interests, capabilities, and temperaments. While this may be of little consequence for running a farm, it can constitute a serious handicap for the successful operation of a gang. Some offspring may be completely devoid of criminal capacity, while good potential *mafiosi* may belong to other families. To a certain degree this drawback is countered by the extension of ties through marriage. But often a desirable working alliance cannot be arranged through a suitable wedding.

Throughout Europe a technique is available for the artificial extension of kinship ties. The technique is that of fictive or ritual kinship. Godparenthood, child adoption, and blood brotherhood make it possible to extend kin ties with ease. These fictive bonds are especially notable for the establishment of kinlike dyadic relationships. Larger social groups have not commonly been formed in this way in Europe except as brotherhoods, the latter with variable, sometimes minimal, success. The Mafia constitutes an unusual social unit of this general type in that the fictive bond is that of godparenthood, elsewhere used for allying individuals, but only rarely for forming groups.[15]

The godparenthood tie has had a variable history in Europe. In the Scandinavian countries it is a momentary thing, with few implications for future interaction. But in the Mediterranean area, and especially in Sicily, it is usually taken very seriously. An indissoluble lifetime bond, it is often claimed to be equal or even superior to the bond of true kinship.[16] While the godparenthood (*comparatico*) union may cross class lines to link the high and the low in a powerful but formal relationship, it is more often a tie of friends, affective in an overt way that contrasts with the lesser open affection of the domestic family.[17] Above all, the relationship is characterized by mutual trust.

Sicilians in general, then, live with greatest security and ease in the atmosphere of the family with its fictive extensions. The Mafia is a common-interest group whose members are recruited for their special in-

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tions du présent et du passé (Paris: Hachette, 1896), p. 165; Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[14] Petrullo, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[15] Friedrich notes for the Tarascans that "every man strongly needs a certain number of intimates, many of whom are usually his ceremonial coparents, or compadres—the fathers of his godchildren and the godfathers of his children" (Paul Friedrich, "Assumptions Underlying Tarascan Political Homicide," *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes*, XXV, No 4 [November, 1962], 316) The Mexican-Americans of Salsipuedes, California, normally feel insecure until they have established godparenthood ties with neighbors (Margaret Clark, personal communication). These Mexican and Mexican-American groups appear to be ego-oriented, however, and not well-defined corporate bodies Eugene Hammel is presently studying godparenthood groups in Yugoslavia (personal communication)

[16] Various ways of contracting godparenthood ties are known to the Sicilians See Whyte, *op cit.*, pp. 66-67; Henry Festing Jones, *Castellinaria and other Sicilian Diversions* (Plymouth, England William Brendon, 1911), pp 131-34, Giuseppe Pitrè, *Usi e costumi credenze e pregiudizi del popolo siciliano* (hereinafter cited as "Usi e costumi"), "Biblioteca delle tradizioni popolari siciliane," Vol XV (Florence, G. Barbera Editore, n d), 255

[17] This utility of fictive kinship for psychological release is a striking feature that merits further attention but cannot be dealt with here See Cutrera, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59; Pitre, *Usi e costumi*

terests in and talents for the maintenance of a predatory satrapy. As noted above, this tie of shared interest often originates within a kinship parameter. When it does not, a kinlike tie is applied by the practice of becoming co-godparents. Although the Mafia *setta* (cell) may or may not be characterized by other structural features, it always builds upon real and fictive kinship.[18]

The Mafia of nineteenth-century Sicily practiced a formal rite of initiation into the fictive-kin relationship.[19] Joseph Valachi underwent the same rite in 1930 in New York.[20] In addition to the "baptism of blood," the chief at the first opportunity normally aranges to become the baptismal godfather of the tyro's newborn child. Lacking that opportunity, he establishes a comparable tie in one of the numerous other *comparatico* relationships. The members among themselves are equally active, so that the passing years see a member more and more bound to the group by such ties.

Ritual ties seem to function in part as a temporizing device. Although efficacious in themselves, they are usually the basis for the later arrangement of marriages between sons and daughters, and thus ultimately for the establishment of affinal and consanguineous bonds. The resultant group is therefore very fluid. It utilizes to the utmost its potentialities for bringing in originally unrelated individuals. Yet it possesses the organizational advantages of a lasting body of kin.[21]

Mafia family culture supports membership flexibility additionally by providing for the withdrawal of born members. The criminal family passes on Mafia tradition just as the farming family passes on farming traditions. Boys are taught requisite skills and attitudes. Girls are brought up to be inconspicuous, loyal, and above all silent. The problems of in-family recruitment are not greatly different from those of non-criminal groups. Just as a son without agricultural propensities or the chance to inherit land leaves the countryside to take up a trade or profession, the Mafia son lacking criminal interests or talents takes up a different profession. Indeed, sometimes Mafia family pride comes to focus upon a son who has left the fold to distinguish himself as a physician or professor. But while such an individual might not himself take up an illegal occupation, he is trained never to repudiate it for his kindred. In the Amoroso family, who controlled Porta Montalto near Palermo for many years in the nineteenth century, Gaspare Amoroso, a young cousin of the chief, degraded himself by joining the police force (*carabiniere*). When the youth was discharged and returned to his family home, the Amoroso leaders removed this dishonor by having him killed in cold blood.[22]

The headship of a Mafia is well defined. Referred to as *capo* ("head") or *capomafia* ("Mafia head"), and addressed honorifically as *don*, the chief is clearly identified as the man in charge. Succession to this post, however, is not a matter of clear-cut procedure. In some cases family considerations may result in the replacement of a *capo* by his son or nephew. Commonly, an heir apparent, who may or may not be related consanguineously, is chosen on an essentially pragmatic basis and succeeds by co-optation. Generally, promotion is

[18] Cutrera, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[19] Alexander Rumpelt, *Sicilien und die Sicilianer* (2d ed.; Berlin: Allgemeiner Verein für Deutsche Literatur, 1902), pp. 141–42.

[20] *Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Report of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Made by Its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, together with Additional Combined Views and Individual Views* (hereinafter cited as "Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics") (Report 72, Senate, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965]), p. 12.

[21] Frederic Sondern, Jr., *Brotherhood of Evil: The Mafia* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1959), pp. 5, 242–43. *Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics*, pp. 39–43.

[22] Cutrera, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–60; Sondern, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6, 24; Maxwell, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

by intrigue and strength. It must be won by the most powerful and ruthless candidate with or without the blessing of family designation or co-optation. Only the *capo*, in any case, is formally recognized. The appointment of secondary leaders and ranking within the membership are informal.[23]

In sum, the traditional Mafia may be described as family-like. It would not be considered a bureaucratic organization. Of the four basic characteristics of a bureaucracy (according to Blau), the Mafia lacked three—a hierarchy of authority, specialization, and a system of rules.[24] Impartiality, the fourth characteristic, requires a special note. Impartiality requires that promotion, reward, and job assignment ideally be uninfluenced by the pervasive ties of a primary group and determined solely by individual performance-achievement. The Mafia is a kind of kin group. The individual, once a member, belongs for life with a family member's ineluctable rights to group prerogatives. Yet, the Mafia seems always to have been ruthlessly impersonal when it mattered. A criminal association survives by making its best marksmen assassins, its best organizers leaders, and by punishing those who are disloyal or not observant of *omertà*. Impartiality in the Mafia is not fully developed, but bureaucracy in this sense has no doubt always been present. The Amoroso murder of the *capo-mafia*'s cousin, for example, illustrates extreme impartiality for a family group.

BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE MAFIA

Though still seriously underdeveloped, Sicily seems poised for industrialization with its concomitant changes. To the extent that change has already occurred, the Mafia has adapted and expanded its techniques of exploitation. Claire Sterling writes of the intensification of urban activities: "Today there is not only a Mafia of the *feudo* (agriculture) but also Mafias of truck gardens, wholesale fruit and vegetable markets, water supply, meat, fishing fleets, flowers, funerals, beer, *carrozze* (hacks), garages, and construction. Indeed, there is hardly a businessman in western Sicily who doesn't pay for the Mafia's 'protection' in the form of '*u pizzu*.'"[25]

Mafia formal organization seems at a turning point. The Mafia so far has remained essentially a hodgepodge of independent local units confined to the western part of the island, although cells have been established outside of Sicily. Co-operation among localities in Sicily has an old history. The more successful *capi* have at times established hegemony over wider areas. But it appears that large-scale groupings could not endure in an underdeveloped milieu with notoriously poor communication systems.[26] Modernization, however, is breaking down this local isolation. The scale of operations is expanding. The face-to-face, family-like group in which relationships on the whole are diffuse, affective, and particularistic is changing into a bureaucratic organization.

The best-documented example of early bureaucratization concerns the Mafia of Monreale. Known generally as the *Stoppaglieri*, or facetiously as a mutual-aid society (*società di mutuo soccorso*), and world famous later for the criminal success of some members who migrated to America, the group first formed in the 1870's, when one of Monreale's political factions, in danger of losing local power, formed a Mafia that succeeded in wresting control from the older Mafia of the area. The basic group consisted of 150 members in the city itself. As they prospered they expand-

[23] Guerico, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Sondern, *op. cit.*, 6; Burton B. Turkus and Sid Feder, *Murder, Inc.: The Story of "The Syndicate"* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1951), pp. 78-87.

[24] See Blau, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[25] Claire Sterling, "Shots in Sicily, Echoes in Rome," *Reporter* (August 4, 1960), pp. 35-36. See Danilo Dolci, *Outlaws*, trans. R. Munroe (New York: Orion Press, 1961), p. 319.

[26] Hobsbawm, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

ed into the surrounding area. Affiliated chapters were established in Parco, San Giuseppe Iato, Santa Cristina, Montelepre, Borgetto, Piana dei Greci, and Misilmeri. A hierarchy of authority was created by the formal recognition of three ranked leadership roles rather than only one. The head of the whole organization was designated *capo,* but each area, including the various quarters of Monreale, was placed under the direct jurisdiction of a subhead or *sottocapo.* Each subhead in turn had an assistant, the *consiglio directtivo.* The rules of the association were made somewhat more explicit than those of other Mafias in providing for the convocation of membership councils to judge members charged with breaking the regulations of the group. And these regulations, completely traditional in character, were very precise, binding members:

1. To help one another and avenge every injury of a fellow member;
2. To work with all means for the defense and freeing of any fellow member who had fallen into the hands of the judiciary;
3. To divide the proceeds of thievery, robbery, and extortion with certain considerations for the needy as determined by the *capo;*
4. To keep the oath and maintain secrecy on pain of death within twenty-four hours.

Group intimacy among the *Stoppaglieri* appears to have been less than that of a smaller Mafia. The whole membership could not be easily convoked as they grew in size and territory. Patterns of universalism intruded upon those of particularism so that, according to some reports, a secret recognition sign was devised. On the whole, however, third-party introductions were more common than secret recognition signs.[27]

This, then, is what we know of one Mafia that bureaucratized to some extent at a relatively early date. Other and recent Mafias in Sicily display similar bureaucratization when they expand their operations.[28] Whatever the terminology—it tends to vary—these larger organizations are all characterized by an embryonic hierarchy of authority. They also continue a degree of impartiality and operate in terms of the traditional, explicitly elaborated, though unwritten rules. Specialization and departmentalization do not appear much developed. The problem of succession to authority continues to be troublesome. Journalists tend to designate one or another chief as the head for all of Sicily. A high command on this level does not seem to have developed beyond irregular councils of autonomous *capi.*

One may observe further bureaucratization of the Mafia in the United States. Mafias were first established in America in the latter part of the nineteenth century. During the prohibition era they proliferated and prospered. Throughout this period these groups continued to function essentially like the small traditional Mafia of western Sicily.

Recent decades in the United States have witnessed acceleration of all aspects of modernization. Here, if anywhere, the forces of urbanization impinge upon group life. But while American criminals have always been quick to capitalize upon technological advances, no significant organizational innovation occurred until the repeal of prohibition in 1932, an event that

[27] Cutrera, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–22, 132–41; Ed Reid, *Mafia* (New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1952), p. 100; Albert Falcionelli, *Les Sociétés secrètes italiennes* ("Bibliothèque historique" [Paris: Payot, 1936]), p. 208; "Mafia," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1951), XIV, 622; Hobsbawm, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42; Peter Maas, "Mafia: The Inside Story," *Saturday Evening Post* (August 10, 1963), p. 21.

[28] Cutrera, *op. cit.*, pp. 165–75; F. Lestingi, *La Fratellanza nella provincia di Girgenti* (Archivo di Psichiatria, Scienze penali ed antropologia criminale), V, No. iv; Salvo di Pietraganzili, *Rivoluzione siciliane dei 1848 a 1860* (Palermo: Bondi, 1898), II, 59. See Pasquale Villari, *Le lettere meridionali ed altri scritti sulla questione sociale in Italia* (2d ed.; Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1885), p. 28; Pitrè, *La famiglia, la casa, la vitadel popolo siciliano,* p. 292; Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 163; Vuillier, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

abruptly ended much of the lucrative business of the underworld. Small face-to-face associations gave way over subsequent decades to the formation of regional, national, and international combines, a change in which American *mafiosi* participated.[29]

As always, information is incomplete and conflicting. Bureaucratization, however, seems to have increased significantly beyond that even of bureaucratized Sicilian groups. Specialization, generally undeveloped in Sicily, became prominent. Personnel now regularly specialize as professional gunmen, runners, executives, or adepts in other particular operations. Departmentalization was introduced and now includes an organizational breakdown into subgroups such as narcotics operations; gambling; the rackets; prostitution; and an enforcement department, the infamous Murder, Inc., with its more recent descendants.[30]

The hierarchy of authority has developed beyond that of bureaucratized Sicilian Mafias. Bill Davidson describes a highly elaborated hierarchy of the Chicago Cosa Nostra, which he compares to the authority structure of a large business corporation. He points to the equivalent of a three-man board of directors, a president of the corporation, and four vice-presidents in charge of operations. He also notes a breakdown into three geographical areas, each headed by a district manager. District managers have executive assistants, who in turn have aids. Finally, at the lowest level are the so-called soldiers.[31] National councils of the more important *capi* apparently meet from time to time to set up territories, co-ordinate tangential activities, and adjudicate disputes. They serve to minimize internecine strife rather than to administer co-operative undertakings. The problem of succession has still not been solved. The Valachi hearings revealed an equally complex hierarchy for the state of New York.[32]

A written system of rules has not developed, although custom has changed. Modern *mafiosi* avoid the use of force as much as possible, and thus differ strikingly from old Sicilian practice. The old "*mustachios*" are being replaced by dapper gentlemen clothed in conservative business suits. But as a criminal organization, the Mafia cannot risk systematizing its rules in written statutes.

A major element of bureaucratization is the further development of impartiality. Mafiosi now freely collaborate on all levels with non-Sicilians and non-Italians. The Chicago association includes non-Italians from its "board of directors" down. In these relationships, consanguineous and affinal ties are normally absent and co-godparenthood absent or insignificant. Familistic organization, the structural characteristic that made for the combination of organizational flexibility with group stability in the traditional associations of Sicily—and that goes far to explain the success of Mafias there—apparently proved inadaptive in urban America. When it became desirable and necessary to collaborate with individuals of different criminal traditions, it sufficed to rely for group cohesion on the possibility of force and a business-like

[29] Walter C. Reckless, *Criminal Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940), p. 135; Donald R. Taft, *Criminology* (3d ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 233; Robert G. Caldwell, *Criminology* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1956), pp. 77–82, 86; *Life* (February 23, 1959), p. 19; Estes Kefauver, *Crime in America* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1951), p. 14; Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Private Government of Crime," *Reporter* (July 6, 1961), p. 15.

[30] Sidney Lens, "Labor Rackets, Inc.," *Nation* (March 2, 1957), pp. 179–83; Martin Mooney, *Crime Incorporated* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935), pp. 5–6; Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. 24–28.

[31] Bill Davidson, "How the Mob Controls Chicago," *Saturday Evening Post* (November 9, 1963), pp. 22–25.

[32] *Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics*, pp. 19–32.

awareness of the profits to be derived from co-operation.[33] Family and ritual ties still function among Sicilian-American criminals to foster co-operation and mutual support within cliques, but pragmatic considerations rather than familistic Mafia loyalties now largely determine organizational arrangements.[34]

CONCLUSION

The Mafia as a traditional type of formal organization has disappeared in America. Modern criminals refer to its successor as *Cosa Nostra*, "Our Thing." The Cosa Nostra is a lineal descendant of the Mafia, but it is a different kind of organization. Its goals are much broader as it exploits modern cities and an industrialized nation. The real and fictive kinship ties of the old Mafia still operate among fellow Sicilians and Italians, but these ties now coexist with bureaucratic ones. The Cosa Nostra operates above all in new and different terms. This new type of organization includes elaboration of the hierarchy of authority; the specialization and departmentalization of activities; new and more pragmatic, but still unwritten, rules; and a more developed impartiality. In America, the traditional Mafia has evolved into a relatively complex organization which perpetuates selected features of the older peasant organization but subordinates them to the requirements of a bureaucracy.

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[33] Lens, *loc. cit.*; Mooney, *op. cit.*; Barnes and Teeters, *op. cit.*; Paul W. Tappan, *Crime, Justice and Correction* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 232; Kefauver, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25 *et passim;* Turkus and Feder, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii–xiv, 6, 44, 85–87, 426, 431; Sondern, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–6; L. McLain, "Mafia: A Secret Empire of Evil," *Coronet* (November, 1958), pp. 60, 62. See Reckless, *op. cit.*; Sondern, *op. cit.*, p. 181; Joseph N. Bell, "Exploding the Mafia Myth," *Pageant* (May, 1960), p. 52.

[34] *Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics*, pp. 37–38, 43.

RESEARCH NOTES

Social Mobility in Italy[1]

In their comparative analysis of social-mobility patterns, Lipset and Bendix have pointed out that "the social mobility of societies becomes relatively high once their industrialization, and hence their economic expansion, reaches a certain level." This supports their hypothesis that "mobility patterns in Western industrialized societies are determined by the occupational structure"[2] rather than by political institutions, historical legacies, or other such variables. Specifically, they have found that "all the countries studied are characterized by a high degree of mobility. From one generation to another, a quarter to a third of the non-farm population moves from working class to middle class or vice versa."[3]

To this finding there has been one major exception, namely, Italy, where the over-all index of mobility was only 16 per cent, according to a 1949 study by the statistician Livi.[4] The Italian data have quite properly arrested the attention of students of social stratification. For, if it is true that, as Colin Clark has stated in a similar context, "Italy is [intrinsically] a society of much greater hereditary stratification than any of the other countries examined,"[5] Lipset and Bendix's hypothesis cannot be considered validated. There is also the likelihood that, when the Italian study was carried out, Italy had not yet reached that "certain level" of industrialization and economic expansion. Finally, there is the compelling fact that the data for Italy, as presented, are not sufficiently comparable to those for other countries. Livi's intention had not been to study social mobility in Italy, but "seulement de proposer une méthode" of statistically measuring such a phenomenon;[6] consequently, he paid little or no attention to the desideratum of comparability in arranging his occupational categories. Perhaps for this same reason he worked with a sample of 636, which is probably too small to be an adequate national sample. In any case, the 1951 Census data indicate that the occupational distribution of Livi's study is very considerably skewed.

Lipset and Bendix, therefore, were well advised to exclude Italy at the crucial point of their comparisons.[7] Just the same, however, Livi's study has been the only source of mobility data in Italy, and scholars often have had to accept them at their face value. Hence, in comparing Italy to a large number of other countries, Miller concludes that Italy is one of several cases which have

[1] The findings reported in this paper are from a survey supported by a Fulbright research grant to Italy and by the Social Science Research Council, both gratefully acknowledged. I wish also to acknowledge the generosity of my friend and expert counselor, Professor Pierpaolo Luzzatto-Fegiz, who, as director of DOXA, the research institute which conducted the survey, took a personal interest in the research project and inspired his assistants, Drs. Salomon and Fabris, to do likewise. Finally, I am grateful to J. David Colfax and to Janet E. Saltzman, who have critically read an earlier draft of this paper.

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 13, 73.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

[4] Livio Livi, "Sur le mesure de la mobilité sociale," *Population*, V (January-March, 1950), 65-76.

[5] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 554.

[6] Livi, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

[7] Lipset and Bendix, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

"distinctly lower rates of mobility than other nations for which data are available."[8]

The present paper briefly examines social mobility in Italy, presenting data with a view to achieving comparability with the major body of data discussed by Lipset and Bendix and with other, more detailed attempts at comparative analysis of social mobility.

METHODS

My data are from a national sample survey of 1,568 male family heads stratified according to age, occupation, region, size of community, and degree of rurality-urbanism of the community. The actual number of respondents presented in the analysis will, however, be somewhat smaller because of our decision to exclude all retired persons, the unemployed (students included), and all cases for which the occupation of both present and past generations is not known.

The interviewing took place between December 10, 1963, and January 15, 1964, and was carried out by DOXA (Institute for Statistical Research and Public Opinion Analysis), of Milan, which used 144 of its most experienced interviewers.

The occupations asked for by the interview schedule are "present" occupation for the son and "last held" occupation for the father. Several other procedures to ascertain the father's occupation had been tried in numerous pretests and had failed. Among these were his "principal" occupation, his occupation when he was about the same age as the interviewee at the present, and his occupation when the son was first employed. In the latter two cases, memory failure, lack of knowledge, and various other factors intervened to produce a very large percentage of "don't know" answers. The first technique was dropped for linguistic reasons. It was found that many respondents inquired about the meaning of the word "principal," and definitions offered to them in terms of prevalence, duration, and importance introduced vitiating dimensions into the question. Competent Italian scholars advised, however, that "last held" could be considered synonymous with "principal" occupation on the basis that there is little mobility in Italy beyond a certain age. Pretests fully corroborated this position. As it turned out, however, according to field reports, the vast majority of the sample interviewers found it convenient, and unequivocal, to ask merely for "your father's occupation."

FINDINGS

The basic table presented by Lipset and Bendix shows that only 8 per cent of the Italian sample is upwardly mobile, in comparison to a percentage of 45 for Switzerland, 39 for France, 36 for Japan, 33 for the United States, 31 for Sweden, 29 for Germany, 22 for Denmark, and 20 for Great Britain. The Italian downward-mobility index of 34 is quite comparable to the corresponding indexes for the other countries, but it is more than four times higher than the Italian upward-mobility index.[9]

Table 1 presents the intergenerational shifts between manual, non-manual, and farming occupations. The data show that 20 per cent of the subjects with fathers in manual occupations have achieved non-manual positions; conversely, 26 per cent of those with fathers in non-manual occupations have declined to manual positions. My findings, therefore, are quite different from those published by Livi and discussed in several contexts in recent years. Indeed, today indexes of both upward and downward mobility are fairly comparable to the corresponding indexes for the other countries compared by Lipset and Bendix. Assuming, as is reasonable, that more recent studies of mobility in these other countries

[8] S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility," *Current Sociology*, IX (1960), 31. More recently, the same point has crept into the most popular text of general sociology in the United States. See Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, *Sociology* (3d ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 211.

[9] Lipset and Bendix, *op. cit.*, p. 25, Table 2.1.

would show no substantial changes from the indexes considered here, these findings eliminate the major source of evidence possibly adverse to Lipset and Bendix's hypothesis.

In order to increase the usefulness of my data, I now reorganize them in a more particular classification that attempts to provide comparability to more detailed schemes of occupational mobility than the one used by Lipset and Bendix. Table 2 presents the sample of respondents and their fathers divided into seven occupational strata. The ranking of the strata was suggested by a comparative examination of these broad occupational categories based on such fundamental factors of stratification as income, prestige, power (declared), style of life, and education.[10] The following are some of the salient findings summarized by this table.

1. In every origin stratum, except the ruling class, the most common destination is the occupational stratum of the father. That is, more subjects remain occupationally stable than move to any one other stratum. The rate of occupational "transmission," however, goes from a high of 63 per cent for the proletariat to a low of 40 per cent for the ruling class and for the petite bourgeoisie. Intergenerational movement, therefore, is quite considerable.

2. Not infrequently, this movement is to non-adjacent strata.[11] This is particularly the case with the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and even more the subproletariat and farmhands, 39 and 34 per cent of whom, respectively, have moved to the proletariat, while relatively small percentages of them have moved to adjacent classes.

3. The occupational shifts have been most marked across three major occupational lines: (1) that separating political, managerial, and professional occupations

TABLE 1

INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN ITALY

Son's Occupation	Father's Occupation						Total (N)
	Non manual		Manual		Farm		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Non-manual .	147	70	104	20	48	8	299
Manual ...	54	26	398	76	235	39	687
Farm	8	4	24	5	320	53	352
Total ...	209	100	526	101*	603	100	1,338

* Details in this table and in the following one do not always add up to 100 per cent because of rounding.

[10] Information obtained in the interview on all these factors suggested that conventionally used occupational scales are, for Italy at least, grossly deficient. Such categories as "professional," "business," "white-collar," and "farmer" are particularly crude and too often bring together occupational types that are greatly heterogeneous in all relevant factors. The same can be said of such other frequently used expressions as "middle classes," "working classes," "lower classes," and agricultural workers." For an excellent critical discussion of occupational classifications, see Otis Dudley Duncan, "Properties and Characteristics of the Socioeconomic Index," *in* Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *et al.*, *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 139-61.

[11] This multiple-stratum movement closely resembles the situation in the United States according to the classification used by Jackson and Crockett. See Elton F. Jackson and Harry J. Crockett, Jr., "Occupational Mobility in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (February, 1964), 5-15.

from lower grades of the same; (2) that dividing unskilled occupations from skilled and semiskilled ones; and (3) that existing between farming occupations and other manual occupations.

4. Consistent with Livi's findings, the rate of exit from the ruling class, and therefore of elite circulation, is very high in Italy.[12]

5. Upward mobility from the bourgeoisie accounts for most of the movement into the ruling class, however, indicating in effect that elite recruitment is largely an upper-class phenomenon.

In conclusion, my findings on occupational mobility in Italy indicate that, when efforts are made to achieve methodological comparability especially if mobility is measured across multiple occupational categories, the rates of upward and downward mobility in Italy today are highly comparable to those found within the past two decades in various other industrialized countries. The findings update the frequently cited data of the earlier study by Livi and lend substantial support to Lipset and Bendix's hypothesis relating occupational mobility to level of industrialization.

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TABLE 2

MOBILITY IN ITALY

Son's Occupation*	Father's Occupation*														Total
	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII		
	N	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	*N*	%	
I. Ruling Class	16	40	12	10	4	2	2	1	3	1		..	...	...	37
II. Bourgeoisie	16	40	64	56	35	21	45	13	29	7	1	2	.	.	190
III. Petite Bourgeoisie	3	8	18	16	65	40	52	15	26	6	4	7	13	8	181
IV. Proletariat	4	10	18	16	51	31	224	63	110	25	24	39	54	34	485
V. Peasantry	1	2	3	3	5	3	11	3	202	45	1	2	7	4	230
VI. Subproletariat	..	....	....	.	2	1	17	5	30	7	26	43	18	11	93
VII. Farm Hands	.	....	. .	..	1	1	6	2	45	10	5	8	65	41	122
Total	40	100	115	101	163	99	357	102	445	101	61	101	157	98	1,338

* I, National political leaders; large-scale proprietors and entrepreneurs; high executives and government officials; professionals with a university degree. II, Medium proprietors and entrepreneurs; medium executives and government officials; professionals without a university degree. III, Small proprietors (except farm) and entrepreneurs; routine grades of non-manuals; artisans with dependent employees. IV, Artisans without dependent employees; skilled and semiskilled industrial workers; domestics and other service workers. V, Small farm owners and other agricultural workers, except farmhands VI, Manual laborers, street cleaners, etc.

[12] In comparing Livi's data to those from thirteen other countries, Miller finds that Italy has the highest rate of movement from the elites (*op. cit.*, p. 49, Table XIV).

Intra-Plant Mobility of Negro and White Workers[1]

INTRA-PLANT MOBILITY OF NEGRO AND WHITE WORKERS

A great deal has been written concerning the economic inequities that characterize the Negro worker in America.[2] Various measures have been taken in an effort to mitigate some of these disparities. It is assumed generally that the Negro industrial worker has derived certain equalizing benefits from union-instituted non-discriminatory clauses which define the contractual relationship between the worker and management. On the surface, this development would appear to foster the emergence of similar career patterns for comparably qualified representatives of the white and Negro races, as well as initial job assignments which are quite similar.

The major foci of inquiry in this research are: (1) to determine if there are major differences in the initial departmental job placements between white and Negro blue-collar workers and (2) to ascertain if there are important differences in the intra-plant mobility patterns between white and Negro blue-collar workers.

SAMPLE AND PROCEDURES

The sample for this investigation was composed of a group of Negro and white workers employed at a meat-packing plant in a midwestern city. The selection of this sample serves two methodological advantages. In contrast to most other industries, a large number of Negroes have been employed in meat-packing for over three decades.[3] Furthermore, all of the workers at the plant under study are protected by a union-guaranteed non-discriminatory clause which has been in existence for more than twenty years.[4]

A total of 1,594 workers comprise the blue-collar labor force at the plant. Through the use of a table of random numbers, 252 service records were examined.[5] The personnel files are maintained by the company and contain information regarding sex, age, and educational achievement, provided by the individual worker at the time of employment. In addition, each personnel record contains a detailed enumeration of all interdepartment transfers of the employee during his tenure of employment. Although racial description is not indicated on the service record, this information was provided by the personnel manager at the plant.

Of the 252 workers whose service records form the basis for this research, 182 are white and 70 are Negro. Pertinent information concerning personal characteristics of the sample subjects is indicated in Table 1. Table 1 demonstrates that the racial subsamples have very similar personal characteristics. The white workers show a slight mean age advantage (two and one-half years) and about fourteen years and four months' seniority as compared to an even fourteen years for the Negro workers. It is noteworthy that the mean educational attainment of both groups is identical, with each group having slightly more than one year of high-school training.

[1] We are grateful to Butler Horton, Institute of Social Research, Florida State University, for his computational assistance.

[2] For a recent book on this subject, see Paul H. Norgren and Samuel E. Hill, *Toward Fair Employment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

[3] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (20th anniversary ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 1122-24.

[4] Theodore V. Purcell, *The Worker Speaks His Mind on Company and Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953) p. 306.

[5] Female workers were excluded because of their limited number and the fact that hiring and mobility patterns vary between the two sexes.

Each of the workers in the sample performs blue-collar work in one of the fifty-eight departments within the packing plant. These departments vary in functional orientation along three rather clearly defined lines. Production departments deal directly with the processing and preparation of products, service departments provide facilities and services to the production departments and to personnel, and mechanical departments are concerned with the maintenance of plant facilities and equipment.

TABLE 1

SAMPLE POPULATION BY AGE, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, AND YEARS OF SERVICE ACCORDING TO RACE

Race	No.	Mean		
		Age	Educational Achievement	Years of Service
White.....	182	42.5	9.3	14 3
Negro.	70	40.0	9 3	14 0

FINDINGS

At the time of initial employment, about 3 out of 4 of the 252 workers (76 per cent) were assigned to production-oriented departments. When this group is analyzed as to racial composition, it is found that whereas 73 per cent of the white workers (133) were assigned initially to production jobs, over 84 per cent of the Negroes (59) were hired as production workers. Service-related departments received 53, or 21 per cent, of the new workers. There were nearly four times as many white as Negro employees hired originally as service laborers. Only 7 workers were admitted to plant employment in mechanical departments; none of these workers was Negro. These data are shown in Table 2.

A χ^2 test was employed to determine if there is a significant difference in the threefold divisional initial assignments of the workers according to race. A χ^2 of 4.73 with 3 d.f. indicates that significance at the .05 level of confidence is lacking.

Although hired to serve in specific departments within the three general functional divisions, workers are not restricted to these departments for the tenure of their employment. An analysis of the personnel records relative to the intra-plant mobility patterns indicates that of the 252 individuals composing the sample, 212 (84 per cent) experienced department changes during their period of employment.[6] When workers transfer from one functionally oriented department to another within the plant, nine different mobility patterns are possible. For example, a worker assigned to a production-related department can transfer to another production department, transfer to a service department, or transfer to a department that is mechanically related. Service department workers can transfer either to another service department or to production or mechanical departments. Workers in the mechanical departments may move to other mechanical departments, to service departments, or to production departments.

TABLE 2

SAMPLE POPULATION BY INITIAL DEPARTMENTAL PLACEMENT, ACCORDING TO RACE

Race	Departmental Functional Orientation			Total
	Production	Service	Mechanical	
White......	133	42	7	182
Negro.....	59	11	0	70

The greatest number of intra-plant mobile workers, a total of 146, moved between

[6] The other forty workers (twenty-five white and fifteen Negro) had not been transferred during their tenure of employment. Of this group, nine men had been employed with the company less than two years, six had worked between two and ten years, and twenty-five had seen service for more than ten years.

departments within the same functional classification: 124 workers transferred to other production departments, 19 to other service departments, and only 3 to other mechanical departments. Although most of the workers remained in departments having the same functional orientation as their initial jobs, intra-functional department transfers were incurred by 66 workers, of whom 17 transferred to production jobs, 22 to service, and 27 to positions of a mechanical nature. Sixty-one of these workers were white; only 5 were Negroes.

Of the sixty-one intra-plant mobile white workers, thirteen moved from either service or mechanically classified jobs to production departments, twenty-one transferred to service departments, and twenty-seven moved to mechanical departments. Four of the five Negro workers transferred from service-related departments to production departments, while one transferred from production to service. No Negro experienced mobility to a mechanically related department.

A summary of the direction of mobility of the 212 mobile workers is presented in Table 3. A χ^2 analysis is derived to determine if a significant difference prevails in the mobility patterns of the two racial groups. The difference between the twofold racial distribution of mobile workers is significant at the .01 per cent level of confidence. That is, Negro workers tend to remain in or transfer to production departments more frequently than expected, while mobility to service and mechanical departments is less than expected. In contrast, white workers tend to remain in or move to mechanical-oriented work positions more frequently than expected and move to production and service departments less than expected.

In a previous study a sample of workers[7] perceived a hierarchy among a selected group of departments in the meat plant under examination.[8] Table 4 is constructed to express quantitatively the mean evaluations received by each of the departments categorized as to functional orientation (mechanical, service, and production). The mean scores for the workers' evaluations

TABLE 3

INTRA PLANT MOBILITY PATTERNS OF 212 WORKERS, ACCORDING TO RACE AND DIRECTION OF MOBILITY

Direction of Mobility	Race		Total
	White	Negro	
To production	88	53	141
To service	39	2	41
To mechanical	30	0	30

TABLE 4

EVALUATIONS BY THIRTY WORKERS OF TWENTY DEPARTMENTS CATEGORIZED AS TO FUNCTIONAL ORIENTATION

Functional Orientation	Departmental Characteristics					Mean Score
	Desirability of Jobs	Pay	Fellow Workers	Working Conditions	Supervision	
Mechanical	3.62	4.14	3.62	2.98	3.02	3.48
Service	2.78	2.85	3.15	2.72	2.92	2.88
Production	2.61	2.98	2.99	2.43	2.86	2.77

[7] With the exception of twenty-six women who were excluded from consideration in the present report, the data of the previous and present studies were collected from the same sample population.

[8] See our "Intra-Plant Mobility: Volitional versus Non-Volitional," *Sociological Inquiry*, XXXIII (Spring, 1963), 197-206.

of the departments in terms of five departmental characteristics indicate that departmental jobs involving mechanical work are viewed more favorably than either service or production-oriented occupations, and service jobs tend to be judged more highly than production jobs. With the exception that service departments were judged to receive less pay than production departments, this hierarchy pattern prevailed for each of the other four specific characteristics.

The findings discussed above reveal major differences in the intra-plant mobility patterns of white and Negro blue-collar workers studied in this research. Furthermore, there is some indication that a proportionately larger group of Negroes than whites remain in or move to jobs that are inferior. The fact that members of the two racial categories are very similar in mean age, seniority, and length of time employed at the plant seems to imply that the differential mobility patterns may be attributed to discriminatory practices or to unmeasured variables that distinguish Negro and white workers. Additional support for this thesis can be realized if it is demonstrated that the mobility differences persist when each of the three factors just mentioned is controlled. The subsequently reported findings relating to this matter are limited to Negro-white comparisons of upwardly mobile and non-upwardly mobile personnel. An individual is defined as upwardly mobile when a comparison between his initial job and current job reveals he has moved from a production department to a service or mechanical department, or from a service department to a mechanical department. An individual is defined as non-upwardly mobile when he has not moved to another department with a different functional orientation, or has moved from a mechanical department to a service or production department or from a service department to a production department. Of the 182 white workers in the sample, 45 are upwardly mobile and 137 are non-upwardly mobile. Among the 70 Negroes, only one is upwardly mobile in contrast to 69 non-upwardly mobile Negroes. These data suggest striking differences between Negro and white mobility patterns. However, a more precise examination was made to establish if the Negro-white differences persist when each of the three other factors is controlled, one at a time. A series of null hypotheses which state there are no Negro-white differences with respect to upwardly mobile and non-upwardly mobile patterns, when controls are made for age, educational achievement, and years of service, were tested. The various tests for differences between proportions result in Z-values that are much greater than the 1.645 required for rejection of the null hypotheses. It is concluded that when controls are maintained for age, educational achievement, and years of service, a significantly greater proportion of the whites are upwardly mobile and a greater proportion of the Negroes are non-upwardly mobile.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This investigation demonstrated that there was no significant difference, although there were certain percentage differences, in the initial departmental job placements of white and Negro blue-collar workers employed at a midwestern meat-packing plant. There was, however, a significant difference between Negro and white intraplant mobility patterns. That is, a disproportionate share of seventy Negro workers tended to remain in or experience mobility to production-oriented departments more frequently than was the case with the 182 white laborers. In contrast, transfers to service and mechanical-oriented departments were experienced less by Negroes than by the white laborers.

Relating the findings derived in an earlier study with those ascertained in this endeavor, the Negro group not only was disproportionately distributed in comparison to the white group but the jobs they

pursued tended to be somewhat inferior in such characteristics as pay, working conditions, general desirability, etc. This is not a surprising discovery. However, more meaning can be ascribed to this finding when two other matters are reconsidered.

It should be recalled that, in general, the Negro and white workers were similar as to age, years of job seniority, and educational achievement. In order to substantiate that the difference in Negro-white intra-plant mobility patterns cannot be explained by differences in these three factors, a comparison was made between those employees who were upwardly mobile and non-upwardly mobile, according to the two races, controlling for the three factors. The conclusive findings were that a significantly larger proportion of whites are upwardly mobile and a significantly larger proportion of Negroes are non-upwardly mobile and that none of the three factors destroys these relationships.

Although the Negroes *may differ* from the whites in such dimensions as motivations, ambitions, and other personality characteristics, it appears warranted to infer that the dissimilarities in intra-plant mobility patterns are probably the products of discriminatory transfer policies. In addition, the effectiveness of union-sponsored non-discriminatory clauses in lessening the disparities of economic opportunities for the Negro career in the plant studied must be questioned. The findings of this research seem to indicate that the non-discriminatory clause is another example of a "democratic artifact" which is in conflict with what transpires in reality. More studies are needed to determine if this condition prevails in other plants and industries.

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Innovation and Constancy in the Church-Sect Typology[1]

Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest among sociologists in the study of social change.[2] A major yet ancient idea emerging from various studies is that constancy and change are actually concurrent phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to examine in an exploratory fashion the implications for both phenomena that may be found in the church-sect typology. Our discussion is based on a more extensive study in which the typology was quantified and several other relevant areas subsequently explored.[3]

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

After surveying earlier attempts to define and/or describe the church-sect typology, Johnson concludes that these efforts are both logically and empirically inadequate.[4] Thereupon, he defines a church as "a religious group that accepts the social environment in which it exists. A sect is a religious group that rejects the social environment in which it exists."[5] The social milieu is defined as the dominant beliefs and social patterns of the society in which the religious group is located. In our attempts at quantification, we did not seek to measure any religious group per se. Instead, a purposive sample was drawn of forty-five married clergymen representing almost every Protestant denomination in a census-defined "standard metropolitan area." For varied reasons (inability to make contact, refusal, etc.) it was impossible to interview both partners in fourteen of these marriages. Thus the sample was reduced to thirty-one couples.

These clergymen were rated in terms of their *acceptance* or *rejection* of the milieu. This was accomplished by construction of a property space of four dimensions that in the literature have been considered classical indicators of church or sect posture.[6] These were theological position, conception of the legitimate membership of the religious organization, attitudes toward social patterns, and orientations toward science. Each dimension contained two categories: "accept" or "reject." Certain assumptions were made as to the prevailing beliefs in terms of each dimension. For example, the dominant theological climate is liberal or neo-orthodox, and those subjects who identified themselves as such were classified as *accepting* the milieu. Those who identified themselves otherwise (fundamentalist, etc.) were classified as rejecting the

[1] This paper is one report of an investigation supported by Public Health Service fellowship 1-F1-MH-19,833,01A1 from the National Institutes of Mental Health. Grateful acknowledgement is made to Professor Benton Johnson of the University of Oregon for his suggestions and criticisms of earlier versions of this manuscript.

[2] E.g., the *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June, 1964), presents five articles on the subject. Recent books include Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), and George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, *Explorations in Social Change* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1964).

[3] See my "Resolution of Role Incompatibility in Church and Sect Clergy Marriage" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon, 1964); also "A Note on Method for the Church-Sect Typology," *Sociological Analysis* (in press).

[4] Benton Johnson, "On Church and Sect," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (August, 1963), 539–49.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 542.

[6] See Matilda White Riley, *Sociological Research* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), I, 342 ff., for the uses of property space with typologies such as church-sect. It will be noted that these dimensions take into account aspects of both culture and social organization. See N. J. Demerath III, *Social Class in American Protestantism* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), chap. iii, for an expanded discussion of both aspects.

milieu. Likewise, those who held an inclusivist view of church membership, who did not believe that certain widely practiced social patterns were inherently dangerous, and who saw no genuine conflict between science and religion were also classed as "accepting" or church type. Those who, in addition to fundamentalist doctrine, held an exclusivist view of the church, who felt that certain social patterns were inherently wrong, and who believed that science and religion were in conflict were classified as "rejecting" the milieu or as sect type.

Perfect consistency was observed among thirteen respondents who accepted the milieu on all four dimensions and among sixteen respondents who rejected the milieu on all dimensions. Two respondents who rejected on the first two dimensions cited above and were neutral on the last two were classified as sect type. After extensive validation of the categorization scheme, it was considered to be adequate. Each wife was placed in the same category as her husband on the assumption that wives of ministers would not be likely to differ from husbands in this regard. Thus, our sample consisted of twenty-six church-type and thirty-six sect-type respondents.[7] Data were collected by means of one-hour interviews conducted separately with each minister and his wife. Having briefly summarized the means of dichotomizing the sample, let us proceed to the main body of this discussion.

ORIENTATIONS TOWARD TRADITIONALISM

It is generally held that when a group or an individual conforms to certain social elements, there are usually certain other elements that cannot be retained simultaneously. Likewise, to deviate from certain social elements implies that other elements must be found to structure behavior. If we let A be the current milieu, then A' can be values and norms that were institutionalized at an earlier time. Let us call A' "traditional orientations."

When members of the church body *accept* the prevailing culture, they must *reject* certain traditional orientations both in the external environment and within the religious system itself.[8] However, a complex society is not static, but undergoes continual change.[9] It follows that if the church-type group is to "accept" modern society, it must continually alter its internal structure and keep on sloughing off traditional elements to keep pace with changes in the external environment. Thus, when we say that the church body "accepts" the milieu, we mean that this is *both* an event and a process, or else it must cease to be either.

In contrast, when members of a sect group *reject* the social milieu, they are forced into continued *acceptance* of religious traditionalism. For them, rejection becomes a *process* of reaffirming the "rightness" of traditional orientations and asserting the "wrongness" of current orientations.[10]

[7] In a validity check similar to one used by Dynes, respondents classified as church type were located in Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational groups. Those classified as sect type were located in various Baptist bodies, and in the Assemblies of God, Church of God, Church of the Nazarene, Church of Christ, Foursquare Church. See Russell R. Dynes, "Church-Sect Typology and Socio-Economic Status," *American Sociological Review*, XX (October, 1955), 555-60.

[8] A careful examination of Johnson's essay (*op cit.*, pp. 546 ff.) reveals that these points are implicit in his arguments. It is our purpose here to elaborate them and to show their consequences for either normative change or constancy.

[9] Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-21. This does not necessarily challenge Parsons' assertion that American values have not changed. (See *American Journal of Sociology*, LXX [November, 1964], 374, for Parsons' most recent claim in this regard.) However, Parsons is dealing at a very high level of generality and degree of abstraction. Moore and others have made a strong case for changes in less abstract values, and certainly change has occurred at the level of norms and behaviors.

[10] A parallel may be noted in the 1964 national elections. The Republican party was controlled by an essentially *traditionally* oriented faction. By rejecting what appear to be the prevailing political sentiments of the day, its platform and candidate maintained no viable relations with society. The

Our data permit a limited test of these divergent orientations toward traditionalism. The tables below deal with the positions and roles of the minister and minister's wife. The data tend to show that church-type respondents reject traditional definitions of these roles in favor of definitions drawn from the dominant milieu.[11] Conversely, sect-type respondents tend to accept traditional definitions of these very same roles. The use of clergymen and their wives is theoretically significant because we are dealing with *group leaders*. If new norms are to be institutionalized or old ones reaffirmed, it is they who must play a large part in both processes.

TABLE 1

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND EVALUATION OF POSITION OF MINISTER'S WIFE*

EVALUATION OF POSITION	RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION	
	Sect	Church
Satisfied or dissatisfied. . .	36	9
"Not a minister's wife at all" (volunteered).	. . . .	17
Total.	36	26
	$\phi=0.72$	

* Question asked. "All things considered, how satisfied is your wife (are you) with being a minister's wife: very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?"

A traditional orientation of American religious groups has been that the wife of a pastor must be the incumbent of a structural position within the religious organization. This is the position of *minister's wife* and is ascribed to her on a particularistic basis, that is, simply because she is his wife. Behaviors encompassed in this role are very similar and sometimes identical to occupational behaviors for which her husband is paid. Though she is *not* paid, she is expected to function as his "third arm" or "assistant pastor."[12] When one considers the social milieu of business, industry, or the professions, there are few if any occupations in which the worker's wife is forced into a comparable situation.[13] Table 1 suggests that the idea of an imposed occupational position is anachronistic to church-type subjects. Conversely, sect-type respondents continue to hold to this traditional orientation. The bottom row of Table 1, "not a minister's wife at all," was not originally in the item which was designed to tap perceived role satisfaction. It was spontaneously supplied by two-thirds of the church-type respondents. When asked about this comment, they consistently replied that the wife is married to John Doe, not to his occupation. His job is only incidental to whatever occupational behaviors the wife may pursue. No sect-type subject supplied these kinds of statements. Thus, by accepting wider culture norms about wife's occupation, church

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conduct of the campaign was directed in terms of an earlier era and seemed totally divorced from the changes that have taken and are taking place in the current milieu. It is no random occurrence that sectarian religion and right-wing politics appear to be related. See Benton Johnson, "Ascetic Protestantism and Political Preference in the Deep South," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIX (January, 1964), 359–66.

[11] Robert P. Rankin ("The Ministerial Calling and the Minister's Wife," *Pastoral Psychology*, XI [September, 1960], 16–22) says that "the impact of middle class values, many of which are non-sacred, is felt even in the life of the parsonage . . . this is not to be deplored."

[12] Wallace Denton, *The Role of the Minister's Wife* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), pp. 26–44.

[13] Whyte has shown that professional wives have certain functions of an expressive sort which are important to their husbands' careers. However, it seems clear that wives are not expected to engage in instrumental activities that bear directly upon the interaction of husbands with business clientele. See William Whyte, Jr., "The Corporation and the Wife," *Fortune*, XLIV (November, 1951), 109–11; and "The Wives of Management," *Fortune*, XLIV (October, 1951), 86 ff. The rejection of compulsory instrumental occupational activities by the wives of current church-type ministers is reported in popular form in "I Want to be the Wife of a Minister, Not the Minister's Wife," *Together*, VIII (July, 1964), 25–28.

subjects *reject* traditional religious norms. Likewise, sect respondents who reject this current viewpoint must look to traditional norms to structure these kinds of behaviors.[14]

Traditionally, the religious group has also held that the position of minister is *qualitatively* different, of a higher moral essence, inherently set apart from any other vocation. In terms of the Davis-Moore approach, religious groups have considered the ministry to have *the greatest functional importance possible* for society.[15] However, the current secular milieu is not likely to recognize the ministry as an occupation of such great functional import or even moral superiority. The data of Table 2 reveal that most church-type respondents accept the milieu on this point and reject the strongly institutionalized traditional view of the ministry. Likewise, sect-type subjects, in rejecting this aspect of the social environment, have no alternative but to accept the traditional view that the ministry is a "special" type of vocation possessing greater functional importance than any other occupation.

Max Weber defined "virtuoso"-type expectations as being applied to those who are "differently qualified in a religious way . . . who possess sacred values which could not be attained by everyone . . . who must prove themselves by the ethical quality of their conduct in the world.[16] If the positions of minister and minister's wife are held to be different and superior, it follows that incumbents of these positions should be expected to *behave* in a "superior" fashion. This has indeed been a historic and strongly held view in traditional religion. With regard to American Protestantism, it has meant that the minister and his wife can never become "one of the boys" or "one of the girls." On most occasions, to "let their hair down" was scandalous. Their children were expected to be "paragons of virtue." Such things as dress, personal behavior, speech, leisure activities, and so on, were subject to the greatest scrutiny by the congregation. Negative sanctions were applied if virtuoso expectations were not fulfilled.

We assume that church respondents accept middle-class standards of personal behavior and "respectability," and we note in Table 3 that they reject the concept of

TABLE 2

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND CONCEPTION OF THE POSITION OF MINISTER*

Conception of Position	Religious Orientation	
	Sect	Church
Unique calling . . .	13	2
Like any other profession (or both equally)	5	11
Total (husbands only) .	18	13
	$\phi=0.56$	

* Question asked: "There has been some debate recently over whether the ministry is a 'calling' or a 'profession.' Do you feel the ministry is a calling, a profession, or both equally?"

TABLE 3

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND BELIEF THAT VIRTUOSO EXPECTATIONS ARE LEGITIMATE*

Legitimacy of Expectations	Religious Orientation	
	Sect	Church
Yes . . .	35	1
No . . .	1	25
Total . .	36	26
	$\phi=0.93$	

* Question asked: "Do you think you and your family should maintain a higher standard of conduct than your (husband's) congregation?"

[14] The interested reader is referred to my dissertation, *op. cit.*, for more extensive data, both normative and behavioral, which supplement the few brief tables presented in this report.

[15] Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, X (April, 1945), 242–49.

[16] Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 288–91.

traditional virtuoso or "meta-middle-class" behavior. However, sect-type husbands and wives reject the belief that middle-class standards are sufficient kinds of norms to order personal behavior and tend to conform to traditional virtuoso expectations.

Lenski, drawing on Weber, has made the point that traditional religion has tended to disvalue kinship ties because they are thought to compete with religious obligations.[17] Simmel has suggested that this is particularly true of the clergyman and notes that the mechanism of celibacy serves to remove this conflict among Catholic priests.[18] Ascetic Protestant groups, because of their emphasis on work as a sign of moral worthiness, have tended to be suspicious of leisure and, hence, of family companionship behaviors since these occupy leisure time. This is particularly true as applied to the minister, since time given to family companionship behaviors might be better spent in the work behaviors which are considered so functionally important.

TABLE 4

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND BELIEF THAT MINISTER'S WORK IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN HIS FAMILY*

Legitimacy of Belief	Religious Orientation	
	Sect	Church
Yes	32	5
No	4	21
Total	36	26
	$\phi = 0.70$	

* Question asked: "It is sometimes said, because of Jesus' words that a man should 'forsake wife and children,' that a minister should put his pastoral work ahead of his family. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?"

However, the general middle-class notion of familial-occupational relations is not one of tension or conflict but of complementarity. There is no attempt to define *either* one or the other hierarchically as being necessarily of greater significance.[19] Table 4 shows that church-type respondents accept this prevailing view and in so doing reject the traditional devaluation of the family and of primary and companionate behaviors. By rejecting this belief of equality between the two areas, sect respondents adhere to traditional religious disvaluation of kinship roles in general, and companionship behaviors in particular.

TABLE 5

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND RESPONSE OF MINISTER TO REQUEST FOR COUNSELING AT INCONVENIENT TIME*

Response of Minister	Religious Orientation	
	Sect	Church
See person immediately	32	1
Make appointment	2	18
Decision depends on urgency	2	7
Total	36	26
	$C = 0.64$	

* Question asked: "Let us imagine a situation in which you are (your husband is) spending an evening or afternoon at home with your family on your (his) scheduled day off. Everyone in the congregation knows this is the day off, yet you(he) receive(s) a phone call from a person who wishes you (him) to come immediately in order to discuss a religious matter. What would you (your husband) do: go at once to this person; explain the family situation and make an appointment?"

It may seem strange to argue that the same religious groups that hold such high moral and functional estimations of the clergyman have also traditionally consid-

[17] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), p. 246.

[18] Georg Simmel, *Conflict* (and) *The Web of Group-Affiliations*, trans. Kurt Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), pp. 143–46.

[19] If anything, as Berger suggests, the middle class is placing greater emphasis on the "intrinsic worth" of leisure than on work. It is to leisure, he argues, that many people now turn for "values and identity" (Bennet M. Berger, "The Sociology of Leisure: Some Suggestions," *Industrial Relations*, II [February, 1962], pp. 31–45).

ered him at worst their "captive" or at best their "employee." This seeming anomaly is probably due to elements of charismatic leadership mixed with routinized authority. Even though some charisma is still thought to reside in the position of clergyman, he is also paid by his parishioners. As their employee, he has been expected to fulfil any and all of the work expectations they hold for him, in the same mode as they fulfil work expectations held for them. Since there has been and remains a relationship between traditional religion and lower occupational rank, it becomes clear why these groups hold this "employee" concept of their clergy.[20] Since this is the only concept of work with which they are genuinely familiar, it seems doubtful that they understand the attitudes and behaviors of the professional.

The contemporary professional in the current milieu does not consider himself an "employee," even if he happens to work for a formal organization. He prefers to retain a great deal of autonomy over his work behaviors and discretion over the use of his time. The concept that he is "coerced" by superiors into certain kinds of work behaviors is repugnant to him. When respondents were asked what they would do if called on at a very inconvenient time to offer immediate religious counsel, church subjects revealed that they accept the orientations of the current professional. They would, in most cases, either make an appointment to see the caller or perhaps determine the actual urgency of the request. Sect-type respondents report that they would respond immediately to the request; their rejection of the social environment seems to force them into acceptance of the traditional role of "employee."

[20] See Glenn M. Vernon, *The Sociology of Religion* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), pp. 181 ff., for a discussion of the differential amounts of structural power available to church-type vis-à-vis sect-type clergy. Since those in the latter category tend to possess less power, they are forced to be more subordinate to their laymen.

DISCUSSION

These data provide a *tentative* verification of the divergent postures toward traditional orientations which are inherent in either a church or sect position. In order to *accept* the current social milieu, it is necessary to *reject* traditional cultural and social elements because of extensive change in this milieu. The reverse is also true.

However, there is no "group mind" which suddenly orders a religious group to "accept" the milieu where once it may have rejected it. Rather, there exists a *process* of social change in which traditional values and norms are gradually replaced by current orientations. We suggested earlier that church-type clergymen and wives play a part in this normative change; and on the basis of the above data, we wish to make this explicit as a proposition in need of further testing. For example, Eisenstadt argues that innovating leaders are a necessary element to bring about change within a group.[21] "The crucial problem is the presence or absence . . . of an active group of special 'entrepreneurs,' or an elite able to offer solutions to the new range of problems."[22] This description fits precisely the behavior of the church-type clergyman and his wife.

Because of limits of space, data are omitted which show that church-type respondents perceive their congregations to be less "accepting" of the milieu and more traditionally oriented than they themselves are. Sect-type subjects perceive no discrepancy between themselves and their congregations; both they and their laity are strongly traditionally oriented. However, those groups which had church-type leaders accepted the milieu and rejected traditionalism *to a greater extent* than did those groups with sect-type leaders.[23] These

[21] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June, 1964), 384 85.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 384.

[23] See my dissertation, *op. cit.*, for further discussion of this point. For example, only 50 per cent of

comparisons imply that church-type leaders actively seek to institutionalize new norms within the groups they lead. Although these groups may contain many traditional elements, the "elite leaders" perceive that changes are in order if the group is to adapt ever more meaningfully to its milieu. For example, "We are seeking to educate our people out of older and erroneous ideas" was a spontaneous statement made repeatedly by church-type respondents during the interviews.

There are other data that indicate that church-type clergy are "innovating elites." For example, they tend to be more liberal than their parishioners on political, social, and economic issues.[24] What is more, they tend to resocialize normally Republican and conservative laity into more liberal political views.[25] The National Council of Churches, for instance, is a federation of church-type groups boycotted by sect bodies. This federation has consistently made liberal pronouncements on areas such as race relations, the welfare state, unions, and so on. Yet it is under constant attack not only by sect groups but also by conservative church-type laity.[26] Despite this severe criticism, the clergy-controlled NCC continues its support of liberal innovations, with little fear of effective negative sanctions.

In terms of theology, the same pattern emerges. Within the regional conference of a denomination classed as church-type, 78 per cent of the ministers identified themselves as liberal or neo-orthodox; yet they consider only 40 per cent of their total congregations to be in the same category. Within the conference of a sect-type group in the same region, all ministers and all congregations were identified as fundamentalist in theology.[27] Sect-type clergy oppose most vigorously all changes in these orientations. Yet church-type clergy have already succeeded in changing the orientations of 40 per cent of their congregations and will probably increase this proportion in the future.

Three questions deserve brief attention. First, what of the literature that seems to indicate that it is the sect group that is dissatisfied and disgruntled and hence agitates for change?[28] It must be remembered that the above discussion is in terms of a modern, industrial society in which the religious system is not in control. In a society less than fully industrialized, the religious system may possess a great deal of power. It may be deeply entrenched within the status quo and interested in its preservation. Therefore, when the religious group "accepts" this kind of society, the relationship that emerges is essentially a static one.

At the same time, there may be a sect enclave that charges that the established church has become "lax" and corrupt." As a result, it seeks change—but the direction

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church-type respondents perceived their congregations to hold virtuoso expectations for the minister and his wife. Better than 90 per cent of sect-type subjects perceived such expectations by their congregations. It is significant that the data Demerath used for his study were taken from groups affiliated with the National Council of Churches. Although this federation consists almost entirely of church-type groups, Demerath still found a high incidence of sect orientations within these groups (*op. cit.*, pp. xix–xxvi). The question arises as to whether, over time, the leadership of these groups will be able to reduce the proportion of these types of orientations.

[24] Charles Y. Glock and Benjamin Ringer, "Church Policy and the Attitudes of Ministers on Social Issues," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (April, 1956), pp. 148–56.

[25] Johnson, "Ascetic Protestantism and Political Preference in the Deep South," *op. cit.*

[26] E.g., see editorial, "Why is NCC Prestige Sagging?" *Christianity Today*, III (February 2, 1959), 5–8, in which liberal statements are equated with "lack of democracy" and in which a "laymen's revolt" is encouraged among the NCC.

[27] Unpublished data collected by Benton Johnson in 1962. The *N* for the church group is 119; for the sect group it is 170.

[28] Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

of change is always "back to original purity." There is no thought of seeking to institutionalize totally new norms within the religious system. In comparison to the church group that "accepts" a relatively static situation, the sect group is *conspicuous* in that it seeks any normative alteraation at all. Yet in spite of the fact that sectarian changes are oriented toward tradition and the past, unintended and new innovations may result. As Weber observed, the Protestant reformers never dreamed that their sectarian religious ideas would affect, as they did, the political and economic history of the world. Nonetheless, in a modern society, it is church-type leaders who stand out in their attempts to institutionalize *new patterns*.[29]

A second question pertains to the widely observed change from sect to church which Niebuhr argued is inevitable.[30] Wilson has modified Niebuhr by suggesting that sects of the "conversionist" type, that is, those that actively seek converts and that lack insulating mechanisms, tend to become church type more rapidly than other kinds of sects.[31] It seems possible to modify Niebuhr still further by suggesting that the movement from sect to church is related to the presence of "innovating elites" within the sect group. It may be that these individuals perceive that continued rejecttion of the milieu and refusal to adapt to external conditions could ultimately endanger the very existence of the group. To prevent the disengagement of the sect group from society from becoming too great, these leaders gradually begin to incorporate the behaviors of church-type leaders into their behavior and their own groups. Thus begins the *process* of "accepting" the milieu. After several generations, the former sect body is now the "proper" church group, containing within itself dissident elements seeking to move "back to original purity."

Finally, there is the issue of the structural conditions under which innovating elites emerge. Eisenstadt remarks that we know practically nothing of these conditions, but he does suggest that educational centers may play a role in their development.[32] Historically, certain "prestige" seminaries in the United States have played a major part in recruiting men with traditional orientations and resocializing them in the church-type direction. These men return to local congregations and begin to play the role of "innovating elite." Significantly, our investigation indicated that sect group leaders who tended to lean toward a church-type position in certain areas had been trained at seminaries that were considerably less than traditional in their outlook.

JOHN SCANZONI

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[29] Johnson ("Ascetic Protestantism and Political Preference in the Deep South," *op. cit.*) shows that sect groups do tend to socialize *individual members* into a conservative political orientation. At the level of individual analysis, this represents normative alteration, but the sect group itself remains the same. What is more, since the alteration is in terms of a political outlook that was dominant in an earlier era, it is alteration in a *traditional* direction. The more lower-status people the sect group can convince to join its ranks, the more are traditional orientations reaffirmed and the greater is the resistance toward acceptance of the milieu. Most sect groups strongly supported the 1964 Republican presidential candidate for the precise reason that he advocated *a return to traditional* political and social orientations within the larger society. If sect leaders seek social change at all (they are much more concerned with individual change), it is of a sort they are unable to bring about, namely, change within the larger society to bring it into conformity with the sect group. Given the impossibility of this ideal, the sect minister must be content with preserving traditionalism in his own enclave against the onslaughts of the society.

[30] H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York: Holt & Company, 1929), p. 19.

[31] Bryan R. Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (February, 1959), 3-15.

[32] Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Gendell, *Swedish Working Wives*

April 29, 1965

To the Editor:

Alice Rossi's review of my book *Swedish Working Wives* (March, 1965) is more wrathful than right.

1. She claims I repeatedly warn that my "analysis is often little more than 'tangential and inconclusive,' 'illustrative rather than demonstrative.'" On page 123 I say that the analysis "can, at times, be little more than tangential and inconclusive." "At times" is hardly "often." Similarly, *only* in discussing the methodological problems involved in testing an hypothesis of Parsons do I say that "the analysis has more illustrative than substantive value" (p. 226).

Dr. Rossi says: "The analysis of the 'wives' situation,' and of the bearing of household facilities and domestic obligations upon their employment, rests upon an item-by-item analysis of contrasts between full-time, part-time, and non-working wives in proportions owning a sewing machine, a vacuum cleaner, and a refrigerator." Of the twenty-four pages in chapter vi, called "Wives' Situation," *only four* discuss ownership of the specified equipment.

Dr. Rossi quotes me correctly that the data available on motherhood and motivation for employment were limiting, but she says nothing about the analysis the data did permit. Since Sweden's birth rate is among the lowest in the world, and wives have been increasingly entering the labor force, it is important to examine the association between employment and fertility. This I was able to do, concluding that outside employment and motherhood, under prevailing conditions, whereby mothers have almost sole responsibility for housekeeping and child care, are regarded by women as largely incompatible.

The data also permitted me to conclude, despite frequent claims to the contrary, that financial need was not a major motive for working among Swedish wives in the mid-1950's. (Dr. Rossi seems unaware that a *direct* correlation between proportion of wives employed and husbands' income is unusual.) On both points Dr. Rossi's account is misleading in that, for all the reader can learn from her, I had no data permitting useful analyses bearing on important issues.

2. She says: "The limitations of the data and the sample are in no sense compensated for by the author's treatment of these data." Her evidence? There was no table showing the occupations of the employed wives, and occupation was not used as a control in the analysis. On balance, I plead guilty to the first charge. As to the second, with a small sample it is not feasible to use controls incapable of being dichotomized or trichotomized. It seemed to me, and still does, that occupation cannot be reduced meaningfully to two or three, or even four, classes. When it is so reduced, one obtains the socioeconomic-status classification I used as a control.

Moreover, Dr. Rossi reasons strangely when, after saying she was able to infer that "very few of the working wives were in technical or professional fields," she says two sentences later that "it would have been of far greater interest to American readers" if I had compared these very few Swedish wives to their American counterparts.

3. Dr. Rossi regretfully concludes that I did not write "a volume on Swedish

working wives based on all published studies on the topic, subordinating [my] own weak data to a minor illustrative role." She is here shooting in the dark. There have been few such studies, and these have been well reviewed by the leading authority on the subject, Edmund Dahlström of Gothenburg University. The survey data I used, which Dr. Rossi finds so inadequate, provided many opportunities otherwise unavailable. My examinations of the relationship between women's employment and their political and religious behavior, for example, is the first with Swedish data and may be the only such effort anywhere.

MURRAY GENDELL

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Reply

To the Editor:

The petulant tone of Dr. Gendell's response to my review of *Swedish Working Wives* suggests a rather shaky basis for accusations of "strange reasoning." Little purpose is served by a detailed point-by-point rejoinder to his objections, yet there is no alternative if one is to stay with the specifics of the case.

1. Dr. Gendell takes me to task for pointing out that he himself often warns the reader that his data are not adequate to the task of dealing with many important issues concerning working wives. "At times" is admittedly not "often," but my notes on his book include many more than the two qualifications he admits to in his letter and the four I cite in the review.

The general point I was trying to convey by illustrative means was that this is a very disappointing book. Even the conclusion he refers to in his letter, to the effect that "outside employment and motherhood are regarded by women as largely incompatible," is far from firmly established. The reader must remind himself, since Gendell does not, that these working wives are working at quite low occupational levels and have very low educational attainment and that, even in this sample, only 23 per cent of the full-time and 15 per cent of the part-time working wives thought it difficult to combine work and home (pp. 103-4).

2. I said nothing in my review about the relation between proportion of wives employed and husbands' income, and hence there is no basis for any comment concerning whether I am or am not "unaware" that a direct correlation is unusual.

3. I *am* perfectly aware that the sample contained too few cases of highly educated Swedish women living in large cities to permit any empirical focus on these women. But most American readers of a volume on Swedish working wives will be interested in the points of difference between them and American working wives. There are marked differences in educational attainment and the balance of rural to urban residence between the two countries. I was not saying that Gendell should have analyzed women who do not appear in sufficient numbers in his sample, but again I am expressing regret that this comparison, of special interest to Americans, could not be made.

4. My point concerning the lack of information on just what jobs these Swedish wives held remains. At a minimum Gendell could have given a detailed marginal distribution of the occupations the working wives were in and introduced a two- or three-way control on their occupation for such topics as work satisfaction, reasons for working, and desire for change in employment status, topics on which wives' occupation is as relevant as their age or residence.

5. Lastly, concerning the desire I expressed for greater incorporation of material from Swedish bibliographic sources: very few American sociologists have even

a reading knowledge of the Swedish language, hence few of us can read Dahlström's chapter on Swedish working wives in *Kuinnors liv och arbete*. Gendell can, and has sparked our interest in Dahlström's work by commenting in the bibliographic section that it "provides the most complete inventory of relevant factors in Sweden, and perhaps anywhere else" concerning the employment of women. None of the references to Dahlström in the text gives the reader any grasp of what this inventory consists of, and my point was that Gendell's work could have helped, but does not, his less linguistically qualified colleagues in sociology. It would have redeemed what remains, in my judgment, a volume based on data inadequate to the task of analyzing the important issues raised.

ALICE S. ROSSI

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BOOK REVIEWS

Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. I: *Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, Tocqueville, the Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848.* By RAYMOND ARON. Translated by RICHARD HOWARD and HELEN WEAVER. New York: Basic Books, 1965. Pp. 272. $4.95.

Raymond Aron's work is at once the most profound and the most interesting account of classical sociological theory that has been written. For years the students at the Sorbonne have been listening to his lectures on "The Great Doctrines of Historical Sociology." Now American students will enjoy their urbanity, lucidity, and analytic power.

Four authors hold the stage in this first volume of Aron's work—Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, and Tocqueville. In a sense Tocqueville is Aron's hero, the "great figure" of the French school of political sociology whose founder was Montesquieu. "Probably I am a latter-day descendant of this school," remarks the author. What this school stresses is, first, the autonomy of the political order and, second, the rejection of sociological determinism.

The chapter on Karl Marx is a masterpiece of exposition and analysis. "It is impossible," says Aron, "to reduce the sociology of political regimes to a mere appendage of the sociology of economics or of social class." Whether a society is capitalist or socialist, the problem of who is to exercise authority and how will have to be decided separately. Moreover, since the proletariat, unlike the bourgeoisie, is not a privileged and dominant minority but a "great unprivileged mass," it cannot itself become a ruling elite; instead, men claiming to represent it try to hold power. Aron's main point, we might say, is that, whereas the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie were both classes and elites, the proletariat constitutes a class but not an elite.

Aron traces the ambiguities of Marxist sociology to its effort to be a philosophy as well Marx's critique of capitalism, originally a moral one in terms of the concept of alienation, evolved toward a strictly sociological analysis, and Aron thinks the problem of the interpretation of the later role of alienation is still "unresolved." He explores the difficulties of Marx's historical materialism; to say that the infrastructure *determines* the superstructure is too rigid, while to say that it merely *conditions* it is too flexible. Aron feels the need of "an intermediate formula" between determination and conditioning. I would suggest that the economic infrastructure be regarded not as the determining or conditioning factor but as the *preconditioning* one. Aron incidentally subjects to a careful analysis Marx's account of the Revolution of 1848; he finds that Marx invalidly attributed the rivalry between Legitimists and Orleanists to "contradictory economic interests," whereas actually it was founded on the constitutional tautology that a monarchy can have but one king.

Auguste Comte emerges, in Aron's book, as the sociological prophet of managerial, industrial society, the spokesman of the "polytechnician-managers," and as such contemptuous of the parliamentary windbags and an enthusiast for Napoleon III. Aron raises the question as to why Comte's ideas have remained outside the mainstream of modern social thought. He thinks (like Marx) that it was because Comte made "an exact diagram of his dreams" and also because he believed war to be obsolete. Actually, we might say, Comtist ideas returned to significance only when the observable rise of a bureaucratic class in the Soviet Union showed a tremendous flaw in the Marxist analysis. Perhaps historical evolution has been dishonest with itself, and Marxism has played the part of a "false consciousness" to an underlying Comtist development. Comte's intellectual interpretation of history, one might add, always seemed too far-removed from the realities of class struggles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

With Tocqueville, Aron inclines to a concept of revolution as essentially political The French Revolution is said to have taken place because the bourgeoisie, already economically and culturally the equal of the aristocracy,

sought a corresponding equality in political rights. Aron thinks the Russian Revolution would fit the Tocquevillian scheme better than the Marxist. To which we might reply that there were at least two French Revolutions as there were Russian ones. The Tocquevillian formula might apply to the revolution of the middle classes, but it would scarcely be applicable to that of the peasants or *sans culottes*, for whose uprising the Marxist explanation seems most adequate. Perhaps a total revolution, however, would not have taken place if the Tocquevillian component of unrest had been resolved.

Aron values Montesquieu not only as the precursor of sociology but for his philosophy as a liberal. No one, says Aron, can live by a complete determinism; sociological laws must allow for human intelligence, which brings freedom. "The laws relative to human behavior are no longer in the category of inescapable causality." Montesquieu, like Aron, is devoid of ideology; in the French Revolution he would have had to face the choice, "like the liberals of his kind," between death and emigration, internal or external. In every society, however, "it is always possible to think in the manner of Montesquieu, . . . to seek by the balance of powers, the guarantee of moderation and liberty."

Like Tocqueville, Aron is critical of the intellectuals, the men of letters who "have no experience with the problems of government and are drunk with ideology." He agrees with Tocqueville that history is a blend of two currents, one which is made up of historically necessary trends and the other composed of such contingent circumstances as the stupidity of Louis XVI. The future of sociology, he believes, lies with the American model; young French sociologists renounce revolutionary ideology as they become researchers. He tends, however, to take Soviet sociology at its face value as given to smug praise of its own society, and self-satisfied in its knowledge of the laws of history. Actually, the unofficial, unpublished Soviet sociology is also much like the American in its direction; it is wrong to take the official publications as an index of what young Soviet sociologists really think. As for the Soviet official presumption to know laws of history, it is about where American social theory was seventy years ago, in the time of John Fiske and Lester Ward.

How shall we characterize Aron's sociology? He is neither Marxist, existentialist, nor behaviorist. We might say he is in the wisdom tradition. He holds on to man's freedom without exaggerating it, and he sees the influence of impersonal conditions without elevating them into a determinism.

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Fact and Theory in Social Science. Edited by Earl W. Count and Gordon T. Bowles. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. xvi+253. $5.50.

This volume consists of essays presented to Douglas G. Haring by former students and associates on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Like most *Festschrifts* the writing commemorates the contributions of its celebrity by exploring scholarly issues directly or indirectly related to his life work. Paul Meadows concisely states and carefully documents Haring's principal themes. William C. Lehmann analyzes the "Sociological and Cultural-Anthropological Elements in the Writings of Johann von Herder." John W. Bennett comments on "Myth Theory and Value in Cultural Anthropology." Along with flavorful remarks on the style and personality of "great anthropologists," he raises pertinent questions about the responsibilities of fellow professionals. Discoursing on facts in anthropology, Earl Count insists that they are "culture-bound," "culture idioms," or "codified culture." In a cautiously critical vein Robert E. L. Faris perceptively discusses some of the conditions under which errors arise in the interpretation of questionnaires. Difficulties of conceptualization are brought to the level of specific research procedures.

Following a brief essay by Carl Friedrich on political theory and the Human Relations Area Files and one by Talcott Parsons on structural functional theory, John Manfredi pursues Goldenweiser's classic principle of "limited possibilities." Increasing size and complexity within a society reduce the possible forms that social arrangements may take. More duplication of facets in arrangements of

greater complexity appears to result in convergence of social arangements. Writing on "The Validity of 'Oedipus Complex' as an Abstract Scientific Construct," Ernest Becker treats of problems of conceptualization in science and psychoanalysis.

The concluding section of the volume is devoted to essays on the general topic of cultural relativity. Diverse images are provided by T. F. McIllwraith ("Facts and Their Recognition among the Bella Coola"), Morris Opler ("Cultural Context and Population Control Programs in Village India"), Craighill Handy ("Active Volcanism in Kau, Hawaii, as an Ecological Factor Affecting Native Life and Culture"), and Alfred Hussey ("The American Official Overseas"). Of these contributions Opler's is perhaps the most useful to sociologists. In a clearly reasoned chapter he contests the familiar assumption that the restraints of nuclear family structure are necessarily more conducive to decreasing population growth than the joint family system.

Viewed in its entirety the volume reveals its authors' quiet but serious concern for theoretical and factual conceptualization in social science.

LLEWELLYN GROSS

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Exchange and Power in Social Life. By PETER M. BLAU. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. xxiii+352. $7.75.

This book constitutes a very important extension of what may be called exchange theory in sociology and in the analysis of social structure and organization. Its far-off forefather is, of course, *The Wealth of Nations* and to a smaller degree also *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. More recent ancestors are Simmel, Game Theory, and most of Homans.

Its most important contribution can perhaps best be brought out by comparing it with Homans' explanation of social behavior as exchange of attitudes, sentiments, and activities—the laws of this exchange being a combination of simple "supply and demand" and Skinnerian psychology. From these laws Homans derives the laws both of interaction in informal, interpersonal relations and of institutionalization of complex structures—hence the charge of psychological reductionism so often made against him.

Perhaps the greatest significance of Blau's analysis is that, instead of extrapolating structural organization, institutions, and institutional behavior from such elementary "laws" of "psychological" or interpersonal behavior, he attempts, first, to understand how the very processes of interpersonal exchange may give rise, through their own dynamics and dialectics, to some basic structural problems and exigencies which are not, however, simple extrapolations of such informal behavior. Second, he attempts to see what are the equivalents on the macrosocietal (structural) level of the major problems and dynamics that develop in informal relations—but does not hold that they necessarily constitute outcomes of such relations.

The greater part of the book is devoted to the exploration of these extremely important problems. Chapter titles give a good indication of its range and scope: "The Structure of Social Association," "Social Integration," "Social Support," "Social Exchange," "Differentiation of Power," "Expectations," "The Dynamics of Change and Adjustment in Groups," "Legitimation and Organization," "Opposition," "Mediating Values in Complex Structures," "The Dynamics of Substructures," "Dialectical Forces." The analysis is based on a very great variety of illustrations drawn from a very broad and rich range of sociological data.

It would be difficult to summarize adequately, in the confines of a brief review, the richness and complexity of the argument. The following quotation from the analytical synopsis comes perhaps closest to giving the gist of the book's central argument:

> Social exchange can be considered a mixed game, which poses dilemmas. Dilemmas are also revealed by the analysis of social attraction, approval, love, leadership, and opposition. They have their sources in mixed-game situations, the contradictory forces that affect the impact of rewards on social interaction (often due to the principle of diminishing marginal utility), and incompatible requirements of goal states. Structural differentiation often resolves dilemmas of individuals but produces new ones reflected in dialectical forces of change.
>
> Status securely rooted in the social structure promotes expansion of power. Multiple supports in the social structure make power independent of any one of them by making it possible to insure

against the risk of defections. The joint social support of subordinates solidifies dominant status further. The independence resting on multiple supports of superior status promotes tolerance, but it also permits the oppressive use of power should conditions invite it, at least up to the point where the oppressed join in opposition to the oppressor and thus deprive him of multiple supports.

Perhaps the most important contribution of this analysis is its great sensitivity to the differences between the basic propensities of institutional and structural organization and norms and those of interpersonal relations. Blau does not assume that either sphere can be entirely derived from the other, since each has its own propensities which, even though to some extent subject to the same or similar laws, are not easily interchangeable.

Hence, he attempts to look not only for similarities between interpersonal relations, on the one hand, and structural organization and institutional behavior, on the other, but also for points of meeting between them and of transition from one to the other.

Particularly important are Blau's explorations of power, norms, and the dynamics of complex organizations. He attempts to derive power from principles of reciprocity and balance. Power relations are seen by Blau as a result of processes of interpersonal exchange. Power relations also characterize the range of social behavior beyond that of exchange as such, viewed more or less as taking place in a relatively free market. Processes of social exchange and of differentiation of power are complementary, not simply parallel to one another, and each creates its own dialectics and influences the dialectics of the other.

Similarly, norms and standards, and to some extent group goals, are not only "outcomes" of interpersonal relations but (as in the "prisoner's dilemma" in game theory) also a basic element in any type of long-range interchange, they are inherent in its structure and necessary to its very existence.

The dynamics of complex organizations are analyzed in terms of two basic principles—the legitimization of an increased scope of authority and the emergence of oppositions along different lines producing conflict and change.

In most of these areas Blau's analysis represents a very important advance in the application of exchange analysis to social structure and behavior because it attempts to confront interpersonal exchange, on the one hand, and structural organization and institutionalization, on the other hand, and not simply to derive or extrapolate one from the other.

It seems to me, however, that it does not go far enough in this direction; it does not fully analyze the differences between interpersonal exchange and institutional behavior and organization, nor does it sufficiently explore the nature of institutionalization in general and institutional exchange in particular. First, it does not stress enough that the institutionalization of exchange—through power, wealth, etc.—does not necessarily abolish the process of exchange but sets normative and organizational limits to some of its basic properties or elements, such as the rates of exchange, the initial bargaining positions, and the extent of persons admitted into the exchange. Second, it does not fully explore how the differences between interpersonal and institutional media of exchange, and among different institutional media (power, money, prestige), may influence the very process of exchange. Third, and closely related to the former, are several still unexplored problems of the transition from interpersonal relations to the institutionalism of norms and the crystallization of institutional commodities as given in the "needs" of organized social life.

Deeper exploration of all these problems seems to be of importance for the further application of exchange theory to the analysis of social structures. Blau's book provides a very important contribution to such analysis and to the possible convergence between such analysis and functional-structural theory—a convergence that seems to me of great importance for the advancement of sociological theory.

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Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance. By Leon Festinger. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. vii+163. $4.75.

It is unusual for a report of experiments by eight people to read like a detective story. Yet that is the case for this report of work pursuing Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance. The story reaches an appropriate

climax in Walster's study of decision, regret, and dissonance attending choice by draftees of an Army career. Another high point is Jecker's study of partner-choice for a game and the effect of dissonance upon information-seeking in such situations. The design of the latter study is most interesting.

The sure guidance of Festinger's thought is evident throughout, providing coherence to bits of research which, by themselves, might be of lesser consequence. In many of the studies the decisions made by subjects are of such minor importance—for example, choice of a phonograph record or a hair style by a high-school girl—or so hypothetical—for example, choice by teen-age girls of a person to be vice-president of an imaginary corporation—that a sociologist's credulity is strained. This weakness is balanced by the effort to achieve experimental rigor. Still the work is to be defended on the ground that production of dissonance and even regret in situations where the choice is of little importance even to the subject is a critical test of the generality of dissonance theory. Nevertheless, readers will not find the extensive range of applications of dissonance theory cited in Festinger's earlier book.

Two important discoveries were made First, the cognitive process in a conflict situation prior to decision is different from the cognitive dissonance phenomenon after decision. In these studies, predecision thought and information-gathering are rational and unbiased with regard to alternatives of relatively equal attractiveness. After decision, systematic upgrading of the chosen and downgrading of the rejected alternative appear almost immediately. Second, shortly after having made a decision of some importance (four minutes in Walster's study), the subject experiences regret at having had to reject a desirable alternative. This phenomenon disappears fifteen minutes after the decision (choice of Army job) and is replaced by dissonance-reduction. Regret consists in devaluation of the chosen alternative while the value of the rejected alternative is increasing. This is the exact opposite of dissonance-reduction. Walster suggests that regret appears when the impact of having rejected a desirable alternative occurs and signals the beginning of the process of dissonance-reduction.

Scholars working in this field should be urged to investigate instances in which a subject is given, or must accept, the *less* desirable or rejected alternative. Such cases ought to produce large and important dissonance phenomena. Do regret and dissonance have the same or different characteristics when one has to accept the rejected alternative (as so often happens to voters in political campaigns)?

ROBERT J. POTTER

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Handbook of Modern Sociology. Edited by ROBERT E. L. FARIS. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964. Pp. vi + 1088. $17.50

With the plethora of new handbooks, reviews, and compendia in sociology, one wonders whether there is a need for yet another one. Faris' volume, however, is a welcome addition.

The editor, who is also the author of the first chapter, "The Discipline of Sociology" states in his preface that he is seeking "to summarize all of the major growing research areas of modern sociology." Twenty-nine sociologists have contributed summaries and analyses in the standard and conventional fields of recent sociology. There are reviews of demography (Irene B. Taeuber), ecology (O. D. Duncan), labor force (Philip Hauser), small groups (A. Paul Hare), collective behavior (Ralph H. Turner)—a total of twenty-seven chapters.

Each chapter is comprehensive and clearly written. Full documentation accompanies every exposition There is no doubt in this reviewer's mind of the volume's immense value to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in sociology. To college instructors who find it difficult to keep pace with the developments in all fields, this volume will surely be of great benefit. To the young instructor plunged into teaching the principles course at first blush, the volume should be of help for supplementing the standard text with erudition and scholarliness.

The reviewer has often felt that two propositions seemed fair bases for judging a book. First, it would appear that one has a right to assess a book by deciding whether the author has fulfilled the objectives set by himself. (This is the author's *raison d'être* for his publication.) Second, a reviewer has perhaps

the right to appraise the goals themselves. Are the objectives of the author legitimate?

Faris states his objectives clearly and succinctly; they are fulfilled precisely and authentically.

While his goals in selecting the sociological areas had to be limited and "arbitrary," one wishes that he had not excluded some fields such as crime, delinquency, generic aspects of social change. However, goal preferences are more personal than objective, and limitations of space might have damaged the extant chapters.

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Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. By ALFRED SCHUTZ. Edited and Introduced by ARVID BRODERSEN. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xv+300. Gld. 25.25.

In his effort to base social theory on philosophy Schutz draws upon Husserl, Bergson, James, Simmel, Scheler, Weber, and, to a lesser degree, Dilthy, Hegel, Heraclitus, Hobbes, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Parsons, and MacIver. The volume is divided into two parts, on pure and applied theory. "Pure Theory" is devoted largely to "The Dimensions of the Social World." Here the author discusses social reality with particular attention to the meaning and circumstance of direct and indirect experience. The general theme is Schutz's image of sociological method—ideal types as structures of typifications applicable to both "The World of Contemporaries" and "The World of Predecessors." He concludes with a separate essay on "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World." The part on "Applied Theory" appears to be no less pure —if the somewhat discursive character of Schutz's writing is overlooked. Here are to be found essays on the stranger, the homecomer, the well-informed citizen, Don Quixote, music, Mozart, and Santayana, all purveyed in idioms appropriate to the literary strain in sociological discourse. The longest essay in this section, entitled "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," returns the reader's attention to the principal themes pervading the book.

Short of a thoroughgoing analysis of Schutz's deceptively simple style—sometimes he sounds banal, sometimes nearly profound (but who doesn't?)—the following propositions appear to be central appendages to the author's leitmotiv:

1. The simplest complex of meaning in social action consists of the interpretation of action by reference to the actor's motives. The "in-order-to" motive is identified with the object or purpose of action. The "because" motive is identified with the reason or cause of action. "Because" motives are grouped into systems of social personality (G. H. Mead, Znaniecki, etc.) reflecting past experiences, as they become condensed into principles, maxims, tastes, affects, etc. The "in-order-to" motives are organized into subjective systems of planning for today and tomorrow.

2. To understand individual actors it is sufficient to find typical motives of typical actors which explain acts as typical ones arising out of typical situations. This understanding depends on the extent to which the individual can imagine himself performing analogous acts were he in the same situation and directed by the same motives.

3. The pure we-relation is characterized by face-to-face temporal and spatial immediacy, the "content" of which bears a strong similarity to the stream of one's own consciousness. *On the other hand, the object of the* they-orientation, knowledge of contemporaries, is not the existence of a concrete man but typical knowledge of typical processes. The context of meaning is "objective"; "it exhibits the idealization: 'again and again,' i.e., of typical anonymous repeatability." Therefore, "a social relation between contemporaries consists in the subjective chance that the reciprocally ascribed typifying schemes (and corresponding expectations) will be used congruently by the partners."

4. Everyday social experience is derived from tradition, habit, previous reflection, etc. It embraces heterogeneous kinds of knowledge, incoherent and confused, intermingled with vague conjectures, with intermissions and discontinuities. The ideal of everyday knowledge is not certainty or probability but likelihood. Predictions are not in accord with truth and falsity but with "reasonable expectation." It may be said that they are or are not "well founded." "The consistency of this system of knowledge is not that of natural *laws*, but that of typical sequences and relations."

(Analysis is made of the various equivocal implications of the term "rationality" when applied to the level of everyday experience.)

5. Because language is surrounded by fringe meanings and emotional halos, group idioms and dialects, multiple connotations and jargons, there are many orders of social reality, each with its separate style of existence (Jamesian "sub-universes"). Among these are the worlds of common sense, science, various supernaturalisms and public opinions as well as an infinite variety of fantasies. (The question of intertwining realities, of clashing enclaves of experience, is raised and explored throughout the book.)

6. All aspects of the world are experienced in terms of types; all typification consists in the equalization of traits relevant to the particular purposes at hand. A system of relevances and typifications determines what facts are substantially equal (homogeneous) for the purpose of solving typical problems in a typical manner. Social actors typify themselves by living up to the typical functions of typical social roles (for example, soldier, judge, father, friend). Congruence between actors' schemes of orientation is enhanced if typifications are standardized and pertinent relevancies institutionalized in mores, laws, rituals, etc.

Schutz appears to be less perceptive when discussing principles governing the formation of ideal types. In the reviewer's estimation he takes too much for granted, is too decisive and hence too unqualified in his remarks about relevance, logical consistency, and compatibility. True, such terms are presented as postulates, but to expect the system of ideal types "to contain only scientifically verifiable assumptions . . . fully compatible with the whole of our scientific knowledge" and "to remain in full compatibility with the principles of formal logic" is too severe an ideal for all but the strictest of logical positivists—if any can still be found. Paradoxically, Schutz's sociological statements may be seen as philosophically significant simply because their suppositions are kin to the Cambridge school of analytic philosophy, for whom the logical strictures proposed by Schutz are issues of controversy. The paradox is doubly confounded by the observation that Schutz's language is not styled to conform with the more typical schemes of formal logic. A liberalized conception of social science would commend Schutz's analysis of everyday logic on grounds independent of the assumption that formalism is a necessary condition of sociological significance.

LLEWELLYN GROSS

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Sociologists at Work. Edited by PHILLIP E. HAMMOND. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964. Pp. x+401. $7.50.

The publication of this book marks a turning point from the "antiseptic" approach to research, which makes believe—and unfortunately inculcates this into students with oftentimes paralyzing consequences—that research consists in proving or refuting an initially well-formulated hypothesis through an initially well-formulated research design. To be sure, we have known for a long time that the trials and tribulations of daily research are quite different from published research reports, but it is important that this be made public. "Between the idea and the reality there falls the shadow." And escape from the shadow often requires some delay till the sun turns, or it demands some reorientation of the itinerary. The authors who here chronicle the natural history of their research—some of these studies such as *Union Democracy* by Lipset *et al.* or Blau's *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* have by now become classics—let us in on their troubles as well as on their unexpected discoveries; they point up the initial thoughts and values that prompted the selection of the research problem; and they share with us some of the ethical problems involved, the responsibility toward the subjects of the research in disclosing the researcher's aims or in revealing to them some of the results obtained.

The fact that the path of research is not a straight one, that hypotheses have to be dropped or refined or that new hypotheses have to be formulated, that the object of the research has to be redefined and restricted in midstream, that ethical considerations prevent the carrying out of an initial design—all this is not an "unfortunate" by-product of research; rather, it is precisely the unexpected hindrances that make new discoveries possible Creativity in research does not stem from a

good design and well-formulated hypothesis—though these are necessary prerequisites—but rather in the responses to the continuous challenges presented during the unfolding of the research. Thus Lipset and Blau, as well as Bellah, show us how they refined their theories and made theoretical discoveries on the basis of their empirical data; Coleman, Wright and Hyman, and, in a different way, Stanley Udy show us how they are challenged to refine their research methods as new theoretical considerations come into play; all the authors give us a taste of what it means to say that "facts do not speak for themselves." They document the fact that the relevance of data stems from a theoretical framework whose outline becomes sharpened during the course of the research. In addition, Renée Fox describes how the very resistance of the subjects of the research can be turned to good advantage in the understanding of the dynamics of social structure.

One "unanticipated consequence" of these chronicles is what we can learn about the social structure of research. The studies that are here reported were all done in different social contexts, and these contexts determined to a large extent the course of the research. There are "lonely researchers" and there is the researcher who is part of a team. The lonely researcher can be doing his research in a structured or a largely unstructured research situation—as can the individual researcher in a team. Peter Blau gives an example of the lonely researcher in a well-structured situation. One of the problems he faces is the presentation of self: If admitted by the directors of the organization, will he be seen as their agent? Will he be suspected of prying and informing? And how will he come to terms with his own loneliness, his lack of a legitimate position amid people who all have their well-defined tasks? Renée Fox, studying medical research in Belgium, is a lonely researcher in an unstructured situation, for her subject matter takes her into many corners of Belgian society. In this setting she faces both trust and distrust, both an excessive supply of information from those who have their own ax to grind and almost insurmountable resistance on the part of those who guard their vested interests. The third type of setting, where the researcher is part of a well-structured research team, can be of two kinds: that of the Lipset study, where researchers (Lipset, Coleman, and Trow) collaborate in a non-bureaucratic setting, and where they share similar academic background, similar values, and are dedicated to using empirical research for the building of theories; that represented by the Davis study (*Great Books and Small Groups*) where the researcher has to adapt his research to the contradictory expectations of the study director, the client, and his university colleagues. Finally, there is the setting, described by Riesman and Watson, in which the researcher is also part of a team, but in this case one that is completely unstructured. In addition, the researchers in this case are of different background and have different research interests and different values. It would be worthwhile investigating to what extent results obtained are dependent on structural determinants of the research setting. Thus, indirectly, the reports contain much that awakens us to a study of the sociology of social research. But generally, the papers included in this volume can be studied from several perspectives from which students as well as researchers will learn a great deal.

ROSE LAUB COSER

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Blue Collar Marriage. By MIRRA KOMAROVSKY, with the collaboration of JANE H. PHILIPS. New York: Random House, 1964. Pp. xv+395. $5.95.

In the past decade an increasing number of studies of working-class family and community life have appeared to redress the balance of what has been predominantly a middle-class subject. The rebirth of interest in poverty and related social problems has begun to add new detail and a more sophisticated understanding of what lower-class existence means. The increasing stability of life for the better-off portion of the country's vast blue-collar and service groups has stimulated interest in how these groups differ both from their less fortunate lower-class neighbors and from the middle class. Komarovsky's study adds to our knowledge of working-class families a subtle and penetrating analysis of how blue-collar husbands and wives build their common life style and the satisfactions and difficulties they encounter in doing so. The tremendously

detailed portrait she gives us of working-class marital relations makes the reader wish for a similarly rich portrait of middle-class marriages; it may well be that the sociologists of working-class life have now so far redressed the middle-class bias of the field that we need a renewed but more sophisticated interest in middle-class family life.

Blue Collar Marriage is based on a study of fifty-eight marriages using "flexible case study interviews." Both husband and wife were interviewed (a far too rare procedure in family research) using a combination of focused interview methods (which stressed concrete discussion of specific marital situations) and projective story devices presenting typical marital difficulties. The respondents were white, native-born Protestants of native parents, not over forty years of age, and having at least one child. Their education did not exceed high school and almost all of them had blue-collar occupations. The sample was selected from an area called "Glenton," a working-class community with a population of 50,000 within a large metropolitan area. It is clear from the excerpts in the book that the interviews were fuller and more detailed than is typical for qualitative or case-study researches; the author makes excellent use of the rich material at her disposal both to present the dominant patterns and to analyze deviant cases.

The book presents a discussion of socialization into conjugal roles and interferences with this process, and then proceeds to an exhaustive analysis of the day-to-day activities and relationships that make up blue-collar marriages. There is a discussion of homemakers and working wives, of sexual relations in marriage, of marital role expectations and realities, of difficulties in marital communication, and of capacities for coping with the demands and conflicts of married life. The author emphasizes the role of outsiders as both stabilizing and disrupting influences in the marital relationship, and concerns herself with the extent and nature of the use of confidants. There is a chapter on power relations in marriage which analyzes the problem in both a more complex and a more adequate way than much previous research has done and a brief treatment of kinship relations. Finally, there is an examination of the impact of work and income on marital relationships and a discussion of patterns of joint and separate social life and leisure-time activity.

The over-all picture that emerges is that of blue-collar marriage as organized on a basis of separateness and sharp sex role definitions rather than on the companionate, joint role organization basis characteristic of the middle class. The results provide strong support for Bott's hypothesis that such an organization of the marital relationhip requires the support of close relationships with outsiders if it is to prove stable.

In a final chapter Komarovsky takes up the question of the relative utility in family study of case study, or qualitative methods versus survey and quantitative methods The richness and complexity of findings would justify a much stronger argument for the value of her method than she actually makes. She concludes that it is not one of the functions of this method to test "causal relationships between known and measured variables." Yet her findings make her aware of the very primitive state of development of quantitative survey measures of "such elusive dimensions as authority, empathy and emotional support." A careful comparison of Komarovsky's findings with those of studies of similar problems using a survey methodology might well lead readers to re-evaluate the current uneasy accommodation between qualitative and quantitative methodology, whereby qualitative research is assigned the task of exploration and hypothesis development and quantitative research the task of "testing" these hypotheses. The complex findings that Komarovsky presents are probably testable only by repeated applications of a similar methodology; sample survey tests are likely to produce only a pale reflection of the reality she describes.

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Blue-Collar World: Studies of the American Worker. Edited by ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK and WILLIAM GOMBERG. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xviii+622.

Following the long-bemoaned neglect of the working classes, the recent flow of publications with "blue-collar" in their titles pre-

sents an intriguing problem in sociology of sociology. Since many of these studies antedated the antipoverty drive, the explanation is not the simple one of newly available funds for research. In any event, *Blue-Collar World* now adds a valuable collection of sixty-one essays to that no longer neglected field. The editors are to be commended for discovering these scattered and generally previously unpublished materials. The contributors are predominantly sociologists with about a dozen drawn from the fields of psychiatry, public welfare, education, and business research.

Because in the past the worker has been studied largely in his role of producer, the editors decided to redress the balance. The book does not deal with the workbench and only peripherally with the union, automation, and the other economic trends. Instead, the essays concern the working-class adolescent, the worker as a family man, as a member of the community, his moral and religious perspectives, physical and mental health, leisure, unemployment, and retirement.

As to method the editors state: "We have urged our authors to sin bravely and, given the choice between scholarly sterility and imaginative, daring speculation, we have indicated our preference for the latter." In point of fact, the contributors generally eschew this dramatic choice between sterile scholarship and daring speculation and instead present articles which, as is usually the case, vary in their originality, reliability, and scope. The majority of the essays report empirical investigations limited in time and place, for example, "Resident Response to Urban Rehabilitation in a Negro Working-Class Neighborhood," by Morton Rubin; "Manual Workers as Small Businessmen," a study of eighty-one retail and service enterprises in Providence, R. I., by Kurt B. Mayer and Sidney Goldstein; or "The Meaning of Work and Adjustment to Retirement," a study of a group of retired men in Los Angeles, by Herman J. Loether.

Another category of essays contains summaries of findings on a given topic as, for example, "The Mass Media and The Blue-Collar Workers" by Leo Bogart. Several essays go beyond the straightforward summary of research findings and attempt to discern underlying themes or to formulate a theoretical framework within which to encompass known facts. Examples of the latter are "The Working-Class Subculture: A New View," by S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman; and "Social Structure, Social Class and Participation in Primary Relationships," by Alan F. Blum.

Finally, a few articles address themselves directly to social reform such as the one on "The Future of Toil" by Ronald C. Gross, or "Some Thoughts on Reform," by S. M. Miller. Although the volume was not intended to focus on pathologies of working-class life, given the values of sociologists in a democratic society, the essays inevitably reflect a concern with social problems, be they high-school dropouts, under-utilization of medical services, or obstacles to blue-collar participation in adult education. These articles frequently contain recommendations for reforms but they do not, on the whole, explore the long-range and fundamental social policies which must be charted to deal with the more basic and stubborn problems.

The impressive body of materials here assembled does not quite supply the answer to the central problem posed by the editors: "Is there a style of life peculiar to the blue-collar men and what are its characteristics? How does the style of life fit in with the worker's work experience?" The selections do reveal a great variety of class differences. But it is doubtful whether sixty-seven independent contributors could, in the nature of the case, achieve the required synthesis. The individual essays focus on a particular sphere of life and, moreover, many describe this sphere for a particular segment of blue-collar workers, Negro or white, upwardly or downwardly mobile, more or less educated, and so on. The "blue-collar" in Nathan Hurvitz' article on marital strain, his white, upwardly mobile respondents, are a far cry from the blue-collar consumers studied by David Caplovitz. Thus, if there exists a style of life shared by all these diverse segments of blue-collar workers, in contrast to the middle classes, it remains to be discerned, and the interplay of influences shaping it remains to be understood.

MIRRA KOMAROVSKY

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Repercussions of Redundancy: A Local Survey. By HILDA R. KAHN, with a Foreword by CHARLES MADGE. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964. Pp. 267. 50*s*.

The cryptic title refers to the impact of a mass layoff of workers in the automobile plants of the British Motor Corporation in Birmingham in 1956. The firings, occasioned by a severe drop in the automobile market, were with virtually no notice to the workers and with no prior discussions with union officials. About two years after the event, some 10 per cent of the fired workers were interviewed concerning their experiences in finding work. In a book full of significant details about a small disruption in a big industrial system, Hilda Kahn reports the findings of the survey.

By the time they were interviewed, half of the men were back in their old jobs, most of them for at least a year, and another fourth had been offered their old jobs back. The market crisis was not only sudden but short-lived. This is not to say that the layoff occasioned little hardship in the lives of the workers and their families, nor was the event without interest for the student of workers' adjustment to industrial employment in a highly industrialized society.

The automobile factories in Birmingham pay higher wages than other firms in the same labor market. While most of the fired workers found other jobs quickly—half within two weeks—hourly earnings were so much lower that the typical worker found himself working about six hours longer per week and yet earning about £4 less per week than in his job in the auto factory.

When the B.M.C. began rehiring workers, the situation represented something of an open choice in which its former employees could decide whether they preferred the higher take-home pay for fewer hours of work to other desiderata which many of them encountered in their interim jobs. When interviewed, it was not uncommon for a worker to say that in his new job he felt less caught up in the frustrations of the mass-production system: the tensions of working on a moving assembly line, the fragmented character of his task, the impersonality of social relations in the large plant. The most dramatic choice confronting the men concerned the time of day when they were at work. In the auto plants only 25 per cent were on the day shift, both during the period before the firings and after rehiring. But the men who chose not to return had found jobs where they were far more likely to work during "normal" hours —79 per cent were on the day shift. And the return to the automobile factory inevitably raised the question of job security; since there had been one mass layoff, there might well be others. Only 40 per cent of the men who returned felt their present jobs were likely to last, contrasted with 74 per cent of the men who did not return It is therefore not wholly unexpected that only the men who held the best paying jobs in the auto plants, and who suffered the greatest loss of earnings when forced to find other work, were more likely to return.

The book gives many such insights into the behavior and views of factory workers unwillingly placed in a position of having to cast their social and economic lot. The survey was carefully and competently executed. The tables are adequate, if not excellent. In a concluding chapter the results are well summarized, and their implications for Britain's industrial policy are made explicit

NATALIE ROGOFF RAMSOY

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The Character of Danger: Psychiatric Symptoms in Selected Communities. By DOROTHEA C LEIGHTON, JOHN S. HARDING, DAVID B. MACKLIN, ALLISTER M. MACMILLAN, and ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON. ("The Stirling County Study of Psychiatric Disorder and Sociocultural Environment," Vol. III) New York: Basic Books, 1963. Pp. xiii+545. $10.00.

The data reported in this book are the end result of a massive research operation whose theoretical basis and research design have been fully explored in two previous volumes. *My Name Is Legion* and *People of Cove and Woodlot* In all, the project has taken about fifteen years to complete and has involved the services, at one time or another, of eighty-one professionals plus numerous others involved in administrative, interviewing, and

clerical tasks. The main purpose of this project was twofold: to estimate the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in pseudonymous Stirling County and to investigate the relationship between the social environment and the type and prevalence of psychiatric disorders.

Confronted with the evidence of such a massive endeavor, one cannot help being impressed with the researchers' ability to maintain some degree of coherence in the project and produce a report that enables the reader both to understand the totality of the research endeavor and to follow the researchers from their early conceptualizations through the difficulties of data collection to the final data analysis. At the same time it is difficult to avoid disappointment that the data themselves do not contribute more to advancing our understanding of the relation between man and his environment. Substantive empirical findings are slight. Age, sex, occupational status, and educational differences are found which generally confirm the findings of other studies, except for some minor variations that are apparently due to the peculiarities of local conditions. The major hypothesis underlying the research, namely that social disintegration will be associated with a higher prevalence of mental disorders, found some support, but the extremity of the variance between the integrated and the disintegrated groups, the confounding of familial and community disintegration, and the small number of persons involved weakened the case for a causal interpretation between social disintegration and mental disorder. The authors show commendable caution in interpreting their data, although their preference for the causal interpretation is clear.

At least one-half of the adults in Stirling County were viewed as currently suffering from some psychiatric disorder as defined by the *APA Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, while only 17 per cent were considered "probably well." The authors themselves, however, question the fruitfulness of such a conclusion and suggest that a variable such as "need for psychiatric attention" provides a better approach to the problem of "how much?" Depending on which cutting point one chooses, the authors estimate that 3 or 20 or 57 or 83 per cent of the residents are in need of psychiatric attention. While such information may be useful to the Stirling County Public Health Department, it is of somewhat limited general value except to indicate that large numbers of ordinary people have times in their lives when they are discomforted by some of the symptoms used as indicators of psychiatric disorders. Whether or not psychiatric attention is the best way to ameliorate such problems is, in any case, a debatable point.

The real contribution of this volume to the field of mental health lies in its demonstration that psychiatrically interesting studies of large-scale, non-clinical populations are feasible. This history of the development of the project and the description of the problems involved in translating abstract theoretical considerations into field operations are the most fascinating parts of the book. They should demonstrate clearly that psychiatrically meaningful data can be gathered by non-clinically trained persons and that the data can even be studied independently of psychiatric evaluations. Although the methodology pursued in this study retained the use of ratings and classifications of interview protocols by psychiatrists, there are sufficient data reported to indicate that questionnaire data amenable to objective coding and tabulation could offer a fruitful methodological alternative to the costly and time-consuming reliance on psychiatric ratings.

The methodological requirements of the study, which in the beginning were felt by the researchers to result in unpleasant approximations of their desired goal, turned out during the course of the project to have wrought major changes in the authors' conceptualization of mental illness. One of the striking features of the book is the authors' plea that psychiatrists abandon many of the traditional modes of thought concerning psychiatric diagnostic categories and concentrate more closely on actual symptom patterns. While the transition is not entirely complete, one feels that during the course of the project the authors shifted from a conception of mental illness in the more traditional psychiatric terms of "disease entities" toward a conception in behavioral terms, that is in terms of patterns of behavior that are more or less adaptive to the individual's life situation.

However tentative the conclusions in this volume may be, the main contribution of the project as a whole lies in its focusing of attention on socioenvironmental factors in the

etiology of mental illness. The suggestion that factors which interfere with physical security, with the achievement of socially valued ends by legitimate means, or with the person's sense of membership in a definite human group and in a moral order are contributing causes of mental disturbance opens up avenues of inquiry that have been severely neglected by researchers in the field of mental health. There are many signs that these neglected areas are at last beginning to receive attention, and the credit for this shift in orientation must be given in large measure to the stimulus of the Stirling County project.

NORMAN M. BRADBURN

University of Chicago

Ego Psychology, Group Dynamics and the Therapeutic Community. By MARSHALL EDELSON New York: Grune & Stratton, 1964 Pp. xii+242. $8.50.

In concert with social scientists, mental-health professionals have come to recognize that social-structural factors have profound effects, positive and negative, upon the experience of the hospitalized mental patient. Recent therapeutic approaches, therefore, have emphasized maximal utilization of the institutional setting as a treatment device. Yet, these approaches have lacked an underlying systematic frame of reference in terms of which such an objective might be implemented. Edelson's book is an attempt to provide one such framework By integrating theories of ego psychology and group dynamics, the book sets out to present a "theoretical foundation for the role of the therapeutic community as an indispensable setting for intensive individual psychotherapy in the treatment of patients."

On the theoretical level, Edelson has taken on an ambitious task. He defines the issue in terms of the age-old problems of the relation of the individual to society; indeed, of the "abnormal" individual to "abnormal" society. Principles of ego structure and function are derived from the works of Freud, Hartmann, Rapaport, and others. A set of loosely tied propositions is generated from this framework which attempt to link ego adaptation to group process. The concepts used in these propositions provide little understanding of the interstitial articulations that occur between the ego and the group. While the basic assumptions of the group-dynamics tradition are acknowledged ("groups have properties of their own which are different from the properties of their subgroups and their individual members"), Edelson fails to spell out how group structure affects or redefines ego adaptation. Rather, he merely indicates that endopsychic processes of the ego become reflected in the group situation. This deficiency results from Edelson's propensity to reduce social phenomena to psychological properties

The theoretical problem is most clearly manifested in the postulated role of the therapeutic community. Its task is to provide opportunities for the characterological deficiencies of the patient to be expressed in activities and other aspects of group living In turn the community is to confront the patient with his difficulties and their consequences for group life Group behavioral concomitants are left residual in this scheme For the operational purposes of the community it is individual behavior that is important insofar as it provides additional information for the therapist in his psychotherapeutic work with the patient One wonders if this outcome requires the effort that went into the theory. At that level the basic issue of the relation of the individual to the group and its consequences for ego adaptation are left unresolved

The problems in the theoretical aspects of this book notwithstanding it should have a practical value for those involved in the treatment endeavor. Sensitive and perceptive insights characterize Edelson's descriptions of the therapeutic community with which he worked To the extent that this form of treatment is considered meaningful practitioners are introduced to a systematic rationale for both administrative and therapeutic decision-making Finally an illuminating postscript discusses the problems and potentialities associated with teaching residents how to understand their own role in relation to the patient within the framework of the therapeutic community The value of the book to sociologists is less clear, although it does establish a point of departure with which those engaged in research in the mental hospital must be familiar.

ANTHONY F. COSTONIS

University of Wisconsin

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NORMAN M. BRADBURN

University of Chicago

Ego Psychology, Group Dynamics and the Therapeutic Community. By MARSHALL EDELSON. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1964. Pp. xii + 242. $8.50.

In concert with social scientists, mental-health professionals have come to recognize that social-structural factors have profound effects, positive and negative, upon the experience of the hospitalized mental patient. Recent therapeutic approaches, therefore, have emphasized maximal utilization of the institutional setting as a treatment device. Yet, these approaches have lacked an underlying systematic frame of reference in terms of which such an objective might be implemented. Edelson's book is an attempt to provide one such framework. By integrating theories of ego psychology and group dynamics, the book sets out to present a "theoretical foundation for the role of the therapeutic community as an indispensable setting for intensive individual psychotherapy in the treatment of patients."

On the theoretical level, Edelson has taken on an ambitious task. He defines the issue in terms of the age-old problems of the relation of the individual to society; indeed, of the "abnormal" individual to "abnormal" society. Principles of ego structure and function are derived from the works of Freud, Hartmann, Rapaport, and others. A set of loosely tied propositions is generated from this framework which attempt to link ego adaptation to group process. The concepts used in these propositions provide little understanding of the interstitial articulations that occur between the ego and the group. While the basic assumptions of the group-dynamics tradition are acknowledged ("groups have properties of their own which are different from the properties of their subgroups and their individual members"), Edelson fails to spell out how group structure affects or redefines ego adaptation. Rather, he merely indicates that endopsychic processes of the ego become reflected in the group situation. This deficiency results from Edelson's propensity to reduce social phenomena to psychological properties.

The theoretical problem is most clearly manifested in the postulated role of the therapeutic community. Its task is to provide opportunities for the characterological deficiencies of the patient to be expressed in activities and other aspects of group living. In turn, the community is to confront the patient with his difficulties and their consequences for group life. Group behavioral concomitants are left residual in this scheme. For the operational purposes of the community, it is individual behavior that is important insofar as it provides additional information for the therapist in his psychotherapeutic work with the patient. One wonders if this outcome requires the effort that went into the theory. At that level, the basic issue of the relation of the individual to the group and its consequences for ego adaptation are left unresolved.

The problems in the theoretical aspects of this book notwithstanding, it should have a practical value for those involved in the treatment endeavor. Sensitive and perceptive insights characterize Edelson's descriptions of the therapeutic community with which he worked. To the extent that this form of treatment is considered meaningful, practitioners are introduced to a systematic rationale for both administrative and therapeutic decision-making. Finally, an illuminating postscript discusses the problems and potentialities associated with teaching residents how to understand their own role in relation to the patient within the framework of the therapeutic community. The value of the book to sociologists is less clear, although it does establish a point of departure with which those engaged in research in the mental hospital must be familiar.

ANTHONY F. COSTONIS

University of Wisconsin

The American Adolescent. By David Gottlieb and Charles Ramsey. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964. Pp. viii+281. $5.95.

This is an extremely superficial and Pollyannaish book in which adolescents' difficulties are largely differences of opinion with their parents—and everything turns out well in the end. The authors' contentions are that adolescent subcultures are reflections of adult cultures and that conflict between the generations is largely due to the fact that "ours is a rapidly changing and complex industrial society, a society with an intricate and elaborate division of labor" (p. 24).

Rehashing the questionable concept of the adolescent subculture, the authors betray the hostility of many sociologists to the concept of culture; among several authorities cited on the existence of this subculture, anthropologsts are conspicuously absent.

The very notion of culture implies several things which should obviate stereotypical invocations of the notion of an adolescent subculture. Parents in every social system bring up their children to participate effectively in the adult culture. They try to teach their children what pressures to expect as adults, what instrumentalities are appropriate for meeting those expectations, what is desirable in life, and so forth. Usually, in any society, the preparations for adult life are geared to the age grade of the child; as a result, adolescents are subjected to different pressures and learning situations than infants or prepubescent children. Does this make for an adolescent subculture any more than it makes for an infant subculture or a prepubescent one? Additionally, is it legitimate or meaningful to use the term subculture for adolescents as well as for, let us say, Puerto Ricans in New York?

While there can be no doubt that our industrial organization might play a role in the colorations of adolescent problems, just as the glacier-like rate of change in other societies might color the nature of their adolescent problems, the authors' treatment of this problem goes little beyond the clichés of standard categories (e.g., occupational choice, status and role, developmental tasks). When most of us were growing up, we were taught that productivity was one of the measures of social and personal usefulness and that, all other things being equal, an honest day's work brought a day's pay. But there is nothing in this book about the forebodings (not necessarily conscious, to be sure) of adolescents who face an industrial society in which electronic processing of productive procedures will require the society to find new ways of allocating income to people for whom there are no jobs, no matter how highly skilled they are. The book speaks of adolescents as if the quiet tree-lined towns of 1920 were still the predominant milieu of American society, in which, after disagreeing with parents, adolescents see the light and achieve a pretty salvation.

It is incredible to me that a book purporting to be about *the* American adolescent fails to discuss suicide; there is no mention of masturbation, the extremes of ambivalence, excruciating loneliness alleviated by the joys of self-discovery and mastery, irrational and warranted guilt, the fear and use of creative energies, the cultural pressures to irrationality as well as rationality, and so forth. Is there no biological basis to adolescent conflict? The myth that primitive cultures do not have these *Sturms und Drangs* is uncritically restated; there are probably very few such societies.

We are also treated to a truncated Gesellian description of adolescence: "Twelve-year olds like to talk very much. . . . The thirteen-year old is very sensitive to criticism of his behavior. . . . The fourteen-year old's vocabulary is much larger and suggests nearly adult [*sic*] thought. . . . The fifteen-year old has become capable of holding grudges and seeking revenge. . . . The sixteen-year old is more tolerant of the world in general." Well, *isn't* life a choo-choo train running on exact schedule?

Also in the how-naïve-can-you-get department, the Peace Corps is offered as a model program for useful adolescence. Hence, the authors suggest the establishment of a Student Education Corps—do we really need more SECs?—which seems to be a rather frightening haven for do-gooders. What insignia will decorate their armbands?

In the midst of this arid book is a warm, human, honest chapter by Francis A. J. Ianni on adolescence in three minority groups.

Yehudi A. Cohen

University of California
Davis

Traité de psychologie sociale. By ROGER DAVAL, FRANÇOIS BOURRICAUD, YVES DELAMOTTE, and ROLAND DORON. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. Pp. xx+530. New fr. 28.

The first of two volumes intended to provide the French university student with a systematic review of social psychology sufficient to prepare him for a certificate in that field within the framework of the *licencié* in psychology and sociology, the *Traité* is part handbook, part textbook. It is also, implicitly, a defense of the idea of social psychology, for, following Durkheim, classical French sociology has maintained a certain resistance to an emergent discipline whose concepts cut across the traditional emphasis on opposition of individual and social structure and whose point of view suggests that old enemy, *"le psychologisme."* It is nicely ironic that Jean Stoetzel, the distinguished sociologist now at the Sorbonne, who contributes a discerning preface to the *Traité*, was appointed in 1945 to the chair in social science at the University of Bordeaux founded by Durkheim; two years later Professor Stoetzel gave the first French course in social psychology. Professor Daval, of the University of Bordeaux and his collaborators continue this tradition of the new. They follow Stoetzel's path rather than Durkheim's not only in the general sense of insisting on the validity of a social psychology but in the special sense of insisting on the primacy of methodology and research technique. The book has, therefore, a decidedly American tone. The great majority of reference in text and bibliography are to American sources, and American sociologists not strong in French will have no difficulty passing from *"personalité de base"* to Lazarsfeld's *"pressions contradictoires"* to *"l'interview focalisée"* to *"les échelles d'attitudes"* of Thurstone and Likert. The authors assert that they are only making explicit "what everyone knows: social psychology . . . has profited from an American contribution which is probably decisive." Thus, after two general chapters on the development and conceptual arsenal of social psychology, Daval and his associates devote the remaining 430 pages to methodology, rather narrowly defined: interview technique, attitude measurement (nearly half the entire book), psychodrama, sociometric testing, and content analysis. The *Traité* ends abruptly with a discussion of tabular arrangement in content analysis. The second volume, now in press, will be devoted to applications, probably along the lines of the well-known American *Handbook*, with its sections on prejudice, voting behavior, and the like. Even so, a broad summary and interpretive chapter is needed to provide perspective on the preceding methodological detail.

Taken together, the two volumes of the *Traité* should perform well the function for which they were intended: to give the French student a sound background in social psychology in preparation for the all-important *examens*. That is no small accomplishment. Nevertheless, I suspect that a great many sociologists—French and American—will be greatly disappointed in the lack of balance in this book, in the overemphasis on details of research technique to the detriment of an integrated approach in which the methodology develops logically from "theories of the middle range" and explanation of divergent concepts and points of view. I would guess that the imbalance stems from the determination of a group of skilled and sophisticated French behavioral scientists to demonstrate that social psychology in France concedes nothing in the way of empirical rigor to social psychology in the United States. The demonstration seems to me unnecessary, however; the scholarly community is well aware of the way in which "classical" French sociology and social psychology have been supplemented and complemented by recent developments in research. In the process a potentially valuable book suffers from an approach in which the concept of role is treated in six pages, in which Freud and the psychoanalytic method receive one-sixth of the attention given to sociometric technique.

RICHARD ROBBINS

Wheaton College
Boston College

Disabled Workers in the Labor Market. By A J. JAFFE, LINCOLN H. DAY, and WALTER ADAMS. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminister Press. 1964. Pp. xiv+191. $5.00.

The concern with unemployment and poverty has led to increasing attention to those disadvantaged in the labor market. Four mil-

lion men between the ages of seventeen and sixty-four have suffered a major physical limitation at some time. Among those in the fifty-five to sixty-four age group, almost one of twenty has suffered serious physical limitations; in the over-sixty-five group, almost two out of five have this experience. Serious injury is not an infrequent occurrence, although it has been infrequently studied by students of the labor market.

What is the job experience of men who have had serious injuries? This is the concern of the report of the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University, which conducted a study in co-operation with the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. A cross-section of more than a thousand men under sixty in the New York metropolitan region who had been involved in workmen's compensation cases in 1950–57 were interviewed in 1960. This population is generally similar to the national cross-section of the seriously injured.

The data do not support the notion of an accident-prone group of workers; the injured are much like the general run of workers. Those who were doing well economically before their injury are more likely to be doing well afterward: Those who are better off are better able to withstand crisis than those who are already in economic difficulty. Most of the injured are able to secure jobs after a while that are as good as or better than those they had at the time of injury. Twenty per cent are the troublesome or "failure" group. They have no jobs or poorer jobs. Those who return to their same firms suffer the least economically, but Jaffe *et al.* can shed little light on what determines return. The failures are characterized by chain injuries, not returning to their firm, lack of education, and those over forty-five. This is the group that especially needs counseling and guidance. But the Jaffe prediction index offers little in this respect: To identify 80 per cent of this failure group of 20 per cent we would have to identify 50 per cent of all cases.

The importance of personnel practices in determining the job future of the injured reminds us of how little we know of the determination and operation of personnel policies. While we have made attacks on the use of one form of testing or another, we still have little empirical material on the formal and informal processes of this central gate-keeping activity.

As one who has learned much from Jaffe's other writings, I found the book disappointingly thin. It reads like a research report to a funding agency, with no effort having been made to transform it into a book. There is no general perspective that can be called sociological (although there is an intriguing finding that absolute deprivation is more significant than relative deprivation in reporting physical and emotional difficulties). An appendix contains a review of relevant literature as though it had no significance for research that was done. The data are under-analyzed; seldom is more than one variable used at a time to explain results. This may be because of the authors' insistence on statistically significant results (which limits the number of cross-tabs). But are possibly spurious relationships arising from one-variable analysis less disturbing than statistically uncertain ones?

Sociologists are going to be called upon to do research that is specifically useful for planning purposes. One danger lies in conducting such research so that it is interesting sociologically but of little practical relevance. Another danger is that it may have policy relevance but lack broader perspective. This volume suffers the latter difficulty, and I suspect it would make a greater contribution at the level of practice if it had a broader focus.

S. M. Miller

Syracuse University

Income Distribution and Social Change. By Richard M. Titmuss. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Pp. 240. $4.25.

Richard Titmuss has given us an excellent book. Contrary to the findings of numerous recent studies on income distribution in the United Kingdom, he finds no trend toward equality or levelling. While his case is not definitive, the reasons for this deficiency are made clear at many points throughout the book where he painstakingly indicates the gaps in statistics presented by the official reporting agencies.

The work is concerned with income before tax and the period under study is from 1938 to

the mid-1950's. The appearance of a "trend toward equality" has resulted in part from changes in the social structure which merely involve a regrouping of the income "units" in question. More frequent and earlier marriage, for example, results in a combining of incomes which reduces the number of very low income units. Longer life expectancy means greater opportunities for spreading income-wealth over more generations of descendants, in which case one extended family of great wealth now appears as numerous smaller units of only moderate wealth. In addition to the social structural changes there is a matter of basic economic conditions needing consideration, since to contrast the mid-1950's with 1938 is to compare a period of full employment with a low point in the business cycle.

Combined with the changes in the social structure of the earning units is another consideration of equal importance, namely, that what is meant by income has not been constant over this period. A considerable shift occurred in the definitions of *statutory* income such that huge quantities of real income no longer are subject to tax. Since those with high incomes are thus enabled to hide substantial portions of their earnings, and since it is the distribution of statutory income which is reported, the appearance again is one of equalization.

Titmuss has given an extensive catalogue of the structural changes and of the redefinitions of the period. In addition, he has presented whatever limited data are available to give some indication of the amounts of income regrouped or redefined. Since the data are so inadequate he can only point to the types of loss to the Exchequer and give rough estimates of the volume of loss. The main problems with the data are round-number estimates, absent explanations, lack of continuous reporting over time, and in some cases, "missing units" running in excess of one million.

As far as this reviewer can judge, Titmuss has, with two possible exceptions, taken the subject as far as is possible given the current state of the data. On this ground his argument is most convincing. The two exceptions are that he has taken before-tax income and he has not considered the benefits from public and social services, omissions which he readily admits. They are in part justified, however, since the leading previous studies on which the equalization thesis are based also worked with pre-tax figures, one of them finding that the impact of tax increases during the period were relatively unimportant. (This finding, incidentally, is similar to the experience in the United States.) The concern with shifts in the size of the tax base, moreover, is clearly of prior importance to the question of the distribution within the taxable remainder. As for the social services, the fact of considerable increases in tax avoidance on the part of high-income groups probably means that the cost of social services has come to be paid by the low-income beneficiaries themselves. This would mean, in other words, that there is probably little redistribution taking place through this process.

In addition to the immediate concerns of the book, there are many suggestive leads for other lines of inquiry. There are suggestions for the reconsideration of the welfare state, the benefits of which appear to be more of a "grant" by the ruling classes than an imposition by the underdogs. The way it works out, the welfare state does not hurt the high-income groups and allows them the very useful appearance of having been put upon. There are leads for a study of the behavior of data-reporting agencies. The care with which income data are let out indicates a rather considered "feeding" process, the result of which is that only one conclusion appears possible. Should one push to an opposite conclusion, he has to support his position either with meagre scraps of information or with the aid of numerous inferences. Linked to this "feeding process" is an interpreting process. The extent to which some of the leading income analysts in Great Britain either avoided consideration of significant gaps or else satisfied themselves with crude estimates as to their importance is amazing. Titmuss shows repeatedly that these turn out to be underestimates. There is much food for thought here for those interested in the sociology of intellectuals.

The position Titmuss argues against has provided one of the mainstays of the "end of ideology" thesis. The largely unchallenged reign of this viewpoint tells us much about the state of intellectuals outside the Establishment. One consequence of non-pluralistic periods, especially in the contemporary situation, is that

the interests of the non-intellectual masses are not represented; the intellectuals of the left have failed them and have needlessly allowed the left position to become a defensive one. The entire character of the left in our new age is considerably changed. Direct action is ever less a "realistic" possibility. The average man cannot defend himself in the face of the highly technical considerations that rule his life; he needs technically trained intellectuals to "represent" his interests for him and he is dependent on these "representatives." One of the very fine things about Titmuss' work is that he performs this representative function with diligence, making his findings available at least to the educated layman. He is continuously unveiling and putting into understandable terms events which would otherwise appear as dull and obscure bureaucratic processes. In his hands, laws are not just print on paper but things made by human beings, administered by them, and reported on by them. He frequently takes us back to the enactment of a law and follows it through its many revisions as well as through its administrative interpretations.

It should be remembered that the book, for all its interest to intellectual detectives, tracks down the impact of English tax law and that its direct concern for American scholars is therefore somewhat limited. The considerations most applicable to American experience are in chapter iii on social structure and the distribution of incomes.

RICHARD F. HAMILTON

Princeton University

The Urban Ambience: A Study of San Juan, Puerto Rico. By THEODORE CAPLOW, SHELDON STRYKER, and SAMUEL E. WALLACE. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. 243. $8.50.

Interview five hundred women, twenty each from twenty-five barrios in San Juan, women chosen because of their residential contiguity along a street north from a certain centrally located intersection in each barrio. Ask questions about neighborliness, visitation patterns, and satisfaction with the neighborhood. Then conclude, "The skillful and sensitive planner will not want to substitute some symmetrical scheme for the living network that constitutes a city, but its very complexity and want of symmetry will urge him perpetually to improve it [the network?]." This *The Urban Ambience* does. It is difficult to visualize the authors' design of their "neighborhood," since "contiguous" is not defined, but it is on its face absurd to define a neighborhood as "the entire network of inter-relations among the twenty [contiguous] households." Operationalism run rampant is not sound sociology, regardless of the neatness of the resulting correlations.

Or proclaim that "we need only provide adequate physical facilities, both inside and outside the individual dwelling, and the society need only to provide a rising level of welfare, for increased neighborliness to follow of itself." This *The Urban Ambience* does.

The book contains several distinctive themes, none handled well. It is a practical guide "to provide the planners of San Juan with more accurate knowledge of how ecological zones and neighborhoods are structured in their community and how residential conditions can be improved." It has a theoretical goal: to reflect "on the nature of urbanism and the general question of how small voluntary groups develop and survive." It includes an ecological history of San Juan, and disclosure of ingenious indexes to determine ecological areas in a city which does not conform to a concentric zone pattern. But the connection between urban ecology and neighborhood ambience is unclear.

The study reports amazing success in conducting all the originally planned interviews and describes the ethically questionable "call-back" technique of presenting a formal apology to those who refused to be interviewed on first contact.

We learn that "bedroom density is inversely and significantly associated with neighboring," that "homogeneity [of neighborhood] and intensity of neighboring" are positively correlated, and that "families with higher income tend to know their neighbors better."

Tantalizing hypotheses permeate the study. The conclusion that "the more young children in a family, the more likely are the parents to be dissatisfied with the neighborhood and to intend to move" is at odds with the oft-stated observation that American children initiate neighborhood ambience. The unsubstantiated observation that the comfortably housed subur-

banite in San Juan may be more culturally poor than the villager or slum-dweller suggests that the child in America's lily-white suburb may be *the* culturally deprived American of today.

It is regrettable that the authors did not consider the Latin Americans' general preference for urban over rural life and that they dismissed kinship as a significant variable in urban ambience.

A major arithmetic problem remains unsolved. The book reports that about one-fourth of the population of San Juan migrates to the United States mainland each year (although they may not settle permanently), but also that "more than half of all the dwelling units in the urban area were occupied by only one family" during a recent four-year period.

Although the book as a whole is somewhat distressing, the spice of several provocative hypotheses and the adventurous combinations of data from the interviews make it unwise to dismiss summarily this multifaceted study.

LEONARD D. CAIN, JR.

Sacramento State College

Problemas de urbanización en América Latina. By LUIS CALDERON, with JAIME DORSELAER and ARTURO CALLE. Bogotá: Oficina International de Investigaciones Sociales de FERES, 1963. Pp. 240.

The bulk of this book consists of a research report by Father Luis Calderon. Father Calderon made a sample survey of three different sections of Bogotá. His aim was to discover the degree to which social contacts took place within neighborhoods. The purpose was to test the hypothesis that the "neighborhood" in the large cities of Latin America has lost to a certain degree its retentive power for social contacts, and thus its social cohesiveness.

Father Calderon found, for example, that in each area examined there is a direct correlation between the social position of the individual (i.e., a worker would be classed as lower class, while the professional man and the merchant would be at the other end of the social scale) and the proportion of his social contacts outside of his neighborhood. He also found that the length of stay in a neighborhood does not influence the outside contacts for the upper and the lower classes, but that there is some correlation for the middle classes.

Most of the book consists of a careful documentation of each step undertaken in the research project. Much of this material could have been presented in an appendix. The major gap in the study is the lack of any attempt to explain the findings. Why is there a tendency for intraneighborhood relations to diminish in the upper social groups? What is the significance of this phenomenon? There is no analysis of the hypothesis initially stated that there is a tendency for intraneighborhood contacts to diminish over time. Length of time in the neighborhood of a person who was interviewed does not answer the question. Some evidence of conditions ten or twenty years ago would have helped to answer the question.

I was puzzled by the all-inclusive title of this study—"Problems of Urbanization in Latin America." I wonder if the disintegration of the neighborhood is really the principal urban problem in Latin America today. I am thinking especially of other problems which seem a great deal more pressing, such as the invasion of cities by people from the countryside, who are looking for jobs which are not available, or the problem of integration into the complexities of an urban civilization of illiterate newcomers. Although Father Calderon's work is very informative, it does not illuminate what in my opinion are the most basic problems of urbanization in Latin American countries.

The other authors have contributed one slim essay each. Dorselaer's essay deals with the socioeconomic function of Latin American cities. It consists mainly of a short discussion of the "tertiary crisis," that is, the lack of opportunities in industry for new arrivals in Latin American cities, who are absorbed by the tertiary (or service) sector and hence represent a fairly unproductive section of society. Once the problem is stated with some data to back it, the essay stops. Calle's essay consists of a very superficial unquantitative description of the well-known principal characteristics of slums in Latin America. The connection between Calderon's work and the two essays escapes me.

WERNER BAER

Yale University

Japan's New Middle Class. By EZRA F. VOGEL. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Pp. xiii+299. $6.50.

Subtitled "The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb," this terse work is written by a versatile social scientist who, with his family, lived, studied, and carried on research in Japan from 1958 to 1960.

The Vogels went to Japan to obtain information on middle-class Japanese families. In order to make their research design comparable to an earlier study of Irish-Italian-American families, they selected six families, each with an emotionally disturbed child, and six families with "normal" children and saw these families at least once a week for more than a year. In addition to utilizing the psychiatric-casework technique, they interacted as participant observers with many other people in a variety of situations.

The idea of focusing their research on the salary men and their families was sharpened during the field phase of the study. Vogel develops the thesis that an important element in Japan's social order is the emergence of a new middle class. This stratum of society is comprised primarily of employees of stable business organizations and their families.

The main body of the book is divided into four parts: (1) "The Significance of Salary," (2) "The Family and Other Social Systems," (3) "Internal Family Processes," and (4) "Mamachi [the suburb intensively studied] in Perspective."

For the people of Japan, salary men are today a symbol of a "bright new life." They have regular income, security, substantial leisure time, and have fewer traditional obligations to meet. The employee's salary and fringe benefits rise sharply with the number of years of service, and except for extreme incompetence or misbehavior dismissal is rare.

The salary man's social contacts are, for the most part, with his occupational associates. Opportunities for a wife to meet her spouse's friends and their families are minimal, and her husband very seldom participates in her neighborhood and domestic world. Relatives, children, and education are the main areas of mutual interest.

School for the children is the primary goal and major expense item for most middle-class families. The *rite de passage* into a good company is through the successful passing of "infernal entrance examinations" which may start as early as kindergarten and which become increasingly difficult. Large-scale organizations consider the university attended the most important criterion in hiring personnel.

As one would expect from a work of this kind, there are topics and certain details which are not included. For example, what physical and mental illnesses confront middle-class families, and do companies provide any health care? How is personal and social deviancy handled? Since compulsory occupational retirement occurs at age fifty-five or sixty, what adjustment problems are currently prevalent?

While a "Report on the Field Work" appears in the Appendix, this reviewer would have appreciated the inclusion of the questionnaires that were utilized and specific information on the projective and sentence-completion tests More details as to how the families with abnormal children were selected would have been illuminating.

Withal, the research, which made use of an interdisciplinary approach, has much depth and sensitivity; it is well organized and lucidly presented. In sum, this scholarly book makes an important contribution to cross-cultural studies of the family, social stratification, and industrial sociology.

I. ROGER YOSHINO

University of Arizona

Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. By JÜRGEN HABERMAS. ("Politica." Vol. IV.) Neuwied: Herman Luchterhand Verlag, 1962. Pp. 291. DM. 28.

Jugend und Gesellschaft. By FRIEDRICH H. TENBRUCK. Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1962. Pp. 127.

This book is an excellent example of substantive sociological analysis in the dialectical tradition. Among other things, such analysis is critical. The standard of evaluation inheres in the subject matter itself: historical reality is contrasted with the idea it has of itself, or what it claims to be.

The idea in this case is the concept of the public as developed in the liberal period of bourgeois society. It means a community of publicly reasoning private persons, distinct from the sphere of familial privacy, and dialectically opposed to the sphere of state au-

thority. The political function of the public is not only to communicate the demands of civil society to the state authorities. The concept of the public claims that the latter expresses, through its reasoning, that objective truth which, if it is enacted in the general norms of law, serves to transform political power into rational administration. The image of a substantively rational society free from power and coercion thus becomes the evaluative benchmark of the analysis.

Habermas draws on philosophical arguments, historical description, and social-research data in the sweep of an argument covering the historical development of Western European society from the sixteenth century to the present. He first traces those features of bourgeois society which correspond to (and have given rise to) the liberal model of the public. But the concept is shown to transcend reality, since its full realization rests on certain conditions which even at the time were not met. Turning to the development of modern mass society and the welfare state, Habermas then shows how these changes further erode the preconditions of a public corresponding to the liberal model. While the public with its critical function remains a legitimating principle of the modern state, it actually is seen to degenerate to the publicized opinions of official institutions and formal organizations on the one hand, and to the private opinions of a non-reasoning population of consumers on the other. In part, this development is shown to result from the very efforts to realize the liberal models: The dynamic of history is dialectical.

In the detailed analysis of the process, the evaluation of the brilliantly presented facts is consistently negative. This may seem insufficient as long as the basis for such evaluation is the historical form of the liberal public. The more salient standard is the—never fully realized—political function attributed to the public. When Habermas explicitly uses this standard, he finds a potential functional alternative in the critical public which *may* develop within large-scale formal organizations: the hint of a happy end in which the author himself hardly believes.

With other authors using the dialectical approach, Tenbruck subscribes to the maxim that social phenomena must be analyzed as particular manifestations of the general, or in a more pedestrian formulation, as parts of the social whole. Thus he argues forcefully against youth sociology which merely engages in describing research into the behavior and attitudes of youth. Youth should be analyzed as a social group determined by its position within modern society. This perspective gives him a framework in which to reassess familiar theses and empirical data of youth sociology.

Youth, he argues, is a determinate social group resulting from delayed entry into adult life and continuous contact within the age-group. This social group is today a major agent of socialization: Modern youth socializes itself. Family socialization, impeded by the segmental social experience of parents, is largely unable to impart, instead of training for specific roles, general principles of behavior which provide guidance in all the non-predictable adult roles the adolescent might later have to play. The self-socialization of youth has important consequences, both for its non-rebellious attitude toward the parental generation and for the character of the norms and the behavior patterns taught in the youthful peer group. Most important, Tenbruck emphasizes that youth as a social group lies open to the direct and unmediated influence of organizations which, while mobilizing and utilizing youth for various commercial, political, and ideological purposes, inadvertently act as socializing forces.

RENATE MAYNTZ

Freie Universität Berlin

The Crisis in Medical Education. By LESTER J. EVANS. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964. Pp. vi+101. $4.00.

Along with all other institutions in modern society, medical education and medical practice are regarded as being in a crisis. These observations are made in a series of graceful essays by a person who has spent many years in medical education and related problems. His observations are necessarily sweeping, but still he quite successfully points to pivotal events and conditions leading to the current status of medical education. The last basic adjustment medical education made is symbolized by the date 1910, the year in which the famous Flexner report was published, showing the bad state of most medical schools

of that period in relation to the burgeoning of scientific medical knowledge. In the ensuing twenty years medical education embraced the biological and physical sciences, enriching the medical sciences. Further, the triad of teaching, research, and service in association with a university became the accepted pattern. This pattern is still the viable one, but is being strained tremendously by the demands society is placing on medical education and medicine as medical knowledge and technology proliferate and as they are overtaken, through their own successes, by chronic illness, rehabilitation, long-term care, and related problems. Medical education, having successfully absorbed the biological and physical sciences, now needs to do likewise with the behavioral sciences in order to cope as successfully with current and future problems as it has with past problems. There needs to be increasing emphasis on "patient care research," a term rarely heard before World War II. It is also of interest to sociologists to learn that the future medical practitioner needs to be taught self-awareness that "he is a part of the system, is influenced by it, and influences it," a task to be intrusted to strategically placed behavioral scientists in the medical-school curriculum. Finally, there is a plea for a human laboratory, better known to sociologists as human ecology, which should become an integral aspect of evolving medical education. For sociologists who have had little exposure to current concerns in medical education, this little book will give a preliminary view of the vast challenges facing medicine and sociology.

ODIN W. ANDERSON

University of Chicago

Understanding the Multiple-Problem Family: A Conceptual Analysis and Exploration in Early Identification. By L. L. GEISMAR and MICHAEL A. LA SORTE. New York: Association Press, 1964. Pp. 224. $5.95.

The authors attempt to clarify the concept of the multiple-problem, or disorganized family, to present a systematic analysis of its functioning, and to explore ways in which social work can achieve greater precision in the diagnosis of its therapeutic needs. In setting up a conceptual model for the identification and assessment of family disorganization, family functioning is defined in terms of both the performance of roles by individual members and the over-all character of role performance, with emphasis upon the latter. The method for assessing family functioning was developed in connection with the Family Control Project of St. Paul, called the Profile of Family Functioning, in which profiles were obtained through the use of open-end interviews and the reading of agency records. Data were collected relative to nine categories and twenty-six subcategories, each of which was rated by two or more judges.

Conceptual validity of the profile technique, the authors assert, had been established previously. The authors attempt to establish external validity by comparing four sets of data. In general, the profiles of the four samples are not too different in mean scores of the nine categories, all means lying somewhat above the middle of the seven-point scale toward adequate functioning.

The next step in the research program was to select a sample representing the two extremes of the stability-instability continuum for profile analysis. Seventy-five families were selected from among 300 living in a public-housing project in New Haven. Agency records were utilized in locating both the disorganized and the stable families. Each family was interviewed and the profile scores determined. Upon the basis of the profile scores, the families were divided into high, median, and low and compared in terms of eight categories and twenty-four subcategories of family functioning. The maximum difference is approximately two and two-thirds points in the seven-point scale for both major and minor categories.

An analysis of a series of background factors was made to determine their causal significance in family disorganization. The book concludes with a discussion of the relationship between social research and action. Poverty is emphasized as basic to the inadequate functioning in the instrumental areas of economic, health, and household practices. The authors' own data, however, show greater adequacy of family functioning in these areas than in individual adjustment, family relationships, and child care. The book ends with a plea for the utilization of an intensive casework approach to the treatment of multiproblem families.

The study's major contribution is the de-

velopment of a model by which the disorganized family may be dissected through the systematic differentiation of family roles. It is unfortunate that a more reliable scheme of scoring than the utilization of judges has not been developed and that the data come exclusively from families known to social-welfare agencies. The use of judges in determining profile scores shrinks the continuum of instability-stability by virtually eliminating the unstable half of the seven-point scale so far as mean scores for any category for any sample is concerned, including the specifically chosen extremely disorganized families.

Serious errors of ideological bias creep into the interpretation. For example, the poverty theme would seem to have been very much overworked. What the authors have found with reference to poverty they have built into their data through their sampling process. To infer that what is true of lower-class families is characteristic of all families is to ignore all the extant sociological analyses of class differences.

Whatever may be the deficiencies of this study, however, they are outweighed by a number of highly commendable features. First, the testing of the external validity of the profile technique suggests the plausibility and potential fruitfulness of developing scaling techniques for each of the categories and subcategories. The problem of the differentiation of family roles and the development of scaling techniques for each is of major importance to the building of a more precise model of family disorganization. Second, the comparison of stable and unstable families reveals the need for greater attention to the degree of discrimination in the selection of subcategories which go into any general measure of family disorganization. Third, the exploration of antecedent behavior patterns and the relationship of these variables to family disorganization has added new variables to those already well established. Careful examination of the percentage differences between the high, median, and low functioning families, however, tends to raise grave doubts about the virtue of all common-sense variables in the scientific understanding of family disorganization.

ERNEST R. MOWRER
Northwestern University

The Personality of Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Subjective Factors in Law Based on Interviews with German Lawyers. By WALTER O. WEYRAUCH. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii+316. $7.50.

This is a strange book: three parts amateur psychiatry, one part amateur sociology mixed with a little law, and just a dash of bitters. It was written by a lawyer who formerly practiced in Germany and is now a professor of law at the University of Florida. His purpose was to determine the perspective and the personality of lawyers; he was especially interested in determining whether the lawyer's personality characteristics conform to the "social function of maintaining the status quo." He is trying to find universals. But Professor Weyrauch recognizes and states over and over again that his hypotheses are tentative and that his findings need verification.

The study is based mainly on free associational interviews with 130 respondents, most of them Germans. Slightly over one-half of the sample was previously known to the interviewer and the rest he picked up in whatever manner he could. The result of this casual method of choosing respondents, which the author defends by stating that his approach is clinical rather than statistical, is that he or he and his wife as a tandem interviewed thirty-four attorneys, thirty-two judges, nineteen law professors, eighteen government lawyers, six house counsels, four law students, and seventeen laymen.

Part I of Weyrauch's book is devoted to describing his research methods. In this section of about sixty-three pages, the author discusses everything from the evolution of the research problem, the reason for using a German sample, to the necessity for the interviewer to "interpret the various shades of silence in the data." Each methodological decision is painfully described as if the author were on the couch and the reader sitting in the analyst's chair. His own predisposition toward psychoanalytic thinking leads him to the continuous use of such words as unconscious, preconscious, and semiconscious and to a certain amount of what might be considered psychoanalytic interpretation. For example, he concluded that because his respondents "implied a lack of qualifications in

the interviewer, wrong sampling, unscientific methods, intuitive speculations, and the like," they were showing hostility. In a way the reader learns almost as much about the author as he does about German lawyers.

The interviews as described in Part II are evaluated according to the eight value categories developed by Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal who also wrote a favorable foreword to this volume. Their eight value categories are enlightenment, skills, respect, affection, rectitude, wealth, power, and well-being. It is only as the author uses these categories that he gives any systematic structure to this book. For free association can lead anywhere and except for the restraining hands of type cost and the categories of Lasswell and McDougal, it does. Too many topics are discussed and usually in too general a fashion. The author finds lawyers among other things to be hostile, critical, compulsive, parochial, unhappy, and many hypochondriacal. They have personality traits "that counteract or retard a wide distribution of democratic values." Their standards "may cover up unconscious predispositions and identifications, which frequently favor the status quo and establish power alignments."

What can be said favorably about this book is that it is a thoroughly honest one and it does present some interesting insights about German lawyers and tidbits about their attitudes toward the United States, toward Jews, toward the law, and toward legal training. Perhaps it may have the additional value of inciting someone to attempt a scientific investigation on the personality of lawyers and its meaning for the client and the law.

ERWIN O. SMIGEL
New York University

The Vanishing Village: A Danish Maritime Community. By ROBERT T. ANDERSON and BARBARA GALLATIN ANDERSON. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Pp. 148. $5.00.

The assimilation of once independent communities into satellite or suburban status can precipitate, as more than a few studies have shown, dislocation of community functions and fragmentation of community norms. That such assimilation need not necessarily result in such consequences, however, is the main thesis of *The Vanishing Village*. The village chosen for study by the Andersons is Dragor, Denmark. For centuries it led a virtually isolated existence despite close geographical proximity to Copenhagen. Economically, culturally, psychologically, the villagers might have been thousands of miles removed from the mainstream of Danish life for all the effect it had on them. But toward the end of the last century Dragor's historic isolation was invaded by the same amalgam of negative and positive technological forces that were altering so many other parts of the world: on the one hand technological displacement of traditional occupations and home crafts; on the other, technological opportunities emanating from the city, the latter becoming irresistible after 1907 when the Copenhagen-Dragor railroad was completed.

The authors, following now familiar ethnological methods, have based their excellent study largely on a year's visit to Dragor. Depth interviews, questionnaires, direct and participant observation, as well as study of diaries generously placed at the authors' disposal by some of the older families are the prime sources of information, though public records and other forms of historical documentation are not disregarded. From these it has been possible to reconstruct the transition of a small community from a condition rooted deeply in the kindred and church to one in which the processes of individualization and secularization have become as nearly dominant in small Dragor as in Copenhagen itself. The successive chapters deal with the roles of men and women, with the nature of the family (there is a special chapter on sexual behavior among Dragorians that is almost a model of what such a study and report should be), with the rites of passage, the nature of religious belief, social structure, and so on.

The book is set in the context of interest in the processes of change, and if the authors see more continuity and frictionless adjustment in social behavior than sociologists commonly find, the explanation lies, I would judge, in the nature of the people and culture involved rather than in presuppositions that supposedly differentiate ethnological from sociological studies of community. The book is mercifully free of the effort, all too common in sociological empirical studies these days, to upgrade

the intrinsic significance of its data by heavy-handed importation of classical or other large-scale theories and concepts.

ROBERT A. NISBET

*University of California
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The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. III: *Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages*. Edited by M. M. POSTAN, E. E. RICH, and EDWARD MILLER New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Pp. xvi+696. $13.50.

The plans for this series were laid down by the first editors, John Clapham and Eileen Power. In the past, economic policy and policy-making institutions had dominated the interests of medievalists. Now the first two volumes of *The Cambridge Economic History* were to champion interpretations that undermined the view that the history of trade and industry could be absorbed into the matrix of manorialism. It would therefore be necessary to postpone the treatment of economic policy and policy-making institutions until the third volume of this series. The present volume is framed to serve just such a purpose, divided as it is into two sections, the first treating economic organizations and the second, policy.

Unfortunately, better than twenty years have elapsed between the publication of Volumes I and III. The chapters of Professors van Werveke on "The Rise of the Towns" and Verlinden on "Markets and Fairs," written almost a quarter-century ago, can hardly be expected to be crisp or current. There is also a serious imbalance in the structure of the entire work. Carlo Cipolla's chapter on "The Italian and Iberian Peninsulas" is much too brief, lacking the concrete detail that would render his generalizations less flamboyant. On the other hand, E. B. and M. M. Fryde's chapter on Northwestern Europe's public credit is detailed and tedious. Further, there is no discussion of the development of public credit in Southern Europe—a grievous oversight. Likewise, the most prominent of all burgeoning fields in medieval economic history—money and coinage—is treated in a most cursory fashion in a long note, optimistically spoken of by the editor as an appendix. Finally, the last essay, which by all rights should be the capstone of the volume, Gabriel Le Bras' chapter on "Conceptions of Economy and Society," is a pedestrian exercise.

Three happy exceptions are the chapters by R. de Roover on "The Organization of Trade," S. L. Thrupp on "The Gilds," and A. B. Hibbert on "The Economic Policies of Towns." The first two studies are marked by a masterful control of complex data and admirable lucidity of style, while the third is bold and adventuresome, stressing the mounting intervention of governments in late medieval economic life.

To paraphrase a felicitous comment of Trevor-Roper's, economic policies and organizations do not mobilize themselves. This view, echoed in the humanistically oriented work of such sensitive practitioners as Georges Duby and Armando Sapori, finds no place in the least distinguished volume of this once formidable and avant-garde series.

MARVIN B. BECKER

University of Rochester

A Cross-Polity Survey. By ARTHUR S. BANKS and ROBERT B. TEXTOR. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963. Pp. ix+1416. $20.00.

One of the more glaring problems in social research is that a tremendous amount of time and money may be spent to gather data which are used for only one investigation. In brief, the use of the same body of data by different investigators is the exception rather than the rule, and it is in this context that the present publication is most noteworthy.

What the authors have done can best be described in three steps. First, they attempted to classify all of the world's 115 independent polities (as of April 1, 1963) in terms of fifty-seven variables—location, territorial size, population size, density, population growth rate, urbanization, percentage of population that is agricultural, gross national product, per capita gross national product, international financial status, economic-developmental status, literacy rate, freedom of the press, newspaper circulation per one thousand population, religious composition, religious homogeneity, linguistic homogeneity, date of independence, degree of "Westernization,"

former colonial ruler, historical type of political modernization, period of political modernization, ideological orientation, system style, constitutional status of present regime, government stability, representative character of current regime, current electoral system, freedom of group opposition, political enculturation, sectionalism, interest articulation by associational groups, interest articulation by institutional groups, interest articulation by non-associational groups, interest articulation by anomic groups, interest articulation by political parties, interest aggregation by political parties, interest aggregation by executive, interest aggregation by legislature, number and dominance of political parties, qualitative aspects of party system, stability of party system, *personalismo*, political leadership, leadership charisma, vertical power distribution, horizontal power distribution, legislative-executive structure, current status of legislative, character of legislature, current status of executive, character of bureaucracy, political participation by the military, role of police in political activity, character of legal system, and status with reference to communism.

Second, having classified the polities, the authors dichotomized the variables and cross-classified the polities (evidently) by all combinations of variables taken two at a time. Third, they identified and reported those tabulations which resulted in a designated level of statistical significance (a Fisher value of less than .150 for a two-by-two contingency table).

Rather than give summary statistics, the authors report not only the characteristics of each polity but also the polities in the right and the left columns of all the matrices (and in some instances all quadrants). In short, the data are reported and organized in such a way as to facilitate their use by other investigators. However, the data are subject to at least five limitations (some of which are freely admitted by the authors). First, in numerous instances the data employed in classification are of a dubious quality. Second, some of the variables are such that for purely conceptual reasons the classification must be "judgmental" rather than "objective." As an illustration, imagine attempting to decide if "interest articulation by associational groups" is significant, moderate, limited, or negligible in a given country. Third, a fairly large number of countries could not be classified in all instances because of a lack of requisite data, and this introduces a possible bias in the way of selectivity. Fourth, in some cases the authors employ a most questionable basis for classification. For example, in treating governmental stability they actually classified polities as to *type* of government (how they determine the stability of the different types is left implicit) and not governmental stability per se (see p. 8). Fifth, and this is most unfortunate, the authors did not attempt a formal reliability check of their classifications. Despite these limitations, the data may be of value to sociologists, and all the more so since the decks of cards used in analysis are available at cost (see p. 49 for details).

The results of the cross-tabulations are secondary to the data. For one thing, the search for patterns evidently was not guided by any theory; indeed, one could cite this investigation as a classic illustration of crude empiricism. Equally serious, the authors do not even attempt an evaluation of the results, leaving the reader to find what he will in the hundreds of pages of computer printout.

Space limitations preclude an analysis of the research techniques, particularly the use of the computer, but anyone concerned with the problem of data analysis will profit by reading the first 118 pages.

JACK P. GIBBS

University of Texas

Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. By DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. xiii+171. $6.00.

This book is the result of a survey of the then leading nationalist party, the Istiqlal, conducted by Ashford in Morocco in 1958. The data collected are viewed through two related frames of reference: (1) "to see how effective the party has been in placing its more talented officials and in meeting the rapidly increasing expectations and aspirations they attach to the nationalist movement," and (2) "as glimpses into the political psychology of the party militant in a new nation." Indorsed and aided by the national Istiqlal leadership, Ashford sent out questionnaires to 1,200 party secretaries. Of these, 337 were returned, and only 93 were usable. Ashford himself carefully notes over and over again that the sifted

"sample" was too limited and biased in the direction of the more literate of the party secretaries to form the basis for generalizations at any level. But he rightly claims that the data gathered could serve to suggest hypotheses on problems of contemporary nation-building. And indeed his book is teeming with these. The only problem is that the rapid growth of studies on emerging nations in the past few years has already produced most of the hypotheses he presents. Had the book appeared earlier, it might have aided us in moving beyond some of the hypotheses sooner.

My comments should not be construed as criticism of the quality of Ashford's study. Nor do I wish to imply that it has nothing to offer us. The book has many merits. First, one of its most important features is Ashford's discussion in Appendix II of problems involved in planning, printing, and administering a questionnaire in an underdeveloped and culturally different country. His recognition of the paucity of "comparable guidelines in designing his own questionnaire . . ." motivated in part the publication of the study. The other part is tied to his major concern—that of the development of general theory founded on data and adequate to the task of comprehending the processes going on in emerging nations. This study performs a service by implicitly and explicitly indicating some of the problems attendant on these related ends.

Second, the wide range of topics covered in his analysis gives us in one book most of the relevant questions being posed today on the problem of creating viable modern societies. In this sense the study serves as a quasi-guide for researchers—particularly novice scholars.

Third, Ashford implies in this study and states more clearly elsewhere (e.g., in the July, 1964, issue of the *Annals*) that, ultimately, less-centralized political systems are more conducive to the success of developing and maintaining modern societies than are more-centralized systems. He feels that such systems permit more effective disposal of local problems and handling of the general social differentiation ancillary to modernization. He shares this view with others, notably S. N. Eisenstadt (see, e.g., the latter's article in the July, 1964, issue of *Economic Development and Cultural Change*). However, most other social scientists, to one degree or another, accept political authoritarianism in emerging nations as necessary. They tend to affix blame at other points in the "social system" when these regimes falter in the creation of modern societies. Needless to say, I have oversimplified both views here. And without assessing either, I would only note that it is scientifically comforting to know that some are not tied to the original social science explanation of authoritarian regimes in emergent nations. Thus Ashford's hypotheses which center on this problem may be quite suggestive.

Fourth, for those interested in North Africa, and in Morocco in particular, the data assembled and the analysis of them are enlightening. One would gather, however, that specifically for Morocco, Ashford in retrospect would have prepared a somewhat different questionnaire. (Appendix I provides a copy of the questionnaire.)

And last, Ashford's grasp and application of theory from the social sciences in the present study rekindles the fire of the interdisciplinary approach.

ELAINE C. HAGOPIAN
Smith College

Slovenia's Role in Yugoslav Economy. By TOUSSAINT HOCEVAR. Columbus, Ohio: Slovenian Research Center, 1964. Pp. ix+62. $1.50.

Yugoslavia has frequently been described as the most complex country in Europe. It has a population of somewhat less than 19,000,000, but two alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin), three religions (Orthodox, Catholic, and Moslem), four languages (Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian), five nationalities (Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin), six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and a dozen national minorities. It is, indeed, strange that a country of such tremendous historical, cultural, and socioeconomic diversity has, with very few exceptions, so far failed to attract the attention of American social scientists.

Good scientific literature on Yugoslavia is still relatively scarce. Even a few available "authorities" often contradict each other, as

the following examples of statements on Slovenia, the northernmost region of Yugoslavia, show. R. G. Duncan writes that 86 per cent of Slovenes are illiterate and that they have no literature of their own. He then develops a very interesting "theory" to explain why this is so (*Immigration and Assimilation*, Boston, 1933, pp. 309–10). Unfortunately for the author and for his readers, he must have used very old statistics, and he repeatedly presented the percentage of literacy as that of illiteracy. His "rational theory" that almost convincingly "explains" these distorted results should be of some interest to sociologists of knowledge.

On the opposite extreme we find such statements as the following: "Literacy in Slovenia is almost 100 per cent and the general level of urban, rural and domestic culture is high even by West European standards. Their beautiful literature is often characterized by a gentle melancholy or a positive constructive optimism" (R. G. A. de Bray, *Guide to the Slavonic Languages*, London and New York, 1951, p. 363). And "the publication of books in Slovenia is proportionately the highest in the world" (Bernard Newman, *Unknown Yugoslavia*, London, 1960, p. 187).

Amidst such contradictory reports, one is apt to welcome any new publication which represents an honest attempt to study and present the facts in an objective, scientific manner. Professor Hocevar's little book is such an attempt. While written primarily for economists, the book should provide with a set of hypotheses also those sociologists who are interested in the complex interactions of economic, political, religious, nationality, and "cultural" roles.

As might be expected, centuries of Turkish occupation are believed to have contributed to an economic and "cultural" retardation of the Southern Yugoslav regions, while a millennium of Slovenian symbiosis with other Central European nations stimulated more rapid economic, technological, and educational developments in Alpine Slovenia. When in 1918 the highly diverse South Slavic peoples were thrown into a common Yugoslav would-be melting pot, the Slovenes retained a favored position in the field of economy, technology, and over-all education, while the Serbs, whose political and military history was more developed, rose to a dominant role in politics. In this process, there was a steady flow of Slovenian national income southward, but the Slovenes still managed to maintain the highest standard of living in the country, although decreasingly so. Yugoslav official statistics are reticent on this point, but a Trieste author (mentioned in the Preface to Hocevar's book) claims that the Slovenes were in recent years forced to contribute nearly 40 per cent of their national income to the development of economically less advanced Yugoslav republics. Hocevar does not give us a clear answer on the "redistribution" of national income, but the reader finds some compensation in several good statistical comparisons of the relative economic and industrial developments of highly diverse Yugoslav regions. A relatively rapid industrial progress is evident in all regions, although in some more so at the expense of others.

My over-all impression is that Dr. Hocevar's book is only a beginning, but it certainly is a good beginning in a highly interesting area that calls for many additional economic, sociological, and historical studies. The book is sold by EURAM BOOKS, Box 1159, Cleveland, Ohio, 44103.

GILES EDWARD GOBETZ

Cleveland, Ohio

Explorations in Cultural Anthropology: Essays in Honor of George Peter Murdock. Edited by WARD H. GOODENOUGH. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964. Pp. xiii+635. $12.50.

The twenty-three papers in this *Festschrift* by Murdock's former graduate students at Yale cover a vast array of problems and topics. In fact, a glance at the table of contents tempts the reader to question the logic of a discipline that apparently attempts to encompass the entire realm of human experience in non-Western societies. Is there an intellectual rationale for a collection of papers on language, social organization, kinship terminology, cognition, religious behavior, cultural change, land-tenure, material culture, law, political organization, ecology, warfare, archeology, and ethnohistory?

Fortunately for the uninitiated reader, Goodenough discusses the unifying concerns

of cultural anthropology in his introduction. He notes that, of the social sciences, anthropology combines an interest in the natural history of man with an interest in the natural science of society. As natural history, anthropology tries to account for the similarities and differences between both present and past cultures. As a natural science of society, anthropology is primarily synchronic and idiographic and focuses on the relationship between concrete social processes and the culturally distinctive configuration of value, belief, and custom of a particular society.

Goodenough also discusses the theoretical orientation of many recent ethnographic studies, sometimes referred to as the "new" ethnography, which is represented in this book by papers by the editor, Conklin, Frake, Friedrich, Lounsbury, and in a somewhat more eclectic fashion by Pospisil. Goodenough claims that "anthropologists have been talking about two orders of reality as if they were part of the same order" (p. 11). He suggests that the phenomenological order is composed of concrete happenings from which we can derive only statistical regularities while the ideational order provides us with "ideal forms" which make the flux of objects and events intelligible. He goes on to assert that the phenomenological order is an "artifact" of the ideational order, adding the proviso that there is feedback from the former to the latter.

The "new" ethnography conceives of the external, that is the non-psychological, world as an essentially passive set of existential possibilities which are transformed into systems of action by cognitive categories indigenous to a specific culture. For example, Frake's paper on "Subanun 'Religious Behavior'" holds that cultural categories discriminate between those features of the universe, including deities and other non-material objects, relevant for conduct in a given social context. In the "new" ethnography, social action is seen as a stream of external behavior that is organized and segmented into meaningful units in a rather arbitrary fashion by cultural categories. Consequently, it tends to underplay the importance of ecological constraints on human behavior. Though the major thrust of these papers concerned with the "new" ethnography is to develop a method that will precisely delineate the modes of thought and perception peculiar to a culture, they leave the problem of the relationship between adaptive environmental pressures on social organization and the cognitive and evaluative categories that make the phenomenological world meaningful largely untouched.

In such a short space it is impossible to mention all or even a good number of the papers in this volume. This is especially unfortunate because all are interesting and many deal with problems relevant to other social sciences. Therefore, we will discuss a few papers which are representative of work being done on the frontiers of ethnography.

Conklin's paper on the "Ethnogenological Method" stems from the realization that typologies of kinship based upon variables such as residence and descent rules often do not fit native classifications of the same phenomena. Conklin takes the links formed by descent and marriage as the material basis upon which a culturally significant kinship reality is constructed, and he argues that precise, inductive methods analogous to those of descriptive linguistics must be used to elicit "the relevant relationships obtaining among locally defined categories and contexts (of objects and events) within a given social matrix" (p. 25). The ultimate aim of this kind of analysis, as exemplified in Goodenough's paper, "Componential Analysis of Könkämä Lapp Kinship Terminology," is a paradigm in which the cognitive principles called components, which distinguish various types or classes of kinship relations, are arranged so that each term in the system is accounted for in a non-redundant manner if homonyms are excluded from the analysis. Friedrich's paper, "Semantic Structure and Social Structure: An Instance from Russian," constitutes a distinct advance over the more formal componential analyses in that he relates distinctions in affinal terminology that depart from conventional categories of primary and secondary relatives to postmarital residence patterns, the authority structure of the domestic household, and the affective relationships of solidarity and conflict engendered by these living arrangements

It must be very gratifying for a teacher to look at a collection of papers of such high

quality by his former students and to realize that they have continued to work creatively in areas where he has made a major contribution.

GARY SCHWARTZ

Institute for Juvenile Research

Religion in American Culture: Unity and Diversity in a Midwestern County. By W. W. SCHROEDER and VICTOR OBENHAUS, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xxiii+254. $8.50.

The urban and the suburban church has been the focus of much sociological research in the postwar era, and usually with the assumption that religion in the city is ineffective to the degree that it differs from rural and small-town religion. The authors, however, deliberately chose "Corn Country" as the site of research, looking for empirical data at the local level where, they opine, the culture both reflects and determines that of most of the rest of the nation. In this sense, they are trying to get at the "roots" of religion and culture.

Although claiming the typicalness of this midwestern farm country, the authors do not seek causal relations between urban and rural, or between the religious and the secular spheres, which they interpret as "mutually influential." Their report is both normative and descriptive because fact and value are "inextricably interwoven," and because human behavior results from a complex of influences: the causal past, God's mediation, man's free response. Although repudiating the search for "causal variables" this book attempts to weigh the impact of various religious traditions (or none) on the feelings and attitudes of individuals.

The writers approach their carefully collected data from a "transcendental perspective" and with a skepticism of precision and prediction in social studies. They insist also on the necessity of employing open-end interviews rather than scaled instruments and structured interviews. They feel that they are thus in a position to make qualitative interpretations, but they also feel constrained to provide 128 statistical (quantitative) tables of findings.

About fifty of these tables are a further breakdown into four localities of the county. More than seventy tables deal only with "Maizeville," the largest town in the country. This introduces an ecological factor that is not analytically exploited and that is not apparently significant to the purposes of the study. If Corn County is typically rural, it seems futile to concentrate on only one locality or to make comparisons among four (and sometimes seven) residential areas, each of which has three categories of respondents: Catholic, Protestant, and "none."

The main finding is that church adherents, even frequent participants, know little about their church's teachings. "The institution had communicated portions of its cognitive structure to its members in only minimal fashion." The interviewees had even less information about churches other than their own. Very few of them attempt to relate their religious principles to contemporary secular political and economic issues. People want a clergyman with a "good personality," and are not much concerned about his doctrinal depth. The intellectually brighter persons know more about their religion and are better participants than others. All in all the cultural commonalities are more significant than the cultural dissimilarities between adherents of differing religious traditions.

JOSEPH H. FICHTER

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Familienbeziehungen und Freizeitgewohnheiten jugendlicher Arbeiter; eine Untersuchung von 800 Lehrlingen in Wien und Niederösterreich ("Family Relations and Leisure of Young Workers"). By LEOPOLD ROSENMAYR. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1963. Pp. xx+431. DM 48.

This volume is a publication of the Austrian Department of Education. Its internationally known author is at present the only professor in an Austrian university devoting full time to the teaching of and empirical research in sociology. Yet Austria can look back upon an impressive tradition of social research, particularly in the field of youth problems as epitomized by Charlotte Bühler and Paul Lazarsfeld. With the comprehensive survey of eight hundred adolescents reported on in the present book, Rosenmayr

has continued this line of research. As a first step, he has applied a 237-item questionnaire to a sample of male apprentices who, in Austria, generally range between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, and who, by law, are required to attend specialized trade schools one full day a week for three years. This category includes a substantial portion of the total age group, namely, more than half in Vienna, about 40 per cent in Austria as a whole. The sample is taken from trade-school classes for wood and metal workers (corresponding to grades 9 and 11 of the American school system) in Vienna and two places in lower Austria both of which draw their students in part from a rather extensive rural hinterland.

With this choice the author focuses attention not only upon the numerically largest section of Austrian adolescents but also upon a group about whom the self-appointed critics of modern youth possibly know least. In part, at least, this treatise amounts to an attempt at the strictly empirical falsification of several widely circulated and accepted theories about family life and leisure-time activities of contemporary youth.

Among the opinions challenged are certain propositions by the influential German sociologist H. Schelsky which have met with wide acclaim. The findings of this study fail to support Schelsky's characterization of post-Nazi youth as a "skeptical generation" disinterested in public affairs, suspicious of high-sounding ideas, averse to social engagement, and reluctant to join organized groups. Nor does it appear that Austrian youths assume primarily a consumer's attitude toward sport. The author also takes exception with Schelsky's description of the attitudes of the young generation toward social reality as "privatistisch" (determined by private consideration). For his data contradict the assumption that many modern youths are inclined to solitary activities and social isolation.

The report touches upon a wide range of topics; about these an eleven-page English summary in the appendix provides sufficient information to guide the casual reader to those portions of the book that are of special interest to him. Apart from background data on socioeconomic status and housing, two parts may be distinguished as indicated by the title: family relations and leisure-time activities. The wealth of information offered cannot be outlined in a brief review. The significance of the volume, however, is not exhausted by the methodically sound description of conditions in one country. Unfortunately, its general design tends to conceal the strongly theoretical tendencies of the whole study. To be sure, the author starts out with a set of hypotheses; but the theoretical framework gets rather lost in the vast amount of sheer reporting and minute details, although they, too, are given in a highly readable language and interlaced with thoughtful remarks, corollaries, and commentaries. Moreover, theoretical problems of general importance are treated in a more systematic and formal manner (pp. 135 ff.). Here the author discusses for thirty pages several important aspects of the sociology of the family, compares the results of his investigation with those of similar studies, adds a test of hypotheses in the light of present research and a list of general propositions following from it. A second passage of wider theoretical significance is found on pages 254–61 concerned with the political interests and engagement of modern Austrian youth.

Thus the importance of the book is not confined to providing a standard work and model for social research in Austria. It is also a valuable contribution to the field of family and youth problems in general. American sociologists will particularly welcome the addition of really reliable empirical material of this nature to their "cross-cultural" treasure chest; they also will admire the excellent printing and technical appointment of the volume.

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Role Strain in Diversified Role Sets[1]

J. Diedrick Snoek

ABSTRACT

One important source of role strain is the requirement to maintain working relationships with persons in a wide variety of complementary roles. It is shown that in a national sample of wage and salary workers high job-related tension is associated with frequency of interaction with each of five classes of role senders and even more strongly with the total number of different role relationships required by the respondent's job. Role-set diversity is more common in supervisory than in non-supervisory jobs, but the association between tension and supervisory responsibility is not wholly accounted for by the influence of role-set diversity. Differences in role-set diversity and number of supervisory jobs account for a good deal of the differential prevalence of high tension in large as compared to small organizations. There is also some support for the hypothesis that high diversity is more tension-producing in large organizations than in smaller ones. Finally, the results show that the relationships between tension and sex, age, or education are substantially reduced once the influence of role diversity and supervisory responsibility has been taken into account.

In one of his astute observational studies of human behavior, W. F. Whyte investigated the causes of crying among waitresses. He concluded that outbursts of crying were clearly related to strains in the waitress' role and particularly in the waitress-customer relationship. In describing the problem situation faced by workers in the restaurant industry in general, he wrote:

> Nearly every restaurant worker must adjust to people in at least two different relationships—in addition to getting along with fellow workers on his own job. For example, the cook responds to the directions of the kitchen supervisors and also must respond to requests for food from kitchen runners or supply men. Similarly, the pantry worker is under the pantry supervisor and responds to orders for food from waitresses. For the waitress the problem is a good deal more complex. She must adjust herself to supervisor and to other waitresses, and in addition she has to deal with between 50 and 100 customers a day, many of them complete strangers; and she has to adjust to service pantry workers or cooks to get the food out, and to bartenders to get her drinks, if the restaurant serves liquor. Clearly it requires a high degree of social adaptability to handle this assignment successfully.[2]

Whyte thought the problem one of co-ordination between a production and service department which might be unique to the restaurant industry, but there is reason to believe that both the kind of problem he describes and the resultant emotional

[1] This paper is based upon research supported by research grant M-3346 from the National Institute of Mental Health. Many of the ideas expressed in this paper were developed in discussion with my former colleagues at the University of Michigan, Drs. Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, and Robert P. Quinn.

[2] William F. Whyte, "Where Workers and Customers Meet," in *Industry and Society*, ed. William F. Whyte (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), p. 124.

tensions occur with noticeable frequency in many kinds of industrial organizations. This paper represents an attempt to relate the experience of tension in the work role to one structural feature of all such roles, namely, the diversity of interests and loyalties represented in the role set.

The term "role set" was introduced by Merton to designate the total complement of role relationships in which a person becomes involved by virtue of occupying a particular social position.[3] Following Rommetveit, we shall call all those persons who complement a given person's role in this sense his "role senders," to designate their function of communicating and enforcing the relevant role expectations.[4] In a formal organization the role senders to a given office need not be under the same administrative authority; indeed, from the management's point of view, some role senders may have no discernible (or legitimate) relationship with the office at all. But from the point of view of role analysis, any person who is actively concerned with the officeholder's performance presumably holds expectations regarding his role. To illustrate from Whyte's example, the cook, the supervisor, the barman, the pantry helper, the customer, and the other waitresses, all have expectations about how the waitress should behave, and they will communicate these expectations in their behavior toward her.

Both Merton and Goode have pointed out that any role set possesses a potential for conflict to the extent that members of the set occupy different social positions.[5] The key to the waitress' problems lies in the fact that her role requires her to relate to people in an unusually large variety of complementary roles. In the simplest case, one's job requires contact with only one complementary role, that of the supervisor. In the more usual case, role relationships have to be maintained with several others, including especially co-workers as well as a supervisor and perhaps subordinates. The waitress' role fits well up on the scale of diversification, inasmuch as it calls for a complex balancing of relationships with at least five classes of role senders: supervisor, customers, fellow waitresses, pantry personnel, and the barman. We can characterize a role set as more or less *diversified* to the extent that it involves the maintenance of a variety of role relationships. It should be possible to arrive at a measure of role-set diversity by counting the number of different classes of role senders with whom relationships must be maintained. The concept of a class of role senders is introduced here to take account of the equivalence of all role relationships involving subordinates, for example. The dimension of diversity, therefore, refers to the number of different relationships that must be maintained, not to the number of persons with whom the officeholder must interact.

The greater the diversification of a role set, the greater the possibility of intrarole conflicts, because each class of role senders is apt to develop expectations that are more attuned to its own organizational goals, norms, and values than to the total requirements of the officeholder's role. Gross, Mason, and McEachern have demonstrated such conflicts in their study of school superintendents.[6] Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, and Snoek also pointed to this source of difficulty in their study of role conflicts in industry, arguing that conflict is especially likely to occur in so-called boundary positions, that is, positions for which some of the role senders are located in a different role system, whether this be another unit in the same organization or another organ-

[3] See Robert K. Merton, "The Role Set: Problem in Sociological Theory," *British Journal of Sociology*, VIII (June, 1957), 113 ff.

[4] Ragnar Rommetveit, *Social Norms and Roles* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1954).

[5] See Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); and William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (1960), 483–96.

[6] Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

ization entirely.[7] Accordingly, the first hypothesis to be examined is that role strain, in the sense of felt difficulty in job performance, will be more common in jobs requiring the individual to maintain a highly diversified set of role relationships.

A second factor of interest is the size of the organization in which the individual is employed. Organizational size bears upon the rationale just presented in that we would expect the typical phenomena of bureaucratization to be maximally present in large-scale organizations.[8] One of the major unintended consequences of bureaucratization is the increase in rule-bound, inflexible behavior on the part of the organization's members, resulting in difficulty in meeting the needs of the organization's clients. This result should increase the conflict potential for relations with extra-organizational role senders as well as for relations among different units of the organization which were intended to serve each other. A second and related feature of bureaucratization is what Selznick has called the "bifurcation of interests" among departments of the organization, produced by each department's commitment to its own goals and maintenance.[9] Again, where departments develop to some extent their own goals for the organization and their own rules of procedure, the relations among role senders representing different departments should hold greater potential for conflict. A second hypothesis, therefore, is that role strain is more common in large than in small organizations, particularly in those positions that require highly diversified role-sender contacts.

SAMPLE AND PROCEDURES

The data for this study are drawn from a series of questions included in a national sample survey conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center during 1961. In this study respondents were chosen to represent all adults over eighteen years of age living in private households. Interviews were conducted with 1,300 such persons. For purposes of the present analysis, however, we selected only those people in the sample who reported that they were wage and salary workers and who were working more than twenty hours per week at the time of the survey—a total of 596 persons altogether. Comparison of the present sample with figures reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for the year 1960 revealed no significant differences in terms of age, sex, education, or occupational distribution.

The variable used as an indicator of role strain in this study was the Job Related Tension Index (JRT), developed at the Survey Research Center. Scores on this index are derived from a list of fifteen common problems on the job. The interviewer introduced the items by telling respondents:

> All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things in our work. I'm going to read a list of things that sometimes bother people, and I would like you to tell me how frequently you feel bothered by each of them.

Respondents then reported on a five-point scale the frequency with which they felt bothered by each of the following:[10]

[7] Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, and J. Diedrick Snoek, *Organizational Stress* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), chap. v.

[8] One recent investigation of the relation between organizational size and bureaucratization asserts that small organizations may on many dimensions of comparison be as "bureaucratic" as large ones (Robert H. Hall, "Bureaucracy and Small Organizations," *Sociology and Social Research*, XLVIII [1964], 38–46). However, several of the small organizations in Hall's study were local branches of very large ones, and larger organizations clearly had higher scores on some of the dimensions of bureaucratization that Hall employed, e.g., "systematization of rules governing the rights and duties of positional incumbents."

[9] This discussion rests heavily upon the analysis of theories of bureaucracy offered by James G. March and Herbert A. Simon in *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

[10] The answer "Doesn't Apply" was also printed on the card shown to respondents. It was used frequently by self-employed persons, but rarely

1. Feeling that you have too little authority to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you
2. Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of your job are
3. Not knowing what opportunities for advancement or promotion exist for you
4. Feeling that you have too heavy a workload, one that you can't possibly finish during an ordinary workday
5. Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting demands of various people over you
6. Feeling that you're not fully qualified to handle your job
7. Not knowing what your supervisor thinks of you, how he evaluates your performance
8. The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out your job
9. Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals, people that you know
10. Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the people you work with
11. Feeling unable to influence your immediate superior's decisions and actions that affect you
12. Not knowing just what the people you work with expect of you
13. Thinking that the *amount* of work you have to do may interfere with how *well* it gets done
14. Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are against your better judgment
15. Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life

It is assumed that a high average tendency to report feeling troubled by the variety of problems on the list reflects a high level of emotional tension associated with the job. In earlier studies it has been shown that the items intercorrelate significantly with each other and that each item correlates with total scale scores more than with any other item. High index scores have been found to be significantly associated with an objective measure of role conflict as well as with job dissatisfaction and a variety of mild neurotic symptoms.[11] Getzels and Guba used a very similar measure, labeled "intensity of felt conflict," in a study of role conflict among military instructors, and reported it to be significantly associated with ratings of ineffective teaching performance.[12] In short, JRT seems to measure a variety of difficulties in job performance, close to the conceptual meaning of role strain as discussed by Goode.[13]

The classification of diversity of role-sender contacts was based upon the question: "How often do you have something to do as part of your job with each of the following groups of people?" Five classes of role senders were defined for the respondent: (1) Your boss or other people over you; (2) People you supervise, directly or indirectly; (3) Others who work in the same department as you do; (4) Others who work in the same company, but not in the same department; (5) Outsiders who have business with your company. In addition, the respondent was asked about any other class of contacts he could mention, and this was counted as a sixth class if the contacts he named could not be reclassified into any of the earlier categories. Frequency of contact was reported on the five-point scale reported earlier.

Two questions were asked to obtain information about the size of the organization where the respondent was employed. The first of these was intended to establish the size of the plant where respondent worked ("About how many people work at the same place where you work?"). The second

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by wage and salary workers. To take account of such instances, however, the index score used in this study is the mean frequency score based on the number of items that the respondent thought applied to his job.

[11] See Donald M. Wolfe and J. Diedrick Snoek, "A Study of Tensions and Adjustment under Role Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVIII (1962), 102–21; and Kahn *et al.*, *op. cit.* See also Bernard Indik, Stanley E. Seashore, and Jonathan Slesinger, "Demographic Correlates of Psychological Strain," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXIX (1964), 26–38.

[12] Jack Getzels and Egon Guba, "Role, Role Conflicts and Effectiveness: An Empirical Study," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 164–75.

[13] William J. Goode, *op. cit.*

question obtained the respondent's best estimate of the total number of persons employed by his company ("Does the company [organization] you work for employ other people besides the ones that work at the same place as you do?" IF YES: "To the best of your knowledge, about how many people work for your company [organization] altogether?"). For all companies of more than 100 persons, interviewers also ascertained the name of the organization. The figures reported by the respondents for these organizations were later checked against standard business references.[14] Figures for roughly two-thirds of the companies named could be verified in this way. Few corrections of respondents' estimates proved necessary. In this analysis we shall be concerned with *company size* rather than *plant size*, on the assumption that many of the distinctive features and processes of a large-scale organization probably make themselves felt even in smaller plants belonging to it. Nevertheless, company size is only a very crude operational index of the intended conceptual variable, bureaucratization.

A series of questions attempting to locate each respondent in his organization's chain of command did not yield useful data, because it classified all but a few respondents at the fourth level from the top or lower. This failure is further testimony to the growing importance of the large-scale organization as the most common working environment for Americans today. Instead we shall classify respondents in terms of an implied rank ordering of level of supervisory responsibility, according to whether they have no such responsibility, have some subordinates but all of them under their direct supervision, or have both direct subordinates and indirect responsibility for others.

DIVERSITY OF ROLE-SENDER CONTACTS

Scores on the JRT index have a possible range from 1.0 to 5.0. The frequency distribution of scores is markedly skewed, 16.4 per cent of the sample obtaining the lowest score of 1.0 and an additional 36.9 per cent scoring between 1.1 and 1.5. Since the greatest interest pertains to the high scorers, "high tension" has been defined arbitrarily as a score of 1.6 or higher for purposes of the present analysis.[15]

Table I shows the relations between job-related tension and frequency of interaction with each of the five predefined classes of role senders. For four out of five classes of role senders, there is a marked but not necessarily linear relationship between frequency of contact and the prevalence of high tension. In all cases, the greatest increment in high-tension cases occurs in the comparison of those who have no contacts with those who have some contact or more with each class of role senders. This is true even for the case of interaction with superiors, although the number of respondents who report a total absence of daily contacts with their superiors is so small that the difference between them and the remaining respondents might easily have arisen by chance alone.

In the case of contact with subordinate role senders (*line B*), the more frequently the respondent interacts with subordinates, the greater the likelihood that he will have a high tension score. But interaction with other kinds of role senders—those not hierarchically related to the respondent—is most tension-producing when it occurs with a frequency less than the maximum possible on our scale. When the five classes are compared in terms of the over-all levels of tension associated with them, no single class of contacts stands out as significantly more tension-producing than any other. We may summarize the data in Table I by concluding that, with the exception of contact with superiors, jobs that require any kind of daily contact with subordinates, with other organization members—whether

[14] Mainly, *Moody's Industrial Manuals* (New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1961).

[15] The separation of the JRT distribution comes close to a median split, "high tension" scores starting at the 53d percentile.

in one's own department or outside it—or with outsiders who have business with one's organization, are apt to be more tension-producing than those that do not.

Let us now ask whether roles that require the maintenance of contacts with many classes of role senders (high diversity) show a greater incidence of high tension than those which involve only a moderate or small number of such relationships. The question is answered in Table 2. The result strongly supports the hypothesis that there is a significant association between tension on the job and interaction with a diversified set of role senders.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

The data collected also permitted the analysis of the relationship between job-related tension and supervisory responsibility. In an earlier study on a much smaller sample, Wolfe and Snoek found tension to be associated with both supervisory responsibility and organizational rank.[16] In this sample, 42 per cent of those who have direct supervision over some people and 75 per cent of those who have both direct supervisory responsibility over some and indirect responsibility for others have high tension scores, as compared with only 36 per cent among those without any supervisory responsibility.[17]

Since people with diversified role sets carry supervisory responsibility noticeably more often than those in low-diversity role sets, we may well ask whether the greater prevalence of tension among supervisors

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH-TENSION CASES IN RELATION TO FREQUENCY OF INTERACTION WITH FIVE CLASSES OF ROLE SENDERS*

CLASS OF ROLE SENDERS	"HOW OFTEN DURING THE DAY DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING TO DO AS PART OF YOUR JOB WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF PEOPLE?"						
	Never (Inap.)†	Rarely	Sometimes	Rather Often	Nearly All the Time	χ^2	P
A. Your boss or other people over you	38 (21)	47 (125)	48 (171)	51 (145)	54 (133)	2 6	N.S.
B. People you supervise directly or indirectly	33 (340)	57 (28)	52 (46)	64 (72)	69 (110)	55 5	< 001
C. Others who work in your department	38 (157)	50 (62)	51 (130)	58 (106)	42 (141)	14.0	< 01
D. Others in your company, but not in the same department	35 (200)	46 (137)	59 (135)	54 (77)	51 (51)	14 6	< 01
E. Outsiders who have business with your company	34 (278)	64 (66)	59 (71)	65 (69)	47 (108)	38 1	< 001

* In this as in the following tables the number of cases in each cell is shown in parentheses Total number of cases in each row does not always add up to 590 because of N.A.'s.

† Cases coded Inap. have been combined with those coded Never.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH-TENSION CASES IN RELATION TO ROLE-SET DIVERSITY

	NO. OF CLASSES OF ROLE SENDERS WITH WHOM RESPONDENT MAINTAINS CONTACT IN HIS JOB				
	1-2	3	4	5	6
Per cent	25	34	45	65	80
N	(144)	(138)	(136)	(98)	(88)

NOTE: χ^2 (excluding N.A.'s): 83.3; 4 d.f.; $P < .001$.

[16] Wolfe and Snoek, *op. cit.*

[17] Chi-square for supervisory responsibility in relation to tension (excluding N.A.'s): 50.1; 2 d.f.; $P < .001$.

is not associated almost exclusively with the diversity variable.[18] As Table 3 shows, supervisors appear more likely to report high tension even when we control for the effects of the diversity variable. In the remainder of the analysis, supervisory responsibility will therefore be treated as an independent contributor to tension.

COMPANY SIZE

Let us turn now to the variable of company size, with its implications for increased complexity of organization and difficulty of co-ordination among adjacent

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH-TENSION CASES IN RELATION TO SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY AND ROLE-SET DIVERSITY

Supervisory Responsibility	Low Diversity (1-2)	Moderate Diversity (3-4)	High Diversity (5-6)
None:			
Per cent	20	36	63
N	(127)	(200)	(70)
Direct, indirect, or both:			
Per cent	67	49	77
N	(12)	(67)	(113)

NOTE. χ^2 for tension in relation to supervisory responsibility: low diversity, 12.01 (corrected for continuity), $P < .01$; moderate diversity: 3.75, $P < .10$; high diversity: 4.23, $P < .05$.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH-TENSION CASES IN RELATION TO COMPANY SIZE

	Estimated No. of Employees Working for Respondent's Company				
	1-9	10-49	50-499	500-4,999	5,000+
Per cent	29	45	42	56	54
N	(85)	(95)	(141)	(96)	(183)

NOTE: χ^2 (excluding N.A.'s), 18.5, 4 d.f., $P < .001$.

offices. Table 4 shows that high tension is relatively more common in large organizations than in smaller ones. Table 5 shows that the differences in tension level associated with company size tend to disappear when we control for the respondent's level of role-set diversification, except in the case of those with the highest level of diversification. The same reduction of differences between small and large companies appears in the second half of Table 5, when we control for supervisory responsibility. None of the apparent differences in tension level between those working in small as opposed to large companies reaches the 5 per cent level of significance in this case.

TABLE 5

PREVALENCE OF HIGH TENSION IN SMALL AND LARGE COMPANIES,* CONTROLLING FOR ROLE-SET DIVERSIFICATION AND SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

Company Size	Level of Role-Set Diversity†		
	Low (1-2)	Moderate (3-4)	High (5-6)
Small (<500):			
Per cent	27	40	64
N	(96)	(201)	(114)
Large (≥500):			
Per cent	26	39	85
N	(38)	(72)	(72)
	Level of Supervisory Responsibility‡		
	None	Direct Only	Direct and Indirect
Small (<500):			
Per cent	35	57	68
N	(281)	(64)	(40)
Large (≥500):			
Per cent	38	73	86
N	(124)	(40)	(29)

* χ^2 small versus large high diversity, [illegible], $P < .01$.

† χ^2 role-set diversity small company, [illegible], $P < .001$, large company 45.7, $P < .001$.

‡ χ^2 supervisory responsibility small company [illegible], $P < .001$, large company 30.1, $P < .001$.

Focusing on the previously established relationship between level of diversification

[18] Chi-square for role-set diversity in relation to supervisory responsibility (excluding N.A.'s): 149.8; 4 d.f.; $P < .001$.

and tension, the results show that it appears in both small and large companies. The same is true for the relationship between supervisory responsibility and tension. In short, the prevalence of high tension increases as a function of both role-set diversification and supervisory responsibility, regardless of company size. The over-all greater prevalence of tension in large companies is in large part attributable to the fact that one finds more role-set diversification and also more supervisors in large than in small organizations.

TABLE 6

PREVALENCE OF HIGH TENSION BY AGE, SEX, AND EDUCATION

	Crude Prevalence* (Per Cent)	Standardized Prevalence† (Per Cent)	Base *N*
Age:			
18–24	42	43	64
25–34	53	51	169
35–44	49	50	148
45–54	43	43	128
55–65+	35	37	92
Sex:			
Male	51	48	384
Female	38	43	219
Education:			
Grade school (0–8)	32	39	144
High school (9–12)	43	44	284
College (13+)	63	52	170

* χ^2 (crude rates): age: 24.4, $P < .001$; sex: 18.5, $P < .001$; education: 32.1, $P < .001$.

† Standardized for role-set diversity and supervisory responsibility; χ^2 calculated on standardized rates fails to show significant associations.

If our earlier reasoning is correct, we would also expect that whatever possibilities for role strain are implicit in role-set diversification would be realized more often in organizations with a higher level of bureaucratization. Using company size as a crude indicator of bureaucratization, the results give tentative support to this hypothesis in that high role-set diversification is associated with a significantly higher level of tension in large than in small companies.

SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF TENSION

The first column of Table 6 shows the prevalence of high tension in relation to sex, age, and education. High tension tends to be more common among males than females, among the younger than among the older age groups, and among college-educated than among high-school– or grade-school–educated groups. These findings are in accord with those published by Indik, Seashore, and Slesinger, who reported the demographic correlates of job-related tension among a very large population of employees of a single company.[19]

It is, of course, possible that the apparent association of tension with age, sex, and education can be attributed to differences among these demographic groups in the distribution of role diversity and supervisory responsibility. The second column of Table 6 shows the relationship between tension and each of the demographic variables after the figures have been adjusted to take account of the influence of role diversity and supervisory responsibility.[20] A comparison of the crude and standardized prevalence figures shows that, especially in the case of sex and education, the degree of association between the demographic variable and tension is substantially reduced after role diversity and supervisory responsibility have been taken into account. Chi-square values calculated on the adjusted figures fail to reach the 5 per cent level of confidence, although the trends noted in the crude figures are still apparent. The reduction of tension differentials is especially apparent in the case of sex and education, but less so in the case of age. In short, the high prevalence

[19] Indik *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[20] The standardized figures have been calculated by the so-called indirect method, set forth in George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), pp. 161–66. Tension-prevalence rates for the total sample, subdivided into six groups defined by three levels of diversity and two levels of supervisory responsibility, were used as the standard.

of tension observed among men and among college-educated persons can apparently be attributed in large part to the fact that the jobs held by these persons are more likely to involve role-set diversification and supervisory responsibility.

DISCUSSION

The data support the conclusion that one important source of strain in the work roles of wage and salary workers is the requirement to maintain working relationships with a wide variety of complementary roles. In this paper this condition has been referred to as "diversification" of the role set. On the basis of other observations by students of organizational behavior, it seems reasonable to assume that the greater the diversity of organizational positions occupied by the individual's day-to-day associates, the greater the likelihood that his associates will hold conflicting goals, values, and role expectations. The person whose work role is characterized by such a diversity of orientations among his role senders is more apt to experience difficulty in integrating their role expectations. We might call this the problem of normative integration of the role set.

While at least a moderate degree of role-set diversification is very common among supervisory personnel and, therefore, undoubtedly a factor contributing to the high level of tension reported in these jobs, our results show that not all of the tension associated with supervision is accounted for by this aspect of the supervisor's role. The explanation for the association between tension and supervision that remains when we control for role-set diversification must be sought in other aspects of the role and the types of persons who are recruited for it.

Although this study does not contribute direct evidence on the nature of the difficulties encountered by respondents working in diversified role sets, previous investigations suggest at least four common problems.[21] At the top of the list are direct *conflicts*, in which incompatible role expectations from two or more role senders must somehow be reconciled. An oft-described case in point is the first-line supervisor's role. A second common problem is that of *overload*, a condition which exists when the demands from all sources pile up to a total in excess of the worker's capacity. Overload problems are typically experienced as conflicts between priorities, but they are distinguished from intrarole conflicts in that the demands upon the role occupant are not inherently incompatible. Overload problems are likely to occur in diversified role sets (1) because the members of the set are often unaware of each other's expectations, or (2) because they do not share each other's evaluation of the relative importance of various tasks. The role of the student who must learn to cope with the academic demands of several courses simultaneously provides a familiar illustration of overload problems. *Ambiguity* characterizes a third class of problems likely to occur in diversified role sets. Because members of the same role set occupy such a variety of positions, implicit assumptions are often not shared, unspoken rules are broken, and unexpected failures of communication tend to occur. Moreover, ambiguity may increase when members of a role set deliberately restrict communication with each other in an effort to avoid or reduce open conflict. Finally, certain common problems arise out of the frequent necessity to exert *influence without legitimate authority*. In diversified role sets we often encounter relationships in which there is no provision for the exercise of legitimate authority. Take, for example, relationships with such role senders as customers and suppliers. Whether in the service of his job or in sheer self-defense, the individual whose job requires him to deal with such role senders must develop some relatively reliable means for eliciting their co-operation. In the American business world, such influence is often built upon the manipulation of "favors" and

[21] See Kahn *et al.*, *op. cit.*, for a more extended discussion of sources of role strain.

"business friends," but we are also well acquainted with the conflicts of interest (and of conscience) that accompany these arrangements. Inside the organization, the need to exert influence without legitimate authority often reflects imperfections in the "planned" organizational mechanisms for co-ordination, which must be corrected by the individual's own initiatives and at his own risk.

It has been suggested that the factors that tend to make role-set diversification a strain-producing condition, namely, inflexibility on the part of role senders and opposition of interests among them, ought to occur more often in complex organizations with a high degree of bureaucratization. The present results give some support to this hypothesis, if one is willing to accept company size as an indicator of bureaucratization.[22] The hypothesis awaits further testing with a better index of bureaucratization.

In summary, role-set diversification is likely to be a significant aspect of a role, in industrial as well as in other types of organizations. The problem of defining diversification was approached in this study by an a priori classification of what seemed to be significant classes of role senders. In the future this problem might well be approached by an empirical determination of the equivalence of various role relationships in terms of the nature of the interdependence between *ego* and *alter*.

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[22] The same analysis was performed using plant size rather than company size as a variable; plant size and company size are highly correlated, and the results were essentially the same.

Individual Commitment to Industrialization in Rural Mexico[1]

Frank W. Young and Ruth C. Young

ABSTRACT

Placement in industrial work is a function of the number and strength of kin-mediated ties to urbanized or differentiated situations. This hypothesis, which specifies much of what it is about social class, education, size of community of residence, and other similar "factors" that influence non-farm occupational placement, was tested in a rural but industrializing area in Mexico. Occupational type is empirically specified by a continuum based on present and past work experience, and primary urban ties are measured by a range of indicators. Lipset's related findings are reinterpreted, and the hypothesis that farmers seek factory work because of landlessness is rejected.

Why do men shift from farming to factory and other urban work? The question presupposes a distinction between the types of work, and perhaps between social worlds. It also presumes a special importance to the particular direction of change; writ large, the shift from field to factory sums up much of what is meant by modernization.

The notion that farmers are "driven" off the land by overpopulation, poverty, or some combination of these fails to explain why some stay while others leave, and why, of the latter, only a portion seek factory work. As an explanation for the generally increased rate of movement off the land over the last centuries it is deficient, because it assumes the existence of cities without taking into account their probable influence. Finally, the evidence to be reviewed below flatly contradicts it.

A more positive line of explanation emphasizes the interplay among such factors as individual capacity, family and class reinforcement, and the opportunity structure of cities. According to Lipset,[2] the key variable in this frame of reference is the size of the community of orientation. This factor predicts non-manual job placement even when education is held constant. Lipset's interpretation of the result is phrased in terms of the quality of education and the greater awareness of the wider opportunities in cities, and, in general, size of orientation community is considered only one of an array of factors, such as socioeconomic status and ethnic origin, that determine an individual's mobility. Of course, the size of one's community of orientation, while convenient and adequate for large-scale surveys in heterogeneous areas, has the obvious limitation that it does not predict for persons coming from communities of the same size. Presumably we should then turn to the other factors, but here we lack theoretical guidance. Which factors? What exactly should we be concerned about? In Lipset's interpreta-

[1] This report is one of several on modernization and community structure in rural Mexico. The field work was supported by the Doherty Foundation and the analysis by the Department of Rural Sociology of Cornell University. Special support for the material analyzed here came from National Institute of Mental Health Small Grant M-6031(A). The authors would also like to acknowledge the help of Betsy Joslin, the statistical clerk.

[2] S. M. Lipset, "Social Mobility and Urbanization," *Rural Sociology*, XX (December, 1955), 220–28. See also S. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Community Structure," *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), chap. viii. Although Lipset and Bendix were interested in predicting manual versus non-manual occupational placement, the same approach should apply to the prediction of farm versus non-farm and, specifically, factory work.

tion, education—broadly conceived—appears to be the mediating variable, but we must still ask what it is about education that accounts for its association with relatively high-status occupations.

The hypothesis here proposed asserts that the probability that a person will be firmly committed to an occupation of an urban type is determined by the number and strength of the social relationships, particularly kinship, that link him to the wider urban environment. The defining characteristics of such "urban" associations include rationality in the Weberian sense, their generalized or standardized quality, and their differentiated nature, that is, the diversity of perspectives that the activity involves. More simply, and more in line with the actual indicators used in this study, urban ties are relationships with institutions that emanate from cities. Even the smallest peasant village is linked to the city and oriented to the market via its shopkeepers and journeymen. The people in these roles form a nucleus of a network that may extend to the lowliest farmer's son. To the degree that a person participates in or is linked by primary ties to this urban-oriented web of social relations, he will act in terms of it. This hypothesis gives real guidance to the task of constructing measures, and it helps to interpret otherwise mute indicators such as the number of years a person attended school, the socioeconomic status of his father, and the sheer population size of his community of orientation.

The analysis begins with a demonstration that an individual's occupational experience can be viewed as a continuum reflecting more or less of an urban commitment. The typology constructed for this purpose is validated by showing the association between it and a range of obvious attributes of urban style of life. It is then shown that urban occupational commitment is predicted by a range of indicators of primary urban ties which, when taken together, indicate a broad network of relationships. Thereafter the many ramifications of the hypothesis are pursued. These include supporting evidence on the respondents' working sons, the influence of landowning fathers, and the control on and rejection of education and landlessness as separate exploratory factors.

The setting of this research is the area around Ciudad Sahagun, Hidalgo, a relatively new industrial town begun about 1950 with a population of about 5,000 and located some seventy miles northeast of Mexico City. The jobs in the several factories (assembling automobiles and trucks, manufacturing textile machinery and smaller items, and constructing railroads cars, as well as the work of building the town) provided a range of industrial work previously unavailable to the area. Although most of the skilled workers came from the capital or other large cities, enough of the labor force left the nearby agricultural villages to provide contrasting cases. Perhaps more important, some returned to farming after experience in industrial work, and the sample also includes a great number of farmers who did not shift. In short, the research setting is perhaps unique in being a microcosm of industrialization, with the full range of transition types still available.[8]

METHOD

There are many possible ways of measuring involvement in the urban-oriented sector. Such participation may be simply attention to certain kinds of mass media, visiting particular cities, experience with urban-industrial occupations, or direct interpersonal contact with members of the urban-industrial world. The indicators may emphasize either the interaction or the attitudinal aspects of such participation.

[8] For an analysis of the regional structure, see our "Social Integration and Change in Twenty-four Mexican Villages," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VIII (July, 1960), 366-77, and Frank W. Young, "Location and Reputation in a Mexican Intervillage Network," *Human Organization*, XXIII (Spring, 1964), 36-41.

This study focuses on what is assumed to be the most intense kind of involvement: the influence of one's kinsmen. It is assumed that the communication of the urban-industrial outlook through primary ties is likely to be extended over time, be adapted to the particular interests of the individual, and be many-sided. Not only will a young man hear about the urban-industrial world but he may be exposed to the "demonstration effect" of observing or learning from a relative working in a factory job. Another reason for focusing on generalized exposure through primary ties rather than on narrowly defined attitudes or values is the assumption of this study that one develops his vocabulary of motives as he is drawn into the urban structure. Initially, a person has only skeletal ideas of urban life and these are accompanied by great areas of vagueness. Only gradually, as he participates in the urban structure, are these areas replaced by more certain knowledge and attitudes.[4]

The measure of occupational placement is a variation of "career mobility" and consists of a typology based on present and past occupational experience. It was constructed by combining present occupation and any instance of the other listed occupations in the past. The previous occupation is not necessarily a man's first job, although quite often it is. When the occupational categories are arranged in past-present order, the four major types are farmer-farmer, *obrero*-farmer, farmer-*obrero*, and *obrero-obrero*. We retain the Spanish term *obrero* because it covers both factory and unskilled construction work. The term "blue collar" is equivalent but more awkward. The very small number of cases of many of the types, particularly white collar and shopkeeper, makes analysis of them impossible, although a subsequent section describes the shopkeeper category in particular and occasionally the relevant types are collected together as "other urban occupations." The focus of the ensuing analysis is on the four major types named above, which may be labelled, respectively, the career farmers, the transitional farmers, the transitional *obreros*, and the career *obreros*.

The data consisted of questionnaire responses obtained in 1958 from a 50 per cent systematic sample of household heads in four villages near Ciudad Sahagun, the populations of which were 314, 586, 1,636, and 1,688. The industrial town itself was not surveyed.

Although the respondents were not asked about their community of orientation, for most of them their present community of residence was also the place where they grew up. Most of the workers from large cities lived in the newly constructed housing in the industrial town. Accordingly, the proportions of career farmers and of career *obreros* may be compared across the increasingly large village populations to reveal a rough association, corroborating Lipset's finding. The smallest place has the largest proportion of career farmers (44 per cent contrasted with 19 per cent for the largest village), while the largest place has the largest proportion of career *obreros* (10 per cent as contrasted to 4 per cent for the smallest community). However, the percentage differences are not great and the relationship is not linear. More refined analysis is indicated.

Table 1 shows the relationship of the four occupational types to a range of validating attributes. The contention is that this typology indicates increasing involvement in the urban sector by way of occupation. The types are interpreted as a rough continuum, and the regular increase in most of the proportions supports this

[4] In this respect the hypothesis draws specifically from the work of George H. Mead. The emphasis on kin-mediated ties to urban institutions was suggested in part by Joseph A. Kahl's review of research findings with respect to the assistance given by kinsmen to migrants to the city, particularly in Africa. See his "Some Social Concomitants of Industrialization and Urbanization," *Human Organization*, XVIII (Summer, 1959), 65. Otherwise the hypothesis merely extrapolates the general interactionist perspective in sociology.

interpretation. Thus, if a man's present job is that of *obrero*, and especially if he started as an *obrero*, he is likely to be young;[5] have had a better-than-average education; to prefer non-farm work and city life; to have worked in a city, and probably in a factory; not to belong to the village communal land organization; and to want an urban occupation, urban residence, and higher education for his sons. Most of the indicators discriminate all four types, and those that do not are explicable in terms of the local situation. The evidence negates an interpretation of the transitionals as special types of upward or downward mobility; they are simply intermediate. They reflect the local sorting-out process which was facilitated in this area by the proximity of the factories.

TABLE 1

VALIDATING CORRELATES OF OCCUPATIONAL-SEQUENCE TYPOLOGY

Attributes	Farmer-Farmer		"Obrero"-Farmer		Farmer-"Obrero"		"Obrero"-"Obrero"	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Thirty years old or younger	23	107	26	50	45	54	46	26
Third-grade education or better	33	105	38	50	45	53	63	24
Does not belong to an *ejido**	15	100	20	40	15	34	31	13
Prefers urban-industrial work	20	104	35	49	75	55	86	22
Worked in a factory	16	112	42	50	32	53	54	26
Prefers to work in a city	33	106	43	49	53	55	68	25
Worked in a city	16	112	42	50	43	54	81	26
Goes to Mexico City at least occasionally	47	109	53	49	51	53	75	28
Wants an urban place of residence for sons	31	97	51	46	54	52	77	21
Wants at least a secondary education for sons	40	98	48	46	65	52	82	22
Wants a non-farm occupation for sons	64	100	65	46	83	54	92	22

* The communal landholding organization.

THE NETWORK OF URBAN TIES

If the occupational-sequence typology is taken as a rough measure of increasingly urban placement, the next question is whether the career *obreros* are generally more connected to the urban structure by way of primary ties.[6] Table 2 lists all such close ties contained in the schedule. The first four factors index the urban character of the respondent's family of orientation. Here, as in the rest of the world, an individual's first job is strongly influenced by his father's position in the urban structure. The nature of the father's occupation, his level of education, his involvement in commercial transactions consequent to owning land, and the family's contact through its children with formal education all delineate the family's articulation with the institutions of the urban world. These

[5] Although the worker's relative youth is interpreted primarily as a correlate of more urbanized occupational placement, the attribute is especially interesting in this area because it reflects the fact that the industrial complex is new and simply was not available to men who are now in their middle years.

[6] When occupational type is considered the dependent variable, it might be argued that the table should be percentaged in the opposite direction. It is handled as shown to simplify the presentation of data and because many of the items are contemporaneous. For those, such as father's landholding, that are more likely to be antecedent, it can be argued that percentaging in the opposite direction also entails a sample of fathers, which is not available. Finally, when the table is broken up and percentaged in the opposite direction, the findings still obtain.

factors are most sensitive to initial occupational placement of the respondent: those who begin in farming contrast with those with past experience in *obrero* work. The prediction of final occupational placement, on the other hand, is best made in terms of contemporary associations, for these seem to reflect a more long-term supporting structure. The characteristics of the respondent's brothers, *compadres*, and wife consequently show a more linear relationship to the steps in the typology. most, because they could move directly from farm to factory.

Further attempts to summarize the association of multiple urban ties to occupational involvement are unfeasible. Although there is a general tendency for the effect of the attributes to cumulate, the fact that a number of them overlap (i.e., having at least one brother in an urban occupation is often synonymous with having a relative living in Mexico City) results in such small numbers in some cells that

TABLE 2

URBAN CONTEXT OF THE FOUR OCCUPATIONAL SEQUENCES

Indicators of Urban Context	Farmer-Farmer		"Obrero"-Farmer		Farmer-"Obrero"		"Obrero"-"Obrero"	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Father was in an urban occupation	16	96	38	47	24	50	60	25
Father's education was third grade or higher	28	64	50	40	17	35	88	16
Brothers' education averages three or more years	43	69*	50	34	39	41	69	23
Father owned some land	56	95	55	47	75	48	68	26
Has at least one brother who is an *obrero*	19	75	57	40	63	43	58	24
At least one brother is in an urban occupation	29	75	62	40	75	43	92	24
At least one brother lives in a large city	61	76	58	40	64	45	75	24
Has a relative working in Mexico City	62	110	70	50	76	54	85	27
At least one *compadre* is an *obrero*	28	89	36	40	61	41	60	20
At least one *compadre* is in an urban occupation	45	112	50	50	60	55	61	28
Some member of family has worked in nearby industrial center	35	108	57	49	61	55	46	28
Wife's education is three years or more	23	108	26	47	31	54	65	28

* In this and subsequent rows referring to attributes of brothers, respondents with no brothers were omitted.

An exception is the item concerning a member of the family who is working in the nearby industrial center. A low proportion (46 per cent) of the career *obreros* have close relatives working in the factories in Ciudad Sahagun. Very likely this low proportion is an artifact of the local situation: the factories in the industrial town had been operating only five years by 1958, so only a few of the respondents' fathers or brothers would have had time to enter industrial work in some other way and then transfer to one of the factories. The local situation favored the transitional *obreros* comparison is vague. Similarly, the construction of scores, although in fact they yield strong correlations, seems inappropriate for these attribute data. Nonetheless, they should be seen as measures of a wider pattern; they are not to be taken as separate determinants.

The factor of education, however, should be singled out for separate consideration. If any one factor, especially one like formal education, dissolves the associations between urban ties and occupational type, considerable doubt is thrown on the hypothesis, even if it interprets education as

an alternate index of urban involvement as this one does. At the very least, such a negative result would raise the possibility that primary ties have been overemphasized. Table 3 shows one of three tests that were run. This particular cross-tabulation shows the relationship of the fraternal urban tie to occupational type when education is controlled. The main hypothesis holds, although education appears to be operating somewhat independently with respect to the career-*obrero* type. A similar pattern emerged when father's occupation—agricultural versus urban—was substituted for the fraternal tie. When the interpersonal tie was a *compadre* in an urban occupation, the effect of education was more pronounced, although it no more than equalled the predictive ability of the independent variable. In short, the results of these three tests align with the hypothesis; education is one among a number of predictors, but no more than that.

A different kind of support for the hypothesis is contained in Table 4, which shows the characteristics of the respondents' children. It has already been shown that career *obreros* are more likely to want an urban style of life for their sons; Table 4 shows that the sons actually achieve it. In general, the more urbanized the father's

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP OF OCCUPATIONAL-SEQUENCE TYPES TO FRATERNAL URBAN CONTACT WHEN RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION IS CONTROLLED

No. of Years of Education	No. of Brothers in Urban Occupations	Occupational-Sequence Type (Per Cent)				N
		Farmer-Farmer	"Obrero"-Farmer	Farmer-"Obrero"	"Obrero"-"Obrero"	
0–2	0	66	22	10	2	59
	1+	23	25	36	16	44
3–4	0	57	12	31	0	16
	1+	25	28	34	13	32
5+	0	80	0	0	20	5
	1+	18	23	14	45	22

TABLE 4

URBAN CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKING CHILDREN OF MEN IN THE FOUR OCCUPATIONAL SEQUENCES

Characteristics	Farmer-Farmer		"Obrero"-Farmer		Farmer-"Obrero"		"Obrero"-"Obrero"	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Children sixteen or over average three or more years of education	50	59	43	28	44	18	66	9
At least one son is an *obrero*	49	43	48	23	79	14	75	8
All working sons are *obreros*	26	43	35	23	57	14	50	8
At least one son is a shopkeeper	9	43	0	23	21	14	38	8
All sons are in urban occupations	37	43	39	23	79	14	100	8

occupational type, the more likely it is that the son will participate in the urban sector. The lower than expected proportions of career *obreros* with sons in *obrero* work are accounted for by the fact that the sons went into other, more urbanized jobs.

ECONOMIC MARGINALITY AND INDUSTRIAL COMMITMENT

It is widely thought, and Wilbert Moore has explicitly proposed it as a hypothesis,[7] that farmers move into industrial work because they lack the resources, especially land, that enable them to remain in agriculture. It is argued that incipient industrialization brings about massive changes in the peasant hinterland and, specifically, that population increases more rapidly than agricultural income. Thus, some men are pushed off the land, so to speak, and migrate to industrial jobs. Other factors, such as the ravages of war, the decline of handicraft industries, exploitation on plantations, etc., are also thought to reduce the productivity and attractiveness of the land, but the underlying idea is that the urban-industrial world is antagonistic to the rural sector and that, indirectly, urbanization is the cause of the various rural deficiencies, especially lack of land, that are the immediate causes of the farmer's attempt to join the urban labor force. It is only fair to say that in his later work Moore seems to have increased his emphasis on the structure of opportunities in cities. Moreover, his discussion of landlessness as a specific factor was always a part of a more general conception involving other factors.

Nonetheless, the hypothesis is widely held and deserves analysis. The fact is that 62 per cent of the career *obreros*, as compared with only 10 per cent of the career farmers, had no land, and the transitional types had the expected intermediate proportions. Those *obreros* who did have land had very little—under four hectares usually—and typically they worked it themselves.

But just because the *obreros* have no land now does not mean that they were forced into industrial work because they lacked it. The mobility required for industrial work is not compatible with landholding, and it would not be surprising if an *obrero* chose to invest in other things if he had any wealth to begin with. Moreover, we

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIP OF AMOUNT OF LAND OWNED BY FATHER IN AGRICULTURE TO CHARACTERISTICS OF SON (RESPONDENT)

SON'S CHARACTERISTICS	NO. OF HECTARES OF LAND FATHER DOES OR DID OWN*			
	0	1–4	5–6	7+
Has two or more brothers	43 (70)	60 (30)	69 (42)	71 (49)
Has at least one brother in farming	45 (47)	62 (21)	76 (38)	74 (39)
Has three or more years of education	26 (65)	44 (27)	56 (43)	53 (49)
Brothers have an average of three or more years of education	11 (44)	25 (20)	33 (36)	37 (38)
Has two or more brothers living in a large city	40 (48)	36 (25)	34 (38)	54 (43)
Respondent has a relative working in Mexico City	62 (71)	69 (29)	84 (43)	80 (51)
Is a career or transitional *obrero*	14 (71)	37 (30)	33 (33)	32 (50)
Is a career *obrero*	3 (71)	3 (30)	6 (33)	12 (50)

* Number in parentheses = *N*.

[7] Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrialization and Labor* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951), pp. 272, 294.

have seen that *obreros* are better educated and have more urban connections and higher aspirations, so they do not have the restricted cultural background characteristic of the truly poor. If landlessness pushed them out of farming, it was a specific push and not a general economic and cultural marginality.

A crucial piece of evidence in support of the urban influence as against the landlessness hypothesis has already been presented in Table 2. There it was shown that having a father who owned some land was associated with going into *obrero* work. In line with the rest of the indicators, amount of father's land was interpreted as an index of involvement in the urban sector; landowning necessarily involves such contacts. Table 5 continues this interpretation by presenting a number of characteristics of the respondent that are associated with the amount of land owned by his father, if the father was in agriculture. The table is confined to farmer fathers in order to focus on the problem of rural people entering factory work. The first characteristic is simply the size of the family. Large landholders tend to have more sons, and more have sons who are farmers. Nonetheless, they educate them better, and the sons are more likely to grow up knowing relatives who live in large cities. Landowning fathers are more likely to have sons who are transitional or career *obreros*, although the proportions do not increase with the amount of land held. When the analysis is confined to the career *obreros*, however, as shown in the last row in Table 5, entering and staying in *obrero* work is somewhat more frequent for sons with fathers in the largest landowning category.

Support for this interpretation appears in two previous studies of occupational type and landholding. In a study of factory workers in Puerto Rico, Gregory[8] found the same lack of landholding among most of his subsample of 291 *obreros* with agricultural experience. On the other hand, over two-thirds of these same workers reported having been previously employed throughout the year in agricultural work—a record far superior to that of the ordinary farm worker. Moreover, only 15 per cent said they had left primarily because of sporadic employment. When asked about the conditions under which they would return to agriculture, some 60 per cent said they would not return under any conditions, and over two-thirds said they had hope of higher earnings in industry and little in agriculture.[9] Although Gregory does not report data on the landholdings of the fathers of these workers, and although he has no group of farmers with which to compare his factory workers, his evidence does not support the economic marginality explanation. Rather, the factory workers were shown to be familiar with and favorable toward the urban-industrial sector and were embedded in it by way of education and social contacts.[10]

Finally, Moore's data, which originally suggested to him the importance of landlessness, admit of an alternative interpretation in line with that proposed here. He finds the same initial fact that fewer factory workers have land or rights to cultivation when compared to those in farming.[11] Supporting this fact are the majority replies of the workers emphasizing necessity, improving their situation by their own efforts, and lack of land to support all of them when asked why they got into factory work. In addition, Moore's data show that the factory workers have more education, are more likely to expect help from the union, and more often had fathers in non-agricultural work.[12] As in-

[8] Peter Gregory, "The Labor Market in Puerto Rico," in Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman (eds.), *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), pp. 136–72.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 145–46.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[11] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 295.

terpreted by Moore, the combination amounts to the "push" of poverty and the "pull" of urban alternatives.

But is it not odd that the villagers who were driven to factory work because of poverty are also the best educated? And would it not be surprising if the factory workers did hold more land than the farmers? The interpretation is internally contradictory, a fact that is masked by the push-pull framework. More penetrating analysis, impossible for Moore because of lack of cases, might have revealed what the present data show, that factory workers with no land of their own tend to come from families with considerable land.

A variation of the economic-marginality explanation is proposed in the International Labour Office's (ILO) report *Why Labour Leaves the Land*.[13] According to its authors, the main "push" factor is the lower level of income in agricultural work. They qualify this factor by another, the expansion of employment in non-agricultural occupations, and attribute to this second factor the determination of the rate of movement out of agriculture. But other sections of the ILO report actually contradict the emphasis on low incomes. For instance, they note that the low-production countries, presumably those with the lowest farm wages, have the lowest rate of movement out of agriculture. "Viewed from the international angle, rates of movement are lowest where levels of labour productivity in agriculture are lowest, and where a higher rate of migration is most needed."[14] Moreover, it appears that the low income groups within the farm population are least likely to move. "People who are unskilled, insecure and underemployed find it difficult to get job information, to move to places where employment is growing, and to acquire qualifications for work in other types of employment. This is the crux of the problem of movement out of agriculture."[15] We can only agree and add that the evidence of this study indicates that these deficiencies amount to lack of involvement in the urban network and that it is gratuitous to attribute such marginality to low income. Correlation is not necessarily causation.

THE PROCESS OF URBAN INFLUENCE

It has been argued that occupational placement in the urban-industrial sector is a function of a person's links to that sector through primary relationships that communicate and support the differentiated styles of life and multiple perspectives that are associated with cities. This particular study has stressed access to the urban world through one's kinsmen, but other factors, such as formal education, father's landownership, and even age, have been interpreted as indicators of the presence of a network of urbanized relationships. An additional range of factors, such as exposure to mass media, political participation, and certain aspects of level of living might be interpreted similarly, although they have not been included in this report.

It has been assumed that the actual temporal sequence of association usually moves from kinsmen to mass media if for no other reason than the fact that such is the typical sequence of exposure as one matures, and this is especially so in peasant villages. In later life a man might appear to respond first to mass media, but we would argue that this is possible only because of prior socialization by way of interpersonal contacts. The hypothesis has not specified which primary ties are most crucial or the number required for various prediction levels. With so much overlap in the influence of diverse kinsmen it seemed inappropriate to attempt to score them, although a general cumulation is hypothesized and appears to be demon-

[13] International Labour Office, *Why Labour Leaves the Land* (Geneva, 1960).

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

strable with more refined methods. Again, the problem of cause versus association has been skirted. Occupational placement is here taken as a dependent variable, and the cumulation of primary urban ties is asserted to lead to commitment to an urban-industrial occupation, but our analysis does not demonstrate a causal sequence except insofar as we can appeal to the actual temporal priority implied in the influence of a father, then one's brothers, and on to friends and *compadres*.

It may be, indeed, that the placement measured by the occupational-sequence typology is simply a correlate of the other factors, and all are indexes of an urban style of life. If this is so, the real problem for investigation is why the nuclei of the urban networks form and why some of these expand and others do not. The solution of this problem would require a comparative study of communities and subcommunities, a task that goes beyond the available data. However, such an alternative interpretation of the results in terms of group formation and expansion is close to our assumption that the process of urban influence is not simply a matter of transmitting a state of mind. We interpret our data in terms of a web of ongoing relationships; without these the urban outlook would not exist. We would even go further by proposing that the urban state of mind or, more precisely, the urbanized vocabulary of motives and labels consists initially of minimal cues and sketchy knowledge. As one becomes involved in the web of urban affiliations, one's stock of symbols expands, clarifies, crystallizes, and becomes operative. A previous paper based on such vocabulary data from this sample lends support to this interpretation. The perception and evaluation of *obrero* work by the farmers and shopkeepers were vague and unrealistic in comparison to those of the *obreros* themselves.[16]

[16] Frank W. Young and Ruth C. Young, "Occupational Role Perceptions in Rural Mexico," *Rural Sociology*, XXVII (March, 1962), 42–52.

The hypothesis of kin-mediated urban influence is in general complementary to those explanations that stress the over-all opportunity structure or, in Lipset's words, "the variables which determine the horizons and opportunities of individuals."[17] But the relationship is not one of adding factors in a way that would only perpetuate the *ad hoc* research that is presently being pursued in terms of the opportunity structure approach. Instead, it proposes a common, abstract interpretation of these factors and guides the selection or rejection of others. It would interpret factors such as education, social class, or size of community of orientation as diverse indicators of the probability that a given individual will be tied into the urban sector. What they all have in common is their relationship to a differentiated way of life. They are all indicators of "education" in a very broad sense, but it is probably inappropriate to attempt to stretch the meaning of the word so far. Even "intelligence" may be another way of indexing a person's involvement in a more complex and abstracted perspective. In other words, these attributes should not be seen as so many separate "factors," such that a pinch of this and a year of that add up to placement in an occupation of a more urbanized type, and the rules for combining the ingredients are left unspecified.

The urban-influence hypothesis appears to be more parsimonious, too. It requires fewer assumptions about the "perception of opportunities." In terms of the network conception, perception is an integral part of participation in the urban sector; one index of involvement is possession of a stock of labels for discriminating opportunity. It is not a matter of being raised in a large city, "seeing" that white-collar work is "better" than manual, and then searching out the "opportunities." What happens is that aspirations and evaluations of urban opportunities develop or are taken

[17] Lipset and Bendix, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

over as the individual is drawn into the urban network. Said more generally, the network-influence interpretation refuses to separate the "out there" as sharply as the opportunity-structure approach appears to require.

There is a practical implication of this research that bears mention. If placement in an urbanized occupation is indeed a matter of associations with significant others in the urban network, then attempts at "retraining" or special preparation that ignores the wider web of support and communication are inadequate. In this view, no amount of formal education is sufficient in itself to put a man into the urban sector and insure his commitment. Only if he is grafted into the social fabric will he comprehend and respond to it sufficiently to sustain his position. Granted that school attendance on the part of the young often amounts to a microcosm of the urban world, it is easy to see how specialized training programs for adults might, in the interests of "efficiency," omit the very experience that spells the difference between participation in or relative exclusion from the more urban social placement that is the wider goal of such programs.

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Some Influence of Hebraic Culture on Modern Social Organization[1]

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ABSTRACT

Limited, diffuse authority characterizes social organization in the modern West. This pattern's emergence entailed a revolutionary breakthrough in seventeenth-century England, a breakthrough catalyzed by scriptural influence on the Puritans and, in turn, on other opponents of the establishment. Hebraic concepts of Divinity, humanity, nature—and of their interaction—preclude completely centralized, absolutist authority.

Scriptural culture is thought of as transcending the social system per se. Decreasing saliency of the concept of a transcendent Deity weakens cultural control over despotism operating through the social order. Without such control, diffusing authority among the masses may promote tyranny rather than restrain it.

I

A major feature of social organization in the modern West is the limitation and diffusion of authority. This pattern is exemplified by "decentralization," judicial review, committees, parliaments, congregations, etc. It has operated not only within diverse spheres of activity, such as the economy and the polity, but also between them.

Under some conditions, the limitation and diffusion of authority can promote the instrumental effectiveness of a social system. Accordingly, social scientists frequently have applied a functionalist analysis to this pattern of organization. Functionalist and structural-functional approaches have not been restricted to social structure or to explaining how an ongoing system works, however; cultural factors and the question of system development and change also have been considered. In this context, evolutionist frames of reference are prominent.[2]

These efforts have contributed greatly toward formulating the *general requisites* for the limitation and diffusion of authority (in the West, at least); the theoretical work on bureaucracy is a good example. Much less has been accomplished, however, in explaining adequately the *actual occurrence* of the limitation and diffusion of authority in the West. This phenomenon was blocked by powerful people in high positions who were dedicated to centralized absolutism and/or found it expedient. I contend that functionalist, evolutionist approaches alone cannot adequately explain or predict the elimination of this potent blockage. Such approaches must be supplemented by consideration of catalysts of external origin, catalysts that fostered revolutionary breakthrough.[3]

[1] Much of the material on English Puritans and Puritanism used in this paper was obtained from research supported by the University of Delaware General Faculty Research Fund. This support is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] See, e.g., the papers by Talcott Parsons, Robert N. Bellah, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt in *American Sociological Review*, XXIX, No. 3 (June, 1964), 339–86.

[3] Simultaneous consideration of evolutionary and revolutionary change is most fruitful when it goes beyond mere eclectic summation. Eisenstadt has opened a major avenue of advance in noting the importance of the *interaction* of evolutionary social differentiation with revolutionary charismatic innovation (*ibid.*, pp. 384–86). Evolutionist approaches often are applied only to internal, in-

I suggest that one crucial breakthrough was the revolt against the state-church establishment in seventeenth-century England. Unlike the Wars of the Roses, which were essentially only power struggles among competing dynastic elites, the seventeenth-century conflict involved a fundamental challenge to basic institutions. The latter struggle gave rise to a torrent of daring philosophical speculation on politics, economic activity, and religion. This speculation helped bring on the American Revolution and the French Revolution, thereby spreading the struggle far beyond England.

It is further suggested that Puritanism was the most potent factor in organizing and *sustaining* the revolt in England—and that Hebraic influence on Puritanism was crucial in this matter. Thus, it is contended that Hebraic culture was an external factor that entered and catalyzed a fundamental Western revolt against what was conceived of as centralized absolutism. This paper deals with the Hebraic basis for the revolt, the Hebraic influence on Puritanism, and the Puritan impact on public life in seventeenth-century England.

II

The Hebraic culture complex presented here must be treated as a given, for its origins and development are beyond the scope of this paper. The task at hand is to analyze this culture's subsequent influence, not its genesis and transformation. The configuration dealt with here is the one embodied in the canonized Hebrew Scriptures.[4] Although sometimes only a minority of the Hebrews adhered to scriptural culture, even deviants generally acknowledged it to be the ideal way of life. Furthermore, scriptural Hebraic culture ultimately has won out over all other cultures that may have had greater short-run popularity among the Hebrews. Hence, for the purposes of this paper, it is scientifically appropriate to regard the Hebraic culture of the Scriptures as *the* Hebraic culture. An even more basic consideration for this paper is that *this* Hebraic culture is the only one that has been familiar and influential in the West.

One of the most fundamental features of scriptural culture is a tripartite view of the universe, which is seen as consisting of Divinity, humanity, and nature. Each of the three categories is sharply distinguished from the others.[5] Divinity completely and eternally transcends humanity[6] and nature,[7] while humanity, in turn,

herent sources of change in a system. I suggest that *both* internal and external factors be examined in *both* evolutionary and revolutionary change. The internal-external question and the evolutionary-revolutionary question can usefully be treated as dimensions of variation that are analytically independent of one another.

[4] The term "Old Testament" is undesirable for scientific purposes, since it is laden with theological bias, a bias that is both alien and negative to the ethos of the Hebrew Scriptures For the books of Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, references are to *The Torah* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1962) For the other books, references are to *The Holy Scriptures* (2 vols; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1955).

[5] See the story of Creation (Gen 1, 2) The Deity exists before man and nature, and His essence does not change through creating them Man (*'aDaM*) is created independently of nature, i.e., from the dust of the earth (*'aDaMaH*) rather than from an earlier form of life (Gen 2 7). Also, Solomon explicitly postulated God's separateness from the forces of nature that He manipulates (I Kings 19 11-12).

[6] See the following assertions: (*a*) Although man should praise God, God is exalted beyond all human praise and has no need of it (Neh. 9 5). (*b*) Man cannot become wealthy or achieve great things without God's generosity and help (Deut. 8:11 18; I Chron. 29.11-16) (*c*) God gives moral man military victory over numerically and technologically superior immoral man (Deut. 9:1-4; Judg. 4:1-16; 7.2-22; Isa. 31:1-3).

[7] It is asserted not only that God created nature but also that He subsequently manipulates it at will Miracles entail omnipotent manipulation, for they are fundamental suspensions or reversals of the "laws of nature" rather than mere elaborations or modifications. See (*a*) Sarah giving birth long after her menopause (Gen. 17:15-21; 18:9-15;

transcends nature.[8] Divinity is postulated as unitary, humanity as a homogeneous multiplicity, and nature as a heterogeneous multiplicity. (The idea that mankind is essentially homogeneous rests on the assertion that all peoples have the same ultimate human ancestor.)[9]

These fundamental concepts in scriptural culture have the following imperative implications:

1. Divine transcendence over nature precludes the deification of either nature, a natural entity, or a natural attribute (such as fertility).

2. Divine transcendence over humanity precludes the deification of people (generically, collectively, or individually).

3. Human transcendence over nature precludes degrading people to the level of beasts or tools.[10]

4. The basic homogeneity of mankind precludes unquestioning submission to arbitrary ultimate rule by one's fellow man.

Although humanity is postulated as completely distinct from both Divinity and nature, humanity is held to share some of the traits of each of these other two categories. Like God, but unlike nature, man is regarded as having mental capacities, notably for rationality and ethical evaluation.[11] Man's mentality enables him to achieve a substantial degree of control over the physical forces of animate and inanimate nature—in both the external and internal environments.

Man's control over nature would be spurious, however, if it depended entirely on his rationality. Rationality provides only means, not ends. Without ethical evaluation to institute goals, man's ends would be dictated by pleasure/pain impulses, and he would be only an unusually dynamic aspect of nature. This scriptural rejection of spontaneous impulse gratification as the most basic guide to human behavior is expressed and supported by the rejection of all deities that are apprehended through mystic experience or sensory observation.[12] However, man is like nature, and unlike God, in being at least partly subject to physical forces and limitations. Consequently, asceticism is rejected along with hedonism; moderate, *conditional* impulse gratification is held to be appropriate for man.[13]

21:1–7), (*b*) the bush burning but not being consumed (Exod. 3:1–6), (*c*) the slaying of the Egyptian firstborn (Exod. 11, 12), (*d*) only Elijah's sacrifice being consumed by fire (I Kings 18:20–39). At the building of the temple, Solomon postulated the infinity of the Deity when he asserted that no space, no matter how large, can contain God (I Kings 8:27–29; II Chron. 2:5; 6:18–20).

[8] The transcendence of both Divinity and humanity over nature is expressed in the prohibition of worshipping anything with physical attributes—even celestial bodies (Deut. 4:15–20). Humanity's transcendence over nature also is expressed in the assertion that God gave man dominion over other works of creation (Gen. 1:26–29; 9:2–3; Ps. 8:6–9).

[9] The word *ʾaDaM* is not just the name of the first man; it also means "man" generically.

[10] The pyramid building of ancient Egypt elicited especially severe Hebraic condemnation because it violated two principles simultaneously. The masses were exploited to help deify the pharaohs.

[11] Note that the only food forbidden to man in the Garden of Eden was fruit from the tree of *knowledge of good and evil* (Gen. 2:15–17) and that ethical knowledge is implicitly asserted to be Divine knowledge (Gen. 3:2–7, 22–24).

[12] Hellenic culture inherently linked beauty to truth and goodness, while early Christian culture suspected that beauty masked falsehood and evil. By contrast, scriptural culture postulated neither a positive nor a negative correlation between sensory appeal and moral merit. (Both hedonism and asceticism were avoided thereby.) The Hebraic principle of dissociation is stated in I Sam. 16:7 and Prov. 31:30. It is evident in Samuel's choice of a new king from among the sons of Jesse (I Sam. 16:1–13). The handsome Eliab is rejected because of his character, not his looks. David, who is also handsome, is chosen irrespective of his appearance, not because of it and not in spite of it. Thus, in terms of P. A. Sorokin's conceptual scheme, scriptural culture is "idealistic" rather than "mixed" (*Social and Cultural Dynamics* [one vol.; Boston: Porter Sargent, Publisher, 1957]).

[13] The conditional propriety of prosperity and physical gratification is expressed, directly or indirectly, in Deut. 8:7–18; 12:20–21; 26:11; 28:11–12; 32:13–14; Prov. 5:18–19; Eccles. 2:24; 3:12–13, 5:17–18; Neh. 8:9–12.

Scriptural culture asserts that God not only provided man with the capacity for ethical evaluation, but also offered specific codes of behavior. Acceptance of these codes, not to mention conformity to them, is problematical, for it is postulated that the omnipotent Deity intentionally leaves much of human behavior to man's free will. Thus, man is seen as no more a pawn of God than a pawn of nature.[14]

The Hebrew Scriptures assert further that in the ancient Middle East, some related kin groups collectively accepted the codes of behavior offered by the Deity, and on this basis they became a single national community. Acceptance of these codes as binding obligations was sanctified and institutionalized through a covenant. As was not the case in previous covenants, Divinity was not just a witness and enforcer of agreements among people; the Deity was also a direct participant. Henceforth, in all man-to-man interaction and all God-man interaction, *both* parties to the Covenant (God and the nation of Israel) were bound by its ethical codes and by the rational implications of these codes.

By binding God to rational ethics and ethical rationality, the Covenant enabled the people involved to *limit* Divine authority (as distinct from Divine power) while accepting this authority. Indeed, the Hebrew Scriptures at least implicitly postulate *man's right to confront God directly and debate with him on the morality of his own behavior.*[15] It is even considered possible, sometimes, to dissuade the omnipotent Deity from some harmful intervention in human affairs.[16] Such conditional limitation of Divine authority certainly precludes unlimited *human* authority.

Since God was regarded as a party to the Covenant, subsequent shifts in public opinion could *not* legitimate human abrogation of the agreement. This restriction involved more than Divine transcendence over man. Even if *all* the people wanted to renege, acting on such unanimity would still constitute unilateral abrogation. The multiple kin groups involved had assumed their obligations as a single nation, as one participant in a new dyadic relationship between the unitary Divinity and a unitary human social system.

Although the kin groups composing this social system were closely related to one another, they were also closely related to certain other kin groups that did not participate.[17] The most fundamental basis for this social system is attachment to the Covenant rather than kinship. This attachment weakens some kinship ties (between participating groups and related non-participating groups) while it strengthens other kinship ties (among participating groups).[18] Thus, attachment to the Covenant transcends kinship ties even when it coincides with them.

Unlike a kinship system, this social system is regarded not as an end in itself but as a necessary means for maintaining conformity to the Covenant and its derivative scriptural culture. Hence, the *legitimate* exercise of social control must at least be compatible with the dictates of scriptural culture. Just as man is thought of as transcended by God, the human social organization is transcended by its basic culture, which is held to have Divine sanction.[19]

[14] This principle is expressed in Jer. 2:5-13; Ezek. 20:35-36; Ps. 81:9-14; Prov. 3:11.

[15] See Jer. 2:5. For a specific case, see Abraham's attempt to dissuade God from destroying Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 18:22-32).

[16] See, e.g., the reports that Moses successfully dissuaded God from punitively destroying the descendants (not "children") of Israel (Exod. 32:9-14; Num. 16:20-35).

[17] See the genealogy reported in Exod. 16.21-25, 29-30, 36.

[18] The various common ancestors may be stressed differentially to weaken further the ties between certain related kin groups and to strengthen further the ties among others.

[19] My inheritance of these traditions may underlie my sociological interest in analytically distinguishing between culture and social structure—

An important corollary of this view is that obligatory loyalty to the social system (and to the members exercising authority) is *conditional* on the social system's adherence to scriptural culture.[20] Such adherence became more problematical with the transformation from theocratic government to monarchy. With the polity semiautonomous, authority over the nation was exercised by people who were *not* essentially the guardians of scriptural culture. The repeated misuse and abuse of royal authority fostered the doctrine that no man inherently rules over others, that there is nothing sacred about a particular dynasty—or even about monarchy per se.[21] Rulers who are unduly exploitative or oppressive need not even be tolerated, much less obeyed; their overthrow is at least a privilege, if not an outright obligation.[22]

Theocratic combination of governmental and religious authority had obscured the complexity of the role of guardian of the scriptural culture. The structural differentiation that is reflected in the emergence of a semiautonomous polity did not create this complexity; it only made it more apparent. All along there was not one but three basic mechanisms for maintaining scriptural culture. They can be designated as *priestly, prophetic,* and *rabbinic.* Insofar as these mechanisms were institutionalized, they can be thought of as three constituent roles of the more macrocosmic guardian role.

The priestly function is to officiate in ritualized behavior, and this function was ascribed exclusively to members of the Levitic kin group. The prophetic function is to respond to Divine prompting to catalyze changes in people's everyday behavior, changes that would yield *greater conformity* to the codes and principles of the Covenant. The rabbinic function is to ponder the specific codes held to be promulgated by God—and extrapolate corollaries to handle behavioral problems that had not been covered explicitly by Divine revelation through prophets.

One important type of variation was the degree of coalescence among these functions. Some people who exercised authority, such as Moses, tried to fulfil two or all three of them—simultaneously or successively. Whenever priestly Levites also functioned prophetically and/or rabbinically, the priestly role tended to seem paramount—partly because its assignment was so restricted. If the priests seemed to be deficient or defective in prophetic or rabbinic activity, however, tendencies toward centripetal coalescence were outweighed by tendencies toward centrifugal separation among the functions.

Regardless of the degree of coalescence involved, none of these functions has any clear logical or chronological priority over either of the other two. They constitute three basic approaches to controlling behavior without ultimately relying on force. In this connection Max Weber's tripartite analysis of the legitimation of authority is quite useful. The priestly role entails "traditional" authority, the prophetic role entails "charismatic" authority (or leadership), and the rabbinic role entails "rational-legal" authority.[23]

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and in studying the influence of culture on social structure.

[20] Thus, the prophet Jeremiah could, in clear conscience, look forward to the downfall of the nation of Israel when its people were deviant—and could even urge his compatriots to surrender to the invaders (Jer. 20:4–6; 21:4–14; 26:1–15).

[21] Monarchy is said to be foolishly chosen by the people rather than wisely ordained by God, and God is reported to interpret the request for a king as a rejection of Him (I Sam. 8). Furthermore, Solomon's transgressions allegedly induce God to end the rule of the Davidic dynasty over a united nation (I Kings 11:1–13).

[22] I and II Kings report the overthrow of one dynasty after another when it has flagrantly and repeatedly violated the codes of the Covenant. The rebellions involved are said to have been incited by God—partly through prophets.

[23] See Max Weber's *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 324–86. In *Ancient Judaism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952) Weber stressed the rational and legal aspects of Judaism, but he did

Although all three functions are perennially basic, there has been a long-term change in relative emphasis, with the rabbinic function becoming dominant. Adequate explanation of this change requires at least two approaches: (1) structural-functional analysis of roles and (2) appraisal of cultural influence on social development.

With respect to structural-functional analysis, one should note that the prophetic role could be filled much more flexibly than the priestly role. Consequently, those men who were acknowledged as legitimate prophets often were more capable and dedicated, on the average, than those men who were priests alone. The exercise of prophetic authority tended to be relatively unstable, however, for people often responded more to the personality of a man than to the merit of his message. The ultimate dominance of the rabbinic role seems *partly* to be due to its having much of the stability of the priestly role, without the latter's rigidity in assignment, and much of the flexibility of the prophetic role, without prophetic instability.

The effective exercise of the rabbinic role rests *essentially* on the incumbent's superior knowledge and superior interpretive skill, not on his descent or personal magnetism. Furthermore, a cumulative body of law was developing from the discrete prophetic announcements of Divine rulings on specific new problems.[24] This accumulation was reducing people's need for revelation through prophets, but was increasing their need for rabbinic instruction and interpretation.[25]

With respect to cultural influence on social development, the eventual dominance of the rabbinic role entailed increasing application of the emphasis on rationality (in ethics and ritual). This emphasis is better served by legalism than by traditionalism or revelation. What is especially crucial for the limitation and diffusion of authority is that, unlike the priestly function, the rabbinic function is open to *every* man of the socioreligious community, and unlike the prophetic function, the rabbinic function is open to all men (of the community) *simultaneously*.

The rabbi is an expert, not a monopolist. He is an expert on the Law and related historical events who helps people (himself and others) to gain greater knowledge and insight. Since this knowledge and interpretive skill are available to everyone, a rabbinic pronouncement, unlike a priestly or prophetic pronouncement, need not be accepted unquestioningly. Anyone may challenge a rabbinic pronouncement by offering an alternative interpretation of the Law. The alternative must compete or conflict with the original pronouncement, however, and the alternative interpretation must be demonstrably superior. Thus, the very essence of rabbinic authority promotes its limitation and diffusion.

III

Earlier in this paper it was asserted that the actual occurrence of the limitation and diffusion of authority in the modern West entailed a seventeenth-century Puritan-led (and Hebraic-inspired) revolt against the state-church establishment in England. Although the Hebrew Scriptures were accepted by the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Anglican churches, these churches were too involved symbiotically with absolutist (or would-be absolutist) governments or felt too insecure to push for limitation and diffusion of state authority. Also, the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches shared an ethos of *centralized* religious authority.

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not perceive rabbinic activity clearly unless the rabbinic role was sharply demarcated from the priestly and prophetic roles.

[24] Although these prophetic utterances were discrete, they certainly were not discreet.

[25] Attention to such factors can promote further progress in formulating the conditions for—and problematical consequences of—the routinization and transformation of charisma postulated by Weber (*The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 363–92).

Furthermore, those people who adhered to Roman Catholicism or Anglo-Catholicism tended to be more receptive to the Hellenic/Hellenistic outlook than was true of the Puritans. Whereas the Hebraic orientation toward centralized, absolutist authority is one of active opposition, the classical orientation tends to be one of active compliance. No sharp distinction was made between the social system (polis or Hellenistic state) and the culture (symbolized by the patron deity). Unconditional loyalty to those in authority was expected, and rebellion was deemed inherently immoral. Although philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle had grave reservations about unconditionally supporting the established social order, and even considered possible justifications for rebellion, such thinking never seriously undermined the institutionalization of absolutist authority either in the polis or the Hellenistic state.

There have been serious doubts as to how much Hebraic impact there was on Puritanism (and, in turn, on the limitation and diffusion of authority in the West). Scholars expressing such doubts have pointed to New Testament orientations in Puritanism that differ appreciably from those of the Hebrew Scriptures.[26] There are at least two factors to consider in this connection: (1) the respective degrees to which the Hebrew Scriptures and non-Hebraic aspects of the New Testament influenced Puritanism; (2) whether the non-Hebraic New Testament influence also could have promoted the limitation and diffusion of authority.

As regards the respective degrees of influence, I suggest that *both* the scripturally oriented students of Puritanism and the New Testament–oriented ones are somewhat in error. Scripturally oriented appraisals tend to *overestimate the relative degree* of Hebraic influence on Puritanism, while New Testament–oriented appraisals *underestimate the absolute degree* of Hebraic influence. Much of the scholarly conflict becomes spurious if it is conceded that in some respects there was great Hebraic influence on Puritanism, while in other respects there was heavy influence by non-Hebraic aspects of the New Testament.

Since a non-Hebraic early Christian ethos also molded Puritanism substantially, one needs to consider whether this ethos, as well as the Hebraic ethos, helped produce Puritan rebelliousness. The early Christian reaction to objectionable absolutist authority was not direct and active revolt, however, but rather was abstention or withdrawal from involvement in civic affairs, insofar as it was feasible.[27] This ideal is developed further in Augustinian individualism, which essentially entails detachment from the objectionable features of the mundane world. Thus, it constitutes a negative adaptation, individualism by default rather than true decentralization.[28] Consequently, it seems to me that of the

[26] This reservation is alluded to but not spelled out in Marshall M. Knappen's definitive work, *Tudor Puritanism—a Chapter in the History of Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 359–60.

[27] This reaction was not just a tactic to avoid the pagan features of civic rites; it expressed a basic, pervasive orientation. Note the dictum to "render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's [but no more]." The early Christian orientation, as expressed in "turn the other cheek when smitten," contrasts sharply with the Hebraic tradition embodied in the bloody Bar Kochba revolt. Also relevant is the New Testament report that the populace preferred saving the thief Bar Abbas to saving Christ (Matt. 27:15–21). Bar Abbas symbolized active opposition to the oppressive, exploitative politico-economic elite created by an alliance between the Roman conquerors and a collaborationist native upper class. Bar Abbas may even have been a guerilla fighter rather than a true thief.

[28] To rebut my line of thought, one might point out that when Puritans called for the decentralization of authority in the Church of England, they argued that the New Testament did not authorize bishoprics. What is crucial for the question of ideological sources of decentralization, however, is that the New Testament also did not prohibit bishoprics. The Puritans read this prohibition *into* the New Testament, not out of it.

three major ideological influences mentioned (the Hebraic, the classical, and the early Christian), only the Hebraic influence could play a major direct part in shaping the Puritan emphasis on limited, diffused authority.

In the mid-seventeenth century, the English Puritans broke out in open revolt against the Anglican monarch, and the Hebraic influence was clear. Some Puritans compared their struggle to that of the Maccabees and drew inspiration from the latter.[29] Although the rebellion gained enough momentum to become a full-fledged civil war, the Puritan-Parliamentarian forces initially suffered one military setback after another, and only the most dedicated Puritans were able to maintain faith in ultimate victory for their cause.[30] This faith was bolstered by continual, widespread rereading and discussion of the Hebrew Scriptures,[31] which told of righteous men gaining victory in war although the odds against them seemed overwhelming. The Puritan chaplains, serving also as official war correspondents, frequently used scriptural analogies to support the claim that their side was fighting God's enemies and could expect Divine assistance.[32] Countless sermons on the home front did the same.[33]

The Puritan spread of Hebraic orientations toward authority is perhaps more evident in America than in England. (Before the major revolt, the Puritans who were most strongly opposed to the establishment often emigrated from England, sometimes by necessity.) Puritans who left during the reign of James I (1603–25) often compared their departure to the Hebrew Exodus from Egypt—and compared King James to the corresponding pharaoh.[34] America was called "The Promised Land," and the Puritan immigrants and their geographically spreading descendants gave scriptural names such as Salem, New Canaan, Jericho, and Rehovoth to many of the towns they founded. In addition, Englishmen and Anglo-Americans frequently have given their children such scriptural names as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, Benjamin, Joshua, Samuel, Josiah, and Jeremiah. The frequency suggests that at some time the corresponding scriptural persons were regarded as appropriate models for behavior.

The scriptural doctrine of resistance to an unduly oppressive monarch was echoed in America as late as 1776. Although England had set up a limited monarchy much earlier, the American Declaration of Independence nevertheless blamed the king for alleged British tyranny. For the United States, Franklin and Jefferson proposed a seal that bore the motto: "Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God." The scriptural influence on it is demonstrated by the accompanying illustration. It depicted the overwhelming of Pharaoh's charioteers in the Sea of Reeds.[35]

At the beginning of this paper it was noted that in the modern West, limited and diffused authority is *widely* characteristic of social organization (e.g., in economic, governmental, and religious activity). To explain adequately the extensiveness of this pattern, one needs to con-

[29] Louis I. Newman, *Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movements* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), p. 632.

[30] John Marlowe, *The Puritan Tradition in English Life* (London: Cresset Press, 1956), pp. 22–23.

[31] William Haller, *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

[32] Joshua Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva—England's Recovery* (1647). (Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, Gainesville, Fla., reproduced this book in 1960.)

[33] See the Hepworth Dixon Collection of Pamphlets, Speeches, and Sermons Relating to the English Civil War (Astor-Lenox-Tilden Foundation reference collection, New York Public Library, New York).

[34] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 634.

[35] Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), *The Hebrew Impact on Western Civilization* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), p. 50.

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Both the merchant and the Puritan divine insisted on keeping a complete, accurate account of all debits and credits incurred in dealing with others and with oneself. The Puritan divine interpreted his experiences and observations in terms of competition and conflict between God and Satan, and he carefully recorded each interaction and its outcome in his diary.[36] With respect to similarities between the common-law practitioner and the Puritan clergyman, both are said to have stressed institutional autonomy and interdependence, decentralized authority, legalism, and rational interpretation of laws. Also, allegedly both were often narrow constructionists, prone to exaggeration, and intolerant of their opponents.[37]

The extensive spread of Puritanism in seventeenth-century England is partly due to its proponents' attempts to achieve mass communication and mass involvement (middle class and lower class), rather than focus on small elites. The clergymen who leaned toward Puritanism concentrated on preaching—and preaching "in plain English to the plain people" at that.[38] Families were encouraged to retain an esteemed clergyman of Puritan persuasion to tutor the boys of the household.[39] Laymen became increasingly and quite actively involved in Puritan worship and church organization.

Self-interest as well as idealism led to increasingly organized opposition to the state-church establishment. Royal attempts to centralize control over all major spheres of public life induced diverse opposition groups to unite in an alliance of expediency. Both the Puritan clergymen and the lawyers of the common law opposed the extensive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. Whereas the Puritan clergy objected mainly to the Anglo-Catholic religious policies pursued, the lawyers perceived these courts (along with the royal-prerogative courts) as endangering their livelihood, for such courts did not use the system of common law.[40] Up-and-coming merchants opposed the establishment because the early Stuart monarchs granted monopolies to a few export companies. This royal policy was geared to controlling (and even restricting) economic activity by concentrating trade in the hands of a few very rich, docile merchants.[41]

Although much of the initial unity within the opposition was dictated by expediency, the unity itself fostered the spread of Puritanism—and the further spread of Puritanism induced still greater unity. Ironically, the diffusion of Puritanism was promoted unwittingly by the supporters of the state-church establishment. They derisively labeled an opponent of any established policy or entrenched interest as a "Puritan."[42] Since Hebraic-inspired Puri-

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[37] John Dykstra Eusden, *Puritans, Lawyers, and Politics in Early Seventeenth Century England* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. viii–ix, 124–25, 141–42.

[38] Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism*, pp. 51–55; Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714* (Edinburgh: Thos. Nelson & Sons, 1961), pp. 82, 83.

[39] Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism*, pp. 292–93.

[40] Eusden, *op. cit.*, pp. vii–viii. Knappen, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

[41] Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 37. Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

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IV

The Hebraic stress on limiting and diffusing authority fitted in well with the social and cultural development of the West along industrial lines. Western instrumental effectiveness has been promoted by a high degree of specialization, and such specialization often was made tenable by organized decentralization of authority.

The Hebraic orientation toward authority did not stem from pragmatic considerations, however, but from an independent, pervasive system of ultimate concepts and ethics. The Hebraic and Puritan passion for moralizing tends to apply the central, ultimate ethos to passing judgment on all behavior. Little, if anything, is left both optional and ethically neutral. This centralization of *cultural* control sharply limits the eufunctional flexibility that may be gained via decentralized authority.

The cultural control in question is limited, however, by the basis for its centralization. The idea of adhering to a supreme, all-encompassing Deity and his eternal principles prevents people from readily accepting their own collective impulses or collective expediency as legitimation for basic changes in outlook and behavior.[43] The concept of a transcendent metaphysical guide to propriety has been eroding in the West, however. An intermediate stage of erosion is manifest in certain forms of "Deism," which postulate that God has retired from managing the world and has left the charting of its course entirely to man.[44] In this context it is illuminating to contrast the Mayflower Compact (with its strong overtones of the Hebrew Covenant) to the subsequent U.S. Constitution, to which God clearly is not a party—and which man may amend at will.

Actually, systems such as Deism cannot maintain their ground continually. Severe crises arise, and they undermine man's faith in his *independent* supremacy over the environment. In response he tends, at least implicitly, to postulate something greater than himself. People who claim to be completely objective and secularized often unwittingly deify nature—whether or not they spell it with a capital *n*. Philosophies based on or buttressed by the work of Rousseau, Darwin, Malthus, Marx, Freud, etc., often postulate that modern man's troubles stem from his lack of spontaneity or his interference with some inherent natural order (static or progressive). Such an orientation divests people of responsibility for their own behavior; homicide, economic depression, war, etc., are attributed to reified abstractions that are cloaked in statistical probabilities.

Abrogating responsibility does not necessarily lead to a fundamental increase in

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[44] Systems such as Deism may promote further erosion of the scriptural outlook in the West—as well as fill a growing void produced by independent erosion. Deism can be regarded as a cultural force in its own right rather than simply a watered-down version of scriptural culture. The homocentric world view of Deism also characterized the "renaissance" of classical culture, which may be one important root of Deism.

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flexibility (freedom), however. The decline in the Hebraic and Puritan types of moralizing has led, rather, to the replacement of one kind of restriction with another. It has led to excessive control by masses of people. Tyranny does not depend on a minority suppressing the majority; the majority can unduly constrain a minority—*or even unduly constrain itself*. Through the decline of transcendent cultural control, the very diffusion of authority that such control had fostered may make the West *more* vulnerable to tyranny rather than less vulnerable.

Without restraining ethics based on a metaphysical referent that transcends both man and nature, democratic rule can be far more totalitarian than control by a royal despot. (Note George Orwell's version of human brotherhood in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.) Discussion of democratic rule should include even those twentieth-century European systems that have been labeled "totalitarian dictatorships," for they have had a much broader base of popular support and participation than the respective systems they supplanted. They have no monopoly on modern totalitarianism, however; the "liberal" democracies also have strong basic tendencies in this direction. Totalitarian democracy may well be germane to the Western type of industrial society per se,[45] despite the influence of Hebraic culture (and indirectly, in part, because of it).

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[45] J. L. Talmon has noted that democracy can be totalitarian, but he piously exempts the "liberal" democracies (*The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1952; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960]). He does not adequately consider whether industrial democracy per se tends to be relatively totalitarian.

Intermarriage of Puerto Ricans in New York City[1]

Joseph P. Fitzpatrick

ABSTRACT

A study of out-group marriages of Puerto Ricans, based on all marriages in which one partner was first- or second-generation Puerto Rican, indicates that assimilation is taking place rapidly. Increases in the rate of out-group marriage among second- as compared with first-generation Puerto Ricans in 1949 and 1959 were as great as those found by Drachsler for all immigrants in New York, 1908-12. Out-group marriage was positively correlated with higher occupational status only in the case of brides. Age at marriage drops in second generation. Civil and Catholic ceremonies drop in New York in contrast to Puerto Rico; Protestant ceremonies increase. Catholic ceremonies increased in 1959 over 1949 and in second generation over first.

According to the 1960 Census of Population,[2] there were 612,574 Puerto Ricans living in the city of New York; 429,710 (70 per cent) of these had been born in Puerto Rico; 182,864 (30 per cent) had been born in New York of Puerto Rican parentage. The question is frequently raised about the assimilation of the Puerto Ricans into the New York community: how rapidly are they becoming assimilated; is their assimilation more rapid or less rapid than that of immigrant groups which came to the city at an earlier date? The present study is an effort to determine the rate of assimilation[3] on the basis of marriage behavior. It indicates that assimilation is proceeding rapidly.

In every study of cultural assimilation, the factor of marriage is of central importance. A high rate of intermarriage of members of one ethnic group with another is generally accepted as a reliable index of cultural assimilation. Ruby Jo Reeves used intermarriage as the crucial sign of assimilation and found that ethnic groups were intermarrying with other ethnic groups, but within the three major faiths of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish.[4] Will Herberg accepts this same position.[5] John Thomas questions the fact that marriages take place this way within religious groups. He finds interreligious marriage not only extensive, but increasing.[6] These three studies are all concerned with the factor of intermarriage, especially interreligious marriage, in the process of assimilation.[7]

[1] The research on which this paper is based was made possible by a grant of the Luis Ferre Foundation, Ponce, Puerto Rico.

[2] U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960* (PHC (1)-104), Part I, Table P5.

[3] The term "assimilation" is used here with full awareness of its ambiguity in the literature about immigrants. It is intended in this article to indicate what S. Eisenstadt means by "social assimilation" in his book *Absorption of Immigrants* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), i.e., the acceptance of the newcomers by the host society into close social interaction. It is the same concept that Milton Gordon seeks to express in the term "structural assimilation" in contrast to "cultural assimilation," in *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), chap. ii.

[4] Ruby Jo Reeves, "Single or Triple Melting Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870-1940," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX (1944). Also "What Has Social Science To Say about Intermarriage?" in Werner J. Cahnman, *Intermarriage and Jewish Life* (New York: Herzl Press, 1963), p. 32.

[5] Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), chap. iii.

[6] John L. Thomas, "The Factor of Religion in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *American Sociological Review*, XVI (1951), 487-91.

[7] The validity of intermarriage as an index of assimilation has been questioned by Simon Marc-

This study, therefore, seeks to determine the rate of assimilation among Puerto Ricans on the basis of the extent of in-group versus out-group marriage. The simple hypothesis is that a high level of out-group marriage reflects a high level of assimilation. The phenomenon of out-group marriage will be examined in relation to generation, occupational status, age, and type of marriage ceremony.[8]

The best known earlier study of this kind was one published by Julian Drachsler[9] in 1921, analyzing the rates of intermarriage of immigrants in New York City from 1908–12. Drachsler found a rate of out-group marriage of 11 per cent among first-generation immigrants, and a tripling in the rate of out-group mar-

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son, "A Theory of Intermarriage and Assimilation," *Social Forces*, XXIX (1950–51), 75–78; and by C. A. Price and J. Zubrzycki, "The Use of Intermarriage Statistics as an Index of Assimilation," *Population Studies*, XVI (1962), 58–69. Marcson argues that the significant variable in intermarriage is "class" rather than "culture," and intermarriage is an index of class similarity rather than of cultural assimilation. There is no conflict between Marcson's position and that of the present paper. Marcson uses a much more limited concept of assimilation. Price and Zubrzycki point out the difficulty of determining ethnic identity and generation accurately on the basis of marriage records. Neither problem was present in this study.

[8] Data on color were taken from the marriage records, but it is so difficult to make any reliable judgment about color in the case of Puerto Ricans that any attempt to analyze its significance on this basis is useless. These difficulties are explored in detail in J. P. Fitzpatrick, "Attitudes of Puerto Ricans toward Color," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, XX (1959), 219–33. The designation of color on the marriage record is as the person himself or herself declares it. The overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans declared themselves white. For example, the color combinations according to the marriage records are given in the table below. The significance of color in Puerto Rican marriages must be sought by another method. In the article just cited, the present author reports on a 1958 study of marriages of Puerto Ricans of noticeably different color, in which the color of each partner was identified by the priest performing the ceremony. Of 115 marriages studied, the distribution according to color combination is given below. Unfortunately, in neither case was an effort made to identify marriages of Puerto Ricans with American Negroes. The percentage would have been very small.

	1949 (*N* = 4,514)	1959 (*N* = 9,370)	1958 (*N* = 115)
White/white	90 25	84 83	50 4
White/brown	35	1 99	16 5
White/colored	1 66	3 17	2 6
Brown/brown	2 37	4 14	27 0
Brown/colored	11	2 64	3 5
Colored/colored	3 06	2 21	0 00
Other	2 20	1 12	.....

("Colored," *de color*, is the term used by Puerto Ricans to designate what we call Negroes.)

[9] Julian Drachsler, *Intermarriage in New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921). Studies in intermarriage have been and continue to be of great interest to sociologists. The earlier studies lacked accuracy, many of them being subject to the criticism of Price and Zubrzycki. A number of studies, other than that of Drachsler, have included New York City data. J. V. DePorte, in "Marriages in the State of New York with Special Reference to Nativity" in *Human Biology* (May, 1931), pp. 387 ff., gives general statistics on marriages between people of different nativity for the years 1916–29 but discriminates between first and second generation only for 1927–29. Only place of birth is given, such as Poland or Russia, with no indication whether the person was of German or Jewish ethnic background. Only for Italian men (1927–29) is it possible to draw an accurate conclusion about in-group, out-group marriage: 12 per cent of the first-generation Italian men married out; 37.6 per cent of second-generation men with two Italian parents; 62.7 per cent of second-generation men with one Italian parent. The rate of out-group marriage for second-generation Italian men is very high, but there is no way of determining from DePorte's data whether the out-group brides were third-generation Italians. J. H. S. Bossard, in "Nationality and Nativity as Factors in Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, IV (1939), 792–98, analyzes nearly 70,000 marriages in New York State (excluding New York City) for 1936. He studied the rates of intermarriage between people of different nationalities and between people of differing generations of the same nationality. Bossard acknowledges the difficulty of not being able to identify the Jews as an ethnic group (p. 795); and he does not distinguish between French and English-speaking Canadians. The most serious difficulty with Bossard's study is that many of the native-born of native parentage may

riage among second-generation immigrants, namely 32 per cent.[10] Drachsler analyzed three hypotheses offered to explain this intermarriage: (1) the sex ratio, the preponderance of the number of marriageable men over the number of marriageable women; (2) a rise in economic status which places people of different nationality groups (especially women) in closer contact with the out-group; and (3) the breakdown of the cohesive ethnic group. Drachsler discounts hypotheses (1) and (2) and accepts hypothesis (3) as the only reasonable explanation for the high rate of intermarriage in the second generation. In other words, intermarriage is an index of cultural assimilation or integration.

In the present study, every marriage in the city of New York of a first- or second-generation Puerto Rican in the years 1949 and 1959 was reviewed, and all relevant data were gathered from the marriage record. The data were as follows:

1. Place of birth of bride; of groom.
2. Age at marriage of bride; of groom.
3. Place of residence at time of marriage of bride; of groom.
4. Place of marriage; time of marriage according to month.
5. Type of ceremony: civil, Catholic, Protestant, other.
6. Color, as declared, of bride; of groom.
7. Occupation of bride; of groom.
8. Previous marriage of bride; of groom.
9. Place of birth of father and mother of bride; of groom.

On the basis of these data, first-generation Puerto Ricans (born in Puerto Rico of Puerto Rican parentage) and second-generation Puerto Ricans (born on the mainland, of Puerto Rican parentage) can be identified. Beyond the second generation, all persons are recorded as native-born of native parentage, and it is no longer possible to draw an accurate distinction between persons of different ethnic backgrounds.

In-group and out-group marriages were determined by the following criteria:

In-Group: marriage of a first- or second-generation Puerto Rican with a first- or second-generation Puerto Rican.[11]

Out-Group: marriage of a first- or second-generation Puerto Rican with a partner, born on the mainland of mainland parentage; marriage with a partner foreign-born or born in the United States of foreign parents.[12]

The data on out-group marriages are presented in Table 1. The data give evidence of a significant increase in the rate of out-group marriages among second-generation Puerto Ricans, both men and women, in both 1949 and 1959. One difficulty in these comparisons is the small number of second-generation marriages in comparison to first-generation. Nevertheless, the trend over the 10-year period was consistent. And the trend indicates a significant increase in out-group marriage.

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be third generation of the same ethnic group as the first- or second-generation partners who marry them; Bossard's data do not permit him to identify them.

[10] Drachsler, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

[11] There is one difficulty in this classification. It is possible that a person mainland-born of mainland parents could be third-generation Puerto Rican. Thus the marriage would not really be an out-group marriage. This possibility is very remote. Because the Puerto Rican migration is so recent, the number of third-generation Puerto Ricans in the city is negligible. One of the difficulties of the present study is the fact that there are so few second-generation Puerto Rican marriages relative to first-generation Puerto Rican marriages.

[12] Marriages of first- or second-generation Puerto Ricans with Latin Americans have been omitted entirely from these calculations on in-group and out-group marriage. In view of the cultural similarities, it did not seem correct to identify them as out-group marriages, nor did it seem correct to categorize them as in-group. Also omitted are marriages of first- or second-generation Puerto Ricans with persons whose ethnic identification could not be determined. The number of these was insignificant. However, they were retained in the calculation of "type of ceremony" in Tables 9 and 10.

Is the increase as significant as the increase that occurred among former immigrants? In his study of immigrant marriages of 1908–12, Drachsler[13] found a rate of out-group marriage of 10.39 per cent for first-generation men, and of 10.1 per cent for first-generation women. This rate of out-group marriage was higher than the rate for first-generation Puerto Ricans in either 1949 or 1959. The data are compared in Table 1. However, the percentage increase in out-group marriage from first to second generation is almost the same for all three groups. In fact, in terms of percentage, the rate of out-group marriage among second-generation Puerto Rican women is the same in 1949 and higher in 1959 than was the rate for second-generation immigrant women in the years 1908–12; the rate among second-generation Puerto Rican men approaches the rate of out-group marriage for second-generation men, 1908–12. On the basis of this evidence, it appears that the assimilation of Puerto Ricans is advancing as fast as the assimilation of the immigrants in the 1908–12 period.[14]

In seeking to explain the great difference in out-group marriage rates between first and second generation, Drachsler first hypothesized that it was a consequence of the sex ratio. However, he found that this was not relevant.[15] Neither is it relevant to the Puerto Rican marriage. The sex ratio for all Puerto Ricans, aged 15–44, in New York City in 1949 was 82.7; in 1960 it was 91, identical with the ratio for the total

TABLE 1

RATE OF OUT-GROUP MARRIAGE OF PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1949 AND 1959, BY GENERATION; AND OF ALL IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1908–12

	First Generation		Second Generation		Increase in Second Generation
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent
Grooms:					
Puerto Rican, 1949	5 2	3,079	28.3	378	23.1
Puerto Rican, 1959	3.6	7,078	27 4	638	23 8
1908–12	10.39	64,577	32 4	12,184	22 01
Brides:					
Puerto Rican, 1949	8 5	3,077	30 0	523	21 5
Puerto Rican, 1959	6 0	7,257	33 1	717	27 1
1908–12	10 1	61,823	30 12	14,611	20 02

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 35. It is important to note that Drachsler found a wide range between nationalities in the extent of out-group marriage. Out-group marriage was lowest among Jews; highest among northern Europeans. Drachsler found a very high rate of out-group marriage among Puerto Ricans, but their number was so small (41 men; 24 women) that they are hardly comparable to the present study. The sex ratio was evidently an important factor since out-group marriage was twice as high for the Puerto Rican men as it was for the women (see p. 99).

[14] These rates of out-group marriage are still considerably lower than those for Puerto Ricans in Hawaii. Between 1945 and 1954, 64.4 per cent of Puerto Rican marriages were out-group marriages. The sex ratio among Puerto Ricans in Hawaii in 1950 was 110, but, interestingly enough, most of the Puerto Ricans marrying out were women. The high rate of out-group marriage is attributed partly to the small number of Puerto Ricans in the total population, but more so to the general tendency of all groups to intermarry in Hawaii (C. K. Cheng and D. S. Yamamura, "Interracial Marriage and Divorce in Hawaii," *Social Forces*, XXXVI [1957], 77–84).

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

population of New York State, aged 15–44. However, there was no appreciable difference in total out-group marriages among Puerto Ricans between 1949 and 1959. It is only when the first generation is distinguished from the second that the increase in out-group marriage appears as a second-generation phenomenon, nor does this have any relationship to the sex ratio. In 1949, the sex ratio showed a marked increase in the second generation (82 to 90), but there was a marked increase also in the percentage of out-group marriages. In 1959, there was little difference between the sex ratio of the first and second generation (90 to 92); yet there was a marked increase in the percentage of out-group marriages.

Drachsler combined categories (*a*) and (*b*) into one which he called "higher economic classes," and he combined (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*) into what he called "lower economic classes." When the data are presented in these categories, as in Table 2, it is evident immediately that intermarriage was a phenomenon of the higher economic classes. However, economic level was as significant for the intermarriages of the first generation as it was for the second. Since Drachsler was trying to determine the factors that accounted for an increase in intergroup marriage in the second generation, he therefore discounted economic level as a variable.[16]

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF OUT GROUP MARRIAGES OF FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION IMMIGRANTS, 1908–12, FOR NEW YORK CITY, ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION AND SEX

	Men		Women	
	First Generation (Per Cent)	Second Generation (Per Cent)	First Generation (Per Cent)	Second Generation (Per Cent)
High occupational level	63.6	72.4	45.4	75.7
Low occupational level	36.4	27.6	54.6	24.3
Total out group marriages	100 (2,108)	100 (1,572)	100 (2,014)	100 (1,062)

Adopted from Drachsler, *op. cit.*, p. 65. Only a third of the marriage records reported occupation.

The second hypothesis of Drachsler was that out-group marriage increases as socio-economic status advances. The occupational categories used by Drachsler are much different from the standard categories now used by the U.S. Census. He used five categories of occupation:

Highest Group: Professionals.
Middle Group: Persons in commerce.
Lower Group: Personal and domestic service; lower grades of public service.
Low Group: Agricultural, transportation, and navigation workers.
Lowest Group: The unskilled.

In the present study, the standard occupational categories of the U.S. Census were used, and collapsed to represent three different levels:

Higher occupational level:
Professional, technical, and kindred workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Middle occupational level:
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
Lower occupational level:
Operatives and kindred workers.
Non-household service workers
Private household workers.
Laborers.
Farm workers.

[16] *Op. cit.*, pp. 38–40.

Is the increase as significant as the increase that occurred among former immigrants? In his study of immigrant marriages of 1908–12, Drachsler[13] found a rate of out-group marriage of 10.39 per cent for first-generation men, and of 10.1 per cent for first-generation women. This rate of out-group marriage was higher than the rate for first-generation Puerto Ricans in either 1949 or 1959. The data are compared in Table 1. However, the percentage increase in out-group marriage from first to second generation is almost the same for all three groups. In fact, in terms of percentage, the rate of out-group marriage among second-generation Puerto Rican women is the same in 1949 and higher in 1959 than was the rate for second-generation immigrant women in the years 1908–12; the rate among second-generation Puerto Rican men approaches the rate of out-group marriage for second-generation men, 1908–12. On the basis of this evidence, it appears that the assimilation of Puerto Ricans is advancing as fast as the assimilation of the immigrants in the 1908–12 period.[14]

In seeking to explain the great difference in out-group marriage rates between first and second generation, Drachsler first hypothesized that it was a consequence of the sex ratio. However, he found that this was not relevant.[15] Neither is it relevant to the Puerto Rican marriage. The sex ratio for all Puerto Ricans, aged 15–44, in New York City in 1949 was 82.7; in 1960 it was 91, identical with the ratio for the total

TABLE 1

RATE OF OUT-GROUP MARRIAGE OF PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1949 AND 1959, BY GENERATION; AND OF ALL IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1908–12

	First Generation		Second Generation		Increase in Second Generation
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent
Grooms:					
Puerto Rican, 1949.	5 2	3,079	28 3	378	23.1
Puerto Rican, 1959...	3.6	7,078	27 4	638	23 8
1908–12...........	10 39	64,577	32.4	12,184	22 01
Brides:					
Puerto Rican, 1949...	8 5	3,077	30 0	523	21 5
Puerto Rican, 1959...	6 0	7,257	33 1	717	27 1
1908–12...........	10.1	61,823	30.12	14,611	20 02

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 35. It is important to note that Drachsler found a wide range between nationalities in the extent of out-group marriage. Out-group marriage was lowest among Jews; highest among northern Europeans. Drachsler found a very high rate of out-group marriage among Puerto Ricans, but their number was so small (41 men; 24 women) that they are hardly comparable to the present study. The sex ratio was evidently an important factor since out-group marriage was twice as high for the Puerto Rican men as it was for the women (see p. 99).

[14] These rates of out-group marriage are still considerably lower than those for Puerto Ricans in Hawaii. Between 1945 and 1954, 64.4 per cent of Puerto Rican marriages were out-group marriages. The sex ratio among Puerto Ricans in Hawaii in 1950 was 110, but, interestingly enough, most of the Puerto Ricans marrying out were women. The high rate of out-group marriage is attributed partly to the small number of Puerto Ricans in the total population, but more so to the general tendency of all groups to intermarry in Hawaii (C. K. Cheng and D. S. Yamamura, "Interracial Marriage and Divorce in Hawaii," *Social Forces*, XXXVI [1957], 77–84).

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

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Lower occupational level:
Operatives and kindred workers.
Non-household service workers.
Private household workers
Laborers.
Farm workers.

[16] *Op cit*, pp 38 40.

Marriages in which occupation was unknown were omitted. They were too few to be significant. Data on occupation are presented in Table 3. It is important to note two things, in contrast to Drachsler, in evaluating the marriage according to occupational level: (1) The occupation of the *groom* alone was used. This was done to maintain consistency. It is also reasonable since, in the United States, the status level of a marriage is generally determined according to the occupation of the husband. (2) The data are presented according to the percentage in each occupational level that married out, rather than the percentage of all out-group marriages which took place among persons of high or low occupational status. In view of the small numbers, this was considered a more accurate method of indicating the differences.

TABLE 3

OUT-GROUP MARRIAGES OF PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1949 AND 1959, ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION OF GROOM

Occupation Level	1949 Per Cent	1949 *N*	1959 Per Cent	1959 *N*
	Grooms			
High:				
First generation	8 7	127	8 5	212
Second generation	53 0	34	20 0	62
Middle:				
First generation	7.7	650	5 0	1,584
Second generation	26.4	106	28 7	307
Lower:				
First generation	4.3	2,182	2 6	5,133
Second generation	25.0	207	24 9	241
	Brides (According to Occupation of Groom)			
High:				
First generation	21.0	127	26 8	269
Second generation	51 2	45	55.4	83
Middle:				
First generation	12.6	673	9 6	1,706
Second generation	39.6	149	35.9	268
Lower:				
First generation	5 8	2,231	3.5	5,120
Second generation	16.6	283	26.3	319

Two things are evident from these data: Among Puerto Rican brides, the higher the occupational level at which they marry, the higher the rate of out-group marriage. Although it can only be surmised from these data, it is likely that Puerto Rican women are marrying up as they marry out. On the other hand, there is no such consistent trend among the Puerto Rican grooms. There is little difference between the rate of out-group marriage among second-generation grooms of lower and middle occupational status, and, in 1959, the rate is lower for Puerto Ricans on the high occupational level than it is for those on the lower levels. Among the Puerto Rican grooms, generation, not occupational level, appears to be the significant variable in out-group marriage.

Two other types of data taken from

marriage records may also be helpful in a study of the assimilation of Puerto Ricans, namely, age at marriage and type of religious ceremony. A comparison between practices on the island and practices on the mainland may indicate the extent of adaptation to mainland American patterns. Table 4 presents median age at marriage for men and women, 1950 and 1960, in Puerto Rico. It also presents median age at marriage for Puerto Ricans in New York, first and second generation, 1949 and 1959. There is no consistent pattern evident in the change in age at marriage among Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico and in New York. The consistency appears in the tendency of second-generation Puerto Ricans in New York, both grooms and brides, to marry at an earlier age than those of the first generation. This is more evident in Table 5 which gives the percentages of Puerto Ricans marrying below age 20.[17]

[17] John Burma, "Research Note on the Measurement of Interracial Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVII (1951), 249-55, gives the me-

TABLE 4

MEDIAN AGE AT MARRIAGE FOR ALL MARRIAGES, PUERTO RICO, 1950 AND 1960; AND FOR PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK, BY GENERATION, 1949 AND 1959

	MEN		WOMEN	
	All Marriages	Out Group Marriages	All Marriages	Out Group Marriages
Puerto Rico (1950)	26.02	...	22.16	
Puerto Ricans in New York City				
1949	24.68	24.62	23.01	23.70
First generation	25.47	26.91	23.59	25.05
Second generation	21.83	22.42	19.90	21.43
Puerto Rico (1960)	23.01	.	21.75	
Puerto Ricans in New York City:				
1959	24.23	24.49	22.85	23.7
First generation	24.33	25.62	23.00	24.4
Second generation	23.13	23.46	21.66	22.04

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE OF GROOMS AND BRIDES UNDER 20 YEARS OF AGE, ALL MARRIAGES, FOR PUERTO RICO, 1950 AND 1960; FOR PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK BY GENERATION, 1949 AND 1959

	MEN		WOMEN	
	All Marriages	Out-Group Marriages	All Marriages	Out Group Marriages
Puerto Rico (1950)	6.4	......	32.1	.
Puerto Ricans in New York City:				
1949	5.7	6.3	22.0	18.1
First generation	3.7	2.3	17.9	13.1
Second generation	20.9	14.4	45.8	31.4
Puerto Rico (1960)	10.3	......	36.1	.
Puerto Ricans in New York City:				
1959	8.4	11.8	26.3	19.7
First generation	7.7	11.5	25.7	16.3
Second generation	14.8	12.7	32.1	20.2

A number of factors enter into the tendency toward lower age at marriage for the second generation. It may simply reflect the trend toward lower age at marriage in Puerto Rico itself. However, as Mills, Senior, and Goldsen pointed out in their study of the Puerto Rican migration,[18] the migrating population is an older population than that of the island. Most migrating people are in their late teens or early twenties. There is a selective feature in economically motivated migrations, since single people are more mobile. The children of the migrants, however, being settled in the new land, are evidently tending toward the pattern of the United States of younger age at marriage.

Finally, it may be of some help to examine the factor of religion in the marriage of New York Puerto Ricans to determine whether evidence from this source may indicate the speed of assimilation.[19] No one has reliable evidence of the exact number of Puerto Ricans who profess Catholicism or Protestantism. The overwhelming majority, probably 80–90 per cent, profess the Roman Catholic faith, although the level of instruction in the faith is often very limited and the practice of the faith, as in most Latin areas, is quite different from the practice that is common in the United States.[20] One notable contrast between Puerto Rico and the United States mainland is in the extent of the use of the Catholic religious ceremony at marriage. Religious marriage is the overwhelming pattern for Catholic people in the United States. John Thomas estimates that 80 per cent of all marriages involving a Roman Catholic are marriages with a religious ceremony.[21]

In Puerto Rico, however, the situation is not easily determined. The pattern differs sharply from one area of the island to another. The pattern also differs from one year to another. Table 6 presents marriages according to type of ceremony for selected areas of Puerto Rico for 1960. It illustrates the wide differences from one municipality to the other. Table 7 presents marriages according to type of ceremony for 1949, 1956, and 1960, to indicate the wide fluctuations from year to year for all marriages on the island. The percentage of Protestant marriages tends to be reasonably consistent. Variations in the percentage of Catholic and civil ceremonies are not easy to explain. A sharp increase

dian age at marriage for men and women in outgroup marriages in California. They tend to marry at a much later age than the population generally in the United States. No such significant difference in age at marriage is evident among Puerto Ricans in out-group marriages in New York City.

[18] C. W. Mills, C. Senior, and R. Goldsen, *Puerto Rican Journey* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), p. 25.

[19] Much of the interest of American sociologists in intermarriage is directed toward interreligious marriage. It is important to note that this present paper does not deal with that question. There was no way of determining from the marriage record whether the parties to the marriage professed to be Catholic or Protestant or Pentecostal. This paper deals only with type of ceremony.

[20] Cf. J. P. Fitzpatrick, "Mexicans and Puerto Ricans Build a Bridge," *America* (Dec. 31, 1955), and "Puerto Rican Story," *America* (Sept. 3, 1960). A Survey Report, *Midcentury Pioneers and Protestants*, published by the Protestant Council of the City of New York (1954), estimated that 26,000 Puerto Ricans were then affiliated with Protestant work in New York City; and the number in contact with Protestant work was probably 50,000. At that time, the Puerto Rican population of New York City was estimated at 425,000. If in 1954, the estimates of the Protestant Council were accurate, it would indicate that about 12 per cent of the Puerto Ricans were in contact with Protestant work, and about 5 per cent were affiliated. The Protestant Council published a much more detailed report in 1960, *A Report on the Protestant Spanish Community in New York City*. They estimated (p. 77), a Spanish-speaking membership of 31,126 in the Protestant churches, including the Pentecostal and Evangelical sects. This would have been about 6 per cent of the Puerto Rican community. Unfortunately, no reliable estimates are available about the number of Puerto Ricans in New York who are in contact with the Catholic Church and its works.

[21] *The American Catholic Family* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), chap. vi.

in Catholic marriages may be the result of island-wide parish missions. Variation may also be due to the presence or absence of a pastor from a parish. No one seems to have a reliable explanation.

If one compares type of ceremony in all Puerto Rican marriages in New York (Table 8) with type of ceremony in Puerto Rico, a number of differences appear immediately. The percentage of civil marriages is consistently much lower in New York than in Puerto Rico. In 1949, the percentage of Protestant marriages in New York was much higher than that of the island (50 versus 14.3 per cent), whereas the percentage of Catholic marriage was much lower (27 versus 61.4 per cent). There was a considerable change in this situation in 1959. Catholic marriages had increased greatly and Protestant marriages had decreased, but the percentage for Catholic marriages still remained considerably lower than that of the island, and the percentage of Protestant marriages much higher.

It is difficult to interpret the meaning of these differences in marriage practice between Puerto Rico and New York. In view of the reports referred to in footnote 20, the high percentage of Protestant marriage ceremonies does not indicate affiliation with Protestant churches; it would appear to indicate casual contact for the purpose of marriage alone. The increase in the percentage of Catholic marriages undoubtedly reflects the widespread efforts of the Catholic archdioceses of New York and Brooklyn during the 1950's to develop special programs and prepare personnel for the spiritual care of the Spanish-speaking people. Two other kinds of data were analyzed, which helped to clarify the re-

TABLE 6

TYPE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY FOR SELECTED MUNICIPIOS OF PUERTO RICO

	N	Civil (Per Cent)	Catholic (Per Cent)	Protestant (Per Cent)
Aguada	206	22.6	71.4	6.0
Aguadilla	400	12.7	34.3	53.0
Barranquitas	115	31.0	69.0	0.0
Guayanilla	125	27.0	55.0	18.0
Santa Isabel	111	71.0	23.0	6.0
Total for Puerto Rico	20,580*	36.2	45.8	17.6

* A small number of other types of ceremony are included in this total.

Source: Registro Demográfico, Departamento de Salud, Gobierno de Puerto Rico.

TABLE 7

TYPE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY FOR ALL MARRIAGES IN PUERTO RICO, 1949, 1956, 1960

	Civil (Per Cent)	Catholic (Per Cent)	Protestant (Per Cent)
1949	24.3	61.4	14.3
1956	26.5	59.5	14.0
1960	36.2	45.8	17.6

Source: Registro Demográfico, Departamento de Salud, Gobierno de Puerto Rico.

TABLE 8

TYPE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY IN ALL MARRIAGES INVOLVING PUERTO RICANS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1949 AND 1959

	N*	Civil (Per Cent)	Catholic (Per Cent)	Protestant (Per Cent)
1949	4,514	20	27	50
1959	9,370	18	41	36

* A small number of other types of ceremony are included in this total.

NOTE.—This table includes all marriages which were omitted in Table 1.

lationship of marriage behavior to assimilation, namely: the differences between first and second generation, and data which indicated that most of the Protestant marriages were performed by Spanish-speaking ministers of Pentecostal and Evangelical sects. The data on differences between first and second generation are given in Table 9.

The low percentage of civil marriages and the consistent drop in civil marriages from first to second generation may reflect a tendency toward the preference for religious marriage ceremonies which is characteristic of the United States. What is more striking is the difference in religious ceremonies. The percentage of Catholic marriages is much higher in the second generation than the first, both for grooms and brides, and in both years; while the percentage of Protestant marriages is much lower.

More light was thrown on the significance of these differences when the Protestant ceremonies were analyzed in more detail. It was possible, on the basis of the marriage record, to distinguish between ministers of Protestant denominations (Lutheran, Methodist, etc.) and ministers of Pentecostal and Evangelical sects, many of the latter being in storefront churches. Table 10 gives the data on Protestant marriage ceremonies performed by ministers of these sects. The decline in Protestant marriages was actually a decline in marriages performed by Pentecostal and Evangelical ministers. This tends to confirm the theory, widely discussed, that the storefront church and the sect are lower-class religious phenomena. People tend to abandon them as they advance socially and economically.

TABLE 9

TYPE OF CEREMONY IN MARRIAGES OF FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION PUERTO RICAN GROOMS AND BRIDES, NEW YORK CITY, 1949 AND 1959

	N*	Civil (Per Cent)	Catholic (Per Cent)	Protestant (Per Cent)
1949 (Grooms):				
First generation....	3,212	18 8	25 2	53 6
Second generation..	418	11 5	40.4	45.5
1949 (Brides):				
First generation....	3,435	20 5	24 2	52.5
Second generation..	591	10.0	41.8	45.2
1959 (Grooms):				
First generation....	7,316	15 8	41.6	42 0
Second generation..	694	14.7	47.1	36.6
1959 (Brides):				
First generation....	7,777	17 6	41 4	40 5
Second generation..	793	15.1	49 2	33.9

* A small number of others are included in this total.

TABLE 10

MARRIAGES OF FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION PUERTO RICANS PERFORMED BY MINISTERS OF PENTECOSTAL AND EVANGELICAL SECTS, NEW YORK CITY, 1949 AND 1959—PERCENTAGE OF ALL MARRIAGES

	Grooms	Brides
1949:		
First generation........	47.2	46.2
Second generation......	38.1	38.1
1959:		
First generation........	38.4	37.0
Second generation......	33.3	30.1

The excellent study by Sidney Mintz[22] of the conversion of a poor sugar cane worker in Puerto Rico to a Pentecostal sect proposes the theory that poor people, caught in the midst of upsetting change, uprooted from a traditional way of life, tend to seek security in the strong sense of community which is characteristic of the sect. Mintz's theory could be projected to the experience of migrating Puerto Ricans, whose traditional way of life is upset by migration rather than economic development at home. The sect would provide a means of security. A study by Thomas F. O'Dea and Renato Poblete[23] of the storefront churches among Puerto Ricans in New York supports the theory of Mintz. O'Dea and Poblete indicate that the sect has a strong attraction for the poor and underprivileged, especially in the process of transition in which they are uprooted from their native land and find themselves strangers in a strange and complicated society. The informality of the sect, the fact that all members are on the same social and economic level, the active participation in religious services, the sense of brotherhood and community which is fostered, its availability in the neighborhood, all contribute to providing for the poor and uprooted a sense of satisfaction, of belonging in a community which supports and strengthens them. However, as the migrants become more firmly established, as they find themselves more a part of the larger society and able to interact more effectively with it, they either give up the practice of religion or convert to their more traditional Catholic or established denomination.

A further analysis of the data was made to determine whether there was any relationship between type of religious ceremony and in-group versus out-group marriage. No consistencies appear. The significant variables related to type of religious ceremony are generation and year of marriage.

[22] Sidney Mintz, *Worker in the Cane* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960).

[23] "Anomie and the Quest for Community: The Development of Sects among the Puerto Ricans in New York City," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, XXI (1959), 18–36.

SUMMARY

1. There is a significant percentage increase in out-group marriage among second-generation Puerto Ricans in New York. The increase is as great for grooms and greater for brides than the increase in out-group marriage among second-generation immigrants of the period 1908–12. The number of second-generation marriages is still small relative to first-generation. But the difference is evident in both years studied and indicates a consistent trend.

2. Correlation between higher occupational status and out-group marriage is not consistent. Among grooms the significant variable is generation, not occupational level. Among brides, out-group marriage increases consistently as the occupational level of their husbands rises. This suggests that they may be marrying out in order to marry up.

3. The only significant feature of age at marriage is the change to lower age at marriage among second-generation Puerto Ricans in New York. They tend toward the young age at marriage, which is characteristic of the United States as a whole, and appears to be a trend in Puerto Rico also.

4. Civil marriage is much more common in Puerto Rico than among Puerto Ricans in New York. Protestant marriages in 1949 were much more common among Puerto Ricans in New York than in Puerto Rico. Catholic marriages increased between 1949 and 1959 in New York. There is a strong tendency for Catholic marriages to increase and Protestant marriages to decrease in the second generation in both 1949 and 1959. This appears to be related to a decline in marriages by Spanish-speak-

ing Pentecostal and Evangelical ministers.

5. Each of the above phenomena indicates that on the basis of evidence of marriage practice, the process of assimilation to the culture of the U.S. mainland is increasing rapidly. The positive correlation of out-group marriage with second generation and with advance in occupational status, the tendency toward younger age of marriage, and the decline of interest in the Evangelical and Pentecostal sects all give evidence of the acceptance of mainland American ways.

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The Altruism Scale: A Measure of Co-operative, Individualistic, and Competitive Interpersonal Orientation[1]

Jack Sawyer

ABSTRACT

Consider an interaction situation with various outcomes whose values to two individuals, Person and Other, are imperfectly correlated (as in non-zero-sum games). Let the welfare of Person be P and that of Other be O. Then if Person is purely co-operative, he maximizes $P + O$; if purely competitive, he maximizes $P - O$; and if purely individualistic, he maximizes P alone. More generally, he maximizes $P + aO$, where a (altruism) normally ranges from 1.0 to -1.0. To assess a, Person either directly estimates its value on a scale from 1.0 to -1.0 or ranks his preferences for various outcomes for himself and for Other. Both measures show that (1) three college groups all differentiate among friend, stranger, and antagonist, (2) YMCA college students are generally more positively oriented toward the other's welfare—friend, stranger, *or* antagonist, (3) business students maximize their own reward more, and (4) social science students differentiate most between friends and antagonists.

The Altruism Scale assesses the value one places upon the welfare of another in relation to his own. This measure is intended to correspond generally to conceptualizations of altruism both from psychology ("affection and concern for others") and from sociology ("where the goal of conduct [of the ego] is exterior to itself"), as well as to more general definition ("the principle or practice of seeking the welfare of others").[2]

An explicit assessment of altruism as an individual characteristic serves at least two major lines of inquiry. First, it helps in the traditional problem of evaluation of the operation of general norms, as characterized by Durkheim in his examination of altruistic suicide, or by Parsons in positing collectivistic and individualistic orientations.[3]

More recently, emphasis upon understanding interpersonal behavior by evaluating its costs and rewards—epitomized by the work of Thibaut and Kelley, Homans, and Blau—has added new relevance to the concept of altruism.[4] If the behavior of two individuals is to be assessed strictly as a function of the rewards (positive and negative) to each, then it becomes crucial to know to what extent these interact, such that the welfare of one person provides a reward to the other.

[1] The author is grateful to Norman Bradburn of the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and to Clifford Holmes and Alex Shulin of George Williams College for aid in obtaining subjects; to Lawrence Carson, Brian Heller, and Thomas Tyler for assistance in the analysis of the data; to Peter Blau for comments on the manuscript; and, particularly, to Morris Friedell for insightful contributions to the conceptualization as well as to later stages of this research. This research was supported by U.S. Public Health Service grant MH 05350, "Experiments on the Resolution of Interpersonal Conflict."

[2] This notable correspondence of psychological, sociological, and general usage is found in Horace B. English and Ava C. English, *A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytic Terms* (New York: David McKay, 1958), p. 24; Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 221; and C. L. Barnhart (ed.), *The American College Dictionary* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 38.

[3] Durkheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-76; Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 329-58.

[4] John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959); George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

ever, conceives of altruism as a characteristic that may vary, within individuals, as a function of the object of the altruism and of the commodity and situation in which it is expressed. For example, one may be altruistic toward peers but not toward subordinates, altruistic with prestige but not with money, or vice versa.

A direct and theoretically desirable way to assess such variation in a person's altruistic behavior would be to observe him in specific natural situations where he makes choices that affect his own and another's welfare. But practical difficulties of observation and methodological problems of uncontrolled and unknown biases detract from this approach and suggest what is perhaps the next best procedure: Ask a person to report what he feels his behavior would be in such situations. This is the approach of the Altruism Scale, which employs for this purpose two separate measures—one a ranking of outcomes for self and other, the other a direct estimation of altruism on a scale from 1.0 to —1.0.

Ranking of outcomes.—Subjects (all of whom were college students) received the following written instructions:

> Imagine yourself in the following situation. It is the beginning of the term and you are taking, among other courses, an important seminar in your area of specialization. It so happens that there is only one other student in the seminar. You are both taking the course for credit, however, and each of you will receive one of the grades, A, B, or C. Since there are three possible outcomes for each of you, and the instructor assigns grades independently, there exist nine possible combinations of outcomes, ranging from both A's to both C's. Rank your preference for these nine outcomes in the following situation. Place the numbers 1 (first choice) to 9 in the cells of the accompanying table, indicating your preference for each of the combinations of grades for you and the other student. If you have absolutely no preference between two combinations, indicate this by placing the same number in both of the cells.
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> I. The other person is *one of your best friends.* You and he have been together in several classes and seminars during the course of your work here. You have enjoyed working with him on joint projects.

In Figure 1, the response matrix is filled in as it would be by a purely cooperative respondent, who cares exactly as much about the other's grade as about his own. Two A's are best and two C's worst, and it is better that one of them have an A and the other a B than that both have B's, though the strictly cooperative person does not care whether he or the other person gets the A.

A purely individualistic orientation results in choices as in Figure 2, where a person prefers first the three combinations that give him an A, but does not discriminate among these by the grade the other receives. The third defining orientation—pure competition—is represented in Figure 3. Most preferred is an A for oneself and a C for the other, and the opposite is the least preferred. A purely competitive person is indifferent between an A for himself and a B for the other, and a B for himself and a C for the other; in both cases his relative advantage—his only concern—is the same.[8]

tractiveness as a friend," suggesting that they might simply tap a slightly different aspect of friendliness. The average absolute correlation of self and others' rating with twenty other variables thought possibly indicative of altruism was .07; only one of these forty correlations reached .15. Perhaps because of such difficulties, the few measures of altruism so far constructed appear to have experienced little research use: A search of *Sociological Abstracts*, since its inception in 1953, and of *Psychological Abstracts* for the same period, under "altruism" and the names of the authors of the four articles, reveals no use of these or similar measures.

[8] It has been assumed, in computing a value for altruism from these choices, that the utility of a B lies halfway between that of an A and that of a C. This was checked on the twenty-eight social science students, whose direct estimates on a ten-point scale placed a B, on the average, 55 per cent of the distance from a C to an A. Only three students placed a B less than 40 per cent or more than 70 per cent of the way from a C to an A. Further,

FIG. 1.—Preference rankings of a strictly co-operative person. (Numbers in the corner of each cell illustrate adjustment for tied ranks.)

The ranks are scored to indicate how much a person values the other's welfare in relation to his own—producing, for the three defining orientations, a values of 1.0, 0, and −1.0. The value placed upon own welfare is indicated by the extent to which one prefers higher to lower grades; this is indexed by the sum of the ranks he gives to the three cells in which he receives C's minus the sum of the ranks he gives to the three cells in which he receives A's. The larger the difference (the more he discriminates between an A and a C), the more he cares about his own welfare.

Orientation toward the welfare of the other is assessed similarly, by subtracting from the summed ranks for the three cells in which the other receives a C the summed ranks for the three cells in which the other receives an A. For the other, however, one may prefer C's to A's, and the corresponding difference can be either positive (indicating positive altruism) or negative (indicating negative altruism).

FIG. 2.—Preference rankings of a strictly individualistic person.

To produce the measure of relative altruism, a, the discrimination between C's and A's for the other is divided by the discrimination between C's and A's for self. Thus,

$$a = \frac{\text{(summed ranks for C to other)} - \text{(summed ranks for A to other)}}{\text{(summed ranks for C to self)} - \text{(summed ranks for A to self)}}.$$

Division by a measure indexing strength of preference for own grades creates the desired *relative* altruism, and causes the three defining orientations to have the appropriate values: In Figure 1 (after adjusting for tied ranks),[9] a equals (21.5 −

OTHER GETS

PERSON GETS	A	B	C
A	3	2	1
B	4	3	2
C	5	4	3

FIG. 3. Preference rankings of a strictly competitive person.

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trial computations assuming a B to be as little as three-tenths of the distance from a C to an A, or as much as seven-tenths, affected the value of altruism very little.

[9] When ties exist, ranks are adjusted to give the average ordinal position, as illustrated by the numbers in the corner of each cell in Figure 1. The sum of the nine ranks is thus always the same, promoting comparability and permitting the difference between summed ranks for A's and for C's to express completely average preferences for own and other's welfare (since the summed ranks for B's is then determined).

RATIONALE

Interpersonal behavior may be characterized by situations in which two or more persons each take certain of alternative actions, whose combination produces outcomes providing particular rewards for each. Such a formulation, deriving from and elaborating upon bargaining and game theory, has proven highly provocative of both conceptual and empirical analysis.[5]

As conceived in this analysis, a person's selection among alternative actions depends, to some degree, upon the resultant welfare not only to himself but to the other as well. Explicitly or implicitly, he places a certain weight upon the other's welfare in relation to his own. Three particular values of this weight are of special interest, for they define the following prominent orientations.

Co-operation, individualism, and competition.—Assume that Person is interacting with Other in a situation in which there are several possible outcomes, not all equally favorable to both. Then, in arriving at a preference among these outcomes, three prominent orientations that Person can take are these: (1) He can prefer that outcome in which the sum of his welfare and that of Other is the greatest; (2) he can simply prefer that outcome in which his own welfare is the greatest, irrespective of Other's; or (3) he can prefer that outcome in which the relative advantage of his welfare over Other's is the greatest.

These three orientations may be considered as pure co-operation, pure individualism, and pure competition, and the conceptual element that differentiates them is the weight Person places upon the welfare (O) of Other in relation to his own (P). If Person is acting purely co-operatively, he maximizes $P + O$; if acting purely individualistically, he maximizes P alone; and if acting purely competitively, he maximizes $P - O$. Examples of pure co-operation, individualism, and competition occur in the interaction of (1) husband and wife striving to augment family income, (2) entrepreneurs each attempting merely to maximize his own profit, and (3) bureaucrats competing for relative prestige and status.

Most interaction probably does not correspond exactly to any of these three situations but rather to intermediate orientations involving their combination: for example, Person may place some positive weight on the welfare of Other, but not so much as on his own. The cases in which Person maximizes $P + O$, P alone, and $P - O$ serve as defining orientations to establish a continuum of degrees of altruism, on which pure co-operation and pure competition are extremes, and pure individualism the midpoint. Then Person may be regarded, not simply as evidencing one of three tendencies, but more generally as maximizing $P + aO$, where a (altruism) normally ranges from 1.0 (pure co-operation) through 0 (individualism) to -1.0 (pure competition). The relative weight placed upon the welfare of the other is thus summarized in a single parameter, a—the assessment of which is the purpose of the Altruism Scale.

In the present formulation, altruism is not necessarily opposed to egoism; it is possible (as in pure co-operation, when a equals 1.0) to be equally concerned with both one's own and the other's welfare. Altruism is not incompatible with a desire for greater individual welfare. If, for example, we both prefer a travel grant to Moscow over one to Los Angeles, then my

[5] See R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), for a general exposition of game theory, emphasizing its relation to the social sciences; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1960), for insightful intuitive extensions involving threats and promises, commitment, credibility, etc.; Anatol Rapoport and Carol Orwant, "Experimental Games: A Review," *Behavioral Science*, VII (January, 1962), 1–37, for empirical research; and Jack Sawyer and Morris F. Friedell, "The Interaction Screen: An Operational Model for Experimentation on Interpersonal Behavior," *Behavioral Science*, X (October, 1965), 446–60, for an articulation with various constructs of interpersonal behavior.

preference that we each receive one to Moscow is equally altruistic with a preference that we each receive one to Los Angeles, and both are more altruistic than a preference that mine be to Moscow and yours to Los Angeles.

Conditions prescribed by Durkheim for altruistic suicide imply a value of a much greater than 1.0; the value placed upon oneself is very small in relation to that placed upon (collective) others. Though this extreme act is relatively rare, lesser degrees of selflessness are common and find favor with various moral systems. Logic, however, cannot universally recommend even such lesser degrees of selflessness. In fact, it is reasonable for the altruism of one of two interacting persons to exceed 1.0 *only if* the other's does not: Only if, for example, a husband's altruism toward his wife is less than 1.0 can hers toward him reasonably be greater than 1.0; then they are agreeing that his welfare is more important than hers.

If, however, each person values the other's welfare more than his own, this may cause an infinite regress in which each person says, "I want to do what you'd like," and the intrinsic values, overshadowed by the altruistic values, may never become known. For example, suppose that, in dining together, each of us would rather let the other have his choice of restaurant. Then I will try to make you believe that my preference is the restaurant I think you like, and you will do the same. Thus I will discount what you say, and guess at your true preference. If I guess wrong, you may eventually become convinced that the restaurant I claim I like is truly my preference (since you know it's not yours), and we may thus go to a place neither of us prefers, though each may think (for a time, at least) that the other does.

Toward the other end of the altruism continuum, values of a less than -1.0 may also have unreasonable aspects. Competition normally doesn't go this far: If you and I are each trying to reach a goal before the other, I may welcome an event that slows me a week but slows you two weeks—but this only implies a value of a between 0 and -1.0. For a to be less than -1.0, I have to be so interested in your delay that I am willing to sustain even greater delay myself; such a feeling, especially if reciprocated, has highly destructive implications.

Thus both unusually high and low values imply potential difficulties, and values from -1.0 to 1.0—between pure competition and pure co-operation—may be considered to constitute a normal range. Within this range, values should vary widely, depending upon the situation and upon the two persons. What levels of altruism are typical for given situations, persons, and others is an empirical question, but it seems likely that effective interpersonal relations imply some moderately positive value, definitely greater than 0 and less than 1.0.

THE MEASUREMENT OF ALTRUISM

The few previous attempts[6] to measure altruism objectively in individuals have all approached it as a stable, general characteristic.[7] The present approach, how-

[6] Raymond B. Cattell and J. Z. Horowitz, "Objective Personality Tests Investigating the Structure of Altruism in Relation to Source Traits A, H, and L," *Journal of Personality*, XXI (September, 1952), 103-17; Robert W. Friedrichs, "Alter *Versus* Ego: An Exploratory Assessment of Altruism," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (August, 1960), 496-508; Robert W. Friedrichs, "An Exploratory Study of Altruism" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1957); Salomon Rettig, "An Exploratory Study of Altruism" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1956); and Buford Steffire, "Concurrent Validity of the Vocational Value Inventory," *Journal of Educational Research*, LII (May, 1959), 339-41.

[7] One such attempt (Friedrichs, *op. cit.*) illustrates the difficulty of this approach. a sixteen-item especially constructed Likert scale of altruistic acts (of high internal consistency) correlated only .17 with a self-rating of altruism and .15 with a summation of others' ratings (also of high internal consistency). These two ratings correlated .37, but the others' ratings correlated .66 with "al-

ever, conceives of altruism as a characteristic that may vary, within individuals, as a function of the object of the altruism and of the commodity and situation in which it is expressed. For example, one may be altruistic toward peers but not toward subordinates, altruistic with prestige but not with money, or vice versa.

A direct and theoretically desirable way to assess such variation in a person's altruistic behavior would be to observe him in specific natural situations where he makes choices that affect his own and another's welfare. But practical difficulties of observation and methodological problems of uncontrolled and unknown biases detract from this approach and suggest what is perhaps the next best procedure: Ask a person to report what he feels his behavior would be in such situations. This is the approach of the Altruism Scale, which employs for this purpose two separate measures—one a ranking of outcomes for self and other, the other a direct estimation of altruism on a scale from 1.0 to −1.0.

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> Imagine yourself in the following situation. It is the beginning of the term and you are taking, among other courses, an important seminar in your area of specialization. It so happens that there is only one other student in the seminar. You are both taking the course for credit, however, and each of you will receive one of the grades, A, B, or C. Since there are three possible outcomes for each of you, and the instructor assigns grades independently, there exist nine possible combinations of outcomes, ranging from both A's to both C's. Rank your preference for these nine outcomes in the following situation. Place the numbers 1 (first choice) to 9 in the cells of the accompanying table, indicating your preference for each of the combinations of grades for you and the other student. If you have absolutely no preference between two combinations, indicate this by placing the same number in both of the cells.
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8.5)/(21.5 — 8.5), or 1.00; in Figure 2, *a* equals (15 — 15)/(24 — 6), or .00; in Figure 3, *a* equals (8.5 — 21.5)/(21.5 — 8.5), or —1.00.[10]

Thus, this measure of altruism translates into a single value on an essentially continuous scale[11] the several choices a person makes among alternatives that are better or worse for him or the other; it infers the value of altruism from the person's choice behavior. Alternatively, however, the person can, as in the following measure, estimate his value of *a* directly upon a graphic scale.

Direct scale estimation.—The scale ranges from —1.0 to 1.0 by tenths, and the person checks one of the resulting twenty-one boxes. The scale is anchored by descriptions attached to the boxes at the ends and midpoint of the scale (the three defining orientations) and to the boxes halfway between these, as follows:

1.0 I am *equally* interested in how *good* his grade is and in how *good* my grade is
.5 I am *half* as interested in how *good* his grade is as I am in how *good* my grade is
.0 I am *only* interested in how *good* my grade is; how good or poor his grade is makes no difference to me
—.5 I am *equally* interested in how much *better* my grade is than his and in how *good* my grade is per se
—1.0 I am *only* interested in how much *better* my grade is than his; I do not care how *good* my grade is per se

The italicized words emphasize to the respondent the relation between his and the other's welfare at each of the five anchor points.[12] The words are chosen to correspond to values of *a* in the general expression $P + aO$ of the total weighted welfare. For the first three alternatives, the value of *a* is directly specified (by the words equally, half, and only). The fourth anchor statement specifies equal interest in $P - O$ and in P, a total of $2P - O$, which is relatively the same as $P - .5O$. In the last anchor statement, the word "better" specifies $P - O$ as the criterion.

Thus defined by these five statements, this scale reflects the same rationale that underlies the previously described measurement through rankings; rather than inferring altruism from choices that allocate welfare, however, direct estimation assumes that a person can make a reasonable estimate of his preference for his own and other's welfare. This serves to quantify such common feelings as "I'd do as much for him as for myself," "I'm just looking out for myself," and "All I care about is beating him." A design to examine how well it serves is specified in the next section.

VALIDATION PROCEDURE

The purpose was to determine the extent to which the Altruism Scale possesses both generality (over different measures and situations) and discriminability (among groups and alters for whom altruism should differ). Hence, altruism was measured

[10] If a person's preference for A's does not exceed his preference for C's, the denominator is either zero (making altruism indeterminate) or negative (making it appear more altruistic to want lower grades for the other, too). Such preferences show the falsity, for a given person, of the initial assumption that higher grades are preferred to lower; for such a person, it is inappropriate to assess altruism through grades, since these are not something he values.

[11] In practice, many subjects' rankings produce values intermediate between those of pure cooperation, individualism, and competition. One prominent modification of these defining orientations is simply resolving tied ranks in one's own favor. For example, instead of the pure individualism of Figure 2, a person might prefer higher grades for the other whenever it involved no sacrifice in his own grade. This orientation would produce ranks of 1, 2, and 3 in the first row; 4, 5, and 6 in the second row; and 7, 8, and 9 in the third row, resulting in an altruism of .33 instead of .00.

[12] It now appears that more affectively toned statements (e.g., "I want both our grades to be as high as possible") may produce purer expressions of desire, less contaminated by cognitive orientations than the term "interested" may suggest (e.g., whether it is strategic to act altruistically).

both by ranking of outcomes and by direct scale estimation, for three groups of subjects, each toward three different alters and in two situations.

Alters: friend, stranger, antagonist.—Since reciprocation of friendship or antagonism forms the most basic kind of interpersonal balance—widely theorized about and observed[13]—altruism should vary strongly with the nature of one's relation to the other person. To assess the influence of affective relations, subjects were presented not only the previously described situation I, involving a friend, but the following as well:

II. The other person is *virtually unknown to you.* Although he is a student in your department, you have never before happened to have class with him or otherwise to come in contact with him. You have heard nothing in particular about him from any sources.

III. The other person has *often been belligerent toward you.* In several other classes in which the two of you have been together, he has frequently made harsh attacks upon your viewpoints. His attacks have been very direct and personal and as a result you have a strong dislike of him.

Situations: grades and salary.—Since altruism is only meaningful for commodities one values, it is important to use a commodity as widely valued as possible by the particular population. And because altruism may vary with commodity and situation, it is also important to use more than one situation.[14] Hence, this validation uses not only grades in an academic situation, but salary in an occupational situation, as follows:

Imagine yourself in the following situation. You and another person have just graduated together from the same college and have accepted as your first permanent full-time jobs similar positions in the same large institution. Each of you is to be paid either $6.000, $8.000, or $10.000 a year, and other things being equal, each of you would prefer a larger to a smaller salary.[15] [The remaining instructions are similar to those for grades.]

Measures: ranking and direct estimation.—Each person responded using both measures, in both situations, toward all three alters—in this order: ranking of grades (first for friend, then stranger, then antagonist), direct estimation for grades, ranking of salaries, direct estimation for salary.

Groups: social science, business, and YMCA students.—Responses were obtained from three groups thought to differ in altruism: social science students (mostly sociology graduate students) in a small groups class at the University of Chicago; students in the University's Graduate School of Business; and students at George Williams College, which trains students for YMCA and other social service positions. George Williams students come mainly from lower-middle-class backgrounds, have usually been oriented toward the YMCA for some time, and are, according to Grinker and his associates, of unusual mental health.[16]

[13] Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (April, 1960), 161–78, Theodore M. Newcomb. *The Acquaintance Process* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1961); Robert F. Priest and Jack Sawyer, "Proximity and Peership: Changing Bases of Interpersonal Attraction," *American Psychologist*, XX (July, 1965), 551. (Abstract.)

[14] Added scales have been constructed in another important area: relations with the opposite sex (for single college students). Girls give preferences for three different frequencies of dating (the more the better) for themselves and a hypothetical apartment-mate. Men do the same for three levels of physical intimacy each enjoys with his girl.

[15] For each of the groups, the three salaries represent high, medium, and low points on the distribution of salaries actually received by students in that field. The figures given above are for graduate students in social sciences; for business students working toward the M.B.A., the three levels were $500, $600, and $700 per month; for YMCA college students working toward a Bachelor's degree, the three levels were $4.000, $5.000, and $6.000 per year.

[16] Roy R. Grinker, Sr., Roy R. Grinker, Jr., and John Timberlake, "'Mentally Healthy' Young Males (Homoclites): A Study," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, VI (1962), 405–53.

VALIDITY, RELIABILITY, AND IMPLICATIONS

Comparing the three groups and the various scales assesses both the validity and the reliability with which the construct of altruism is measured. To be valid, the Altruism Scale should differentiate among the three groups in ways that correspond to their general orientations, and responses toward friend, stranger, and antagonist should vary systematically. Further, if the scale possesses internal consistency, such differences should emerge regardless of the mode of measurement, and altruism shown toward the three alters for the two commodities should correlate moderately though not too highly.[17]

TABLE 1

MEAN ALTRUISM TOWARD FRIEND, STRANGER, AND ANTAGONIST, BY YMCA, BUSINESS, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDENTS*

Situation, Measure, and Alter	Group			
	YMCA (N=62)	Business (N=32)	Social Science (N=28)	All 3 Groups (N=122)
Grades (Ranking):				
Friend	47	29	41	41
Stranger	24	03	12	16
Antagonist	−10	−28	−41	−22
Grades (Scale):				
Friend	63	43	55	56
Stranger	18	−03	09	10
Antagonist	−06	−37	−35	−21
Salary (Ranking):				
Friend	35	22	35	32
Stranger	19	03	06	12
Antagonist	−01	−25	−25	−13
Salary (Scale):				
Friend	51	39	60	50
Stranger	15	−01	03	08
Antagonist	−02	−25	−31	−15
Both situations and both measures:				
Friend	49	33	48	45
Stranger	19	01	07	12
Antagonist	−05	−29	−33	−18
All twelve responses	21	02	07	13

* All altruism values are in hundredths.

Distinction among alters.—As Table 1 shows, there are, for all three groups, in both situations, using either measure, large and consistent differences among the three alters. Altruism toward a friend is substantially greater than that toward a stranger, which in turn is substantially greater than that toward an antagonist.[18] The over-all averages, .45, .12, and −.18, place the stranger almost exactly halfway between the friend and the antagonist; there is slight positive altruism toward strangers; and though altruism toward antagonists is negative, it is considerably smaller in absolute magnitude than the positive altruism shown toward friends.

Group differences.—YMCA college students are generally more altruistic; their mean altruism toward all alters is .21, and even toward an antagonist, it is barely negative. Social science and business students both have mean altruism near zero, but differ in the extent to which they discriminate among friend, stranger, and antagonist. Responses of business students are almost exactly balanced around the zero point, with a spread of about .6 between friend and antagonist. Social science students discriminate more (about .8) between friend and antagonist.

Thus, each group appears to respond according to values generally ascribed to it: YMCA college students, interested in social service, show more altruism, generally, toward anyone; business students are more concerned strictly with maximizing their own welfare, disregarding the other's;

[17] Principles for establishing construct validity employed in the present analysis are detailed in Lee J. Cronbach and Paul E. Meehl, "Construct Validity in Psychological Tests," *Psychological Bulletin*, LII (July, 1955), 281–302.

[18] This and all following comparative statements of results are supported by tests of statistical significance (usually a two-sample t test). For each result, the probability of occurrence, through random sampling under the null hypothesis, of differences as large as those obtained is less than .01. The same is true for relations assessed by correlation coefficients.

social science students, trained to recognize individual differences in behavior, give more weight to their specific previous experience with the other person. More than the other groups, the social science students act in accord with principles of exchange and reciprocity.[19] Grossly, the tendencies differentiating the three groups may be put as follows: YMCA students help everyone, business students help themselves, and social science students help those who help them.

Individual characteristics.—These group differences on altruism are reinforced in two ways by relations for the characteristic of authoritarianism, as measured by the F Scale.[20] First, altruism appears to be quite distinct from authoritarianism, as evidenced by the correlation of —.03, over all 122 individuals, between a person's F Scale and his total score on altruism, summed over the twelve measures. Even separate scores, computed for altruism toward friends, toward strangers, and toward antagonists, and for grades and for salary, all correlate less than .10 with the F Scale.

Second, the F Scale itself discriminates among the three groups in a way that appears reasonable, lending further credence to their use as standards: Business students are the most authoritarian, social science students the least, and YMCA college students—whose lower-middle-class background suggests authoritarianism, but whose social service orientation suggests the reverse—are in the middle.

Two sex differences appeared. Among YMCA college students, women are generally even more altruistic—toward friend, stranger, or antagonist—than are men. Considering the background of these students, it seems reasonable for them to display what is probably the general norm, belief, and fact—that women *are* more altruistic. In social science, a less conventional field for women, their responses are more similar to those of men. Only in their failure to share men's unusual punitiveness toward antagonists do they differ markedly; women's altruism toward antagonists is —.22, men's —.42. If, within social science, these women are less likely than are men to achieve full-time professional status, it seems reasonable that they are also less likely to see antagonists as competitors whom one wishes ill.[21]

Within the males of the YMCA college group, two variables of family structure relate to altruism.[22] The 30 per cent who are married have a mean altruism of .39; mean altruism for single males is .15. The number of older sisters correlates .35 with total altruism; for men having no older sisters, mean altruism is .14, for those having at least one older sister, mean altruism is .47. Number of older brothers, younger brothers, or younger sisters is not related to altruism.

To understand why only the older-sister sibling relation might be associated with altruism, one should recognize that of the four possible age-sex combinations for a pair of siblings (twins excepted), only the pairing of an older sister and a younger brother fails to produce a clear dominance. Among like-sex pairs, the older is domi-

[19] Blau, *op. cit.*; Gouldner, *op cit*; Homans, *op. cit*

[20] Theodore W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

[21] Comparing males alone among the three groups leaves the findings essentially unchanged. The slightly greater differentiation among friend, stranger, and antagonist made by male social science students (16 of the 28) distinguishes somewhat further that group from the others. There is little or no change in the other groups, since of the YMCA students, less than 15 per cent were women, and of the business students, none

[22] For the YMCA group, but not the other two, additional variables were available: 14 background characteristics, 7 paired self-descriptive adjectives (co-operative-competitive, etc.), and 13 activity preferences (singing, solitaire, etc.) Many of these variables were significantly related to one or several of the altruism scales, but none related as consistently to all twelve altruism scales as did marital status and number of older sisters of the male students. Female YMCA students were too few for reliable analysis.

nant, while an older brother is clearly dominant over a younger sister. But in the older sister–younger brother combination, dominance of the older and dominance of the male may be partially compensatory—and by thus having a more nearly equal sibling relation, the boy with an older sister may thereby have a greater chance to learn the value of co-operation. This interpretation is also consistent with the greater altruism of married men; it may in both relations be the opportunity for prolonged and intensive co-operation with a near equal—whether an older sister or a wife—that causes these experiences to relate to the display of altruism.

Internal consistency.—The most direct index of over-all altruism, across the various alters, measures, and situations, is simply the sum of the twelve separate scores a subject receives; considered as a twelve-item scale, this measure of altruism has an internal-consistency reliability of .79.[23] Other consistencies appear between particular subsets of scores: A composite score for the four scales involving a stranger correlates .63 with a corresponding composite for friends and .57 with one for antagonists. Thus not only is altruism toward strangers midway between that toward friends and antagonists (as previously shown by the means) but it is equally related to each. The correlation between the two more distant points of friend and antagonist is correspondingly less: .31.

Altruism in situations involving grades corresponds rather closely to altruism in situations involving salary; the correlation between the two six-item composites is .75. Correlation between the six-item composite measuring altruism by direct subjective estimation and the composite measuring it by ranking is much smaller: .32. Despite the logical relation that connects the two modes of measurement, subjects are far from perfectly consistent in their responses. This discrepancy may result partly from lack of understanding or of motivation by the subjects, since the task is in some ways novel and complex. However, complete ranking of pairs of grades—the more difficult task—can be achieved instead by presenting a number of paired comparisons, each calling only for a preference for one pair of grades or another.

The low correlation of the two measures may also partially reflect multidimensionality in the rankings. Direct estimation on the twenty-one-point scales promotes unidimensional judgments, but ranking the nine pairs of outcomes in the matrix makes it easy for persons to consider more than the single dimension of altruism. One added principle is egalitarianism—indeed shown by some subjects, who prefer first A's for both, then B's for both, then C's for both; by preferring these over such alternatives as A for one and B for the other, they show that they value strict equality more than absolute level of reward.[24] Such egalitarianism warrants separate assessment as another principle for allocating rewards between persons—though one that in these data accounts for fewer choices than does altruism.

Everything considered, the present research shows the Altruism Scale to assess, with moderate validity and reliability, a continuum, ranging from co-operation through individualism to competition, that defines a central orientation of a person toward the rewards he and another experience in interaction.

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[23] The value is for Cronbach's alpha, which in effect gives the reliability that would be obtained by correlating total scores over one set of six items with total scores over the remaining set of six items, averaged over all possible splits of items into two groups of six. See Lee J. Cronbach, "Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests," *Psychometrika*, XVI (December, 1951), 297–334.

[24] The tendency to forego substantially greater reward for the sake of equality with the other person has also been noted in two-person bargaining experiments. See William Lawrence White, "Cross-cultural Bargaining and Game Behavior," *Proceedings of the IXth Congress of the Interamerican Society of Psychology*, December, 1964, pp. 555–61.

Group Differences in Perception: A Study of Community Beliefs and Feelings about Tuberculosis[1]

C. David Jenkins

ABSTRACT

Study of a probability sample of an urban county using an adaptation of the semantic differential showed differences in perceptions of tuberculosis to be associated with educational level, social class, and most markedly, with ethnic-group membership. In addition to displaying quantitative disparities on numerous scales, the three ethnic groups studied approached tuberculosis with surprisingly different structures of meaning, as revealed by factor analyses. The group differences in beliefs and feelings, both quantitative and structural, are related to the tuberculosis morbidity and mortality experience of the white and non-white subpopulations of this county and state. The findings illustrate the role of the collective experience of the group in shaping individual beliefs and feelings.

This report illustrates a method for investigating and quantifying public perceptions of disease. It then analyzes perceptions of a specific disease, tuberculosis, among a population sample. Particular attention is paid to how social and ethnic groups differ in their perceptions of tuberculosis, and how this difference is associated with varying group experiences with this disease.

The following questions will be considered: Do the various social classes view tuberculosis (TB) differently? Do members of different ethnic groups have different ideas about this disease? What qualities or attributes of TB are interpreted differently by adults in these various categories? Aside from quantitative differences, are there variations between groups in the basic dimensions of thinking and feeling about TB? Are these somehow related to the group's mortality experience with TB over the past generation?

This study was intended both to provide substantive data concerning beliefs and attitudes about disease and to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the influence of group-membership factors on perceptions of socially relevant events.

It is generally acknowledged that diseases are perceived as dissimilar in many respects. Various diseases arouse different amounts of feeling having distinct qualities (gnawing worry, sudden panic, embarrassment, guilt, distaste, etc.). Past approaches to this research problem have been sparse and not too precise. Survey-type multiple-choice questions give results that have often been more highly influenced by the social desirability of the alternatives than by the respondents' underlying beliefs about health. Projective techniques overcome this objection but are an expensive procedure, the reliability of which is greatly influenced by the level of skill (and the uniformity of approach) of the field interviewers.

A newer method for the study of beliefs and feelings is the semantic differential

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developed by C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum.[2] To date, this technique has been used most conspicuously in studies of linguistics, communication, and personality. The semantic differential does not depend on verbal fluency. The subject responds by making a mark. It does not prestructure a subject's response to the same degree as a multiple-choice question.

The Osgood method was altered slightly by H. Maclay and E. Ware in their study of three American Indian tribes.[3] They found this modified semantic differential to be suitable for use with non-literate subjects and to be a valid discriminator between the constellations of meaning found in three different tribal languages (Hopi, Zuni, Navajo). The technique was further modified for the present study by the development of scales directly pertinent to health-related behavior and by certain technical additions, such as the use of verbal labels at several points along the scale, in addition to words expressing extremes at the ends of the scale.

Scales were constructed with the intention of eliciting the following perceptions and feelings about the diseases under study: general public susceptibility; personal susceptibility; prominence ("salience") of the disease in thought and conversation; three forms of severity (pain, risk of death, and amount of residual disability); difficulty of prevention; feeling of mystery about the disease; the clean-dirty continuum; the proud-disgraced continuum; a moral judgment about the kind of people attacked by the disease; and two scales as markers to dimensions commonly found in factor analyses of Osgood's semantic differential—speed and power (see Fig. 1).[4]

This instrument, subsequently referred to as the Semantic Differential for Health (SDH), was administered in 1962 as part of a longer questionnaire to a probability sample of 436 adults, ages twenty to thirty-nine years, drawn from the population of a large urban county in Florida. The composition of the sample closely approximated the age-sex-race composition of the county as determined two years prior to the survey by the U.S. Census.[5]

A. QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POPULATION SUBGROUPS IN PERCEPTIONS OF TUBERCULOSIS

Ethnic group.—Three major ethnic groups were identified in the study population. The interviewers used the common cues of the culture and asked questions about the language used in the home to categorize persons as Negro, Latin, and Anglo. "Latins" as here used refers to persons whose primary language is Spanish, most of whom had immigrated from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Latin American

[2] *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

[3] "Cross-cultural Use of the Semantic Differential," *Behavioral Science*, VI (1961), 185–90.

[4] Selection of these variables was prompted largely by the emerging theory discussed by I. M. Rosenstock, G. M. Hochbaum, and S. S. Kegeles, in "Determinants of Health Behavior" (Washington, D.C.: Behavioral Studies Section, Division of Community Health Services, U.S. Public Health Service, 1960 [mimeographed]).

[5] Each respondent worked two sample scales before proceeding with the SDH. Interviewers read the verbal labels on each scale to each respondent, the latter reacting by marking an X on the five-inch scale line at the point he felt best characterized his attitude. Fig. 1 is a reduced size photoreproduction of the sixteen SDH scales.

The marked responses were scored with a plastic ruler on a scale of 0–20. The observed distributions of scores on each scale were sometimes relatively normal, but often either multimodal or markedly skewed. For testing the similarity of distributions of scores between subgroups, the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was used in all instances (S. Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956], pp. 127–36). For calculation of correlation coefficients and factor analysis, the scores on each scale were transformed to normalized, standardized scores using the procedure described by J. P. Guilford, in *Psychometric Methods* (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954), pp. 237–41.

A. Many People Got It — Some People Got It — A Few People Got It — Almost nobody Gets it

B. This is usually a disease of: Babies — Children — Teenagers — Young Adults — Middle Age — Very Old People

C. Is extremely Painful — Causes Much pain — Causes Some Pain — Causes little Pain but is Uncomfortable — Causes Very little Discomfort

D. People Recover Fully — People recover But are weaker — People have Permanent minor Body Damage — People have obvious Permanent disability

E. The chance you have of getting it: Big chance — Some chance — Little chance — No chance

F. Usually Causes Death — Often Causes death — Sometimes Causes death — Rarely Causes death

G. Clean — Sort of Clean — Sort of Dirty — Dirty

H. Nothing can Prevent it — Hard to Prevent — Can be prevented With a little effort — Easily Prevented

I. A fast-moving disease — A slow-moving disease

J. A "Powerful" disease — A "Mild" disease

K. A mystery — Something is known About it — Well understood

L. I think about it often — I think about it sometimes — I think about it Occasionally — I never think About it

M. Attacks mostly Good people — Attacks mostly Bad people

N. To keep from getting it, I'd give: A day's pay — A week's pay — A month's pay — A year's pay

O. Often talked about — Sometimes Talked about — Occasionally Talked about — Almost never Talked about

P. Proud — Acceptable — Embarrassed — Disgraced

FIG. 1.—Photoreproduction of scales of the Semantic Differential for Health (reduced to eight-tenths the size used in the field).

republics. "Negroes" as here used refers to persons whose appearance suggests a clear African genetic component, irrespective of primary language. Only one or two Negroes spoke primarily Spanish. All other persons are labeled "Anglos," essentially Caucasians whose primary language is English. Some persons included here were of Greek or Italian background.

These three ethnic groups think about TB in remarkably different ways. Of course, some people from each group view diseases in the same way as some people from the other two groups. Taking the distribution as a whole, however, there are significant group differences in perceptions of TB on nine of the sixteen scales of the SDH. The views of the Anglos and Latins were generally more alike, while the views of the Negroes as a group differed from the first two ethnic categories. Thus, ideas about TB seem to be based on cultural differences associated with race and not on whether the person is part of a Spanish-speaking or English-speaking subcommunity. The specific divergences between ethnic groups in beliefs and feelings about TB are discussed below.

Negroes believed that TB is far more frequent in the population than did either Anglos or Latins. Over 50 per cent of them felt that "many people" get TB, whereas only about 30 per cent of Anglos and 30 per cent of Latins reported this frequency. (All differences to be reported are significant at $p = .05$ or less.) Similarly, over half the Negroes reported that TB is "often talked about." In comparison, only 10 per cent of the Anglos and 16 per cent of the Latins gave answers at this end of the scale. The bulk of the latter groups reported their experience to be that TB is "almost never" or only "occasionally" talked about. Negroes gave most personal thought to TB; the Anglos thought about it least. The Latins reported thinking about TB sufficiently more than the Anglos to make the Negro-Latin difference not significant.[8]

Views of the severity of the disease were also divergent. Negroes perceived TB to be a fast-moving, powerful disease. The Anglos believed it to be slow-moving and weak. The Latins had diffuse perceptions but were closer to the Anglos on both scales. The groups did not differ significantly in their perceptions of the pain and risk of death associated with TB, but the weak tendencies for Negroes to perceive greater pain and death were consistent with the speed and power scales.

The three ethnic aggregates had different ideas about the degree of mastery man has achieved over this disease. Negroes more often viewed TB as a mystery, while Anglos more often believed the disease to be well understood by science. Latins expressed even greater certainty of medical understanding than did the Anglos.

Tuberculosis was more acceptable socially to Anglos and Latins than to Negroes. The latter associated a social stigma with this disease as shown by their preponderance of responses that TB is a dirty disease and that it is a source of embarrassment. While most Anglos and Latins insisted upon a precisely neutral moral evaluation of the kind of people most attacked by TB, the Negroes, including some with average or higher education, more frequently were willing to say that TB mostly attacked either particularly bad people or, less commonly, particularly good people. The tendency to imply negative evaluative overtones to TB contrasted sharply with responses to the same scale for poliomyelitis. Among Negro respondents the idea that polio most often attacked especially "good people" was

[8] The graphs and tables displaying the data summarized in the text may be found in C. D. Jenkins, *Identification of Public Beliefs about Health Problems as a Basis for Predicting Use of Health Services* (Final Project Report to Division of Community Health Services, U.S. Public Health Service [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology, 1964] [Gestefax]).

three times as frequent as the notion that it usually attacked "bad people."

In summary, these differences between individual scales portray the typical Negro perception of TB as a disease with which they are very much involved. It attacks many people, it is talked about and thought about. Tuberculosis is seen as a powerful, fast-moving disease which is embarrassing and dirty. It is rather poorly understood scientifically and attacks "bad" people more often than it attacks particularly "good" people. Anglos and Latins feel TB is less of a threat, and feel more distant from it. They see it as a mild, slow-moving, infrequent disease, well understood by medical science. They judge it to be clean and acceptable and to attack without regard to the "goodness" of people.

Social class.—Social class was determined by Warner's Index of Status Characteristics (ISC), as modified for use in the southern United States by McGuire and White.[7] The distribution of ISC scores was divided into quartiles for these analyses. Quartile I (or Class I) refers to the upper and upper middle classes. Quartile IV includes the lower lower class and the lower margins of the working class. The initial analysis for all ethnic groups combined showed that persons in the top social-class quartile (I) felt far removed from TB. They stood alone among the social classes in believing it to have a very low incidence. Classes II, III, and IV clustered together in their perceptions, but, in that rank order, showed increasing tendency to believe that TB attacks larger numbers of people (Scale A). This over-all social class difference held only among the English-speaking, white subgroup (Anglos). Among the Latins and Negroes, the higher classes tended to see TB as having greater incidence than did their respective lower-class counterparts. All levels of Negroes perceived higher frequency of TB than any level of any other ethnic group. Estimate of incidence was influenced most by ethnic membership and only secondarily by social class.

The distributions of perceptions by social class for all ethnic groups combined suggested that persons in social-class Quartile I only rarely thought or talked about TB. Classes II, III, and IV reported successively increasing frequency of conversation about TB. Ethnic-specific distributions by class showed that much of this effect was due to the exaggerated involvement of Negroes with this disease. Ethnic membership was more strongly associated with amount of thought and talk about TB than was social class, when both these variables were statistically controlled.

Perceptions of the characteristics of the disease process did not show marked differences among social classes. Negroes viewed TB as culminating more frequently in death than did Anglos, and within each of these two groups the lower social strata tended to judge death as more frequent than did the corresponding higher social strata. Both social class and ethnic group seemed to have an independent impact on this perception.

Upper-class persons believed TB to be a well understood disease. This is not just a general perceptual difference applicable to all diseases, as evidenced by contrary observations in related studies of other diseases. Each lower stratum showed greater doubt about how well TB is understood, to the point where Class IV felt TB to be a real mystery (Class I differs from IV at $p = .001$). When ethnic groups were considered separately, this social-class difference held up in Anglos and Latins. Except for Anglo social-class Quartile IV, whose perceptions they approximated, all strata of Negroes exceeded all other ethnic-class categories in frequency of believing TB to be a mystery. Latins were much like Anglo middle classes, but were even more

[7] W. L. Warner, M. Meeker, and K. Eells, *Social Class in America* (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949); C. McGuire and G. D. White, "The Measurement of Social Status" (Research Paper in Human Development, No. 3 [rev.; Austin: University of Texas, March, 1955]).

certain that TB is well understood. Two factors seemed to be associated independently with the idea that TB is a mystery, social class among white persons and an ethnic factor among non-white persons.

With regard to the personal virtue of people thought to be in greatest risk of getting this disease, the initial analysis showed Classes I and II to have taken a strictly neutral position, with Classes III and IV somewhat more likely to have responded that TB attacks either "mostly good people" or "mostly bad people." This contrast was primarily the result of proportionally high representation of Negroes and Latins in the lower social-class quartiles. Those upper- and middle-class Latins and Negroes who departed from a strictly neutral judgment tended to see TB as attacking good people more than bad people. In the lowest classes this tendency was reversed, with bad people seen as having greater risk.

It should be emphasized that for all groups, except Class-IV Negroes, 60–90 per cent of persons maintained a neutral judgment, asserting that TB (and all other diseases thus far investigated) occur without any regard to the goodness or badness of people. Only 17 per cent of Negroes in the lowest social-class quartile asserted this neutral position. Thirty-seven per cent said "TB attacked mostly good people," and the remaining 46 per cent asserted that it "attacked mostly bad people." A 6×3 contingency table showing response by social-class level within ethnic group (not reproduced here) yielded a χ^2 significant beyond the .001 level.

None of the SDH scales that failed to show significant differences between social classes on the initial analysis became significant when ethnicity was controlled. The initial analyses of all respondents collectively showed social-class Quartiles I and IV to differ in their distributions of responses on six of the sixteen SDH scale. Controlling for ethnic-group affiliation reduced to three the number of scales that continued to show significant social-class differences within one or more ethnic groups.

Educational level.—Respondents were divided into four levels by the amount of formal education they reported having. Significant differences in perception between groups were noted on only two scales.

Persons who had not gone to school beyond the eighth grade viewed TB as a rather frequent disease. As higher levels of education were reached, respondents steadily decreased their estimate of TB's prevalence. This difference became more marked when ethnic group was controlled.

Respondents with eight or fewer grades of schooling believed that TB was a more mysterious, unknown disease than did respondents with higher education. Those with college experience rated TB as one of the best understood diseases. Education had a stronger effect than did ethnic group on this belief. In all other instances where either of these two variables was associated with differences in perception of TB, ethnic affiliation had the stronger statistical effect.

It is interesting to note that educational level of respondents was associated with fewer differences in perceptions of this disease than was social class, despite the fact that the latter datum derives from head of household and not from the individual respondent. Only about half of the respondents in this sample were heads of households.

B. DIMENSIONS OF BELIEF AND FEELING ABOUT TUBERCULOSIS: A FACTOR ANALYTIC STUDY

What are the fundamental components of community belief and feeling about TB? Factor analysis with varimax rotation was used to find the basic perceptual dimensions that are called into action when people react cognitively and emotionally to the disease TB.

The factor analyses of SDH responses to other diseases (polio, cancer, and mental illness) led to the extraction of three

or four factors for each disease. Tuberculosis was very different. Less-common factor variance could be extracted from the matrix, because interscale correlations were lower. The factor analysis yielded only one general factor. Loadings are shown in Table 1.

The general factor combined ideas of personal involvement and of power of impact of the disease. The most commonly held view of the Anglo majority was that TB was a distant, vague, weak disease. For that reason the factor loadings will be described in terms of the more popularly

TABLE 1

GENERAL FACTOR: TOTAL SAMPLE'S BELIEFS ABOUT TUBERCULOSIS

Scale	Verbal Label at Left Extreme	Factor I	Communalities h^2
A	Many people get it	55	303
B	Usually a disease of babies	03	001
C	Is extremely painful	34	116
D	People recover fully	00	000
E	You have *big* chance of getting it	51	260
F	Usually causes death	53	281
G	Clean (dirty)	− 17	029
H	Nothing can prevent it	29	084
I	A fast-moving disease	35	123
J	A powerful disease	40	160
K	A mystery	27	073
L	I think about it often	54	292
M	Attacks mostly good people	07	005
N	To keep from getting it, I'd give a *day's* pay	− 09	008
O	Often talked about	49	240
P	Proud (disgraced)	− 01	000
$\Sigma a^2/16$	.	12	.124

endorsed pole of the involved scales. This general factor is marked by the following scales: "Almost nobody gets it" (.55), "I have no chance of getting it" (.51), "I never think about it" (.54), "Almost never talked about" (.49). It is also marked by "Rarely causes death" (.53) and "A mild disease" (.40). Moderate loadings from two more scales round out the "power-of-impact" component of the general factor: "Causes very little discomfort" (.34) and "A slow-moving disease" (.35).

The majority of people scored in the "unconcerned–mild disease" range of this dimension. When a person showed high personal concern, he was also likely to

TABLE 2

GENERAL FACTOR ANGLOS' BELIEFS ABOUT TUBERCULOSIS

Scale	Verbal Label at Left Extreme	Factor I	Communalities h^2
A	Many people get it	58	336
B	Usually a disease of babies	00	000
C	Is extremely painful	27	073
D	People recover fully	− 00	000
E	You have *big* chance of getting it	58	336
F	Usually causes death	52	270
G	Clean (dirty)	− 18	032
H	Nothing can prevent it	27	073
I	A fast moving disease	25	063
J	A powerful disease	34	116
K	A mystery	23	053
L	I think about it often	55	303
M	Attacks mostly good people	15	023
N	To keep from getting it, I'd give a *day's* pay	− 15	023
O	Often talked about	39	152
P	Proud (disgraced)	− 03	001
$\Sigma a^2/16$		116	116

view TB as a more potent, dangerous disease. This general factor accounted for 12 per cent of the total variance.

The rather muddy factorial picture of perceptions of TB, coupled with the previously observed sharp differences between ethnic groups in their ideas about TB, suggested to the investigator that part of the lack of clear factor structure might be due to having combined all three ethnic groups for this analysis. Accordingly the total sample was divided by ethnic classification, and a separate matrix of correlations and separate factor analysis were done for each ethnic group. The factor struc-

ture and loadings for Anglos, Latins, and Negroes are given in Tables 2, 3, and 4. These will be discussed in turn.

Factor structure for Anglos.—The Anglo group included 332 of the 436 persons in the sample. Since Anglos comprise 76 per cent of the original sample, it is not surprising that the factor structure observed for them rather closely replicated the findings for the total sample described in the preceding section.

Only one general factor could be extracted. The factor is marked by Scales A, E, L, and F, and to a lesser extent by Scales O and J (see Fig. 1). This factor is a dimension of personal involvement and of power of impact of the disease. Most Anglos saw TB as mild and non-fatal. They did not feel in danger from it and did not think about it.

Factor structure for Latins.—Fifty Spanish-speaking people responded to a Spanish translation of the SDH. It was noted previously that quantitatively their responses were very similar to the responses of Anglos for the four diseases studied in this project. When their beliefs and feelings about TB were factor analyzed, however, a very different framework of meaning emerged. Five distinct factors were extracted, two of which involved only two scales apiece. These collectively accounted for 44 per cent of the total variance (Table 3). In contrast, only one factor involving about 12 per cent of the variance could be extracted from the Anglo matrix.

The first factor gets its strength from an unusual combination of six scales. It seems to represent a dimension of potency and threat not centering on the self. The major scales are: "Often talked about" (.73), "Is painful" (.68), "Many people get it" (.55), "Is a powerful disease" (.55), "A fast-moving disease" (.53), "Is a disease of young people" (.48).

It cannot be said that the Latins as a group scored either on the "threatened" end of this dimension or on the "mild, unconcerned" side. The Latins did not differ significantly from other ethnic groups on most of these scales. As individuals they seemed more often to take extreme

TABLE 3

VERIMAX FACTOR MATRIX: LATINS' BELIEFS ABOUT TUBERCULOSIS

SCALE	VERBAL LABEL AT LEFT EXTREME	FACTOR					COMMUNALITIES h^2
		I	II	III	IV	V	
A.........	Many people get it	.55	−.10	−.01	− 05	.54	.607
B.........	Usually a disease of babies	.48	.02	.13	.47	− 01	.469
C.........	Is extremely painful	.63	.31	−.14	−.11	−.05	.593
D.........	People recover fully	.05	.00	−.70	.18	.05	.527
E.........	You have *big* chance of getting it	.21	.35	.08	.03	.55	.476
F.........	Usually causes death	.37	.03	.08	−.60	.26	.572
G.........	Clean (dirty)	−.03	.00	.14	.06	.06	.028
H.........	Nothing can prevent it	.20	.68	−.06	−.04	.02	.508
I.........	A fast-moving disease	.53	.18	.16	.31	− 02	.435
J.........	A powerful disease	.55	.04	.08	−.06	.13	.331
K.........	A mystery	−.02	.74	.00	16	.01	.574
L.........	I think about it often	.28	.23	−.09	.52	.25	.472
M.........	Attacks mostly good people	−.19	.03	.27	.21	− 03	.155
N.........	To keep from getting it, I'd give a *day's* pay	.12	− 03	.55	.08	−.04	.326
O.........	Often talked about	.73	.07	−.18	.09	.00	.578
P.........	Proud (disgraced)	−.24	−.30	−.04	− 09	.40	.317
$\Sigma a^2/16$..	....	.16	.09	.06	.07	.06	.436

positions on the scales rather than middle positions. This may account for the high correlation coefficients in their matrix.

The second factor is the human-mastery dimension found in studies of other diseases. The Latins associated the perception of "well understood" to that of "easily preventable." These two scales loaded .74 and .68, respectively, on this doublet factor.

The third factor, also a doublet, remains uninterpreted for the present. It involves two scales: "People recover fully" (—.70) (this is the same as the opposite pole positively loaded: "People have obvious permanent disability" [+.70]), and "To keep from getting it I'd give a day's pay" (.55).

It seems paradoxical that people who believe TB is seriously disabling say they would give *less* money to prevent it than people who believe recovery from TB is complete. The total sample gave highly skewed distributions of responses to both scales, with the skew in opposite directions. Most people believed in full recovery from TB, yet gave the cliché answer that they'd give a month's pay or a year's pay to prevent each of these four diseases. Yet the use of a *t*-score transformation and evidence from other scales rule out "skew" as the explanation of this finding.

The fourth factor is also difficult to interpret. The most important scales are: "Rarely causes death" (+.60), "I think about it often" (.52), "Young people get it" (.47), and, of lesser loading, "A fast-moving disease" (.31). It may be that Latins tend to polarize themselves by viewing TB either as "A fast but non-lethal disease of young people which they think about freely" or, conversely, as "A slow, fatal disease of older people which they try to avoid thinking about." The latter syndrome of perceptions would make psychological sense, especially for the older respondents.

The fifth factor extracted from the perceptions of the Spanish-speaking subgroup dealt with perceptions of susceptibility and of social acceptability. The strongest scales follow: "Many people get it" (.54), "I have a big chance of getting it" (.55), and "Proud" (.40). This combination was not found in any of the other derived factors. Yet it is rather logical that the more commonplace a disease, the less embarrassment would be associated with it.

The study should be repeated with a larger sample before the factor structure found here can be accepted confidently as a valid representation of that for the Latin subculture. Some of the uniqueness of the factor structure observed for Latins may be attributable to differences in connotation and overtone between the English-language scales and their Spanish translation.

Factor structure for Negroes.—Negroes comprised 12½ per cent of the total sample ($N = 54$). The basic organization of their ideas about TB differed from the way Latins and Anglos organized their ideas. Four factors were found to account for 29 per cent of the total variance in the matrix of Negro perceptions (Table 4).

Their first factor might be termed "escape from social damage." A very similar factor emerges from Negro perceptions of polio. These are the relevant scales (listed in terms of their positive loadings): "To keep from getting it, I'd give a *year's* pay" (+.60), "A dirty disease" (+.56), and "Attacks mostly bad people" (+.41). The following scales were more weakly related: "I never think about it" (+.36), "Many people get it" (.34), and "People recover fully" (.31).

The general picture sketched by this factor makes sense emotionally, yet it does not fit our preconceived theories of how diseases are perceived. Negroes, more than any other group, see TB as a common disease with social stigma. It does not entail residual physical disability, but people do not like to think about it and would make sacrifices to avoid it. This describes the Negro group's quantitative position on these scales as well as the structure of intercorrelations.

The second factor calls up ideas of a shared feeling of dread of TB. These are

the scales that mark it: "Usually causes death" (.71), "Often talked about" (.51), "A mystery" (.41), and "Causes much pain" (.31). All in all, it has a funereal tone. This factor mixes scales which for other diseases have occurred separately in severity, salience, and human-mastery factors. If death from TB had been a common part of community life, one would expect to see an over-all response to this disease blended from perceptions of its deadliness and pain, its common place in everyday conversation, and its underlying mystery.

The third factor shows the workings of psychological defense against the threat of TB. Whereas Factors I and II refer to two dimensions of threat (social stigma and risk of death), Factor III seems to point to the ways persons in this ethnic group frequently defend against their fears of TB. The positively loading poles of its major scales are: "I have (almost) no chance of getting it" (+.66), "Nothing can prevent it" (.54), "I never think about it" (+.38), and "Almost nobody gets it" (+.37).

This suggests that people who emphasize the notion that TB cannot be prevented may ameliorate this threat by telling themselves they are at no personal risk. In addition, they may need to make lower estimates of general TB incidence and, to cap it with another defense, to avoid thinking about the disease as completely as possible. Persons scoring on the other end of this same dimension feel TB can be prevented and, consequently, have less need to underestimate personal and community risk and do not need to repress the topic.

The fourth factor, like several of the others, follows emotional logic rather than cognitive logic. It relates age of patient to the impact of the disease. It is marked by these scales: "A fast-moving disease" (.45), "A powerful disease" (.37), "Usually a disease of old people" (+.42).

Respondents who perceive TB as fast and powerful tend to be thinking of the disease as attacking old people, perhaps

TABLE 4

VERIMAX FACTOR MATRIX: NEGROES' BELIEFS ABOUT TUBERCULOSIS

Scale	Verbal Label at Left Extreme	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III	Factor IV	Communalities h^2
A.	Many people get it	.34	.24	− 37	.04	312
B.	Usually a disease of babies	−.10	.16	.05	− 42	.212
C.	Is extremely painful	.20	.31	−.14	− 25	.218
D.	People recover fully	.31	.12	.03	.25	.174
E.	You have *big* chance of getting it	.09	.13	− 66	−.09	.469
F.	Usually causes death	.02	.71	.15	−.06	.531
G.	Clean (dirty)	−.56	.04	−.08	− 16	347
H.	Nothing can prevent it	.08	.15	.54	− 16	.346
I.	A fast-moving disease	.07	.00	.01	.45	.208
J.	A powerful disease	.13	.08	− 10	.37	.170
K.	A mystery	−.25	.41	−.15	−.21	.297
L.	I think about it often	−.36	.26	−.38	19	.378
M.	Attacks mostly good people	−.41	.17	.17	.08	.232
N.	To keep from getting it, I'd give a *day's* pay	− 60	− 01	.00	−.14	.380
O.	Often talked about	− 08	51	−.11	.21	.323
P.	Proud (disgraced)	−.25	.15	.01	− 15	.108
$\Sigma a^2/16$	. . .	.09	.08	07	.06	.294

because of the much higher mortality rates among older TB patients. Those who think of TB in terms of its attack on youth and children see the disease process as slower and milder. These inferences are derived from the degree and direction of correlations between the scales discussed.

Latins also associate their view of the age group most attacked by TB with the severity of the disease, but different aspects of disease impact are correlated, and not all in the same direction. For the Anglos the "age scale" did not load on any factor for any disease.

Possible explanations of group differences in perceptions.—The observed quantitative and organizational differences among ethnic groups in beliefs and feelings about TB call for an explanation. As mentioned earlier, statistical analyses not presented here showed these differences were not a function of differential levels of education. While social class has a notable association with variations in perception, this association is not as strong, nor is it spread across so many SDH scales, as is the association of ethnic identification with these perceptual differences. Age and sex composition of the three ethnic samples was comparable, thus ruling out these variables as explanations.

The hypothesis was then put forward that the history of a group's experience with a disease might be a potent determinant of its current perceptions of that disease. Data were gathered to test this hypothesis.

Florida's census and vital statistics record data by race but make no provisions for recording ethnic background or language used. Thus, no denominator would be available for disease rates among Latins even if number of cases or number of deaths attributed to this disease could somehow be obtained. The analysis is thus reduced to a comparison of white versus non-white segments of the population. This was also the distinction most strongly associated with quantitative differences in perception of TB.

The number of active cases of TB reported in this county by race for the five-year period 1959–63 was obtained. The 1960 Census provided the data on the population at risk. For this five-year period the mean annual rate of reported active TB cases (per 100,000 population) was 26.1 for the white population and 74.5 for the non-white population. This indicates a rate of illness three times higher for the non-white population. This county and state have a record of complete reporting of TB, yet questions can always be raised that possibly TB-screening of one race in the population may be less complete than for the other race, or that whites more often than non-whites may go to medical centers outside the county (rather unlikely in this instance) for treatment of respiratory disorders. The same criticisms can be leveled even more strongly at hospitalization data for TB, so this source of information was not sought. In any event, data going back only five years do not test adequately the hypothesis that a group's history of TB, perhaps over one or more generations, influences its current perceptions.

Tuberculosis mortality data for this state and county are available for a longer period and are less subject to reporting bias than are morbidity figures. Furthermore, a death from a disease has a more stark and penetrating influence on the remainder of the subcommunity than mere illness of one of its members. The occasional migration of persons with TB out of the county and state, which may occur particularly among white upper-middle-class persons, would cause a small under-reporting of deaths for that ethnic category, but the absence of these people from the community would also reduce their impact on the views of TB held by their subcommunity. Mortality rates, then, seem to be a crude but fair index of the per-

ceptual impact of a disease on a social group.

The death rates from TB from 1940 to 1963 for white and non-white populations in this state and in the county under study are presented in Table 5,[8] which documents the tremendous disparity between the experiences the white and non-white racial-ethnic groups have had with TB as a killer over the past generation. The two- to four-times higher death rates among Negroes and particularly their extremely high rates as recently as 1940 explain the reservoir of dread and the emotional and cognitive involvement the Negro associates with TB. The fact that the SDH yields data in directions theoretically expectable in view of the group histories of TB supports the notion that the SDH is a promising technique for measuring beliefs and feelings about diseases and for studying further the relation of group experience to group perceptions. The table also demonstrates the notable progress that the state and county public-health programs have made against TB in the past quarter century, particularly among non-white persons.

TABLE 5

RESIDENT DEATH RATE FROM TUBERCULOSIS BY RACE (SELECTED YEARS: 1940–63)

Race	1940	1950	1955	1960	1963
	For Florida				
White......	26 8*	11.5	5.9	3.1	3.2
Non-white..	115.6	43.7	15.1	8.7	9.1
	For the County under Study				
White.......	38.7	11.6	6 9	4.4	4.7
Non-white...	135.6	41.1	20.9	14.2	9.9

* Deaths per 100,000 persons in category.

Source: Florida State Board of Health, Division of Public Health Statistics.

Discussion.—It is an accepted truism in social psychology that past experience creates a frame of reference which guides the perceptual process. Perceptions, in turn, provide the substance for the beliefs and feelings that direct behavior. A. W. Gouldner, in discussing Karl Mannheim's concept of "paradigmatic experiences," points out that the important experiential determinants of perception are frequently the shared experiences of a group or the shared conception of what group members think they have experienced.[9] A specific past event need not have happened to a given individual to mold his perception into a replica of his group's common perception.

Thus the collective experience of the previous generation could influence the perception of the next. This appears to be the case with Negro perceptions of TB. A death rate for a specific disease of only one per thousand (100 per 100,000) per year could create a pervasive shift of an entire social group's perceptions of that disease, assuming that some process such as "paradigmatic experience" operates to disseminate vicariously a sense of personal involvement in loss of a significant other person to death from TB.

In David Mechanic's discussion of the "concept of illness behavior," four characteristics of a disease are asserted to be important in influencing whether an individual will seek medical aid. These are: (1) the frequency with which the illness occurs in a given population, (2) the familiarity of the symptoms to the average group member, (3) the relative predictability of the outcome of the illness, and (4) the amount of threat and loss likely to result from the illness.[10] As has been shown, all four of these characteristics

[8] The assistance of Mr. George Purcell, public-health statistician of the Florida State Board of Health, is gratefully acknowledged.

[9] *Wildcat Strike* (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1954), pp. 165–67.

[10] "The Concept of Illness Behavior," *Journal of Chronic Disease*, XV (1962), 189–94.

differ for TB between the white and non-white subcommunities in this county. It would follow both from Mechanic's framework of thought and from general psychological theory that these two groups will differ markedly in their behavioral response to symptoms of this disease and health programs aimed at its prevention and cure.

The greater commonness of TB and the greater group familiarity with its signs and symptoms among Negroes apparently do not breed indifference, inasmuch as feelings of threat and personal involvement were found to be highest in this group. The perception of the disease as poorly understood and frequently fatal, however, may predispose them to inaction born of a feeling of helplessness.

The actual effect on behavior needs to be determined empirically. An attempt was made to obtain the recent history of chest X-rays for respondents of all ethnic groups. These data were clouded by differential entry into occupations where chest X-rays are legally required, by different attitudes toward voluntary X-rays stemming from different experiences with official governmental agencies, and by possible biases in accuracy of memory. A valid and reliable criterion of adequate self-initiated TB-preventive behavior is not as simple to establish as may at first appear.

The striking differences between the three ethnic groups in the factorial structure of their perceptions of TB were unexpected. Small sample sizes in the Negro and Latin groups dictate caution in acceptance of these observed factor structures. Yet it seems unlikely that replication with larger samples could reconcile into a single general frame three such extremely different factor structures as appeared here for Anglos, Latins, and Negroes. This raises the broader question of the degree to which one can justifiably apply a factor structure—or its fruits in the form of a factor score or test scale derived, for example, from college students or hospital patients—to groups of sharply differing cultural and social identification. Osgood and his associates, usually evaluating rather abstract concepts, have shown considerable similarity of semantic structure across cultural groups. Morris and Jones, using concrete descriptive statements as material in their pioneering study of values, report different factor structures for students of different nationalities.[11] Perhaps there will be less assumption of the universality of factor structure in certain domains of socially influenced content and greater description of diversity of factor structure as populations of different cultural identifications and atypical histories of collective experience are studied with quantitative social-psychological techniques.

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[11] C. Morris and L. V. Jones, "Value Scales and Dimensions," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LI (1955), 523–35.

RESEARCH NOTE

Substance and Artifact: The Current Status of Research on Community Power Structure[1]

In the twelve years since the publication of Floyd Hunter's classic, *Community Power Structure*,[2] sociology and political science have experienced a vigorous revival of interest in community studies. Certainly one of the major explanations for this resurgence is to be found in the fact that Hunter introduced a method that promised wide application and a procedure for the verification of particular results. Yet at the same time Hunter's method aroused considerable skepticism, especially among political scientists, for what was alleged to be a misplaced focus on reputation rather than actual influence and, perhaps as a result, an overly monopolistic description of the community power structure. In these twelve years the debate over the relative merits of the (Hunter) reputational method, as opposed to the analysis of decision-making processes, has been joined by numerous scholars of various persuasions and shows little sign of abatement.[3] There is, however, one point on which researchers and commentators are nearly unanimous: the need for truly comparative studies.

The purpose of this paper is to review a substantial portion of the existing literature on community power in order to identify what generalizations, if any, can be drawn concerning the methodological and substantive correlates of various types of community power structure. Once this has been done we should be in a position to suggest some guidelines for comparative studies. Rossi, commenting on the diversity of findings and persistent gaps in our knowledge of the community, has observed that "little progress has been made in putting things together in a systematic way."[4] This review is an attempt to "put things together" in such a way.

SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE

Table 1 summarizes thirty-three studies dealing with fifty-five communities.[5] The

[1] I am especially grateful to David Gold for the advice and encouragement he has given in the preparation of this paper. For their comments on an earlier version, I also wish to thank Robert Agger and Albert Pierce.

[2] Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.

[3] Key issues and contributions to the debate are summarized in Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (October, 1960), 636-44; and M. Herbert Danzger, "Community Power Structure: Problems and Continuities," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (October, 1964), 707-17.

[4] Peter H. Rossi, "Theory, Research and Practice in Community Organization" in Charles R. Adrian (ed.), *Social Science and Community Action* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1960).

[5] The identifying names of each community in Table 1 are those used in the study; frequently they are pseudonyms. The original studies, listed roughly in order of publication, are as follows: (1) Floyd Hunter, *op. cit.*; (2) James B. McKee, "Status and Power in the Industrial Community: A Comment on Drucker's Thesis," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVIII (January, 1953), 364-70; (3) Donald W. Olmstead, "Organizational Leadership and Social Structure in a Small City," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (June, 1954), 273-81; (4) Roland J. Pellegrin and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal*

TABLE 1—*Continued*

Community	Region	< 10,000	10,000–50,000	50,000–100,000	> 100,000	Industrialized	Non industrialized	Diversified Economy	Narrow Economy	Absentee Ownership	Increasing Population	Stable Population	Heterogeneous Population	Homogeneous Population	Integration	Cleavage	Reputational	Two-step	Positional	Decision-making	Combined	Case Study	Non-governmental	Governmental	Pyramidal	Factional	Coalitional	Amorphous	Leadership Group (N)
25. Watertown	S				X		X	X						X			X	X					X		X				74
Centralia	S				X		X	X						X			X	X					X		X				61
26. Orange Point	S	X					X		X		X		X			X						X	X		X				...
Floriana	S		X				X		X			X	X			X						X	X			X			...
Center City	S			X		X		X			X		X			X						X		X		X			...
Eastborne	S	X					X		X			X		X								X		X	X				...
Westborne	S		X				X		X		X			X								X	X		X				...
Dorado	S	X					X		X		X			X								X		X		X			...
Hiberna	S																					X	X			X			...
Estiva	S																					X	X			X			...
27. Dallas	S				X	X		X			X			X			X	X					X		X				67
28. Wheelsburg	NC			X		X		X		X	X			X			X	X	X				X	X		X			78
29. Edgewood	NE	X					X		X					X				X			X		X	X			X		36
Riverview	NE	X					X		X				X					X			X		X	X		X			35
30. Midway County	S	X					X											X			X			X		X			20
River County	S			X													X	X						X			X		38
Beach County	S		X														X	X						X	X				18
Southern County	S																X	X						X	X				8
31. Atlanta	S				X	X		X				X	X			X					X			X			X		133
32. Farmdale	W	X					X	X			X			X				X			X		X	X	X				14
Oretown	W		X			X			X	X	X			X				X			X		X	X			X		38
Petropolis	S			X		X		X			X		X			X		X			X		X	X			X		61
Metroville	S			X		X		X			X		X			X		X			X		X	X	X				41
33. Oberlin	NC	X																		X			X	X		X			...

information that it contains regarding research method, community characteristics, and type of power structure has been distilled from each separate study and, for that reason, loses somewhat in comparability. This difficulty has been met in two ways. When studies are not explicit on certain aspects, no entry is made in the table. Second, it is believed that the categories used in the summary are sufficiently general to provide reasonable comparability for present purposes.

A brief description of the variables with which we will be concerned should demonstrate the point.

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of Sociology, LXI (March, 1956), 413-19; (5) George Belknap and Ralph Smuckler, "Political Power Relations in a Mid-West City," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* XX (Spring, 1956), 73-81; (6) Alexander Fanelli, "A Typology of Community Leadership Based on Influence and Interaction within the Leader Sub-system," *Social Forces,* XXXIV (May, 1956), 332-38; (7) Harry Scoble, "Leadership Hierarchies and Political Issues in a New England Town," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-45; (8) Delbert C. Miller, "Decision-making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXIV (November, 1958), 299-310; (9) Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Janowitz, *op. cit.,* pp. 19-80; (10) William J Gore and Robert L. Peabody, "The Functions of the Political Campaign," *Western Political Quarterly,* XI (March, 1958), 55-70; (11) Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958); (12) Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs: Power and Democracy in an American City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); (13) William H. Form and William V. D'Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage among Community Influentials in Two Border Cities," *American Sociological Review,* XXIV (December, 1959), 804-14; (14) Orion Klapp and Vincent Padgett, "Power Structure and Decision-making in a Mexican Border City," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXV (January, 1960), 400-406; (15) Ted C. Smith, "The Structure of Power in a Suburban Community," *Pacific Sociological Review,* III (Fall, 1960), 83-88; (16) Edward Sofen, "Problems of Metropolitan Leadership: The Miami Experience," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* V (February, 1961), 18-38; Thomas J Wood, "Dade County: Unbossed, Erratically Led," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCCLIII (May, 1964), 64-71; (17) Ernest A. T. Barth, "Community Influence Systems: Structure and Change," *Social Forces,* XL (October, 1961), 58-63; (18) Robert C. Stone, "Power and Values in Trans-Community Relations," in Bert E. Swanson, *Current Trends in Comparative Community Studies* (Kansas City, Mo: Community Studies, Inc, 1962); (19) Linton C. Freeman *et al*, *Local Community Leadership* (Syracuse, N Y: University College, 1960); (20) Roscoe C Martin *et al., Decisions in Syracuse* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961); (21) Jackson M. McClain and Robert Highsaw, *Dixie City Acts: A Study in Decision Making* (Birmingham: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1962); (22) David A. Booth and Charles R. Adrian, "Power Structure and Community Change: A Replication Study of Community A," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* VI (August, 1962), 277-96; (23) Delbert C. Miller, "Town and Gown: The Power Structure of a University Town," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVIII (January, 1963), 432-43; (24) Charles M. Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVIII (May, 1963), 672-81; (25) Ivan Belknap and John Steinle, *The Community and Its Hospitals* (Syracuse, N Y: Syracuse University Press 1963); (26) Gladys M. Kammerer *et al*, *The Urban Political Community: Profiles in Town Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963); (27) Carol Estes Thometz, *The Decision-makers: The Power Structure of Dallas* (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963); (28) Donald A Clelland and William H. Form, "Economic Dominants and Community Power: A Comparative Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXIX (March, 1964), 511-21; (29) Robert Presthus, *Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); (30) Ralph B Kimbrough, *Political Power and Educational Decision Making* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964); (31) M Kent Jennings, *Community Influentials: The Elites of Atlanta* (New York: Free Press, 1964); (32) Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled: Political Power and Impotence in American Communities* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964); (33) Aaron Wildavsky, *Leadership in a Small Town* (Totowa, N J: Bedminster Press, 1964). (Owing to the recency of its publication, only a portion of the available information has been drawn from the Wildavsky study.)

A. Community Characteristics

The demographic and economic characteristics in Table 1—region, population size and composition, extent of industrialization and economic base—are self-explanatory.

B. Method

Studies of community power have relied on three distinct methods: the reputational, the decision-making, and the case study. Actual use of these three usually involves some variations which are more definitively encompassed with the following fivefold classification.

1. Reputational methods
   a) Reputational—informants are asked to identify the most influential people in the community when it comes to getting things done. Here leaders are nominated directly in a one-step procedure.
   b) Reputational, two-step—informants are given lists, assembled by various means, of purportedly influential leaders and asked to evaluate them in terms of influence (usually by narrowing the list or ranking its members).
2. Positional methods
   a) Positional—leaders are taken to be those persons occupying important positions in formal and/or informal organizations.
   b) Positional and Reputational—a combination of 1 *b* and 2 *a*.
3. Decision-making approach (event or issue analysis)
   a) Decisions—the focus is on specific community issues, and leaders are those persons active or instrumental in the resolution.
4. Case-study method
   a) Case study—methods are less explicit;. usually the community and leadership are analyzed as a process.
5. Combined approaches
   a) Combined—simultaneous use of the above, especially 1 *b* and 3.

C. Issues

This category designates the area of influence with which the study is chiefly concerned.

1. Governmental—influence in matters of public jurisdiction, for example, nominations and campaigns, bond issues, public works.
2. Non-governmental—influence in matters of private jurisdiction, for example, general community policy, new industry.

D. Community Power Structure[6]

1. Pyramidal—monolithic, monopolistic, or a single concentrated leadership group.
2. Factional—at least two durable factions.
3. Coalitional—fluid coalitions of interest usually varying with issues.
4. Amorphous—absence of any persistent pattern of leadership.

HYPOTHESES

The organization of studies provided in Table 1 enables us to test, at least on the basis of a substantial portion of the literature, a number of hypotheses that have been advanced in more limited contexts. The nine hypotheses employ community power structure as the dependent variable and are arranged under three categories of independent variables. They are derived from a number of sources with occasional modification in order to keep the list to a manageable size and to provide conceptual equivalence with the data.

A. Methodological Characteristics

1. *The reputational method tends to identify pyramidal power structures, while the decision-making approach discovers factional and coalitional power structures.*[7]
2. The two-step reputational method tends to produce a pyramidal description of power structure more frequently than the direct-nomination procedure.[8]

[6] Except for some difference in emphasis in types 2 and 3, this typology closely resembles that offered by Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, IV (November, 1960), 390–401.

[7] Dahl, *op. cit.*; Nelson Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," *Social Forces*, XXXVII (March, 1959), 232–36; and Polsby, "Community Power: Some Reflections on the Recent Literature," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (December, 1962), 838–41; Wolfinger, *op. cit.*; David Rogers, "Community Political Systems: A Framework and Hypotheses for Comparative Studies," in Bert E. Swanson (ed.), *op. cit.*

[8] William H. Form and William V. D'Antonio, *op. cit.*; Nelson Polsby, "Three Problems in the

3. Studies focusing on governmental issues tend to find factional and coalitional structures, while a focus on non-governmental issues more frequently results in a pyramidal description.[9]
4. Comparative studies tend to find factional and coalitional power structures.

B. Demographic Characteristics
1. Socially integrated, heterogeneous populations have less concentrated power structures.[10]
2. Regional differences obtain.[11]

C. Economic Characteristics
1. The more industrialized the community, the less concentrated its power structure.[12]
2. Communities with a high proportion of absentee ownership tend to have less concentrated power structures.[13]
3. The more diversified the economic base, the less concentrated the power structure.[14]

RESULTS

Table 2 illustrates the association between research and power structure.[15]

Hypotheses A1, A2 and A3 are confirmed. The reputational method tends to identify pyramidal structures while decision-making and combined methods reflect factional, coalitional, and amorphous types.[16] Further, when the reputational method is used, either exclusively or in combination with some other, the two-step procedure indicates pyramidal structures. Third, when non-governmental areas of influence are of chief concern, pyramidal structures more frequently obtain than when the focus is on governmental areas.[17] Hypothesis A4 is rejected, comparative studies showing no significant departure from the results of single case studies.

Hypotheses B1 and B2 are not clearly supported although the data in Table 3 show tendencies in that direction. A socially integrated population may tend to be associated with a less concentrated power structure. Regional differences are somewhat clearer with the northeast and north central regions, reflecting less concentration of power than is found in the South.

Although the levels of significance are not striking, mere inspection of the data on the economic variables provides some support for hypotheses C1 and C2, although in the case of C3 the data are inconclusive.[18]

Analysis of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 796-803.

[9] Thomas J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism and Local Politics," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VII (March, 1963), 425-57; Robert E. Agger, in private correspondence. The converse to each of these first three hypotheses, i.e., that "the reputational approach does not predetermine conclusions in the way which critics suggest," has recently been put forth. See Baha Abu-Laban, "The Reputational Approach in the Study of Community Power: A Critical Evaluation," *Pacific Sociological Review*, VIII (Spring, 1965), 35-42.

[10] Presthus, *op. cit.*

[11] Suggestions in Paul A. Miller, *Community Health Action* (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1953).

[12] Rogers, *op. cit.*

[13] Agger *et al.*, *op. cit.*; Barth, *op. cit.*; Schulze, *op. cit.*

[14] Rogers, *op. cit.*; Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, *Industry, Labor and Community* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960).

[15] Where, for purposes of statistical analysis, the categories have been collapsed, pyramidal forms one and factional, coalitional, and amorphous the other.

[16] The decision-making and combined methods are taken as one category here since the intention is to contrast the reputational approach with alternative ones.

[17] Problems in the interpretation of this finding result from the fact that the reputational method characteristically is concerned with influence in non-governmental matters of general community policy. Looking only at reputational studies, there are not enough cases dealing with influence in governmental matters to provide support for hypothesis A3, although the available data reflect a more even distribution among power-structure types.

[18] In addition to these five variables, four others were investigated: type of city government, population, population growth, and population composition (homogeneous-heterogeneous). No significant relationship was observed in any of these, however, because of the low quality of the data, these findings are inconclusive. Generally speak-

TABLE 2

RESEARCH METHOD AND COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

	Pyramidal	Factional	Coalitional-Amorphous*	Total†
Method:				
Reputational	13	7	7	27
Decision-making combined	2	4	8	14
Total	15	11	15	41
	$x^2(2\times2)$ $p<.05$‡			
Reputational method:§				
One-step	2	5	3	10
Two-step	13	5	7	25
Total	15	10	10	35
	Fisher exact $p=.072$			
Area of influence:				
Non-governmental	11	4	3	18
Governmental	5	9	12	26
Total	16	13	15	44
	$x^2(2\times2)$ $p<.02$			
Scope of study:				
One community	7	7	11	25
Two or more communities	12	10	8	30
Total	19	17	19	55
	Not significant			

* The coalitional and amorphous categories are combined because of frequent small N's in the latter and because both represent the absence of any concentration of power, thereby satisfying the purposes of this analysis.

† The N's here and in the table that follows vary because the studies do not uniformly provide data on each variable.

‡ The x^2 test is employed here with the recognition that the assumption of independent cell frequencies is not fully met, since over half of the communities were investigated in conjunction with at least one other. This consideration did not seem important enough to dispense with an otherwise useful technique.

§ The N here is inflated because studies employing either the one-step or two-step reputational method in combination with the decision-making approach are included in the analysis.

TABLE 3

COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE

	Pyramidal	Factional	Coalitional Amorphous	Total
Social integration:				
Integration	0	2	4	6
Cleavage	8	4	3	15
Total	8	6	7	21
	Fisher exact $p = .032$			
Region:				
Northeast	1	2	5	8
North Central	1	5	3	9
South	14	8	7	29
West	3	0	3	6
Total	19	15	18	52
Industrialization:				
Industrialized	7	7	11	25
Non industrialized	10	6	3	19
Total	17	13	14	44
	χ^2 .10 $< p <$ .05			
Industry ownership:				
Absentee owned	0	2	6	8
Locally owned	7	5	5	17
Total	7	7	11	25
	Fisher exact $p = .040$			
Economic base:				
Diversified	10	5	9	24
Narrow	6	7	3	16
Total	16	12	12	40

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

1. The type of power structure identified by studies that rely on a single method may well be an artifact of that method.[19]

2. Social integration and region, variables which reflect something of the political life of the community, show some association with power structure.[20]

3. Economic variables reflecting patterns characteristic of increasing industrialization are moderately associated with less concentrated power structures.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A COMPARATIVE METHOD

The findings presented here must be regarded as tentative. The tests that have been employed on a sample of studies are scarcely a substitute for tests based on a large sample of communities.

To come to grips with the diverse social and political facets of community life in a comparative design remains the chief problem in this field. Yet this sharpening of our focus on the problem has several procedural implications which should be instructive guidelines for future research. Specifically, comparative studies should employ samples stratified with regard to demographic and economic characteristics. Considerably more attention should be devoted to change, especially vis-à-vis metropolitan development and larger governmental units.[21] An abbreviated combination of the reputational and decision-making techniques needs to be developed to guard against the type of bias we have considered.[22]

In summary, the absence of comparative methods continues to be the major obstacle to an adequate sociology of community power. This review documents the need for more attention to this problem.

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ing, the lower the quality of the data, the more difficult it is to demonstrate statistically significant relationships and the more likely it is that such relationships may be obscured.

[19] The relationship between method and power structure is stronger when the "combined" cases are left out of the analysis.

[20] An attempt was made to get at the political life of the community with a variable designated "public involvement in civic affairs," which was found to be highly associated with power structure irrespective of method (the less concentrated power being characteristic of towns with high public involvement). However, in terms of the data, this finding is very nearly tautologous. Future research might do well to explore this question on the basis of an independent assessment of "political life."

[21] In twenty-four studies which dealt with changes, eighteen (75 per cent) reported that power had become more dispersed, while only one reported more concentration.

[22] Systematic comparisons between methods and implications for a parsimonious combination of them are provided in the following: Robert O. Schulze and Leonard Blumberg, "The Determination of Local Power Elites," *American Sociological Review*, LXIII (November, 1957), 290-96; John M. Foskett and Raymond Hohle, "The Measurement of Influence in Community Affairs," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, XXV (June, 1957), 148-54; Linton C. Freeman *et al.*, "Metropolitan Decision Making," in Publications Committee of University College (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University, 1962); Irwin T. Sanders, "The Community Social Profile," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (February, 1960), 75-77; David A. Booth and Charles R. Adrian, "Simplifying the Discovery of Elites," *American Behavioral Scientist*, V, No. 2 (October, 1961), 14-16; Bonjean, *op. cit.*; Presthus, *op. cit.*; Agger *et al.*, *op. cit.*; L. Vaughn Blankenship, "Community Power and Decision Making: A Comparative Evaluation of Measurement Techniques," *Social Forces*, XLIII (December, 1964), 207-16.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ideology and Discontent. Edited and introduced by DAVID E. APTER. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. 342. $9.95.

This volume appears as the fifth International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, an interesting and valuable series under the general editorship of Heinz Eulau. Edited and introduced by David E. Apter, Volume V contains chapters by Clifford Geertz, Joseph W. Elder, Robert A. Scalapino, Leonard Binder, Charles F. Andrain, Philip E. Converse, and Reinhard Bendix, with a collective article on "America's Radical Right" and a bibliography compiled by Kay L. Lawson.

The fare offered is diverse. Case materials and illustrative instances are drawn from Indonesia, India, Japan, Egypt, and Africa—the latter mainly by way of contrasting the views on democracy and socialism expressed by Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius Nyerere. There follow two chapters based on ideological problems and materials in the United States—concerned, characteristically, with "mass publics" and political movements—and the historical overview by Bendix entitled. "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing."

The composition of the volume, which might have seemed bizarre and pretentious in the antebellum days when this reviewer was a student, thus reflects a perspective that political behaviorists have routinized in the past decade or so. In this perspective, area [illegible] serves the need of comparative analysis, and comparative analysis de[illegible] and evaluates political processes as [illegible] of some general model of "the political system"—which model is sometimes formally articulated, but more often is conveniently assumed.

In any case, one would have to be exceedingly "square" nowadays to find anything odd about the expectation that a scholar interested in ideology wants a "global" view of the matter; that such a global view can be obtained from a sequence of essays that "cover" some of the world's larger areas (especially underdeveloped areas); and that the scholarly reader is ready, willing, and able to digest such varied fare with pleasure and profit. These expectations have taken such firm and fast hold over our bookways, at least in part, because they have been made self-fulfilling. Starting from the famous Almond-Coleman volume, which initiated the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics series, books made to this pattern have been so interesting and numerous that they have successfully restrained their own clientele of readers.

As a member of this clientele who has learned what little he knows about Indonesia and Subsaharan Africa mainly from chapters in such volumes as this, I was bemused to notice that I had turned first to these areas in the present collection. My ease in apprehending these areas remote from my personal experience is a function of each writer's facility in shuttling between his geographical focus and some more general perspective. It is thus provocative when Geertz announces, early in his essay, a major theme: "We may wait as long for the 'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion." But we perceive his local referent more clearly when he turns to Indonesia "where the whole political process is mired in a slough of ideological symbols." So too Andrian situates the ideological predicaments of his African leaders in the contemporary global context when he writes: "All leaders reject the class struggle, which is relevant to Europe, and total nationalization, which characterizes the Soviet Union's economy."

Small wonder that the ideological dialectic that served Europe so intensely over the past two or more centuries—for better and worse—comes only marginally and as a malingerer, to bear in the developing areas: emerging nations, new states. The classic Marxist dialectic—nation versus class—continues to agitate the new states. But this polarity lost its second wind in Europe during World War II

and brings no afflatus to ideological thinking in most new nations, where the dialectical interaction of class versus nation has been rather shallow.

This shallow quality of post-Western ideology is noted only incidentally in this collection of essays. I have no interest in quibbling with this fine volume, but it is more than a quibble to note that "Europe"—as the source of the Western ideology polarity—is not accorded a separate essay. Such an essay might, if distributed well in advance, have given the analysts of underdeveloped "new nations" an interesting target to shoot at. Unfortunately, European "ideology and discontent"—our major source of learning in these matters—figures centrally only in the brilliantly bravura introduction by Apter and the reasonable résumé by Bendix. The others reflect only improvised attitudes toward the European sources—from the clever (though sometimes wrong) comments by Geertz to the relative indifference of the American chapters.

Despite these reservations—which amount to saying we want more: on Europe, on Latin America, on the British Commonwealth and other more-developed extensions of Western ideology in the non-Western world—we wish to congratulate the editor and contributors on having produced a lively, readable, and enlightening volume.

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Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. By WILBUR SCHRAMM. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; Paris: UNESCO, 1964. Pp. xiv+333. $7.50.

Wilbur Schramm has written a book that puts all students of communication and development in his debt. This book is an intellectual digest of the heavy corpus of literature extant in these two separate fields, an analytical paradigm of how they can be made to converge, and a modest set of proposals that would raise the idea and practice of communication-in-development to levels of effectiveness yet unknown (to their considerable cost) in the developing areas of the world. It is an indispensable *vademecum* for all who want to understand communication-in-development for human betterment.

The book opens with an essay on "The Human Meaning of Underdevelopment," takes hold with a chapter on "The Role of Information in National Development," and supplies the essential global framework in two chapters on "The Flow of Information in the World" and "How the Mass Media Are Distributed in the World." These chapters, which interweave context with cases, provide digested data on the flow of information *within* and *between* countries and the *development of media* among haves and have-nots, as well as piquant exegeses of what information does and how social change occurs.

The exegesis of social change makes the transition to a brace of chapters dealing with what mass communication can do, and what it can *help* to do, in national development. The first of these, as honorably and competently thought through as any piece of writing on this problem that I know, is followed by a careful set of case studies on the four great campaigns that have been launched over the past decade to accelerate development with the aid of communications—agriculture, health, literacy, formal education. Schramm makes a contribution to our understanding of the communication-in-development process simply by *identifying* these four campaign areas which, treated in pretentious isolation, have yielded inglorious defeats (this being the reviewer's net judgment, which is less qualified than the author's). The beauty of Schramm's book is that it patiently and sapiently frames his account of these four disastrous—or at least dysfunctional—campaigns in a lucid, indeed lustrous, presentation of "The Concept of System."

The book then concludes on its policy terms. There is a chapter on "Communication Research as an Arm of Economic and Social Development," followed by a chapter on "Building the Mass Media." The concluding chapter, modestly entitled "Review and Recommendations," packs more wisdom into less space than this reviewer has had the privilege of reading in many a year. The three appendixes also repay close reading. Indeed, I should be unhappily surprised if Appendix B, "A Pattern for a Basic Mass Communication Inventory in a Developing Country,"

did not become a standard take-off point for all future dissertations on communication-in-development. The book ends, much too soon, with notes, a bibliography, and an index.

That the book is shorter than its scope and accomplishment entitle it to be, hence that it may mislead the young-man-in-a-hurry, requires a word as to Schramm's style—in Buffon's sense that the style is the man. The man, in this case, is surely the Elder Statesman of this very new field of conjoined effort. What Harold Lasswell did for the theory of communication and Paul Lazarsfeld for its research technique, what Lord Keynes did for the theory of development and Colin Clark for its research technique, this is what Schramm has opened the gates for all of us to try to do for communication-in-development.

His prose is so lucid and simple that some jejune readers will say, as a classmate of mine said years ago on reading Ogden Nash: "I could write that myself!" To the jejune readers of Schramm's book I can only respond, "Try it!"

To those who seek the most ripened fruit from our half-baked vineyards, I can only say, "Read it!"

DANIEL LERNER

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The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization. Edited by MORRIS JANOWITZ. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964. Pp. 369. $6.50.

Following his publication of *The Professional Soldier*, Morris Janowitz organized an interuniversity seminar and collected essays on various aspects of the problem of the adaptation of the American military to the needs of the modern age, especially the switch in emphasis from making war to a "constabulary" function. This book is a series of essays on this general theme but without any pretense at cohesion. Janowitz regards this kind of volume as a substitute for and an improvement on more normal use of periodical publication of unrelated articles.

The aspects that are studied include career management problems in the army, the developing attitudes of cadets, the effectiveness of military organization under excessive stress, career opportunities for officers in and out of the army, and a bibliography for the study of military upheavals in newly freed states.

In an introduction Janowitz makes the assumption that the American military have in general accepted the switch from their former concept of their role as warriors to one in which they must perform constabulary functions. By this he seems to mean more than "peace-keeping" duties and to regard the military posture that accompanies deterrence as a form of "constabulary" function. His basis for this premise is that there has been among American officers a widespread acceptance of the belief that war is not inevitable and that this acceptance grows with service experience. He accordingly sees a significant change in the motivating purpose at West Point.

Janowitz instances Norway, Sweden, and Denmark as countries that have had peace-keeping experience, but he neglects to mention the considerably greater experience of Canada. He might well find in the training of Canadian officers a degree of constabulary force motivation which would be more significant than the much smaller changes at West Point. This Canadian example, however, stems from historic developments in Canadian military education when Canada had virtually no professional military force. It happens by coincidence to meet modern needs. By contrast, John Lovell's article on the professional socialization of United States cadets does not carry conviction that the American changes have yet gone very far. Recent events in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia seem to suggest that there is room to doubt the significance of the conclusions that sociologists have deduced by statistical methods about the attitudes of the American soldier. But of course much depends on the interpretation given to the meaning of the words "constabulary function." The questionnaire and statistical technique is still too crude and blunt an instrument to make sufficiently subtle distinctions that can stand up to rapidly changing circumstances. However, this book is only the pioneer beginning of a most worthwhile investigation. Future work should produce a deeper and more subtle understanding.

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Religious Behavior: Where Sociology and Religion Meet. By OLIVER R. WHITLEY. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xiii+177. $5.95.

Five of the seven chapters of this volume were originally presented as lectures at the College of the Bible, Lexington, Kentucky, and portions of the remaining two as addresses at the Fall Retreat of the Divinity School of Drake University. The chapters deal with the character and strategy of the sociology of religion in general, with the church as an organization, with "the so-called religious revival," with the church in suburbia, with "denominations, polity, and power," and with roles of the Protestant minister.

The author effects some interesting confrontations, as when he contrasts views on religious revival afforded by "religionists" on the one hand and by sociologists on the other, or presents with a moderate yet clear enough challenge the images of the suburban church that have been set out by writers like Gibson Winter. But in the cases of these and other confrontations Whitley stops too soon—indeed, at the point where his discussion begins to become really interesting. It is not altogether his fault that he does this, since the plea of lack of pertinent knowledge is all too often valid. Nevertheless, part of the difficulty lies in the failure to summon needed analytical strength at crucial points. The author has some tendency to pile up conceptual distinctions, to illustrate their applicability in some area of his concern, and then to come to a halt, again creating the impression that he is too short-winded.

At the same time, Whitley's discourses have point. It is at least provocative to find some skepticism of the view of suburbia's religion as devitalized and desperately bourgeoisified, or to encounter the contention that insofar as suburbia's religion is indeed aptly described in such terms this is neither new nor peculiar to suburbia. If the book's general argument is somewhat elementary it is still intelligent and clear-headed. Only rarely will the reader find a glib sentence unredeemed by its context (such as one that appears on page 34: "Religion is a less tangible area of organization in society than are some other areas"). With some supplementation and a somewhat heavier factual load within appropriate frameworks, this volume might serve as a useful introduction to a number of problems in the sociology of religion. One may hope that Whitley will try such additions himself. The clarity of his writing is a distinct merit and might be employed to further advantage in a larger work more nearly covering the field played over in this rather slim one.

LOUIS SCHNEIDER

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Religion, Culture and Society: A Reader in the Sociology of Religion. Edited by LOUIS SCHNEIDER. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. 663.

The most useful review of this anthology is already contained in the book itself, in the comments provided by the editor as foreword and introductions to each of the six parts. Schneider makes a strong case for reading this book in the given sequence of parts, especially for persons to whom this field of study may be relatively new. Some of the obstacles to the sociological study of religion are first pointed out, like Western religious ethnocentrism, resistance by church people, and lack of religious statistics. Then the problems of definition are discussed by four authors, the best known of whom are Wach and Durkheim.

The editor's theoretical perspective which tends to provide some unity to these selections is found in Part 3, stressing the various aspects of functional analysis, which has indeed been the chief orientation of sociologists of religion. The essential structure of the compilation is seen in Part 4, on religion and culture, and in Part 5, on religion and society which comprise well over half (396 pages) of the volume. While a great deal of American material is spread throughout the book a special section at the end, Part 6, is devoted to the religious scene in the United States.

This book tries to be comprehensive in the sense that the editor includes materials from non-Western religions as well as from primitive societies. He has selected highly sophisticated, theoretical articles as well as some pedestrian statistical descriptions, analyses of modern phenomena as well as historical reconstructions. This does not mean that we have here a random sampling of the literature. The decision on selections and omissions had

to be difficult. The result is not merely a "reference" book to be consulted occasionally. It is a reader to be studied completely and systematically by anyone interested in the sociology of religion.

There is here a successful effort to select significantly and exclusively sociological contributions, but not all of the seventy selections from sixty-one authors are likely to "please everyone," as Schneider forewarns. Anyone familiar with the literature can think of omissions like Robert Bellah, Allen Eister, Marshall Sklare, Milton Yinger, to mention only some Americans. Yet the total presentation is impressive. It would have been improved with a bibliography (which can fortunately be found in the special issue of the *Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie* for 1962). The failure to include a subject index in the present volume is its only serious defect.

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Religionssoziologie. Edited and introduced by FRIEDERICH FUERSTENBERG. ("Soziologische Texte," Vol. XIX.) Neuwied and Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag. 1964. Pp. 46[illegible] DM. 28.

Under the direction of Professors Maus and Fuerstenberg with Dr. Benseler as an [illegible] young editor, the Luchterhand publishing house has been making a definite contribution to German sociology with a series of inexpensive texts, partly reissues and translations of the classics, occasionally an original monograph, partly readers as with the present volume. It is rather a matter of taste to judge the value of an anthology a major portion of which is made up of more-or-less obvious selections from Durkheim, Max Weber, Troeltsch and Malinowski. As a first introduction they serve a useful purpose for the growing number of interested laymen and students of sociology in Germany. American readers will look for another type of information. In his effort to present as broad a panorama as possible, the editor chose several recent statements familiar to American sociologists: Yinger's treatment of "Religion as an Integrator of Society" from his *Introduction*, a sample from Father Fichter's parish studies dealing with the social role of the priest, an article by Bryan Wilson in the *American Sociological Review* on the development of sects, another by T. O'Dea on the dilemmas of institutionalized religion in *Social Compass*. Less well known might be an essay by Gabriel Le Bras, a pioneer of empirical research in this field, on the measurement of social vitality of French Catholicism (from his *Etudes*) and/or a selection from *Moralstatistik* published in 1868 by A. von Oettingen, a theologian of Dorpat University, presenting a quantitative and comparative analysis of Protestant participation in church activities. Another item of considerable historical interest is a lecture given in 1905 by Paul Drews on the changes that under the influence of changing social conditions since the Reformation, have occurred in the social standing of the Protestant church and its clergy in Germany. It contributes to a better understanding of the loss of popularity the church has suffered among the masses of the people.

An emphasis on the practical applicability of sociohistorical and sociological insights is revealed in several other places in the book, particularly in the recent contribution by T. Rendtorff on the nuclear religious congregation. The questions he raises are typical of Protestant religious bodies organized along territorial or parish lines like the Catholic church. Here the *Kirchengemeinde* or religious community is at least on principle, considered as being coextensive with the secular community. With increasing heterogeneity of the population and separation of secular and religious life, the claim of these churches to entire subdivisions of global society has become obsolete; the manifest structure of the *Kirchengemeinde* has largely been reduced to a nucleus of the faithful assuming more and more the characteristics of Protestant denominations of the congregational type which together with sects have been the focus of interest among American scholars. Related problems are taken up by Fuerstenberg himself in an article originally published in 1961 in the *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuse*. He distinguishes the *Bruderschaftskirche* or brotherhood modeled after the early church, the *Verbandskirche* or institutionalized church, and a third type bent upon directly influencing society and providing

answers to its pressing problems, which seeks close co-operation with the state and culminates in the established church. The author believes that in a pluralistic society a *Verbandskirche* freed of its hierarchical structure, which functions as a catalyst rather than as an instrument of social integration, holds out the greatest promise. Accordingly he recommends that less emphasis be put on research on small-group behavior and more on the analysis of institutions. Finally, in an article originally published in the *Archives de sociologie des religions*, Henri Desroche deals with a wide array of questions concerning the relationship between religion and society, using as a springboard a survey conducted among a group of students from underdeveloped countries. Though in many respects interesting and stimulating, the treatment, in the opinion of one reviewer, is too inconclusive and diffuse to merit inclusion in a reader so limited in size, all the more so in view of the rather awkward translation. Unfortunately the editor in his modesty confines himself to a somewhat short general introduction and to sketchy remarks presenting each selection which, taken together, fail to do justice to what he himself has to say on the subject. After a historical survey he analyzes recent trends, referring both to the essays included in this volume and to other publications listed in a bibliography of 189 items at the end of the book. Although providing a unifying theoretical framework, the editor's remarks together with the readings will probably whet the intellectual appetite of the uninitiated and acquaint others with some literature easily missed, but they do not quite answer the urgent need for a comprehensive German introduction to the sociology of religion.

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The Image of the Federal Service and *Source Book of a Study of Occupational Values and the Image of the Federal Service*. By Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and M. Kent Jennings. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1964. Pp. xvii+301; xxv+681. $5.00; $10.00.

Under the Kennedy administration a call to government service was answered in a dramatic manner by many who would not, under ordinary conditions, have seriously considered government employment. But precisely the spectacular nature of the response leads one to doubt that it signifies a shift in traditional attitudes toward government employment. There is thus far no evidence that a greater proportion of our college graduates are contemplating a career in the federal service, or that the scholars and scientists who staff the many private research and development firms doing government contract work have presented themselves for civil service examinations.

Some observers feel that such a state of affairs is fraught with danger; that unless the federal government attracts into the career federal service a sizable proportion of the creative talents of our nation, we must expect dark days ahead. Others would aver that this situation presents no threat to the effective achievement of national purposes, since when talent is needed for some special end, it is somehow acquired, whether by contract, temporary service in Washington, or otherwise. The authors of these two volumes have adopted the former view, if only, perhaps, to justify the research they report on in these two volumes. Whatever the merits of their stance, their research report will no doubt prove a useful addition to the literature on occupational images and value orientations.

This survey sets out to discover what things make a job attractive to the American working public and in what ways respondents contrast the federal civil service with their present jobs and with the "ideal" job. The total of 5,078 persons interviewed includes several samples representing the general employed public; federal employees; executives, natural scientists, social scientists, and engineers in private enterprise; these same groups in the federal government; college teachers in various disciplines; high school teachers and vocational counselors; and students in high school, college, and graduate school. The sampling and fieldwork procedures, as reported, appear to be sound, and the authors report response rates that do not fall below 85 per cent for any of the samples.

The researchers' strategy is to contrast the occupational values and aspirations of different groups, the images they have of federal and

non-federal employment in general and as pertains to people like themselves, in order to indicate which groups presently find federal employment attractive and why, and what factors would have to be changed to attract those groups not presently oriented toward federal employment. The method is sound in that it contrasts with values and aspirations, not the reality of federal employment but the respondents' perceptions of that reality.

Persons in lower-level occupations perceive the major advantages of federal employment to be good wages, good working conditions, security and fringe benefits. Because these tend also to be the things they want from work, these people are attracted to federal employment. Persons in skilled technical and managerial positions, on the other hand, emphasize self-determination as one of the most important benefits of a job. Since their perceptions of the positive aspects of federal employment are similar to those of the less skilled, these highly trained persons tend to have values and images that are incongruent as they pertain to federal employment. Compounding this incongruence is the fact that high-status persons emphasize doing worthwhile work and being of public service as occupational values, but do not perceive government employment as providing such opportunities.

When government is compared only with private business as an arena for exercising self-determination, the high-level specialists split in their preferences (engineers and natural scientists perceiving government as better, and executives and social scientists preferring private business). The most favorable image of the federal service among higher-level non-federal employees is held by high-school teachers, the least favorable by businessmen and engineers, with college teachers falling between these groups.

These and numerous other findings about occupational values and images are presented in two quite different formats. *The Image of the Federal Service* appears to be the actual "report" of the survey, containing a good many summary tables and a great deal of non-technical discussion of the findings, including findings not documented in the tables of this volume. It is topped off with a chapter of recommendations, some following unequivocally from the research findings and others, as the authors avow, stemming from their more general knowledge and their own values. Of the two volumes, this is probably the one that will be preferred by non-technically oriented readers who are interested in the substantive problem of recruitment to government employment.

The *Source Book*, though it is presented as primarily a repository for detailed tables and study design, could probably pass for a report directed at behavioral scientists concerned with occupational values and images. It contains a fair amount of interpretive text and an impressive array of tabular material on values, attitudes, images, satisfactions, etc., as these pertain to the respondents' own jobs and work settings and to the federal government as a potential employer. The mere existence of this material, by providing baselines for responses among various populations, should insure the use of many of the same items in future research. The usefulness for secondary analysis of the material in the *Source Book* itself is lessened by the fact that about half the material is presented in the form of rating scales and indexes which are probably less easily manipulated than percentage tables.

All in all, we have here a technically sound survey presenting a great deal of interesting and potentially useful material in a straightforward manner with a minimum of technical gimmickry or literary flourish.

JOSEPH ZELAN

Brandeis University

Communities in Action: Pattern and Process
By SEVERYN T. BRUYN. New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1963. Pp. 205. $5.00.

This work, originally written as a doctoral dissertation, attempts to describe and analyze the "art" of community development as practiced by staff members of two Illinois institutions of higher learning. The staffs of each of the two schools apparently approach the problem with different orientations. One, the staff of Illinois College, adopted a "community council approach," where the community consultant works within the existing universe of community organizations and manifest leaders, hoping to weld them into a

viable and more inclusive organizational structure. The second, working out of Southern Illinois University, conceived its role as one of bringing a new sense of community to the total community by urging the formation of a grass-roots, all-community organization with a capacity for systematic self-study and self-mobilization.

The first approach tends to define "community" in relatively limited, non-ideological terms: for them community becomes merely "an area of common activity and interest" (p. 41). The second group adopted a far more ambitious and heavily ideological definition. For them community represents both a need and a desirable state: community becomes "an experience to be discovered by people who need to recover a sense of wholeness and by towns which need to recover an economic self-sufficiency" (p. 41).

Bruyn's preference, to judge from the uneven distribution of attention and coverage, lies with the latter group; indeed, this is a preference that frequently borders on advocacy. He offers the reader four case studies. One, the premier, show-case operation of the SIU group, is described at great length. There is a short description of another community to receive the attention of the SIU community consultants. And there are two brief case reports on the experience of the Illinois College group.

The author provides us with only two pieces of empirical data to bolster his somewhat uncritical historical reconstructions. In one instance, with samples of thirty from each community, differences in citizen awareness, attendance, and participation are reported and the SIU total community orientation proves more successful on such levels: here Bruyn—even with small samples—proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that community development programs that are oriented toward wide participation and general community awareness are more successful in getting participation and awareness than are community development programs not so oriented. Bravo!

If this was intended to be a comparative study, Bruyn has done little to facilitate meaningful comparisons. Such variables as community size (populations varied from slightly over 400 to slightly under 15,000), the amount of investment by the consulting agencies (the community most frequently discussed was a show-case first effort, and subsequent work by the same group in other communities produced a record that is far from enviable), and the quality of community problems (these varied from getting a doctor for the area to restoring a shattered economic base) should have been approached more thoughtfully.

In sum: Bryn has provided us with neither a manual in community development (though part of the work sounds appallingly like one) nor a significant contribution to the field of community studies. He does, however, provide students of community social structure who utilize a comparative framework a fine bad example from which to learn.

WILLIAM SIMON

Southern Illinois University

Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function. By HENRI HUBERT and MARCEL MAUSS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. ix+165. $3.25.

The Hubert-Mauss essay on religious sacrifice appeared originally in *L'Année sociologique* shortly before the turn of the century. Although it has long been recognized by anthropologists and sociologists as a major contribution to the scientific study of religion, it has only now been made available in English translation.

The major value of this brief, lucidly written and copiously footnoted essay is its interpretation of the central activities and purposes of the sacrificial process. This interpretation is not derived from facts unknown to other scholars of the day. It is based instead on an insightful handling of available data on sacrificial practices in many societies, ancient and modern. Unlike some of their contemporaries, the authors did not seek to reconstruct or explain the historical development of sacrifice. Their main purpose was to demonstrate that all sacrifice consists, in varying proportions, of two closely related processes. Basically, their thesis is that sacrifice involves either the release or the expulsion of a spirit residing in the object to be de-

stroyed. If the spirit is beneficial its release is sought in order that part of the spirit may be appropriated by one or more of those officiating at the sacrifice. The re-enactment in the Christian mass of Christ's personal sacrifice, followed by the consumption of His body and blood by the priest and perhaps by the laity, is a case in point. If the spirit is harmful or undesirable its expulsion is accomplished by its transfer to a victim, which is then destroyed. Much of the essay is devoted to showing how a great many very different sacrificial ceremonies contain these processes in varying forms and degrees.

The modern sociologist may feel a little uneasy about the methods the authors use to argue their points. They make no attempt to test the proposition that all sacrifice contains their elementary processes. Their method consists largely in illustrating the argument with whatever data they can find to support it. But the essay should not be judged by its methodological deficiencies alone. It is unsurpassed as an exercise of creative insight that brings order and simplicity to a bewildering mass of observations. It is the kind of work that revolutionizes the manner in which nature is categorized and reorients the research process by suggesting questions no one has thought to ask before. It is a pity that this classic essay, like Weber's systematic treatment of religions, has remained untranslated and therefore relatively unknown to English-speaking scholars for so long. We may hope that its major impact is yet to be made.

Benton Johnson

University of Oregon

Other Cultures: Aims, Methods and Achievements in Social Anthropology. By John Beattie. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xii+283. $5.50.

To paraphrase his countryman Parson Thwackum, when Mr. Beattie speaks of a science of man he means social anthropology, and when he speaks of social anthropology he means Anglican social anthropology. *Other Cultures* introduces it to anyone interested. Who that might be, Beattie doesn't say; but from the way he writes he apparently hopes it is a grinding graduate student and not a highbrow *frau*. He writes clearly and deals with jargon deftly—his chapter on kinship is as good an exercise for beginners as any I know. But if the book packs a fair amount of substance it lacks even a faint amount of spirit. Compared with Firth's *Elements of Social Organization* (for me still the best book on what the British are up to), *Other Cultures* is sometimes more comprehensive, never as captivating.

British social anthropology as Beattie professes it still seems stifled by schizoid uncertainty: was Malinowski *pater* and Radcliffe-Brown *genitor?* Or vice versa? It is "a kind of sociology, but it does not restrict itself only to strictly sociological problems." It also is a kind of anthropology, but it does seem to restrict itself to simple societies mostly in Africa and Oceania. Actually, by his neglect of British work in Asian civilizations Beattie makes his discipline look even more narrow than it does under the accusing fingers of its American critics. Worse, he starts with a humble stance—"this book is not and is not intended to be an original contribution to the subject on the theoretical or any other level"—but sustains it only at the cost of prideful exorcism. Among others, he casts out Freud, Frazer, historicism, psychologism, amateurs, Victorians, and American ethnologists. British accomplishments are real enough not to need a petulant defense.

I have a quibble and a qualm. The quibble is about Lévi-Strauss. His distinction between mechanical models and statistical models is not always clear, but I can't believe he meant that native models are mechanical, anthropological ones statistical. The qualm is about ethnocentrism. Beattie likes to call it "the pathetic fallacy of social anthropology," and he offers homilies on it in nearly every chapter. The pathetic danger in this is that readers may come to believe that *only* native categories are important. On our side of the Atlantic this oversimple thesis has found its oversimple antithesis in Marvin Harris' recent assertion (*The Nature of Cultural Things*, Random House, 1964) that we should pay no attention at all to native categories because natives aren't scientists. *Sic transit* otherness.

David W. Plath

University of Iowa

Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns. By CLIFFORD GEERTZ. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Pp. vii+162. $5.00.

Rostow's concept of the "take-off" into sustained economic growth has become part of the intellectual armory of most people concerned with problems of development. The criterion of "take-off" is the progress of per capita income, but, as Professor Geertz says, "such increases are but one highly visible resultant of a complex process." Before economic development can appear as a quantum jump in per capita income there must take place a long and gradual reorganization of society to provide the social, political, and cultural requisites of growth which will not be reflected in any increase in per capita income, and may even lead to a decline in that index through the disruption of traditional economic organization.

In this book Geertz analyzes the changes toward modernization taking place in two Indonesian towns, Modjokuto in Java (already discussed in *The Religion of Java* and the writings of other workers in the M.I.T. Modjokuto Project) and Tabanan in Bali.

Modjokuto possesses a highly individualistic and acquisitive economic tradition seen organizationally in the bazaar economy and finding its ideological expression in the ethic of modernist Islam. Here development takes the form of increasing size and more complex organization of some enterprises within the bazaar economy. Some traders increase their operations to the point where they own a *toko* [shop] and some craftsmen elaborate their small scale operations to the point where they can be called *perusahan* [master craftsmen].

Tabanan, on the other hand, has no long-standing commerical tradition. Peasant agriculture was largely for subsistence, and, what trade there was, was largely the province of outsiders, Muslim Javanese or Chinese, forming enclaves in traditionalistic Bali. In Tabanan, modern economic enterprise has come about through the initiative of the local royal house, whose members are now excluded from their traditional political role, organizing their hereditary subjects into modern economic enterprises.

I cannot do justice, in such a brief review, to Geertz's analysis of his two cases. I found particularly stimulating his discussion of the bazaar economy as a set of social relations and feel that here we have a model which can be extended to many other peasant societies, facilitating wider comparison and generalization.

The analysis naturally tends to emphasize the different features of development in the two examples, the one highly individualistic, the other emphasizing the traditional particularistic loyalty of lord and hereditary retainer, but Geertz rounds off his discussions with a number of conclusions which justify the view that the two processes are but two converging paths which will surely justify comparative testing by workers whose research experience covers other areas.

Throughout the book the author maintains a balance (often difficult for anthropologists to achieve) between ethnographic analysis and wider theory. If the reader wants information about Indonesia he will find it, but if he is more interested in discussion of the general problem of social and economic development he will find that too.

M. G. SWIFT

University of Sydney

What Is Sociology: An Introduction to the Discipline and the Profession. By ALEX INKELES. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii+120. $3.95 (cloth); $1.50 (paper).

There are many ways to introduce sociology to the uninitiated—the analysis of basic concepts or of sociological theory, the presentation of the results of empirical studies or of the basic methods of research, the comparison of the sociological with other approaches to the study of man, even the description of the professional role and status of the sociologist. In this brief volume Professor Inkeles includes, in varying degrees, all of them. Within just over one hundred pages he seeks to define the nature of the discipline and to distinguish it from history and the other behavioral sciences, to summarize the various models of society employed by scholars, to explain the central concepts and the major social processes, to examine the chief problems in social research, and to describe the present status of sociology as a profession.

In dealing with these problems Inkeles manages to incorporate an extraordinary amount of material, albeit usually in quick summary strokes. To define the subject matter of sociology, for example, he first presents brief accounts of the relevant ideas of Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, and Weber and then describes "what sociologists do" by reference to the coverage of textbooks, the various fields of specialization, and the 1957 meetings of the ASA from which came *Sociology Today*. Finally, he provides a "logical analysis" of the proper contents of sociological inquiry. In examining the psychological premises upon which sociology should rest, he first disposes of the "non-sociological" and the "over-socialized" conceptions of man and then discusses the personality typologies of Thomas and Znaniecki, Pareto, and Riesman, and the development of measures of personality, particularly the *F*-scale. He concludes with a few observations on the relations between personality and social roles, politics, and social structure.

Inevitably, perhaps, so compressed a discussion suffers from the often cryptic and necessarily incomplete presentation of ideas. The concept of "social system," for example, is disposed of in one seven-line paragraph, one-half of which refers to the ambiguities in the concept. The "conflict of meaning and measurement" is dealt with in just over two pages: a brief statement of the nature of the conflict is followed by a short description of Bales's methods for identifying group differences.

Inkeles covers most of this wide array of material with assurance and skill; chapter iii, for example, is an excellent condensed account of the diverse models of society current among sociologists. But taken as a whole, the rich fare in this little book is more likely, in my judgment, to give most of its readers a case of mental indigestion than an appetite for more.

ELY CHINOY

Smith College

Some Aspects of Family in Mahuva. By I. P. DESAI. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. 239. R.18.

As India accommodates herself to the drift of world culture under the shock waves produced by the revolutionary upheavals of the West, her social scientists are beginning to ask: "What are the consequences of urbanization, bureaucratization, and industrialization (often taken as the essence of the cultural revolution of the West) for India's traditional institutions such as caste, religion, and the joint family?"

Under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, Professor I. P. Desai of the University of Baroda undertook an examination of the status of the joint family in the port and market town of Mahuva, a community of some 25,000 population, located north of Bombay on the southeastern coast of Saurashtra. Export items from Mahuva include ground nuts, oil, oil cakes, and onions. Import items include timber and tiles from Kerala and South Gujarat. In addition to foodstuffs grown in the area there is brisk trade in cloth, gold, silverware, and timber. Before it came into the hands of the state of Bhavnagar, Mahuva was an administrative center of the Bhavnagar princes. It is now reduced to a Taluka head with a Deputy District Collector's office, a judicial court, a revenue court, and a police officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector. Mahuva is thus an administrative as well as a commercial center.

A random sample of 423 was drawn from Mahuva's households. These were classified, for purposes of statistical analysis, in terms of lineal descendents (one to three generations) in a single household and in terms of the observance of obligations to relatives outside the household, from zero to highest degree (traditional) jointness. A series of questions was phrased to the heads of households to determine the presence or absence of trends toward the Western type of nuclear family. It was found that the joint family was still the assumed norm in the overwhelming majority of cases, that no increase in nuclearity was present, and that nuclearity did not vary systematically with caste, religion, occupation, or education in ways often assumed by prophets of Westernization.

The study does not—and was not intended to—refute the hypothesis of a linkage between the nuclear family and industrialization, bureaucratization, and urbanization. Though Mahuva's cotton mill employs around 1,000 persons, most of its establishments are small and run on a personal basis. The municipal and government offices lack the classic

features of bureaucracy. "It would be an error," Desai observes, "to regard such as the textile mill and the oil mill and even Government and Municipal offices as similar to the large, impersonal business and industrial houses that we find in modern times. They are more like private and personal concerns" (p. 8). Moreover, though Mahuva's population is some 25,000, it is subdivided by religion and by caste into a mosaic of subgroups under caste panchayats stronger in the lives of their members than the municipal administration. Mahuva is in fact a preindustrial Indian small town in all critical respects.

Desai's study has considerable interest for Western sociologists for its statistically accurate description of the traditional institutional complex which dulls the thrust of Westernization in India. It may well serve as a benchmark for the measurement of future changes in India's domestic institutions.

DON MARTINDALE

University of Minnesota

The Family Estate in Africa: Studies in the Role of Property in Family Structure and Lineage Continuity. Edited by ROBERT F. GRAY and PHILIP H. GULLIVER. Boston: Boston University Press, 1964. Pp. v+265. $6.00.

The African family, structurally and in several other ways, has been well studied over the years. Although the volume under review is, in a sense, simply another collective orthodox anthropological analysis, it is something more. It is done with a modern touch that subdues the dullness customary in such presentations and sees this basic institution, the family, as a social process. Although it charts no new course, the book does summarize well the large and familiar features of the wealth and inheritance patterns of five East and one each South African and Congolese (Leopoldville) groups.

The family estate is quite inclusive. Cattle and other livestock, crops, personal property, money, and widows are major components that function as process within a context of time. The human network through which these flow may be either matrilineal or patrilineal and can be affected by ecological factors that have pertinence for estate settlement, such as the lack of land, ritual competence, immediate need, and so on. In Africa, unlike Western societies, one may find that property may not command the services of others to any appreciable extent. Rather, people may tend to do things out of ties of kinship and neighborhood, with the beer that is served being enjoyed by any passerby who wishes to partake. Again, wealth may be of value only insofar as it can be used to meet a need of the moment or to create and sustain social relationships.

One notes the consistently high quality of each of the papers in this collection and detects on the part of nearly every author an awareness of the implications of recent developments as colonialism fades away. The symposium retains the reader's interest through a projection of the historical and traditional ideal of the family estate onto a very real and changing present. Almost every contributor has a knack of presenting the ideal pattern vis-à-vis actual practices of today, with the ideal made real in serving to validate actions that regulate family estate matters.

Lack of space no doubt prevented analysis of other pertinent aspects that might have been conducive to providing even greater insights into the estate system, but to say this is mere quibbling. For, over-all, this is a knowledgeable and eminently readable survey of the subject. Competently done, it exposes various kinds of inheritance and the transfer of different kinds of property, reveals how and sometimes why it is done, and contains many details and treatment of intricate and intimate aspects of the respective systems assessed.

HUGH H. SMYTHE

Brooklyn College

South Africa: A Study in Conflict. By PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE. Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1965. Pp. x+376. $8.95.

If sociological theory is not to remain entirely insular, confining itself to the analysis of the relatively stable advanced industrial societies of western Europe and America, it is urgently necessary that we develop a morphology of colonial societies. Too often such societies are seen as marginal exceptions

not worthy of the sociologist's attention even though they cover more than half the world and seem to represent, far more than the advanced industrial societies, the normal human condition. On the other hand, too much writing about countries like South Africa is polemical, and ineffective even as polemic, because it fails to answer the questions, "What kind of society is this?" and "What are its dynamics?" Professor van den Berghe's book is thus doubly welcome because he is a theoretically oriented sociologist applying himself to the study of one of the most problematic social systems in the world today.

Van den Berghe insists that South African society cannot be understood in functionalist terms, particularly where functionalism implies a value consensus. No such consensus exists in South Africa, and some model of a plural society is necessary to account for its institutions. Moreover, the author insists that a theoretical approach should be made, in part at least, in terms of the Hegelian dialectic. He quotes Gluck, Balandier, and Dahrendorf as the theorists to whom he is most indebted.

It is not clear, however, precisely what this emphasis upon the Hegelian dialectic means. It could mean an analysis of social groups brought into a relationship of conflict by divergent interests and resolving this conflict by revolutionary change or by a perpetually changing bargain. This would involve an analysis of class groupings and a careful study of the relationship between these class groupings and the political organizations that are the agency through which they seek to achieve their objectives. But this kind of analysis is peculiarly lacking in van den Berghe's book which, after paying lip service to the dialectic, turns out to be a much more static study of cultural and social pluralism.

In this respect it must be said that the book is extremely informative. It gives more factual information about the cultural affiliations and the social stratification of South African ethnic groupings than can be found in any other place, and the objective statistical approach which the author adopts to these questions is very rewarding indeed. But the politics of the situation are discussed either under the general heading "The Social Structure of Modern South Africa" or under the heading "Socio-Political Conflicts," where little more is done than to record the ideological conflicts that exist among the whites and between black and white. There is no careful analysis of the way in which these ideologies connect with the interests of classes and their organization.

Perhaps van den Berghe emphasizes too much the uniqueness of the South African situation. He is right, no doubt, to insist that in many ways this is not a Fascist society, and right too in rejecting a vulgar Marxist analysis of the South African working class. But there are other models. There have been societies based upon racial conquest before and what we want to know of such societies is what kind of classes or estates they give rise to and how the conflicts between these groups are played out. This is what a theoretical account of South African society must do.

Yet it must be emphasized that all of these criticisms are made only because of the high expectations one is encouraged to have about this book as a study in sociology. As an account of the South African situation, partially illuminated by sociological analysis it is very good indeed

JOHN REX

University of Durham

The Plural Society in the British West Indies. By M. G SMITH Berkeley University of California Press, 1965. Pp. xix + 359. $7.00.

Let me start with a visceral reaction that required no vitiating revisions even after two readings this is a first-rate book, a fine blend of ethnographic and theoretical writing The tradition of English social anthropology embodied in Professor Smith's text causes one to wonder about the nearly complete separation of sociology from anthropology in the United States. For all of its wealth of data, the book remains uncluttered by excess baggage The author appreciates the distinction between complexity of statement and profundity of insight. One knows what to agree with or disagree with, without wallowing about in "communication problems."

The first part of this volume represents a series of studies in search of an understanding of the British West Indies Without disregarding or minimizing the impact of external social forces from the United States to Brazil and

from other Caribbean Islands to Africa—Smith provides a strong case for certain structural linkages that define the British West Indies. He does not make assumptions about "consensus" or "common values" or "actors" in search of "particular ends"—indeed, he is highly articulate in rejecting the implicit banality in the sort of functionalism that can neither explain nor weight factors. Instead, he views the matter of cultural identity in terms of structural disparities: differences between subordinate and superordinate, pivotal from peripheral economic classes, racial strains, educational status pockets. In this way, he not only builds up a grid of social relations in the British West Indies, but also shows what these relations have been and will be. For all of this ambitious theorizing, Smith manages to retain a genuine modesty of the limits as well as the worth of his efforts.

Smith uses "pluralism" distinctively, not as an illusration of cultural democracy, but rather as a characteristic feature of dependence and decadence. That is to say, pluralism is not a philosophic statement about a marketplace of ideas, but a sociological statement of the seedbed of political dominance. Pluralism is meant to include both economic and ethnic contradictions without being reduced to either component. Beyond this, pluralism serves as a synthetic tool for the study of the British West Indies. Indeed, pluralism is one side of the intellectual apparatus; the other is a powerful comparative basis embodied in each of the essays.

The second part of the book (chaps. iv–viii) contains by all odds the most pellucid writing. In comparing slavery and emancipation in Jamaica and in Zaria, a Hausa society in Nigeria, Smith realizes the high possibilities in the comparative-historical model over other available models. In his hands, the structural approach is shorn of the metaphysics of functionalism, and thus serves to make racial and economic determinisms appear futile. Smith shows the different structural features distinguishing a homogeneous-autonomous society from a heterogeneous-dependent society. This distinction has vital field research implications. It helps to explain why slavery "has left its mark" in the British Caribbean but not upon the Zaria of Africa. It reclaims for the area of social research subject matter that is often prematurely surrendered to those starting from a pool (a cesspool) of human nature and instinctual drives. The further dissection of the "plural framework" of Jamaican society in terms of such rarely operationalized variables as law, trade, and credit systems, along with the more customary distinctions of class, race, and ethnic origins, is of great significance for investigators of other areas showing similar pluralist formations. And for those laboring under the Schumpeterian myth of the beneficent character of British colonial rule, these chapters will prove of special value.

The final portion of the book (chaps. ix–xii) presents materials of a more technical level. Yet Smith has the rare capacity to infuse even dense material with insight and literary grace. First, he shows the strains within Jamaican society in terms of urban preferences and educational achievements among a sample of Jamaican children and adolescents. In his sample, where expectations and aspirations differ, so too do motivations and performances. Smith then goes on to indicate the enormous role played by ascribed status in the way customary tenure of land displaces legally valid land transfers. His remarkable knowledge of law, no less than of custom, transforms a prosaic topic into something of wide relevance: the tenacity of custom in the developmental process. The penultimate chapter is a fascinating study of Grenada and its little-known mass leader, E. M. Gairy. Beyond that, it is a study of how political enfranchisement enables the colored masses to cope with a Western-oriented white elite. The author, by using the historical method, shows how gains in economic levels cannot guarantee status gains and status equality. The final chapter in the book shows how tensions in the bifurcated "plural society" take place. Parallel increases in social mobility and education are required to reduce strain, and this is rarely the case. Even if it were, the results would be problematic, since for Smith meaningful changes in the economic system or in the status hierarchy proceed by political action. Thus the doubts and uncertainties attendant on political action, rather than the selection of the main parameters, make prediction difficult.

I have one major and one minor criticism. Smith's multi-determinate framework some-

times obscures the total situation. Several times the assertion of economic primacy is made, only to be obscured by secondary factors. For instance, we are told that "influence and power rest with those who control economic resources and employment opportunities in the local community" (p. 191). Yet an "informal leadership" based on "age" and distinct from economic power is unconvincingly introduced to explain the character of voluntary organizations. And earlier in the book the reader is informed that a genuine division of labor based on racial distinctions is maintained, yet in the same paragraph the author suggests that "cultural performance and skill is decisive rather than racial status" (p. 16). Had he said that racial definitions are made *in terms of* cultural levels of achievement, the situation might have been saved. In general, Smith is troubled by the assignment of weight to class factors and racial factors. The structural approach serves to disguise rather than remove the troublesome business of what factors are basic and what factors are derivatives in the process of social development.

At a much lesser level, I am curious as to why Smith has not considered the work of Wendell Bell on the political leaders of Jamaica, particularly since this has a major bearing on the thesis of Smith's work, that is, the critical role of political action in changing the economy and the society. Also, it would be interesting to see how Smith would evaluate the impact of culture shock on the overseas Jamaican, such as is provided in the analysis of Ruth Glass's work. But this is admittedly a query rather than a criticism. I have no doubt Smith could field it without much trouble.

This is an important book for all sociologists. It would be a mistake to assume that the specialized nature of the subject matter, or the technical nature of the title, is a warrant for ignoring it.

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ

Washington University, St. Louis

The Shearers and the Shorn. By E. W. MARTIN. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. vii+250. $6.50.

This study documents the changes that have taken place in the English borough of Okehampton and the larger community of Devon. The major objective of the study is to "find the roots of rural malaise, depopulation and discontent." The author begins with the assumptions that in order to describe Okehampton as it is today it is necessary to document the historical past from whence it arose.

Part I, "The Ceremonial Regime," is concerned with a description of the social system of this English borough during the nineteenth century. Martin's description of the property elite, the squire's personality, pauperism, the workers, and the "code" is well done and interesting. The author enumerates the major events that gradually brought about the decline of the old order and the rise of the local "Establishment."

Part II, "Conflict and Co-ordination," presents the social factors involved in the conflict between "ceremony" and democracy. The author feels that the loss of prestige experienced by the squirearchy and clergy, plus economic failure and cultural change, has brought about the present conflict; and that the present conflict plus industrial efficiency plus "co-ordination" equals progress. In the chapter on "Social Context" the author describes the class structure in terms of (1) the minority (the leisured group), (2) the majority (the middle class), and (3) the mass (the working class). One of the most interesting chapters in this section is on the role of public opinion as a means of social control.

Part III, "Towards Tomorrow," does not attempt to offer solutions or speculations about the future of the rural community in England, but simply lists the effects of depopulation on the social system, industry, and youth. The author is optimistic about the future of this and other rural communities in England and believes that modern "mass democracy will help break down social and economic barriers which have impeded the flow of ideas and growth of industry."

In sum, this is a well-written and interesting study of the historical factors that still play a dynamic role in the everyday life of a small rural community in England. Some readers will regret the lack of a more sophis-

ticated approach and particularly the almost total absence of the more or less accepted sociological terms and concepts.

SHAW GRIGSBY

University of Florida

The Puerto Ricans: Strangers—Then Neighbors. By CLARENCE SENIOR. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Pp. 128. $3.50.

In this compact volume is presented the essential story of the migration from Puerto Rico to mainland United States. It is directed at the layman who may only know what he "reads in the newspapers"—and who thus has received a picture composed only of social problems and violence, for what other types of events are news? For his information, Clarence Senior, who has long studied and worked with Puerto Rican and other Latin American groups, has presented in capsule form facts about the Puerto Ricans both in Puerto Rico and the mainland—how they live and work, and the social and economic problems faced in both places.

Since the essence of the book is migration, these various problems are shown in their relationship to the shift from one culture to another. In addition, the Puerto Rican migration is presented in the context of the previous streams of migrants to the United States. New York City received vast numbers of these earlier migrants—Germans, Italians, Irish, Jews, etc.—and recently has received the larger part of the Puerto Rican migration. Accordingly, much of the factual material is concerned with New York City.

The author's thesis is that the Puerto Rican migration generally is similar to the earlier migrations. The strangers in both the past and the present were greeted by the natives with doubt and apprehension and were placed at or near the bottom of the United States socioeconomic ladder. Subsequently the descendants of these migrants managed to climb the ladder, more or less. At present the Puerto Ricans, Negroes, and poor Southern whites are the major groups at or near the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder in New York and other large northern and western cities. Senior does not attempt to predict the future conditions for these groups, but does indicate that the Puerto Ricans are making some progress.

An excellent bibliography of over two hundred items is included.

This reviewer concurs with Vice-President Humphrey's statement in the Foreword, "I am pleased to recommend this excellent introduction to our Puerto Rican neighbors by Clarence Senior."

A. J. JAFFE

Bureau of Applied Social Research
Columbia University

Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power. By KENNETH B. CLARK. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp. 251. $4.95.

The author of this very provocative book grew up in Harlem where he spent more than forty years of his life. He returned to Harlem as a founder of and moving spirit behind the well-planned Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited (Haryou) project. For two years he served as the project's chief consultant and chairman of the board of directors. This is an insightful social psychological interpretation of basic data presented in the 620-page Haryou report. It is, perhaps, the best example, so far, of "action research." Professor Clark makes no pretense of being scientifically detached. He does not hesitate to take sides and warns that extreme scientific objectivity tends to block "meaningful or insightful study of human affairs" and often leads to "the preoccupation with trivia." He insists that if social science is to be truly relevant it must "appropriate its technology in . . . helping society," not simply in trying to understand it.

In a unique prologue the author highlights "The Cry of the Ghetto." Among the things denizens of the ghetto cry about are helplessness or powerlessness; limited economic, educational, and social opportunities; decayed and overcrowded housing; high rent; social agencies that seem to be insensitive to their needs; lack of respect; police brutality; and exploitation by their leaders as well as by the society at large.

Harlem is regarded as a prototype of all large urban ghettos. Its major ubiquitous social

pathologies are mental and physical illness, homicide, delinquency, venereal diseases, drug addiction, family instability, and school drop-outs. The rates for these pathologies are from two to ten times as high in the ghetto as they are in the city as a whole. The author employs great skill in the interpretation of these pathologies in terms of advanced social psychological theories. He criticizes traditional means of coping with problems of the ghetto and proposes what he believes to be more promising approaches.

Perhaps Clark's greatest contribution is his analysis of the structure of social power. He cites, as the main agencies of power, political organizations; the press; social service agencies; the church; civil rights organizations; and powerful, virtuoso leaders. In all instances it is his opinion that these main power groups have tended to exploit, rather than help, the powerless people who live in the ghetto. He refers to Harlem as the "outpost" of the larger society.

From the beginning of this research the author's primary aim was the establishment of an organization through which effective social changes would be initiated and guided. This book is a proposed blueprint for such changes. It is well written, copiously documented, and presents a delicate, fruitful blending of the role of "involved observer" with scientific objectivity. As such it will be of great value to both scholars and action leaders.

DANIEL C. THOMPSON
Dillard University

Society and Education in Brazil. By ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST and J. ROBERTO MOREIRA. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965. Pp. xviii+263. $6.00.

The purpose of this volume is to explore the role of education in planned social change and the impact of socioeconomic forces on education in Brazil, which has been "moving with tremendous speed and momentum out of a colonial past into an industrial democratic future" (p. xi).

The authors analyze how the structure of Brazilian education underwent change, and influenced social change in turn, as Brazil's society evolved through periods of "colonial exploitation" and "imperial independence" into a "modern republic." A significant finding is the increasing role of formal institutions of education, such as schools and universities, which are regarded as more competent for the task of educational reconstruction; and the gradual divesting of the family, church, state, and the economy of their educational activities.

In short, "the educational system of Brazil is rapidly taking added responsibility for the rearing of the younger generation in such a way as to make Brazil economically stronger and politically wiser, and socially more democratic" (p. 257). Yet certain questions affecting Brazilian education remain, namely, whether the present rapid spread of education will persist, the proper role of private versus public institutions in educational development in a "development" society, and the future of decentralized education.

The method of research is social-historical and analytical within the perspective of sociology of education. The data are derived from various Brazilian sources, studies by foreign historians, economists, and sociologists; and the personal experience and research of the authors in Brazil. The study is rich in substantive findings and is a valuable contribution not only to the sociology of education but also to the field of social change in "developing" countries. It also offers to the English-speaking world an interpretation of a country that is emerging as the "power-center of economic and political affairs in South America."

SANTOSH KUMAR NANDY
State University of New York at Buffalo

Class in Suburbia. By WILLIAM M. DOBRINER. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963. Pp. xii+166. $1.95 (paper).

Two quite dissimilar approaches to the study of suburbs have been joined in this volume. The first part contains a description and criticism of much of the sociological literature concerning suburbs along with Dobriner's contention that suburbs are distinct because of the social class identity of

their populations. The second part is composed of a partially empirical and partially impressionistic analysis of social change or class conflict in two suburbs.

Dobriner effectively destroys many myths that have been fostered by the naïve characterizations of life in suburbs written by some sociologists. Works in the vein of Whyte's *The Organization Man* are categorized as the commentaries of "an exuberant band of social impressionists" rather than the findings of social scientists. Many of the supposedly distinctive criteria of suburbs, he notes, are not peculiar to suburban areas. Certainly suburban residents commute to work, but so do most individuals who reside within central cities. Suburban areas may include homogeneous neighborhoods with individuals who come from identical social, political, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. But similarly homogeneous neighborhoods may be found within the boundaries of the largest cities. Home ownership and single-family dwelling units may typify suburbs, but they are also common to most small towns and many parts of the central city. The idea of a distinctive personality syndrome is destroyed in an equally effective manner.

The question then arises, "what is there, if anything, that is distinctive about suburbs, and what makes them different from cities?" To answer this question a lengthy but highly speculative discussion of social class is introduced. It is Dobriner's view that almost everyone has a fairly conscious view of class structure and that when important decisions are made, such as the choice of a spouse or residential area, class considerations become prominent. As a result of this decision process, suburban residential areas tend to be populated by individuals of one social class, most often the middle class. Living in suburban areas, then, differs from living in a city partly because of the greater distance between home and office but more importantly because of the "extent and degree of informal relationships at the neighborhood level; degree of home-centered activity, such as gardening, do-it-yourselfing, and the like; and ease of child-rearing."

This image of the suburbs is hardly compatible with Dobriner's effective critique of sociological descriptions of suburbia contained in the previous chapters. Although noting the existence of working-class and industrial suburbs, Dobriner sees suburbs primarily as homogeneous middle-class residential areas and assumes that class variables critically define suburbs. He implies that any single-family dwelling-unit residential area populated by the middle class is a suburban area—a definition which would include much of the population in central cities as well as that in the suburban area.

The growth of the suburbs is explained as a result of a search by middle-class residents for desirable residential areas. The spacious suburbs offer an alternative to the crowded and grimy city with its corrupt government and second-rate schools. Technological considerations, such as the rise of automobile transportation and land-use patterns, are considered as possible reasons for suburban developments but are not explored.

The second part of this volume describes two kinds of suburban residential succession. Levittown, Long Island, according to Dobriner, was first populated by well-educated upwardly mobile war veterans who sought the amenities of suburban living. By 1960 many of these individuals had moved into larger homes farther out on the Island, and less-educated blue-collar workers invaded Levittown. The white-collar group that stayed maintained their homes and gardens and favored higher taxes for improved schools, while the newer working-class element cared less about the upkeep of their property and looked with disfavor on higher tax rates. Some census data are used to describe Levittown; however, very much of his argument is based upon his idiosyncratic impressions of how such things as the quality and color of homes and the cleanliness of the streets changed between 1950 and 1961. Unfortunately it is not possible to detect where the scientific description ends and the personal view begins.

A different process of suburban succession is analyzed in the final chapter which describes a small but historic New England fishing port which has gradually been invaded by outmigrants from a nearby metropolis. At one point in time well-to-do individuals established mansions and summer homes in the town, but following World War II real estate developers erected numerous homes. The new upper-middle-class suburbanites came into conflict with the older residents over such things as

the kinds and extent of municipal services and the quality of the educational system. Eventually the more numerous suburbanites won out.

The entirety of this work is well written, and many interesting topics are mentioned. This volume focuses upon the description of particular suburbs, however, and never are suburbs viewed as components of an over-all metropolitan area. One gets the impression that life in certain Long Island cities is not like life in much of Manhattan, but this is not convincing evidence that suburbs differ generically from central cities. The pattern of suburban growth and residential succession detailed by Dobriner would seem to fit the Burgess conceptualization rather neatly. It would appear that if the author had viewed urban growth and the rise of suburbs in this broader perspective he would not have had to develop the constrained definitions and distinctions that he makes.

REYNOLDS FARLEY

Duke University

Social Class and Family Life. By DONALD GILBERT MCKINLEY. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xii+306. $6.50.

During the past decade, there has been a steady flow of studies relating social class variables to child-rearing practices. With results of some of these studies as supportive evidence, Donald McKinley presents data from his own investigation to suggest the manner by which social class affects socialization in the family.

McKinley tries to show that there is greater punitiveness and rejection of children by parents in urban lower classes than in other social classes. He regards this punitiveness and rejection as a consequence of lower-class parents' greater frustration and stronger feelings of threat. This aggression is displaced from the "power and reward structure of industrial society" to the powerless child. He also tries to indicate that those individuals who enjoy much autonomy in their work tend to show less hostility. Similarly, fathers who are dissatisfied with their work use more punitive techniques of punishment and show greater hostility to their sons. As a consequence of this severity of child-rearing practices and hostility, identification by sons with their fathers is reduced. Accordingly, there is greater admiration and identification with the father in the upper social class level than the lower. Moreover, in upper-class levels sons are willing to accept the authority of the father to a greater extent.

In general, the findings reported by McKinley are consistent with the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Aside from his preoccupation with displaced aggression in the family, McKinley presents other findings relevant to the relationship between the family and the economic system. For example, his data suggest that there is a tendency for sons in families in which the father is the source of authority to enter technological and scientific occupations, while sons in families in which parents have equal authority more often enter cultural, artistic, and entertainment occupations. In families in which the mother is the source of authority, sons tend to enter occupations in which organizational ability is important.

At various points, McKinley suggests that he "was not completely prepared on a theoretical level for the empirical results." At other times, he complains that evidence for his views is "sometimes rather slight." Indeed, McKinley occasionally bases his conclusions on minute differences in percentages in very small samples with data gathered for other purposes.

This book generally reads more like an expanded Ph.D. dissertation than a comprehensive analysis of social class and family life. McKinley's own data do not permit him to examine the confounding effects of ethnic group, race, and religious variations on the relationship between social class and family life. McKinley tries to compensate for the deficiencies in his data by introducing results of other studies which are based on different indexes, conceptual apparatus, and diverse samples. The result is a loosely written book sometimes sounding like a textbook.

At most, this book is highly suggestive in indicating relationships between social class and family life. At a minimum, it presents some data in support of the frustration-aggression hypothesis as related to social class. On the whole, McKinley presents some interesting data, some insightful comments

about the frustration of lower-class family life, but not a comprehensive and integrated analysis of effects of social class on family life.

BERNARD FARBER
University of Illinois

Social Mobility and Controlled Fertility: Family Origins and Structure of the Australian Academic Elite. By H. Y. TIEN. New Haven, Conn.: College & University Press (in collaboration with Australian National University), 1965. Pp. 224. $6.00.

Thanks largely to the leadership of W. D. Borrie, Australia has contributed to demographic research far out of proportion to its size. The study under review is the most recent of a number of excellent research reports from that area.

Tien's *Social Mobility and Controlled Fertility* is an adapatation of his doctoral dissertation. It is a good example of the now somewhat old-fashioned idea that a Ph.D. dissertation in sociology should reflect the student's experience and competence in successive stages of social research such as planning a study; construction and pretesting of the questionnaire or interview schedule; collection of data (including the prodding of reluctant respondents); the processing, tabulating, and analysis of data; and finally the writing of a coherent report.

The study is neatly designed. Completed questionnaires were secured from 479 faculty members of the grade of Lecturer or higher in two Australian universities, Sydney and Melbourne. This number was approximately 87 per cent of the number distributed.

The questionnaires were carefully planned and pretested. Among the areas covered were age, sex, marital status, date of marriage, religion, and educational occupational history of self and parents. Married subjects were asked to have their spouses complete a separate questionnaire which contained essentially the same questions plus provision for recording birth dates of the couple's children.

The book provides a brief critical review of past studies of social mobility in relation to fertility. After proper controls were introduced the data yielded no statistically significant relation of *family size* to intergenerational mobility. However, a central contribution is the finding that faculty members in two Australian universities who experienced intergenerational mobility also experienced *longer intervals between marriage and first birth* on the average than did the non-mobile couples.

The "social mobility" with which the study is exclusively concerned is "intergenerational," and the mobility status of the faculty member hinges altogether upon the broad occupational class of the father. All faculty members in the study were considered to be of identical broad occupational group I, or "Professional." All whose fathers were of either I or II occupational status (I. Professional, semi-professional; II. High official, managerial) were considered as "non-mobile." All others were considered as "mobile." Strictly, therefore, the study is of fertility of college faculty members in relation to social origins. This had the advantage of simplicity and objectivity. It seems a pity, however, that advantage was not taken of the opportunity to relate fertility also to the occupational mobility of *the faculty members themselves since their marriage*. This could have taken into account the variations in present rank as well as the variations in occupational class at the time of marriage.

Also, although the author quite properly restricted the central analysis to couples who had married, he might have pointed up a little more sharply than he did the relation of social mobility to marital status and age at marriage. It may be, of course, that the author did carry out such analysis but found the results limited in value by small size of the sample. This limitation indeed imposes sharp limits on the results of the study, as the author repeatedly states. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Tien's book is a valuable report on a job well done.

CLYDE V. KISER
Milbank Memorial Fund

The Third Child: A Study in the Prediction of Fertility. By CHARLES F. WESTOFF, ROBERT G. POTTER, JR., and PHILIP C. SAGI. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1963. Pp. xxiii+293. $6.50.

This is the second of a three-volume series reporting on the Princeton Fertility Study.

The first volume, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America*, examined correlates of family-size preferences among a sample of 1,165 metropolitan native white couples with "uncomplicated" marital and pregnancy histories who had their second child six months before the initial interview in 1957. The present volume, based on a re-interview of the original sample three years later, is concerned with the extent to which family-size preferences expressed in the initial interview had been translated into actual fertility.

Desired family size as ascertained at the first interview explained 23 per cent of the variance in number of pregnancies occurring during the subsequent three years. Various personality and family interaction variables washed out as predictors of fertility, while significant but weak correlations obtained with such standard variables as socioeconomic status, migration status, and place of residence. Religion was associated with fertility but more interesting is the way it affected relationships of fertility with other variables such as education and rural-urban background. An extensive search for a relation between social mobility and fertility yielded negative results. I suspect part of the problem is that certain crucial factors facilitating mobility, such as education and marriage, precede childbearing. As a result, the mobile individual has a pretty good idea of his class of destination before embarking upon childbearing.

Attempts to predict individual fertility have generally been unrewarding. In the present case, prediction and analysis were complicated by the homogeneous nature of the sample and the use of religion as a control. A final factor analysis is an unsatisfactory attempt to assess multivariate relationships—it serves mainly as a vehicle for a sketchy summary of the zero-order findings. Undetermined is the relative predictive utility of the separate variables within a multivariate framework. The place of family-size preference within a theoretical scheme linking social background variables to actual fertility is not elucidated. Family-size preference is discussed as an intervening variable, yet the partial correlations between fertility and social background holding constant size preference are not examined.

The longitudinal character of the study is put to clear advantage in the analysis of contraceptive practice. The effectiveness with which couples practice contraception apparently increases sharply as desired family size is approached. Past evidence on the effectiveness of various methods of contraception must be reinterpreted in the light of this indication that motivation rather than method is crucial, and that the seeming ineffectiveness of the rhythm method may reflect the fact that Catholics, desiring larger families than others, practice the method somewhat desultorily during much of the reproductive period.

ALMA F. TAEUBER

University of Wisconsin

The Politics of Education in the Local Community. Edited by ROBERT S. CAHILL and STEPHEN P. HENCLEY. Danville, Ill : Interstate Printers and Publishers. 1964. Pp. xvi +251. $5.75.

The reader will recognize this as a product of a summer seminar. In such seminars, the participants fall into two categories—those who are planning research, and present their preliminary conceptual scheme; and those who are not planning research, who must meet the deadline by putting dress clothing around whatever loose ideas they might have. The result, as in this case, is the economical and efficient production of a non-book. The efficiency reaches near-perfection if each participant religiously follows rule No. 1: Do not read any of the other papers until yours is in galleys.

The first three of the eleven chapters contain a hasty review of the elitist-pluralist warfare in studies of community power. The second chapter, by Luvern Cunningham, represents a legitimate attempt to educate social scientists to the possibilities for research in the politics of education. He deals with the situational and structural constraints on school districts as political entities. He further argues that certain roles, such as that of the state superintendent, and relationships such as the dependency on city governments for financing, are unique to the educational structure and must be taken into account.

The middle seven chapters address themselves to a potpourri of questions more or less related to community power structure and decision-making. The topics have only an

accidental relationship to the avowed purpose of the book, and range from more reviews of the pluralist-monopolist argument to a rather abortive attempt (by Bert E. Swanson) to infer the decision structure from interaction process analysis of small groups.

If we contrast Cunningham's plea that educational systems have important unique aspects and David Minar's proposition that the over-all community power structure is of little consequence for educational decision-making with the fact that five of the papers review the community power literature and one calls for analysis of the local government on traditional terms, we see that the participants had grounds for a lively debate as to whether, and how, autonomous educational systems are affected by the politics of the rest of the community. However, following rule No. 1, they neither raise nor debate the question.

The final chapter is a multi-faceted discussion of the place of action research in a changing social system and makes a plea for joint research by educators and social scientists, although it is not clear that this need is not being met by the mushrooming of interdisciplinary centers for community study.

In summary, the collection of papers fails rather badly in trying to go from abstractions to reality, and is particularly weak in facing the question of what research on the community political system will tell us about the community's educational decision-making apparatus.

ROBERT STOUT and ROBERT CRAIN

National Opinion Research Center
University of Chicago

Workers Councils: A Study of Workplace Organization on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain. By ADOLF STURMTHAL. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. x+217. $5.00.

This report on workplace organizations in France, Germany, Yugoslavia, and Poland is informative. Distinguishing, according to their tasks and purposes, five types of shop stewards or worker councils, the author has focused attention on the evolution and functions of mainly two: bargaining and managerial councils. The contrasting exposition of different national developments provides suggestive material for an improved understanding of the unfolding of labor movements in varying political, economic, and social contexts. The description of the Yugoslav experiments with establishing a decentralized market economy on the basis of socialist property arrangements is among the most interesting of the book.

The fate of the councils emerges as inseparably tied to the meaning of labor movements in the various countries and to the changing relationships of some of their constituent elements—councils, unions, political parties, and workers. The author emphasizes that these relationships, including the structure of unions, vary at different stages of the process of industrialization. He disputes the notion that certain forms of the labor movement are, in essence, superior. Relativism of objectives, depending on the nature and process of industrial and political developments, is seen as extending also to forms and patterns of organization. Linking rearrangements in the hierarchy of objectives to changes in the role that various components of an organization are in fact playing, the author traces the fate of councils from those stages where labor in the West has operated as a class movement to and beyond periods where councils were placed in the service of collective bargaining. In a regrettably brief discussion some challenging questions about the future potential and limitations of managerial councils are raised.

The book does not present a polished piece of comparative research. It does, however, provide important data and hypotheses in a crucial area of social development. While the reader may not be convinced by some of the propositions he will find the ideas and tentative projections suggestive. The evolution of bargaining and managerial councils should be of interest not only to the specialized concerns of the industrial relations expert. An analysis of the power of such councils, the factors that affect their functions and influence, the limits imposed upon their development, and the meaning that worker self-government may have in different industrial and social settings should be of interest to all students of the dynamics and interrelation-

ships of organizational processes and social movements.

DAISY M. TAGLIACOZZO

Illinois Institute of Technology

Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. By MILTON M. GORDON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. iv+276. $2.50 (paper).

This is one of the most important of many recent popular and scholarly works on ethnicity. Milton Gordon makes a valuable contribution to the discussion of group life in America by suggesting that the various ethnic groups serve as self-enclosed subgroups within which most voluntary primary interaction takes place. Earlier theories, emphasizing cultural assimilation or separateness, are reviewed by the author and serve to highlight Gordon's own contribution, that is, the distinction between cultural and structural assimilation, and the use of the concept "structural pluralism."

Gordon postulates that the distinguishing characteristic of ethnic groups is a "sense of peoplehood," that is, a feeling of members that their lives are "ultimately bound with the fate" of the group. This sense of identity is said to exist within racial and religious groups, and among intellectuals as well as nationality group members; and, therefore, all are characterized as ethnic groups. Two major functions of the ethnic group are therefore highlighted: it furnishes psychological rewards to members who are able to identify themselves with it, and it provides "a patterned network of groups and institutions which allow an individual to confine his (voluntary) primary group relations to his own ethnic group." Taking into account the overriding influence of class even within ethnic groups, Gordon coins the term "ethclass," and hypothesizes that frequent interaction and behavioral similarities are likely to be confined within the ethclass.

Aside from distinguishing structural from cultural or behavioral assimilation, Gordon specifies five other stages or types of assimilation: marital assimilation, identificational assimilation (i.e., the emergence of a sense of peoplehood based on the host society), the absence of prejudice, discrimination, and value or power conflict. Finally, Gordon draws on previous research to characterize the life of the various contemporary ethnic subgroups. Since there are so few empirical data on the nationality subgroups, much of this material is necessarily limited to religious groups.

The author's failure to elaborate at least on theoretical grounds the relationship between ethnic subgroups and other aspects of social structure detracts from the value of this admirable book. Rather than exploring, for instance, the links between ethnic subgroups and political life, as manifested in voting preferences, etc., he forecasts their attenuation in the future. Economic behavior is seen primarily as a point of contact for individuals from different ethnic groups and as an arena where success is possible only through conformity to Anglo-Saxon cultural patterns. Thus, ties between ethnic subgroups and economic or political institutions are deemphasized rather than highlighted. Unfortunately, the author characterizes economic, political, and educational contacts as "secondary relationships," making it more difficult to discern the bonds that link the ethnic group to these aspects of social structure.

Gordon holds that one of the functions of the ethnic group is to integrate the cultural patterns of the host society with those of the ethnic group. His own work nevertheless reflects the position commonly held by contemporary sociologists that ethnic groups have undergone a process of cultural assimilation which leaves intact few or no socially relevant ethnic cultural patterns. Furthermore, his extension of the concept ethnicity to include other than nationality groups serves to obscure cultural differences that may still exist among national groups, and which may distinguish national groups from other groups.

It may be argued that cultural and structural differences among ethnic groups are relatively unimportant in view of the author's goal of affirming the existence of "structural pluralism" and relating it to the process of integration. It seems to this reviewer, nonetheless, that unless cultural differences of the various ethnic groups are specified, and subgroup links to the various social institutions

are elaborated, it will be difficult or impossible to understand the continued existence of ethnic subgroups. Asserting the continued existence of a sense of peoplehood does not appear to provide an adequate explanation of ethnic survival. Not only does that concept remain inchoate in Gordon's work, but it is difficult offhand to imagine how ethnic subgroups are able to impart such a sense of identity unless there is something unique about subgroup members, aside from their ancestors. On the other hand, if subtle differences between in-group and out-group ideas, manners, and expectations remain, and if there are ties between ethnic groups and economic and political resources, there would be sociological reasons for expecting the continued existence of the ethnic subgroup. Those aspects of ethnic group life should be the focus of future research. In the absence of this kind of research a theoretical paradigm which gave prominent place to these factors would be of value: it could, for instance, shed light on a question that held Gordon's interest: ethnic group response to desegregation and integration. If these dimensions of ethnic life are ignored, on the other hand, structural pluralism seems like a non-rational residue of the past and possibly the artifact of blind prejudice.

LEONARD J. PINTO

National Opinion Research Center

Explorations into Urban Structure. By MELVIN M. WEBBER, JOHN W. DYCKMAN, DONALD L. FOLEY, ALBERT Z. GUTTENBERG, WILLIAM L. C. WHEATON, and CATHERINE BAUER WURSTER. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. Pp. 246. $6.50.

This volume, written by a group of urban planners, represents an attempt to develop new conceptual models of the metropolitan community. The authors' aim is to supplant the traditional models based on land-use considerations with models that include behavioristic considerations. Supposedly by incorporating social-structural variables it is possible to develop a new and better frame of reference for studying the urban area.

Foley makes an interesting distinction between the spatial distribution of people and objects in the urban complex and the normative context within which locational decisions are made. By relating spatial-aspatial differentiation to differences between form and process, Foley extends to urban planning the structural-functional approach of sociology. The morphological structure of metropolitan areas is seen as a result of processual aspects of the community. In elaborating upon these views Foley demonstrates sophistication at building Parsonian models. After constructing his model Foley attempts to show its usefulness, but his defense seems constrained and not altogether pertinent. The model may have intellectual appeal but its explanatory value remains in doubt.

Webber attempts to add a new level to the structural-functional analysis of the community by introducing the concept of forms in action (a gerund view). He notes that while models of previous city-planners focused on locational considerations, the action model must focus upon communications networks since these are so important in the decision-making process of the modern community. The flow of information might be measured just as bank flows are, and an index of cultural wealth might be computed analogous to measures of per capita income. Cities could then be typified and analyzed by degree of cultural wealth.

Wheaton's essay is a refreshing change from the high-level abstractions of the other writers, for his concern is a very specific one. Who makes the major investment decisions that shape a large metropolitan area like Philadelphia and what criteria are used for making these decisions? By analyzing data, he determines that a large number of private investors and governmental bodies make these decisions and that such decisions are constrained by political and market considerations. Many of the capital expenditures are made in ignorance of the real state of the market or in ignorance of what other firms or agencies are doing. Wheaton concludes that plans or models for urban development will be deficient if they fail to consider the process by which investment decisions are made.

Guttenberg presents a series of suggestions about how to make urban planning effective. His view is that a tactical plan specifying the steps to some over-all goal produces the best results. Dyckman concludes the volume

by summarizing the contributions and speculating about their import.

The task these authors have selected is an immense one, for creating new and sociologically relevant models for urban communities involves many difficulties. It is disappointing that these authors have not specified exactly what are the properties of a desirable model. Furthermore, they dismiss the traditional ecological models far too summarily, hardly bothering to do more than consider their weaknesses. There is little in this volume to please those who feel that conceptual models should be based upon observations of the real world. Those model-builders who feel that data contaminate rather than contribute may find the volume satisfying, however.

REYNOLDS FARLEY

Duke University

Muslim Communities in Gujarat: Preliminary Studies in Their History and Social Organization. By SATISH C. MISRA. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964. Pp. xvi+207. $7.75.

For more than two-thirds of his work, Misra turns an intrinsically interesting subject—specific subcommunal ("caste") organization and general social structure of Islam in parts of the state of Gujarat—into a rather dull historical check list. The first section of this three-part volume is devoted to a frequently tedious and seemingly purposeless historical account of Indian Islam in Guiarat. The author spends much of the first chapter arguing that the Muslims have been in India, and particularly in Gujarat, for a long time. This is followed by detailed histories, each twenty pages long, of two Isma'ili subcommunities (the Bohra and the Khojah) covering the last thousand years. Relationships between Sunni and Shi'a subcommunities are occasionally considered, but rarely in any perspective. The author has the proclivities of an Indian historian (he teaches history at the University of Baroda) for obscure sixteenth-century Muslim intrigues, which offer the reader some slight taste of the possibilities of his work, but he makes little effort to integrate the material here. His recently published book on the rise of Muslim power in Gujarat would seem to touch on that subject more directly.

The second section, which bears little connection to the first, is even more encyclopedic in approach. The author uses the two chapters in this part to list certain aspects of social organization and ritual practice that are followed by sixty-nine Muslim subcommunities. No consistent pattern for this listing is followed, and the exclusion and inclusion of items appear haphazard. For most "castes" he lists habitat, chief occupations, and ritual practices in regard to marriage, death, and circumcision.

It is only in the third section, which is the briefest, that Misra raises the possibility of an interesting account of the social hierarchy existing among the Muslims and some of the routes available for mobility. Complementing Srinivas' concept of Sanskritization, he introduces three (of many) possible refinements to discuss patterns for Muslim mobility in modern India. *Islamization*—purifying communal practices by removing Hindu influences and emphasizing ties to Islamic culture (in many instances for the *first* time); *rationalization*—reform of traditional practices in order to adapt them to modern conditions; *Westernization*—internalization of certain Western values and abandonment of tradition. Each of these involves problems of empirical referents which the author does not tackle

From even this brief summary, it is obvious that this book is a patchwork. Indeed, the author warns us early in the game that it is a kind of prospectus for a larger project in which he is involved. Haste in publication is evidenced by three pages of "Additional Notes and Corrections" appended to the text and by frequent statements that a particular point will be investigated at a later date

While something may be said for publishing one's field notes in an unassimilated fashion, in this case a reviewer is impelled to suggest waiting for the greater effort For the non-specialist in Muslim history and sociology, only the third section of the present volume is intrinsically interesting

The self-confessed incompleteness of this volume makes it difficult to comment on the general approach of the author toward the Muslim community in India today but it is interesting how little he either feels free to or else is sensitive toward the problems

arising from the peculiar position of those Muslims who have not chosen to flee to Pakistan. While he speaks of the recent internal organizational changes in Indian Islam, he makes little mention of the effects of pre-partition "Pakistan" agitations among the Muslims and gives only skimpy attention to the frequently difficult position of the Muslim in post-partition India.

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Hindu Culture, Economic Development, and Economic Planning in India. By K. WILLIAM KAPP. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963. Pp. viii+228. $8.75.

This volume consists of a collection of ten papers, nine of which were written during 1959–62 and the tenth one a revision of a 1950 paper. The first three of these ten essays were written in collaboration with the author's wife and another in collaboration with an Indian colleague. The work is divided into three parts: Hindu Culture and Economic Development; Development Projects: Problems of Evaluation; and Economic Planning: Problems and Criteria.

The central theme of the book is that "institutional arrangements often stand in the way of a more rational use of available resources and they may well offer the main explanation for the slow rate of development of many underdeveloped economies" (p. 3). Coming from an economist, this is refreshing, and a sociologist can hardly disagree. The author rightly points out that this approach is "a significant departure from the position of the mechanical determinist who believes that institutional changes are inevitable side-effects of economic development and who assumes an attitude of *laissez-faire* to institutional reform" (p. 5).

The volume is not a case study in institutional economics. The three parts are somewhat unrelated, and the general theme is not carried systematically through the entire book. For example, chapter v ("River Valley Projects: Their Direct Effects") treats its subject matter almost entirely in the manner of traditional agricultural economics. In spite of this deficiency, the essays are interesting, especially the first four which deal with the relationship between culture and economic change. I will restrict my comments to these essays, which largely carry the major theme of the volume.

After making brief references to the Protestant ethic, "political unification of large masses of people in national states with administrative centers," "progressive equalization of . . . educational opportunity," and "progressive removal of barriers to social mobility" as major factors that contributed to the modernization of Western societies, the author proceeds to analyze the nature of caste, family, and village as basic elements of the Hindu social system and their relationships to India's economic growth. Beyond this, the author has given some attention to the relationships between economic development and the Hindu concept of time, people's level of aspiration, moral aloofness resulting from caste, Hindu joint family, and the Hindu personality.

In general, the various aspects of the Hindu social system are described as ill-suited for the economic development and modernization of India. With "no religious or intellectual reformers on the Indian horizon who may do for India what Luther and Calvin, or Galileo and Newton, did for the modern interpretation of the world in the West" (p. 64), and with India currently unwilling "to pay the price of economic development in terms of abandoning those elements of her pre-technological civilization which stand in the way of the necessary secularization and modernization" (p. 64), the author feels that India faces an almost hopeless task of building her economy.

One has heard these arguments and conclusions before. They are interesting but moot points. The arguments sound so true and yet they smack of a certain amount of glibness and one-sidedness, perhaps unintended. Let me give an illustration: The author argues that the combination of caste rigidity, the doctrine of *Karma*, and the cyclic notion of time of the Hindu acts heavily against individual aspiration and achievement motive, resulting in developmental stagnation. As opposed to this, the author finds the Protestant ethic and the concept of linear time in the Western world as explanatory devices for understanding the economic development of

the Western world. The explanation of the relationship between capitalism and the Protestant ethic as offered by Max Weber and others, though fascinating, demands much more intellectual exercise than the notions of caste, *Karma*, and cyclical time in the Hindu way of life. These Hindu notions, I will argue, could have combined to produce a modern life within a truly humanistic context. Assuming each caste has its *dharma* (duties), which is a very vague notion to say the least, the *Karma* doctrine demands that an individual (*a*) adhere to his caste *dharma* and (*b*) excel in his duties to the point of perfection so that he may rise in the scale of life in his next incarnation. The Hindu cyclical notion of time is not one of moving in circles, but one of giving man repeated chances to equal the Divine (the process of achieving *mukhti*). Thus, man is made the master of his own destiny, with possibilities of being one with the Divine in course of time, on the basis of *his own efforts*. Taken seriously, these elements of the Hindu culture system ought to provide the bulk of India with more than sufficient motive force to aspire and to achieve, unless one subscribes to the view of total human deprivation. Corruption should have no place, and there should be no ceiling for one's aspiration.

I am not arguing for caste, *Karma*, and a cyclical notion of time. But I am saying that explanations of lack of economic growth based on these notions are inadequate. Further, such explanations do not offer any hope for the future, for these notions will continue to exist in India for a very long time to come. Those interested in developmental programming in India (or any other country) should look for evidence from the on-going social process. Ancient lore like the Mahabharata certainly provides insights to certain favorite cultural themes, but the effect of these themes on daily life should not be assumed but investigated. Kapp's discussion of the Hindu social system leans heavily on cultural sources.

There are other points in Kapp's book to which I must take exception. Caste is less rigid than is pictured, and caste walls do fall. The Indian joint family is much less a hazard to economic development than is presented by Kapp. As a matter of fact, the joint family might yet prove to be one of the major institutional devices working for social adjustment of individuals and groups caught in the turmoils of change. Further, Indian village life has by no means stood still. The most disturbing part of Kapp's analysis of the situation is that it sounds fatalistic like the views of a Western cultural determinist. This is unfortunate because the author is genuinely concerned with the problems of India. Had he not equated the contemporary Indian social system with three elements (caste, joint family, and village) of the Hindu society of an older era, he would have come to a different set of conclusions.

The author is insightful when he talks about the problems of public administration, evaluation of projects, and planning criteria Of course, he has not systematically built into these chapters the implications of the social system.

In spite of these deficiencies, the book is worth reading, especially by traditional economists interested in developmental problems in developing nations.

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Paternalism in the Japanese Economy: Anthropological Studies of "Oyabun-Kobun" Patterns. By JOHN W. BENNETT and IWAO ISHINO. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963. Pp. 307. $6.50.

From this book one gets a picture of a pattern of social relationships that has played a very critical role in providing cement for a rapidly developing society while being sufficiently flexible to permit rapid economic development. In contrast to Western countries, which have had much more individualistic modes of social integration, and in contrast to developing countries, which either have less social integration or rely on totalitarian control with a heavy overlay of ideology, this spontaneous pattern which has been so highly developed in Japan cannot help but be intriguing to social scientists.

The authors, along with their former colleague, Herbert Passin, have been responsible for calling the attention of Western scholars to these practices in Japanese society, and the present volume represents the fullest presentation of this theme available in the West. It is based on their original field work in

Japan in 1949–1951, and the book unfolds in a way reflecting the growth of their own analytic framework from that of a specific system of fictive kinship (*oyabun-kobun*) to a more generalized model, dealing with a more diffuse and widespread phenomenon, paternalism.

Paternalism, hierarchical social relationships in which the senior and junior have reciprocal obligations that go far beyond their instrumental relationships, is not unique to Japan, and in their concluding chapter the authors treat paternalism as a generalized pattern of relationships more likely to arise in occupations requiring little skill, where the labor force is relatively uneducated, poor, or mobile, and where the laborers are not so militant that they are inclined to take risks.

The empirical material comes from studies of labor bosses, patron employers (who are less exploitative than labor bosses), the entrepreneur bosses (more middle class, respected, more inclined toward economic rationality), and landowners (who have virtually passed from the scene now because of land reform). The authors are dealing in this work with economic paternalism, a critical kind of paternalism; the political aspects of paternalism in Japan have already received attention from Robert Ward and others.

It is one of the merits of this book that it does not treat paternalism simply as a kindly kinlike social form preserving earlier values, but as a highly dynamic form in which the *kobun* (the child-status person) can be exploited for selfish or rational economic ends by the *oyabun* (the parent-status person) because of the relationship. Some of the recent work by Japanese scholars that shows the attempts by employers to get greater job stability, especially in the skilled labor market, by developing non-instrumental commitments, shows that paternalism is not simply a prolongation of "traditional" patterns in Japan, although obviously there is a value system which supports these patterns in Japan. Nor can paternalism be explained merely as a transitional form linking a kinship society to a more modern society, since many features continue to persist in the most modern organizations.

The first section of the book, which treats the problem of doing research under the American occupation, is of interest in its own right. It raises such intriguing problems in the organization of the occupation that one hopes to see someone in the growing body of Western social scientists studying Japan who will undertake a full-scale study of the American occupation in Japan, a field that with the passage of time can now be undertaken with relative detachment and objectivity and that should be of enormous interest to those concerned with problems in the role of Western aid programs to the underdeveloped countries.

Ezra F. Vogel

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Chiefs and Strangers. By J. C. Buxton. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1963. Pp. ii+167. $4.80.

The Mossi of Upper Volta. By Elliott P. Skinner. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. ix+236. $6.50.

Both of these books are ethnographies of an African people, and both emphasize the study of traditional political institutions. Buxton writes about the Mandari of the Southern Sudan, a group with so little collective structure that the author devotes his first chapter to defining who the Mandari are. Skinner's book is about the Mossi, a highly structured West African kingdom that has had a continuous existence of about 700 years. To describe these societies, both authors make use of the classic anthropological technique, participant observation, bolstered mildly in Skinner's case by the use of some documents.

The backgrounds of the authors are quite different. Buxton did his study for the colonial government, which presumably wanted a clearer picture of the ways of a relatively obscure people. He argues that, although it may now be unrealistic "to present indigenous institutions as they were," it is justified in this case because the "inaccessibility" of the Mandari made colonial reorganization slower. In this tradition of timelessness, he makes little more than a bow toward reconstructing precolonial history and discusses the impact of the colonial regime only in a peripheral manner.

Skinner, on the other hand, tells us that his curiosity about Africa was "born of my

parents' concern over Ethiopia's struggle to remain free and nurtured by the writings of Mr. Marcus A. Garvey, Dr. H. E. B. Dubois and Professors Melville J. Herskovits and E. Franklin Frazier." Skinner thus points to commitments somewhat different than those of Buxton. They show up to some extent in the material he covers. History, both pre-colonial and colonial, receives ample treatment. Indeed, this is probably the most complete treatment of Mossi history available. Yet, nonetheless, the history is segregated in separate chapters; while other chapters remain standard ethnographic decription.

Skinner's book is more solid and inspires more confidence than that of Buxton. But both lead me to reopen the question of whether research that covers so many diverse topics in order to describe the state of things as they are (or were) is the most fruitful use of the anthropologist's time. I cannot help but feel that such books are both dull and of use primarily to a historian of the area. After all, intrinsically, I am no more interested in the coronation ceremonies of the Mossi than of the Swedish. I would never dream of reading a book about Sweden that would tell me all about Sweden. No doubt there is some demand for such books. But would not the world of social science benefit more if ethnologists, like the rest of us, studied focused problems and constructed their books around the explanation of phenomena? They will say they are saving the scholarly raw material for future analysis by describing vanishing cultures. But a description presumes a theoretical framework. The future analyst will in many cases find the previous descriptions unusable for his purposes.

Let me make myself plain These are good books of their genre. Indeed. Skinner's is one of the best I have seen. It is to the genre, however, that I take exception.

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ERRATUM

The *Journal* regrets an error in the article, "Women's Sexual Responsiveness and the Duration and Quality of Their Marriages," by Alexander L. Clark and Paul Wallin (*AJS*, LXXI [September, 1965], 187–96). In Table 2, the *N* for unresponsive wives whose marriages were positive in both the early and the middle years of marriage should be 21 rather than 52.

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Global Sociology: The World as a Singular System[1]

Wilbert E. Moore

ABSTRACT

Over the years, sociology has exhibited a partly dialectical and partly alternating emphasis on the global and on the particular. Many early theorists emphasized the unity of mankind, or attempted to order civilizations according to various theories of history. Subsequently, there was a retreat to description and data collection, particularly in the United States; the rediscovery of other times and other places, but in a predominantly relativistic context; and the use of "systems" concepts to exaggerate the sovereignty of society. The renewed quest for generality appears to be partly an autonomous development within the scholarly discipline, as exemplified by "comparative analysis" and emphasis on common functional requisites. A seemingly more powerful influence has been the course of contemporary history, which is divisive in important and conspicuous ways, but has elements of unity, such as the universal quest for economic growth and political participation. Though the degree to which common structural features will emerge from somewhat common goals and the use of pooled techniques is an empirical question of great theoretical import, the methodological moral is drawn that our systems must at times cut across national frontiers and, indeed, here and there, become global.

The primary question raised here is whether we may now speak of civilization and its changes in the singular, and if so, in what respects. In the course of these comments, little attention will be given to civilization, somewhat more to sociology as a discipline that now and then, here and there, has interested itself in civilization. I shall even, toward the end, discuss briefly some small intersection between the course of events in the contemporary world and their reflection or interpretation by some segments of the sociological fraternity. A full-fledged *wissensoziologische* interpretation will not be attempted, however, partly because of some diffidence about my competence, partly because I have yet to encounter a predictive proposition yielded by such scholarly exercises.

We shall traverse some familiar terrain, with a sort of tourist's guidebook to the living remnants and fossil remains of bits of the intellectual history of our discipline, noting the partly dialectical and partly alternating emphasis on the global and the particular, the broad-brushed portrayal of mankind and its evolution, on the one hand, or the precise miniature cautiously constructed with a camel's-hair brush, on the other.

THE GLOBAL AND THE PARTICULAR

By global sociology I shall mean sociology of the globe, of mankind. But there is another sense of the term that is worth passing comment. The discipline of sociology, though not firmly established in a variety of exotic places visited chiefly, and

[1] Adapted from a paper presented at the convention of the American Sociological Association, August, 1965.

temporarily, by anthropologists, has itself become remarkably international. Sociology reached America chiefly from the European continent, being of slight academic consequence in England until relatively recently. But now British universities and those of the older British commonwealths are rapidly expanding their academic positions. A few older Indian sociologists are now being joined by large numbers of younger ones. A few older Latin-American sociologists, largely in the cultivated traditions of the *pensadores*, the thinkers, are now being overwhelmed by large numbers of younger sociologists, oriented to the strongly empirical strains in contemporary North American and European sociology—these are, if you will, the *investigadores*. The Near East, postwar Japan, and post-colonial Africa support at least a few sociologists. The discipline has even penetrated the Iron Curtain, though mainly in those fields that seem most immediately practical, rather than in conceptions of grand theory that might too frontally clash with current Marxist orthodoxy.

We may properly ask of this rapidly spreading sociological enterprise, is it adding to the common knowledge or only enriching the store of specialized knowledge? Does the discipline share only method plus a kind of framework for analysis, so that the questions are similar but the answers different? Or do the answers resemble one another enough so that we gain a kind of collateral replication of cause and effect, or at least a confirmation of functional correspondences? The answer is "both," but in the nature of the case the rather small, specialized study of unknown transferability and thus of unknown broader import is more frequent among the sociological novices where they are pioneers, as compared with the careful testing of allegedly established principles in somewhat novel settings.

There is, however, some basis for hope, not that sociologists will themselves help unify the world, for they can scarcely unify themselves, but rather that the common features of human existence will be increasingly documented and otherwise verified along with the undoubted variability that makes the human experience so challenging to those of us who seek to understand it, order it, and predict it. Part of the present thesis is that the quest for common features will be aided not alone by the growing ubiquity of sociology, but more importantly by the growing ubiquity of similar problems and similar solutions in the world of events.

THE GRAND TRADITION

A brief and selective reading of our intellectual history is now in point. At least some of the precursors of our discipline, the philosophers and the philosophers of history who wrote about the nature of man and society, had a kind of grand view of the unity of mankind. It is true that the unity seen by Polybius or Ibn Khaldun was one of common historic experience, not a richly factual appraisal of mankind at the time. Indeed, well into the nineteenth century it was the Judaeo-Christian, Graeco-Roman world and its historic heirs that enlisted the attention of at least those grand-scale theorists with which we have some small familiarity. (Incidentally, that familiarity owes much to Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*,[2] which provided American sociologists with a window on European historical and sociological traditions that they sadly lacked at the time. But that is getting ahead of the story.) Several of the leading founders of sociology shared this global view of mankind. This was notably true of Comte, with what we should now call a "stage theory" of social evolution. Later, Spencer and Durkheim were also generalists, though by that time the awareness of societies or cultures not a part of the classical historic sequence had grown apace, so that their view of mankind could reach to Oriental civilization and tribal societies. Soci-

[2] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1928).

ology was indeed the "science of society," as it was called by Sumner and Keller,[3] and though diversity kept getting recorded, the singular society, the common features of the human condition, continued to be given central emphasis.

PAROCHIALISM RAMPANT ON A FIELD OF DATA

This grand tradition fell upon evil days. Emphasis on precision of conceptualization and of observation began to grow, particularly after the turn of the century, and, here and there, use of quantitative data appeared—though of course one can find precedents for all of these. A most important circumstance, in my view, was the Americanization of sociology. The burgeoning, state-supported higher-educational system began to introduce instruction in sociology, mainly following the lead of a rather new private university, Chicago, rather than an old one, Yale, which gradually withdrew from contact with the rest of the discipline. And despite the original, strongly Germanic orientation of Chicago's sociology as prolifically portrayed by Albion Small,[4] his immediate successors and various independent developments in the large state universities pointed in other directions. The motto became, "Get out there and observe, record, measure, verify." The introduction and rapid expansion of rural sociology gave added weight to local studies.

The Americanization of sociology, though never complete, was enhanced by the virtual rejection of the subject by the British academy and by the extremely modest flexibility of continental universities. An even more severe influence was World War I, which virtually ended the Durkheim school in France and radically reduced Weber's heritage in Germany, while the Bolshevik Revolution ended the small but active development of Russian sociology. To exaggerate only slightly, sociology between the wars became the all-American science, and its focus was increasingly empirical and often minutely local. For several decades in most of the general texts, society was American society, the family was the American family, and so on. Park and Burgess's large text of 1921[5] was widely imitated in organization, but the imitators saw fit to exclude the historical and contemporary European materials of the original, and include, instead, data on Chicago and tables from the *U.S. Statistical Abstract*. By the early 1930's Sorokin's *Social Mobility*[6] and *Contemporary Sociological Theories*[7] and the Sorokin-Zimmerman *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*[8] had been in circulation for several years, and these were far from parochial books. But they had little early impact on the most widely used texts.

THE OPEN MIND: RELATIVISM AND ALL THAT

Among the popular texts, the break in parochialism came in a different form, with attention, not to contemporary Europe or to historic civilizations, but to the ethnographic monographs produced by anthropologists studying tribal societies. Ironically, this meant a rediscovery of anthropology by sociology, a tentative and partial reunion of subject matter that Spencer and Durkheim had considered to be inseparable. With Sutherland and Wood-

[3] William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (3 vols., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1929).

[4] Small was a principal contributor to the early issues of the *American Journal of Sociology* during the 1890's and 1900's.

[5] Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921).

[6] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1927).

[7] Sorokin, *op. cit.*

[8] Pitirim A. Sorokin and Carle C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1929).

ward's *Introductory Sociology*,[9] the beginning student was given a kind of shock treatment. In the great outside world, other people have other beliefs and customs. The emphasis was insistently comparative, but also insistently relativistic: we do it this way, they do it that way. "Ethnocentrism" was introduced from Sumner's vocabulary as the cardinal sin. The compensating moral virtue presumably was tolerance, but the bare sociological message was morally neutral—it was simple diversity in the human experience. Such general theory as sociology had to offer survived in the chapter headings: somehow some of this diversity could be grouped under the rubric of the family and kinship, some more could be inclosed in a chapter on political institutions (which mostly dealt with political structures), and an additional part in a chapter on religion. What justified this sorting of descriptive data into conventional categories was not an explicit intellectual issue until somewhat later, and often is not yet among the writers of introductory texts. Ethnocentrism was perhaps defeated as an intellectual stance, though almost certainly not as an evaluative stance. But anthropocentrism in the special sense of a focus on man somehow got defeated too, though that had not been explicitly identified as an enemy.

SOVEREIGN SYSTEMS

Now matters begin to get complicated, and an even more radical ellipsis will be necessary in order to encompass developments in the last three decades. My specific focus will be on the central issue of the singularity of civilization and therefore neglectful of the vast bulk of continuing sociological investigation which, perhaps wisely, remains unconcerned with that problem.

Two *somewhat* independent developments engage our attention. The one development was Sorokin's reintroduction into sociology of the grand tradition of large-scale concern for human civilization, with a considerable overlay of modern technical sophistication as compared with earlier protagonists. It must be said, negatively with respect to our concerns here, that *Social and Cultural Dynamics*[10] is almost entirely, and explicitly, limited to a reading of the evidence from the Western world, in the classic, historic sense. It must be added, positively, that in that monumental work Sorokin dealt with social and cultural *systems* and *super-systems*, the latter, especially, transcending the mere boundaries of national states or small periods of history.

The other development involved the rediscovery of anthropology, though it may not have grown out of that influence in any precisely determinate way. Certain theorists—Parsons[11] as a persistent leader, Davis[12] and Levy[13] as mature co-conspirators—labored assiduously to make of sociology a generalizing science of man's social conduct. This development, which is still going forward actively, had consequences that were also mixed. One emphasis looked like relativism revisited. Cultures, in the language of anthropologists, or societies, in the tongue of their sociological counterparts, became self-subsistent entities. Autonomy reigned wherever somewhat separable ethnic groups, tribal enclaves, or, implicitly, national states were to be found. Durkheim's sociologism—the explanation of social phenomena in terms of other, presumably simultaneous, social phenomena—became the watchword. With

[9] Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1937).

[10] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York: American Book Co., 1937–40).

[11] See especially Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951).

[12] Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949).

[13] Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952).

Parsons, social action became the universal element for analysis, but social action was caught up in systems.[14] The highest level of such systems, as more or less indicated in Parsons' work and explicitly in Levy's,[15] was a society: either encompassing all social action or being the mediator of that action if it transcended systemic boundaries. The kind of eclectic, almost scandalmongering, picking up of odd practices for contrast with our own at the hands of the earlier relativists came to be exaggerated into a kind of rampant functionalism: everything must be seen in its immediate context. The cautionary qualification, "It all depends," had been taken out of the southern tier of counties in Iowa or the patients in a private mental hospital and spread across Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa, and had lost none of its stultifying effect by overseas transportation. We were really back where we had come in, save for the cash price of a field trip and the personal price of roughing it without water closets and drug stores.

Several further consequences of this particular, rather recent, intellectual tradition, need to be noted, however. One was the restoration of theoretical stature to the chapter headings of texts, by making explicit the common, functional features requisite for any society. Even if it be argued that those common features of society were *ex definitione* by a kind of extended derivation of the defining characteristics, they were at worst useful tautologies, sharing that designation with all other scientific uniformities, once verified, but still subject in principle to being nullified by evidence, if in fact the uniformities are not mere translations or equations. Another consequence, intrinsically dependent on the first but not always explicitly so in the theoretical works, was the formulation of particular propositions of great generality: the circumstances under which magical practices can be expected (Malinowski[16]), the universality of social differentiation for specifiable reasons (Sorokin,[17] Parsons,[18] Levy,[19] Davis and Moore[20]), the congruence between power and responsibility (Levy[21]), the discrepancy between ideal and practical norms (Levy[22] and Moore[23]). A third consequence is especially noteworthy at this point because it can be carried further: the emphasis on *systems* as the proper focus of sociological inquiry. For it is only in social systems that one makes explicit the emergent qualities that derive from the interaction of the human actors in any social context, and thus avoids the kind of classical exemplification of the reductionist fallacy embodied in George Homans' presidential address to the American Sociological Association in 1964.[24] Social systems are real, they are earnest, and they may be both smaller and larger than societies, however defined.

In practice, society has come to be defined "operationally" either as units identified by anthropologists as "cultures," not always with explicit criteria, but duly recorded as separate entities in the Human Relations Area Files, or as coterminous with national states, which, though they

[14] Parsons, *op. cit.*

[15] Levy, *op. cit.*

[16] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948).

[17] Sorokin, *Social Mobility, op. cit.*

[18] Talcott Parsons, "Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *Essays in Sociological Theory: Pure and Applied* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1949), chap vii.

[19] Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-66, 275-78.

[20] Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, X (April, 1945), 242-49.

[21] Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 384-86, 468 503.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 123-25.

[23] Wilbert E. Moore, *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 18-21, 77-81.

[24] George C. Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," *American Sociological Review*, IXXX (December, 1964), 809-18.

may not be truly self-subsistent, do mostly get represented in the United Nations, and do form the principal takers of national censuses and assemblers of other aggregative and distributive social quantities.

Let us pass over for the moment the rapidly disappearing authentic and relatively autonomous primitive or tribal societies, for they move to the center of the stage a little later. Let us examine, rather, the equivalence of the modern national state with the models of those encompassing social systems called "societies" in our theoretical systems. That the fit is not perfect is not in itself disturbing, for it is the nature of theoretical models to be abstract and the function of theory to detect such verifiable elements of order as can be extracted from otherwise chaotic phenomena. But the discrepancies *are* instructive and by no means adequately attended to in our current theoretical writings.

First, the multicommunal state is the statistical norm, not the exception, in the contemporary world. The encompassing of two or more distinct and somewhat noncommunicative and even hostile segments within a national polity is often forgotten by American true believers in the somewhat ineffective melting pot. The Levantine states of Lebanon and Syria somewhat precariously survive deep religious divisions, but so do Belgium and The Netherlands. The former African colonies face nationhood with political boundaries formed with no regard to rather vague ethnic frontiers, but such ethnic and linguistic diversity still survives in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. India has problems of language, religion, and caste, but so in some degree does the United States. The "common value system" of these states may be extremely thin and essentially negative, comprising antipathy to the former metropolitan power and, by extension, other "colonial" or "imperialist" powers. Such negative nationalism figures prominently in new nations. This appears to be no more durable as a basis for consensus than the reliance on personal loyalty to a charismatic leader, which also appears frequently in newly independent or post-revolutionary states. In many communist states the "common values" may be superficial and strongly mixed with overt political power. In some of the seemingly most stable democracies, such as Switzerland, Britain, and the United States, a major part of the underlying consensus may rest on procedures for compromising and containing differences, rather than on substantive agreement.

Second, some of the seemingly strongest national polities have made a positive virtue of pluralism in various forms and degrees. Despite insistence on the political ascendancy of the Communist Party apparatus in the Soviet Union, the "cultural" protection of ethnic minorities has been a somewhat ambiguous and intermittent policy. Tolerance for diversity has been a strong feature of Anglo-American traditions, though also sometimes set aside in periods of extreme and paranoid anxiety. In principle, we tolerate almost every preference except national identity itself.

Third, some of these intrasocietal identifications are transnational in scope. From the possibly inconsequential shaping of national foreign policy in order to placate domestic ethnic groups to rather more consequential concerns with one form or another of "international conspiracy," the ways in which segments of human populations identify and differentiate themselves tend, perhaps increasingly, to criss-cross national frontiers.

The initial, methodological moral to be drawn from these considerations is to emphasize the importance of applying the *system* concept wherever it has some degree of empirical warrant, without assuming that society is both man's highest achievement, tardily discovered by sociologists, and that non-societal systems must necessarily be subsystems of that great piece of social architecture. This kind of elementary caution is given added point

by attention to such empirically real and possibly theoretically significant phenomena as international political and technical organizations; private, non-governmental, international associations such as those found in the learned professions; organizations such as the English-Speaking Union, or ecumenical organizations that seek to make common cause across some part of the spectrum of religious affiliations and beliefs.

GRAND THEMES REVISITED

But is this global sociology? No, it is only a step in that direction, the essential preliminary of freeing the concept of system from automatic limits at the "boundaries" of societies or cultures.

We may "take a giant step" toward global sociology by returning once more to the exotic places, dearly beloved of ethnographers. The main, overwhelming fact about them is that they are losing their pristine character at an extremely rapid rate. Viewed at any particular time, the results may still be odd as judged by our precedents, but let us not get entangled with that now. The main negative point about our procedure for dealing with the modernization of traditional societies is that such simple, two-party transactional models as contained in the older theory of "acculturation" simply will not fit most of the evidence. More positively, what is happening is a great series of nationally directed programs of *deliberate* change (with its vicissitudes and unintended consequences). These programs take some account of local traditions and structures, and political leaders often seek, for understandable reasons of maintaining a national allegiance that is precarious at best, a distinctive nationalistic authenticity. But most of the elements are not autochthonous; they are drawn eclectically from a genuinely global pool of alternatives. Those alternatives include those of political ideology—Chinese Communist; Russian Communist; socialist of allegedly distinctive variety as the most commonly announced program; and, occasionally, mixed economies; or even free enterprise. But the alternatives also include the possibilities of wide choices in technology, in the mix between capital expenditures and consumer goods, in allocations between such options as national defense and public education, and even in the order of introduction of consumer goods available in the world's marketplace.

Viewed in one way, the world's new nations and their resurgent counterparts in such areas as Latin America have substituted a distinctly contemporary diversity for a rather more charming diversity that the ethnographers recorded. Viewed in another way, and that is the present perspective, we witness several elements of commonality that go beyond our hard-won detection of uniform functional features of societies. There is, first, a rather remarkable concurrence in the ideology of economic development, despite differences in technique and, often, despite differences in the more ultimate goals to which this essentially instrument goal is to be directed. There is, second, the fact that this diversity is the product of accidental *and eclectic* combinations from pools of options that are essentially worldwide in scope.

The world, then, is a singular system in these minimal senses and in one other as well: to an increasing degree, the life of the individual anywhere is affected by events and processes everywhere. This is as true within the seemingly initiating great powers as it is within the seemingly dependent small powers and new nations. Of course this is partly owing to the circumstance that the great powers compete for influence over others, but that adds to the singularity of the system, if not to its simplicity.

I am not arguing for the view that we are in the midst of a uniform and rectilinear process leading to world homogeneity or a singular civilization of mankind in that sense. Several years ago,

Feldman and I indicated the kinds of structural similarities that could be expected from the continuing changes of industrial societies and from the addition of newcomers to that circle of somewhat ambiguous charm, and also the reasons for predicting that diversity, including diversity along cultural, societal, or national lines, might be expected to persist.[25] I am arguing for the view that we must rediscover super-systems, some of which are even more encompassing than those to which Sorokin has insistently drawn our attention. Mankind may not survive long enough for us to study it as a complex entity, but that is scarcely an excuse for abandoning one of the oldest themes of our calling.

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

[25] Arnold S. Feldman and Wilbert E. Moore, "Are Industrial Societies Becoming Alike?" in Alvin W. Gouldner and S. M. Miller (eds.), *Applied Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 260–65.

Indices of Civilization[1]

Robert Bierstedt

ABSTRACT

Civilization, often juxtaposed with culture, has been treated in different ways by writers like Alfred Weber, Robert M. MacIver, Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Pitirim A. Sorokin. In some of them it has positive, in others negative, and, in still others, neutral connotations. The word also appears in both the singular and the plural. In the singular a large and unmanageable number of indices have been proposed, and any one of them—from the digging stick to the dry martini—is clearly arbitrary. Although no less arbitrary than others, a useful index might be a literate sophistication in a special meaning of that expression.

A treatment of the subject of civilization might appropriately begin with the recollection that the word itself is of fairly recent origin in both the French and the English languages. Dr. Johnson declined to include it in his dictionary of 1772, even though Boswell urged him to do so. Johnson preferred the word "civility." In French it appeared first, so far as research can disclose, in the year 1757, in a book written by the Marquis de Mirabeau, and later on in an unpublished manuscript by the same author in which he associates it variously with urbanity, comity (*la politesse*), the refinement of manners or customs, something that gives to societies the form and foundation of virtue and is the source of their humanity.[2] This is not, of course, the sense in which the word is used today in sociology and the philosophy of history, but it is related nevertheless to certain indices to which I shall later refer.

The concept of civilization, like the concept of culture, has had a variegated and colorful career in the literature, and both of these words have been defined and refined, compared and contrasted, by many writers. Indeed, although not used interchangeably by the same writer, they operate nevertheless like twins who are seldom found apart. One Frenchman, for example, can say that America has a civilization but no culture, another that America has a culture but no civilization, and both mean exactly the same thing.[3]

Sociologists and anthropologists, however, have generally preferred to maintain a distinction between these two concepts. One of these distinctions was developed by Alfred Weber and Robert M. MacIver and discussed also, incidentally, by Robert K. Merton in one of his early papers.[4] For Weber civilization appears to mean all of the practical and technical arts, including knowledge, that have been devised for the control of nature. Culture, on the other hand, consists of values, principles,

[1] Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 31, 1965.

[2] See E. Benveniste, "Civilisation: Contribution à l'histoire du mot," in *Eventail de l'histoire vivante (hommage à Lucien Febvre)* (Paris, 1953); and Lucien Febvre, *Civilisation, le mot et l'idée* (Paris: Publications du Centre International de Synthèse, 1930). Referred to in John U. Nef, *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 79.

[3] I am indebted for this observation to William R. Dennes, "Conceptions of Civilization: Descriptive and Normative," *Civilization* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 149.

[4] Robert K. Merton, "Civilization and Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXI, No. 2 (November-December, 1936), 103-13.

and ideals, a unique set of which is represented by every historical society. Civilization is thus a means, culture an end; civilization is cumulative, culture is not; civilization is impersonal and objective, culture personal and subjective. The difference is illustrated by an example suggested by Merton, namely, that "A profound study of the techniques of Shakespeare or of Rembrandt will not enable a modern litterateur or painter to duplicate the work of these masters. But any repetition of the operations defined by Newton in his *Principia* will enable the modern scientist to attain the same results, upon which he can build further developments. It is this basic difference between the two fields which accounts for the cumulative nature of civilization and the unique (noncumulative) character of culture."[5] This is not to say, of course, that anyone else could have written the *Principia*. Indeed, a French commentator of the time remarked that Newton was not only the greatest genius who ever lived but also the most fortunate. Why the most fortunate? Because there is only one universe, he said, and it can therefore be given to only one person to discover its laws. One also remembers Alexander Pope's lines:

Nature, and nature's laws, lay hid in night;
God said, "Let Newton be!" and all was light.

To which, incidentally, there is a twentieth-century emendation:

And so it was, until the Devil, crying "Ho,"
Said, "Let Einstein be!" and restored the
status quo.

In MacIver the distinction we have been discussing is perhaps even clearer. Civilization for him pertains to everything that is instrumental, that is, a means to something else; culture, on the other hand, is ultimate, an end in itself. A typewriter, a printing press, a lathe, a factory, a locomotive, a bank, a currency system, are all utilitarian, conceived and devised as means to ends. They belong to the realm of civilization, by which MacIver means "the whole mechanism and organization which man has devised in his endeavor to control the condition of his life."[6] Culture is something else. It is a novel, a picture, a poem, a game, a philosophy, a creed, a cathedral, things we create because we want them for themselves and not for some more ultimate end. Culture is thus "the realm of values, of styles, of emotional attachments, of intellectual adventures,"[7] and it is the antithesis of civilization. There is a close relationship, to be sure—culture affects civilization as civilization influences culture—but the distinction is clear. It is as clear as the relationship between means and ends.

It is fair to say, however, that this distinction in both Weber and MacIver did not survive. The almost universal adoption in the literature of sociology, of culture in the anthropological sense, in the sense originated by E. B. Tylor, made the Weber-MacIver usage obsolete; and indeed no one today continues to insist that civilization is a means and culture an end. Even clear and useful distinctions succumb sometimes to more importunate conceptual needs.[8]

In Spengler we find still other meanings attached to the concept of civilization. In a significant sense, as Spengler says in his big, brooding, and beautiful book, the problem of civilization is the fundamental question of all "higher history." Culture, however, is the unit of philosophical-historical analysis, and thus he treats of eight cultures—the Egyptian, the Indian, the Babylonian, the Chinese, the Arabian, the Classical, the Mexican, and the Western—each of which goes through its inevitable transformation of spring, summer, autumn, and winter, not with the mechanics of

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[6] Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society: A Systematic Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1949), p. 498.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 499.

[8] For Sorokin's criticism of MacIver on this point see *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. IV (New York: American Book Co., 1941), chap. iv.

causality but with the inevitability of destiny. Each of these cultures has its own civilization. "In this work," Spengler says,

> for the first time the two words, hitherto used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical distinction, are used in a *periodic* sense, to express a strict and necessary *organic succession*. The Civilization is the inevitable *destiny* of the Culture, and in this principle we obtain the viewpoint from which the deepest and gravest problems of historical morphology become capable of solution. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again.[9]

Now civilization is an end in the other sense, in the sense not of goal but of termination. Culture is to civilization as life is to death, as springtime is to winter, as the Greek soul is to the Roman intellect, as efflorescence is to desiccation, as folk is to mass, as art is to science, as faith is to scepticism ("Scepticism," says Spengler, "is the expression of a pure Civilization; and it dissipates the world-picture of the Culture that has gone before.")[10] Finally, the existence of money and the rise of the city are the marks of a civilization and of a decaying Culture.

Spengler is so rich in imagery, so profound in historical imagination, and so metaphysical in motive that it is difficult to resist the temptation to quote him at length. No one takes his philosophy of history seriously any more (though perhaps one should), and yet one cannot help but characterize *The Decline of the West* as a work of art. Spengler has created for us, however, a difficulty in that a Culture has for him a career that consists of two parts, a culture part and a civilization part, and thus culture is both an entire historical process and a part of that process. Civilization, however, is the end, the Thanatos, the corpse of every Culture, and it therefore has only negative implications. Civilization is not a goal to be sought by human societies, but is rather their destiny when they cease to be human and creative and become instead mechanical and dead. Let us succumb to temptation and quote Spengler once more as he says:

> At last, in the gray dawn of Civilization, the fire in the Soul dies down. The dwindling powers rise to one more, half-successful, effort of creation, and produce the Classicism that is common to all dying Cultures. The soul thinks once again, and in Romanticism looks back piteously to its childhood; and then finally, weary, reluctant, cold, it loses its desire to be, and, as in Imperial Rome, wishes itself out of the overlong daylight and back in the darkness of protomysticism, in the womb of the mother, in the grave. The spell of a "second religiousness" comes upon it, and Late-Classical man turns to the practice of the cults of Mithras, of Isis, of the Sun—those very cults into which a soul just born in the East has been pouring a new wine of dreams and fears and loneliness.[11]

And so we see for Weber, MacIver, and Spengler, civilization has negative connotations, although they are negative, of course, in different ways. It is the utilitarianism in Weber and MacIver, as contrasted with more ultimate values, and the disintegration and decay in Spengler, as against the springtime of culture. This is a curious development, when one thinks of it, because civilization in the eighteenth century was a positive accomplishment, something that only a few societies had managed to attain.

In Toynbee a civilization is synonymous with a society, by which he means not a nation-state and not mankind as a whole, but a certain "grouping of human-

[9] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1926), I, 31.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

ity" in between. Five of these civilizations now exist—Western Christendom, an Orthodox Christian society in Southeastern Europe and Russia, an Islamic society, a Hindu society, and a Far-Eastern society. By tracing these backward in time and discovering others to which they are affiliated, Toynbee ends with a list of nineteen civilizations or, if the Orthodox Christian is divided into an Orthodox-Byzantine and an Orthodox-Russian, and the Far Eastern into Chinese and a Korean-Japanese society, twenty-one. The fact that he may have nineteen or twenty-one civilizations, depending upon the division just mentioned, presents a problem of definition, of articulation, and of boundary both in time and in space; and this is one of the arguments directed against Toynbee's procedure by his critics and most notably by Sorokin.

Before looking into Sorokin's criticism, let us attend to Toynbee's defense of his procedure. In seeking his unit of investigation, what he calls "an intelligible field of study," he has chosen Civilizations. Civilizations, however, are only one species of the genus society; there is one other, and that is primitive societies. The difference between the two species of the same genus is that twenty-one of these societies, one species, are "in process of civilization," and that all of the others, the other species, are not. Toynbee notices other differences between the two species. There is only a small number in the first—twenty-one to be exact—whereas there must be at least 650 contemporary representatives of the second and no one knows how many since man first become "human" some 300,000 years ago. "The numerical preponderance of primitive societies over civilizations is [thus] overwhelming."[12] Second, civilizations are much more imposing in their individual dimensions than primitive societies, which are relatively short-lived, restricted in geographical area, and possess only very small populations. These differences are apparent, and we can readily grant the point to Toynbee. But differences are not criteria of differentiation, and we do not yet have an index of civilization. Surely size, duration, and numbers of people do not suffice to characterize a civilization or to give an indication of what the process of civilization is.

Toynbee approaches the problem directly in discussing his unaffiliated societies, six of the twenty-one that emerged not from another civilization but from primitive life. These, incidentally, are the Egyptiac, the Sumeric, the Minoan, the Sinic, the Mayan, and the Andean. Toynbee first considers two indices of civilization that he immediately dismisses: (1) the presence of institutions and (2) the division of labor. That institutions are universal in human societies and the division of labor nearly so are propositions that would surely be acceptable to sociologists —indeed we would insist upon them. It is true that in some societies one can detect no division of labor except that which obtains between the two sexes and between age groups. These cases are so few in number, at least among contemporary societies, that the proposition can stand without challenge. The division of labor, in short, is not a useful criterion of civilization because it throws almost all societies into the civilized category and increases Toynbee's count of civilizations to very much more than twenty-one.

Toynbee does have an answer, however, as follows, even though he is not entirely satisfied with it:

> An essential difference between civilizations and primitive societies *as we know them* (the *caveat* will be found to be important) is the direction taken by mimesis or imitation. Mimesis is a generic feature of all social life. Its operation can be observed both in primitive societies and in civilizations, in every social activity from the imitation of the style of film-stars by their humbler sisters upwards. It operates, however, in different di-

[12] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridgement of Vols. I–VI by D. C. Somervell (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 35.

rections in the two species of society. In primitive societies, as we know them, mimesis is directed towards the older generation and towards dead ancestors who stand, unseen but not unfelt, at the back of the living elders, reinforcing their prestige. In a society where mimesis is thus directed backwards toward the past, custom rules and society remains static. On the other hand, in societies in process of civilization, mimesis is directed towards creative personalities who command a following because they are pioneers. In such societies, "the cake of custom," as Walter Bagehot called it in his *Physics and Politics*, is broken and society is in dynamic motion along a course of change and growth.[13]

As I have suggested, Toynbee is not entirely satisfied with this. He regards the difference as important, but as one that is neither permanent nor fundamental. That is, who knows whether or not a society, now "primitive" and static, did not have an earlier stage in which it was moving more dynamically than any civilization now known to us has ever moved? Furthermore, an earlier mutation, the "mutation of sub-man into man, which was accomplished, in circumstances of which we have no record, under the aegis of primitive societies, was a more profound change, a greater step in growth, than any progress which man has yet achieved under the aegis of civilization."[14] Nor does Toynbee offer any explanation for the fact that mimesis operates in one direction in some societies and in the reverse direction in others.

Toynbee is thus compelled to fall back upon his famous analogy of people lying on a ledge on the mountainside, with a precipice below and one above, some of them torpid and motionless, others striving to climb to the top. Some societies therefore can be compared with paralytics and others with athletes, the first remaining in the primitive category and the second rising to the civilized. The principal difficulty with this analogy, as Toynbee himself recognizes, is that the paralytics may one day shake off their torpor and begin to climb, whereas the athletes may stumble and fall off the precipice into the void below. The difference, therefore, is not an absolute one, nor is it permanent. It gives us an insight, and that is all, between two kinds of societies, one static and the other dynamic. A society in its active phase—if it has one—is a civilization. It imitates its innovators rather than its ancestors. And thus the "integration of custom" is transformed into "the differentiation of civilization."

Our task with Sorokin is a different one for the simple reason that he does not use the concept of civilization in the construction of his vast and commanding theory of social and cultural dynamics. Indeed, one detects in his writing a hostility to the term, and there is in fact an explicit criticism of the manner in which Spengler and Toynbee have employed it. It will be recalled that in Sorokin there are various kinds of unities, some logically and meaningfully integrated, others causally integrated. For these he uses the term "systems" or, sometimes, "cultural systems." These systems are of three different kinds: the ideational, the sensate, and the (transitional) idealistic; and it is these that change from one pole to the other, in irregular fluctuation, over the course of history. Some collections of culture traits, on the other hand, do not exhibit the kind of unity that would enable them to change together, and these he calls "congeries." Sorokin's difficulty with the concept of civilization, in both Spengler and Toynbee, is that both of these writers fail to take into consideration the basic difference between a system and a mere congeries. They have compounded the confusion by failing to distinguish between an organized group and a cultural system—what they call a civilization is sometimes the one phenomenon and sometimes the other. Furthermore, most of their "civilizations" are really language groups, or state groups, or partly territorial and partly religious

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 49. (Italics in original.)

[14] *Ibid.*

groups. Most of them are neither meaningful nor meaningful-causal nor even causal unities. It follows from these observations that the civilizations of Spengler and Toynbee cannot go through the stages from childhood to death or from springtime to winter that their authors have outlined for them. These, in essence, are Sorokin's criticisms.[15]

A hundred years ago no one would have had much difficulty with the meaning of civilization. Even earlier, Buckle could quote with approval Voltaire's remark, "I want to know what were the steps by which man passed from barbarism to civilization." "Barbarism" and "civilization" were contrary terms, and everyone knew the difference between them. Barbarians were people, first, who were not Greeks and who, in later periods of Western history, were unaffected by Greek achievements. Barbarians were people who wore no clothes, who procreated without benefit of clergy, who indeed had no clergy, who practiced un-Christian rituals, who pillaged their neighbors and sometimes ate them. The following passage from an old book on tropical Africa is typical:

> Hidden away in these endless forests, like birds' nests in a wood, in terror of one another and of their common foe, the slaver, are small native villages; and here in his virgin simplicity dwells Primeval Man, without clothes, without civilization, without learning, without religion—the genuine child of nature, thoughtless, careless and contented.[16]

The Victorians, of course, disapproved of people like these. Charles Kingsley, for example, wrote a story called "The History of the Great and Famous Nation of the Doasyoulikes," who preferred leisure to work and who paid the penalty for their preference by degenerating into gorillas. In recounting this story, Toynbee compares Homer's attitude toward his Lotus-Eaters, who are enormously attractive, and says, "Kingsley, on the other hand, displays the modern British attitude in regarding his Doasyoulikes with such contemptuous disapproval that he is immune from their attractions; he feels it a positive duty to annex them to the British Empire, not for our good, of course, but for theirs, and to provide them with trousers and Bibles."[17]

Trousers and Bibles—these surely are unmistakable indices of civilization! They are only two, however, of a very long list that could be put together; and each index would reflect, in part at least, the culture in which it was proposed. Among these indices one would find an extraordinary variety, including language, literacy, law, soap, paper, the wheel, money, government, religion, science, agriculture, the city, commerce, print, the domestication of animals, the breeding of cattle, the use of milk, the digging stick, the use of the fork, plumbing, dental caries, and even the dry martini. Another list would contain such moral virtues as kindness, charity, compassion, order, discipline, toleration, and the emancipation of women. Stendhal identified civilization with the invention of love: "On ne trouve qu'un amour physique et des plus grossiers chez les peuples sauvages ou trop barbares."[18] Still another list would accent, in reverse, the absence of such vices as war, cruelty, violence, dogmatism, fanaticism, ignorance, and superstition. The sociologist Edward Cary Hayes remarked in one of his books that "Three meals a day are a highly advanced institution. Savages gorge themselves or fast."[19] A contemporary historian also prefers to date the dawn of civilization from the time when men first learned to make

[15] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), esp. chap. xii, pp. 205–43. See also *Society, Culture and Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 638–44.

[16] H. Drummond, *Tropical Africa*, pp. 55–56 (quoted in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 87).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *De l'Amour* (1822), chap. xxvi.

[19] *Introduction to the Study of Sociology* (New York, 1918), p. 494.

provision for the future, when they learned to remedy a situation that had hitherto been either feast or famine.

The difficulty with using this as an index of civilization, however, is that it too is arbitrary and involves an ethical judgment. As the historian says, "There is a mute wisdom in this improvidence," in not taking thought for the future:

> The moment man begins to take thought of the morrow he passes out of the Garden of Eden into the vale of anxiety; the pale cast of worry settles down upon him, greed is sharpened, property begins, and the good cheer of the "thoughtless" native disappears. . . . "Of what are you thinking?" Peary asked one of his Eskimo guides. "I do not have to think," was the answer; "I have plenty of meat." Not to think unless we have to—there is much to be said for this as the summation of wisdom.[20]

This historian nevertheless calls "primitive" those societies that make little or no provision for unproductive days and "civilized, in contrast, those whose members are literate providers.

We now, however, have enough amorphous suggestions. Let us stand back and confront directly the problem that we face. First of all, we have found no consistency at all in the use of the term "civilization" and no consensus on the phenomenon it is supposed to symbolize. In some writers it has positive and in others negative connotations. Second, we have found civilization and culture sharply distinguished and then used in contrary senses by different writers. Third, we have found our word in both the singular and in the plural, without knowing whether the former is the class name for a group of the latter or a concept with a connotation of its own. Fourth, assuming that one can give it a significance in the plural, we have found it a strenuous if not impossible task to delineate the boundaries between one civilization and another—and this is also one of Sorokin's principal criticisms of Spengler and Toynbee. Fifth, assuming that one can give it a significance in the singular, we have found an unmanageable variety of indices by which it is marked off from something else, usually called primitivism or barbarism. Sixth, as the word is used in the singular it often appears as a normative or evaluative concept and seldom as a categorical or purely descriptive one. Seventh, in talking about civilization, it is exceedingly easy to slip into the subjective mood and to think of it in terms of the things we ourselves happen to appreciate and enjoy. And eighth, civilization is tightly bound to sociocultural conditions, and its meaning is a function, therefore, of the culture, age, period, or society in which definitions of it are proposed.

Is there any solution to these problems? One way out is to contend that civilization does not exist, that no society in human history, including our own, can fully qualify. Certainly, if we use as indices literacy and the law—two very useful indices—then a serious question arises. We think *we* satisfy both of these criteria but, unfortunately, although our claim to literacy has a modicum of cogency, we, members of an American society—as recent events unhappily demonstrate—do not subscribe to a rule of law if it conflicts with what we conceive to be our own interests. There is no political order in the world at large, no law to which men of all nations subscribe, no legislature for the human race. In this respect we have not overcome the tribal loyalty with which we should be inclined to associate not civilization but rather its absence. In the long chapters of Western history we have made some gains in overcoming religious and racial prejudice. But national prejudice remains, the notion that in some way or other our country is superior to others, that our country's interests come first, and that patriotism is a form of virtue. Only when we become fully civilized will we realize that patriotism is a form of

[20] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization*, Part I: *Our Oriental Heritage* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1954), p. 6.

prejudice and indeed the most dangerous form of prejudice that still afflicts our human society.

One may reasonably object, of course, that these observations belong to the realm of the normative, that loyalty to the human race rather than to a nation-state is a moral preference and not an objective index. We ought perhaps to turn in another direction in search of a solution.

I should like finally to propose, therefore, a simple and yet I think objective criterion that can serve as an index of civilization. It has to do with sophistication in a *sophisticated* sense of that word. It concerns the self-reflection and self-criticism and other-awareness in which it can be said that the members of a civilized society indulge. Thus, a primitive society in these terms has art but no aesthetics, because aesthetics is a sophisticated reflection on the meaning and nature of art. Similarly, it has religion but no theology, because again theology is a sophisticated reflection and rational analysis of the meaning and nature of religion, as contrasted with the practice of religious rituals or the belief in deities. The difference is clear, and it can be extended. In sum, an uncivilized society has art but no aesthetics, religion but no theology, techniques but no science, tools but no technology, legends but no literature, a language but no alphabet (or ideographs), customs but no laws, a history but no historiography, knowledge but no epistemology, and finally a *Weltanschauung* but no philosophy. Literacy is the necessary condition and sophistication the sufficient condition, and thus a literate sophistication becomes a prime index of civilization and one that has some claim to objectivity.

There is one vital part of this index, which I offer in conclusion, and that is the existence of sociology. It is not enough to live in a society or to be a member of a group, because all men satisfy these criteria. The civilized man reflects in addition upon the meaning of society, on its structure and changes, and on the nature of human association. It is sociology that enables him to transcend the provincialisms of time and place and circumstance and to recognize that in spite of cultural differences and disparities, all human societies are in essence the same. They all have the same structure and they all pursue, in different ways, their identical destinies. We thus have, in sociology itself, an index of civilization to which I would invite your earnest attention.

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Comments on Moore's and Bierstedt's Papers

Pitirim A. Sorokin

Both of these papers contribute notably to our knowledge of the still little-known macrosociological realities or vast unified systems called by Toynbee "civilizations"; by Spengler "high cultures" (*Hochkulturen*); by Kroeber "high-value culture patterns"; by Danilevsky "main culture-historical types"; by Northrop and Berdyaev "world or great cultures"; by Schubart "prototypes of culture"; by Gurvitch "the global or world social systems"; by Parsons, Levy, and Martindale "self-sufficing society or community."

Moore's "tourist guide" on recent orientations of sociology concerning civilizations and his hypothesis about "the world as a singular system" are done with his usual ability to cover in a few pages enormous regions of sociocultural universe. In my forthcoming volume, *Sociological Theories of Today*, I deal much more substantially with these problems. On the basis of this study, I find no particular fault with Moore's sketch of both these problems. If I rightly understand his theory about "the human world as a singular system," I wholeheartedly agree with him that at the present time the whole of mankind has largely become a single one-causal and causal-meaningful-social system, and that only this system can be regarded as the kind of "self-sufficing society" of which Parsons, Levy, Martindale, and others are now talking.

Besides a critical analysis of some recent theories of macrosociological realities, Bierstedt offers to us his original and sophisticated criterion of "civilizations" that differentiates them from the non-civilized groups and cultures. This criterion consists in "sophistication in a *sophisticated* connotation of this word." This criterion certainly deserves our attention, though Spengler and other scholars of civilization, including myself, would likely say that it fits better the decaying phase of the *Hochkulturen* (their phase of "civilization" in Spengler's terms) than the great cultures in their creative growth.[1]

To these remarks I would like to add one criticism directed not so much to the papers as to today's sociology. The shortcoming of the papers consists in that they deal with the peripheral rather than the basic problems of macrosociology. My criticism of today's sociology consists in its neglect and insufficient study of macrosociological realities—the vast cultural and social systems and supersystems as they have become manifest in empirical, historical processes.

Sociology of recent decades has intensively studied various "small groups" and simple cultural complexes. It has paid much less attention to the vast cultural and social systems. With a possible exception of my *Dynamics*,[2] practically all the recent significant works about these vast systems and supersystems have been produced by the non-sociologists ex officio: by historians and social philosophers like Spengler and Toynbee, by eminent anthropologists like Kroeber, by social philosophers like J. Ortega y Gasset, Northrop, Berdyaev, and a few other thinkers. Sociologists ex officio have produced hardly any work in this field that can rival in its cog-

[1] See, on these theories, P. Sorokin, *Modern Historical and Social Philosophies* (New York: Dover Publications, 1963).

[2] P. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4 vols.; Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1962).

nitive significance these masterpieces of investigation of the vast and most important sociocultural realities that tangibly determine millions of small social and cultural systems, the soul, body, and behavior of all human beings, and the historical destiny of humankind. Despite their errors, these works have given us a deeper and more adequate understanding of many mysteries of the sociocultural world than most of the studies of small groups and little cultural complexes or than the abstract "analytical" schemes and "models" which are ascetically detached from empirical reality and depict social and cultural systems as so many empty balloons decorated by different physicalistic mottoes like "equilibrium," "homeostasis," "laws of inertia," "equality of action and reaction," "feed-backs" and so on. These schemes and models are in fact much worse than the analogies of the bio-organismic school of the nineteenth century.[8]

Sociology of today in this respect reminds one of the visitor at a zoölogical garden in Krylov's fable who reports enthusiastically to his friend on the wonders he has seen: marvelous insects, gnats, butterflies, bugs, mosquitoes, and similar creatures. But when his friend asks him what he thought of the elephants, the visitor confesses with embarrassment that he had not noticed any elephant.

It is all right to study the little sociocultural creatures, but such a research does not justify neglecting a study of sociocultural elephants.

If sociology does not want to degenerate into a sort of finicky preoccupation with routine sociological crossword puzzles, it has to venture to study the vast sociocultural realities with all their what, how, and why. Methodologically, opposing the prevalent belief that anything should be studied in its smallest, simplest, and most elementary form, there is the Aristotelian rule that the properties of an oak can be more fully investigated in a fully developed oak tree than in a mere acorn.

To sum up: whether sociology wants it or not, if it aspires to grow as a science, it has to enter an intensive study of vast, empirical, sociocultural "continents" called "civilizations," vast cultural and social systems and supersystems. Their intensive investigation is already on today's agenda of history, and sociology is equipped as well as any other science for such a study.

These brief and all too superficial remarks call attention to the importance of macrosociological problems. The papers by Moore and Bierstedt make a tangible contribution to our knowledge of these great problems.

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[8] See a criticism of these in P. Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956 and 1965); and in the forthcoming volume, *Sociological Theories of Today* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class[1]

Maurice Zeitlin

ABSTRACT

Cuba has been characterized by abrupt political and social transitions, and Cubans have interpreted their history to a significant extent in generational terms. This study is based on interviews with 202 Cuban industrial workers. Hypotheses were formulated in accordance with the concept of political generation. Each political generation, both in the aggregate and in structural (employment-status) subgroups, had prerevolutionary attitudes toward the Communists and has responded to the Castro revolution as predicted from knowledge of the historical experiences hypothesized to have been of decisive political relevance in the formation of that generation.

The concept of political generation focuses on the intersection of biography, history, and social structure. It thus compels us to pay attention to variables of explanatory value that we might otherwise overlook. However, despite the wide interpretive use to which some variant of the concept of generation has been put (whether, for example, in creative literature, literary criticism, or qualitative political analysis), its use has been infrequent in the sociological analysis of politics, and especially so in the analysis of data gathered through survey research methods.[2] The most significant lack in this area is of studies of the formation of political generations elsewhere than in the advanced industrial societies of the West.[3]

This paper is about the formation of political generations in the Cuban working class and the relevance of these generations for the recent social revolution. Its thesis is that (*a*) different political generations were formed among the Cuban workers as a result of the impact on them of distinct historical experiences and that (*b*) the differential response of the generations to the revolution is understandable in terms of these experiences.

My approach to the specific problem of generations in Cuba is based essentially on Karl Mannheim's general formulation of the problem. He suggested that common experiences during their youth might create a common world view or frame of reference from which individuals of the same age group would tend to view their subsequent political experiences. Sharing the same year of birth, they "are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process."

[1] A brief portion of this article appeared in "Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers," a paper delivered at the meetings of the American Sociological Association, August, 1963. I am indebted to the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, for a grant that made my research for this study possible and to its director, Klaus Knorr, for his encouragement. I should also like to acknowledge the theoretical stimulation provided by Norman Ryder's unpublished paper, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," delivered at the meetings of the American Sociological Association, August, 1959, and the helpful suggestions of my colleagues, Michael T. Aiken, Jerald Hague, and Gerald Marwell.

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset, for instance, recently noted again that, "unfortunately, there has been no attempt to study systematically the effect of generation experiences with modern survey research techniques" (*Political Man* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960], p. 265). The statement also appeared much earlier in Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Allen Barton, and Juan Linz, "The Psychology of Voting," in G. Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), II, 1124–70.

[3] See, however, S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), and Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

Much like the effect of class on its members, the generation also limits its members "to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and *a characteristic type of historically relevant action*." (Italics mine.)[4]

From the standpoint of our analysis, it is particularly significant that the Cubans themselves see their history to a great extent in generational terms, a fact that is not at all surprising given the dramatic and profoundly traumatic nature of the events that formed several Cuban generations. Cuban literature—political, historical, fictional—is replete with references to the "generation of '68" or the "generation of '95" or the "generation of the thirties," generations formed during singularly significant historical epochs in Cuba: respectively, the Ten Years' War against Spain (1868–78), the War of Independence (1895–98), and the abortive revolution of the thirties (1933–35). It is especially significant that the movement led by Fidel Castro, in common with other revolutionary nationalist and anticolonial movements, placed special emphasis on its being a new generation, shorn of the cynicism and the betrayal of revolutionary ideals typical of its elders. The movement's cadre consisted predominantly of young people in their late teens and early twenties and, to this extent, shared with other revolutionary youth movements an identification of the general social movement with their particular generation.[5]

The very first lines of the manifesto of the 26th of July movement, which stated its general aims in the anti-Batista struggle, were: "The 26th of July Movement is resolved to take up the unfulfilled ideals of the Cuban nation and to realize them, . . . [counting] on the contribution and the presence of the reserves of *youth* who are anxious for new horizons in the chronic frustration of the Republic. *That is its credential and its distinctive feature.*" (Italics mine.) The manifesto condemned "the colonial mentality, foreign economic domination, [and] political corruption" of the republic, and the regime of exploitation and oppression installed by Batista, and implicitly repudiated the older generation, saying that only the youth of the country had resisted this "storm of horror and shame" without bowing. The movement traced its roots directly to the revolutionary students and workers of the "generation of the thirties," who also had fought against "the intact chains of the past" and who, "in the 'hundred days' that the revolutionary forces held power . . . did more in the defense of the interests of the nation and of the people than all the governments of the preceding thirty years."[6]

On the one hand, the young rebels of the 26th of July movement identified with the generation of the thirties, its accomplishments and aspirations; on the other, they condemned that generation for its failure to fulfil the ideals of its youth and for its capitulation to reaction—a capitulation that led, they believed, to the need for the revolutionary movement of their own generation.

Not only did this generational animus characterize a good deal of the rebel movement before the conquest of power but apparently it also has continued as one significant source of self-identification since the revolution. In one of his first public speeches (on January 8, 1959) after the fall of Batista's regime, Castro again identified the youth of his generation as one of the decisive social bases of the revolution:

"When the 26th of July Movement organized itself and initiated the war, it

[4] "The Problem of Generations," in Mannheim's *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Paul Keckskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 286.

[5] See Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

[6] "Manifiesto-programa del Movimiento 26 de Julio," Appendix to Enrique González Pedrero, *La revolución cubana* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1959), pp. 89–91, 97–99, 103–5, and 125.

. . . was evident that the . . . Movement had the sympathy of the people, and . . . that it had *the nearly unanimous support of the youth of Cuba.*"[7] (Italics mine.)

The generation of '53, the generation of Castro and his fellow rebels, is held up as a model of sacrifice and heroism on the nation's behalf. Its special quality has been reiterated in many speeches by Castro. "Ours is the generation for which no one set a good example . . . but it drew upon itself for the idealism, virtue, and courage necessary to save the country . . . *It is the best generation that the nation has had.* It grew up in the midst of negation and bad examples. But the coming generation will be better than ours. It will be inspired not only by the generations of '68 and '95 but also by *the generation of 1953.*"[8] (Italics mine.)

Thus, as a result of having lived through a history of rather abrupt social and political transitions and clearly demarcated political intervals, Cubans apparently have developed a relatively high level of generational self-consciousness. Stated formally, the major hypothesis of this paper is that *the specific historical period in which succeeding generations of workers first became involved in the labor movement had significant consequences for the formation of their political outlooks.* Shaped by the early experiences of their youth in the labor movement—that movement's conflicts, organization, tactics and strategy, ideology, and leadership—working-class political generations emerged in Cuba with measurably different attitudes toward the Castro revolution.

For our purposes, the concept of political generation will be defined, as Rudolf Heberle has put it, as "those individuals of approximately the same age who have shared, at the same age, certain politically relevant experiences."[9] The concept leaves open to empirical investigation the decision as to (*a*) which age groups to isolate for analysis and (*b*) which experiences to delineate as of decisive political relevance for that age group.[10]

Thus, in our analysis of political generations in the Cuban working class and their contemporary relevance in the context of the revolution, two strategic methodological decisions were necessary: (1) which age category or categories to locate in time and (2) in which historical periods, depending on which experiences were hypothesized to be politically relevant.

1. Normative expectations of political involvement in Cuba were established and perpetuated by the political activities of students, whose agitation and action since the foundation of the republic were often decisively bound up with the politics of the working class—whether, for instance, in the anti-Spanish colonial struggle for independence or in the abortive revolution of the thirties. The late teens and early twenties have been viewed in Cuba as a period in life demanding political commitment and involvement—the period of coming to manhood politically. In two of Cuba's most significant political periods, the political cadre that predominated in the movement consisted of young men and women; the short-lived government of Ramón Grau San Martín during the revolution of the thirties rested to a considerable extent on the support of the youth. Raúl Roa, a student leader at that time, and now foreign minister of Cuba, dubbed that regime "the ephebocracy," or teenage government.[11] And in the guerrilla struggle and urban *resistencia* against Batista, men and women in their late teens and early twenties apparently formed the

[7] *Guía del pensamiento político económico de Fidel* (Havana: Diario Libre, 1959), p. 44.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1951), pp. 119–20.

[10] This concept is essentially identical with the concept of "cohort" used in demographic analysis; see Ryder, *op. cit.*

[11] Teresa Casuso, *Cuba and Castro* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 64. Miss Casuso's work emphasizes especially strongly the generational politics of Cuba (see esp. pp. 77 ff).

majority of the movement's leaders and cadre, whatever their class of origin.[12] On these grounds, I chose the age category of eighteen to twenty-five to locate the generations temporally.

In addition, I chose this age category on more general sociological grounds. First, the meaning of age varies in accordance with social norms governing specific activities and their relationship to age, and it is precisely at the age at which coming to manhood is normatively defined that the individual becomes more responsive to the impact of social change, since he is relatively less subject to parental influence in his new role. That is, it is likely that the individual who has come of age is more "responsive to the impact of social change" than the child who is still "insulated from it by his home environment."[13] It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the experiences of workers in the period after they enter the labor force, assume their own support, and are no longer under parental supervision would be particularly significant to them, especially if this occurs in a period of social upheaval.

Second, it is a central assumption here that the social pressures arising out of the work situation are fundamental in determining the worker's political outlook. The work place is probably the most important source of the worker's political socialization, more so than for non-workers. A recent study found, for example, that French workers were more likely than other Frenchmen to discuss politics at work.[14] Much of the most significant political socialization of workers—insofar as that involves assimilation of the political orientations current in their class—occurs after the inception of their work career. This being so, crucial historical events impinging on the working class are more likely to affect a worker's personal politics if he has been working for a few years than if he has just begun. These are additional reasons why I chose to focus on historical events when workers were in their late teens and early twenties rather than when they were younger.

2. From the standpoint of our analysis of political generations, five critical periods in Cuban political history of the past several decades can be distinguished. Their general social conditions, political issues, and "concrete internal political and social struggles"[15] constitute the decisive politically relevant experiences of succeeding Cuban generations—that is, of those who were eighteen to twenty-five years old when each of these critical periods began. In Table 1 I have briefly indicated the decisive events of each political generation

[12] Exact information is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain about the ages even of top revolutionary leaders, let alone of typical rebel cadre members. Fidel Castro's biographies are not consistent; Spanish sources usually place his birth date at August 13, 1927, English at August 13, 1926. See Gerardo Rodríguez Morejon, *Fidel Castro: Biografía* (Havana: P. Fernández, 1959), and such American sources as Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro: Rebel Liberator or Dictator* (Chicago: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1959), and Robert Taber, *M-26: Biography of a Revolution* (New York: Lyle Stuart, Publisher, 1961). Nonetheless, from talking to individuals who "should know" in a variety of positions in Cuba, including *comandantes*, administrative personnel, and union officials, aside from the workers interviewed in our study who had fought in the hills, a consensus emerged that the typical age of the rebel youth was about 18–25 years old in 1952, when Batista came to power. Relatively reliable ages of some of the more important leaders in 1962, when we did our research in Cuba, were: Fidel Castro, 35; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 34; Raúl Castro, 30; Armando Hart, 31; Osmany Cienfuegos, 32; Augusto Martínez Sánchez, 36. Camilo Cienfuegos, one of Fidel's top *Comandantes* during the guerilla war, who died in a plane crash in 1959, was about 30 when he died; Enrique Oltuski, a leader of the urban *resistencia*, was 31 in 1962; Faustino Pérez, co-ordinator of the abortive 1958 general strike, and head of the urban *resistencia*, 31; Vilma Espín, Raúl's wife and an active leader of the *resistencia*, known romantically as "Deborah" during the war, was 28; Haydee Santamaría, another rebel heroine, 32.

[13] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 131.

[14] Richard Hamilton, *Affluence and the French Worker: The Fourth Republic Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), chap. iv (forthcoming).

[15] Heberle, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–23.

analyzed in this paper and the predicted political consequences of those events. These events deserve fuller descriptions, nonetheless, so that the reader can ponder their significance for himself.

Sugar speculation in the aftermath of World War I ended abruptly with Cuba's economic collapse in the early 1930's (partly as a consequence of the Great Depression in the United States), and a terminals, public utilities, ports, thirty-six sugar centrals, and a number of adjoining towns, in many of which they established "soviets" of workers, peasants, and soldiers. Students, young intellectuals, and workers, aside from taking independent political action, were in liaison with each other, with the former acting in many instances as workers' delegates to the short-lived radical nationalist Grau regime. The

TABLE 1

TEMPORAL LOCATION AND DECISIVE POLITICAL EVENTS OF POLITICAL GENERATIONS, AND PREDICTED POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Age Category at Time of Study (1962)	Period That Began when Workers Were 18-25	Decisive Politically Relevant Events	Predicted Rank of Generation's Support for	
			Communists	Revolution
21-27	1959 on	Establishment of the revolutionary government and ensuing revolutionary changes, including nationalization of industry and declaration of "socialist" regime	*	4
28-35	1952/'53-58	Batista's coup; guerrilla war and urban resistance led by Castro; agitation and organization in working class, rebirth of working-class economic struggle; abortive national general strike; fall of Batista	3	1
36-43	1944-51	Relative political democracy and economic stability; alliance of government and anti-Communist labor officials; purge of Communists from CTC† leadership	4	5
44-51	1936/'37-43	Suppression of insurrection; re-emergence of Communist leadership of labor movement; collaboration with Batista; achievement of tangible socioeconomic benefits for organized workers	2	2
52-59	1928-35	Mass working-class and student insurrection; "dual power" of "Soviets" under Communist leadership; establishment of radical nationalist regime	1	2

* The youngest generation's response to the Communists before the revolution is excluded here and in the following tables, since the question refers to an attitude held before they were adults.

† Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba.

period of social upheaval began. Working-class and student political strikes throughout the country resulted not only in the overthrow of the repressive Machado regime but also in increasingly more militant political initiatives. These included the students' taking control of the University of Havana and demanding its "autonomy" from government interference and the workers' occupation of several railroad young Communist party was dominant in the leadership of the workers, and, despite the equivocal role of the Communists in the final overthrow of the Machado regime, they maintained and increased their influence among the workers throughout the revolutionary period. Repression of the revolutionary movement by Fulgencio Batista, who had led a revolt of the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers

and gained leadership of the army, led to his consolidation of power in late 1936 and early 1937.

The suppression of the revolution, forceful dissolution of working-class organizations, and the advent on the international Communist scene of the Popular Front period resulted in the transformation of the radical and independent workers' movement into a reformist movement under Communist leadership, which inaugurated an era of government-labor collaboration. The relative stability and economic security in Cuba during World War II accentuated even further the reformism of the workers' movement, as well as its growing bureaucratization. Under Communist leadership, the organized workers were able to gain certain tangible economic and social benefits.

Batista relinquished power in 1944, and a period of relative political democracy began—a period, however, that also included an alliance of the government and anti-Communist labor officials which increasingly used extra-legal and violent methods to harass the Communist leadership of the labor movement. The Communists were thus finally ousted in 1947 from official leadership of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), the national labor organization the Communists themselves had formed in 1938 under Batista's aegis. The growing bureaucratization of the unions, their loss of contact with the mass of the workers, and their collaboration with the government was heightened during this period of comparative internal economic stability and "prosperity."

CTC officials, under the leadership of Eusebio Mujal (whence comes the derogatory term *mujalista*), did not resist Batista's coup d'état of March, 1952, in which he regained power. In the years following, and throughout the guerrilla war and *resistencia*, the CTC was largely an appendage of the regime and was often used as a weapon against the workers themselves; and the already significant union corruption of prior years became increasingly supplemented by gangsterism and intimidation of the workers. The Communists, having lost the government's tutelage and having been outlawed by Batista, regained a measure of grassroots influence among the workers and led some important victorious strikes, especially in the sugar industry. But the regime fell not as the result of a working-class insurrection, which never materialized on a mass level, but as the result of conflict with the guerrilla forces and urban *resistencia* under the leadership of Castro's 26th of July movement, whose cadre included predominantly young men and women. Until the final demise of the regime in 1959, their age peers, whether active in the anti-Batista movement or not, and whatever their class, were both more suspect to the police and the military and more likely than Cubans of other ages to suffer arbitrarily at the hands of the regime.[16]

The role of the workers in the anti-Batista struggle contrasts strikingly with their decisive insurrectionary role against the Machado regime. Nonetheless, the years of the Batista regime saw a reinvigoration of the Cuban tradition of independent working-class economic struggle—under the leadership of Communists and non-Communists alike. The apparent political quiescence of the workers should not be exaggerated. For instance, in the 1955 strike in the sugar industry there were several militant actions, the sugar workers were joined by other workers in cities such as Santa Clara and some sugar

[16] "The most barbaric methods of torture, not excluding castration, were daily incidents in the police stations, where *the groans of a whole generation of youths* were heard as they were tortured for information, or for having aided the revolutionary movement" (Casuso, *op. cit.*, p. 134; italics mine.) Miss Casuso resigned her position as Cuban ambassador to the United Nations in 1960 and sought asylum in the United States. Similar descriptions of the Batista regime's arbitrary violence against young people during the guerrilla war appear in all the accounts of this period, such as Dubois, *op. cit.*; Taber, *op. cit.*; and Ray Brennan, *Castro, Cuba, and Justice* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959).

towns of Camaguey and Havana provinces, and their economic demands became coupled with such political slogans as "Down with the criminal government!"

In eastern Cuba and in Santiago, Cuba's second largest city, there were especially significant instances of working-class political support of the anti-Batista movement. A spontaneous political strike set off by the funeral of two young 26th of July leaders on August 1, 1957, spread from Santiago to other cities in Oriente Province and several towns throughout the country. The strike was complete in Santiago, shutting down the Nicaro nickel plant and shops in the city for five days. In subsequent months "strike committees" were organized in many plants by 26th of July organizers and other opposition elements, in preparation for a general strike in 1958. The general strike, called for April 9, 1958, collapsed in several hours in Havana, with little mass support; but it completely paralyzed industry and commerce in Santiago, where the workers stayed out despite the regime's threats of arrest and its offers of immunity from prosecution to anyone killing an advocate of the strike. Despite their failure to overthrow the regime, then, the events mentioned here were certainly significant in the movement against Batista's regime and must have affected the workers' political outlook.[17]

If it is correct that the struggle against Batista and the events flowing from it were of decisive significance in shaping the political outlook of the workers of this generation of '53, then clearly they should be far more likely than the members of other generations to support the revolution. How correct this inference is, and the evidence regarding it, will be seen below. First, however, we must briefly describe our methods.

[17] For a more detailed account of these events, see Maurice Zeitlin, "Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1964), and the references therein.

METHODS

The data for this study are drawn from interviews with industrial workers in Cuba in the summer of 1962. By that time the revolutionary government had clearly consolidated its power (the Bay of Pigs invasion being a year in the past); the original relatively undifferentiated popular euphoria had already been replaced by relatively clear lines of social cleavage generated in response to actions taken by the revolutionary government; it was two years since the nationalization of industry and more than a year since Castro had declared the revolution to be "socialist." A study of the differential appeals of the ideology and social content of the revolution to Cuban workers could now be meaningful and valuable.

Interviews were carried out with a randomly selected sample of 202 industrial workers employed in twenty-one plants widely scattered throughout the island's six provinces. Plants were chosen from a list of all those functioning under the direction of the Ministry of Industries.[18]

The plants were selected by means of a self-weighting random sample in which the probability that a plant would be chosen was directly proportional to the number of workers employed in it. This sampling method tended to exclude the smaller industrial establishments ("chinchales") that abound in Cuba. In each plant, ten workers were selected by a method designed to obtain a simple random sample. My wife and I each separately

[18] The Ministry of Industries facilitated the completion of this study by providing me with credentials to the administration of the plants I wanted to visit. There was no interference with the wording or content of any questions, nor was there any prearranged schedule for my arrival at the plants, nor, it was evident, had the administrators or union heads been informed of my impending arrival. On several occasions, administrators or personnel chiefs phoned Havana to check my credentials and my insistence that I had permission (which was apparently unbelievable to administrators trying to raise production levels) to take ten workers from their work for as long as the interviews required.

interviewed five workers per plant, in Spanish. All interviewing was done in complete privacy, in a location provided within the work center, such as a storage room, office, or classroom. We told each worker interviewed (as well as anyone else concerned) that I was a correspondent for *The Nation;* that we had permission from the Ministry of Industries, the plant administration, and the union delegate to interview workers in the plant; that the worker was chosen by a scientific method of randomization; that he would not be identified personally in any way; and that his answers would be entirely anonymous; we simply wanted to know his opinions about some things at work and in Cuba in general, so as to be able to write an objective report about the condition of the Cuban working class.[19]

It might be objected, of course, that such survey research could not obtain meaningful results since Cuba was already a police state in the summer of 1962. This obviously pertinent question cannot be discussed at length here. The reader will have to be content with the elliptical assertion that this objection is without foundation and that in our observation Cubans could and did inquire and speak freely about whatever they wished—at that time. There were no formal safeguards of freedom of speech and association, and the potentialities for totalitarian rule were great, but that potential had yet to become a reality. We were able to carry out our interviewing without disturbance or interference of any kind and to obtain, I believe, data quite as valid as those obtained in any competent survey research.[20]

The interview schedule began with questions which were, on the surface, far removed from political issues of any kind. These questions pertained to length of residence in a particular place, length of time working in the work place, and so on. Questions of more or less obvious political content came somewhere in the middle of the interview. Five of these, which I think together adequately indicate how the workers view the revolution, were combined into an "index of attitude toward the revolution." Of these five questions, two were open-ended and three were forced-choice questions.

The open-ended questions were: (1) "Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as a Cuban?"[21] and (2) "What sort [*clase*] of people govern this country now?"

One hundred and fifteen workers gave answers to the first question that were favorable to the revolution. A response was considered "favorable" only if it clearly indicated, or explicitly stated, support for the revolution.[22]

The workers could be especially blunt, as was a young worker at a paper-milling plant in Cardenas, whose answer was simply, "Of nothing, *chico* . . . I don't like

[19] Eight of the 210 workers selected for the sample refused to be interviewed, were not replaced by others, and are not included in our tables. As a precaution, the 8 were included in parallel runs defined as "hostile" to the revolution, and every significant relationship was either the same or strengthened.

[20] Professor Dudley Seers, the well-known British economist, who was also doing research in Cuba at that time, has referred to some preliminary findings of my study as follows: "[Zeitlin's] findings are not inconsistent with the general impression we all [Seers and his co-authors] formed during our stay in Cuba, where we traveled the length of the island and conversed with hundreds of people. (In general, there was clearly little hesitation on their part about speaking their minds.)" (Seers [ed.], *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964], p. 394, n. 70, and p. 31.)

[21] This question was borrowed from the study then in progress by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), and my use of it is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

[22] Mention of the revolution itself, of the "socialist government," of specific economic and social reforms of the revolutionary government, of increased work security since the revolution, etc., were counted as "favorable." All other responses, whether more or less "neutral" or "clearly hostile," were classified simply as "not clearly favorable."

Communism," or a West Indian cement worker (with two teenage daughters in the militia) in Mariel, who explained (in English): "I stay only because I have two daughters who will not leave—otherwise I'd go away. . . . No one bothers me, I just do not like it. Why? I can't say why. I guess I just prefer the old Cuba."

In contrast to these clearly hostile remarks were such noncommittal replies as a shoemaker's, "Of our movies and our athletes," or a brewery worker's equivocal, "I am a peaceful worker. I have no passionate interest in anything. After my work, I pass my time in my house in Manacas with my little one and my wife," or a cigar-maker's witty but equally noncommittal, "Our women, and our cigars."

Occasionally a revolutionary worker would wax poetic, as did a copper-miner in Matahambre: "Cuba is a cup of gold to me. It is the only country in the world that is now moving forward." A sugar worker's simple statement was more typical, however: "I earn good money now. I lack nothing. . . . All of the workers are with the revolution." A Havana brewery worker said: "I am content with the revolution in general. . . . For the first time one can do what one wants without fear."

One hundred and twenty-five workers replied to the second question in terms clearly favorable to the revolution. Given the double meaning in Spanish of the word "clase," which can mean "type," "sort," or "kind," as well as "class," the workers could, of course, choose to interpret the question's meaning in a number of ways. As with the preceding question, we counted as "favorable" replies only those that could be clearly regarded as such.[23]

A worker at the nationalized Texaco plant responded that those governing Cuba "are completely Communists. All of their accomplishments have been through the work of others—including how they think. I have a sister-in-law and a brother-in-law in prison for speaking against the government—[sentenced to] seven years." Another antirevolutionary worker said: "Socialists, they say. The kids say Communists. I don't know. Listen, if somebody comes and take that pen of yours, and you bought it, what are you going to think?"

"Well, I've never been 'political,'" a cigarette-machine operator said, "for me, they are all right." A brewery worker's reply was equally equivocal: "My experience so far is good. I don't worry about such things—neither before the revolution nor now." A skilled electrician in Santiago committed himself only so far as to say that the men in the government are "persons with socialist ideas, who though they have good intentions have committed many serious administrative errors."

"The truth is," a carpenter in a sugar central said, "that now those who govern here are Cubans. They are honest and hardworking men." A sixty-seven-year-old maintenance man at the Nicaro nickel plant who had been an agricultural worker until recently said: "Look, before I couldn't look a boss in the eye—I looked at my feet. Not now, now we have liberty and walk where we wish, and nothing is prohibited to us. It is a great joy to be alive now. These men [who govern us] are 100 per cent better than before. I have known governments from [Mario García] Menocal [Cuban president, 1913–21] until Batista left three years ago, and I have never seen any like this government." Equally articulate in his support of the revolution was a twenty-year-old bootmaker in a newly established factory in Guanajay: "*We* are the government, we run things. Go to a factory or *consolidado* anywhere, *chico*, and see: those who work govern, those who govern work, not like the capitalists who lived without working

[23] E.g., "the people," "the humble," "hardworking," "good," "sincere," "moral," "honest," "defenders of the poor and humble," "the working class" Responses such as "socialists" or "revolutionaries" which did not clearly commit the worker were not counted as favorable; neither were such equivocal replies as "Cubans," "Fidel," "Communists," nor hostile ones such as "Russians," "Soviets," "shameless," or "traitors."

before the revolution triumphed. Now, the power of the workers and peasants has emerged."

The workers were also asked the following questions with fixed alternatives: (3) "Do you believe that the country ought to have elections soon?" (4) "Do you think that the workers now have more, the same, or less influence on [*en*] the government than they had before the revolution?" (5) "Do you belong to the militia?"[24]

TABLE 2

POLITICAL GENERATION AND ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REVOLUTION

(Per Cent)

Age Category at Time of Study (1962)*	Favorable	Indecisive	Hostile	*N*
21–27........	55	19	25	36
28–35........	90	2	8	51
36–43......	61	17	21	51
44–51.......	69	15	15	26
52–59.......	70	9	22	23

* This and the following tables do not include eight workers who were under twenty-one and seven who were over fifty-nine in 1962.

The index of attitude toward the revolution was constructed by coding favorable responses as +1 and all others as 0:[25]

Index

Points	Definition	*N*
3–5............	Favorable	142
2..............	Indecisive	24
0, 1...........	Hostile	36
Total.........		202

FINDINGS

Comparison of the generations confirms our expectation that members of the rebel generation of Castro, or the generation of '53 are most likely to support the revolution (Table 2). United by the common political frame of reference they developed during the anti-Batista struggle, the generation of '53 stands out as the decisive generational base of the revolution. Further, the two other generations that stand out are precisely those whose members experienced the revolutionary events of the thirties as young men. It is, of course, possible to argue that, having experienced an abortive rather than a successful revolution, they should be cynical and pessimistic rather than optimistic about the Castro revolution, and this argument does make a good deal of sense. Yet, while the *social* revolution was crushed, the Machado regime *was* overthrown, and thus the political revolution in the narrow sense was a success. Moreover, seen in retrospect the revolution also yielded significant gains for the workers in subsequent years—especially the legitimation of their right to political and economic organization, a right that allowed them to win substantial economic benefits. It is also relevant that the repression of the revolution of the thirties, which in any case had significant "anti-imperialist" overtones, was widely believed in Cuba to have been the result of United States political intervention.[26] The anti-imperialism of the revolutionary government may, therefore, be another source of their support. Thus, it is understandable that these generations may view the present revolution as the renascence and continuation of the struggles of their own youth and may be more disposed to

[24] Answers to these questions were distributed as follows: (3) "no," 136; "yes," 44; "no opinion," 22; (4) "more influence," 170; "the same," 17; "less," 8; "no opinion," 7; (5) "yes," 110; "no," 92.

[25] Item analysis of answers to the five questions indicates that the questions form an acceptable Guttman scale, 88 per cent of the workers giving answers exactly (67 per cent) or consistently (21 per cent) in conformity with a Guttman model. The coefficient of reproducibility equals .95.

[26] See Dana Gardner Munro, *The Latin American Republics: A History* (2d ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 501; Charles A. Thompson, "The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XI (January 1, 1936), 261–71; Casuso, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 ff.; Robert F. Smith, *The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917–1960* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1959), pp. 148–66; and Zeitlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–46, and the references therein.

support it than the generation who came to manhood during the republican interregnum of relative stability or the present generation for whom prerevolutionary struggles are mere "history."

The low proportion of the present generation who support the revolution is unexpected. My own prediction (see Table 1) was that this generation would be outranked by those of '53 and the thirties but would itself outrank the republican generation. The explanation may be that the workers of this generation knew little if anything through personal experience about the prerevolutionary situation of the working class. Many of them (55 per cent) were not yet workers before the revolution and thus could hardly appreciate the positive changes in the situation of the working class wrought by the revolution.

The impact of the anti-Batista struggle on the workers of the generation of '53 has made it the generational base of the revolution. Moreover, in a significant sense it was their generation that bought the revolutionary government to power. The leaders of the revolution itself it will be remembered, who led the *resitencia* and were the rebel cadres in the hills and in the cities, are members of the generation of '53. In accordance with the hypothesis of political generations, the fact that the members of this generation acquired their political frame of reference in the course of the anti-Batista struggle should have made them more likely than members of other generations to suppot the revolution now, *regardless of the generation to which the rebel leaders themselves belonged.* But the fact that the rebels were predominantly of their own generation may have been an additional source of their support for and identification with the rebels and their cause It may be surmised that the rebels became, in a significant sense, collectively the reference group of that entire generation, and the chief rebel leaders its foremost culture heroes or "reference individuals."[27] That the rebel leaders couched so much of their program in generational terms also may have considerably increased the likelihood that the members of the generation of '53 would identify with them. In turn, this act of identification may itself have reinforced the attitudes this generation was developing in response to the set of stimuli created by the historical situation.

If our assumption is correct that identification with the members of their generation who were actively participating in and leading the rebel movement was one more element in the complex of elements comprising the distinct politically relevant experiences of the generation of '53, we should expect a similar identification in the present. Are members of the generation of '53 more likely than others to identify with the leaders of the revolution? Using the question "Aside from personal friends or relatives—of all the people you hear or read about—could you name three individuals whom you admire very much?" as a rough empirical indicator, we found that the generation of '53 is distinct in this regard.[28] Its members were more likely than those of other generations to name a revolutionary leader (Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Juan Almeida, etc.) as at least one of the three individuals whom they admire greatly (Table 3).

That the political generations vary in their response to the revolution in accordance with their historical location in prerevolutionary Cuba suggests also that they should have varied in their prerevolutionary political orientations as well. The political strength of the Communists in the working class, for instance, was significantly different in the critical periods

[27] As Robert Merton conceptualizes it, "Emulation of a peer, a parent, or a public figure may be restricted to limited segments of their behavior and values and this can be usefully described as adoption of a role model. Or, emulation may be extended to a wider array of behavior and values of these persons who can then be described as reference individuals" (*Social Theory and Social Structure* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959], p. 303).

[28] This question was also borrowed from the Almond-Verba study (*op. cit.*) and is acknowledged gratefully.

that formed the political generations. We might predict therefore, that the workers varied in their attitudes toward the Communists before the revolution in accordance with the role of the Communists during the workers' common youthful experience in the labor movement. If the Communists were then a significant independent political force, the workers of that generation should have been more likely to support the Communists before the revolution than workers whose youthful experience in the labor movement came during a period of Communist weakness or irrelevance.

As a rough guide to their prerevolutionary attitude toward the Communists, the workers in our sample were asked: "How would you describe your attitude toward the Communists before the revolution? Hostile, indifferent, friendly, or supporter?"[29]

As Table 4 indicates, the political generations did view the Communists in expectably different ways. The two generations with the highest proportion of workers sympathetic to the Communists before the revolution are those that were

TABLE 3

POLITICAL GENERATION AND REFERENCE INDIVIDUALS

(Per Cent)*

Age Category at Time of Study (1962)	Proportion Naming at Least One Reference Individual Who Is a						N
	Cuban Revolutionary Leader†	Communist Political Figure‡	Cuban Hero or Martyr§	Popular Celebrity‖	High Culture Figure#	Anti-Castro Political Figure**	
21–27	55	11	11	17	25	8	36
28–35	78	18	12	14	18	2	51
36–43	55	14	13	9	22	2	51
44–51	54	19	4	23	13	4	26
52–59	57	4	9	4	22	13	23

* Percentages do not total 100 because three responses were required. Categories in which no more than 10 per cent of any generation named a reference individual are excluded from this table.

† Only *fidelistas* or so-called new Communists.

‡ Cuban Partido Socialista Popular leaders ("old Communists") or international Communist figures, e.g., Mao, Khrushchev, Lenin, Ho.

§ Historic heroes or martyrs such as José Martí, Máximo Gómez, Antonio Maceo, Antonio Guiteras, or martyrs of the anti-Batista struggle such as Frank País, José Antonio Echevarría.

‖ Athletes, movie stars, radio and TV entertainers, etc.

\# Scientists, novelists, artists, philosophers, poets, etc.

** Counterrevolutionary leaders such as Carlos Prío Socarrás, José Miró Cardona, Manuel Urrutia, or political figures such as President Kennedy, Eisenhower, Allen Dulles, etc.

TABLE 4

POLITICAL GENERATION AND PREREVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COMMUNISTS

(Per Cent)

Age Category at Time of Study (1962)*	Friendly and/or Supporter	Indifferent	Hostile	N
28–35	29	43	27	51
36–43	29	35	35	51
44–51	38	38	23	26
52–59	39	39	22	23

* The youngest generation of workers (twenty-one to twenty-seven in 1962) is excluded from this table since the question relates to an attitude held before they were adults.

[29] According to this crude measure, 28 per cent of the workers in our sample classified themselves as prerevolutionary friends or supporters of the Communists; and, according to a report written after the Communists had been officially purged from the labor movement, the Communists still had "a strong underground influence in some unions, and some authorities estimate that perhaps 25 per cent of all Cuban workers are secretly sympathetic to them" (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Report on Cuba* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951], p. 365).

formed, respectively, during the anti-Machado struggles and the abortive revolution of the thirties, in which the Communists played a leading political role, and during the period when the Communists were dominant in the leadership of the CTC. It is significant, moreover, that although the workers of the revolutionary generation of '53 might be expected to "recall" favorable attitudes toward the Communists in the prerevolutionary period, their generation does not differ in this respect from the generation of republican stability, although the latter has a higher proportion of workers who were hostile to the Communists. It was during the republican interregnum that the Communists were at their weakest level in the working class. During this period they were purged from official leadership of the CTC, and the workers who entered the labor movement at this time would have been more likely than other workers to assimilate anti-Communist political orientations. As to the attitude of the generation of '53 toward the Communists before the revolution, there are good historical reasons why they should have been, at best, ambivalent about the Communists. Fidel's leadership of the assault on Moncada was denounced by the Communists as a bourgeois, romantic, and "putschist" adventure,[30] and throughout the guerrilla war against Batista—until it entered its last months—the Communists' official attitude was at best equivocal. As late as May, 1958, the Communists were still referring to the 26th of July movement as "those who count on terroristic acts and conspiratorial coups as the chief means of ousting Batista," although they described the movement as the "most militant and progressive sector of the non-Communist opposition."[31] In the unsuccessful April 9, 1958, attempt at a general strike, the Communist leadership—though not opposing it—declared that it did not have enough support to succeed, and this statement, circulated by Batista, was construed by the 26th of July movement as detrimental to the strike effort. As late as June 28, 1958, when the guerrilla war had reached a high point, the Communists had not reconciled themselves fully to the necessity for armed struggle, and the party's National Committee called for "clean, democratic elections" to eliminate Batista.[32] The fact is that the Communists, despite the influence they still retained among the workers, were the tail end of the anti-Batista struggle, with the unquestioned leadership of the struggle residing with the 26th of July movement. Thus, it is understandable that members of this generation of '53 were no more likely than the generation of the republic to view the Communists favorably.

So far, our analysis of the political generations has treated them in terms of their members' common location in the historical process. The common politically relevant experiences of their members have, taken as a whole, differentiated the political generations from each other. It is clear, however, that the generations are themselves internally differentiated by structural factors and that individuals of the same generation sharing different locations in the social structure will have experienced the politically relevant events of their youth differently. As Bennet Berger has put it: "The temporal location of a [generational] group must first be kept analytically distinct from its structural location; second, when considering them together, we should be aware that the impact of structural (e.g., occupational) factors on the nature of the temporal location may, under some conditions, be such as to fragment the cultural 'unity' of a generation beyond recognition."[33]

[30] *Daily Worker*, August 10, 1953, p. 2.

[31] Quoted in *Daily Worker*, May 4, 1958, p. 6.

[32] See Zeitlin, *op. cit.*, pp 83 104, and the references therein

[33] "How Long is a Generation," *British Journal of Sociology*, XI (March, 1960), 16. Cf. also: "In the comparison of different age groups in the *aggregate*, or the same age groups at different historical periods in the *aggregate*, any differences that appear

One of the most significant structural determinants of the Cuban workers' response to the revolution, as I have shown elsewhere,[34] was their prerevolutionary employment status. The workers who were unemployed and underemployed before the revolution were more likely to be pro-Communist before the revolution and are now more likely to support the revolutionary government than those who were employed regularly.

It is therefore important to consider the impact of their prerevolutionary employment status on the workers of different political generations (Table 5). As we might expect, within every political generation the workers who were unemployed and underemployed are more likely to support the revolution than those who were regularly employed before the revolution. Moreover, among both the unemployed and the regularly employed, the generation of '53 exceeds the other generations in the proportion of prorevolution workers; and among the employed workers the generation of the thirties comes second, as we should expect. Among the unemployed workers, however, the generation of the republican interregnum has as great a proportion of prorevolution workers as does the generation of the thirties.[35] Here is a particularly instructive instance of how generational peers, located differently in the social structure, are differently affected by historical events. The relative stability, prosperity, and political democracy of the republican interregnum, having left the problem of unemployment and underemployment untouched, proved from the perspective of the unemployed workers to be irrelevant to their situation and may indeed (as our evidence seems to indicate) have inclined them (even more than their unemployment may otherwise have done) toward radical solutions to their problems.

As Table 5 indicates, among unemployed workers those in the generation of the republican interregnum were second only to the generation of the thirties in prerevolutionary support of the Commu-

TABLE 5

POLITICAL GENERATION, PREREVOLUTIONARY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES*

Age Category at Time of Study (1962)	Under- and Unemployed†			Regularly Employed		
	Percentage Supporting		N	Percentage Supporting		N
	Revolution	Communists		Revolution	Communists	
21-27	75	‡	8	42	‡	12
28-35	100	31	22	85	35	20
36-43	81	41	21	43	17	23
44 plus§	82	64	11	68	39	31

* Those who were not workers before the revolution are excluded from this table.

† "Under- and unemployed" refers to workers who worked, on the average, nine months or less per year before the revolution, while "regularly employed" refers to those who worked ten months or more.

‡ See Table 4, footnote.

§ This category combines the generations of the second Machado regime and the first Batista regime and is referred to in this paper henceforth as the "generation of the thirties."

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to be generational may simply be *artifacts* of the different social composition of the groups. . . . In principle, this can be solved by the introduction of certain controls or matchings, but it may often be neglected in practice" (Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 130).

[34] Maurice Zeitlin, "Economic Insecurity and the Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers," *American Sociological Review*, February, 1966.

[35] See n. 3, Table 4.

nists. Also consistent with our findings on aggregate generational differences in prerevolutionary attitudes toward the Communists is the fact that the generation of the thirties, both among the employed and unemployed, had the greatest proportion of prerevolutionary Communist sympathizers.

Looking at the relationships differently, it might be expected that the unemployed, since they were generally more likely to support the Communists before the revolution, would also do so in each political generation. In fact, this is true in every political generation *but one*. In the generation of '53 unemployed workers were *not* more likely than their employed peers to sympathize with the Communists. In view of the experiences of the different political generations with the Communists, as pointed out earlier, this finding makes more sense than if they had been more likely than the employed to support the Communists. The most significant radical movement on the contemporary scene for the generation of '53, which possessed the political initiative and clearly led the anti-Batista struggle of that period, was not the Communist but the 26th of July movement. There is little reason, then, why the unemployed of *this* generation should have been more responsive to the Communists than were their employed peers. Not only were the *fidelistas* leading the anti-Batista struggle, but their agitation among the workers was also radical in social content, and perhaps even more radical than the agitation of the Communists who continued to counsel moderation for so long. Indeed, we already know that the unemployed of the generation of '53 are more likely to support the revolution than the employed workers, though they were not more likely to support the Communists before the revolution.

Finally, it is important to note that it is among the regularly employed workers that the relationships between generations most closely approximate those found when the generations are viewed in the aggregate. This is especially worthy of emphasis, since it is where unemployment (which tended to override the effects of their historical experiences) is absent that the generational relationships we predicted from knowledge of Cuban history are strongest and clearest. Thus, for example, among the employed workers of the generation of the republican interregnum, whose historical experiences were not "contaminated" by unemployment (which provides one basis for radicalism), the ideology developed under the impact of the republican experience became operative. Our findings are consistent, therefore, with the view that participation in historical struggles will have the greatest effect on the ideological development of precisely those workers who objectively have the least to gain from revolutionary politics.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, then, not only does comparison of the political generations in the aggregate reveal significant political differences in accord with hypotheses based on the concept of political generation, but comparison of *intra*generation subgroups are also in accord with those hypotheses.

The theoretical significance of our findings lies, first, in their demonstration of the analytic utility of formulating specific hypotheses in terms of the concept of political generations. It may indeed be correct, as Herbert Hyman has argued, that the "generic process of learning of politics" does not include generational influence and that "susceptibility to this influence may not be universal or may be constrained in many cases by other factors," but this hardly warrants relegation of the concept to the conceptual dustbin, as is implied in Hyman's otherwise incisive and valuable discussion.[36] In fact, of course, it is precisely one task of sociological inquiry to discover under what conditions

[36] Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 124. Hyman repeatedly refers to the concept of generation as "doctrine."

a particular type of social determinant may or may not be operative and to modify theory appropriately. The fact that some non-literate bands do not have social classes, for instance, and that, therefore, "susceptibility to this influence may not be universal," hardly warrants discarding the concept of social class. On the contrary, such empirical findings lead to further conceptual and theoretical development. Failure to use the generation concept because its empirical demonstration is difficult may be detrimental to the analysis of political behavior. It is especially important from a theoretical standpoint to analyze the effects of generations in societies characterized by comparatively greater social instability and internal conflict than the advanced industrial societies of the West in which the few empirical studies utilizing the concept (whether implicitly or explicitly) have been done. This is important not only because of the necessary comparative perspective on generational politics such studies could provide but also because generational politics seem to be most associated with differences in social stability during the periods in which the different generations came of age.[37] Thus our findings, based as they are on interviews with workers now living through a social revolution in a country whose history has been marked by social and political instability, are of particular theoretical interest.

Second, these conclusions bear indirectly on the issue of the relevance of "history" to sociological analysis and theory. The very concept of political generation implies the hypothesis that social processes, relationships, norms, and values sometimes may be inexplicable without reference to the events of the past and that analyses which are limited to consideration only of contemporary relationships may be deficient in significant ways.

Third, to the extent to which the concept attempts to link up behavior and character with *non*-institutionalized but historically significant forms of social interaction, our findings also impinge on social psychological theory. Such decisively relevant experiences as may be included under the rubric of "historically significant events" (major political issues, concrete internal struggles, general social conditions) may or may not themselves have significant consequences for the social structure and, *therefore*, for the character, norms, and values of the men formed within it. But these very events may have independent psychological effects on their participants, aside from their institutional consequences. "If you wish to understand persons—their development and their relations with significant others—you must be prepared," as Anselm Strauss has put it, "to view them as embedded in historical context. Psychological theory and psychiatric theory, at least of the American variety, underplay this context; and those sociologists and anthropologists who are interested in personal identity tend to treat historical matters more as stage setting, or backdrops, than as crucial to the study of persons."[38] That the historical context in which they came to manhood played a significant role in the formation of the political identities of succeeding generations of Cuban workers—their political allegiances and norms and their response to the revolution—has, of course, been precisely the point of this paper.

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[37] Cf. Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 267; Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 168; Hamilton, *op. cit.*, chap. vi.

[38] *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 164. See also Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1953), p. xix.

Social Structure and Modernization: A Comparative Study of Two Villages[1]

D. Weintraub and F. Bernstein

ABSTRACT

Two "traditional" small-holders' co-operative settlements in Israel, similar in farming and market conditions, in population and in exposure to communication, but strikingly different in processes of economic development, social and political modernization, are examined. The differences are traced to the nature of the kinship structure in the two villages, and the mechanisms through which this structure sustains or impedes change are shown. Some general conclusions on the relationship between traditional elements and modernization are then drawn.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study has been to analyze social factors responsible for striking differences in the development and modernization of two neighboring villages in the mountain district near Jerusalem. Of special interest in this situation is the fact that both villages have practically identical farming and market conditions, population, and extension service; that is to say, they are similar in areas to which variability in development is commonly traced. A laboratory situation, as it were, is thus created, facilitating a systematic examination of the effect on development and modernization of structural social factors. In the following pages this effect is documented and analyzed. The analysis falls into four parts: first, the similarity of background and setting of the two villages is briefly described; then the divergent roads they have taken are shown; next, this divergence is linked up with differences in kinship structure; and finally, the historical processes responsible for the crystallization of the contrasting kinship patterns are traced. Some general conclusions on traditional elements in modernization are suggested.

BACKGROUND AND POPULATION OF THE VILLAGES

Agur and Zakharya are both *moshavim* —that is, small-holders' co-operative settlements, populated by new immigrants. They are situated in the Jerusalem area, about ten miles apart, and are characterized by similar climate, topography, soil, market situation, and facilities. Their economies are alike based on the mixed mountain type of agriculture, comprising the same branches of production. In both villages each settler was allocated a similar area of land[2] and quantity of water for irrigation. The two *moshavim* were established at the same time and settled by immigrants from Kurdistan—people with one culture of origin, a similar occupational and educational background, and a like motivation to immigrate to Israel, as well as similar attitudes to agriculture and rural life. Agur has forty-three households and Zakharya seventy.

This essentially common heritage is also reflected in the similar demographic pat-

[1] The study presented in this paper is part of a current research project on "Social Factors Which Promote or Impede Changes in Agricultural Organization and Production." The project is being carried out in the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University with the support of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

We are indebted to Professors S. N. Eisenstadt, Elihu Katz, and Y. Talmon for a critical reading of an earlier version of the manuscript.

[2] Each farm was given six dunams (1½ acres) of arable land under irrigation (excluding fruit orchards cultivated by the village as a whole), twelve dunams in reserve for further development, and ten sheep, sheep pens and chicken coops (the latter to be developed on individual initiative) were provided as part of a long-term loan scheme

tern of the two groups, as regards nuptiality, fertility, and mortality. They are also alike in respect to distribution of manpower and age-composition.

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The differences in economic, political, and social development of the two villages stand out against this identity of physical characteristics, cultural and communicative background, and demographic features. Let us briefly compare each of these areas in turn.

I. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A. *Cultivated area.*—While in Agur the maximum cultivated area is fourteen dunams, with two-thirds of the farms not exceeding ten, in Zakharya most farms were far larger, two-thirds of the households cultivating an area of twenty to twenty-four dunams.[3]

B. *Number of standard workdays required on the farm.*[4]—The average number of yearly standard workdays is 1,224 in Agur, while in Zakharya it is 2,414—or almost twice as large.

C. *Level of proficiency in farming.*[5]—Farmers' proficiency was graded on a scale from 0 to 100. While the average level of skill in Agur was 31, in Zakharya it was 55. Furthermore, whereas in Agur only 19 per cent of the population achieved a score higher than 40, and none exceeded 53, in Zakharya over half the population scored more than 50, the highest score being over 70.

D. *Gross farm income per household.*—This index was based on the settlers' testimonies, and is not, therefore, entirely reliable.

While in Agur not a single family was found whose income from the farm was more than I.£2,000 per year, in Zakharya 45 per cent of the families had such an income. Since the great majority of Agur settlers and some of those in Zakharya supplement their farm income by means of outside work, we computed the over-all income per family. It was found that, while in Agur 83 per cent of the families declared an income of less than I.£2,000, in Zakharya only 34 per cent of the families earned as little as that. In short, while some of the indexes used are crude, they clearly demonstrate the considerable economic differences between the two villages.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

A similar contrast exists in the local government of the two villages, here characterized—for brevity's sake—by two political institutions central to the *moshav*—the nominations committee and the village council.

The formal task of the nominations committee is to draw up the list of candidates for election to the council, but in most veteran villages its work is extended to the canvassing of the various factions, interest groups, and centers of opinion in order to select the most acceptable candidates and thus establish a government based on the broadest possible consensus.

[3] Size of farm is a good measure of development and innovativeness since (see n. 2) each unit has a built-in reserve allowing the farmer to expand as fast as he can increase his ability to farm more land. In addition to this reserve, one can also rent plots from less active neighbors—an opportunity taken in Zakharya but not in Agur.

[4] In this index, the yearly agricultural production in all branches is expressed in the workdays required in them according to established norms. The measure, while related partly to size of farm, is not the function of it: it reflects also the intensity of cultivation of any given area, as well as development of livestock; and it is significant here also when size of farm is controlled. Because of a similar farm composition, there is little bias here due to heavily manpower-loaded branches.

[5] The grading of the farmers was done by a panel of experts on the basis of a questionnaire and observed performance. Data included a sample of activities in a sample of crops (and livestock) within each branch of production. The skill expended on each operation was defined against generally established norms relating to timing, quantity, and quality. The degree of skill was then weighted according to the importance of the crop within the farm type (so that proficiency in a marginal crop would not be given an undue place) and according to the "criticalness" of the activity for the success of the crop.

No such function exists in Agur. Here nominations are decided by the two basic political groups, each of which represents a combination of two kinship networks.[6] Each such group draws up a list of five names from among its members, and then votes for it en bloc. There is no previous exchange of ideas and no attempt at adjustment and accommodation; the political process is limited to the struggle for the floating votes; and the ballot is obviously not personal but collective. The community does not accept the rules of the game concerning defeated minority "parties," with the result that the council represents one political group rather than the village as a whole, and is not generally supported and legitimated.

In Zakharya there is an active nominations committee, composed of members of the three largest kinship groups. The terms of reference of this committee are thus kinship-oriented, too, and it functions among the kinship-based political units. There is, however, a previous weighing and adjustment of interests as well as of personalities. What is no less important—within the context of a traditional society—is that the final list of candidates attempts to represent as many groups as possible, and is voted for on an individual basis. The members of the council are thus elected directly and represent the village as a whole, rather than a single political unit within it.

The difference between the two villages is also reflected in the structure and functioning of the council. The council of a *moshav* is its central administrative body, responsible for all municipal and co-operative services, and is consequently the focal point of political struggle in the village. In Agur the councils are elected by a small majority controlled by one of the two political cliques or by coalitions between two kinship groups. Because of frequent shifts in the allegiance of the "floating" voters, no political group can stand firm long enough to plan and implement a long-term schedule of activities. The council is neither capable of proper municipal and economic management nor oriented to the welfare of the village as a whole, since the candidates are nominated on the basis of kinship seniority, rather than on the basis of ability. The council, being founded on a narrow, ascriptive basis, tends primarily to advance the interests of the in-group; in general, political office is seen in terms of exercising particularistic obligations and of reinforcing the traditional status of kinship elders. The situation became so serious that outside personnel had to be appointed by the Land Settlement Department to many of the decision-making positions on the village council as the only way of excluding vital administrative tasks from the sphere of political conflict. This arrangement, however, inevitably minimizes the participation of the settlers in government.

In Zakharya the five-man council has for several years embodied an adjustment and a reconciliation of the various political interests, including two members from the largest kinship network and one each from three other groups. In this way four of the six groups are "in," representing over 80 per cent of the electorate. The universalistic orientation of the council is also significant: once elected, members rise above kinship obligations and act to promote the welfare of the village as a whole.

This growth of universalistic orientation has been accompanied by changes in the criteria for election to and, consequently, in the composition of the council. Until 1958 members had been elected, as in Agur, on the basis of traditional status, but since then kinship groups have begun to nominate those of their members objectively best qualified to manage village affairs. Initially, younger members were intrusted with specialized functions below the decision-making level; having proved themselves in those fields, they were allowed to assume positions of greater responsibility (such as the secretaryship of

[6] This structure is explained fully below, and the exact relationship between it and the political system is traced.

the village), while the elders retained the headship of the council and the majority of the seats. Gradually the younger generation assumed a greater proportion of the formal offices, while the traditional leaders kept their prestige within the kinship group, providing still-needed legitimation of economic and political activities, and preserving traditional values. The inevitable friction accompanying these changes has been minimized by the separation of public and private spheres, the solidarity of the family, the deference accorded to parents and elders, and the acceptance of religious obligations on household and community levels.

The institutionalization of youth in the leadership elite of Zakharya is reflected in the considerable differences between the two villages with respect to their attitude toward the appointment of young people to various posts. The most significant contrast lies in the respective assessment of the chances of young people to reach leadership positions, which stands at 23 per cent in Agur and 63 per cent in Zakharya.[7]

III. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Agur and Zakharya also differ considerably in the extent of their social modernization, in the sense of the "unfreezing" and the differentiation of the traditional frameworks of interaction. These differences are reflected in the contrasting friendship networks of Agur and Zakharya, respectively, which were arrived at with the help of a sociometric questionnaire, in which each settler was asked to name his two best friends.[8] An examination of these sociometric charts (see Figs. 1, 2) shows that in Agur there are two main groups, largely coinciding with the basic political divisions into two "coalitions" of kinship networks, and that each group is internally subdivided into two clusters. Table 1 gives the population distribution of Agur by kinship,[9] friendship, and political affiliation,[10] and shows the extent of overlap between

TABLE 1

FARMERS IN AGUR (INCLUDING ISOLATES) BY KINSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, AND POLITICAL GROUPS

Friendship Group	Kinship Group				Total	Political Division		Total
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*		Group I	Group II	
1	....	....	2	7	9	9	....	9
2	....	....	7	4	11	9	2	11
3	9	1	1	1	12	....	12	12
4	1	6	1	....	8	2	6	8
Isolates	....	....	....	1	1	1	....	1
Total	10	7	11	13	41	21	20	41

[7] Based on a survey of all heads of households in the two villages—seventy in Zakharya and forty-three in Agur.

[8] Friendship groups were defined on the basis of sociometric connections—each group consisting of a network of first and second choices (of a person and by a person). In case of membership in more than one group by this criterion, (*a*) first choice determined over second choice, (*b*) the person was placed in the group to which he had more sociometric ties.

[9] The nature of the kinship group analyzed—the *hamula*—is described below. Here it must be mentioned, however, that operationally the kinship groups were defined on a twofold basis: (*a*) self-identification by households as belonging to one group, (*b*) nomination by key informants. There was *complete* agreement between the two criteria, and no case of dual membership in these terms, so that kinship status was objectively and subjectively clear and unambiguous.

[10] For determination of political groups see n. 16.

POLITICAL GROUP A
POLITICAL GROUP B
ab kinship group (see table 1)
first choice
second choice
sociometric star
intergroup link
group boundary
political boundary

ab.... kinship group (see table 2)
first choice
second choice
sociometric star
intergroup link
group boundary

the groups. The table shows the extent to which traditionally imbedded political criteria influence choice of friends: for example, all nine of the members of friendship group 1 are in political group I; only four persons—two in friendship group 2 and two more in group 4—deviate from the political group in their choice of friends. This connection between friendship and kinship-based political commitment not only reflects a congealing of the undifferentiated traditional structure, but also constitutes a further obstacle to unity and integration in the village. Any change in the political setup[11] must disrupt the friendship framework, and, conversely, every personal quarrel becomes a political crisis.

In Zakharya, on the other hand, there are seven friendship groups unrelated to any other groupings. Table 2 shows that there is no significant connection between the kinship frameworks (and the political units identical with them) and friendship; members of the same kinship network belong to different friendship groups; and every friendship group includes individuals from many kinship units.

No less striking is the contrast with regard to the relations among the different friendship frameworks. As shown in the sociograms, in Zakharya most friendship groups are linked together by a system of outwardly oriented sociometric stars.[12] In almost every friendship group in the village there are two sociometric stars. The more popular one of these usually gives his first choice to someone outside the group, while the second one usually chooses within the group. The sociometric stars who have no outside contact thus act as solidary leaders within the group, while those who interconnect the groups fulfil an important integrative function for the village as a whole along modern, associational lines.

In Agur, the most popular sociometric star also chooses his best friend from a different friendship group, but from the same political unit. Since the two political units are not interlinked as they are in Zakharya, and since each unit itself is not stable but is subject to changes engendered by the "floating" element, no over-all integration is created.

We have traced briefly, through selected aspects, the differences in economic development and in political and social modernization between the two villages. Seen against the uniformity of background and setting described earlier, and forming within the short span of ten years, this contrast

TABLE 2

FARMERS IN ZAKHARYA (INCLUDING ISOLATES) BY KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP GROUPS

Friendship Group	Kinship Group						Total
	a	b	c	d	e	f	
1	1	6	......	......	1	3	11
2	6	......	1	1	......	2	10
3	2	1	1	1	1	......	6
4	....	1	1	1	......	6	9
5	......	......	1	......	4	1	6
6	4	......	1	3	..	6	14
7	2	1	......	......	2	3	8
Isolates	2	1	......	2	....	1	6
Total	17	10	5	8	8	22	70

[11] That is, a shift in the allegiance of the "floating" votes.

[12] Identified by the number of choices received.

seems nothing short of amazing. Part of the explanation may no doubt be found in the mutual reinforcement and cumulative nature of the changes. However, feedback mechanisms do not account for the initial point of divergence, nor are they automatically maintained. It is suggested that it was the different kinship structure of Zakharya, reinforced by a more homogeneous group composition which provided this basis and has since served as the backbone of development and modernization. Since the significance of social homogeneity for culturally similar traditional immigrants has already been documented in respect to villages of this general type,[13] attention will be focused mainly on the kinship structure, with the associated factor mentioned only when clarity demands.

THE KINSHIP STRUCTURE OF AGUR AND ZAKHARYA

The "traditional" Jewish community—to which the Kurdish Diaspora belonged—was organized in a highly familistic way, the family unit determining social interaction and division of labor. This pattern was characterized by a very strong attachment to kinship and territorial groups, by limitation of social interaction to these groups, and by an unwillingness to "co-operate" with outsiders. The basic framework of this type was the *hamula*, that is, the Mediterranean patrilineal and patrilocal lineage.

In the countries of origin, the members of the *hamula* usually formed a neighborhood group (sometimes constituting an entire village), membership implying an obligation to give economic help, hospitality, political support, and general protection to other members. The ties of the *hamula* did not specify any communal or co-operative arrangements in production, the individual household (usually comprising the extended family) serving as the unit of production and consumption, as well as of socialization. Status, however, was determined primarily by the importance of the *hamula* one belonged to and by one's position within it. The *hamula* was usually endogamous and often had a special prayer version and synagogue, thus engendering intense loyalty that overrode affiliation to any other group.

Familism as a value and as a pattern of social organization not only continued to exist after immigration to Israel, fitting "naturally" into the small community pattern, but was even reinforced by the crisis of migration and by the greater scope of activity in the *moshav*. The structural integrity of the kinship units, however, was sometimes impaired during the process of settlement. As a result, the original criterion of membership—direct patrilineal descent—became blurred, and *quasi-hamulas*, representing the familistic principle but admitting ties by marriage and territorial cliques, emerged. Agur and Zakharya, it has been found, differ considerably in this respect, the one having a more "simulated" or modified kinship structure, the other a more "organic" one.[14]

These kinship systems in each of the two villages were analyzed with reference to three characteristics, assumed to represent "organic" continuity, namely, the "density" of the network, that is, the extent to which it was based on close blood ties (father-son, sibling, uncle-nephew, cousins, grandfather-grandson), or else on distant or marriage ties;[15] the historic

[13] See chiefly D. Weintraub and M. Lissak, "Social Integration and Change," in J. Ben-David (ed.), *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel* (Paris: UNESCO, 1964).

[14] The term "organic"—even though in quotation marks—is not a very happy choice in the present context, and is used for want of a better one. Clearly, the process of migration and the confrontation with the *moshav* has meant a break in continuity for all groups of this kind, and they all are reconstituted entities. The difference lies in the nature of this reconstitution, that is the extent to which it approximates or reconstructs the earlier pattern. "Organic" thus means here "neo-traditional" rather than strictly continuous.

[15] As pointed out above (n. 9), each kinship group represented a clearly identified entity. Within this entity, each person was considered to have a kinship tie with every other member. Initially, these ties were classified into three types: (*a*) close blood relations (as defined above); (*b*) distant

memory of the members; and the size of the units.

As may be seen from Table 3, the kinship network in Zakharya is denser than in Agur; 76 per cent of the relationships are close blood ties, as against only 49 per cent in Agur. Moreover, in Agur only one of four groups has a hard core of close blood ties which are more numerous than distant ties. In Zakharya, on the other hand, five out of six groups have a greater proportion of close blood ties.

The historic memory of the two villages, as expressed in the number of generations mentioned and how far names of lineal ancestors could be remembered, was much stronger—by as much as 30 per cent—in Zakharya. This memory tends to be related to the density of the network, so that it may be a corollary of the greater intensity and salience of the closely knit group. In any case, in Zakharya it can be seen to reinforce the "organic" continuity of the units.

The same trend exists with regard to the relative size of the kinship groups in the *moshavim:* Agur is characterized by four roughly equal groups, while Zakharya has two units that are appreciably larger than the others, and which constitute a natural nucleus of authority around which the village can stabilize.

These differences in the "organic" continuity of the kinship networks have immediate consequences for political organization. Neither Agur nor Zakharya has divisions based on ideology, policy, or economic interests; the political struggle is concerned, rather, with power and prestige, and alignment tends to be vertical, corresponding to kinship lines.[14] However, the extent and nature of this correspondence differs significantly in the two communities. In Agur there are, as has been mentioned above, two political units, each

TABLE 3

KINSHIP NETWORKS IN AGUR AND ZAKHARYA ACCORDING TO TYPE OF TIE (BASED ON ADULT MALE POPULATION)

Group	Agur: Close Blood Tie	Agur: Distant or by Marriage	Group	Zakharya: Close Blood Tie	Zakharya: Distant or by Marriage
a	7	3	*a*	16	1
b	3	4	*b*	8	2
c	5	6	*c*	5	.
d	5	8	*d*	4	4
			e	6	2
			f	14	8
Total	20	21	Total	53	17
Per cent	49	51	Per cent	76	24

blood relations—that is, blood ties of a degree not defined as close (e.g., third cousins); and (*c*) relations by marriage. However, analysis of data showed the latter distinction to be insignificant, and all ties which are not of the close blood-tie type mentioned are consequently grouped together as "distant or by marriage."

[14] In establishing the political units of the villages, use was made of informants who classified all adult males according to political affiliation, of participant observation in elections and general meetings; and of direct questions. There was full agreement between all sources of information, reflecting a clearly articulated structure. This structure includes only males—for though the *moshav* constitution calls for universal suffrage, in "traditional" *moshavim*, the women are excluded from direct participation in the political game.

based on a coalition of two kinship groups; this identity, however, is incomplete, since the coalition is between the closely blood-related nuclei of these groups, while the households attached by marriage or by distant relationship are a "floating" element, courted by both sides. Thus, ties which are not "dense" or "organic" do not constitute a politically binding criterion: of twenty-two adults remotely related to their kinship networks, twelve crossed family lines in their political choices during the year of research. On the face of it, the situation would seem to be one of greater flexibility, with the "floating" vote preventing a hardening of the political structure along rigid ascriptive lines. In reality, however—as we have seen—the "unattached" traditional households are incapable of giving their loyalty to one group for a prolonged period of time, and they change sides frequently. The situation is aggravated by the heterogeneity of origin of the *hamulas* of Agur,[17] with the result that political stability cannot be achieved, and there is no basis for concerted action at community level.

In Zakharya the identity between political affiliation and kinship is complete, each of the six networks constituting a political unit, which includes both close and distant kinship ties. There would thus seem to be a qualitative difference between the structural effect of the "organic," closely knit kinship system and that of the loosely knit one: the first is capable of holding marginal members, while the other is not. Moreover, this greater internal cohesion of the networks does not make them intransigent toward each other, owing to the existence of a dominant social group and to homogeneity of origin. The solidarity of the component units is in this way associated with an over-all unity of the village as a whole. It would thus appear that as long as ascription remains the decisive element of social organization, "organic" kinship networks and homogeneous social composition constitute a positive force for the integration of the community and its crystallization at a higher level of activity and efficiency.

The apparent paradox of the situation lies in the fact that the strong kinship units of Zakharya, while upholding traditional organization, do not strengthen resistance to innovation and change. On the contrary, it was the integrated kinship-imbedded political system that produced more modern political behavior as well as greater social differentiation. This process of association between traditional kinship structure and innovation seems to have developed mainly through two interrelated mechanisms.

1. *The existence of conditions facilitating the emergence of young leadership within the traditional framework.*—It appears that the leader of the younger generation—the most vocal and gifted of its members—was strategically located within the central extended family in the largest *hamula*. By acting within the kinship framework, by accepting its authority and drawing upon its legitimation, and by enhancing its status through successful performance of his functions, he has succeeded in gaining the support of the *hamula* for his election as the first young chairman of the council. Since then, his skill and universalistic orientation have gained him the support of other kinship groups and a considerable measure of personal popularity;[18] and this has, in turn, reinforced his position within his kinship unit. Undoubtedly a part was played here by the coincidence of personal qualities, both professional and charismatic. However, these qualities could only exert their influence in specific structural conditions, which enabled secondary innovating elites to succeed through securing the support of central traditional groups.

[17] As is well known, Kurdistan is divided between Russia, Persia, Turkey, and Iraq. The settlers in Agur came from diverse regions in the last two countries, while those in Zakharya from one region in Iraq only.

[18] In the 1962 elections he won by 77 per cent of the votes. A similar process has accompanied the rise of the secretary—a member of the second largest group—elected by 67 per cent.

This particular blend of kinship-imbedded political organization, on the one hand, and of achievement and universalism in elite selection and government, on the other, has indeed been of crucial importance for a balanced process of modernization in the village. It has prevented the emergence of new factions and demands, which would as yet be beyond the capacity of the new elite to meet and absorb.

2. *Differential toleration of change.*—It was seen that in contrast to Agur, the "dense" kinship networks of Zakharya were able to absorb and secure the political loyalty of distantly related households as well. An inverse situation obtained in respect to social interaction and friendship outside the *hamula* was characteristic of the stronger system rather than of the weaker one. It would seem that this derived from the greater structural flexibility of the "organic" group, more capable than the "simulated" one of coexisting with competing patterns of organization. In other words, an assured core of genuine loyalty allows the group, as it were, to "unfreeze" or release part of the commitments due to it, while the lack of such a core engenders resistance to all innovation.[19] Table 4 pinpoints this structural difference. In the table, the population of each community is divided into those who are close blood relations to their kinship group and those who are merely distantly related, or related by marriage, to their kin group. As may be seen from the table, in Agur each friendship group contains a nucleus composed of close blood relations. These choose their friends within the nucleus. In Zakharya, on the other hand, even those who are centrally located in the kinship system are free to choose their friends from outside it.

To summarize the discussion so far: the village of Zakharya, unlike that of Agur, has moved along the road to economic development and social and political modernization. This process, moreover, has not entailed either social disorganization or a complete break with traditional patterns. It has, on the contrary, grown out of these patterns and in reference to them, and has struck a functional balance between and within the different spheres of development and modernization. It was

TABLE 4

POPULATION OF AGUR AND ZAKHARYA BY TYPE OF TIE TO KINSHIP GROUP AND CHOICE OF FRIENDS

Type of Tie to Kinship Group	Agur			Zakharya		
	Choice of Friends		Total	Choice of Friends		Total
	Outside Kinship Group	Within Kinship Group		Outside Kinship Group	Within Kinship Group	
Close blood relations......	3	16	19	22	19	41
Distant or marriage ties...	9	10	19	9	6	15
Total	12	26	38	31	25	56

[19] Such a seeming paradox, though, regarding industrial modernization, was documented by M. Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (October, 1953). Generally similar lines were pursued, also, in some earlier Israeli studies on problems of absorption of immigrants. See chiefly S. N. Eisenstadt, *Absorption of Immigrants* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954); and "Patterns of Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Agricultural Settlements in Israel," in *Essays on Sociological Aspects of Political and Economic Development* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1961).

suggested that the major factor responsible for this successful modernization has been the "organic" kinship structure of Zakharya that served as the basis of change and has been its mainstay and safety valve. Some of the mechanisms through which this was effected were then analyzed.

We must now examine briefly some of the historical factors responsbile for the differences in the crystallization of a different kinship structure and composition in the two villages.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE STORY: SOME EARLIER SOCIAL PROCESSES

The most significant difference in the histories of the people of the two villages lies in the fact that the settlers of Zakharya before coming to Israel already constituted a group—though a loose one—with a mutual acquaintance, common experience, and common purpose. Although the various *hamulas* of this group had lived in different localities and had nothing like an organized pioneering nucleus, they nevertheless all came from Barazani's district in Iraq, were involved in his abortive rebellion of 1945, and fled the area to escape the persecutions of the local sheiks. On hearing about the establishment of the State of Israel, they assembled in Baghdad, clustered there around the leading *hamulas* for nine months, and were then flown together to Israel.

The present settlers of Agur, on the other hand, came from different regions, had no previous contacts, and were thrown together by chance. They included thirty-two immigrants from diverse districts of Iraqi Kurdistan and a large minority of eleven Turkish Kurdish families. Moreover, it was the minority group that was integrated, while the majority was divided against itself. The clue to the situation, from the point of view of systematic analysis, is that the factor of selection and of village composition was left to chance—and this in the context of the social, cultural, and ethnic heterogeneity of the immigrant groups to the country and the disorganization associated with migration. It was thus pure chance that a relatively homogeneous and cohesive nucleus composed of "organic" networks was sent to Zakharya and that Agur, by contrast, was filled up piecemeal by Turkish and Iraqi Kurds as well as some Moroccans (who later left). The greater heterogeneity of origin was thus accompanied by greater fragmentation of settlement.

The situation created in Agur actually suited, initially, the official "melting pot" policy of absorption, which aimed at a quick integration of different groups of origin. Later, because of social crises in many villages, this policy was abandoned in the *moshavim* themselves and attempted at regional level. For existing villages, however, it was by then too late, short of a complete upheaval. Nor was there yet a real understanding among policy makers of the significance of social homogeneity for a "traditional" population; and Agur, the Moroccans having left, became, by the criteria of the Settling Agency, a socially uniform place. In a situation like this, nothing could be done by the settlers themselves; the village was too small to prevail on any one group to leave in order to create a greater political stability, and there was no natural nucleus around which to reorganize. Not so in Zakharya, where a similar situation could be resolved. Here, too, the first group of settlers did not fill all the farm units in the village, and the Settling Agency brought in "reinforcements." The newcomers, composed of one *hamula* and fringes, were strangers to the earlier settlers and did not integrate within the village. There was constant bickering with them, and the presence of a "militant" minority, which did not accept the "rules of the game," proved highly disruptive. This situation culminated in an all-round fight—in which firearms were used—following which most of the "active" intruders left the *moshav*. The vacant farms were then reallocated to sons of farmers (the population being strong enough and large enough to resist the introduction of another batch of new settlers), and the social fabric was reintegrated.

It seems, then, that the following historical factors favored Zakharya in comparison with Agur: (1) previous acquaintance and interaction abroad, (2) some signs of early organization around dominant and organic groups, and (3) selection by rejection and ejection during settlement.

GENERAL REMARKS

In the foregoing analysis, we have examined the place of kinship structure in the processes of development and modernization in two agricultural villages in Israel. Before attempting to generalize from this analysis, a few remarks on the specific features of rural development in Israel must be made. Four major characteristics seem to distinguish the situation here from that in other developing countries:

1. Rural development in Israel is carried out within a relatively modern and stable institutional framework.

2. The rural sector has never been isolated from, or dominated by, the urban one—on the contrary, rural elites have consistently occupied a central position regarding the political, economic, and value systems of the country.

3. Owing to historical circumstances, Israel is able to invest relatively more capital and skilled manpower in rural development than can most other developing countries.

4. The traditional communities, undergoing a process of change in Israel, are composed of immigrants uprooted from their native surroundings and resettled in preplanned, already established villages. Thus they lack a background of long territorial continuity and have less hardened and "interlocked" elements. This, while possibly affecting the integration of the group, may also lower resistance to change.

For these reasons the rate of change and development may be quicker in Israel; and it is doubtful whether many countries could duplicate the case of Zakharya, where, within the span of half a generation, a traditionally oriented group accepted modern technology and farming methods as well as some significant elements of social and political modernization.

In spite of these reservations, however, internal problems of developing communities in Israel seem to be of an essentially general nature; and thus some general conclusions may be drawn from the material presented here.

1. Our data lend support to the view that the "opposing" principles of traditionalism and modernity are not as mutually exclusive as has often been assumed, and that not only can they coexist under certain conditions, but that they may even reinforce one another. Traditional patterns were thus found to be capable of facilitating modernization through social integration, regulation of mobility, and the mobilization of resources for new policies and goals. Of crucial importance in this respect is the demonstration that a traditional "lag"—or structural discrepancy in development—may be functional for the efficiency of the system and its continued orderly change.

2. The question arises whether traditional patterns, which can be incorporated into the processes of modernization, should be encouraged to do so; that is, when the readiness and aptitude for development and modernization are present, what is the balance of profit and loss in taking traditional patterns into account? In simple terms, the argument is between possible loss of speed and possible gain in social continuity. The present study seems to suggest one criterion for a generally valid conclusion, namely, the *type* of modernization attempted. When modernization is individually oriented—as in industrialization and urbanization—the "atomization" and dispersion of traditional structure seems to be indicated. When, however, change refers to a community—such as the type represented by the co-operative village—some adherence to traditional structures as the units of interaction would be a necessity.

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Organizational Goals and Inmate Organization[1]

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ABSTRACT

Relationships between organizational goals and informal organization in three minimum-security prisons were examined in an attempt to replicate Grusky's study and to investigate relations between formal and informal structure in total institutions and conditions which generate oppositional informal organization.

(1) Inmate attitudes were found to be more positive in treatment institutions than in custodial ones. (2) Inmate attitudes were shaped significantly by prison experience: the longer the time spent in prison, the most pronounced was its effect. (3) Differences in attitudes between prisons resulted from different patterns of informal organization, rather than inmates reacting individually to their similar prison experience, since attitudes were found to be related to involvement in informal organization, and informal leaders in these institutions systematically differed in their attitudes. (4) Differences in informal organization arose out of the different functions performed by the inmate subsystems in response to conditions set by the organization's goals. (5) The functions performed by the inmate subsystem, in turn, had implications for the roles of informal inmate leaders.

While sociological interest in informal organization dates back to the time of Cooley, there has been little exploration of the relationships between formal and informal organization. Earlier research efforts have been more concerned with documenting the existence of informal organization and demonstrating that it had an impact upon organizational functioning than in trying to establish relationships between it and the organizational context. Different conclusions have been reached in regard to its contribution to the formal organization's ability to achieve its goals, with Roethlisberger and Dixon highlighting its subversive aspect in limiting productivity in economic organizations, while Shils and Janowitz suggest it can facilitate the goals of military organizations by developing social cohesion.[2] Rec-

[1] The author would like to acknowledge indebtedness and gratitude to: Dr. Oscar Grusky of the University of California at Los Angeles both for his earlier work which stimulated this research and for his comments and aid in clarifying this paper; also my intellectual indebtedness to Professor Morris Janowitz of the Center for Social Organizational Studies and the University of Chicago and to Professor Guy E. Swanson of the University of Michigan. Naturally, I am to be held solely accountable for any errors or defects in this paper. I would also like to thank the National Institute of Mental Health which supported this research (Grant MF-8943) along with the Michigan State Department of Corrections, the camp staff, and inmates for their kind co-operation. This research was based upon "Informal Social Organization Among Inmates in Treatment and Custodial Prison Camps: A Comparative Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1961), which formed part of a research program under the direction of Professors Robert Vinter and Morris Janowitz dealing with the treatment potentials of correctional institutions (Vinter and Janowitz, "Effective Institutions for Juvenile Delinquents: A Research Statement," *Social Service Review*, XXXIII [June, 1959], 118–30). Comments by Allan Silver, Halowell Pope, and Harwin Voss of an earlier draft are gratefully acknowledged.

[2] F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939); Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration of the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XII (1948), 280–315. Informal organization has also been found to contribute positively to economic organizations by reducing absenteeism, and negatively to military ones by generating norms which foster "goldbricking." Lewin's study contrasting the consequences of different patterns of control upon informal relations specifies in more detail relationships between organizational parameters and informal relations (K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, "An Experimental Study of Leadership and Group Life," in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and

onciling these findings rests upon the notion that organizations with different goals, structures, and contexts should produce different patterns of informal organization, and informal organization would also have different effects upon the functioning of such diverse types of organizations. What is needed is specification of relationships between the parameters of formal and informal organization and identification of those aspects of organizations which generate oppositional informal organization. By limiting this investigation to one particular type of organization and by examining variation in one of its parameters—its goals—it is hoped some clarification of the problems may emerge.

Specifically, this paper examines relationships between organizational goals and informal organization in a variety of correctional institutional settings. The study had major objectives. First, we sought to replicate Grusky's study of the consequences of treatment goals for the informal organization of prison inmates.[3] Second, we were concerned with extending existing formulations concerning the relationship between the formal and informal structure of total institutions and, in particular, the conditions which generate informal organizations that are fundamentally opposed to the existing administration.

DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH SITES

The three institutions selected for study were minimum-security prisons which differed in their emphasis of treatment goals. The criteria used to determine the extent to which treatment goals were dominant were: (1) the presence of a full time counselor or of treatment personnel; (2) the existence of a rehabilitative program; and (3) the active implementation of educational, vocational, or other auxiliary-type programs. The three prisons (to be called Benign, Partial, and Lock) were ranked on a continuum ranging from a strong treatment orientation to a strong custodial orientation.[4]

Camp Benign ranked as the most treatment-oriented institution, as all three criteria were present. In addition, it was the smallest, containing only ninety-seven inmates. This prison was characterized by considerable staff-inmate interaction, maximal opportunities for counseling and guidance,[5] and a sincere effort directed at

E. L. Hartley [eds.], *Readings in Social Psychology* [rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1952]). For an excellent study dealing with similar concerns in juvenile institutions which was published too late for comment in this paper, see David Street, "Inmates in Custodial and Treatment Settings," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (February, 1965), 40-56.

[3] The replicated study was: Oscar Grusky, "Organizational Goals and the Behavior of Informal Leaders," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV, No. 1 (July, 1959), 59-67. Sociology is characterized by a lack of replication studies, particularly in the area of social organization. In his analysis of replication studies, Hanson noted fewer than twenty-five such studies in the field of sociology, with fully one-third of these refuting the original hypothesis. This would appear to leave sociology in the position of having relatively few sets of propositions which have been independently tested in different research sites. This condition neither contributes to the development of a cumulative fund of reliable knowledge, nor does it permit of the development of a set of standardized instruments which can be used to compare different types of organizations. See Robert Hanson, "Evidence and Procedure Characteristics of 'Reliable' Propositions in Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (January, 1958), 357-71. This replication was enhanced by the use of the same instruments in two new prison camps in addition to a repeat investigation of the prison originally studied by Grusky. Moreover, we utilized Grusky's questionnaire items and Guttman scales.

[4] It is important to keep in mind that all three prison camps would be located on the treatment end of the continuum if compared with maximum-security institutions.

[5] One cannot overlook the possible importance of the size of the prisons, which could provide an additional explanation to the one offered in this paper. However, the fact that Benign almost doubled in size between the original study and the replication, while inmate attitudes remained relatively unchanged, casts some doubt on its usefulness in accounting for our findings. Also, similar data collected on three other juvenile institutions

changing the inmate. Camp Partial was slightly larger (127 inmates) and had both a full-time counselor and a limited educational program. However, it did not have an official treatment program. Treatment techniques employed in this institution tended to be subverted to custodial ends, such as securing inmate conformity. Camp Lock, which had 157 inmates, was the most custodially oriented institution, the sole rehabilitative program being an Alcoholics Anonymous group. Its primary goal was containment, and there was little official pretense or concern about treatment or rehabilitation. The officials sought to run an institution which attracted as little attention as possible from the community.

THE FINDINGS

Inmate attitudes.—The first area investigated was the differences in attitudes of inmates of the treatment and custodial prisons. Numerous observers have asserted that the relationship between guards and inmates in custodial institutions is characterized by hostility, mistrust, suspicion, and fear, promulgated by both the official dictates of the prison and the informal norms among the inmates.[6] Grusky, Vinter and Janowitz, and others have argued that a positive and co-operative type of staff-inmate relationship is a prerequisite for and a consequence of treatment goals. This is due primarily to accepting attitudes on the part of the staff, the over-all replacement of formal controls by more informal ones, and the general reduction of inmate deprivations.

Grusky found support for the hypothesis that more positive attitudes among inmates are found in treatment, rather than in custodial institutions. By comparing attitudinal responses of inmates in three institutions, each situated in a different position along the treatment-custodial continuum, we were able to test this same hypothesis more carefully than could be done in the original case study.

As in the original study, inmate attitudes in three areas were examined: attitudes toward the prison, staff, and treatment program. Table 1 demonstrates a positive relationship between favorable inmate response toward the prison and the degree of development of its treatment goals. Where about six out of ten of Benign's inmates were positively oriented toward the prison (63 per cent), not quite five of ten of Partial's inmates (48 per cent) and less than four of ten of the inmates at Lock (39 per cent), the most custodially oriented prison of the three, had positive feelings toward their institutions. A similar pattern is revealed concerning attitudes toward the staff. At Benign, 44 per cent of the men had favorable attitudes toward the staff, whereas only 29 per cent at Partial and 23 per cent at Lock were as positively oriented toward the staff. The third area of inmate attitudes investigated were those toward existing programs. These attitudes were also found, as expected, to be related to the goals of the

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did not show attitudes to be related to size as such; rather, it confirmed the importance of organizational goals. This is not to discard the importance of size, since it may have important ramifications for organizational structure which, in turn, influences informal organization. There was also a selectivity in the inmates sent to Benign, which will be dealt with in this paper.

[6] Donald Clemmer, *The Prison Community* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1958), chap. ii; Donald Clemmer, "Observations on Imprisonment as a Source of Criminality," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XLI (September–October, 1950), 311–19; R. J. Corsini, "A Study of Certain Attitudes of Prison Inmates," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXXVII (July–August, 1946), 132–42; Donald Cressey (ed.), *The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organization and Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961); Lloyd W. McCorkle and Richard Korn, "Resocialization Within the Walls," *Annals*, CCXCIII (May, 1954), 88–98; Hans Reimer, "Socialization Within the Prison Community," *Proceedings of the American Prison Association* (1937), pp. 151–55; Gresham M. Sykes, *The Society of Captives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958); Gresham Sykes and Sheldon L. Messinger, "The Inmate Social System" in *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison* (Social Science Research Council Pamphlet No. 15 [March, 1960]), pp. 5–19; Robert Vinter and Morris Janowitz, *op. cit.*

prison. At Benign, 89 per cent of the men felt that the program had helped them, as compared with 82 per cent of the men at Partial, and 75 per cent of the men at Lock who expressed similar views. Attitudes toward the programs were the most positive and reflected, in part, the salience of the program which, in turn, was due to the official support for treatment goals. In short, Grusky's original hypothesis was strongly confirmed.[7] Significant differences were found between the prison which was most custodially oriented and the one most treatment-oriented.

The effects of socialization.—In order to give a sharper test to the proposition, the length of residence in the institution was held constant. In this manner, the consequences of official socialization could be examined. It would be expected that the longer the inmate was exposed to the values and programs of the prison, the more likely he would be influenced by them; that is, inmates who have spent a long time in the prison should most clearly reflect the impact of the prison on their attitudes, and those who have been there only a short time should be least affected.

The data presented in Figure 1 show a strong relationship between attitude toward the staff and length of time spent in the prison. Inmates who had spent longer time in the custodially oriented prison were more likely to hold negative attitudes than those who had only been there a few months, whereas the reverse was true at the treatment-oriented prison where inmates who had spent a long time in the prison were more likely to hold positive attitudes than negative ones.[8] When those inmates at Benign who had spent fewer than three months in the prison were compared with those who had spent more than eight months there, we found that only about one of three (35 per cent) of the former, as contrasted with about half (56 per cent) of the latter, fell into the most favorable scale type. At Camp Lock the reverse was found true. The proportion of positive responses dropped sharply from 27 per cent of the inmates who had been there less than three months to less than 9 per cent of those who had been there eight or more months. Camp Partial exhibited a mild positive influence, reflecting its intermediate position.[9]

TABLE 1

INMATE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRISON, STAFF, AND PROGRAM

	Benign (Per Cent)	Partial (Per Cent)	Lock (Per Cent)
Attitudes toward the prison [a]			
Favorable (Scale Types I–II)	63.1	48.2	39.1
Attitudes toward the staff [b]			
Favorable (Scale Types I–II)	44.3	29.2	23.4
Attitudes toward the program [c]			
Favorable (Item response "yes")	88.8	81.9	74.8
N=	(95)	(124)	(138)

[a] For a description of scale see O. Grusky, "Treatment Goals and Organizational Behavior" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation [University of Michigan, 1958]), p. 141. The coefficients of reproducibility for this scale were Benign .91, Partial .90, and Lock .93. The coefficients of scalability were .54, .77, and .81, respectively. A difference of over 12.5 per cent between the camps is significant at the .05 level by a difference-of-proportions test.

[b] The coefficients of reproducibility for this scale were Benign .88, Partial .91, and Lock .92; for scalability, they were .53, .75, and .77, respectively.

[c] Only a single item, "Do you feel 'the program' has helped you in any way?" was available. No answer: Benign 2, Partial 3, Lock 19.

[7] In comparing Grusky's results with our own, there was remarkable agreement in the percentages of positive responses.

[8] In an excellent study of socialization within the prison, Wheeler demonstrates similar findings in regard to "prisonization," a phenomenon related to both attitudes toward society and the prison. His findings show that the longer the time the inmate spent in the prison, the less conforming his attitudes were with those of the staff, reflecting his internalization of the prison culture. See Stanton Wheeler, "Socialization in Correctional Communities," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (October, 1961), 697–712.

[9] It should be pointed out that a smaller proportion of fairly recent (0–3 months) inmates of Partial than those from the more custodial Lock demonstrated favorable attitudes toward the staff. However, the percentage of favorable responses in-

In Figure 2, the same general relationship is revealed with respect to attitudes toward the prison, but not quite as clearly. The proportion of inmates at Lock who were favorably oriented decreased slightly from 36 per cent of those whose stay was short-term to 31 per cent of those having a longer-term stay in the prison. In con-

creased steadily with experience in the former institution, and decreased steadily in the latter. A greater proportion of favorable responses was evidenced at all time periods among inmates of the highly treatment-oriented Benign than among those of both the other prisons. We inferred that inmates of Benign were apparently more receptive to the staff initially, their receptivity then declined, but ultimately were most favorable among those inmates with eight or more months of experience. Of course, the sample survey design which we used has the weakness of providing data only for a particular slice of time. Re-surveys or panel studies are required to assess clearly the effect of prison experience on attitudes.

FIG. 1.—Relationship of attitudes toward staff to length of time spent in prison. The N's from which percentages were based for the 0–3 month period were: Benign 26, Partial 33, and Lock 55. For the 4–7 month period, they were 36, 35, and 44, respectively. And for the 8+ month period, they were 30, 59, and 35.

trast, the percentage of favorable responses increased at Benign from 50 per cent of those having less than three months' experience to 64 per cent of those who had eight or more months in prison. However, in both prisons, inmates with four-seven months' experience were most negative.[10]

Influence of other variables.—Before any conclusions could be drawn from these findings, it was necessary to control for other relevant variables, since an important obstacle to studies of this nature is that inmates are not usually randomly assigned to treatment institutions. This was true of this study as well, in that inmates at Benign were younger and likely to have been less serious offenders. However, this type of selectivity does not ap-

[10] Wheeler, *op. cit.*, found a similar U-shaped pattern in regard to conforming attitudes held by inmates and attributed this to the stage of the inmate's institutional career. Inmates in the last phase of their institutionalization were believed to shed prison culture as they anticipate leaving the prison and returning to society.

FIG. 2.—Relationship of attitudes toward prison and length of time spent in prison. The N's from which percentages were based are the same as for Fig. 1.

pear to have accounted for the results obtained in this study. *Age:* Initially, it might have been argued that the older age of the inmates at Lock and Partial would be sufficient to account for the more negative attitudes found there. Our findings, on the contrary, show age to be inversely related to negative attitude at both Lock and Benign, with the younger inmates in both camps more likely to hold negative attitudes. No difference was found at Partial. Furthermore, young inmates were more positive at Benign than their counterparts at Lock. The same was true for older inmates. This would suggest that selectivity in regard to age would operate against the hypothesis. *Type of offender:* It similarly could have been argued that inmates at Partial and Lock were more experienced and hardened criminals, well indoctrinated in the ways of crime and would, therefore, exhibit more negative attitudes. We may ask, first, whether this is true and, second, if so, is this factor large enough to account for the differences obtained between the prisons? Again, the findings show, in contradiction to what is commonly believed, that the more serious offenders, by a variety of measures, did not have more negative attitudes. On the contrary, these two variables were generally unrelated. In the few cases where differences were found, they were small and variable. Furthermore, the direction of this relationship was reversed in the treatment institution, where the more serious offenders were more likely to hold more positive attitudes than the less serious offenders. And, finally, when comparable groups of types of offenders were compared in the various camps, they were more positive in their attitudes at Benign than at Lock.[11]

It would appear (see Table 2) that the selectivity in regard to age and type of offender would not be sufficient to account for the differences obtained in this study, and certainly could not account for the differences between Partial and Lock, since there was little difference in the types of inmates sent to those two camps. It should be pointed out, however, that inmates at Benign were more positive during the early period than inmates at the other camps, which may have been partly due to a selectivity, or may have resulted from the camp having had an initial positive impact on inmate attitudes. In any case, whatever differences existed in the nature of the inmates in the organization initially as a result of differential recruitment procedures, inmates became more positive over time in the treatment institution and more negative in the custodial one, reflecting the differential impact of the organization upon its members.

By these tests, then, it appears that, regardless of any selectivity in input, the differences between prisons were responsible for attitudinal differences.

Informal organization.—These attitudinal differences between prisons reflected major differences in the nature of the informal organization among prison inmates

Support for this assertion is reflected in the finding that attitudes of inmates were related to the degree of their involvement in the inmate subculture. Attitudes appeared to be acquired as a result of informal socialization and participation in prison subculture, and reflected those informal standards held by its members.

Involvement and participation in the

[11] The total time spent by the inmate in confinement in any institution was also found to be related to negative attitudes; the longer the time spent in custodial institutions, the more negative the attitude. This, of course, supports the argument that it is the prison experience as such which is largely responsible for the development of negative attitudes. Selectivity did exist, however, in that all inmates sent to prison camps to begin with were not believed to be security risks by the prison officials. It should be pointed out in this connection that inmates in all camps were, as a whole, positively oriented toward their institutions, staff, and programs. Whether this finding can be attributed to an initial selectivity in inmates sent to camps, or whether this is a reflection of the differences between maximum- and minimum-security prisons, generally, cannot be settled by this research design. The amount of variance accounted for by characteristics of members in an organization has not been clearly established by research findings.

subculture was measured by the number of friendship choices the inmate received from other inmates. Three types of inmates were distinguished: the uninvolved or isolate who received no choices, the moderately involved who received from one to three choices, and the highly involved who received four or more friendship choices. Table 3 shows that at Benign isolates were the most negative and the highly involved inmates the most positive in their attitudes toward the prison. At Lock, the reverse was true with the highly involved inmates the most negative and the uninvolved inmates the most positive in their attitudes. At Partial, negative attitudes were related to both high and low involvement in the subculture. It is not immediately clear why moderately involved inmates at Partial were more positive than isolates. In all three prisons, however, favorableness of attitude was related to degree of involvement with the informal organization.[12]

Informal leadership.—Further evidence of the impact of custodial and treatment goals on informal organization among prison inmates was found in the kinds of attitudes held by informal leaders in the various prisons.

[12] Wheeler's study, *op. cit.*, also demonstrated a relationship between the speed and degree of "prisonization" and involvement in informal inmate organization

TABLE 2

INMATE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRISON BY AGE AND TYPE OF OFFENDER

(Per Cent in Most Favorable Scale Type)

	Benign (Per Cent)	N	Partial (Per Cent)	N	Lock (Per Cent)	N
Age:						
25 years and under	47 6	(86)	36 3	(11)	11 1	(18)
26+	77 7	(9)	35 4	(111)	35 9	(114)
Number of prison sentences:						
1	48 6	(70)	37 1	(62)	34 2	(76)
2 or more	56 0	(25)	35 1	(61)	29 3	(58)
Number of charged crimes:						
1 3	45 9	(61)	31 9	(47)	35 5	(45)
4+	65 3	(26)	39 6	(63)	33 3	(70)
Seriousness of crimes:*						
Less serious crimes	50 0	(18)	47 5	(59)	30 8	(39)
More serious crimes	50 0	(74)	34 7	(59)	31 6	(76)

* When more than one crime was charged, the most serious was coded Serious crimes were regarded as murder, rape, and assault The less serious crimes consisted in robbery, burglary, larceny, etc

TABLE 3

DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMAL SYSTEM AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRISON*

(Per Cent in Most Favorable Scale Type)

	Benign (Per Cent)	N	Partial (Per Cent)	N	Lock (Per Cent)	N
Isolates (received no choices)	33 3	(15)	32 4	(37)	33 3	(75)
Moderately involved (received 1 3 choices)	50 6	(63)	38 5	(78)	30 2	(59)
Highly involved (received 4+ choices)	64 6	(17)	25 0	(12)	20 0	(5)

* Involvement measured by the number of friendship choices received by the inmate.

Both Schrag's[13] and Grusky's studies dealt with the relationship between leaders and organizational goals. Schrag asserted that leaders were uniformly selected from among the most negative inmates. In contrast, Grusky hypothesized that orientation of the leader would vary with the type of total institution; specifically, informal leaders in treatment institutions were seen as more likely to be co-operative than their counterparts in custodially oriented prisons.

TABLE 4

LEADERSHIP AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PRISON

(Per Cent in Most Favorable Scale Type)

	Benign (Per Cent)	N	Partial (Per Cent)	N	Lock (Per Cent)	N
Leaders.....	61.3	(31)	47.5	(50)	23.3	(37)
Non-leaders.	45.3	(66)	35.5	(77)	34.3	(97)

TABLE 5

LEADERSHIP AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PROGRAM[a]

(Per Cent Favorable)

	Benign (Per Cent)	N	Partial (Per Cent)	N	Lock (Per Cent)	N
Leaders.....	74.2	(31)	47.6	(50)	39.3	(37)
Non-leaders.	62.5	(66)	48.0	(77)	63.5	(97)

[a] The particular item asked if they thought the programs in the camp were a good idea.

Consistent with Grusky's hypothesis, leaders at Benign were more positive in their attitudes than were leaders at Partial who, in turn, were more positive than those at Lock.[14] However, this might have been true for any sample of inmates, because inmates were, as a whole, more positive at Benign than at Lock. By comparing the leaders with the non-leaders within each prison, a more precise test of this relationship was obtained. Tables 4 and 5 show leaders were more positive than the non-leaders at Benign, while the reverse was true at Lock where the leaders were more negative than the non-leaders. This relationship was found to hold both for attitudes toward the prison and the institution's programs.

OBSERVATIONS ABOUT INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

The function of informal organization in total institutions.—Having replicated Grusky's study and substantiated the hypothesis, we sought to develop a fuller explanation of the findings. Inmate attitudes reflect the nature of inmate subculture and informal organization which, in turn, is conditioned by formal organizational characteristics, such as the formal structure and the official objectives.

Informal organization develops in prison because: (1) inmates are isolated from society; (2) institutionalization generates common problems of adjustment[15] which require co-operation for their solution while simultaneously providing a situation with opportunity for effective interaction with others similarly situated;[16] and (3) inmates are members of a formal organization which, by its very nature as a system of action, can never fully anticipate or co-ordinate all behavior through

[13] Clarence Schrag, "Leadership among Prison Inmates," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (February, 1954), 37-42.

[14] Leaders were designated in accordance with Grusky's and Schrag's studies, *op. cit.*

[15] In the typical custodial prison, social rejection; pervasive and rigid social control; and loss of liberty, autonomy, respect, affection, heterosexual relationships, security, and self-esteem have been identified as problems which inmates experience. Because these problems often require the co-operation of others for their solution, strong pressures for a collective response are built up. As cohesion develops among the inmates, a reduction of deprivations is experienced; and, conversely, as it decreases, an increase in the irritants of prison life is experienced. In this manner systematic pressures for a collective solution are created (cf. Sykes and Messinger, *op. cit.*).

[16] Cf. Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), chap. iii, for a penetrating analysis of the formation of subcultures.

the formal system alone; hence, informal organization serves to close the gaps of the formal organization.

Two kinds of informal organization have ben identified in the prisons studied—one supportive of the official structure and the other in opposition to it. We submit that the goal of treatment encourages the development of the former, and the goal of custody the latter.

Inmate subcultures develop as solutions to the problems and deprivations experienced by inmates in the prison situation. They would, therefore, differ in their form and content as the nature of the problems experienced by inmates, particularly those created by the institutional experience itself, differ. The two different types of informal organization developed because the inmate subsystem performed contrasting functions in the treatment and custodial institutions.

Two reasons may be suggested to explain the character of the inmate subculture in the custodial institution; first, the problems faced by inmates tend to be more severe there; in addition, inmates perceive the custodial institution itself to be responsible for their problems. As a result, they band together in opposition to the prison and its administration, which they see as the source of their frustrations.[17] Consequently, inmate subcultures tend to become more and more dominated by the values of professional criminals which already emphasize a strict demarcation between the guards and inmates, since these groups are seen as fundamentally in opposition to one another.

The emergence of this subculture compounds an already difficult problem—a central concern, in fact, of the custodial institution—that of maintaining social control within the prison. Since techniques for insuring conformity are inadequate, guards resort to various methods of accommodation and bargain for conformity with the means available to them.[18] One method, as Sykes points out, is to "buy compliance at the cost of tolerating deviance." In return for the guards overlooking selected infractions of the rules, inmates are expected to comply with the rest. In this fashion, inmates begin to regulate their own behavior and, in so doing, begin to fulfil, in part, the formal organization's task of maintaining internal order. The more effectively they are able to exert control over their behavior, the more advantageous is their bargaining position vis-à-vis the guards—a process which itself has a further consolidating effect upon inmate subculture. In this manner, inmates are able to gain some degree of freedom from the demands and pressures of the formal organization, thereby increasing the relative amount of control they can exercise over the conditions of their existence.[19] This newly gained mastery over their environmental conditions is, however, illusory. It would appear that they have merely traded their previous situation and its attendant deprivations for subjugation to an even more despotic ruling group—other inmates who

[17] McCorkle, for example, has argued that the major problem the inmate social system attempts to cope with is social rejection and that inmates defend threats to their self-esteem by "rejecting the rejectors," a process which allows inmates to maintain favorable self-images in a situation where the formal organization imposes self-definitions which are unacceptable or threatening. This is accomplished by devaluing either the importance or legitimacy of persons imposing such definitions. L. S. McCorkle and R. Korn, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–95.

[18] Gresham Sykes, *op. cit.*; Richard Cloward, "Social Control in the Prison," in *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison*, *op. cit.*, and others have pointed out problems endemic to the custodial institution in maintaining social control, the most important of these being the lack of an internalized sense of duty on the part of inmates, the limitations upon the use of force, the difficulties involved in segregating rule violators, the lack of effective inducements, and the strains inherent in the role of the guard.

[19] See Richard McCleery, "Communication Patterns As Bases of Systems of Authority and Power," in *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison*, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of relations between formal and informal power structures.

have less compunctions and fewer limitations about the use of force and violence to gain compliance with their ends. Thus, in reality, freedom is usually only temporary, as inmate leaders quickly replace the official demands for conformity with new demands for conformity to new rules which sustain their dominance.

In contrast to this picture of informal organization in custodial institutions, we can view the development of informal organization in treatment institutions. While inmate organization can also be found in treatment institutions, it does not generally take on an oppositional character. It does not simply because many of the psychological deprivations of imprisonment have been reduced, and a shift in patterns of control has occurred. Inmates are treated with more respect by the organization and, as a result, the institution is not perceived by inmates to be totally against them or antithetical to their interests. In addition, the treatment institution is more flexible in regard to its rules, and treatment needs of inmates are considered in its demands for conformity. Furthermore, in its attempt to regulate behavior, formal methods of controls are replaced by more informal ones, thus reducing resentment and hostility. This leads to a greater tolerance in the range of inmate conformity and, concomitantly, "control" becomes less important in the hierarchy of organization objectives. Accordingly, there is little payoff from the administration for inmates' regulation of their own behavior.

Selected aspects of the formal organization's structure also have an impact on informal organization. Particularly in total institutions, the formal authority structure serves as a model for the informal. The custodially oriented prison, which is usually highly centralized, tends to produce a similar type of informal inmate leadership; for such an adaptation serves, on the one hand, to strengthen official control and administration of the prison and, on the other, to stabilize inmate relations by focusing attention on the deprivations inflicted by the authorities. Because inmate subculture there is dominated by criminal values emphasizing a strict demarcation between guards and inmates, informal leadership must thereby justify itself by securing special concessions from the oppressors, the "screws," in return for which the leaders prevent their men from stepping too far out of line. The typical inmate in such a situation is confronted with few alternatives and usually accepts the values and the leadership as it is presented to him, thereby perpetuating the subculture.

The inmate subsystems are seen as performing different functions within their respective institutions which, as we have seen, are directly linked to the goals of the prison. In the custodial prison, even though oppositional and subversive to the organization, it also functioned to assist it in the maintenance of internal order by regulating inmate behavior, though this is usually at the cost of the "corruption of the formal authority system." In contrast, control of inmate behavior was not a primary function of informal organization in the treatment institution. Informal organization there was more compatible with the formal organization and was more oriented toward meeting the particular needs of inmates and integrating and coordinating their behavior.

The functioning of informal leaders was, in turn, directly linked to the functions performed by the inmate subsystem, and, as a consequence, the informal leaders' main task in the custodial prison was one of exercising control over the behavior of other inmates. In order to effectively implement this end, the informal leadership employed the same techniques as the formal organization and developed a highly consolidated and centralized power structure. And, like the formal organization, it also relied upon coercion and force, rather than on consensus or co-operation, to insure conformity.

In contrast, the informal leaders in the treatment institution, because the treat-

ment goal allowed for a broader range of inmate adaptation, performed a variety of functions depending on the particular needs of the inmates, and functioned more as co-ordinators and integrators of behavior rather than as controllers, as they did in the custodial prison. Not only did the informal leaders play very different roles in the two types of prisons, but techniques of leadership differed as well, since the inmate subsystem in the treatment institution tended to be based more upon consensus and co-operation than was true of the custodial prison.

These speculations led to a new hypothesis about the structure and functioning of informal leadership in the different types of prisons. As we have pointed out, one of the techniques for maintaining order in the custodial prison was the *centralization of control* by informal leadership. Because this function was less important for the inmate subsystem in the treatment institution, it was hypothesized that the more treatment-oriented the prison, the less centralized the informal leadership structure would be and the proportionately greater number of inmates who would emerge as top leaders.

The data supported this hypothesis. At Benign, 9.3 per cent of the inmates were chosen as top leaders (that is, received nine or more choices), while at Partial 6.3 per cent were chosen, compared with only 1.3 per cent of the inmates at Lock. When inmates were asked: "Who were leaders?" similar results were obtained. Forty-three per cent of the inmates at Benign were named, compared with 38 per cent at Partial and 23 per cent at Lock.[20] Both measures indicated greater concentration of power and centralization of control in the custodial prison.

A second technique, adopted by inmate leaders in the custodial prison to control inmate behavior, was the use of coercion to secure conformity and to maintain power. This led to a hypothesis dealing with types of persons likely to rise to positions of leadership or influence in the two types of prisons. Because *control* was an important function of the inmate leaders in the custodial prison, individuals disposed toward such behavior would be more likely to rise to positions of leadership there than would be true of treatment prisons where a more charismatic, socioemotional, or consensus-oriented type of leader would be expected to develop. Therefore, it was hypothesized that leaders in the custodial institution would be more authoritarian, reflecting their "tough-minded" orientation toward the use of power, and would be "less well liked," due to their reliance upon coercion and emphasis upon control than leaders in treatment institutions. Support for this hypothesis comes from the finding that leaders were selected from the most authoritarian inmates at Lock, whereas the reverse was true at Benign, where leaders were selected from the least authoritarian inmates.[21] Not only was the leadership structure more decentralized at Benign, but the leadership positions were occupied there, as well, by less authoritarian persons. Furthermore, leaders at Benign were less authoritarian than those at Partial who, in turn, were less authoritarian than the leaders found at Lock. No difference in authoritar-

[20] In part, some of the differences between camps in the proportions of top leaders was a function of the numbers of nominations made by respondents in the different camps. Whether the number of nominations reflects the number of actual leaders is directly linked to the difficult problem of validity in the use of sociometric techniques which cannot be dealt with here.

[21] Leaders were more authoritarian than non-leaders at Lock and less authoritarian than non-leaders at Benign. At Lock, 48.5 per cent of the leaders as compared with 39 per cent of the non-leaders gave authoritarian responses to a question asking if they would harshly discipline an angry employee while, at Benign, only 33.3 per cent of the leaders as compared with 47.6 per cent of the non-leaders responded in such an authoritarian fashion. At Partial, 40.5 per cent of the leaders and 52.0 per cent of the non-leaders responded in an authoritarian fashion

ianism was found between the general population of inmates at the three prisons. In addition to their being less authoritarian, the leaders at Benign were liked better, friendlier, and more approachable by other inmates than was true of the leaders at Lock.[22] This style of leadership is reflected in the findings that leaders at Benign were more likely to be chosen by other inmates as "well liked," a "best buddy," and as someone with whom they could discuss their personal problems, than was true of the leaders at Camp Lock. Camp Partial once again was found to exhibit an intermediate position with regard to its leaders.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was twofold: (1) to replicate a study conducted by Grusky; and (2) to examine the consequences of treatment and custodial goals upon the inmate subsystem within correctional institutions, with particular emphasis on the conditions generating oppositional informal organization. Three areas of concern were inmate attitudes, the effect of socialization, and the development of informal leadership.

1. The findings on the whole supported Grusky's major hypothesis: Inmates were more positive in their attitudes toward the institution, staff, and programs in th treatment institution than those in th custodial one. Furthermore, they becan more positive or negative with the lengt of time they spent in the prison, dependin upon the type of organizational goa thereby suggesting that it was the prisc experience which was primarily responsib for the development of negative attitude

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COMMENTARY AND DEBATE

Sociological Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead

My purpose is to depict the nature of human society when seen from the point of view of George Herbert Mead. While Mead gave human society a position of paramount importance in his scheme of thought he did little to outline its character. His central concern was with cardinal problems of philosophy. The development of his ideas of human society was largely limited to handling these problems. His treatment took the form of showing that human group life was the essential condition for the emergence of consciousness, the mind, a world of objects, human beings as organisms possessing selves, and human conduct in the form of constructed acts. He reversed the traditional assumptions underlying philosophical, psychological, and sociological thought to the effect that human beings possess minds and consciousness as original "givens," that they live in worlds of pre-existing and self-constituted objects, that their behavior consists of responses to such objects, and that group life consists of the association of such reacting human organisms. In making his brilliant contributions along this line he did not map out a theoretical scheme of human society. However, such a scheme is implicit in his work. It has to be constructed by tracing the implications of the central matters which he analyzed. This is what I propose to do. The central matters I shall consider are (1) the self, (2) the act, (3) social interaction, (4) objects, and (5) joint action.

THE SELF

Mead's picture of the human being as an actor differs radically from the conception of man that dominates current psychological and social science. He saw the human being as an organism having a self. The possession of a self converts the human being into a special kind of actor, transforms his relation to the world, and gives his action a unique character. In asserting that the human being has a self, Mead simply meant that the human being is an object to himself. The human being may perceive himself, have conceptions of himself, communicate with himself, and act toward himself. As these types of behavior imply, the human being may become the object of his own action. This gives him the means of interacting with himself—addressing himself, responding to the address, and addressing himself anew. Such self-interaction takes the form of making indications to himself and meeting these indications by making further indications. The human being can designate things to himself—his wants, his pains, his goals, objects around him, the presence of others, their actions, their expected actions, or whatnot. Through further interaction with himself, he may judge, analyze, and evaluate the things he has designated to himself. And by continuing to interact with himself he may plan and organize his action with regard to what he has designated and evaluated. In short, the possession of a self provides the human being with a mechanism of self-interaction with which to meet the world—a mechanism that is used in forming and guiding his conduct.

I wish to stress that Mead saw the self as a process and not as a structure. Here Mead clearly parts company with the great bulk of students who seek to bring a self into the human being by identifying it with some kind of organization or structure. All of us are familiar with this practice because it is all around us in the literature. Thus, we see scholars who

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3. The informal leadership structure was also found to be more centralized in the custodial institution in an attempt to maintain more effective control over inmate behavior. The informal leaders among the inmates played different roles, depending upon organizational goals and contexts; and these roles were directly linked to the function of the inmate subculture within the prison. Leaders in the custodial prison were also found to be more authoritarian and less well liked than leaders in the treatment prison, reflecting the differences in their roles.

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I wish to stress that Mead saw the self as a process and not as a structure. Here Mead clearly parts company with the great bulk of students who seek to bring a self into the human being by identifying it with some kind of organization or structure. All of us are familiar with this practice because it is all around us in the literature. Thus, we see scholars who

identify the self with the "ego," or who regard the self as an organized body of needs or motives, or who think of it as an organization of attitudes, or who treat it as a structure of internalized norms and values. Such schemes which seek to lodge the self in a structure make no sense since they miss the reflexive process which alone can yield and constitute a self. For any posited structure to be a self, it would have to act upon and respond to itself—otherwise, it is merely an organization awaiting activation and release without exercising any effect on itself or on its operation. This marks the crucial weakness or inadequacy of the many schemes such as referred to above, which misguidingly associate the self with some kind of psychological or personality structure. For example, the ego, as such, is not a self; it would be a self only by becoming reflexive, that is to say, acting toward or on itself. And the same thing is true of any other posited psychological structure. Yet, such reflexive action changes both the status and the character of the structure and elevates the process of self-interaction to the position of major importance.

We can see this in the case of the reflexive process that Mead has isolated in the human being. As mentioned, this reflexive process takes the form of the person making indications to himself, that is to say, noting things and determining their significance for his line of action. To indicate something is to stand over against it and to put oneself in the position of acting toward it instead of automatically responding to it. In the face of something which one indicates, one can withhold action toward it, inspect it, judge it, ascertain its meaning, determine its possibilities, and direct one's action with regard to it. With the mechanism of self-interaction the human being ceases to be a responding organism whose behavior is a product of what plays upon him from the outside, the inside, or both. Instead, he acts toward his world by interpreting what confronts him and organizing his action on the basis of the interpretation. To illustrate: a pain one identifies and interprets is very different from a mere organic feeling and lays the basis for doing something about it instead of merely responding organically to it; to note and interpret the activity of another person is very different from having a response released by that activity; to be aware that one is hungry is very different from merely being hungry; to perceive one's "ego" puts one in the position of doing something with regard to it instead of merely giving expression to the ego. As these illustrations show, the process of self-interaction puts the human being over against his world instead of merely in it, requires him to meet and handle his world through a defining process instead of merely responding to it, and forces him to construct his action instead of merely releasing it. This is the kind of acting organism that Mead sees man to be as a result of having a self.[1]

THE ACT

Human action acquires a radically different character as a result of being formed through a process of self-interaction. Action is built up in coping with the world instead of merely being released from a pre-existing psychological structure by factors playing on that structure. By making indications to himself and by interpreting what he indicates, the human being has to forge or piece together a line of action. In order to act the individual has to identify what he wants, establish an objective or goal, map out a prospective line of behavior, note and interpret the actions of others, size up his situation, check himself at this or that point, figure out what to do at other points, and fre-

[1] The self, or indeed human being, is not brought into the picture merely by introducing psychological elements, such as motives and interests, alongside of societal elements. Such additions merely compound the error of the omission. This is the flaw in George Homan's presidential address on "Bringing Man Back In" (*American Sociological Review*, XXIX, No. 6, 809–18).

quently spur himself on in the face of dragging dispositions or discouraging settings. The fact that the human act is self-directed or built up means in no sense that the actor necessarily exercises excellence in its construction. Indeed, he may do a very poor job in constructing his act. He may fail to note things of which he should be aware, he may misinterpret things that he notes, he may exercise poor judgment, he may be faulty in mapping out prospective lines of conduct, and he may be half-hearted in contending with recalcitrant dispositions. Such deficiencies in the construction of his acts do not belie the fact that his acts are still constructed by him out of what he takes into account. What he takes into account are the things that he indicates to himself. They cover such matters as his wants, his feelings, his goals, the actions of others, the expectations and demands of others, the rules of his group, his situation, his conceptions of himself, his recollections, and his images of prospective lines of conduct. He is not in the mere recipient position of responding to such matters; he stands over against them and has to handle them. He has to organize or cut out his lines of conduct on the basis of how he does handle them.

This way of viewing human action is directly opposite to that which dominates psychological and social sciences. In these sciences human action is seen as a product of factors that play upon or through the human actor. Depending on the preference of the scholar, such determining factors may be physiological stimulations, organic drives, needs, feelings, unconscious motives, conscious motives, sentiments, ideas, attitudes, norms, values, role requirements, status demands, cultural prescriptions, institutional pressures, or social-system requirements. Regardless of which factors are chosen, either singly or in combination, action is regarded as their product and hence is explained in their terms. The formula is simple: Given factors play on the human being to produce given types of behavior. The formula is frequently amplified so as to read: Under specified conditions, given factors playing on a given organization of the human being will produce a given type of behavior. The formula, in either its simple or amplified form, represents the way in which human action is seen in theory and research. Under the formula the human being becomes a mere medium or forum for the operation of the factors that produce the behavior. Mead's scheme is fundamentally different from this formula. In place of being a mere medium for operation of determining factors that play upon him, the human being is seen as an active organism in his own right, facing, dealing with, and acting toward the objects he indicates. Action is seen as conduct which is constructed by the actor instead of response elicited from some kind of preformed organization in him. We can say that the traditional formula of human action fails to recognize that the human being is a self. Mead's scheme, in contrast, is based on this recognition.

SOCIAL INTERACTION

I can give here only a very brief sketch of Mead's highly illuminating analysis of social interaction. He identified two forms or levels—non-symbolic interaction and symbolic interaction. In non-symbolic interaction human beings respond directly to one another's gestures or actions; in symbolic interaction they interpret each other's gestures and act on the basis of the meaning yielded by the interpretation. An unwitting response to the tone of another's voice illustrates non-symbolic interaction. Interpreting the shaking of a fist as signifying that a person is preparing to attack illustrates symbolic interaction. Mead's concern was predominatly with symbolic interaction. Symbolic interaction involves *interpretation*, or ascertaining the meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person, and *definition*, or conveying indications to another person as to how he is to act. Human association consists of a process of such interpretation and definition. Through this process the participants

fit their own acts to the ongoing acts of one another and guide others in doing so.

Several important matters need to be noted in the case of symbolic interaction. First, it is a formative process in its own right. The prevailing practice of psychology and sociology is to treat social interaction as a neutral medium, as a mere forum for the operation of outside factors. Thus psychologists are led to account for the behavior of people in interaction by resorting to elements of the psychological equipment of the participants—such elements as motives, feelings, attitudes, or personality organization. Sociologists do the same sort of thing by resorting to societal factors, such as cultural prescriptions, values, social roles, or structural pressures. Both miss the central point that human interaction is a positive shaping process in its own right. The participants in it have to build up their respective lines of conduct by constant interpretation of each other's ongoing lines of action. As participants take account of each other's ongoing acts, they have to arrest, reorganize, or adjust their own intentions, wishes, feelings, and attitudes; similarly, they have to judge the fitness of norms, values, and group prescriptions for the situation being formed by the acts of others. Factors of psychological equipment and social organization are not substitutes for the interpretative process; they are admissible only in terms of how they are handled in the interpretative process. Symbolic interaction has to be seen and studied in its own right.

Symbolic interaction is noteworthy in a second way. Because of it human group life takes on the character of an ongoing process—a continuing matter of fitting developing lines of conduct to one another. The fitting together of the lines of conduct is done through the dual process of definition and interpretation. This dual process operates both to sustain established patterns of joint conduct and to open them to transformation. Established patterns of group life exist and persist only through the continued use of the same schemes of interpretation; and such schemes of interpretation are maintained only through their continued confirmation by the defining acts of others. It is highly important to recognize that the established patterns of group life just do not carry on by themselves but are dependent for their continuity on recurrent affirmative definition. Let the interpretations that sustain them be undermined or disrupted by changed definitions from others and the patterns can quickly collapse. This dependency of interpretations on the defining acts of others also explains why symbolic interaction conduces so markedly to the transformation of the forms of joint activity that make up group life. In the flow of group life there are innumerable points at which the participants are *re*defining each other's acts. Such redefinition is very common in adversary relations, it is frequent in group discussion, and it is essentially intrinsic to dealing with problems. (And I may remark here that no human group is free of problems.) Redefinition imparts a formative character to human interaction, giving rise at this or that point to new objects, new conceptions, new relations, and new types of behavior. In short, the reliance on symbolic interaction makes human group life a developing process instead of a mere issue or product of psychological or social structure.

There is a third aspect of symbolic interaction which is important to note. In making the process of interpretation and definition of one another's acts central in human interaction, symbolic interaction is able to cover the full range of the generic forms of human association. It embraces equally well such relationships as cooperation, conflict, domination, exploitation, consensus, disagreement, closely knit identification, and indifferent concern for one another. The participants in each of such relations have the same common task of constructing their acts by interpreting and defining the acts of each other. The significance of this simple observation be-

comes evident in contrasting symbolic interaction with the various schemes of human interaction that are to be found in the literature. Almost always such schemes construct a general model of human interaction or society on the basis of a particular type of human relationship. An outstanding contemporary instance is Talcott Parsons' scheme which presumes and asserts that the primordial and generic form of human interaction is the "complementarity of expectations." Other schemes depict the basic and generic model of human interaction as being "conflict," others assert it to be "identity through common sentiments," and still others that it is agreement in the form of "consensus." Such schemes are parochial. Their great danger lies in imposing on the breadth of human interaction an image derived from the study of only one form of interaction. Thus, in different hands, human society is said to be fundamentally a sharing of common values; or, conversely, a struggle for power; or, still differently, the exercise of consensus; and so on. The simple point implicit in Mead's analysis of symbolic interaction is that human beings, in interpreting and defining one another's acts, can and do meet each other in the full range of human relations. Proposed schemes of human society should respect this simple point.

OBJECTS

The concept of object is another fundamental pillar in Mead's scheme of analysis. Human beings live in a world or environment of objects, and their activities are formed around objects. This bland statement becomes very significant when it is realized that for Mead objects are human constructs and not self-existing entities with intrinsic natures. Their nature is dependent on the orientation and action of people toward them. Let me spell this out. For Mead, an object is anything that can be designated or referred to. It may be physical as a chair or imaginary as a ghost, natural as a cloud in the sky or man-made as an automobile, material as the Empire State Building or abstract as the concept of liberty, animate as an elephant or inanimate as a vein of coal, inclusive of a class of people as politicians or restricted to a specific person as President de Gaulle, definite as a multiplication table or vague as a philosophical doctrine. In short, objects consist of whatever people indicate or refer to.

There are several important points in this analysis of objects. First, the nature of an object is constituted by the meaning it has for the person or persons for whom it is an object. Second, this meaning is not intrinsic to the object but arises from how the person is initially prepared to act toward it. Readiness to use a chair as something in which to sit gives it the meaning of a chair; to one with no experience with the use of chairs the object would appear with a different meaning, such as a strange weapon. It follows that objects vary in their meaning. A tree is not the same object to a lumberman, a botanist, or a poet; a star is a different object to a modern astronomer than it was to a sheepherder of antiquity; communism is a different object to a Soviet patriot than it is to a Wall Street broker. Third, objects—all objects—are social products in that they are formed and transformed by the defining process that takes place in social interaction. The meaning of the objects—chairs, trees, stars, prostitutes, saints, communism, public education, or whatnot—is formed from the ways in which others refer to such objects or act toward them. Fourth, people are prepared or set to act toward objects on the basis of the meaning of the objects for them. In a genuine sense the organization of a human being consists of his objects, that is, his tendencies to act on the basis of their meanings. Fifth, just because an object is something that is designated, one can organize one's action toward it instead of responding immediately to it; one can inspect the object, think about it, work out a plan of action toward it, or decide whether or not to act toward it. In stand-

ing over against the object in both a logical and psychological sense, one is freed from coercive response to it. In this profound sense an object is different from a stimulus as ordinarily conceived.

This analysis of objects puts human group life into a new and interesting perspective. Human beings are seen as living in a world of meaningful objects—not in an environment of stimuli or self-constituted entities. This world is socially produced in that the meanings are fabricated through the process of social interaction. Thus, different groups come to develop different worlds—and these worlds change as the objects that compose them change in meaning. Since people are set to act in terms of the meanings of their objects, the world of objects of a group represents in a genuine sense its action organization. To identify and understand the life of a group it is necessary to identify its world of objects; this identification has to be in terms of the meanings objects have for the members of the group. Finally, people are not locked to their objects; they may check action toward objects and indeed work out new lines of conduct toward them. This condition introduces into human group life an indigenous source of transformation.

JOINT ACTION

I use the term "joint action" in place of Mead's term "social act." It refers to the larger collective form of action that is constituted by the fitting together of the lines of behavior of the separate participants. Illustrations of joint action are a trading transaction, a family dinner, a marriage ceremony, a shopping expedition, a game, a convivial party, a debate, a court trial, or a war. We note in each instance an identifiable and distinctive form of joint action, comprised by an articulation of the acts of the participants. Joint actions range from a simple collaboration of two individuals to a complex alignment of the acts of huge organizations or institutions. Everywhere we look in a human society we see people engaging in forms of joint action. Indeed, the totality of such instances—in all of their multitudinous variety, their variable connections, and their complex networks—constitutes the life of a society. It is easy to understand from these remarks why Mead saw joint action, or the social act, as the distinguishing characteristic of society. For him, the social act was the fundamental unit of society. Its analysis, accordingly, lays bare the generic nature of society.

To begin with, a joint action cannot be resolved into a common or same type of behavior on the part of the participants. Each participant necessarily occupies a different position, acts from that position, and engages in a separate and distinctive act. It is the fitting together of these acts and not their commonality that constitutes joint action. How do these separate acts come to fit together in the case of human society? Their alignment does not occur through sheer mechanical juggling, as in the shaking of walnuts in a jar or through unwitting adaptation, as in an ecological arrangement in a plant community. Instead, the participants fit their acts together, first, by identifying the social act in which they are about to engage and, second, by interpreting and defining each other's acts in forming the joint act. By identifying the social act or joint action the participant is able to orient himself; he has a key to interpreting the acts of others and a guide for directing his action with regard to them. Thus, to act appropriately, the participant has to identify a marriage ceremony as a marriage ceremony, a holdup as a holdup, a debate as a debate, a war as a war, and so forth. But, even though this identification be made, the participants in the joint action that is being formed still find it necessary to interpret and define one another's ongoing acts. They have to ascertain what the others are doing and plan to do and make indications to one another of what to do.

This brief analysis of joint action enables us to note several matters of distinct

importance. It calls attention, first, to the fact that the essence of society lies in an ongoing process of action—not in a posited structure of relations. Without action, any structure of relations between people is meaningless. To be understood, a society must be seen and grasped in terms of the action that comprises it. Next, such action has to be seen and treated, not by tracing the separate lines of action of the participants—whether the participants be single individuals, collectivities, or organizations—but in terms of the joint action into which the separate lines of action fit and merge. Few students of human society have fully grasped this point or its implications. Third, just because it is built up over time by the fitting together of acts, each joint action must be seen as having a career or a history. In having a career, its course and fate are contingent on what happens during its formation. Fourth, this career is generally orderly, fixed and repetitious by virtue of a common identification or definition of the joint action that is made by its participants. The common definition supplies each participant with decisive guidance in directing his own act so as to fit into the acts of the others. Such common definitions serve, above everything else, to account for the regularity, stability, and repetitiveness of joint action in vast areas of group life; they are the source of the established and regulated social behavior that is envisioned in the concept of culture. Fifth, however, the career of joint actions also must be seen as open to many possibilities of uncertainty. Let me specify the more important of these possibilities. One, joint actions have to be initiated—and they may not be. Two, once started a joint action may be interrupted, abandoned, or transformed. Three, the participants may not make a common definition of the joint action into which they are thrown and hence may orient their acts on different premises. Four, a common definition of a joint action may still allow wide differences in the direction of the separate lines of action and hence in the course taken by the joint action; a war is a good example. Five, new situations may arise calling for hitherto unexisting types of joint action, leading to confused exploratory efforts to work out a fitting together of acts. And, six, even in the context of a commonly defined joint action, participants may be led to rely on other considerations in interpreting and defining each other's lines of action. Time does not allow me to spell out and illustrate the importance of these possibilities. To mention them should be sufficient, however, to show that uncertainty, contingency, and transformation are part and parcel of the process of joint action. To assume that the diversified joint actions which comprise a human society are set to follow fixed and established channels is a sheer gratuitous assumption.

From the foregoing discussion of the self, the act, social interaction, objects, and joint action we can sketch a picture of human society. The picture is composed in terms of action. A society is seen as people meeting the varieties of situations that are thrust on them by their conditions of life. These situations are met by working out joint actions in which participants have to align their acts to one another. Each participant does so by interpreting the acts of others and, in turn, by making indications to others as to how they should act. By virtue of this process of interpretation and definition joint actions are built up; they have careers. Usually, the course of a joint action is outlined in advance by the fact that the participants make a common identification of it; this makes for regularity, stability, and repetitiveness in the joint action. However, there are many joint actions that encounter obstructions, that have no pre-established pathways, and that have to be constructed along new lines. Mead saw human society in this way—as a diversified social process in which people were engaged in forming joint actions to deal with situations confronting them.

This picture of society stands in signifi-

cant contrast to the dominant views of society in the social and psychological sciences—even to those that pretend to view society as action. To point out the major differences in the contrast is the best way of specifying the sociological implications of Mead's scheme of thought.

The chief difference is that the dominant views in sociology and psychology fail, alike, to see human beings as organisms having selves. Instead, they regard human beings as merely responding organisms and, accordingly, treat action as mere response to factors playing on human beings. This is exemplified in the efforts to account for human behavior by such factors as motives, ego demands, attitudes, role requirements, values, status expectations, and structural stresses. In such approaches the human being becomes a mere medium through which such initiating factors operate to produce given actions. From Mead's point of view such a conception grossly misrepresents the nature of human beings and human action. Mead's scheme interposes a process of self-interaction between initiating factors and the action that may follow in their wake. By virtue of self-interaction the human being becomes an acting organism coping with situations in place of being an organism merely responding to the play of factors. And his action becomes something he constructs and directs to meet the situations in place of an unrolling of reactions evoked from him. In introducing the self, Mead's position focuses on how human beings handle and fashion their world, not on disparate responses to imputed factors.

If human beings are, indeed, organisms with selves, and if their action is, indeed, an outcome of a process of self-interaction, schemes that purport to study and explain social action should respect and accommodate these features. To do so, current schemes in sociology and psychology would have to undergo radical revision. They would have to shift from a preoccupation [illegible] initiating factor and terminal result [illegible] preoccupation with a process of formation. They would have to view action as something constructed by the actor instead of something evoked from him. They would have to depict the milieu of action in terms of how the milieu appears to the actor in place of how it appears to the outside student. They would have to incorporate the interpretive process which at present they scarcely deign to touch. They would have to recognize that any given act has a career in which it is constructed but in which it may be interrupted, held in abeyance, abandoned, or recast.

On the methodological or research side the study of action would have to be made from the position of the actor. Since action is forged by the actor out of what he perceives, interprets, and judges, one would have to see the operating situation as the actor sees it, perceive objects as the actor perceives them, ascertain their meaning in terms of the meaning they have for the actor, and follow the actor's line of conduct as the actor organizes it—in short, one would have to take the role of the actor and see his world from his standpoint. This methodological approach stands in contrast to the so-called objective approach so dominant today, namely, that of viewing the actor and his action from the perspective of an outside, detached observer. The "objective" approach holds the danger of the observer substituting his view of the field of action for the view held by the actor. It is unnecessary to add that the actor acts toward his world on the basis of how he sees it and not on the basis of how that world appears to the outside observer.

In continuing the discussion of this matter, I wish to consider especially what we might term the structural conception of human society. This conception views society as established organization, familiar to us in the use of such terms as social structure, social system, status position, social role, social stratification, institutional structure, cultural pattern, social codes, social norms, and social values. The con-

ception presumes that a human society is structured with regard to (*a*) the social positions occupied by the people in it and with regard to (*b*) the patterns of behavior in which they engage. It is presumed further that this interlinked structure of social positions and behavior patterns is the over-all determinant of social action; this is evidenced, of course, in the practice of explaining conduct by such structural concepts as role requirements, status demands, strata differences, cultural prescriptions, values, and norms. Social action falls into two general categories: conformity, marked by adherence to the structure, and deviance, marked by departure from it. Because of the central and determinative position into which it is elevated, structure becomes necessarily the encompassing object of sociological study and analysis—epitomized by the well-nigh universal assertion that a human group or society is a "social system." It is perhaps unnecessary to observe that the conception of human society as structure or organization is ingrained in the very marrow of contemporary sociology.

Mead's scheme definitely challenges this conception. It sees human society not as an established structure but as people meeting their conditions of life; it sees social action not as an emanation of societal structure but as a formation made by human actors; it sees this formation of action not as societal factors coming to expression through the medium of human organisms but as constructions made by actors out of what they take into account; it sees group life not as a release or expression of established structure but as a process of building up joint actions; it sees social actions as having variable careers and not as confined to the alternatives of conformity to or deviation from the dictates of established structure; it sees the so-called interaction between parts of a society not as a direct exercising of influence by one part on another but as mediated throughout by interpretations made by people; accordingly, it sees society not as a system, whether in the form of a static, moving or whatever kind of equilibrium, but as a vast number of occurring joint actions, many closely linked, many not linked at all, many prefigured and repetitious, others being carved out in new directions, and all being pursued to serve the purposes of the participants and not the requirements of a system. I have said enough, I think, to point out the drastic differences between the Meadian conception of society and the widespread sociological conceptions of it as structure.

The differences do not mean, incidentally, that Mead's view rejects the existence of structure in human society. Such a position would be ridiculous. There are such matters as social roles, status positions, rank orders, bureaucratic organizations, relations between institutions, differential authority arrangements, social codes, norms, values, and the like. And they are very important. But their importance does not lie in an alleged determination of action nor in an alleged existence as parts of a self-operating societal system. Instead, they are important only as they enter into the process of interpretation and definition out of which joint actions are formed. The manner and extent to which they enter may vary greatly from situation to situation, depending on what people take into account and how they assess what they take account of. Let me give one brief illustration. It is ridiculous, for instance, to assert, as a number of eminent sociologists have done, that social interaction is an interaction between social roles. Social interaction is obviously an interaction between *people* and not between roles; the needs of the participants are to interpret and handle what confronts them—such as a topic of conversation or a problem—and not to give expression to their roles. It is only in highly ritualistic relations that the direction and content of conduct can be explained by roles. Usually, the direction and content are fashioned out of what people in interaction have to deal with. That roles affect in

varying degree phases of the direction and content of action is true but is a matter of determination in given cases. This is a far cry from asserting action to be a product of roles. The observation I have made in this brief discussion of social roles applies with equal validity to all other structural matters.

Another significant implication of Mead's scheme of thought refers to the question of what holds a human society together. As we know, this question is converted by sociologists into a problem of unity, stability, and orderliness. And, as we know further, the typical answer given by sociologists is that unity, stability, and orderliness come from a sharing in common of certain basic matters, such as codes, sentiments, and, above all, values. Thus, the disposition is to regard common values as the glue that holds a society together, as the controlling regulator that brings and keeps the activities in a society in orderly relationship, and as the force that preserves stability in a society. Conversely, it is held that conflict between values or the disintegration of values creates disunity, disorder, and instability. This conception of human society becomes subject to great modification if we think of society as consisting of the fitting together of acts to form joint action. Such alignment may take place for any number of reasons, depending on the situations calling for joint action, and need not involve, or spring from, the sharing of common values. The participants may fit their acts to one another in orderly joint actions on the basis of compromise, out of duress, because they may use one another in achieving their respective ends, because it is the sensible thing to do, or out of sheer necessity. This is particularly likely to be true in our modern complex societies with their great diversity in composition, in lines of interest, and in their respective worlds of concern. In very large measure, society becomes the formation of workable relations. To seek to encompass, analyze, and understand the life of a society on the assumption that the existence of a society necessarily depends on the sharing of values can lead to strained treatment, gross misrepresentation, and faulty lines of interpretation. I believe that the Meadian perspective, in posing the question of how people are led to align their acts in different situations in place of presuming that this necessarily requires and stems from a sharing of common values, is a more salutary and realistic approach.

There are many other significant sociological implications in Mead's scheme of thought which, under the limit of space, I can do no more than mention. Socialization shifts its character from being an effective internalization of norms and values to a cultivated capacity to take the roles of others effectively. Social control becomes fundamentally and necessarily a matter of self-control. Social change becomes a continuous indigenous process in human group life instead of an episodic result of extraneous factors playing on established structure. Human group life is seen as always incomplete and undergoing development instead of jumping from one completed state to another. Social disorganization is seen not as a breakdown of existing structure but as an inability to mobilize action effectively in the face of a given situation. Social action, since it has a career, is recognized as having a historical dimension which has to be taken into account in order to be adequately understood.

In closing I wish to say that my presentation has necessarily skipped much in Mead's scheme that is of great significance. Further, I have not sought to demonstrate the validity of his analyses. However, I have tried to suggest the freshness, the fecundity, and the revolutionary implications of his point of view.

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Comment on Herbert Blumer's Paper

Professor Blumer seems to have a way of leading us to ultimate antinomies, created by the process of abstraction, rather than to operational solutions based on a process of empirical research. His treatments of the concepts of the self, the act, social interaction, and objects all involve dichotomies or dilemmas that are sharper than they need be and force upon us choices we need not make. He prefers one side in each of these dilemmas, but if we simply defend the other side, we are forced into a false position. The appropriate answer is not to defend the other side but to show why the dilemma is a false one.

Is the self a structure or a process? May we not think of it as either or both, depending upon how closely we are looking and how finely we are chopping time? Mead distinguished between the "I" (the process) and the "Me" (the object or structure)—both aspects of the self. Blumer prefers to emphasize the "I"; he says that the self is a process and that those who say it is a structure are mistaken. The argument is a good deal like that of free will versus determinism. So long as one is content to speak of theoretical objects without operational definition, to leave off all time and place specifications —in short, to remain abstract rather than make his language a part of his research—he can take either side of the dilemma. But if he tries to become operational, he discovers that he cannot decide the issue. His errors of measurement and lack of information about the will are so great that he cannot tell whether the will is free or whether he is simply ignorant of the determinants. That part of the self about which one can not get enough information to treat as a structure or object must be treated as a process, or subject. But it is not necessary to disown the object part.

Is human interaction "a positive shaping process in its own right" or is it "a neutral medium through which outside factors affect each other?" The question in this form cannot be answered. One must ask what is being shaped, by what humans, what kind of interaction, over how long a period of time? My conversation with you today is probably not a process that does much to shape the geographical form of the earth. The interaction of all the male and female human beings who have ever lived has done a good deal to shape the growth curve of the world's population. We hope that the interaction of scientists and others over the next few decades will do something to reshape that curve. The interaction of a father with his child over the first fifteen years of life may do a great deal to shape the self-concept of the child. But it may not do much to reshape the ecological zones of the city in which they live. And so on. It does not seem profitable to try to make a generalization that will hold over all humans, all interaction, all time, and all things shaped.

The analysis of objects is particularly notable as an instance in which the problem is stated as a dilemma, and then one side is chosen as a matter of preference. Is an object that which is "constituted by the meaning which it has for the person," or is it a "self-constituted entity" existing as a part of the environment?

Of course, it is possible to use the word "object" to refer strictly and only to that which the person constructs in his head. But such an object is never directly accessible to the observer and is accessible to the acting person only point by point in time, since it changes. To use the concept only in this way leaves altogether out of account whatever the object is supposed to refer to "in the world." One needs another word for the latter, and whatever one calls it, he should not leave it out altogether as a determinant of action. Stars and clouds may not hold many rude surprises for the self-centered object-de-

finer, but other types of objects, such as "nuclear fission," guns that "aren't loaded," "pleasant streams" that run into rapids, and roads so plain that "you can't miss them," somehow tend to get redefined. The observer may indeed think it so likely that they will be redefined that he prefers to have a symbol to refer to their longer-term character. It is not good theory about behavior to leave out altogether as a determinant the longer-term character of things—that character which leads us to designate them as parts of the "environment" rather than simply as parts of our thought processes. Blumer again presents us with an ultimate antinomy based upon a too-high degree of abstraction—human beings are seen either as living in "a world of meaningful objects" or in an "environment of stimuli or self-constituted entities." My world seems to be some kind of a changing mixture, and I think I need a theory that has both kinds of objects—even if I have to make both kinds myself!

The peculiar thing about all this is that in his discussion of joint action, which is his term for Mead's "social act," Blumer makes many of the same points I have just made. As he speaks of joint action he sounds more and more like the Mead I remember and tends to leave behind the Zeno-like paradoxes. It is my impression that Mead's social behaviorism was for Mead a philosophical key which allowed him to break out of the very semantic prisons in which I feel Blumer locks himself in his discussion of the self, the act, social interaction, and the object. For Mead, the process of social interaction was central—not Mind, not Self, not Society. He showed that whoever starts with any one of the latter three as the fundamental phenomenon, supposing that the properties of the others may be deduced from it, has already entered one of the prisons. Blumer seems to start with the self, and in this sense he is not a social behaviorist, as was Mead. But, on the other hand, Blumer gives a good account of social behaviorism as he discusses joint action, and in this sense he holds the key. Why does he not let himself out?

If it is true that it is a defect of (some) sociology and (some) psychology alike, that they fail to see human beings as organisms having selves, the cure is not to assert, as Blumer seems to, that the self is the fundamental phenomenon. The self arises out of human interaction, Mead tells us, and thereafter is an interposed process between stimulus and response. But, as it arises in a process of social interaction, so may it also change. It is not the Archimedean point from which all else in the world is moved—at least not according to Mead. It is one more factor among many that must be considered in most empirical research problems, I should think. Blumer is in favor of ascertaining the meaning that objects have for the actor and against viewing the actor and his action from the perspective of an outside, detached observer. Why not try to take both perspectives, or one that includes both? Mead took both perspectives. The social interaction out of which mind, self, and society arise can hardly be only what the participant, after he develops a self, defines it to be. Something existed prior to his definition of it, or his ability to define; so he must suppose. Symbolic interaction arises out of non-symbolic interaction. The latter is presumably quite as accessible to an outside, detached observer, as to the participants.

In his discussion of "social structure" as a determinant of action versus the "constructions made by actors out of what they take into account," Blumer poses the dilemma less sharply than in some other portions of his article. He does not totally discount the reality of society or social structure, but he gives characteristics of social structure only grudging admission as a set of useful variables. He says they are only important as they enter into the process of interpretation and definition out of which joint actions are formed. For an idealist philosopher that may be true, but

practically speaking, as researchers, we are never able to follow that process in detail for all actors through the whole span of time, as we would have to do if we wished to give up the use of structural variables as indexes of probable meanings. We would have to substitute detailed certainty for the poor, indirect access that we now have. Since we cannot ever get the precise data we want, are we to give up? One of the virtues of sociology is, or should be, that it enables us to make some probable inferences from information that we can actually gather. We do not have the omniscience of God, in whose mind, presumably, neither the abstractions of social structure nor those of personality structure are necessary.

Blumer's account of what holds society together is closer to the middle of the road. Common values are not entirely discounted, as a basis for unity, but emphasis is placed on "the formation of workable relations." This seems true to Mead, since he always presupposed a situation of social interaction, two or more organisms acting in de facto (non-symbolic) interdependence, as the ground out of which meaning, common meaning, and also values, arise. In this way he was pragmatic, empiricist, operational. Should we not regard scientific research as a similar process? Is it not our business as researchers and theorizers to interact with the persons and things we are theorizing about, to "form workable relations," to hope that out of the de facto interaction significant symbols will arise? We cannot hope that we will know all our fellow men from the inside before we start, or ever entirely. But let us work toward that. I like much of what Blumer likes; but I get nervous when he seems to cut all ties with the empirical means by which one gains knowledge and urges me to fly straight to the mind of God without even a pair of wax wings. In this he seems to me not to be a follower of Mead. Mead was not a philosophical idealist, as Blumer seems to be; he was a pragmatist and a social behaviorist.

Robert F. Bales

Harvard University

Reply

Professor Bales charges that I have misinterpreted Mead, but he does not show that I have. He makes no effort to compare what I said with what Mead said. Instead, he tries to sustain his charge by implying that I have reduced Mead's thought to a series of "antinomies" which set false dilemmas and thus misrepresent Mead's views. The only way to respond to this slantwise attack is to consider briefly each of the "antinomies" Bales mentions.

1. In the case of the first I can only reaffirm that Mead definitely "saw the self as a process and not as a structure." This is not a misrepresentation of Mead's thought. The "I" and the "Me" Bales has introduced into the discussion were regarded by Mead as aspects of an ongoing process—the "Me" setting the stage for the response of the "I," with the expression of the "I" calling in turn for control and direction by the "Me." To say that one (the "I") is process and the other (the "Me") is structure is nonsense; both were treated by Mead as aspects of action. Mead saw the "self" not as a combination of the "I" and the "Me" but as *interaction* between them.

2. I find it difficult to understand what Bales is trying to say in the case of the next alleged antinomy, that is, symbolic interaction as a "positive shaping process in its own right" in contrast to human interaction as "a neutral medium through which outside factors affect each other." Bales asks what is being shaped. The answer is obviously the action of the participants. Clearly, Mead saw symbolic in-

teraction as a creative or formative process; this part of the alleged dilemma cannot be regarded as false. The other part is a simple matter of logical validity, that is, if the behavior of people in interaction is explained not in terms of their interaction but in terms of what they bring with them into their interaction, then interaction is a neutral medium. Since each of the assertions is true I am completely at a loss to understand what Bales is trying to say.

3. The next antinomy designated by Bales refers to the nature of "objects." In outlining the nature of the antinomy Bales seems to equate "meaningful objects" to "parts of our thought process" and to set such objects alongside other types of objects (those having "the longer-term character of things") which are to be lodged in the "environment." Mead must shudder in his grave at such butchering of his thought. For Mead an object is something that is designated and does not exist apart from designation. The object is located wherever it is lodged by the designation; the mountain that is seen to be on the horizon is located on the horizon and not in the person's head. Correspondingly, the meaning of the object belongs to the object and is not some accretion lodged apart in some thought process. Next, the meaning of the object is conferred on it by the way in which the individual is prepared to act toward it. Finally, *all* objects—whether a mountain, a house, a speech, a toothache, a dream, a memory, or a sensation—are located *in the individual's environment* in the legitimate sense that in being designated by the individual they stand over against him as the designator. Without understanding these points one does not understand Mead's thought on objects. It is obvious that Bales does not understand these points. If there is any single matter that is abundantly shown in Mead's lengthy analysis of "objects," it is that objects do not have an inherent or self-constituted character; this is a cornerstone of his pragmatic position.

4. The final accusation is that I have misrepresented Mead by seemingly asserting that "the Self is the fundamental phenomenon"—"the Archimedean point from which all else in the world is moved." Here, again, I do not understand what Bales is trying to say, much less to prove or disprove. What I have said about the place and significance of the "self" is no more than what Mead has said about it. Mead has certainly made the "self" central in his thought. Human society is definitely seen by him as made up of organisms with selves; social interaction in human society is between such organisms with selves; the human being as an acting organism has a self; human action is action that is built up through interaction with one's self; and objects come into being only to an organism with a self. The fact that the "self" is a social product, something that is formed in the interaction between human beings, detracts not one whit from this central position given it by Mead. So, what is Bales trying to say? He seems to be using this discussion to make the unnecessary point (*a*) that symbolic interaction arises out of non-symbolic interaction and (*b*) that the latter is "accessible to an outside, detached observer." There is no quarrel over this point; it is exactly what Mead says and what I say. But this is something very different from seeking to study *symbolic behavior* from the perspective of the outside, detached behavior; this is the real source of error in present-day studies.

In short, I do not see what Bales is seeking to accomplish in his rhetorical discussion of alleged antinomies. He has not shown that I have misrepresented Mead's thought. To the contrary, his discussion shows him to be ill-informed and misinformed on the nature of Mead's thought.

HERBERT BLUMER

University of California, Berkeley

Some Characteristic Features of Census Age Distributions in Illiterate Populations

In his article "Age Distribution as a Challenge to Development (*American Journal of Sociology*, LXX, No. 6 [May, 1965]), Professor Nathan Keyfitz discusses some possible consequences of the shape of the Indonesian age distribution.[1] Instead of being a regular pyramid, the latter is characterized, according to the 1961 census, by a large number of persons aged zero to nine years and by a flatness between ages ten and thirty-five. He attributes these two features, respectively, to the health and prosperity of the fifties and to the world war, the Japanese occupation, and the revolution. He argues that the sudden arrival in the labor force of large cohorts, after a marked deficit, will constitute a challenge to, and perhaps an asset for, the social and economic development of the country. The implications he derives from the remarkable features of the age distribution are ingenious and would be entirely plausible, were the reality of the pattern established.

The author takes great care in discussing the possible biases in the reporting of ages. He establishes that the evidence from other Indonesian sources does not contradict the census. Other countries in Asia fail to show a similar steep drop in the age groups; an exception is Pakistan where, the author argues, there was a similar history which could have affected the age distribution. An index of the steepness is the ratio of the ages zero to nine to the ages ten to nineteen. In Indonesia the ratio exceeds 2.0; other Asian countries with a postwar census (except Pakistan) have ratios under 1.8.

THE EVIDENCE IN TROPICAL AFRICA

Work done at the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, on the demography of tropical Africa has revealed the striking similarities of the age distributions recorded in many African censuses and demographic inquiries. For both sexes they are usually characterized by an apparent shortage of persons in their teens; the deficit extends to age group twenty to twenty-four years for the males. The adult ages, by comparison, seem to be inflated. Since various surveys, taken at various dates in countries far apart, show similar features, this would tend to indicate systematic biases in the recording of ages in tropical Africa.

Although we had been aware of the similarity of some of these features to those of the old Indian censuses, it came as a surprise that the 1961 Indonesian age data were extremely close to some of those collected in tropical Africa. Figure 1 gives a graphical comparison between the age distributions of Indonesia and Senegal. In Table 1 some African age distributions are given next to Indonesia's. The data collected by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE)[2] in French-speaking territories are the closest to the Indonesian pattern. We give also the age distribution for the Muslim population of Bengal taken from the 1911 Census of India because it has some of the same characteristics and, by contrast, one recorded in a recent Asian census, that of the Philippines in 1960, which conforms more to the expected pattern.

In the same table, that expected pattern is exemplified by a stable population with rather high fertility and mortality. In the absence of large-scale migration, if fertility and mortality had been constant

[1] The discussion was based on a 1 per cent sample of the 1961 Indonesian census.

[2] This agency has done pioneering work in African demography, under various names and in collaboration with national governments and local organizations.

in the past, they would define an age distribution which we call *stable*. The condition of constant fertility appears to be realized often; mortality has declined in many countries, but changes in mortality will not affect the age distribution much. As a result, many populations in the world have a *quasi-stable* age distribution, which is approximated well enough by the stable age distribution defined by their present fertility and mortality[3]—hence the idea to use a stable population as a standard of comparison.[4]

The stable population in Table 1 is not expected to correspond exactly to the vital rates in any particular one of the countries considered. Also, the exact pattern of mortality in these countries may be different from the one underlying the model. Rather, the stable population is only expected to provide a typical age distribution generated by constant vital rates, a distribu-

[3] See Ansley J. Coale, "Estimates of Various Demographic Measures through the Quasi-Stable Age Distribution," in Milbank Memorial Fund, *Emerging Techniques in Population Research*, 1963, pp. 175–93.

[4] The stable population has been selected in Ansley J. Coale and P. Demeny, *Regional Life Tables and Stable Populations* (Princeton, N.J., 1965). That publication is a large collection of stable populations generated for certain patterns and levels of mortality, by a range of growth rates or gross reproduction rates. The selected stable population is one of the West set, level 7 (female expectation of life of thirty-five years) with a growth rate of 2 per cent. The corresponding birth rate is 48.4 per thousand; the death rate, 28.4 per thousand.

FIG. 1.—Percentage distribution of populations of Senegal, 1960–61, and Indonesia, 1961, ages 0–55+

tion not affected by biases in the reporting of ages. By comparing specific populations to the standard, one is able to identify certain patterns of age-misreporting. For instance, the indexes in Table 2 were obtained by dividing the female age groups reported for a specific country by the corresponding ones in the stable population. These indexes show similar traits in the case of Indonesia, Senegal, or Bengal: ratios above unity at ages five to nine and twenty-five to thirty-four years, and below unity between ten and nineteen years; the age group twenty to twenty-four years typically is close to unity. On the contrary, the ratios for the Philippines show an almost steady decline. The number of small children appears to have been understated, as is often the case. When the latter fact is taken into account, the Philippines' age distribution appears to be steeper than the standard: there are more children and fewer adults and old people. This indeed would be the case if the selected stable population's birth rate was markedly lower than that of the Philippines.

There are other similarities between the Indonesian and the African age distributions. Keyfitz comments on the abrupt drop in the single-year age distribution of

TABLE 1

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED POPULATIONS (IN PER CENT BY SEX)

	Age Group								
	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
	Males								
Indonesia, 1961	17 8	16.2	9.1	8 1	7 3	15 5	12 1	7 5	6 5
Bengal Muslims, 1911	14.7	16.9	12 4	8 3	7.2	16 4	12 7	6 8	5 6
Mozambique, 1950	15.6	15 9	12.8	7 4	7.7	15 2	13.1	6 9	5 4
Guinea, 1954-55	19 0	17.2	9 4	8 3	6 1	12.2	11.2	10 1	6 0
Congo, 1955-57	17.0	13.0	11.0	6 5	7.1	16 6	12.7	10.1	6 0
Central African Republic, 1959-60	17.2	16.7	9 1	5.1	5 2	15 9	16 5	9.6	4 7
Ghana, 1960	18.8	15 1	10 5	8 2	7.9	15.4	10 7	6 5	7 0
Senegal, 1960-61	18 7	16 3	9 0	6 8	6 9	14 8	10.6	8.1	8 7
Dahomey, 1961	20 1	17 8	10 5	6 8	5 9	12 5	10 4	7 2	8 8
Philippines, 1961	17.2	16.5	12.9	10 1	8 7	12 6	9 1	6 5	6.2
Stable*	17.6	13 9	12.1	10 6	9 1	14 4	10 0	6 5	5 7
	Females								
Indonesia, 1961	17.6	15 7	7 9	7 9	8 9	17 5	11 0	7 1	6 3
Bengal Muslims, 1911	16 0	16 9	10 1	9 7	9.3	16 5	9 8	6 1	5 8
Mozambique, 1950	14 9	13.1	9 1	6 4	8 1	18 1	14 4	7 6	8 2
Guinea, 1954-55	17.5	14 6	6 8	9 5	9 2	16 7	12 0	7 0	6 7
Congo, 1955-57	16.8	12 8	8 2	7.2	8 3	19 8	13.6	8 2	5 2
Central African Republic, 1959-60	16 2	14 7	6 4	4 8	8 1	22 1	17 0	7 3	3 4
Ghana, 1960	19.7	15.2	9.8	7 9	9 6	16 7	9 7	5 3	6 1
Senegal, 1960-61	18.7	14 9	7.4	8 4	9 0	17 5	10 3	6 6	7 3
Dahomey, 1961	19.5	15.8	8.4	7 1	9 3	16 1	10 1	6 4	7.3
Philippines, 1961	16.5	15.8	12 4	10 6	9 4	13 4	9 5	6 3	6 0
Stable*	17.3	13.7	11.9	10 4	9.0	14 1	10 0	6 8	6 8

* See text.

Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1963; Moçambique, Repartiçao Tecnica de Estatistica, *Recenseamento Geral Da Populaçao*, II-III (Lourenço Marques, 1950); INSEE, *Enquête démographique en République Centrafricaine, 1959-60* (Paris, 1964); INSEE, *Enquête démographique au Dahomey* (Paris, 1964); *Census of India, 1911*, Vol V, Part II. "Bengal" (Tables).

Indonesia "from over 3 million at age seven to under 1½ million by age twelve or thirteen." Now a similar steepness is also typical of many available single-year age distributions in tropical Africa. Some of the latter are given in Table 3, as the percentage of those aged less than fifteen years. Figure 2 shows part of the single-year age distributions of Senegal and Indonesia.

The data in Tables 1 and 3 are the result of a choice, made in order to show that the Indonesian pattern is not unique.[5] The sample in Table 4 is more extensive. The table gives, together with the proportion under age ten in the population, the index proposed by Keyfitz to measure the suddenness of change in the future number of young adults: the ratio of those

[5] We have not made any extensive search through the age distributions derived from the estimation of ages in illiterate populations. At least one other example of the "African pattern" in another continent could be quoted: the age distributions in F. Lancaster Jones, *A Demographic Survey of the Aboriginal Population of the Northern Territory, with Special Reference to Bathurst Island Mission* (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1963).

TABLE 2

RATIO OF REPORTED POPULATION TO STABLE, BY AGE (FEMALES)

	Ages								
	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
Indonesia	1.02	1 15	0.66	0.76	0.99	1.24	1.10	1 04	0 93
Senegal	1.08	1.09	0.62	0.81	1.00	1.24	1.03	0.97	1.07
Bengal	0.92	1.23	0.85	0.93	1.03	1.17	0.98	0.90	0.85
Philippines	0.95	1.15	1.04	1.02	1.04	0.95	0.95	0.93	0.88

TABLE 3

POPULATION UNDER AGE FIFTEEN BY SINGLE YEAR FOR SELECTED POPULATIONS (IN PER CENT, BOTH SEXES)

Age	Indonesia 1961	Guinea 1954 55	Central African Republic 1959-60	Niger 1959-60	Ghana 1960	Senegal 1960-61
0	7.8	11.9	10.0	11 9	9.3	9.3
1	7.4	5.4	3.1	2.7	7.0	7.2
2	8.7	6.9	9.5	9.5	8.6	8.7
3	9.3	9.8	8.7	10.9	9.7	9.9
4	8.8	9.2	10.7	8.8	8.6	9 0
5	8.1	7.8	8.5	9.3	7.8	8.7
6	7.6	8.5	10.2	8.4	8.1	7.9
7	8.2	8.4	7.3	8.5	6.5	8.1
8	7.1	6 5	8.3	6.5	6.4	6 7
9	6.8	6.4	4 8	6.6	5 2	5.2
10	5.9	2.9	6.0	2.2	5.8	4.6
11	3.3	4.5	3.0	4.8	3 4	3.9
12	4.7	4.5	4.2	3.7	5.2	4.1
13	3.3	3.7	2.7	2.7	4.0	3.7
14	3.0	3.6	3.0	3.4	4.4	2.9
0-14	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9

Source: See Table 1; also INSEE, *Étude démographique du Niger* (Paris, 1963), Fasc. II.

aged zero to nine years to those aged ten to nineteen years. Here again, as in Indonesia, the latter ratio is above 2 for many African inquiries.

This index, however, is often inadequate to measure the steepness of the beginning of the age distribution, because of a bias from which the African inquiries and the Indonesian census appear to be immune to a large extent but which may affect many censuses throughout the world—the underenumeration of small children. Such a bias tends to lower the ratio. The Philippine census quoted in Table 1 may have been affected; the most conspicuous examples seem to be the censuses taken in India and in the Portuguese territories of Africa.

FIG. 2.—Single-year distribution (in per cent of 0–14, both sexes) of populations of Senegal, 1960–61, and Indonesia, 1961.

TABLE 4

RATIO OF POPULATION AGED ZERO TO TEN YEARS TO TOTAL POPULATION AND TO POPULATION AGED TEN TO NINETEEN YEARS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (BOTH SEXES)

	PERCENTAGE	RATIO
	Population 0–9 / Total Population	Population 0–9 / Population 10–19
Indonesia, 1961	33.6	2.04
Rural Java and Madura, 1961	35.5	2.20
Bengal Muslims, 1911	32.2	1.59
Angola, 1940	29.5	1.58
Angola, 1950	28.8	1.53
Mozambique, 1950	29.7	1.68
Guinea, 1954–55	34.1	2.01
Congo (Léopoldville), 1955–57	29.8	1.81
Senegal Valley, 1958	33.2	2.19
Togo, 1958–60	39.4	2.90
Madagascar, 1959	30.9	2.00
Central African Republic, 1959–60	32.3	2.56
Niger, 1959–60	36.4	2.16
Ghana, 1960	34.4	1.89
Congo (Brazzaville), 1960–61	30.1	1.83
Senegal, 1960–61	34.4	2.17
Gabon, 1960–61	21.7	1.70
Dahomey, 1961	36.6	2.24
Chad, 1964	36.8	2.39

SOURCE: See Tables 1 and 3, also J. L. Boutillier, P. Cantrelle, J. Causse, C. Laurent, Th. N'Doye, *La Moyenne Vallée du Sénégal* (Paris: INSEE, 1962); République du Congo, *Enquête démographique*, 1960–61 (Paris: INSEE, 1965); République du Chad, *La situation démographique au Chad* (Telad Société d'Études pour le Développement Économique et Social, Paris, 1965).

DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE

Thus far we have shown that the characteristics of the Indonesian age distribution on which Keyfitz commented are found also in other sets of data. We suggest that the observed pattern can be explained by similar errors in the reporting of ages.

It should be noted, with respect to the African data, that the irregularities in the age distribution, and notably the trough at ages ten to nineteen years, often have been attributed to the war or to other historical circumstances. One of the most accessible examples is to be found in a paper by Alfred Sauvy on Madagascar.[6]

The very competent French team at INSEE, headed by Robert Blanc, has recently brought out a publication attempting to summarize the findings of the demographic inquiries in former French territories on the age distribution and on fertility and mortality.[7] Their goal was the projection of these populations. After some smoothing, they decided to accept the age data on their face value and ended up projecting the troughs and hump of the reported age distribution into the future.

Our interpretation—that the irregularities are not real but the result of biases in the reporting—is thus not the only one possible. The decision to reject the collected evidence on age is indeed very serious. One cannot deny the possibilities of irregularities due to history. Indeed, wars and epidemics are known to have left some scars on age distributions, even in countries where the stable-population assumption appears otherwise valid, because there has been little or no change in fertility during an indefinite past. In successive Turkish or Korean censuses, for instance, the effects of historical events can be identified as the depleted cohorts progress in age.

On the other hand, the African evidence, despite its similarity to the results of the Indonesian census, cannot constitute an irrefutable demonstration that the latter is biased. But the repetition of the same pattern of irregularity in censuses taken at different dates and in areas far apart, but among populations of a comparable degree of economic development and literacy, at least suggests a need for caution before inferences are made from the age distribution.

How would the war, or any other type of calamity, affect an age distribution? It would raise mortality, but to a large extent the rise would be proportional for all age classes and for both sexes. One would expect the young-adult male to suffer most in a war. However, in Indonesia, the sex ratio of those aged thirty-five to fifty-five in 1961, who were aged fifteen to thirty-five in 1941, is definitely in favor of the males (see Table 5).

Rather than mortality, fertility may have been affected by past historical events. Keyfitz suggests the possibility of a decline because marriages were delayed during the Japanese occupation and the revolution. It is impossible for us to know whether the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people continued to live as before under the Japanese and during the revolution; probably in Africa the world war did not affect the life of the villages to any large extent. Here, too, a look at the sex ratio of the abnormal cohorts suggests the existence of bias, since a decline in fertility would leave the sex ratio of an age group little affected, while biases would normally be sex, as well as age, selective.

It is all too obvious that biases can occur in the recording of ages of illiterate populations when enumerators have to estimate the age of respondents. This

[6] "The age pyramid shows a narrowing at age groups 15 to 19 years and 10 to 14 years. Infant mortality was increased, during the war, by the shortage of clothes and medical supplies" ("La République de Madagascar, population, économie et perspectives de développement," *Population*, No. 3 [1962], 445).

[7] INSEE and Ministère de la Coopération: *Perspectives de population dans les pays africains et malgaches d'expression française* (Paris, 1963).

problem can be solved only by the spreading of vital registration. Why biases would be systematic, why similar errors would appear thousands of miles apart, is somewhat mysterious.

A possible explanation of the pattern of age distribution encountered in tropical Africa would be a tendency to classify married or marriageable women as older than they actually are and girls before marriage or before puberty as younger. This centrifugal tendency would result in a thinning out of the ages in the neighborhood of physical or social maturity and a subsequent inflation of the adjacent age groups. It is often assumed that young African males trying to avoid the payment of a poll tax may be interested in being recorded as younger than they actually are. We do not know enough about Indonesian conditions to tell if such factors could explain part of its recorded pattern of age distribution.

In the absence of a second census or inquiry showing either the persistence of the same features at the same ages (an indication of bias) or a moving up of the deflated and inflated cohorts (proving that these features are genuine), there is no sure way for the user of this type of statistics. Understandably, he is inclined to trust the evidence as collected in the field, perhaps after some smoothing. It does not seem fair to substitute a model to the testimony of people who were more familiar with local circumstances than the foreigner can ever hope to be.

And yet, there is a growing body of literature concerning the use of models in such cases. In a number of circumstances, the use of a stable population defined by the present fertility and mortality of the actual population has been proven to give a more reliable age distribution than the recorded one. Even when fertility and mortality are known only with gross approximation, the biases in the reporting of ages may be such that the resulting age distribution may be closer to reality. The evidence given in this paper to substantiate the claim that it may well be so for Indonesia is circumstantial only, but the mere existence of a typical pattern may cast enough suspicion on the data to suggest caution in their use. Of course, we do not *know* that fertility has been constant, as demanded by the quasi-stable model. The use of a model to approximate reality is a choice among evils, but it is often the best bet.

TABLE 5

SEX RATIOS BY AGE (MALES PER ONE HUNDRED FEMALES) OF SELECTED POPULATIONS

	0–4	5–9	10–14	15–19	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55+
Indonesia, 1961	99	101	112	99	80	86	107	102	96
Mozambique, 1950	95	110	128	105	86	77	83	83	61
Guinea, 1954–55	99	108	125	79	60	67	85	102	117
Congo, 1955–57	96	96	127	86	81	79	88	116	109
Central African Republic, 1959–60	97	104	131	96	59	66	89	121	124
Ghana, 1960	98	102	110	105	84	94	113	124	116
Senegal, 1960–61	98	106	118	79	73	82	99	119	117
Dahomey, 1961	99	108	120	92	61	74	98	108	116
Philippines, 1961	106	107	106	97	94	96	98	104	106
Stable*	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	94	83

* With a sex ratio at birth of 104.

ETIENNE VAN DE WALLE

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Reply

I am pleased that my article inspired Mr. van de Walle to publish his extensive and careful analysis of age distributions. His point about a tendency to avoid the statement of ages ten to fourteen in censuses of countries where illiteracy is widespread is well worth making. However, only another census taken at a different time, in the same country, will decide whether the very great excess of those aged five to nine over those ten to fourteen in 1961 is real or an artifact of census taking. If it is real it will have given place, for example, by 1966, to a similar excess of those ten to fourteen over those fifteen to nineteen; if an artifact, the excess will stay at the ages which showed it in 1961. I did exhibit the 1958 Indonesian labor-force data, the one other age distribution independently available for the population in question, and they showed the notch at a somewhat younger age than in 1961, suggesting that the notch was real, but 1958 and 1960 are too close together for this to be decisive, given the large rounding errors.

Since neither van de Walle nor I know how old the Indonesians really are, and further exposition of my slight predilection for the census figures as against his equally lukewarm preference for model age distributions is not very interesting, let me use the remainder of the space that the editor has allowed me to comment on the effect of census error on the broader conclusions that may be drawn. If all of the detailed information contained in the age distribution were false and only the slope from five to thirty could be trusted, then the change the published figures show as occurring in five years would take about twenty years. Instead of an increase of 100 per cent in the young people arriving at working age during the present five-year period, the increase would be only about 25 per cent. But no one argues that the census is *all* wrong. Shall we split the difference and say that the true change will be 50 per cent or 75 per cent? What seems to me important is that *any* increase in this age group will be forced out of the villages for want of land; those forced out will be 80 per cent literate, if the census literacy figures are to be credited; everyone who has had contact with Indonesia knows that youth is mobile and highly politicized. It will be drawn increasingly to the cities and will press on the existing holders of power. When numbers and the social configuration act in the same direction, an error in numbers can only modify the conclusion by a certain fraction; it cannot change the direction of the conclusion.

My article, moreover, called attention to the age complementarity of production: young people willing to work must be complemented not only by capital but by competent managers, and managers are drawn from the older population. If the numerically small older cohorts also suffer from such disadvantages as (*a*) lower percentage literate, (*b*) less likelihood of having had urban work and industrial experience, and (*c*) exclusion of many because of association in their youth with the colonial power, surely production will be constricted. Again the demographic cause reinforces the social.

It is the reaction of the rulers, then, on which we ought to focus. If they see that what young people really want are productive jobs, the difficulty of arranging enough of these may be a stimulus and challenge. If, on the other hand, they respond to the discontent of the new cohorts of urban, literate youth by ever more revolutionary slogans, combined with ever more stagnant policies, trouble will come

quickly. Failure to do anything about births is at least part of the cause of a probably declining per-capita income. Odd as it may sound on this side of the Pacific, the birth rate has been promoted in Indonesia as a weapon against the West. Whether we count them by the census or by the stable model, the increase in numbers of youth is sufficiently rapid, and improvement in mortality sufficiently universal, that those rulers who have been encouraging a high birth rate—Mr. Sukarno wants 250 million Indonesians—will live to feel the sting of the rods they have been making for the backs of others.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

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BOOK REVIEWS

Industrialization and Democracy: Economic Necessities and Political Possibilities. By KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. 309. $6.95.

All students of political economy, especially those in the area of economic development and comparative economic systems, will welcome this book for its concentration on the chances that nations in the twentieth century have to industrialize at a faster rate without sacrificing their aspirations for evolution of human rights.

The first part of the book (pp. 1–75) formulates the problem as to whether industrialization, in the early stages, encourages the evolution of democracy. What are individual aspirations and how can they best be advanced through political and economic institutions? Can the individual shift his initiative and responsibility to the state and enlarge or sacrifice his own aspirations, even if only temporarily, to the general will? The author assumes that the individual in a democratic society is rational, in the sense that he seeks and evaluates his competing alternatives in the light of available ends. He thrives best in a democracy through a corrective system of profit and loss in the market. Like the political system, the market system has its governors and the governed. The governors are the entrepreneurs who form a minority. The governed are the consumers who, facing abuses, seek self-defense through collective action. Oligarchy opposes democracy. Utilitarians oppose monopoly, aristocratic privilege, and feudal rights.

A citizen, to be effective in his own behalf and that of the society, must be enlightened. In Athenean democracy a typical citizen did not know how to read or write. It did not survive, nor would this type of anachronism have a chance to survive today. Countries with an inadequate educational system and high illiteracy, such as we generally find in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, are governed by unstable economic and political systems. On the other hand, democracies such as we find in Britain, the United States, the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia developed into stable political systems, gaining strength from such external economies as are connected with education, technology, and the communication media. Industry naturally benefits from better skills. With increasing ability to create surplus and with rising rate of investment, both public and private economy can accelerate to a higher level. This presupposes the emergence of democratic political institutions.

Several models are discussed in the second part of the book (pp. 79–279) as evidence. The following industrial systems are analyzed: (1) The British and the American—both conducive to industrialization and evolution of democracy. (2) The German—weakening the democratic impulse but capable of developing institutions permitting adjustment. (3) The Russian—a totalitarian industrial model with some elements of democracy. (4) The evolving systems—as seen in underdeveloped countries with special problems of their own.

England, the first country to industrialize, provided middle classes with a chance for self-improvement even though it kept its lower classes relatively poor. While the English political system prevented the formation of the Labor party until almost the twentieth century, the industrial system did permit Peels to rise from humble manufacturing origin to a height of political power and although it weathered rebellious moods and Parliament rejected Chartist petitions for reform (in 1839, 1842, and 1848), the Ten Hour Movement did succeed (in 1847), and the Reform Bill was passed (in 1832); a trade union movement also became a reality.

In the United States, Jefferson and Hamilton epitomized the conflict between democracy and growth.

There was no Magna Carta in Germany and no institutions that would rise in response to rebellion against central authority; quite the contrary, in Germany central authority created political institutions which articulated the German nation. Germany, on the eve of

its industrial period, was still a feudal society. However, socialism as well as trade unionism became a reality and got to work within a system from which there was so much to gain.

A different pattern of industrialization evolved in the Soviet Union, where the Communist party destroyed the legitimacy of opposition, behaving very much in the tradition and manner of the tsars. Even though agrarian reforms increased the proportion of land owned and worked by the middle and poor peasant, agriculture continued to be the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy; the expected increases in the output of consumer goods were slow to materialize. Democratizing elements fail to appear there in the form we are used to knowing in the West.

There are serious demographic deterrents to industrialization in the underdeveloped countries. The author states that, as seen in the case of India, "the state is not a panacea which guarantees a solution to all the problems left unsolved in the period of autonomous growth" (p. 252). On the contrary, it is recognized that private initiative and the expertness of entrepreneurs cannot be replaced by bureaucracy no matter how dedicated to the cause of industrialization and democracy. Voices to this effect can frequently be heard from Indian economists such as Sripati Chandrasekhar (a population expert and author of *Red China, an Asian View* [1961]), B. R. Shenoy, and others. In an article called "Feeding India" Shenoy writes that since the initiation of economic planning farmers have great difficulty in obtaining credits, having to pay as high a rate as 85 per cent per annum. As much as 90 per cent of the national income originates in the private sector (*Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 1964).

It is in the field of underdeveloped areas that more attention could be highly useful. The case of India demonstrates some of the deficiencies of promoting heavy industry while neglecting the most immediate tasks. Alvin H. Hansen emphasizes this point when he writes that no good will will come out of all this industrialization unless a massive rural program is undertaken (*Economic Issues of the 1960's*, p. 157).

One would hope that this highly useful book would put in clearer perspective than has been done the following aspects: (1) The entrepreneurial class should be strengthened in the early stages in a Hamiltonian sense, tempered with Jeffersonian checks to prevent abuses. (2) Changes in agricultural economy are to be stressed in the early stages of economic development to prepare for the creation of surplus for investment in the industrial sector. (3) With the United Nations the "have" nations should share (not merely financial aid) the technical and managerial know-how with the "have-not" nations. (4) There is no need for every nation to follow the same route; deviations and diversifications should be encouraged (Why, for instance, a country like the Soviet Union, not fortunate to have the most favorable climatic conditions, should concentrate on industrialization rather than farming?) (5) Since not only Russia (and China) but even Germany and Japan provide examples of dangers of using short cuts to accelerate economic expansion, we should look for ways of economic development such as presented in the case of Puerto Rico and Israel.

V. E. Andic
New School of Social Research

Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies. Edited by Raymond Firth and B. S. Yamey. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. 399. $8.95.

Perhaps it is a measure of our growing awareness of the need for interdisciplinary understanding that this book, written primarily by anthropologists, should be reviewed by an economist for a journal of sociology. It is appropriate that it should be so reviewed, since it constitutes a plea to the economist that he pay more attention to the contribution which anthropologists can make to the understanding of economic growth.

Besides opening and concluding chapters by the two editors, the book contains fifteen case studies, each examining the nature and financing of capital formation in societies at various stages of economic sophistication, ranging from the crude, "non-monetary" Rossel Island in the South Pacific, to the Haitian market, which approximates the economist's ideal of perfect competition. These case studies might be thought of as illustrations, from the area of capital formation, of the statement that: "What social anthropology has to say to economics is that 'economic

man' is also social and political man, someone's husband and brother and father, sometimes given to religious irrationality, and so forth" (p. 104). The specific case studies in the book give no general principles or rules of procedure for incorporating this idea into the analysis of growth; they do serve as a reminder that much information which is of interest to the economists—or ought to be—is buried in anthropological studies undertaken with other aims in mind, or in the anthropologists themselves. While this may not be new, surely it bears repeating.

The opening and concluding chapters contain a number of interesting ideas. Economists are getting used to the idea of intangible capital formation, as exemplified by investment in education; it is startling—and, the reviewer believes, generally incorrect—to extend this argument to include investment in prestige or status (p. 26). Fortunately, this suggestion is not taken up in the case studies. One interesting point of comparison concerns the ease with which capital stock can be converted into other types of capital or into consumer goods. At one extreme are the nomad's flocks in South Persia, where there is virtually no market for the stock, only for its yield; at the other are Indonesian dwellings, from which a few bricks can be taken and sold in times of hardship. These relationships might be quite important for a country seeking to bring about structural transformation in the economy. The studies also throw some light on the determination of the level of agricultural surplus available for use outside the sector. In New Britain, we are told, increased peasant saving is an alternative to increased leisure, not increased consumption; one wishes that this were generally so, since leisure seems to be in excess supply in many developing countries. In Laos (as of the late 1950's) a limited motivation for material improvement has kept agricultural productivity low, while any surplus available seems to have been devoted to religious purposes; as a result, food for even small towns has had to be imported from neighboring countries.

In the concluding chapter, Yamey raises the question as to why economists have generally ignored the potential contributions of the anthropologists. Perhaps the answer is that, while everyone pays lip service to the importance of the traditional sector in the course of development, its study is regarded as being at the same time less "exciting" (playing a supporting role rather than acting as a major stimulus to growth) and more difficult (in part precisely because of the importance of non-economic factors, in part because of our great lack of data). This book might serve as a reminder that other disciplines are ready to co-operate in a joint exploration of the operation of the traditional sector; perhaps up until now the development economist has been less willing to do his share in pursuing this joint venture.

DONALD C. MEAD
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A Cidade eo campo no civilização industrial ("Town and Country in an Industrial Civilization"). By FERNANDO DE AZEVEDO. ("Obras Complete," Vol. XVII.) São Paulo, Brazil: Ediçãoes Melhoramentos, 1962. Pp. 267.

This is another volume in the re-publication of the complete works (this is Vol. XVII) of the author, known in this country mainly by the translation of his *Brazilian Culture*. As one of the more important scholars in the development of sociology in Brazil, de Azevedo's works give an interesting statement that deserves more attention.

This particular book is divided into three long sections. The first covers an introduction to the sciences in general, and the social sciences in particular, in Brazil, as well as a critical review of sociology in that country, probably the most complete to date. The second section studies attitudes toward change, including analyses of education, political and social crises, and progress. Finally, the third covers some specific recent problems in the relationships between town and country, functions of the political elite in modern Brazil and particularly in São Paulo, and problems of national planning to face the radical changes needed in Brazil.

The book, as stated by the author, grew not as an answer to an organized world, but as a question to a disorganized Brasil. In this study he emphasizes the problems resulting from or aggravated by the process of change that reflect the mentality and customs

of the country. He ends by showing that the growing complexity of problems and the rapid process of change due to technical progress tend to enlarge critical areas and to increase more so those areas that had already entered into a critical transitional phase. Brazilian society in this present moment is considered as being torn apart by competition and internal conflicts. As a result there is developing a minority of privileged men in an ocean of poverty. Both groupings have experienced a certain amount of sociocultural change without taking real consciousness of this and both are exploited by a parasitical administrative structure.

All the studies included are analyses based on inquiry and observation of some aspects of a society in "crisis of development." Several aspects are selected as the basis for this process of change. As the author indicates, the process of urbanization and industrialization, assuming different rhythms in different regions, stimulates internal migratory movements. Migrant movements growing in frequency and volume tend to deplete certain regions of their human resources (as the northeast) and to add to the population of other regions (as in the south-central region). The centers of economic, agricultural, and industrial activities that developed in southern Brazil have increased developmental lag among the regions as well as underlining economic, agricultural, and sociocultural differences. It is possible to observe all over Brazil, and particularly in São Paulo, structural and organizational changes, as well as changes even in the individual's philosophy of life, following the introduction of the new technical processes. Conflicts are growing between the newly developing urban centers and the countryside that only now is beginning to experience technological and social change. Furthermore, it is the whole traditional society that changes with the growth and maturation of the middle class and with the upgrading of the lower segments of the population that follows the transition to an industrial society. All these aspects have a direct influence on the political activities in which are found conflicts and changes in norms, in thinking, and in techniques selected for action. Thus, from a superficial "face-to-face" type of democracy dominated by the rural aristocracy, or better, by the coffee and sugar oligarchy, the nation is changing into an open democracy, growing from the people, in which the middle class is beginning to show its importance and to participate in the national life with the help of the newly growing use of mass communication techniques. Viewed in a historical perspective, it is possible to say that the centralized power of the first republic in the hands of a few oligarchs had a certain beneficial importance to the society as a whole, as they contributed to keeping order in the transitional phase from slavery and empire to the use of free labor and republic. But regimentation enforced by the pressure and control techniques developed by the oligarchy on the voters during the first stage is gradually changing, and from one monolithic party grows a variety of political groupings without ideological content, without platforms or party discipline, and dominated by personality leaders and internal factionalism. During the transitional period of "face-to-face" democracy into open democracy there is developing a phase of demagoguery and charismatic leadership. This whole process is reflected in the relationships between town and country, as one can very well imagine. As one example, in the first period sugar and coffee aristocrats living in small urban centers close to their agricultural enterprises showed little, if any, interest in dealing with agricultural workers, slaves or otherwise. This first period of disregard for "social justice" turned into the contemporary period of tension and open conflict in labor relations, with discussions of problems involving land tenure, levels of income, standards of living, and so on. In brief, now is the time to open the questioning of the old system that regulated man-land relationships, as well as the whole agrarian society. The new ideals of "social justice" have spread from the industrial areas into the rural areas, and agricultural workers are demanding equality of treatment to the factory workers. Thus, basic reforms of a structural type are necessary, as well as an acceleration of the process of urban industrialization and the modernization of the rural area.

In these studies the author always started from two basic principles: first, the concept of meaningful interrelationships among all levels of human activity; and second, the importance of cultural lag as an explanation of

differential rates of change. Finally, as a result of his own theoretical framework, the author calls upon education and cultural diffusion to introduce change and to adapt man to the new society.

J. F. BARBOSA-DASILVA

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Approaches, Contexts, and Problems of Social Psychology. Edited by EDWARD E. SAMPSON. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. ix+576. $8.95.

I sometimes call myself a social psychologist simply because social psychology is so vaguely defined and is applied in so many different ways that the label leaves me free to do pretty much what I want. Therefore, when I say that this book of readings—all reprints of previously published articles or parts of books—covers a wide range of material and has no particular focus, it is more a compliment than a criticism.

Of course, Sampson maintains in his preface that he *does* have a bias which influences his selections. He says he is against atheoretical, purely empirical, pieces. He favors cognitive psychology and discussions that integrate sociological and psychological concepts. I also found that his selections were heavy on experimental psychology (human, not rat). When one gets so much experimental psychology in one lump, one really appreciates how heavily dependent psychologists are on students in introductory psychology courses as research subjects. One may also be amazed at the frequent use of confederates or stooges. (One stooge even had his name mentioned in a footnote, surely the first step toward stardom.)

A large number of the articles that do not report on experiments use an experimental model of reporting: problem, method, results, discussion. But despite the evidence of a selective bias, this book of readings is in no sense an integrated whole or a selection of a single type of article.

The readings are divided into "Approaches," "Contexts," and "Social Issues and Social Problems." But these categories are not important to the user of the book. They are probably not even a convenience for most instructors.

No matter how you slice the pie, the readings do not sample any area of social psychology with thoroughness. Therefore, the book is unlikely to be useful to the scholar as a collection that will save him the trouble of searching for references. It is definitely intended as a course reader which provides the teacher with a substantial cross-section of social psychology writings, mostly of recent vintage.

Taken separately, the articles vary greatly in value. John Whiting's piece on mechanisms of social control from a cross-cultural perspective (pp. 153–66) is a vast theoretical superstructure based on very limited empirical data. Nancy Morse and Everett Reimer's "Experimental Change of a Major Organizational Variable" (pp. 392–403) strikes me as an absurdly simple hypothesis (an increased role in decision-making for rank-and-file groups increases their satisfaction and productivity) demonstrated by an elaborate and time-consuming experiment.

On the other hand, some of the articles are brilliant. There is an excellent critical review of theories of gang delinquency by David Bordua (pp. 533–47). William Goode supplies a thoroughgoing critique of deterministic conceptions of the function of social roles (pp. 439–52). Carl Hovland has a most informative discussion of why experimental studies regularly demonstrate greater attitude change than surveys do (pp. 288–98). Another of the better pieces is Robert White's critique of the drive-reduction theory of learning (pp. 120–41).

But there is no point in continuing this kind of listing. Tastes among readers vary too greatly. In any case, if you teach a social psychology course, this book is worth looking at to see which of the forty-four items you might want to use.

JULIUS A. ROTH

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Religion, Revolution and Reform: New Forces for Change in Latin America. Edited by WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO and FREDERICK B. PIKE. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1964. Pp. x+276. $5.95.

The Introduction and the concluding chapter of this volume are written by the two editors, professors of history and sociology,

respectively, at Notre Dame University. The University's Conference on Religion and Social Change in Latin America had in attendance sociologists, clergymen, and economists. A number of the important papers read at the conference, as well as excerpts from two panel discussions, appear in this volume.

Eduardo Frei Montalva, now President of Chile, wrote about the Christian Democratic reform movements; Bishop Mark McGrath, of Panama, on the neglected teaching responsibility of the Catholic Church; Robert E. Quirk, on religion and the Mexican revolution; Father Roger Vekemans and Simon Hanson wrote on economic development and social change. William P. Glade contributed "The Alliance for Progress as an Instrument of Socialization." Co-editor D'Antonio's chapter on "Democracy and Religion in Latin America" devotes a large, perhaps inordinate, amount of space to the issue of population control.

Father Vekemans is director of the Center of Research and Social Action in Chile. His model for economic development of Latin America is constructed on "thorough and quick change on a truly revolutionary scale . . . accepting the necessity for cultural change." This is easier said than done.

Emilio Willems writes on Protestantism in Brazil and Chile, with statistical tables on membership and cogent comments on long-range trends. He sharply contrasts the orthodox and traditional Protestant groups with the Pentecostal sects, concluding that "the more pronouncedly the internal structure and its inherent value system of a Protestant body deviates from those of traditional Latin American society, the more attractive it has proved to be to the masses, thus subverting the social order in the language of religious symbolism."

D'Antonio, a sociologist, contends that social change—within the bounds of moderation—is accepted as the normal thing to expect in the United States, whereas in Latin America change means to many the totality of a social revolution. This contrast appears to be heavily overstated. A suggestion advanced by D'Antonio (like some of his other valuable thoughts, tucked away in footnotes) is that in inter-American relationships we substitute for the phrase "people to people" the phrase "subsidiary group to subsidiary group." Chambers of Commerce, trade unions, cultural, religious, or youth groups may offer profitable channels of communication and an exchange of expertise in overcoming Latin American problems to a degree and within a time span much more acceptable than by a methodology of one individual to another individual. He is right.

In comparison to other treatises on Latin America which avoid mention of religion entirely, apparently fearful of treading on sensitive ecclesiastical toes, religion and the role of the Catholic Church are predominant themes in this volume. The churchmen-contributors are most explicit in pointing out that in countries "nominally Catholic" there may be as few as 10–12 per cent of the population who practice their beliefs, and understand the tenets of their faith. It is the reviewer's opinion that out of this frank and refreshing presentation can come only good results. One is a realization by U.S. Catholics of the vast differences between them and their Latin American co-religionists. Another is the realization of the limited possibilities, and of the immensity of manpower, energy, and material resources needed to accomplish the changes so dear to the hearts of North American reformers in or out of government.

WILLARD F. BARBER

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Pilgrims, Colonists, and Frontiersmen: An Ethnic Community in Transition. By ALEX SIMIRENKO. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xvi+232. $5.95.

Extensive documentation and lucid writing assure *Pilgrims, Colonists, and Frontiersmen* a prominent place in the literature on minority communities. The subject is the major Russian settlement in Minneapolis. It is characterized by extra-community innovation (they had been allowed to settle in the city at the end of the nineteenth century) and extra-community closure (they were set apart from full participation in the host society). The church became the central institution, uniting the settlement into a purposeful body. Leaders possessing prestige, influence, and authority within the community system of stratification protected and sanctioned the cultural uniqueness that made partial closure a purposefully achieved reality. The focus of

the study is on social stratification and on generational changes in social stratification. Applying Mannheim's concept of the "generation unit," three social elements are distinguished: (1) pilgrims, the original settlers, mostly born in Europe, who claim status solely within the ethnic community; (2) colonists, offspring of the pilgrims who claim status in terms of the ethnic group's symbols, but who are secondarily oriented to American status symbols; and (3) frontiersmen, comprising those offspring of the pilgrims who have broken their ties with the ethnic community by ceasing to participate in the Russian church.

These three generational units are analyzed in terms of four changing dimensions: class, status, power, and acculturation, each dimension measured by a scale containing from four to thirty-seven items. The author has an extensive familiarity both with Slavic society generally and with this community in particular. The present study relies primarily upon the responses of 105 informants of the three groups to interviews utilizing a precoded questionnaire.

The testing of hypotheses about changes in these four dimensions is, for various reasons, the least useful part of the book:

1. In operationalizing sociological concepts the author gives terms different, usually less complex, meanings than normal usage allows (that is, his use of "class" in the restricted sense of access to wealth);

2. He makes unjustified extrapolations from indirect measurements. Thus, for instance, he finds an improvement of status within the ethnic community from pilgrims to colonists. But he measures status with a scale that is really a direct measure of practices relating to education, occupations of fathers, occupations of women, response to classical culture, preference in music, attendance at the theater and symphony concerts, vacation activity, preference in alcoholic beverages, etc., all of which the author characterizes as styles of life and leisure-time pursuits. Extrapolation from style of life to status, however, the assumption that honor or deference is granted on the basis of one's style of life and leisure-time activities, must be demonstrated empirically. To some extent this is done for American society. But the status symbols of the ethnic community are not necessarily the same as those of American society. Symbols are cultural items and must be discovered anew for each social tradition. As between this particular ethnic community and its American host, both style of life and status appear to be different (pp. 6–7). Even though there may be a steady approximation to the styles of life of American society, to the extent that this also indicates increased honor and deference, it would be vis-à-vis the host community rather than within the ethnic community. Within the ethnic community, the scale might actually be interpreted as an indication of decreased status for colonists, since their behavior tends *away* from Russian norms. Some sort of accommodation of Russian and American values undoubtedly took place. But what this accommodation might be and how it occurred cannot be determined from the data presented.

3. The phenomena measured are translated into abstract quantities which distort the significance of relevant behavior in the real world. For instance, the author discerns an improvement in the power situation from pilgrims to colonists. But he translates power into an abstract quantity by divorcing amount of power from context in which power is exercised. Power cannot be exercised in a social vacuum, however. The data indicate that, when the social context of power is incorporated in the measure, a more meaningful but contrary finding is made. Within the ethnic community, pilgrims have *more* rather than less power than colonists, since they participate more in the central institution of the community, the church (pp. 158, 160). The apparent increase in the power of colonists holds with respect to the majority community, but not with respect to the ethnic community as such.

4. Anticipated findings so structure the research design that subsequent findings are tautological. The author finds that "as one moves from Pilgrims through the Colonists to the Frontiersmen, a general increase in acculturation to the American community is discernible" (p. 181). The "generation-unit" approach in this study isolated the three groups on the basis of relative acculturation to American culture rather than by actual generation. The conclusion is therefore tautological, and the value of the scale lies solely in the greater precision and broader

dimensions that it adds to the description of this relative acculturation. It does not lie in a demonstration of its occurrence.

The goal of the project as a whole is to attempt "to isolate some of the major processes by which an ethnic community is undergoing transformation and is preserved" (p. 179). The book really deals only with the first part of this goal, the transformation of the community, and that only in part. Although conceived of primarily as a study in social stratification, it is perhaps better regarded as a study of acculturation. All four scales are largely measures of the adoption of American values and behavior. These American adoptions include American concepts and practices of hierarchical social attainment, making this a study as well of social mobility within the American context. It must also be regarded as a study of urbanization, since it documents changes in a population originally peasant and now resident in a city. This ambiguity represents a recurrent problem in ethnic studies; it is not possible to say to what extent observed changes are primarily the result of urbanization rather than of acculturation.

The second part of the goal, to study the preservation of an ethnic community, is not achieved or seriously attempted, although the history of the community is broadly described. In orienting the study of social stratification to American dimensions, the author neglects the equally important internal stratification of the ethnic community. Given that the settlers were for the most part originally all peasants, to what extent did social strata emerge within their community? While some information is given on community leaders, no attempt is made to show how they function to preserve the community, to reinterpret American behavior and to adapt Russian behavior. And for the membership at large, how do the colonists manage to live simultaneously in two culture worlds? What set colonists and frontiersmen to diverge in ethnic loyalty? Surely these are critical aspects of the preservation of an ethnic community. That the book raises such questions in the mind of the reader is not a matter for criticism. Every good book raises questions that it does not answer. The author has an obvious familiarity with this community. His command of relevant sociological theory is equally impressive, and his success in relating his analysis to the analyses of others greatly enhances the utility of his work. It is to be hoped that he will write still more on Russian pilgrims, colonists, and frontiersmen in Minneapolis.

ROBERT T. ANDERSON
Mills College

Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey. Edited by R. E. WARD and D. A. RUSTOW. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. vii+502. $8.75.

This book contains the papers submitted to a conference on political modernization in Japan and Turkey, sponsored by the National Sciences Research Council in Dobbs Ferry, New York, in 1962.

The introduction and conclusion are written by the editors. Comparable chapters are written about Japan and Turkey in each of the following sections: The nature of traditional society; environmental and foreign contributions; economic and political modernization; education; mass media; civil bureaucracy; the military; political parties.

In this review, major emphasis will be placed on the sections on economic and political modernization and the political parties. These two sections may not adequately represent all the material covered in the book. However, it is hoped that the reader will thus get an idea about the approach followed.

The editors and the contributing authors approach the subject with a primarily historical perspective. Statistical analyses are rare. Modernization is defined as a historical concept including such specific aspects of change as "industrialization of economy and secularization of ideas," though not limited to these. The historical approach is often supplemented with notions and concepts borrowed from sociology, economics, and political science. No single analytical scheme is offered.

A change in the balance of forces is suggested as the origin of social change. According to the editors, traditional society can influence the course of institutional change in two fundamental ways: "First, there is what the historians have called trends or processes which carry the momentum beyond the traditional base into the period of moderniza-

tion; second there is the basic institutional structure which by its pattern of resistance and receptivity can channel the flow of change." In subsequent chapters, however, no theoretical explanation is given as to why a balance of forces changes and another equilibrium is reached. Also, there is no theoretical account of the possible change cycles. It is not a stationary equilibrium, and suggested as the cause of changes leading to modernization are, in the case of Turkey, mainly the external threats and the centralized authority of the ruling individual, and in the case of Japan, besides the external threats, the authority vested in the elite family or committees.

The reader might wonder why Turkey, an underdeveloped country, is compared with industrialized Japan. The editors give the following reasons: "A threat of European conquest or invasion of countries. . . . This led to modernization. . . . Turkey and Japan began to modernize with the spread of technology. . . . The beginning of the modernization dates back to 1839 in Turkey, and to 1868 in Japan. Both Japan and Turkey are of Asian background and culture (*despite Turkey's endeavor to associate herself with the West in the last decades*). . . . Never have they been subject to outright colonial rule, but have maintained their independence throughout the period studied. . . ."

Changes toward modernization are elaborated on in some chapters in terms of a sociohistorical factor, for example, religion in Inalcik's chapter on the Turkish historical background; in terms of the interplay between variables, as in Lockwood's chapter on Japan's economy; or in terms of the description of certain decades under the influence of guiding trends, as in Sugar's chapter on the Turkish economy.

Lockwood has divided his study into parts on the basis of functional relationships between social, economic, and political phenomena; that is, economic development and political stability, economic development and political expansion, and economic development and political democracy. He discusses the bearing on economic development of the institution of political stability and the political change in the initial stages of Japan's developmental history and later the effects of economic growth on the democratization of the country. Lockwood's study is to be praised for its objectivity, for the due emphasis put on the adverse distribution of income to further economic growth, for example, "The common people shared only tardily in the fruits of progress . . . . Many interests such as those of the tenant farmer or the child laborer were poorly served." He resorts to original sources and puts forth his own ideas rather than quoting other authors. This gives him the opportunity to be critical of commonplace slogans such as "Japan must conquer [by political expansion] or perish." Lockwood offers an adequate presentation of the complex of social phenomena that have led to extremely rapid economic development in Japan and the institution of political democracy. In this sense, his study fully serves the aim of the volume, that is, "to improve our understanding of how specific institutions may affect particular outcomes."

Sugar's study on Turkey is distinctly different in the methodology followed, being more of a descriptive historical survey than an analysis of interrelations between various economic and political factors that underlie economic and political modernization in Turkey. His very division of the study into parts entitled "Ottoman Reforms 1789–1877," "The Hamidian and Young Turk Periods," and "The Turkish Republic" testifies to a conformity in his outlook on the developmental pattern displayed by the country he studies. It is also to be lamented that he often resorts to secondhand sources of information, which puts him in the position of a quoter, rather than studying original data and documents. For these reasons, his study remains far from probing deeply into the economic and political causes that explain the decline of the Ottoman Empire despite attempts at reform and the nonterminated modernization of present-day Turkey.

Sugar introduces us to the subject of economic and political modernization by dividing developing societies into those where this process has been "organic," as against those where it has been "induced" and by classifying Turkey in the latter category. This point, in fact, is the basic idea that runs through his study of historical events. Nevertheless, the events under review give support to the thesis that an induced change finds enforcement only at the absorption rate of the people,

for example, Atatürk's "ability to push his reforms at exactly the speed that peasants could be forced to accept."

In the section on political parties where political parties and leaders are considered as symbols of modernization, differences in leadership in Japan and Turkey are elaborated on. However, no attempt is made to analyze the relationships between the structural elements and the external relations. For example, on the one hand, the Ottoman Empire is heterogeneous and Japan is homogeneous in terms of race, religion, language, etc.; and on the other hand, since Japan's location is not as strategic as that of the Ottoman Empire, she did not face the same serious difficulties at the beginning of the modernization period affecting both countries, when Europe was industrializing. Also, at this time the influence of the romantic-nationalist trend was felt in Europe, challenging the other countries, especially the empires. These conditions might indicate that the emergence of strong leaders was to be expected more in the Ottoman Empire than in Japan.

Nobuteka Ike seems pessimistic in applying the Westminster type of party and government system to Japan, that is, "The public does not seem to be involved in the high Councils of Government." However, if Japan's industrialization, the emergence of the working class, the explosion of the atomic bomb, the invasion, and the decentralization of authority are taken into consideration, it can be said that the situation is congenial to the Westminster type of political milieu. On the other hand, although the centralized authority is weak in Turkey, the lag in industrialization and the size of the working class do not warrant the establishment of a similar equilibrium.

Payaslioğlu points out political cycles in Turkey. Each cycle has a liberal beginning and a period of dictatorship following it. However, this seems to be a historical and descriptive account. The so-called cycles may not be integrated with the existing power structure in the country. According to Payaslioğlu, the problem confronting the leaders in Turkey is "to reconcile competing claims of stability and change." Can't we say that the problem is "a change for freedom"?

Dr Gülten Kazgan and Dr. İdris Küçükömer were consulted in reviewing the sections on economics and the political parties.

OĞUZ N. ARI

Istanbul University

Soviet Partisans in World War II. Edited by JOHN A. ARMSTRONG with an Introduction by PHILIP E. MOSELEY. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964. Pp. xviii+792. $12.50.

This voluminous work, a summation of research undertaken by the War Documentation Project under contract with the United States Air Force, is a result of the teamwork of scholars and experts in the field of Russian area studies. Armstrong edited the entire volume, a very difficult task indeed, wrote the introductory section, and contributed an analytic study and a case study. Other case and analytic studies were written by Alexander Dallin, Kurt De Witt, Ralph Mavrocordato, Wilhelm Moll, Gerhard L. Weinberg, and Earl Ziemke. The research is based largely on documentary material now deposited in a number of institutions, as well as on published material.

The volume is divided into four major sections: "Introduction," which gives a general evaluation of Soviet partisan experience; "Analytic Studies"; "Case Studies"; and an "Appendix of Selected Documents," an important collection of primary sources on the partisan movement.

A social scientist will find the major merit of this book to be its attempt to discover what may be called the sociological nature of partisan movements; behavior and attitudes of the population in occupied areas; behavior in man-made disaster situations, as wars were; structure of partisan groups; relationships between group structure, size, and function; class structure of the partisan movement; class attitude toward the partisan movement—to mention a few topics of sociological interest. This volume was not planned as a sociological text or analysis, however. The book contains a wealth of historical material, a military analysis, and general political, sociological, and psychological evaluation (the reader will find interesting sections on psychological warfare). It is above all a source book, an accumulation of data

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Oğuz N. Arı
Istanbul University

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and facts. It is indeed a very valuable volume for historians, social scientists, political scientists, or students of military problems of the last war.

A partisan movement in its modern form probably appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth century, first in Spain, later in Russia as a reaction against the French conquest. The revolutionary guerilla pattern was also considered by the German military strategist, Gneisenau. The general pattern of irregular struggle was later formalized and became a part of military operations during the First and Second World Wars and postwar revolutions. The general character of partisan movements was at one time primarily a revolutionary one. Guerillas and their struggle were considered (and indeed they mostly were) representatives of a national or a revolutionary struggle against oppression or foreign rule. Thus the partisan movement was fundamentally also an ideological movement. As a rule, partisans advanced or defended some kind of an ideology, values, or symbols. This was not necessarily an ideology of social change, progress, or democracy. In fact, the classic guerilla warfare in Spain, against the army of Napoleon Bonaparte, was waged against the new order and in defense of the old one, rooted in inquisition and a despotic monarchy. The Bonapartist rule, despite its authoritarian orientation, was at that time and in those countries a liberalizing force, as it was in other parts of Europe, for example, in Italy. The Russian partisans of 1812, defeating Napoleon, delayed their own emancipation from serfdom for half a century. With the revolutionary struggles for independence in Italy, Poland, Latin America, and later in colonial countries, partisan movements were identified with liberating, revolutionary struggles, and the ideology of the partisans was revolutionary in its general nature. The partisan movement was also regarded as a "spontaneous" popular expression of collective discontent, as a movement "from below," from the social base. The Mexican Revolution may supply examples of those popular, spontaneous movements. The general assumption is that a partisan movement must be motivated by some kind of ideology or general value structure, that it must have strong support from the local population and that it is an expression of local discontent.

The research seems to indicate that the Russian partisan movement during the Second World War does not necessarily agree with this general picture. First of all, the partisan movement—according to the authors—was carefully organized and based on a well-structured "skeleton staff" left behind the German lines and guided as well as controlled from the central headquarters. There were several (not one) lines of command and control to assure the full exercise of power by the Soviet leaders. The Soviet officials, the NKVD, members of the Communist party, and in certain cases military men formed the core of this structure. Most of them were closely related with or part of the Soviet ruling class. The rank and file was formed to a large extent by Soviet army stragglers, Soviet prisoners of war who escaped from German camps, or local peasants mobilized into partisan units. The partisan detachments were reinforced by regular paratroops, especially in time of advance. These troops were specially trained for partisan action. The leadership was connected with the Soviet system, and it must have been ideologically motivated, at least part of it. According to Earl Ziemke, the rank and file was "a model example of involuntary movement." Perhaps not entirely. It was not the ideology, but the cruel conditions of German occupation, the threat of retaliation by both the invaders and the defenders of the country, that favored the growth of the partisan movement. The German rule was so ruthless that it did not offer for many people any alternatives more favorable than the partisan movement and its continuous dangers. On the other hand, Soviet retaliation against collaborationists and deserters, in addition to the difficult conditions of survival, made this dangerous proposition, the partisan movement, one of the major (if not the only) alternative open to many. Deserters and at least some of the collaborationists could save their lives by joining the partisans. The population in the rural areas, terrified, terrorized, and largely indifferent, favored the Russian partisans since the ruthless and indiscriminate cruelty of the German forces, the mass executions, offered no choices. This is perhaps the general thesis of the entire volume, a secondary thesis being that the partisans played only a secondary role in the defeat of German armies.

Nonetheless, this powerful type of partisan movement required dedicated leaders,

strong personalities in the core of the leadership. The partisan movement, like any political movement, appeals to certain personality types, but on the other hand it gathers many, not just one single type. A more detailed analysis and classification of personality types, in addition to the authors' analysis of class and age composition, would have contributed to our understanding of leadership formation in disaster situations.

The mass of the Soviet population was trapped in a large man-made disaster area. A disaster situation, natural or man-made, limits as a rule the number of choices open to people. In the Russian territories the attitudes of the population varied. In the Western Ukraine a nationalist collaborationist movement emerged, at least at the beginning, which was anti-Soviet, anti-Polish, and anti-Jewish. Generally, in the Russian territories, after some experience with the conquerors the population favored the partisans. We learn also from this study, however, that the partisan movement can be developed in areas where local population is indifferent, and that the Russian "formalized" type of partisan movement requires a highly structured organization with many lines of command. The success of such a movement depends largely on a strong "outside base," which supplies the movement with equipment and leadership. Such a movement can be organized by a "skeleton" or core structure, mobilizing into the rank and file local populations and collaborationists. This "irregular pattern" may become a major form of international conflict in limited-tension areas.

In our cold and scholarly evaluation of social and political conditions, of human behavior, group formation and function of groups, of military matters, we may easily miss the essential, let us say the central issue —the human and moral problem—and in consequence, the human drama. Without this human drama the picture is incomplete. The factual material of this volume shows again man's terrifying capacity and will for destruction, extermination of his fellow man, the will to exploit others, the hopeless weakness of an individual vis-à-vis the powerful forces of the state, the hatred and hostility that are a powerful political motivating force. What effect did this experience have on individuals and nations? Are those who were used as a tool for conquest re-educated, did they change, were they affected by this experience, and how?

It was not the task of the authors to discuss these problems. They are, however, issues that social science cannot disregard by invoking cultural and ethical relativism.

This volume is primarily an extensive and systematic collection and analysis of data with several important generalizations and inferences. It is sometimes difficult to discover a central idea, working hypothesis or assumption while moving through the massive forest of data. This is an important contribution, however, to the fields of social and political science, history, and international relations. It supplies rich material for the student of sociology of conflict, although it does not suggest any methods of reductions—but that, after all, was not the task of this volume.

FELIKS GROSS

Brooklyn College
City University of New York

Individualism, Collectivism, and Political Power: A Relational Analysis of Ideological Conflict. By ERVIN LASZLO. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. vi+172. Gld. 19.80.

The author, who "divides his energies between music and philosophy," aims at a systematic analysis of the principles of individualism and collectivism and of their interaction with sociohistorical influences. By a "relational analysis of ideological conflict" he seems to mean an examination of the relationship of logically integrated and politically institutionalized doctrines ("ideologies") to popular thinking. Although the author warns the reader that he is more interested in a broad frame of reference than in the treatment of individual problems, this cannot exempt the treatise from being judged with regard to the pertinence of its philosophical analysis for the study of political phenomena proper. To this reader, at least, the study seems to be seriously deficient on this crucial score. The treatise proceeds from the highly dubious premise that the idea of society is basic to political action and that the ideological conflict between the Communist and the Western world is rooted in two radically opposed ontologies: "The real, actual scope of the con-

flict may thus be determined *only* by studying the penetration of the basic premise of the institutionalized principles into the social consciousness of the people in the respective blocs" (p. 4, my emphasis). Hence, the first part of the book deals with ontological dichotomies in the concept of man and the idea of reality, juxtaposing the collectivist ontology of existence with the individualist ontology of being. The second part is concerned with the rise of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its institutionalization in Communist countries. A summary account of the Hungarian Revolution concludes that it was not just a fight for freedom but a stand for "national collectivism" and that this may explain its relative failure: "When people accept the collectivist principles of Communism without accepting the Kremlin's totalitarian application thereof, they find themselves without concepts to express their ideas" (p. 135). At the same time, however, the nationalist motive of the uprisings revealed the power of cultural and territorial legacies in resisting the internationalist aspect of Marxism-Leninism. The author ends with an almost propagandistic plea for a rapprochement between individualism and collectivism, for a "synthesis of concrete individuality with relational existence"—a surprisingly simple solution after a tortuous terminological exercise. A large number of misprints and grammatical obscurities contrast noticeably with the pretensions of the book.

GUENTHER ROTH

State University of New York

The Sociology of Cities. By JOHN SIRJAMAKI. New York: Random House, 1964. Pp. xviii+328. $5.25.

In this ambitious effort, Sirjamaki aims at an integrated, analytic treatment of the history of cities. The story culminates, however, not in the realization of the Time Spirit, but in the Withering Away of the City. Following Martindale (in his preface to a recent translation of Weber's *The City*) he says: "the people flock to cities, and cities swell into metropolitan and megalopolitan areas; but the national community provides the social organization of their lives and activities and in some respects makes urban communities obsolescent" (viii).

This conclusion derives from the historical approach (about forty per cent of the book consists of history) together with a focus upon the role of cities in societies. As such it is a simple, successful history of urban complexes, paying attention successively to the rise of cities in the near East, the cities of Sumer, Mesopotamia, Rome, the medieval communes, and the commercial-industrial cities of today. For teaching our timeless, ahistorical American sophomore, such a history could be very useful indeed. To be sure it has all been said very well elsewhere, from V. Gordon Childe and Frankfort to Ralph Turner, M. Weber, A. Weber, and Pirenne. The point is, however, that it has not been said as well in any current sociology text. So if one uses a "pony" for urban sociology, this is at least a somewhat different breed.

The analytical focus is upon (*a*) the economic and other functions of cities in total societies and (*b*) the nature of social order within cities. The value of such an approach, however, is greatly reduced by the sketchy treatment of these matters and the unexplicated nature of important terms. Thus the author says, "However, if communities are to persist as organized groups, they must overcome divisiveness in their institutions. They do this by two general means. One is a functional integration of their local and cultural activities which unifies their communities: this forces a pattern over all their enterprises. The other means is a normative integration of their communities, which is similarly dictated by a human strain for consistency in the more" (p. 1). I think this is assuming entirely too much for the audience of scholars, not to speak of our timeless undergraduate.

This analytical weakness is combined with a curious lack of attention to the inner ordering of contemporary cities, curious because of the attention this matter received with respect to earlier ones. I suspect this is true because of the way in which time and circumstance edit our knowledge of earlier states of affairs: our notions of order in, say, Akkad, have some unity and clarity because of our ignorance of Akkad. Our city, however, is sprawling and complex; volatile in the short run, evolving in the long run; and it is all about us, given in a multitude of messages. Yet it is held together, no less than Akkad was, by some mechanisms—and these are

related to each other. Such matters are not dealt with in this study.

Nor do we learn much about the differentiated social worlds of the metropolis. The treatment of local areas is cursory and weak and, in short, there really are no units for analyzing the city. Thus we end up with statements about social class and demography, business organization and labor in the economy, which apply equally well to American society as a whole, the nation, state, or even the Western world. The customary bland chapter on city planning omits both the aesthetic excitement which drives men and cities into such esoteric (for Americans) enterprises, and the rough stuff which tends to drive them out.

Finally, granted that the national society is today an increasingly "tight" system, that it controls much of the fate of any city and its inhabitants, what then? It seems to me our next effort must be to spell out the levels of control, the nature of different levels, and their relationships in the concrete case. The metropolis exists, not in a unitary "national society," but rather in webs of control systems—political, economic, religious, and so on. To describe systematically, we need a framework that can evoke the minute particulars and order them with respect to the broader system. To explain, we need a theory of that system. This, I fear, Sirjamaki does not pull off.

SCOTT GREER

Northwestern University

Skid Row in American Cities. By DONALD J. BOGUE. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, 1963. Pp. xiv+521. $6.50.

Possibly one in five thousand adult American males resides in Skid Row. The ratio is small, but the challenge to welfare and religious workers, city planners, police, health officials, as well as to aesthetes and prudes, is great. The failure of our society—to abolish poverty, to extend compassion, to bestow meaning to life—is possibly exhibited more vividly in the Skid Rows of several dozen American cities than in any other residential locales. Bogue has sought to describe the activities and services in these urban islands of homeless white men surrounded by Negro slum dwellers, and to probe deeply into the backgrounds, perspectives, and aspirations of the men. Chicago's Skid Row is the main object of study.

The book accomplishes well much of what it sets out to do: (1) to supply "information and principles necessary to redevelop successfully Skid Row neighborhoods," and (2) to obtain "sociological knowledge about the Skid Row community and its residents in an attempt to add to or refine theories about personal and social disorganization." Descriptive information, obtained primarily from resource persons familiar with Skid Row and from a sample of the inhabitants themselves, supersaturates the reader. Principles designed to eradicate Skid Rows entirely are boldly put forth. Thereby the first purpose is fulfilled, by comprehensive reporting and cautious yet bold recommendations, including both "salvaging" operations for the derelict and measures which would remove the necessity for the poor and the disorganized to live in squalor.

It is questionable whether the second goal is fulfilled as well as the first. Although there are frequent references to those who serve Skid Row—bartenders, policemen, hotel managers, welfare workers, mission workers, and others—Bogue failed to confront Skid Row as a community. There is surely a social system there, with a morality, social controls, an economy, a basis for achieving identity, and even prestige. Bogue only hints at how this system works. Rather, he emphasizes the several categories comprising Skid Row personnel, not how the men in these categories—alcoholics, pensioners, criminals, the temporarily poverty-stricken, the low-salaried, the disabled, the transient, along with those who serve them—cohere into the community.

Data on recreational activities, religious and political beliefs, illness, courtship and marriage patterns, sexual practices, drinking habits, and the self-images of Skid Row men provide frequent opportunity to question current sociological theories. A number of myths about the men, about alcoholism, violence, sexual practices, and social backgrounds, are exposed.

Sociologists soon need to ask the complementary question, "Why aren't there Skid Rows for homeless women?" The answer, combined with studies comparable to Bogue's, will provide American civic and moral leaders

with new insights into causes of personal loneliness, debilitations, ostracism, and those other factors which have made Skid Rows commonplace in America.

LEONARD D. CAIN, JR.

Sacramento State College

Comparative Social Problems. Edited by S. N. EISENSTADT. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pp. xi+463. $9.95.

The eminence of the editor as well as the title of this book raises one's expectations. Sociological writing in the social problems area has often been parochial, so that emphasis on a comparative approach would seem most promising. But systematic comparisons are absent from this disappointing volume. The comparative study of suicide is hardly advanced by a section that consists of a few pages of excerpts from the work of one Frenchman (Durkheim) and two Americans (Henry and Short). Nor can one make much comparative sense out of a section on "Work and Unemployment" that consists of excerpts from two classical books on British labor (Engels and Rowntree), two short pieces (both by Gadgil) on India, and two well-known studies on contemporary American labor (Wilensky and Dubin).

The section on illness contains two anthropological pieces on disease in Mexican-American culture and in an Indian village (by Rubel and McKim Marriott, respectively), the well-known article by Parsons and Fox on the subject, as well as short excerpts from the work of Field on Soviet medicine and of Caudill on sociocultural effects in reactions to stress. A student reading these materials cannot compare anything with anything; he can, at best, gain the impression that they handle things differently in different societies.

Many selections seem very idiosyncratic. Under "Community Development" one finds four pieces on East and West Africa, one on an Eskimo village, two on contemporary England, and a general article on urbanization by Ralph Beals, from which I learned that "Talcott Parsons recently suggested that . . . it is impossible at present to develop a systematic general theory of sociology."

The book contains no material, *inter alia*, on drug addiction, crime, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, and race relations. The deficiencies of the selections might have been mitigated had the editor tied them together by extended commentary and had he provided a systematic framework. This is, however, not the case. The various sections are introduced by only a few short paragraphs, and the Preface explaining the design of the book is a page and a half long.

LEWIS A. COSER

Brandeis University

The Future of Old Neighborhoods: Rebuilding for a Changing Population. By BERNARD J. FRIEDEN. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964. Pp. viii+209.

The deterioration of downtown urban areas that have not become slums has attracted the attention of urban planners. One current term which has been popularized through a series of Ford Foundation studies is "gray areas." This implies a transition toward the areas which are shown black on maps; namely, the slums. The proposed solution is, therefore, similar to the one that is given for slums: rehabilitation, change before urban blight eats up the whole downtown neighborhood, and speed in executing it. The present volume takes a different line. Granting that the "old neighborhoods" (a term he uses instead of "gray areas") do not have ideal living conditions, the author claims they could be made into quite reasonable dwelling areas. Moreover, he shows the original valuable function of these old neighborhoods, namely, as the first step (which might last for a generation) of immigrant groups to the urban American cities. Although mass immigration has subsided, we still have urban migrants on a similar scale: the southern Negroes and Puerto Ricans. They form a ready market for dwellings in these neighborhoods; not only that, they can afford only this type of dwelling. If it is not available, these groups will get worse housing or they will become dependent on public funds. Although we might want to see, in most of our cities, an ultimately rebuilt downtown area with civic centers, luxury apartments, and business buildings, this cannot be done overnight. And in the meantime, the dwellings are needed and the structures

are standing. For the foreseeable future, say ten to twenty years, it might be more sensible to keep these areas for a reasonable dwelling function for recent migrants instead of either letting them degenerate into slums or tearing them down without any replacement or equivalent housing. After developing this argument, the author proceeds to analyze the different factors that would make such a plan economically feasible and tests them in three different cities: New York, Hartford, and Los Angeles. He shows how the cities can be compared according to the different economic conditions that make continued use of old neighborhoods feasible and how the problem differs in these cities. The analysis is mainly economic, showing the cost, the market, the source of capital, and ways of attracting it. For the sociologist this study is valuable mainly because it describes the conditions within which the sociological questions must be answered. It has a special value in the definite introduction of the time factor. So often can we depict social change showing the direction in which it is going and the goals which we want either to achieve or to avoid that we get impatient with what happens in the meantime. It takes a special kind of courage and integrity to face a problem, analyze it in great detail, and advance an interim solution, which is done here. Sociologists confronted with urban planning will be richly rewarded in skimming this book, both as a source of new ideas and a demonstration of the economic limits in which urban planning occurs, although few will want to dwell on all the details which are of interest mainly to the economist or builder.

KURT W. BACK

Duke University

Suicide and Scandinavia. By HERBERT HENDIN. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1964. Pp. xii+153. $4.75.

This attempt at a comparative study of the cultural patterns of meanings of suicidal actions is clearly one of the few worthwhile works among the many recent writings on suicide. Its value, however, lies in what is suggested rather than in what is clearly stated and in what is attempted rather than in what is accomplished.

The clearly stated purpose of the work is that of synthesizing the "sociological" and "psychological" approaches to suicide. In some way, after having made the mistake of taking the Durkheimian, hypothetico-statistical approach to suicide to be the only significant "sociological" approach, Hendin completely forgot this central purpose. Actually, the work is concentrated almost entirely on the problem of determining the *patterns of meanings* of *attempted suicide* that are most distinctive of each of the three Scandinavian nations. His information on the meanings of suicide was gathered through talks with about fifty individuals, most of whom had attempted suicide and been admitted to a hospital as a result; the informants were from each of the three nations. Hendin also used "content analyses" of literary material to support his arguments, but he totally failed to take into consideration any of the fundamental problems involved in using such material as indicators of culture. His analyses of the information gathered in this fashion led him to conclude that there is a distinctive pattern of meanings to suicidal actions in each nation—a "performance" (or obligatory success) pattern in Sweden, a "dependency loss" pattern in Denmark, and a "moral" (or guilt concern over aggression) pattern in Norway.

There are two very fundamental weaknesses in the work: (1) the failure to consider explicitly the absolutely fundamental problem of just what constitutes an adequate procedure for empirically determining subjective meanings (the Weberian problem); and (2) the implicit assumption that the specification of an *abstract*, more-or-less shared pattern of meaning (phrased in the linguistic categories of specialists rather than those of the members of the culture) constitutes an *explanation* of suicidal actions. There are also many lesser weaknesses in the work such as the usual misinterpretation of Durkheim's *Suicide* and a total lack of consideration of the best recent works on suicide (for example, those by Deshaies, Schneider, Devereux, and Binswanger).

But, in spite of its many weaknesses, in the opinion of this reviewer the all-important point about the work is that its fundamental

approach is correct, at least as a beginning, and that it is of great importance to sociologists to make far more use of this approach. Most fundamentally, Hendin has *tried* to determine the shared subjective meanings of suicidal actions by actually observing the ways in which members of a culture actually talk and act about suicidal phenomena. It is in this direction that future sociological studies of suicide must travel if they are to go beyond the meaningless comparison of "official statistics."

JACK D. DOUGLAS

University of California, Los Angeles

The End of Hope: A Social-Clinical Study of Suicide. By ARTHUR L. KOBLER and EZRA STOTLAND. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. viii+266. $6.50.

The authors present a view of suicide at variance with the current view that suicide is an illness resulting from intrapsychic forces. A person suffering from deep emotional stress has a number of solutions open to him: suicide, withdrawal into psychosis, or severe psychosomatic illness. Which he chooses is in large part a result of the attitudes and expectations of other people who play significant roles in his life. When the situation seems almost but not quite hopeless, the person may talk of suicide or attempt it, usually under conditions that lead to discovery. This, the authors say, is a cry for help. The solution is primarily in the hands of observers; if they respond with anxiety or fear or display lack of confidence in their ability to help the suicidal person, the person believes that there is no help for him, no way out. His next move may well be the completed suicide, carried out secretly and with finality of purpose. However, if the observers treat him as a normal person and help him change his plan of living, the suicidal person may make a satisfactory adjustment. Thus, having made an appeal for help, his further action meets the expectation of those about him. In this theory, the "rational" suicide who has a realistic goal to be met by suicide is excluded, but is regarded as in the minority.

The theory is elaborated in the first chapter and confirmed in the last. Between are seven chapters of supporting data. The study was made at Crest Hospital, a small private mental hospital, whose two founders (psychoanalysts) developed an institution of complete milieu therapy, in which all contacts of the patient with any member of the staff, during the entire day and night, were regarded as significant. "Milieu treatment entailed full involvement of the ward staff in the treatment process; the particular form of milieu treatment that was emphasized was attitude therapy. This entailed the ward staff's behaving in certain ways toward each patient as prescribed by the physician" (p. 20). In addition, each patient had individual therapy with a psychoanalyst. The prevailing attitude toward suicide was hopeful and anxiety-free.

During the first nine years of operation of the hospital there were only three suicide attempts and one completed suicide. Then within six months, four patients committed suicide and a fifth patient attempted suicide. The turning point in the history of suicidal occurrences followed a prolonged institutional crisis created by administrative changes and conflicts, change in the philosophy of treatment, decline in staff morale, and loss of support from outside psychiatrists. Suicide attempts that previously had been met with helpfulness and a hopeful attitude now were met by fear, anxiety, and overt protective measures. These attitudes were communicated to the patient, who then interpreted his situation as hopeless and himself as totally inadequate. If the attitudes of his family were of the same type, he soon reached the end of hope, and suicide followed.

Each of the five cases is presented in detail, with excerpts from records made at the time the patient was under treatment and from interviews with staff members at the time of the study.

The theory needs to be tested by other samples of cases, in other types of hospitals, and in the community. Comparisons should be made with people in despair who seek other solutions. Is too much emphasis placed on the effect of the expectations of other people? What are the attitudes of suicidal persons toward the value of living prior to the situation that induces the initial hopelessness—for example, the wish never to have been born, or toward suicide as sinful? What are

the preceding attitudes and the public reaction toward "rational" suicides? The theory is stimulating, but much remains to be done to validate it and to find its limitations. The book is without an index.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Northern Illinois University

Success and Opportunity: A Study of Anomie. By EPHRAIM HAROLD MIZRUCHI. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xiii+204.

There are many hazards in an attempt to study social structures indirectly through survey research. This monograph, which attempts it, is not an unqualified success, but the volume has so many redeeming qualities that it is, nonetheless, a fascinating addition to the literature on anomie. Mizruchi acknowledges an intellectual debt to Durkheim and others, but he leans most heavily on Merton. His data show relationships between social class and various indicators of aspirations, anomie, and "discrepancies between aspiration and achievement" among the inhabitants of a small American city—problems that emerge from Merton's classic essay. Although Mizruchi discusses deviant behavior and the problem of normative order, his data do not bear directly on these fundamental aspects of the Durkheim and Merton formulations.

In simple language, the purpose of this study appears to have been to explore the relationship between certain indicators of social experience (for example, social class) and feelings of disillusionment and discontent. Mizruchi describes his purpose quite differently, declaring that his "primary interest is to explore the objective features of social structures that give rise to anomie" (p. 49). This statement of purpose suggests a plan to utilize selected features of social structures as one variable, the degree of anomie within those same structures as another variable, and to explore the relationship between the two—a study, in other words, relating the properties of social structures rather than the properties of persons within a single structure. But Mizruchi turns from structural features to "subjective anomie as an index to social structure" (p. 50). A subjective index of anomie is not at all objectionable, but the same index cannot serve as an indicator both of anomie and of social structural features in a study that proposes to explore the relation between the two. Mizruchi advises us that he intends to "use 'anomia' . . . to designate subjective reactions, an operationally *dependent* variable. We shall, however, *think* of 'anomie' as an *independent* variable manifesting itself in certain kinds of relationship among attributes of the social structure" (p. 51; italics in the original). This verbal alchemy fails to make the transmutation convincing. It is high time we recognize the methodological implications of theories that propose relationships between features of social structures. We learned years ago that ecological correlations do not imply relationships between corresponding individual characteristics. We need now to learn that the reverse is equally true—correlations between characteristics of individuals do not imply relationships between corresponding structural properties.

These considerations do not diminish the value of the data that Mizruchi presents; rather, they suggest limitations on the nature of the conclusions that may be drawn from them. Mizruchi has maximized the sociological relevance of his data by utilizing statistical controls in exploring selected associations. The resulting tables show that scores on the Srole anomia scale are related to several variables (for example, limited success expectations) for middle-class respondents, but anomia scores are related less strongly or not at all to the same variables for lower-class respondents. Mizruchi's interpretation rests on the contention that each class is characterized by its own type of anomia, with middle-class anomia resulting "primarily from the strain associated with disparity between aspiration and achievement" (p. 117). Lower-class anomia, on the other hand, is said to stem from "the absence of both the motivation . . . and the opportunity" (p. 118) to achieve recognition. Mizruchi's data pertaining to class differences in goals—lower-class "materialistic" versus middle-class "achievement"—are interpreted as supporting this general assumption. Evidently, it has been necessary to create new interpretive hypotheses to fit the data; the essays that provided the guiding theory did not anticipate the full complexity of the empirical relationships.

This book does not do all that the author

claims. It would be overstating the case to say that the study represents an "attempt to test empirically the Durkheim-Merton anomie hypothesis" (p. 125). The data do not "demonstrate that the lower classes and the middle classes are exposed to different kinds of anomie" (p. 108). And the study does not "explore the objective features of social structures that give rise to anomie." But what it does is well worth the heavy investment of effort that has obviously gone into this study. It represents a valuable addition to that growing body of empirical literature which shows that the phenomena of anomie, anomia, alienation, and deviation present even more of a sociological challenge than was suggested by earlier insights.

HERBERT L. COSTNER

University of Washington

Utopiates: The Use and Users of LSD-25. By RICHARD BLUM and ASSOCIATES. New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. vi+303. $8.00.

This is a brave and honest book: the first to attempt a dispassionate investigation of the social and psychological factors associated with acceptance and continued use, rejection or discontinuance of LSD-25, as well as those factors associated with the reported effects of this agent. It is a brave study in that the relevant data are hard to come by. No one knows the extent of the use of this drug nor the distribution of the users. This makes the location and justification of a sample, for what is largely an epidemiological study, a problem. It is an honest book in that problems such as these are faced directly and the solutions chosen are explicitly stated. The research team faced many such problems. Once the cases had been chosen, there was the problem of maintaining rapport with in-group members while steadfastly refusing to join them. Further, the subjects of the study frequently claimed that the effects were not communicable to "squares" (non-users), but "squares" the research team squarely remained.

The study rests on interview data gathered from ninety-two persons from five subsamples: (1) an informal professional sample made up of those in the medical and mental field professions who take LSD in the company of other professionals without any research of therapeutic goal. The author's estimate is that there are about 25,000 such people across the country. This study reports on interviews of twenty-four subjects of this kind. (2) Experimental subjects who had been part of a bona fide research study in a university or hospital; fifteen people out of thousands, again an estimate, are represented in the data. (3) Twenty-one of the subjects were drawn from an unknown population of private therapy patients who have taken the drug under the direction of a psychiatrist. (4) Twelve were members of an informal black-market users' group who met regularly for LSD parties. These twelve were *all* drawn from a group whose regular membership totaled forty. (5) Twenty subjects were drawn from the rolls of a religious-medical center established for the purpose of giving LSD therapy. Their total treatment roster at that time was 160 patients.

Although the data analysis is no more sophisticated than a comparison of percentages, some trends are clear and illuminating. LSD use is very much a social phenomenon in that it is given by one person to another along predictable lines of association and role-relationship. Its use and continued use are in social groups. The repeated users are most often successful, law-abiding, middle-class, white, Protestant, professional people who are introduced to the drug by high prestige professionals. They are not revolutionaries or nonconformists but a group who seek to make their social conformity more tolerable by altering their feeling for life. Particularly, they seek and appear to find a sense of "loving" or caring for others and a sense of meaning or of putting their lives into a context. Both of these are points of stress for many in our culture, particularly those who are too sophisticated to accept the more approved religious routes to commitment to others and to a cosmic identity. Tighter legal control of the drug will not dispel these needs. This book helps to highlight their importance and persistence and our failure to provide for them adequately in our driving achievement-oriented world. For an unknown number LSD

is the answer, to paraphrase Mary Poppins, for that "cubeful of sugar which helps the medicine go down in a most delightful way."

ROSALIND DYMOND CARTWRIGHT

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Shared Fate. By H. DAVID KIRK. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xiv+192. $4.95.

Shared Fate is an interpretive synthesis of some nine studies about adoption conducted over a ten-year period. The subjects of the studies range from community attitudes toward adoption to content analysis of letters in response to a magazine article to several surveys and interview studies of adoptive parents about their attitudes and experiences. From these sources the author, an adoptive parent himself, develops what he calls a theory of adoption. Whether he develops and tests a theory or generates a comprehensive *post-factum* interpretation, I would rate as a toss-up.

His central thesis is that adoptive parents suffer from role handicap. Whatever little cultural script may be available for playing the role of adoptive parent is full of built-in inconsistencies and ambiguities. These are reinforced by the attitudes of the large community that adoption, while acceptable, is an inferior (perhaps slightly stigmatizing) alternative to the enchantment of natural parenthood. These attitudes may be internalized by the adoptive parents themselves. On these points, Kirk and his data are quite convincing.

It is what follows that is somewhat less solid, somewhat more speculative. Kirk notes that there are two major modes of coping with role handicap among adoptive parents, "acknowledgement of the difference" and "rejection of the difference." He argues theoretically (perhaps implicitly autobiographically) for the superiority of the "acknowledgement of the difference" approach and tests this supposition on the basis of questionnaire data from adoptive parents. The tests involve highly dubious operationalization so that the items presumably indexing empathy with the child could as easily be indexing parental conceptions of the child's being different because he is adopted. The relationships he finds seem built in because of similarity of item content.

The book is somewhat axe-grinding, somewhat preachy. It claims to establish a theory of adoptive relations, but the adopted child is most conspicuous in his absence as a source of data. Nevertheless, it is head and shoulders above the bulk of the literature in the area of adoption and the first piece that brings sociological perspectives to bear in any comprehensive way.

EUGENE A. WEINSTEIN

Vanderbilt University

Life Stress and Mental Health. By THOMAS S. LANGNER and STANLEY T. MICHAEL. New York: Free Press, 1963. Pp. xxii+517. $9.75.

This, the second volume of the Midtown Manhattan Study, deals exclusively with the relationships between mental health assessments derived from interviews with a cross-section of the adult population of the Midtown area and reports of life experiments given in these interviews. The basic mental-health ratings employed are those assigned by two psychiatrists who reviewed summaries of psychiatric symptoms and attitudes to society and health as revealed by the interviews. Readers of the first volume in this series—*Mental Health in the Metropolis*—will recall that roughly one-fifth of the population of Midtown were rated symptom-free, another third were characterized as having mild symptoms, one-fifth as having moderate symptoms, and nearly a fourth were rated as significantly impaired by their symptoms of emotional disturbance. Volume II employs a simple stress-strain model. *Stress* signifies "the environmental force pressing on the individual"; *strain* connotes the "reaction to the external environment" (pp. 6–7). Strain is manifest in the mental-health ratings.

The basic hypothesis of the work is that cumulative strain is the result of successive life stresses. A major part of the task of analysis was to establish whether a variety of socio-cultural factors that had been regarded as probable stresses were indeed related to poor mental health and, if so, whether the relationships were independent of socioeconomic status or whether the stress factors were components of socioeconomic status. Volume I had

clearly established that the psychiatrists' ratings of impairment were most likely to be given to subjects at the lower levels of socioeconomic status, while those seen as symptom-free were found in higher proportion at the upper status levels. It had been assumed that a variety of stresses, such as broken homes, economic deprivation, and parental rejection and the like might be found frequently at the lower status levels, while being relatively rare at higher levels. At the outset, however, we are told that, by and large, these presumed component variables were only slightly correlated with socioeconomic status but were much more significantly correlated with mental-health status as such.

The work falls into three parts: six chapters on conceptual approach, methods, and problems of interpretation; eight chapters reporting general and specific relationships between presumed stress factors and mental-health ratings; and two chapters examining observed differences among socioeconomic strata in terms of regulatory devices in adaptation to stress and in terms of formulations relating to social mobility, socialization, and personality development. Except for a chapter on the mental-health ratings and a brief appendix, both written by Dr. Michael (one of the two psychiatrists responsible for the psychiatric assessments of the protocols), the entire volume was written by Dr. Langner, who had directed the data processing and statistical analysis. The presentation is redundant, but most readers are likely to be grateful rather than annoyed, for the complexities of the analytic task and the volume of data reported call for many guidelines to the reader. All of the chapters containing data have helpful summaries.

In reporting differences among groups characterized on the basis of different life experiences or stresses, Langner has chosen to reduce his mental-health ratings to "ridits." Ridits are percentile scores; the average ridit of any part of the sample is an average of its individual percentile scores. Thus the ridit for any group tells what proportion of the total population is better off than the average member of this group—which means that we are concerned for the most part with scores in the middle third of the distribution. But it is precisely in this third—the range of mild to moderate symptoms—that the reliability of classification by the psychiatrists is lowest and that one can raise the most serious questions about the meaning of the ratings. Do the differences in this range of symptomatology really matter? Does one really care how the average member of a given group scores, or does one want to know how many symptom-free members and how many significantly impaired members there are in the group?

Aside from the choice of a statistical measure, Langner has been both ingenious and painstaking in his analytic efforts to delineate the relationships between presumed stress factors and mental-health ratings. Even so seemingly simple a factor as childhood broken homes turns out to be highly complex indeed in its effects upon mean mental-health ratings. For the lowest status group, for example, subjects whose home were broken by the death of their fathers turn out to have a slightly more favorable ridit than do those from unbroken homes, while those whose homes were broken by the death of their mothers have appreciably poorer mental-health ratings. In the highest status group, neither father's nor mother's death—nor, for that matter, the parents' divorce or separation—appears to be associated with any threat to mental-health rating. For the total population, insofar as the break-up of the home through death or divorce of the parents makes any difference at all, it appears to do so only when it occurs prior to age seven. Remarriage of the same sex parent seems to constitute a much greater threat to mental health than do other patterns of broken home and parental remarriage. The data presented are worth careful study, although the sample of 1,660 respondents proves to be too small for a fully satisfactory analysis of the consequences of various types of disruption and attempted reconstitution of the family.

When one attempts to assess the effects of some of the other factors, such as parental tendencies to worry, the problem becomes much trickier. We are told: "About three-fifths of worrying parents have worrying children, while less than one-third of non-worrying parents have worrying children" (p. 222). A more accurate statement would have indicated that about three-fifths of those respondents who said one or both of their parents were "the worrying type" also stated that they themselves were worriers. When the

statement is put this way, it is not difficult to recognize that a large component of the association between parental and child worry may derive from the respondent's readiness to verbalize worry. If the term is used for self, it is likely to be used for parents. Moreover, the expression of worry is one of the criteria used by the psychiatrists in arriving at their mental-health ratings. Despite Langer's recognition of the possibility of contamination in the chapter on problems of interpretation, many chapters show inadequate recognition of the difficulties that derive from readiness for self-disclosure on the part of the interview respondent. But a very cogent statement of the "correlation due to consistently morbid reporting by respondents" is given in a brief appendix to the volume by Dr. Michael.

Space limitations preclude discussion of the inadequacy of the stress-strain formulation. Major findings as reported are that stresses appear to act additively rather than in interactive clusters, and tend to produce more strain at the lowest status level. As a consequence of basic difficulties in drawing inferences from the twice-filtered interview data, however, it is not possible to interpret the apparent greater vulnerability of the lower-status respondents. One must again be content with hypotheses and speculations, despite the magnitude of the research effort reported. The rigorous reader is bound to have many reservations, yet *Life Stress and Mental Health* offers suggestive leads and cannot be ignored by anyone seeking to advance our knowledge of the relationship between the social order and mental disorder.

JOHN A. CLAUSEN

University of California, Berkeley

Personality in Middle and Late Life: Empirical Studies. By BERNICE L. NEUGARTEN, in collaboration with HOWARD BERKOWITZ, WILLIAM J. CROTTY, WALTER GRUEN, DAVID L. GUTMANN, MARC I. LUBIN, DAVID L. MILLER, ROBERT F. PECK, JACQUELIN L. ROSEN, ALEXEY SHUKIN, and SHELDON S. TOBIN. New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xxi+231. $6.75.

This book is composed of eight studies of personality, together with a Preface, an Introduction, "Summary and Implications" chapter, and Appendixes by the author. The studies and their interpretation are in the mainstream of modern psychological approaches to personality and aging, and may well represent the best available in the field. The book is based on data gathered in the Kansas City Studies of Adult Life carried out by The Committee on Human Development of The University of Chicago from 1952 to 1962. Personality and changes in personality from middle to later life constitute the integrating theme of the studies, with each centering on some specific aspect(s) thereof. The book's author is also joint author of five of the substudies. All collaborators have been associated with the Kansas City Studies in some capacity, and all are currently active in research in this and related fields.

The studies are presented here as exploratory, rather than definitive, and are intended to illustrate the usefulness and the limitations of various research instruments and a number of theoretical and conceptual approaches. One (by Gruen) tests Erikson's theory of ego development. One (by Peck and Berkowitz) approaches personality and adjustment in middle age. Thematic apperception approaches are used in one study (by Neugarten and Gutmann) to treat age-sex roles and personality in middle years, and in two others (by Rosen, Neugarten, Lubin, Miller, and Gutmann) to examine ego functions in the middle and later years. Interviews and thematic apperception tests were employed by Gutmann in an especially suggestive exploration of ego configurations. A study (by Shukin and Neugarten) grew directly from some implications of the disengagement theory of aging enunciated some four years ago, and concludes that eccentricity and egocentricity develop with age, not merely in response to relative social isolation, but also in response to processes of change in the individual. "Such changes in personality might prove . . . to be developmental" (p. 157).

In another study, Neugarten, Crotty, and Tobin attempt, using factor analysis, to isolate the personality types to be found in a community sample of aging men and women, and then to study the relationships between personality types, age, and adjustment. Six personality types were derived for men and six for women, with those in which cogni-

tive abilities have remained intact being related to good adjustment.

Some of the studies show age to be a consistent and significant source of variation from forty on, while others do not.

The summary picture of personality change from middle to later life is one of increased inner orientation, increased separation from the environment, an increased consistency and decreased complexity, with the synthesizing and executive qualities maintaining their centrality and the continuity of personality.

Neugarten asserts that even now relatively little is known about personality change in relation to aging, and a strong bid is made for more research of different sorts in this area. Indeed, one of the many fine features of the book is the set of suggestions for research, which are numerous, creative, and compelling.

The book summarizes, to some extent, more than a decade of varied experiences with attempts to apply and develop theories and approaches to personality change and aging and, as such, goes a long way toward making sense out of a significant emerging field of human knowledge in which, we must admit, relatively little order has heretofore existed.

RAYMOND PAYNE

University of Georgia

Reference Groups: Explorations into Conformity and Deviation of Adolescents. By MUZAFER and CAROLYN W. SHERIF. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xiv+370. $6.00.

At a time of national concern over juvenile delinquency this book is a welcome progress report on a larger project—initiated in 1958 and still under way—aimed at describing and explaining the behavior of American adolescents. The authors contend that youthful conduct and misconduct constitute conformity to demands of reference groups rather than manifestations of personality traits, and they go on to ask: *whose* appraisals count the most, *what* defines a deed as conformity or deviation, and *why* do or do not individuals comply? Peer groups make up the most important audience; youngsters want to count in the eyes of associates of their own choosing. In groups formed by those who share common interests, frustrations, and aspirations, each individual participates in the formation of norms; hence, each regards them as *his* standards. When goals can be achieved only by illegal means, laws are broken, but boys do not feel guilty unless they violate their own rules.

The authors have drawn concepts, propositions, and research procedures both from group dynamics and from sociological studies of gangs. They appeal for interdisciplinary research and provide an example of it. Data were collected in detailed studies of twelve adolescent groups selected from different socioeconomic settings in several cities in the American Southwest. Each group was studied for approximately five to seven months, largely through participant observation. Considerable care was taken to avoid setting up artificial groups, and observers were chosen who were able to fit easily into the neighborhood. The observers did not assume the role of investigator; arrangements were contrived for getting the boys to accept them as they might their older brothers—as a friendly recreation worker, a sympathetic neighbor, or a physical education student who needed coaching experience. Some of the observations, especially on status gradations within the groups, were checked by independent observers who were similarly disguised. Only after all such observations had been completed were the boys and their neighbors interviewed openly; psychological techniques were then used to gather data on personal qualities and skills. Although only a fraction of the activities of even the "toughest" gangs was illegal, information concerning forbidden deeds was covered by codes of secrecy and might have been difficult to obtain by a more direct approach.

Sociologists will find the subject matter familiar, for the study fits into the tradition initiated long ago by Burgess, McKay, Shaw, and Thrasher. Some may object to the overly simple conception of group structure or be astonished that classic references such as Simmel are not mentioned. It appears that the reference group of the authors consists largely of psychologists of individualistic persuasion; perhaps in anticipation of skepticism the argument is developed in tedious details, the major points being repeated over and over. Sociologists, who have long taken this position for granted, will find the presentation redundant, perhaps even irritating.

But they will also find much that is commendable. As psychologists at home in the experimental tradition, the authors state their hypotheses formally, design their study with care, and operationalize their concepts. Furthermore, they present a number of hypotheses from group dynamics that are worthy of serious consideration. For example, sociologists contend that conventional norms define a *range* of acceptable conduct. The authors go on to point out that the more significant an activity for the maintenance of a group and its central interests, the narrower the range of acceptable behavior for all members, the latitude being narrowest for leaders. Conversely, the more incidental the activity, the broader the range of individual variation permitted, the latitude being greatest for leaders. They also present plausible hypotheses on how leadership develops, is maintained, fails, and is displaced.

Juvenile delinquency is widely condemned, and police officials, psychiatrists, and social workers often approach it with moral indignation. All too often deeds that are regarded as reprehensible are assumed to be fundamentally different from those that are approved, and this moral dichotomy prevents one from recognizing that both may be manifestations of the same processes. By showing that illegal activities are not uncommon in more favorable suroundings, the authors refute the common belief that delinquency is a product of the slums. Broken families are often blamed, but the authors indicate that many boys with police records are bound to their families with ties of affection. They are especially critical of attempts to explain illegal acts as expressions of a psychopathic personality. Many boys labeled by authorities as "antisocial" are shown to be well-adjusted, outgoing, and active, loyal members of their gangs. Indeed, those who are seriously disturbed tend to become isolated, for they cannot be counted upon in group transactions.

The authors have produced a number of fruitful studies in the past, and they are to be commended for this volume. Sociologists will, no doubt, join others in looking forward to other publications from this project.

TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI

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Rebellion in a High School. By ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Pp. xi+240. $5.95.

The specific purpose of this book is to deal with three factors which the author sees as being strongly related to adolescent rebellion in an American high school. These are: (1) *social structural*, the degree of "articulation" between high school curriculum and the labor market, that is, the degree of perceived consensus on the part of the student between his curriculum interest and his post-educational career aspirations; (2) *cultural*, the degree to which the student is willing to accept the concept of "adolescent inferiority" and, (3) *psychological*, exposure to failure when a student has deeply internalized success norms.

This book is, to my mind, an excellent example of how one can translate meaningful and exciting research in a manner that makes it of great potential value to those engaged in the empirical study of man as well as for those involved in the formal education of man.

The problem itself—the why and wherefore of adolescent rebellion in the school—is certainly worthy of our concern. Stinchcombe's painstaking analysis and honest pursuit of "other" variables that might disprove his initial hypothesis is indicative of his desire for thorough scientific inquiry.

One important by-product of Stinchcombe's work is to help, in part at least, to dispel much of the myth of social class and its implications for student behavior. The analysis presented in this book would certainly indicate that there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between an adolescent's socioeconomic background and negative behavior within or outside of the school. Stinchcombe's analysis would suggest, rather, that class background does have the effect of stacking the cards in such a manner that the lower-class youngster is more likely to be placed in a situation where he is vulnerable to the variables related to student rebellion within the social structure of certain types of high schools.

The shortcomings of this research are not in what Stinchcombe draws as his conclusions, since these are generally supported by his analysis, but rather in certain methods and variables employed in arriving at these conclusions.

For example, Stinchcombe deals with the

problem of articulation. He proposes that when there is discrepancy between the academic involvement (curriculum) and post-educational occupational plans there is poor "articulation" and a greater probability of student rebellion. What is not clear is why Stinchcombe uses expressed curriculum interests as opposed to actual curriculum involvement in getting at commitment to the school program. It is not clear why actual assignment in a specific phase of the curriculum (college preparatory, vocational, or commercial) was not used instead of the interest variable.

Second, it is difficult to understand some of the footwork involved in the data presented by Stinchcombe. In certain chapters of the book he uses only upperclassmen in his analysis, in others he uses the total sample, and finally he reverts back to the upperclassmen.

Third, Stinchcombe does not deal with the problem of student self-selection. Obviously, as students get older the probability of their dropping out of school increases. In dealing with the upperclassmen and not breaking by age or grade, it is impossible to know whether Stinchcombe's findings hold true across the board or are unique to certain age or grade groups.

The three points raised here are presented as questions to the author. They are not meant to detract from the book which is, for this reviewer, an example of exciting and useful sociology.

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The Intolerant Personality. By James G. Martin. Detroit: Wayne State University, 1964. Pp. 176. $6.50.

In the Preface the author states his main objectives: to *describe* and *explain* the distinguishing characteristics of the "tolerant personality." In his Introduction he asserts that these distinguishing characteristics are non-rigidity, unemotionalism, and non-committal to an advance evaluation of a group. However, by the time he discusses his approach to personality in chapter ii, he is no longer concerned with explaining the characteristics of this personality type. He aims, rather, at contrasting patterns of questionnaire responses of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals, and linking such findings to related studies.

The author states that he is reluctant to present a theory of personality because the large number of different theories makes it impossible to define a single one that will be acceptable to everyone. This reviewer fails to see the necessity for a universally acceptable theory. The primary criterion for any proposed theory is that it stimulates new thinking and research. In this volume, personality is defined as consisting of "habits, attitudes, and traits"; there is little emphasis on motivational concepts, although the author seems to utilize such a theoretical approach in his treatment of the "authoritarian personality." This reviewer found his definitions of "habits, attitudes, and traits" difficult to follow, and the relevance of these definitions to subsequent data analyses and discussions was not clearly established.

In some ways, the *Authoritarian Personality* study is taken as a model for discussion. However, the author does not seem to be cognizant of the questions raised and the doubts expressed about that particular study (criticisms which I think are equally applicable to his own study). He also seems unaware of more recent studies of traits and attitudes that relate directly to his presentation. This is particularly noticeable in his bibliography, which contains almost no references to publications after 1959 (although the book was published in 1964). Findings cited as evidence of rigidity and emotionalism seem to be drawn from other studies reporting correlations between these two variables and the attitudes included in this investigation.

As expected, the "tolerant personality" exhibits most of the positive traits, and the "intolerant personality" most of the negative traits; however, the author presents a number of findings inconsistent with those of the *Authoritarian Personality.* These inconsistencies imply that the stated differences between the "authoritarian" and "non-authoritarian" personalities may be too sharply drawn.

Finally, in his section on "Prescription for Social Policy," the author takes a forthright

equalitarian position and raises some interesting and important questions for social planners to consider.

ROBERT J. KLEINER

Temple University

Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology. By SVEND RANULF. New York: Schocken Books, 1964. $4.50.

Published originally in 1938 in Denmark, Professor Ranulf's treatise is an attempt at empirical verification of Scheler's theory that the attitude of resentment does not appear uniformly in all societies and that it occurs most frequently in societies characterized by a lower middle-class psychology. Ranulf defines the psychological state of the lower middle class as that of living under conditions that force its members to an extraordinarily high degree of self-restraint. This sense of repression produces feelings of resentment or envy which take the public form of moral indignation. The sense of moral indignation which is a manifestation of resentment is the crucial emotion behind the development of a disinterested demand for punishment. By "disinterested" Ranulf means a demand by individuals and groups who having suffered no direct deprivation nevertheless manifest resentment and identify themselves with the public order as a whole.

In the present work, as in earlier studies of Athens in the fifth century B.C. and of Puritanism in seventeenth-century England, the author seeks to discover the conditions under which a disinterested demand for punishment is likely to appear. For data, he relies primarily on the content of the media of communication to which the members of the society are exposed. Thus in his study of Athens he made content analyses of the Greek dramas, and in his study of seventeenth-century Puritanism he examined all of the religious documents published during one month in each year from 1640 to 1663. In the present work, Ranulf surveys a great many societies past and present. Among the contemporary societies, he cites Nazi Germany as a positive example of a society that has a highly developed disinterested tendency to inflict punishment. Most of his negative cases include non-Protestant and non-Western societies.

It is primarily in the preface, written by Harold Lasswell, that one finds any general statements about the relationship between the growth of a disinterested demand for punishment and the development of systems of public law and of rational criminal and penal codes. In general, it is Lasswell and not the author who ties the present work to larger theoretical issues bearing on the sociology of law. Ranulf emphasizes that his primary contribution is neither substantive nor theoretical, but methodological. Unlike Scheler, Nietzsche, Weber, and others who have written about this problem, Ranulf claims that his conclusions are not based on theoretical speculations or plausible guesses. By use of content analysis, searching for negative cases, and the correlation of social factors that seem likely to exercise an influence on the disinterested demand for punishment, Ranulf states that his is the first scientific treatment of the relationship between resentment, moral indignation, and a disinterested demand for punishment. I am not at all sure that the data Ranulf presents are any more valid or any more convincing than the evidence cited by former scholars. But Ranulf describes his method explicitly and is concerned about the process of verification in a way that others who wrote in this area before him may not have been.

Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology provides interesting case materials about the societies that are characterized by a highly developed disinterested demand for punishment, but the general thesis and the methodological approach sound very familiar. In the quarter of a century since Ranulf originally wrote, others have contributed both substantively and methodologically to this literature. Ranulf's warnings about the need for empirical verification sound especially dated.

RITA JAMES SIMON

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Signification and Significance: A Study of the Relations of Signs and Values. By CHARLES MORRIS. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964. Pp. x+99. $5.95.

This is a little book—less than a hundred pages and in very readable type at that—

with a big mission. It is Charles Morris' attempt to bring together the two major lines of his own work as a scholar: development of a general theory of signs (semiotic) and development of a general theory of value (axiology). These he views as two aspects of the common-to-the-point-of-meaninglessness term "meaning"; "thus if we ask what is the meaning of life, we may be asking a question about the *signification* of the term 'life,' or asking a question about the value or *significance* of living—or both" (italics mine).

If there is one general criticism that could be made it is that this book is *too* little for its mission. Morris moves with giant strides from one complicated area to another—from the dimensions of signification to the dimensions of value, from psychology to sociology to linguistics to information theory as they bear on semiotic and axiology—but pauses only long enough in each to stir the leaves a bit and leave a print. In one fifteen-page chapter, for example, the following issues in contemporary philosophy are faced in rapid succession: axiology and "the naturalistic fallacy," the ought and the is, the cognitivist-emotivist controversy, the absolutist-relativist controversy, semiotic, axiology and philosophy, and philosophy and pragmatics. One has the feeling that the author is offering the reader an outline of the *conclusions* of much careful thinking, but with most of the steps leading to these conclusions left out. In Morris' lucid style, this approach has the advantage of presenting his position in bold perspective; it nevertheless has the disadvantage of leaving many crucial issues unresolved.

Consistent with the position taken in *Signs, Language and Behavior* (1946), Morris' approach to the problem of signification is behavioristic. Signification is now seen as tridimensional, however: a sign is *designative* to the degree that it signifies observable properties, *appraisive* to the degree that it signifies consummatory properties, and *prescriptive* to the degree that it signifies how the object or situation is to be reacted to. The "interpretants" in sign-using organisms are, as before, *dispositions*—to react to the object as if it had certain observable properties (for example, "black") in the cases of designation, to react as if it had certain satisfying or unsatisfying properties (for example, "good") in the case of appraisal, and to react to the object in a certain kind of way (for example, "ought to do so-and-so") in the case of prescriptors. In behavioristic terms, these three dimensions relate to the *stimulus* properties of objects or situations, the *reinforcing* properties of objects or situations, and the *instrumental* properties of actions, respectively.

The major difference from Morris (1946) is that here he attempts to do away with the *formative* dimension of signification. But he does this merely with two suggestions which "may indicate a direction of possible analysis": where the signification of one sign is contained in or is identical with that of another, then the latter is an "analytic implicate" of the former; where the signification of one sign is the absence of the conditions which constitute the signification of another, these two signs are said to be "contradictory implicates" of each other. This treatment strikes this reviewer as being insufficient, considering the importance of this issue.

Axiology, or the science of values, is identified by Morris with the study of preferential behavior. Values are viewed as "objectively relative" (referring to properties, like edibility, which certain objects have only by virtue of the preferences of certain organisms), thus avoiding the ancient dispute over whether values are "objective" or "subjective." Three usages of the term "value" are differentiated clearly at the beginning of the argument: *operative value* (the actual preferential behavior of an organism), *conceived value* (the use of appraisive signs, presumably by language-using organisms, with respect to objects that need not even exist), and *object value* (the attribution of value properties to objects in terms of their supporting, or not supporting, preferential behavior for certain organisms).

In attempting to relate axiology to semiotic, Morris identifies three dimensions of value, in terms of organisms as systems having boundaries, and then pairs them with the three modes of signification. *Detachment* (maintaining system boundaries) is related to designative signs and perceptual behavior generally; *dominance* (controlling other systems or objects) is related to prescriptive signs and manipulatory behavior generally; *depend-*

ence (permeability of boundaries to external systems of objects needed for sustenance) is related to appraisive signs and consummatory behavior generally. Factor analyses of preferences for thirteen different "Ways to Live," based on data from the United States, Canada, Norway, China, and Japan, yield five factors which are merged with the basic trilogy as follows: Factors A (social restraint and self-control) and C (withdrawal and self-sufficiency) become the social and individual forms of detachment as values; factors D (respectivity and sympathetic concern) and E (self-indulgence or sensuous enjoyment) become the social and individual forms of dependence as values; and factor B (enjoyment and progress in action) is, on the basis of the Chinese data, divided into social and individual forms of dominance as values.

Why does Morris feel obliged to forge some link between valuing and signifying? It would appear to be more than a matter of philosophical parsimony. Man's *inquiry* into the nature of himself and his universe is value-determined. The inquiry of Man as scientist—"How old is the earth?"—reflects detachment as a value and is characterized by the use of designative signs. The inquiry of Man as technologist—"How should a patient with disease *X* be treated?"—reflects dominance (over nature or man) as a value and is characterized by the use of prescriptive signs. The inquiry of Man as critic—"Is this composition better than that?"—reflects dependence as a value and is characterized by the use of appraisive signs. So, in Morris' mind, the marriage of signification and significance is more than one of convenience.

In discussing the nature of the interpretant, Morris appears to accept the notion of "representational mediation process," used by this reviewer,[1] as an explication of his own notion of "disposition." He reports, quite correctly, that many factor analyses of descriptive scales (for example, *fair-unfair, hard-soft, quick-slow,* etc.) as used in making meaningful judgments of concepts have repeatedly yielded the same three dominant factors—evaluation, potency, and activity. (Query: do all things come in threes, or is this just an imposition of the human mind?) Morris then explores the possibility that these factors may be related to his modes of signifying, concluding that there is no simple relation—with which this reviewer agrees. It now appears that the Semantic Differential (as this measuring technique has come to be called, perhaps unfortunately) gets at what might be termed *affective* meaning. This, in turn, may fall within Morris' appraisive dimension, but even this identification is pretty tenuous.

Sociologists will be most interested, I suspect, in Morris' attempt to relate his semiotic to the work of Parsons, Shils, and Bales. With social systems regarded as organizations of institutions, with institutions regarded as systems of roles, with roles regarded as systems of complementary expectations, and with expectations clearly being sign processes, the entrée for semiotic is provided. Role behavior becomes a type of sign-controlled behavior; the signs may be prelinguistic (perceptual) or postlinguistic (symbolic) as well as linguistic. Parsons' three types of "value-orientations," cognitive, appreciative, and moral, are linked to Morris' notions of the perceptual-manipulative, consummatory, and evaluative stages of action, and hence directly to designative, appraisive, and prescriptive modes of signification. The parallelisms that Morris draws here (and elsewhere) could, of course, be nothing more than verbal analogies—traps for the unwary scholar—but I suspect there is more to it than this when thoughtful men, quite independently using a common language for their own special purposes, come up with very similar cuts through the fabric of human society.

This reviewer found the two concluding chapters of this book, one on art and the other on personality disturbances, of particular interest—and not so much for their philosophical as for their experimental contribution. Here Morris demonstrates that he is a philosopher who likes to get his hands dirty in the sifting of empirical data.

[1] See C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (1957), chap. i. There the definition of a sign was as follows: "A pattern of stimulation which is not the significate is a sign of that significate if it evokes in the organism a mediating process, this process (*a*) being some fractional part of the total behavior elicited by the significate and (*b*) producing responses which would not occur without the previous contiguity of non-significate and significate patterns of stimulation" (p. 7).

After defending his earlier writings on art against criticisms received—on such matters as, can a work of art be a sign and, if so, can it be an iconic sign (physically similar to its significate) signifying values?—Morris launches into an exploration of experimental possibilities. In one study, a positive relation was found between preferences for Ways to Live and preferences for paintings; for example, subjects preferring Way 2 (stressing detachment, self-sufficiency, reflectiveness, heightened self-awareness) preferred painting judged by independent raters to signify these values. Another study revealed a most suggestive conflict of value systems in Communist Chinese students: they preferred Ways 5 and 6 (enjoy life through group participation and constantly master changing conditions), yet selected painting more in harmony with traditional Chinese values. In yet another study, the five value factors and five paintings carefully selected to represent the five value factors (see above) were judged against an appropriate form of Semantic Differential, and were given preference ratings and evaluative ratings—by a group of psychology students and a group of art students. Both groups agreed in correctly matching the Semantic Differential profiles for values with those for paintings; in both groups preference rankings of values and paintings corresponded; but whereas preference and evaluation ratings were positively correlated for the psychologists, they were *negatively* correlated for the artists! In other words, the art students had developed *conceived values* which differed from their *operative values*.

After relating his semiotic to the well-known writings of Gregory Bateson and Jurgen Ruesch on communication in psychotherapy and to the less well known but equally significant writings of Joseph Wolpe on the use of reciprocal inhibition in psychotherapy (which Morris describes as eliminating the negative-appraisive and negative-prescriptive signification of signs), our philosopher again dons his lab coat. He reports a study in which the Ways to Live questionnaire was given to fifty non-institutionalized psychiatric patients, their spouses, and fifty control subjects. Values were found to accord with the personality characteristics ascribed to various types of disorder by the psychiatrists co-operating in the research. The expectation that severity of disturbance in patients would be related to the magnitude of difference in values from those of their spouses was *not* confirmed; neither was the expectation that severity would be related to deviation of values from cultural norms (which demonstrates that Morris' propositions are testable). Severity of disturbance *did* vary positively, however, with the extent of value conflict within a patient, and it seems intuitively reasonable that, for example, a person who simultaneously values highly both dominance over others and detachment from others would be in for trouble.

How might this little book be valued as a whole? Speaking *designatively*, it brings into focus the author's extensive studies on both signs and values and then fuses them; it relates his own views to those of psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, linguists, and art critics, as well as other philosophers. Speaking *appraisively*, this reviewer likes the way philosophical and scientific approaches have been blended and shown quite compatible with one another; he did not like the skimpiness of the argument at a number of crucial points, but he presumes this book to be more a prologue than an epilogue to what will be Morris' major work. Speaking *prescriptively*, this little book on *Signification and Significance* ought to be read by those both long familiar with Morris, as an up-dating, and those unfamiliar, as a most lucid and provocative introduction.

CHARLES E. OSGOOD

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Essays on Ego Psychology: Selected Problems in Psychoanalytic Theory. By HEINZ HARTMANN. New York: International Universities Press, 1964. Pp. xv+492. $10.00.

The book is a collection of papers by the foremost psychoanalytic theorist. The concepts follow in the mainstream of the Freudian tradition and continue as a logical extension of the later writings of Freud on ego psychology.

The essays range over a number of topics: a definition of mental health, the relation between psychoanalysis and the social sciences, rational and irrational action, drive theory, the theory of the ego, the relationship between the psychic structures (ego, id, and superego), schizophrenia, childhood neurosis, sublimation, the reality principle, and psycho-

analysis as a science. Hartmann also includes four papers on psychiatric and experimental studies prior to the development of his psychoanalytic interests in the thirties.

By developing the concept of the ego, Hartmann turned psychoanalytic theory into a general psychological theory, permitting linkage with other behavioral sciences. Freud had already heralded such an extension at the time of the publication of *The Ego and the Id*, in 1923. Psychoanalysis moved away from its exclusive preoccupation with instinctual components, drive derivatives, unconscious impulse life, and manifestations of the aggressive and sexual instincts and the forces which acted against them. It became necessary to postulate an adaptive and organizing function of the mind, designated the ego, which mediated between the id, external reality, and the superego. The ego not only manifests defensive function against the drives but also serves as an important regulator for the psychic apparatus in its entirety.

In considering the relationship between psychoanalysis and the social sciences, Hartmann's approach here, as elsewhere, is in the orthodox Freudian path. In designating social relationships the psychoanalyst could best elucidate, he highlights the significance of man's love relationships and his aggressive tendencies. Infantile object relationships through repetitions and displacements decisively influence the social relationships of the adult. The infant's helplessness and dependence in childhood are directly responsible for the intensity of his social ties and his social interests in later life. Comparative anthropological studies can help delineate the plasticity of the infantile situation and the degree to which it can be modified.

In describing how the conduct of an individual can be influenced by cultural factors, Hartmann indicates the various psychic structures that can be directly influenced. Among these he includes the severity of the superego, the mobility of the ego, methods for the resolution of internal conflict, and social routes for varying developmental channels. On a more superficial level, he includes the choices of rationalizations, the conceptual language, and socially determined mental content.

The cultural factors that directly influence the frequency and type of the neuroses continue to be largely unexplored. Clinicians have noted changes in neurotic symptoms during the decades since Freud described the hysterical patient. We do not fully understand the social factors responsible for these changes, although we fully accept that a neurosis is likely to have different effects upon the personality because of social factors that go into the response toward the illness. Not only has the content of neurotic symptomatology differed in terms of the type of symptom, but more specific mental content has differed as society has undergone drastic transformation. Can one speak of a "social compliance" in the same sense as that in which the psychosomatic specialist speaks of a "somatic compliance" as a causative factor in multiply determined disease? How do social factors affect the state of the instincts, their intensity, and their sublimation? Hartmann is fully aware of the complexities involved in suggesting these studies. He hopes that social studies in which factors involve individual motivation will be sufficiently cognizant of the complexities of such motivation. The likelihood is that such motivations are often unconscious and, thus, can be understood only by explorations in depth.

The complexity of the subject matter of the book as a whole and the turgidity of the style make heavy demands on the reader. Although most of the essays presuppose a detailed familiarity with psychoanalytic theory, a few can be read by the novice. All will yield a rich reward after much labor.

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Talent and Performance. By ELI GINZBERG and JOHN L. HERMA. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xi+265. $5.00.

As part of a continuing series of studies dealing with the conservation of what is perhaps America's most precious resource—its manpower—this volume reports an investigation of the extent to which individuals of superior intellectual accomplishment continue to manifest this accomplishment beyond graduate training. The data consist of 279 questionnaires returned by males who held graduate or professional fellowships at Columbia University during the period from 1944–45 to 1950–51.

Following a description of the sample, Ginzberg and Herma first deal with career development. The data are analyzed in terms of three vectors dealing with (*a*) career patterns, (*b*) achievement levels, and (*c*) the value-choice nexus. The resultants of these vectors, when buttressed by considerations of work satisfactions and the sociopsychological and environmental correlates of work performance, permit the authors to offer in the penultimate chapter some tentative statements about the relation between talent and performance. Implications of the research for the optimal development and guidance of the talented are detailed in the final chapter, "The Conservation of Talent." The questionnaire is appended.

This is an exemplary study, less for what it tells of the behavior of the talented—though the interested individual gains through reading it—than in its clear depiction of a research enterprise. To label an investigation an "exploratory analysis" usually serves as an excuse for either the paucity of findings or methodological imprecision, or both. There is no such here. The authors acknowledge the problems inherent in the investigation they report, they indicate the connection between their data and the explanatory variables emergent therefrom, and they recognize the dangers of overgeneralization within the "limited context" they essay. "The data were used not to test the validity of the formulations and generalizations, but rather to serve as a frame of reference for developing them and pointing directions where interpretations might be found" (p. 24). Both for the information it presents and the elegance of its sentation, this volume deserves a wide audience.

LEE BRAUDE

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Risk Taking: A Study in Cognition and Personality. By NATHAN KOGAN and MICHAEL A. WALLACH. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964. Pp. 278. $8.00.

This book is the report of a study of individual differences in risk-taking behavior in a variety of controlled situations. The authors did not approach their problem in a hypothesis-testing manner, but simply posed a series of questions which they put to nature in a very thorough manner. Among the questions were the determinants of the consistency of an individual's risk-taking tendencies in a variety of situations; the effects of different types of "payoff" on risk-taking; the relationships among decision strategies, outcomes, and post-decisional satisfaction; the relationship of risk-taking to individual differences in cognitive-judgmental processes, intellectual abilities, and personality.

One interesting aspect of their analysis is that, in addition to computing the correlations between risk-taking and other variables, they computed these correlations separately for men and for women, and then separately for each of the four subgroups formed by splitting the sample into those high and low in self-reported anxiety and high and low in self-reported defensiveness. The authors are evidently quite intrigued by the methodological value of separate correlations for each of the four subgroups, which they term a "moderator" analysis. They point out that, often, total sample correlations may obscure variations in the size and direction of the correlations for subgroups. And, indeed, their results support the authors' contentions in numerous analyses. For example, they find that a highly defensive, highly anxious person tends to show a consistent degree of risk-taking in a variety of settings, while those low on both measures are more "realistic."

The great trouble with the book, however, is the extraordinary difficulty of reading it. This difficulty results from the rigid manner in which the authors avoid presenting a theoretical framework at the beginning of the book around which the fantastic complexity of the results can be integrated. Instead, they take the reader through their own experiences as researchers in examining the results and drawing conclusions, so that the reader would not obtain the impression that they were doing any more than "post-hocing." At the beginning of the book, the authors should have stated the conclusions that they report at the end, making it abundantly clear that these conclusions emerged from the data. The reader would still be able to accept or reject the conclusions, since the data are fully reported. The idea that a proposition is more or less valid depending on whether the researcher

stated it in advance of testing it empirically is logically indefensible. His willingness or ability to make an accurate prediction is a reflection on him, rather than on the hypothesis. The only test is data.

EZRA STOTLAND

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Interpersonal Dynamics: Essays and Readings on Human Interaction. By WARREN G. BENNIS, EDGAR H. SCHEIN, DAVID E. BERLEW, and FRED I. STEELE. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964. Pp. xv+763. $8.50.

The authors, all professors of industrial management, note that the field of interpersonal relations is less well developed than neighboring areas such as social psychology or personality. By bringing together a collection of papers from widely varied sources that specifically bear on interpersonal dynamics, they hope to contribute to this underdeveloped field.

The papers are grouped together under five general topics. The first set stresses feelings in interpersonal relations, and includes such papers as Harry Harlow's article on the heterosexual affectional system in monkeys and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's on loneliness. The second section treats the process by which the self-concept and one's beliefs are consensually validated; illustrative papers are Erving Goffman's analysis of ritual elements in social interaction and Carl Rogers' statement of the characteristics of a helping relationship. Change through interpersonal relationships is treated in the third section, with Anselm Strauss's analysis of regularized status passage illustrating institutionalized influence, and several analyses of psychotherapy illustrating uninstitutionalized change. The fourth section deals with the work relationship, as illustrated by Morton Deutsch's material on co-operation and trust and Howard Becker's analysis of the career of a dance musician. The final section is a group of papers representing the authors' commitment to action research. Selections identify the "good" and "bad" values in interpersonal relations.

Selections are of varied types; the laboratory experiment, observational analyses by symbolic interactionists, theoretical articles, and fiction are all included. Reading the selections impresses one with the richness and complexity of interpersonal behavior. Each major section is introduced with a well-organized and well-written essay that identifies the major concepts pertaining to the section topic and provides some structure to the readings that follow. In these essays, the authors have wisely avoided premature theorizing; yet, they have managed to provide some provocative ideas and conceptualizations, particularly in the sections on self and identity and on change through interpersonal relations.

In general, the authors have accomplished their aim of providing a rich sourcebook for interpersonal relations. Reactions to the book will depend upon the educational level and the predilections of the reader. The student is likely to find much interesting material. If he is systematically inclined, he is also apt to be overwhelmed by the diversity of ideas and approaches. The clinician and the symbolic interactionist are likely to react favorably; the tough-minded behavioral scientist is apt to dismiss many of the selections as irrelevant to his domain.

PAUL F. SECORD

University of Nevada

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. I. Edited by LEONARD BERKOWITZ. New York: Academic Press, 1964. Pp. xi+319. $9.00.

Eight useful articles review the data and provide integrating theoretical perspectives in the initial volume of a series that could do for experimental social psychology something similar to what the *Annual Review* does for psychology in general.

Fiedler proposes that an authoritarian leader will be more effective when the leadership task is very easy or very difficult—a permissive leader will be more effective otherwise—in a report based largely on the findings of his research program. Gamson lucidly considers four different explanations for the results of experimental coalition formation studies—ranging from minimal winning coalition theory to "utter confusion."

Can persons be "inoculated" with weakened forms of attacking arguments to resist persuasion? Yes, according to McGuire's series of

experiments—at least where previously unquestioned "cultural truisms" are of concern.

Mason discusses the rapidly expanding sociology and social psychology of non-human primates. Schacter, in a very readable article, shows that emotion is dependent upon both cognition and visceral sensation. He reports ingenious attempts to isolate the effect of these factors.

Shaw interprets the communication network literature in terms of independence of positions, which increases satisfaction, and saturation (overload), which decreases efficiency. Triandis' review of culture and cognition provides some exciting leads to the limitations of cultural relativity as expressed in the Whorf hypothesis.

Finally, Walters and Parke tackle the complex field of social motivation, reconceptualizing the data in terms of emotional arousal and habits of orientation to others rather than as reflecting a social drive per se.

These articles (analogously to middle-range theory) fill a need that the ordinary report and textbook do not. The generally copious references could be improved by including the titles of the articles cited. Also, succinct, readily accessible statements of the authors' main propositions are sometimes lacking. This book is recommended to all those who wish to be up to date in social psychology.

Morris F. Friedell

University of Michigan

Emotional Flexibility-Rigidity as a Comprehensive Dimension of Mind. By Sigvard Rubenowitz. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1964. Pp. iii+256. Sw. kr. 40.

This book reports on an extensive study aimed at testing the general hypothesis that "In adults a general factor of flexibility-rigidity can be identified, a factor which accounts for a considerable part of the variance in thinking, attitudes and displayed behavior." To test this and twelve subsidiary hypotheses a battery of twenty tests were adapted for administration in Sweden from other tests thought by the author to tap an aspect of the rigidity-flexibility syndrome. After establishment of acceptable reliabilities, on more than 2,000 subjects, the test battery was administered to 242 men undergoing compulsory Swedish military training and to 172 students in the introductory psychology course at the University of Gothenburg. Included in the battery were Swedish adaptations of (1) the California F Scale; (2) Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale; (3) Rokeach's Opinionation Scale, scored for both leftism-rightism and conservatism-liberalism; (4) the Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale; (5) the Mass Empathy Test, which had subject indicate his own stand and the normative response individuals such as himself would make to items of Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale; (6) Himmelstrand's Political L Scale; (7) Himmelstrand's Child Training L Scale; (8) Edward's Personal Preference Schedule; (9) Zulliger's Projective Test, a kind of group Rorschach; (10) a Musical Apperception Test, for measuring responses to unconventional music and its composer; (11) an Art Apperception Test, for measuring responses to unconventional art and its artist; (12) Eysenck's Body Build Index; (13–16) four subtests of intelligence, used widely in group administration in Sweden; (17) the Cat-Dog Test, in which a series of presented pictures undergoes a gradual transition from a cat to a dog; (18) the Color Naming Test, in which subject names one hundred colors, as they are presented to him one at a time, and then gives the complementary opposite of each color as it is represented; (19) the Brick Test, in which subject gives as many different uses as he can for brick; and (20) a Choice Reactions Test, a measure of negative transfer, in which subject first practices a complex visual-motor task and then has to switch motor responses to new controls and cues.

The main hypothesis, tested through factor analyses of responses to this test battery, was accepted by the author as being confirmed.

In addition, factor and correlation analyses were applied to tests of twelve more specific hypotheses having to do with differences between more and less rigid people. More rigid individuals, in comparison to less rigid persons, were hypothesized as being (1) more resistant to change in plans and opinions; (2) more stereotyped in habits and more compulsively orderly; (3) more fearful and anxious, with a more negative outlook on life; (4) more authoritarian and more concerned with prestige; (5) more intolerant and more

prejudiced; (6) more limited in both interests and knowledge; (7) more concrete and more oblivious to self-functioning; (8) more leptosomatic than pyknic in body build; (9) less intelligent; (19) older; (11) more frequently the product of harsh and forbidding parent-child relationships; and (12) less frequently exposed to different cultures.

The magnitudes of the correlations among various subtests and their parts support eight of the twelve hypotheses at the .05 level or better. The results, although not significant, were in the direction predicted in hypotheses 6 and 12; however, no support was found for hypotheses 8 and 9.

In addition to accepting the main hypothesis that rigidity-flexibility is a general personality characteristic that affects cognition and behavior transsituationally, the author concludes: "Thus, *other things being equal*, an extremely rigid person can be expected to hold an authoritarian subservient attitude in relation to a variety of authority figures—parents, leaders, [political] parties, supernatural power, social and institutional norms, etc.—he can be expected to show intolerance to people holding a different opinion to his own, and he can be expected to have a somewhat compulsive need for order and a disinclination to compromise. One can further, among other things, expect a condemnatory attitude toward politics, and a harsh, forbidding attitude on questions of upbringing" (p. 233).

From his findings, the author concludes that his concept of rigidity is more akin to dogmatism, as treated by Rokeach, than it is either to perseveration, as conceived by Spearman, or to authoritarianism, as dealt with in the California study.

Although the study is well conceived and carefully executed, it would seem to this reviewer that a generalization of the results to actual behavior in prescribed conditions should be attempted with caution owing to the fact that most of the correlations were between test items and not samples of behavior. Whether or not performance on the tests would indeed predict to behavior under theoretically appropriate conditions remains largely an empirical question. This comment, of course, can be made about many researchers among whom it has become the practice to assume, without actual experimental manipulations, that a construct validated through intercorrelations of paper-and-pencil tests operates in the same way on behavioral samples taken from relevant environments. Many studies, for example some on prejudice, have shown that whether or not there is coincidence between the predispositions implied in some hypothetical construct and overt behavior is dependent upon properties of the situation with which dispositional factors generally interact.

Something that might possibly weaken the construct validity of "rigidity" in the present study is the frequency of occasions in which only one or two carefully selected items of a test are correlated with an equally small number of items from another test. The stability of any relationship based on so few items might be open to question. Despite this possible methodological shortcoming, researchers concerned with rigidity-flexibility and related constructs will find this a worthwhile and theoretically stimulating work.

O. J. HARVEY

University of Colorado

Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. By ROBERT E. LANE. New York: Free Press, 1962. Pp. xxxii+477. $10.00.

Having worked now for a number of years with survey data on politics, often doing secondary analysis, I was most excited in again finding in this book individual human beings with their confusing, often contradictory, sometimes assertive, sometimes undecided opinions; opinions often intelligent, sometimes prejudiced; but always lively and "real" opinions about politics and the world around them. This is the world as it was seen by fifteen working and lower middle-class men, mostly of immigrant stock, eleven Catholics and two Jews, all married and with children, and with one exception all with an income between $2,400 and $6,300 a year. In the course of four to seven sessions, the author skilfully elicited discursive, conversational, and biographical materials (3,750 pp. of transcript).

These rich interview materials are linked with information obtained from the administration of twelve standard scales (Appendix

B) to provide a sociopsychological interpretation of the "world view" (*Weltanschauung* without pathos) of these common men. Lane gives us their ideas about freedom, equality, social classes, democracy, power, government, religion, money, time perspectives, community, ethics, etc., as they understand them in very concrete terms and derived from their own daily experience. We see how experiences on the job, in the union, through the mass media, in their daily life in Eastport (why not call it New Haven?), in their own immigrant families, in their lodges, and even in conversation with acquaintances and friends, shape those ideas.

It is fascinating and intellectually fruitful to watch Lane bring in the themes and hypotheses provided in the classic works about American society and democracy—Tocqueville, Bryce, Riesman, Laski, M. Lerner, and the Lynds are among the most quoted—and to confront these writings with what his men have to say. In the confrontation some of the accepted hypotheses are confirmed, but others have to be modified. These classics and the modified psychoanalytical approaches to politics, the works of Fromm, Kardiner and the studies of the "Authoritarian Personality"—plus the experience of the author in this field with J. Dollard—contribute the theoretical framework of the study. A polemic stand against the theories of mass society and politics comes through at many points but is not fully organized. Curiously enough, given Lane's familiarity with survey data, there is little reference to what we know from national or local studies on beliefs, values, and attitudes, to put the comments of the respondents within a wider framework. The approach adopted in this intensive study of attitudes and ideologies represents a trend that has a parallel in works like Heinrich Popitz, *et al.*, *Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters* based on directed conversations with German steelmill workers; Alfred Willener's *Images de la société et classes sociales*; the essays in *La Dépolitisation: mythe ou réalité* (edit. by G. Vedel), Andrée Andrieux; Jean Lignon's *L'Ouvrier d' aujourd'hui*; and some recent British research. Unfortunately there is no attempt to compare such studies. I feel that the comparison would bring out how the common man in our time of "end of ideology" uses materials from the national and/or class heritage of ideological systems (using the term in a stricter sense than Lane) in a piecemeal, simplified, fashion, often unconscious of their partisan and intellectual origins. As Popitz *et al.* show, the Marxist heritage of ideas about economic cycles, technological change, and war, among others, survives in this way isolated from effective organization and activation by political propaganda of the unions and the parties. The comparison could also show that the mentalities (Theodor Geiger's term for ways of feeling and thinking, more emotional than rational, as distinct from more or less intellectually elaborated and organized systems of thought, by intellectuals, pseudo-intellectuals, or with their assistance, that he calls ideology) of many German workers are probably more isolated from the ideology dominant in the postwar period than those of their American peers. The lack of a comparative perspective perhaps contributes to the optimistic conclusions derived from the concreteness of the thought of these workers, their morseling of reality, their limited and pragmatic aspirations, and their lack of utopian thinking. I wonder if we would not find much the same patterns in industrializing societies. I also wonder if the consistent, rigid, intolerant ideological conceptions in any society (even among those supporting totalitarian parties) affects more than a minority.

This brings me to the only fundamental criticism I have of the work: the unexpressed but implicit assumption that democracy is based on the political ideology (I would call it "mentality" or "culture") of the common man and the extent to which he is or is not susceptible of alienation, anomie, authoritarianism, utopian thinking, cabalism, and the importance of such pathologies of democratic thinking in the electorate. It fails to note that the existence of such ideas among strategically located groups might be more important, and that mass popular politics is not the only political arena where decisions are made. Further, that ideologies (in a stricter sense than his usage) probably gain hold of quite different groups in any society and that common men, like those of Eastport, might not be so different in many societies, but key minorities might be. Lane's work continues in the tradition of a sociopsychological approach to political phenomena without fully considering the role of institutions, elites,

crisis situations, etc., for the stability of a political system.

At many points this study is a contribution to the study of the legitimacy of a social system: the way in which vaguely understood ideas derived from the classic liberal-democratic credo are combined with life experiences (the effectiveness of the society) to make people think that the society is just or fair (even when they could as well perceive many aspects of that reality in critical or hostile terms). The analysis tends to explain this acceptance of ideological thoughts, taken piecemeal out of their context, in terms of predispositions acquired with the development of the personality, mainly in the context of the family and somewhat less in that of the work situation. With this framework the importance of the transmission of ideology from past generations, and through institutions—the mass media and the unions, the churches and lodges, schools and speeches—is somewhat underestimated. The comparison with *Das Weltbild des Arbeiters* would have shown how in another increasingly affluent society the stones that could be taken from the abandoned Marxist ideological building are used in a way similar to that in which the Eastporters use those of the American ideological heritage. I for one would put slightly less emphasis on the psychological mechanisms predisposing to select certain ideological explanations, expressions, etc.

The first section of the book, where we get acquainted with what the lower-class common man beleives, how he interprets conservatively the class structure, expresses fears about dysfunctional consequences of greater equality of opportunity and income, shows his ambivalence about freedom, etc., rationalizing his own position (ideologically, in Mannheim's sense of the term), is excellent. Some of the theoretical and practical implications of these ways of thinking for various proposals to adapt to a post-industrial affluent society are not brought out, but Lane's description and analysis are extremely relevant for them. The pages dealing with the popular views on power—a polity of abundance for those who would make the effort to press their demands, rather than of scarcity of power—are particularly significant in view of Parsons' recent theoretical efforts. The most recent view of power in American sociological theory and the inarticulated views of the common man have much in common. Perhaps this is no accident and it would not be surprising that—independently of their scientific truth—they would be resisted in other societies where people share different experiences and have developed different mentalities. The descriptive parts of the book should be required reading of anyone planning to do research on political attitudes, social stratification, trade unions and business in American society, and race relations (even though this point is not developed as extensively as we might wish today), as a source of fruitful hypotheses, formulations, and questions close to the people's mind. In fact, I wish Lane had devised a questionnaire for a survey-type study based on the responses he obtained in his guided conversations. A book like this should give new ideas to those who draft questionnaires in their research-bureau ivory towers.

I feel some reservations about some of the psychological analogies between the men's lives and their beliefs. The explanation of how these men are willing to support a democratic polity should not be confused with any explanation of how it came to be and this cannot be the only explanation of how it is able to continue being. As I said before, the importance of the sociopsychological explanation should not be exaggerated. It could be argued that many of the psychological processes that make New Haveners good American (democratic) citizens could make Muscovites good Soviet (Communist) citizens.

The more sociological approach that opens Part II, dealing with the effects of abundance, advancement, the escalation effect, the lack of rigid integration into any community, specificity (arguing probably rightly against the critiques of mass society), the intergenerational changes, the basic legitimacy of the business system, etc., is equally—if not more—fruitful. A comparison with other sectors of American society (racial or geographic) where such favorable changes have not taken place would be illuminating, as would their intensive study in societies where the Marxist or Sindicalist labor movement gave and gives workers different frames of reference to perceive comparable changes. Only such comparisons could clarify the relationships described in Lane's basic paradigm (pp. 213, 415–16). The same could be said about the very interesting

section dealing with rhythm, pace, historical focus, and historylessness. Incidentally, why is there no more reference to Mannheim's ideas, or to those of Halbwachs in the *Mémoire Collective*, or to the psychological work on time perspectives and levels of aspiration?

The analysis of how the lack of rootedness, of strong community identifications, facilitates the acceptance of democratic patterns of thought—in polemic against Kornhauser who emphasizes the dangers for democracy of mass society—is suggestive. It might well be that both are right and that the question is to specify further the conditions under which one or another relation may be valid. Perhaps in periods of stability Lane's analysis points in the right direction, while community ties might prevent rapid shifts in the electorate in periods of crisis and demagogic leadership. The dual tendencies Lane notes at the end of the book (p. 477) might have been brought more often into the analysis.

Many hypotheses and ideas presented should become part of a sociology of knowledge: the distinction between contextualizing and ideologizing (p. 355), the substitution of error for evil in moral interpretations (p. 323), to mention some at random. The latter parts of the book are full of them, but the half systematic, half descriptive presentation, the repetition of points made, the not too clearly linked excursus into biographical-psychological explanations, make the reading difficult. Those with patience are rewarded, but their task could have been made easier. There are weaknesses, minor errors, and omissions (after all the book has 477 pp.) such as the neglect of the Enlightenment among the creative crises of man (pp. 346–47); the reference to the attitude toward the Supreme Court (p. 160) that is not documented in the text; the denial of flexibility to the Neapolitan voter, the interpretation of the Spanish Inquisition as scapegoating (p. 328) . . . if this reviewer has the right to be picayunish.

To end, like the author, with a personal note, while I share somewhat the optimism about the fact that "there is no utopia" and the closing lines about the right of the men of New Haven to "sleep well", I wonder if we should not be a little bit uneasy about how millions of Americans like Lane's workers and employees, and the politicians responsive to them, will be able to face some of the great tasks that confront the United States as a world power and a model for other societies? I, as a non-American, would have some queries on this subject. This book, read by intellectuals of other countries, might not lead to optimistic and friendly conclusions. To put himself in their places would have raised further and broader questions: political rather than sociopsychological questions and queries about the dysfunctions rather than functions of the end of ideology. Or more precisely: I wish we could reach both the end of utopia without the dysfunctions of just ideology (in Mannheim's sense) and stability and legitimacy of a social order without unquestioning acceptance and adjustment to just the present or the day after tomorrow.

JUAN J. LINZ

Columbia University

Pre-Seminary Education: Report of the Lilly Endowment Study. By KEITH R. BRIDSTON and DWIGHT W. CULVER. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1965. Pp. xi+257. $4.75.

This monograph is the final report of a two-year study of preseminary education that generated an earlier volume of essays entitled *The Making of Ministers*, edited by Bridston and Culver. *Pre-Seminary Education* is based on the results of a questionnaire sent to all seminary students registered in 1962 in the 125-member schools of the American Association of Theological Schools. The authors received 17,565 responses—an 83 per cent response.

The book is a valuable and able addition to our knowledge of the social background factors characteristic of Protestant seminary students. One wishes, however, that comparable studies existed from earlier periods in order to determine significant changes in the social recruitment of ministers. Thus, the book is on strongest ground when it tells us directly about the social background factors of seminary students in the early 1960's. It is possible that the characteristics discovered by the authors represent profound historical changes—including the end of the so-called religious revival in America.

The data on seminary students do not allow a sanguine and optimistic view as to the

current situation in Protestant seminaries. The authors discover that a relatively small percentage (33 per cent) of seminary students want to work in a parish. Although many students come from the lower middle class, they regard the ministry as having higher occupational prestige than their father's occupation. Coupled with this is the fact that seminaries in the 1960's are attracting the poorer students—those whose academic records indicate they could not get into the better graduate schools. The authors suggest that the factor of social mobility may be an important motivation for seminary students. This is a subject to explore in more depth.

If there is any outstanding weakness to this volume, it is a lack of cross-tabulation and internal analysis of the data. Such a large amount of data is, in some instances, a sociologist's dream—where one can see endlessly possibilities for many-celled tables. It is, however, all too easy for a reviewer to suggest what an author might have done. What has been accomplished here is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the Protestant minister as well as a worthwhile addition to the growing literature on the sociology of occupations.

RICHARD L. MEANS

Kalamazoo College

Principles of Organization. By THEODORE CAPLOW. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. Pp. xi+383. $6.95.

"The argument of this book," writes the author, "is that human organizations are a class of natural phenomena the attributes of which are not time bound or culture bound, and the workings of which are orderly." The argument turns out to be persuasive, because of the very nature of the materials and, equally, because of the skill and perceptiveness of the author.

"Organizations" describe social systems which have the following characteristics: an unequivocal collective identity (a name or distinctive character), an exact roster of membership, a program (including "calendarity" —a schedule—and goals), and replacement procedures. Excluded are races, social classes, nations, communities (mostly), cliques, and playgroups. Adolescent gangs and families *are* included, though the notion of "replacement procedures" would seem to have limited usefulness for them. Doc's gang would surely have changed profoundly if Doc had been replaced. It is doubtful whether it would even have survived.

Such taxonomic questions are not important, however. What is, is Caplow's position: He does not go Etzioni's way—comparative examination of types of organization, a practice Etzioni feels to be essential *before* one can describe the whole. By implication, Caplow suggests that one cannot describe types before one knows the species one is seeking to divide into types. One consequence is that Caplow, after discussing the classification attempts of many others, ends up with an undifferentiated list of examples.

The integrating ideas in the book are placed in the form of a set of variables which Caplow repeatedly applies to organizational analysis. He calls them the SIVA variables since they always have as their initial letters one of those four letters. They bear more than a family resemblance to Homans' and Whyte's variables. At first, they appear as status, interaction, valence (mutual attractiveness), and activity. When organization effectiveness is discussed, the variables become stability, integration, voluntarism (the maintenance of valences), and achievement. Under the heading of "individual adjustment to the enterprise," they appear as subjection, involvement, volition, and adaptation. And, when conflict is discussed, the variables are subjugation, insulation, violence, and attrition. These sets are certainly not the same and Caplow is careful to point out that the whole thing is a purely mnemonic device, but still they resemble each other. The four variables are, in each case, felt to be in equilibrium for small changes. For example, interaction, valence, and activity will, it is claimed, vary in the same direction, if status is equal. In Homans' familiar proposition, an increase in interaction will result in an increase in liking for one another, for example. If status is unequal, less interaction will be needed to maintain a given amount of co-ordinated activity. The latter assertion Caplow refers to as the "*raison d'être* of human organization."

Drawing the relationships among the four variables in their several different forms

enables Caplow to pull together a large amount of the data in the study of organizations and to state general hypotheses. The hypotheses are stated in axiomatic form, are at least partially free from the criticisms of that kind of theory, and meet, in part, the suggestion of Costner and Leik that such theory should involve propositions which are asymmetrically causal. In some cases, however, Caplow seems to feel that the causality can go both ways. At times, the variables seem too broad to encompass the study being discussed. Thus "voluntarism" includes such diverse matters as (lack of) pressure, helpfulness, peer group loyalty, and solidarity. We shall need more specification of those variables in order to test hypotheses. But Caplow points the way to finding the kind of variables we shall need to search for.

As readers of *The Sociology of Work* and *The Academic Marketplace* already know, some of Caplow's most important contributions lie in his insights or his ability to shed unexpected light on a familiar point. The book fairly gleams with those lights. Representative examples include:

1. No wholly satisfactory measure of organization size exists. Number of full-time employees or members is the usual measure, though number of clients, sales volume, or capital value might be defended as good measures. Caplow suggests instead a structural measure, based on interaction possibilities, which results in several types. A small organization is one small enough for its members to form a primary group. Medium-size organizations do not permit of all possible pair relationships, but one or more persons, including a leader, can interact directly with all others. Large organizations permit one or more leaders to be recognized directly by all others; and giant organizations are too big to permit direct interaction of any one with all others, key members being recognized through mass communication.

2. The concept of "replacement procedure" is generalized and seen to involve essentially the same operations in bureaucatic organizations, empaneling and discharging a jury, claiming an inheritance, baptism, burial, and matriculation.

3. Elites are always complacent. The process, Caplow avers, is as follows: each elite overestimates its own success compared to other groups higher or lower in the same hierarchy. But pretensions directly upward are likely to be corrected by superiors, in self-defense, whereas pretensions downward escape much of that chastening influence. So officers overestimate their effectiveness compared to enlisted men, teachers to students, and employers to employees, each attributing their own excellence to their superior leadership and other qualities.

4. Status groups protect their exclusiveness not simply by criteria difficult to meet but by using arbitrary and unpredictable election procedures. Through this means insiders are protected from the potential claims of any persons who might demand admittance because they have fulfilled criteria that were enough to get someone else in.

5. Organizations seek to insure the loyalty of senior persons by seeking only persons who can "fit in." Yet the irony is that the most mobile persons develop a set of skills which enable them to fit in anywhere and also to pull loose from organizations with little emotional stress.

Even such stimulating insights, however, remain secondary to major discussions of theories of the middle range. Most original are Caplow's discussions of organizational socialization, organizational conflict, rules, and "organizational sets." The last refers to two or more organizations of the same type which are continuously visible to one another; for example, the sociology departments of major universities, the Protestant churches in a small town, the baseball teams in the American League, or the leading manufacturers of electrical equipment. A generalization about such sets is called "the aggrandizement effect" —the tendency of each to overrate its own prestige. One effect is to protect leaders from criticism and to hold its employees in the organization, since alternative employment is considered a loss of prestige, though a cost is insulation from criticism. Other valuable discussions deal with organizational effectiveness and improvement, and utopias. Throughout, there is an excellent coverage of the literature.

Caplow's treatment is wholly sociological. As such it provides a reaffirmation of the potential size of the sociologist's contribution to the study of organizations, a matter that readers of the many multidisciplinary collec-

tions available may sometimes doubt. The book is a major effort by a first-rate mind who sets his ideas down with wit and grace. It deserves wide attention.

EDWARD GROSS

University of Washington

Race Relations in Transition: The Segregation Crisis in the South. By JAMES W. VANDER ZANDEN. New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. 135. $1.65 (paper).

Based largely on previously published articles, plus an extensive appendix reporting a study of voting on segregationist referenda, this short book does not offer an adequate interpretation of the southern racial crisis. It has too few facts in it to be a piece of research, yet it is not comprehensive enough to be an interpretive essay.

The introduction presents the concepts of status strain, collective behavior, and crisis situation to provide a sociological framework for understanding the subsequent chapters on the changing South, the Citizens Councils, the Ku Klux Klan, the Negro integrationist movement, disorders accompanying desegregation, and white accommodation to desegregation. But these concepts are not systematically used in the factual chapters, and it is found necessary to pull in other interpretations *ad hoc* at several points.

There is little background from before 1954. This results partly in too ready an acceptance of the locals' interpretation of events. We are told, for example, that Mississippi was ready to prosecute the murderers of fourteen-lear-old Emmett Till until national vilification of Mississippi transformed the issue from "one of murder to one of the defense-of-an-embattled-white Mississippi." But we are not told that Mississippi had not punished any white man for the murder of a Negro since 1875. There is even acceptance of the Mississippi attorney general's statement that a congressman from Michigan acted as though he could control the local courts. The ahistoricism also results partly in the failure to present the earlier origin of contemporary forces. For example, except for brief reference to the Montgomery protest of 1955, the non-violent resistance movement is dated from 1960. Actually, as an organized movement, it goes back to 1942 and, as an informal reaction of the Negro, it has its roots in slavery. The journalistic quality is also manifested in exaggeration: In 1955 "the NAACP found itself virtually wiped out in Black Belt areas."

The booklet is strongest when it is based on concrete research, such as the study of Klan members and on voting statistics. It is better at understanding the whites than the Negroes. But as a general description of southern race relations today, it is disappointing.

ARNOLD M. ROSE

University of Minnesota

Dear FDR: A Study of Political Letter-Writing. By LEILA A. SUSSMANN. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1963. Pp. xxv+191. $6.00.

How often it seems, in the area of communication, a weakness can, by a little reflection, be converted into a strength. There is the classic story from Inkeles of how the Soviet Union, forced by the lack of radio receivers, developed the famous agitator technique. So it was with Franklin D. Roosevelt who, when incapacitated by illness at two critical times in his political life, developed the use of political correspondence into a comprehensive art which enabled him not only to assess the current state of public thinking with uncanny accuracy and depth but also to formulate and lead political opinion. This little book introduces us to some of the rich substance of his correspondence, and to the art with which he brought it to bear on his problems. The current study of public opinion is poorer for the lack of knowledge about the reciprocal influence between decision-makers and the public. This study, based on a sample of the voluminous FDR mail, now housed in the Roosevelt Archives at Hyde Park, provides not only valuable information on that relationship, but a clue as to how further studies might be developed.

This is—as the introduction by Robert K. Merton points out—a book with many significances. It contains a history of American political mail, a biography of Mr. Roosevelt as a political correspondent, an evaluation of him as a leader and interpreter of public opinion, an analysis of the major content

themes and the social characteristics of the authors of his mail, a comprehensive review and comparison with other studies of political communication, and a discussion of the role of public officials' mail in contemporary politics—all of this packed into 191 pages.

Such brevity is admirable, but it has inevitable shortcomings. The "Dear FDR" theme tends to get lost in the more universal considerations of the last fifty pages, and the author's experience with the Roosevelt mail does not really seem to enter into the climactic assessment of the functions of mass political mail in the last chapter. Whether because of the requirements of brevity, or because of the limited time and resourses available for the mail analysis, many interesting and obvious cross-tabulations of the content of the letters by social characteristics of the writers are not offered. To put an essay of this scope into a book of this size can only serve as an introduction and exploration. The introduction holds for the imaginative reader fascinating foreshadowings of more lengthy and detailed studies of the public correspondence of recent political figures.

WILLIAM ERBE

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The Psychology of Aging. By JAMES E. BIRREN. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. 303. $6.95.

Dr. Birren, himself a leading authority in the field of the psychology of aging, states his objective in this volume to be the provision of a "supplemental text in development psychology courses, in courses in the social and psychological sciences or as a basic text when the subject matter of the psychology of the adult is taught." This reviewer read the book as a non-psychologist currently working in the field of the economic and sociological problems of aging. From this standpoint I would judge the book to be an extremely valuable and readable survey of the area. It is of use to any serious student of the social, medical, or psychological aspects of aging.

Gerontology is an example, par excellence, of a cross-disciplinary area of research. The psychologist concerned with reactions of the bereaved widow to the loss of her spouse cannot, as Birren makes clear in his discussion of the "economics of widowhood," ignore the economic pressures which as he says "accentuate the problems of psychological and social adjustment" and which help to make widowhood "probably the greatest role change experienced over the life span." On the other hand, the economist concerned with problems of income maintenance and of the continued employment of the aged will find himself faced with the question of whether any meaning can be given outside a specific social context to the notion of "capacity to work." He must look to the psychologist for help in interpreting this concept.

The great strength of this textbook is that it recognizes the contribution of all the disciplines to the subject matter under discussion —"the individual is a biological, psychological and social constellation moving forward in time" and "man is both the result of and the determiner of his environment." The range of the references is very wide—from a study by English historians of the family in the seventeenth century to the relationship between age and the strength of hunger motivation. The author succeeds with the difficult task of integrating these diverse topics into a systematic story.

Beginning with a general review of the life cycle and the social, cultural, and biological influences at work, Birren proceeds to study five aspects of performance in relation to aging—sense, speed in action, skill, learning, and thinking. After a chapter on occupation and leisure, Birren considers aging and personality, aging and psychopathology, and concludes with an interesting discussion of the psychological problems of the end of life—"grief and the task of dying." Inevitably one could disagree with the presentation and emphasis given to particular problems. That is the price which any attempt at a comprehensive review of a complex subject must pay. Of more interest to the reviewer was seeing how fairly and objectively Birren deals with many controversial topics, from the contentious theory of "disengagement" to the "golden age" view of the family.

This book is an informative and authoritative review of current theories and evidence on the nature of changes in human behavior with age.

DOROTHY WEDDERBURN

University of Cambridge

The Sherpas of Nepal: Buddhist Highlanders. By CHRISTOPH VON FURER-HAIMENDORF. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. 298. $6.50.

The author of this work spent twenty-five months among the Sherpas in order to write the first detailed anthropological description of their society and culture. The Sherpas, who are known chiefly for their skill as mountaineers, are one of the numerous *Bhotia* peoples of Nepal—Mongoloid populations living in the highest valleys of Nepal whose language derives from Tibetan and whose religion is a variety of Tibetan Buddhism. The main concentrations of Sherpas are in three regions immediately southwest of Mount Everest, Khumbu, Pharak, and Solu, but there are many scattered settlements both further east and further west.

Haimendorf gives more than a description of Sherpa society; he seeks to throw light on the problem of the unique place held by the Sherpas among the Buddhist peoples of Nepal. He analyzes the type of society in which such a spirit of independence, a sense of civic responsibility, a genial tolerance, and a delicate balance between this-worldly and other-worldly values could develop. I have known a few Sherpas in Nepal, but have never been in their villages. Haimendorf's description of their character fits in well with my experience of individual Sherpas, and his description and analysis of their society are both fascinating and enlightening.

Among the many topics discussed, those of particular interest to me were the influence of the potato on Sherpa society, and the degree to which a rather sophisticated moral code deeply influences social behavior. The potato was introduced in the middle of the nineteenth century and has enabled a dramatic growth of population and made possible the development of monasteries and nunneries in the last fifty to eighty years. The fact that abbots of monasteries are often reincarnate lamas of great holiness gives special vividness to the doctrine of a chain of successive rebirths, for all the members of Sherpa society have had contact with such men.

RICHARD W. MOODEY

Loyola University, Chicago

Man and Society in Iran. By A. REZA ARASTEH in collaboration with JOSEPHINE ARASTEH. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964. Pp. xii+193. Gld. 28.

The authors of this book are not social scientists and perhaps it is not fair to evaluate their work by a sociological yardstick. However, the subject matter is within the domain of our discipline and their ostensible aim is to contribute to sociological knowledge.

American sociology, which has often been accused of ethnocentrism, has in recent years shown a growing interest in cross-cultural studies and books on other societies. The present trend is a sign of increasing maturity and may lead to a broadened base for many of our generalizations. But if reports on other societies are to help in achieving the abovementioned objective, they should have at least two characteristics. First, they should follow certain well-established rules of data collection and reporting. Second, the investigators must be familiar with the major theories in the areas of their investigation so that their data are not a haphazard collection of facts but bear on the accumulation of knowledge.

The book under review does not possess either of these qualifications. One can tolerate the authors' unfamiliarity with the theoretical works on social phenomena, but there is no excuse for their flagrant neglect of the elementary rules of data collection and reporting. For instance, the authors do not maintain, even to a moderate degree, the objectivity so essential to the analysis of social phenomena. Repeatedly the supremacy of Iranians over their neighbors and conquerors is emphasized (pp. 65–66) or the influence of Persian culture and language in other parts of the world is discussed (p. 67), while no credit is given to the contribution of others to Persian culture. Further, there seems to be a deliberate effort to conceal some of the so-called social vices. For example, it is reported that opium is smoked in the villages by the peasants as a pain-killer and as a temporary release from their burdensome life (p. 148), but nothing is mentioned about the many landlords, businessmen, civil servants, university professors, and members of the parliament who smoke opium. Again, the book is not devoid of partisan propaganda. Thus, the authors side with certain political

factions and condemn others (pp. 107–10 and p. 187).

Although in the Foreword the authors claim their work to be a scholarly effort at "analyzing man and culture," and express hope that it might serve as a model for the study of other cultures, in the last chapter their missionary concern comes to the fore when they propose definite plans for building a "healthy society" and a "healthy social character." They naïvely suggest that "Iran can solve her social divergencies [?] by developing common goals, proposed by a parliament of genuinely elected representatives." (p. 192), but give no hint of how this idyllic condition might be achieved.

Topics discussed in this book are geography, ethnic composition, "social institutions," "social structure," "values," mysticism, family (three chapters are devoted to this subject), and the process of westernization in modern Iran. Here and there the discussion is interspersed with some historical accounts.

In chapter iv the authors present a "theoretical" formulation in order to integrate the materials of the book. However, this is the weakest part of the book, and the discussion of "man's separation from nature" and undefined terms such as "the real culture" and "the essence of culture" confuse the reader without adding substance to the book.

In all fairness, one should mention that this book contains useful demographic data based on the 1956 National Census, taken with the help of the American Point Four advisors, which is probably the most reliable census taken in Iran.

All in all, as a fellow citizen of Mr. Arasteh's I am very disappointed that the content of the book does not do justice to its title.

Asghar Fathi

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Patienthood in the Mental Hospital: An Analysis of Role, Personality, and Social Structure. By Daniel J. Levinson and Eugene B. Gallagher. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964. Pp. xvii+265. $5.95.

This collaborative effort investigates the human condition of patienthood in the mental hospital from a social psychological perspective. Its central concept, the social role, mediates between the social structure or quasi-bureaucracy of the mental hospital and the idiosyncratic definitions and responses of the patients as individuals. The authors consider the most relevant functions and structures of the mental hospital to be (1) the inducement of psychological change in the patient in a therapeutic-educative-corrective system, (2) the care of the patient in a custodial community, and (3) the incarceration of the patient in a forcibly sequestered institution.

The patient is analyzed in terms of his confrontation, conception, and performance of his problematic role issues, but his role-behavior is also analyzed in terms of his social class affiliation and personality predispositions. Since the authors regard the patients as being confronted by protean choices in the ideological and situational diversities of the state hospital, they focus upon the personality characteristics which will influence the patients' role conceptions, orientations, and behavior.

To analyze these problems, they selected fifty male and fifty female patients, predominantly between the ages of twenty and forty from two convalescent wards in a state hospital. The patients were classified in the Hollingshead five-class spectrum by the two-factor index of education and occupation. The chief instrument for analyzing the patients' orientations was the Patient Role-Conception Inventory. The findings were derived from the factor analysis of these responses by the Thurstone Centroid method, and then elaborated by the derivation of factor scales and the correlation of these scales with other measurers.

Of the three primary factors derived, the first dealt with "preference for benign autocracy and conventional façade"; the second concerned the hospital as a polarity of being a "gratifying-comforting" versus a "depriving-rejecting" institution. The third factor dealt with the "feelings of turmoil and lack of control" within the patient. In addition to these primary factors, the authors derived several fusion factors such as I and II, which concerned an "Exploitive-demanding" orientation. These factors were correlated with personality predispositions such as in the Authoritarian (F) scale and the Custodial Men-

tal Illness Ideology (CMI) scale. They were also correlated with the variable of class membership. Thus persons in the lower social classes would tend to have high scores in Factor I because they would have a biological attitude toward their illness and assume a positive attitude toward order and obedience in the hospital and regard sane persons as behaving very conventionally. Upper-class persons who had a more psychological orientation toward their disorders would want a more flexibly organized hospital in order to permit individual decision-making.

In general the authors, who have devoted several years to this inquiry, have demonstrated rigor and care in their mensurative analyses, and have tied in their findings to carefully formulated and relevant hypotheses or questions pertaining to patient adjustment to the hospital. They have made a definite contribution to understanding the plight, conception, and behavior of the patient role within a particular hospital context. The singular patient composition of this hospital, however, does not permit generalization of their findings which are pertinent to this hospital or to other state or private hospitals. But their hypotheses and inventories can be used for inquiry into the patient role in other mental hospital contexts.

S. Kirson Weinberg

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International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers. Edited by Roger Fisher. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii+290. $6.50.

This collection stems from a five-week interdisciplinary get-together to apply behavioral science to current problems of war and peace. Apart from Boulding's discussion of conflict, there is little pure theory here. Nor are there many data, although Bronfenbrenner presents valuable material on what is going on in the minds of the Russians. Rather, defining the situation and working toward solutions are emphasized by the sixteen articles.

As to the nature of the situation, Rapoport discusses the biases in our perception, with particular reference to the Ideology of Games. Gamson's design for research on the diametrically opposite predictions of Soviet responses to conciliatory acts might help settle one important controversy.

One approach to a conflict situation is to modify the parties. Deutsch asks: Are the Communists corrigible?—and proposes, among other things, that we help them become more aware of the effects of their actions. Gough considers the need for a world society, and Etzioni deals with the problems and prospects of the Atlantic Union and a "Commonwealth of the Free" in a carefully thought-out organizational analysis.

Given the parties, what should be done? Conflict can be diverted, as Waskow suggests, into non-lethal channels; Fisher supplies a provocative discussion of the fractionation of conflict, so that the test case becomes a special case; Lieberman discusses strategies of assurance rather than threat for conducting conflict more constructively.

Given some remedies, why aren't they applied? Grinspoon and Eisher provide pertinent, though all too brief, analyses of the governmental decision-making process, focusing on problems of the man in high office and organizational defects respectively.

Finally, what action is feasible? Mishler discusses how the peace movement can influence foreign policy, Robinson notes how the social scientist can affect Congress, and Grinspoon cautions us about the dangers that may lie in ignoring the defense mechanisms that underlie the present apathy.

Two articles this reviewer would have liked to see are one on the problem of co-ordination of behavioral science peace research and one furnishing a systematic analysis of the limitations of the "mirror-image" model therein. In conclusion, the book provides a useful survey of behavioral science thinking about the cold war and contains some solid contributions.

Morris F. Friedell

University of Michigan

How Nations Negotiate. By Fred Charles Iklé. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xii+274. $5.95.

According to the dust jacket, for which, of course, the author is not necessarily respon-

sible, this book "studies the strategies and tactics of negotiation with the same precision that has heretofore been devoted to the science of war." There is a certain ironic truth in the puff, the science of war not being noted for its precision. Nevertheless, this book is a praiseworthy attempt to bring some sort of order and cultivation into what might previously have been described as a briar patch rather than a field. As the title indicates, the emphasis is not upon the process of negotiation in general, but on international and diplomatic negotiation, even though there are occasional side glances at industrial relations and other aspects of the negotiating process. The author defines negotiation rather narrowly as "a process in which explicit proposals are put forward, ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement—where conflicting interests are present" (pp. 3, 4). At any moment in this process there is a continual "threefold choice" (1) to accept the existing offer of the opponent, (2) to break off negotiations, or (3) to continue negotiations. Only if both parties decide on the third choice will the process continue. Even where some agreement is reached, there are usually residual disagreements that also lead to a continuation of the process. Incomplete agreements may be made for a number of reasons (p. 20). A partial agreement may clarify issues; it may postpone them; the disagreement may be contained or narrowed or put into a new context; or, finally, the parties may simply want some symbol of agreement which has very little content. Frequently the side effects of an agreement are more important than the terms of the agreement itself. The importance of a bargaining reputation is noted, and there is an excellent discussion of the rules of accommodation, that is, the various taboos and cultural patterns which permeate the diplomatic subculture. There is a glance at the relation between the negotiators and their domestic environments back home, some interesting notes on the impact of different personalities on the negotiating process, and an illuminating chapter on the way in which the whole experience of negotiators in the international system affects their evaluations of what either they or their opponents will accept, the main moral of which is that there is a distinct advantage in having history on one's own side, or at least in inducing everybody to think so. There is a chapter of ripe wisdom entitled "How Do the Parties Come to Terms?" and the book concludes with an entertaining analysis of the comparative negotiating skills of East and West. There is an excellent bibliographic note on the state of the existing literature.

The method of the book might be described as anecdotal, and in a field where anecdotes are so humorous and so entertaining, a good deal of wisdom can be distilled from them. Nevertheless, the very method illustrates how far we are from anything that might truly be called a "science" of international systems. There is neither depth analysis nor quantitative analysis, and the general point of view is pretty much that of the American Establishment. On the whole, this is a pretty Machiavellian world, and there is, at times, a curious tone of a tough-minded defense against idealism which seems to be characteristic of the Establishment school. Within these limitations, however, this is an excellent work, well written and entertaining, and even those who hope for better things can read it with profit.

Kenneth E. Boulding

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Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the fundamental problem posed by collective decisions for a social theory based on rational actors each pursuing his own interest. The problem is the absence of consensus about the society's choice, in which case the theory of rational behavior breaks down by failing to predict the outcome. The paper proposes that individuals in social systems are faced with a *sequence* of social choices, and can thus exchange their partial control over issues that interest them little for greater control of those that interest them more.

An ideal or perfect system of collective decisions is defined, in a way analogous to the definition of a perfect market.

Finally, the various alternatives to consent are discussed, together with some of the considerations that would lead the rational actor to refuse to consent.

There is one general approach to theory that has been used most widely in both common-sense and formal approaches to the society. This is the approach that treats the acting individual as a purposive agent acting with some goals or purposes in mind.

I do not want here to argue the merits of this purposive approach versus other approaches to theory, though I hope the paper itself will aid that argument. I want merely to make clear that this approach will be the starting point for my discussion of collective action. As a starting point, it will illustrate the fundamental problems in devising a theory of collective action.

THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

From the point of view of purposive action theory, an *action* by an actor is easily explained. The one governing principle of the theory serves to explain it: the actor is striving to maximize his utility.

There is no such principle, however, to explain joint or collective action. For the principle is posed at the level of the individual actor and not at the level of a pair or collectivity. The utility of the collectivity is a meaningless quantity. Is it to be the sum of the utilities of the individual actors? If so, what weights are to be applied to the individual actors' utilities?

The lack of such a principle of behavior for "collective actors" does not prevent explanation of many types of social interaction by use of the individual calculus of purposive behavior. Recent books by Homans, Thibaut and Kelley, and Blau use that calculus to explain many types of behavior in social situations.[1] Even more broadly, economic theory uses this calculus as the basis for explaining the functioning of economic systems, and economic systems

[1] George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1961); John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959); Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

involve much interaction between actors. The calculus of individual purposive behavior explains the functioning of economic systems in a way illustrated by Adam Smith's famous statement in *The Wealth of Nations*. "It is not by the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."[2]

Yet there is a whole set of social phenomena that this calculus will not explain. It is best illustrated by examining somewhat more fundamentally the economic interactions to which it is so well suited. Why is it that an economic exchange involving two actors is carried out? Clearly, in terms of this theoretical approach, it will be carried out only if both actors find it to their individual advantage to do so. It involves the voluntary action of two actors, A and B, and, consequently, four possibilities exist: neither A nor B finds the action beneficial; A finds it beneficial, but B does not; B finds it beneficial, but A does not; or both A and B find it beneficial.

An economic exchange occurs, or a social interaction occurs, when the last of these conditions holds. This is spontaneous action, for it is willed by both actors involved. But does this means that no action will take place except when the last condition holds? If such were the case, almost any action on the part of a large collectivity would be impossible, because as the actors increase to A, B, C, then A,B,C,D, A,B, C,D,E, and so on, the number of no-action conditions increases to 7, 15, 31, and so on, in powers of 2, while there remains only one condition for action: the condition in which the same action alternative is preferred by all.

This is one of the two fundamental problems of collective action. Only under the most extreme condition of consensus does action spring spontaneously from the actors' individual goals. Under any other condition, there is no spontaneous action, for at least one actor prefers a different course of action.

The second fundamental problem of collective action may be called the problem of "contingency." The action may be beneficial to all parties but only if other parties participate in it (and thus pay the cost of participation). That is, there may be complete consensus on the action, contingent on the participation of others. (Even in an exchange, the problem of contingency arises. The exchange is to the mutual advantage of both actors only if both carry out their half of the exchange.) But it is even more to the advantage of each not to participate, if all others do. This problem arises in the economics of public finance, and is known as the "free-rider" problem. Recently, Mancur Olson has treated such action problems more generally, in the context of voluntary associations such as trade unions. He has developed from it a theory of interest-group formation and strength at some variance with existing interest-group theory.[3]

This problem of contingency ordinarily arises only for those collective actions that are implemented by acts of members of the collectivity, such as payment of taxes, and even more for those actions that involve no collective decision at all, but only individual decisions, such as contributions to a voluntary fire association. For other collective actions, such as declaration of war or the decision to build a new courthouse, the decision is truly collective, and the action is implemented by an agency of the collectivity. Even for those collective actions that entail actions of members of the collectivity, it is often the case that a collective decision includes a provision for enforcement designed to remove the problem of contingency. Though the problem is never

[2] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Modern Library, 1937), p. liv.

[3] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); also see Richard Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959), for the general problem in economic theory

fully solved, it will not be treated in this paper. It will be assumed that any collective decision includes some provision for enforcement or is implemented by an agency of the collectivity.

Returning to the problem of consensus, societies and organizations have evolved numerous devices by which the problem may be partly circumvented and collective action carried out. One of the most fully formalized of these is the institution of voting, together with the voting rule. A majority rule is a simple and pervasive rule, but one in which nearly half the actors may prefer another action. A plurality rule (when there are several alternatives) is even weaker, for a majority may prefer actions other than the one selected by the rule. Other rules are more stringent than a majority rule, for example, a two-thirds majority. And in some instances one finds, even in a large and diverse society, the most stringent rule; a requirement that the action be unanimous.

These are the rules made in a society that partially solve the practical problem of collective action. But they neither wholly solve the practical problem nor in any way solve the theoretical problem. For what is to prevent those who disagree from simply withdrawing from the collectivity or refusing to accept the action and rebelling against it? There are many examples of small but violently opposed minorities that refuse to accept a collective action. Civil rights activity has been the scene of many such examples, both by certain segregationists and by certain integrationists who refuse to obey laws they disagree with. This in fact is a curious case, for minorities on each side have refused to accept the collective actions of the society as a whole.

There are many other examples of refusal to accept the collective action under a given set of decision rules in an organization or a society. The physical barriers to exodus from Iron Curtain countries stand as reminders that many persons would withdraw from these societies rather than accept the collection actions if they were not physically constrained. The splitting of sects from a parent church exemplifies the same unwillingness to accept the actions of the collectivity as a whole. The revolutions and coups d'état in many developing countries and the extreme instability of governments throughout the world are sufficient indication that mere construction of a decision rule does not begin to solve the problem.

Another way of putting the issue is that the construction of a constitution is nothing more than putting words on paper and can be done by a dolt, but the construction of a constitution that will allow collective action to proceed without splitting the society apart is nearly equivalent to devising a complete theory of collective action.

To summarize again the problem of collective decisions when one starts with purposive action theory:

a) In actions of individual actors, where each alternative action produces an outcome that has associated with it a utility for that actor, he will by definition spontaneously carry out the action with highest utility.

b) When the outcome depends upon the action of two or more actors (including actions ordinarily referred to as exchange), there may be an alternative preferred by all (assuming that any problems of contingency are solved), in which case the action can be labeled spontaneous, since it spontaneously proceeds from individual utilities. But more often, there will be no action preferred by all, and the theory breaks down. Because of such cases, modifications and additions must be made for collective action must be added to the basic theory of purposive action, if that theory is to be useful in the analysis of collective action. Without such additions, theories of purposive action can only be used to treat those areas of social life, such as exchange in economic markets, which are spontaneous in that the same action alternative is pre-

ferred by all parties (usually only two) to the action.

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Sociologists have not been numerous among those who have made attempts to solve this fundamental problem. I do not know the reason for sociologists' neglect, except for the relative absence throughout sociology of systematic theory and the tendency in sociological theory to take social structures as given and thus to accept coercion, authority, and constitutions without raising theoretical questions about why the actors themselves accept them or refuse to accept them.

Political scientists and economists have shown the greatest concern over this problem of consensus in collective action. The classical political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, took this as a central problem. Among economists, those concerned with public finance and, in general, welfare economists have had to face it. This is most obvious in taxation, for one is forced to ask such questions as what is a "just" distribution of taxes and public services? Or less normatively, what is a distribution of taxes and services that the society will accept?

One of the best known contributions to this theory is a negative one, by an economist, Kenneth Arrow, who showed that no voting decision rule could give a socially "reasonable" outcome under all distributions of individual preferences.[4] But this does not help much, for several reasons. First, the correct task is not to find socially reasonable outcomes but, rather, to link together individual preferences and collective action in the way they are in fact linked in social organization. Second, the theory, to be at all useful, should indicate the conditions under which collective action can be taken by a social organization and the conditions under which it will lead to withdrawal, revolt, or disobedience.

It should first be recognized that there are many kinds of social organizations and many kinds of collective actions. The religious rites of a sect or a primitive tribe are collective actions apparently spontaneously entered into by all members, directed toward a common goal desired by all members. At the other extreme, the actions of a bureaucracy are directed toward a goal held only by a very few at the top of the bureaucracy, and there is no expectation that the goal will be shared by all members of the organization. The collective actions of a feudal estate, a medieval household, or a slave-holding plantation are designed to benefit the actor at the top of the authority pyramid, yet many contribute to these actions.

The actions of a trade union and other mass-based collectivities are not always toward goals collectively held, but the very existence of the collectivity is based upon action toward collective goals. The government of a large, diverse nation carries out many collective actions as the acting agency of the nation as a whole, yet it is obvious that none of these is directed toward goals held by every member of the nation.

As a consequence of this diversity of kinds of social organizations, the theory of collective action must be a diverse one indeed. It is clear that in some of these organizations the principal process is a stable pattern of exchange and can perhaps be treated as a branch of the general theory of exchange. For example, in a rational bureaucracy the employee explicitly exchanges autonomy over his actions in return for money or similar resources that make the exchange a profitable one for him. In this way an entrepreneur who begins with enough such resources can organize a collective action involving the interdependence of many individual actors. In such a circumstance no confrontation of diverse preferences is necessary, since the entrepreneur has "bought" the action of his employees and can so organize it to carry out his own

[4] Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951).

goals. It thus appears, at least on the surface, that the explanation of collective action in such organizations requires no new theoretical principles.[5]

It is quite different, however, for social organizations in which the power over collective action is distributed over more than one person. It is in such organizations that some device such as a voting rule is established for bringing this dispersed power to bear on questions of collective action. And it is clear that such procedures exist at some point in most social organizations, so that the problem of collective action arises somewhere in the organization.

I will take as the focus of inquiry, then, social organizations in which there is a genuine collective decision, where power over the outcome is distributed over more than one person. This means also that I will not ask how that distribution of power arose. I will not examine the question of a "constitution," either informal or formal, but will take the constitution, which establishes the decision-making procedure, as given.

Perhaps the best way to see the difficulties that arise in moving from individual rationality to collective decisions is to study the contradictions that arise in voting rules. Consider a simple decision involving a collectivity of these actors with a choice among three alternatives. Each actor has a preference ordering for the three alternatives; a possible preference ordering is shown in Table 1.

The situation shown in Table 1 produces curious results. For suppose the alternatives are presented to the voters in a pairwise fashion, first A and B, and then the winner versus C. In the A versus B vote, A wins with two votes. In the A versus C vote, C wins with two votes. But now suppose we start with a different pair in the first vote, say B versus C. In the B versus C vote, B wins; and then in the B versus A vote, A wins. Thus merely by shifting the order of voting, the over-all outcome shifts from C to A. If the third order were used, starting with A versus C, this would result in still a different winner, B.

This decision rule appears to violate one's sense of what is a reasonable outcome, for the outcome should not change merely by changing the order of voting. This is the general direction of the argument Kenneth Arrow made. He laid down several conditions that any decision rule should meet if it were to give "reasonable" social outcomes, and then showed that such a decision rule was logically impossible.

TABLE 1

PREFERENCES OF ACTORS X, Y, AND Z FOR ALTERNATIVES A, B, AND C

Rank	X	Y	Z
1..........	A	B	C
2..........	B	C	A
3..........	C	A	B

Such a result, however, flies in the face of reality. Social organizations do establish decision rules, decisions are made, and the organizations persist. Are we reduced to saying that their actions are as grossly unreasonable as the example above suggests?

As numerous students of this problem have pointed out, there would be no difficulty if we had some measure of intensity of feeling. For example, in Table 1, suppose there were a number expressing the amount of utility that X, Y, and Z each associate with alternatives A, B, and C, as indicated in Table 2. In this example, alternative A clearly has the highest total amount of utility. A decision rule that merely determined the outcome by the highest aggregate util-

[5] A deeper analysis of such organizations would show much more complexity, for many such organizations appear to depend greatly on the fact that employees do become imbued with the goals of the organization and contribute to it in ways not at all covered by the exchange agreement they made in selling their labor. In addition, there appear to be processes by which employees over time gain rights to participate in the organization's decision-making processes, thus bringing about a dispersal of power over the organization's collective actions.

ity would always give the decision to alternative A, independent of the order of comparison, and no "unreasonable" outcomes would result.

The fatal flaw in this solution is that there is no meaning to the notion of "amount of utility" or "intensity of feeling" unless it is expressible in the behavior under consideration. Voting certainly allows no such expression, but only registering a preference. Looking at the matter naïvely, we might then say that we could merely ask each actor to write down the amount of utility each alternative held for him. Then we would have the data for Table 2 and could merely aggregate the amounts and arrive at a winner.

TABLE 2

AMOUNTS OF UTILITY OF ALTERNATIVES A, B, AND C FOR ACTORS X, Y, AND Z

	X	Y	Z	Total
u_a	10	8	9	27
u_b	5	10	8	23
u_c	1	9	10	20

But, in truth, this is merely chasing after a chimera. The matter is not solved so easily, for such a procedure invites strategic behavior, writing down whatever utilities will be most likely to give the outcome one wants. For example, Z has merely to inflate the quantity he writes down for C, and C will win—unless, of course, X and Y do the same for their favorites. In effect, asking an actor to write down utilities for each alternative, subject to an over-all maximum, say, of thirty, is nothing other than asking him to cast thirty votes rather than one. Since his goal is to maximize his expected utility, he will cast these votes in a way he hopes will do that, rather than to express the "relative utility" each has for him. However, if there were some way, in the decision process itself, for each actor in his behavior to express his intensity of preference, then this would give a start toward the solution.

BEHAVIOR IN A SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS

An examination of empirical voting systems immediately yields a wealth of such behavior. First, suppose we put back this single decision into the context from which it was abstracted—taking for simplicity a legislature as the context, with a whole sequence of collective decisions on which to act. In such a situation, is it possible to express intensity of preference? The answer is that legislators do so by using the resources at their disposal. These resources consist of a number things, depending on their positions within the legislature. But the most simple case, and a relatively frequent one, is an exchange of resources: legislator X agrees to vote as Y wishes on one action in return for Y's agreement to vote as X wishes on another action. They do so because each sees a gain. Each loses his vote on an action where the outcome makes little difference to him but gains a vote on an action where the outcome matters more. Each has in that exchange expressed something about his intensity of preference. Each has given up a vote on an issue in which the utility difference between alternatives is *less* than the utility difference between alternatives on the vote he has gained.[6] This can be stated more precisely by means of algebra, but the substantive point is most important. By this action, there has been introduced into the system the first step in transforming ordinal preferences into cardinal utility differences that can be aggregated to arrive at a collective decision.

It is not true, however, that any procedure for arriving at cardinal utility differences will be sufficient for use in collective decisions. It would not be correct, for example, merely to use a von Neumann-Morgenstern lottery ticket procedure for arriving at cardinal utility differences and then

[6] This is slightly oversimplified, since his action depends also on the change in probability of a favorable outcome that the vote given up or gained will make. However, it will serve as a first approximation, to be modified later.

aggregate them to arrive at a collective decision.[7] It is crucial to the establishment of a measure of utility that the behavior carried out by the actors involve resources they control within the system under consideration. The reasons for this are evident below.

It does not require much stretch of the imagination to see how this first step can be followed by others, so that each actor, through the vote exchanges or agreements he makes, expresses in minute gradation the interest he has in a given outcome, that is, the difference in utilities that the different possible outcomes would have for him. However, for each step toward a fine expression of intensity of interest in an action, another action is needed. Each actor needs a large set of votes on actions of varying interest to him to be able to express precisely his interest in any one. Each of these votes has the same function as goods in an economic system with barter exchange: it has certain direct utility for him if he uses it to satisfy his own interests; but it also has a certain value to others, so that its use in exchange might bring him resources more relevant to his interests. The precise statement of the conditions under which an actor in such a system will be willing to carry out an exchange is given in Appendix 1.

The necessity for replacing the single action back in its context of a whole set of collective actions should now be obvious. Without these other actions, each actor has no resources he can use to express how strongly he feels about this one. With only the single action, it is of supreme importance to all, for there is nothing to measure it against. The only measuring instruments are provided by the costs of the alternatives to accepting an unfavorable collective decision. Withdrawal, rebellion, and disobedience, together with their many variations, are the alternatives; and some measure of the intensity of his interest in the outcome is given by his willingness to resort to one of these alternatives.

[7] Patrick Suppes and Muriel Winet, "An Axiomatization of Utility Based on the Notion of Utility Differences," *Management Science*, I (1955), 259, describe such a procedure.

POWER IN THE SYSTEM

The case of refusal to accept the decision will be examined later at somewhat more length. However, it is useful first to consider more carefully the question of power and the comparison between utilities of different persons. We can approach the matter very heuristically by reflecting on what does in fact constitute power in such a system. Quite simply, we think of power of an actor in a system of collective decisions as the ability to obtain the outcomes that will give him highest utility. He is given by the constitution or rules a certain amount of direct control over various collective decisions—for example, in a legislature, each member ordinarily has one vote on each action. In the general case, he will have differing amounts of control over different actions. He may have a large amount of control over a number of actions. Does this mean he has a great amount of power in the system? It is easy to see that it does not, for it could be that no one is interested in the outcomes of the actions over which he has a great amount of control.

It is clear, then, that his power, or ability to get what he wants in the system, depends both upon his formal control of various collective actions and on the interest of others in those actions. If he has a large amount of control over only one action, but that action has much interest to many other actors, then this is a very valuable resource for him, and he can use it to get his way on those actions of interest to him.

For an ideal system, comparable to a market with pure competition, there are a great many collective actions of widely varying interest to the actors. For such a system, in which exchanges can be carried out to express minute differences in interest, the precise expression for the power of an actor can be given. This is given algebraically in Appendix 2. In words, it can be stated this way:

The value of control over an action is equal to the sum of the interests of each actor in that action times the total power of that actor. In turn, the total power of an actor is equal to his constitutional control over each action times the value of that action, summed over all actions in the system.

The basis for this definition of the value of control over an event can be seen as follows: Suppose an actor has some interest in an action. The effect of this interest is to make him willing to employ a portion of his resources, that is, his partial control of other actions. But his resources depend on the value of the actions that he has some control over, that is, on the amount of interest that those with power have in the actions he has control over.

On the other hand, suppose another actor has some control over this action which interests the first actor. He will want to exact the highest price he can get for giving up this control. He will hold out for the most power he can get, either in control of actions of interest to him or control of actions that he can further exchange for control that interests him.

Thus the definition of value is one in which there is a simultaneous calibration of the value of different actions and the power of different actors. Actions are valuable when powerful actors have a great deal of interest in them. Actors are powerful when the actions they control have high value. A consequence of this definition is that the value of an action is the cost of obtaining complete control over it (in this perfect market). Thus, with a probabilistic decision rule, an actor can fully control an action only if he has total power greater than the value of the action and is willing to employ all his resources toward gaining control of it.[8]

[8] A probabilistic decision rule, in which the probability of a positive outcome is proportional to the proportion of positive votes, is the only one in which the actual control of an actor over an action is equal to his constitutional control and not contingent on the particular coalition.

There are numerous examples which illustrate the way this principle operates in a social system. The classical example is that of the king who has control over nearly all actions but suddenly becomes entranced with a poor but beautiful girl who has nothing but her own autonomy. His interests are now focused on the actions he does not have control over, the actions of this girl. Thus, her power in the society jumps from near zero to the greatest of all, for she has control over the only actions that interest the king, who controls everything that interests anyone else. Obviously, for such a system to work, the girl must be in no way beholden to the king, a matter which in such tales is usually contrived by her being the daughter of a poor but independent woodchopper living off the forest at the edge of the kingdom.

INTERPERSONAL COMPARISON OF UTILITY

This examination of power allows us to return to the question of interpersonal comparison of utility. As an earlier point in the paper, it was evident that one could not naïvely ask people to give their intensity of feeling, and then merely add up these utilities to arrive at a collective decision that "maximized utility." But now, with somewhat more sophistication, we can come back to the question of interpersonal comparison of utility, having defined the value of an action and the power of an actor, as indicated above. The exchanges themselves provide a comparison of different actors' utilities or interests.

As a result of the exchanges, each actor has a certain power. Thus, just as the value of an action is the sum over all actors of their power times their interest in that action, the value of one actor's interest in an action is his power times his interest in it. That is, if two actors have identical interests in an action (i.e., action occupies the same proportion of their total interests), then actor A's interests are more valuable than B's if his total power is greater than B's. This difference in power results, of course, from the fact that A has control

over more valuable resources than does B and thus has more power to see his interests realized.

Thus an interpersonal comparison of utility automatically occurs in exchange, weighting an actor's interests by his total power. But such a comparison raises questions about interpersonal comparison in the usual sense. Are we not assuming that individuals communicate with others the precise size of their interests in arriving at a value? The answer to this is "No." The only communication assumed here is that assumed in any market: what exchanges an actor will make and what ones he will not. The perfect functioning of the market assumes that he has complete knowledge of what exchanges others will make and can thus assess the value-in-exchange of any power he gains in an exchange. It does not assume, however, that he makes his interests known in any way beyond stating which exchanges he will agree to and which ones he will refuse. It is worthwhile to note the sense in which the actor's power provides a scale by which his utilities may be compared to others. His wants are exactly as important as is his ability to realize them. If A has twice the power of B, his wants or interests are worth twice B's. This is no value judgment of ours as analysts but a description of the value judgment implicit in the distribution of control over actions in the system.

A question can be raised in this context concerning the maximization of social welfare. In a perfect exchange system, as described above, do the exchanges result in a maximization of social welfare? This is a reasonable question because each exchange will benefit at least both parties to it; and in a perfect exchange system, when the state has been reached in which no other exchanges are possible, is this not a maximization of social welfare?

It becomes clear that this question can only be answered relative to a given framework of constitutional control. The situation is exactly analogous to a perfect market of private goods. Utility for each trader is maximized, but relative to the goods he brought to the market, that is, the resources he began with. Similarly in collective actions. The perfect exchange system maximizes social welfare, but only when each person's welfare is weighted according to his power that derives from his constitutional control of actions. The scientific question becomes: Given the distribution among actors of constitutional control over collective actions, what procedures will insure that each actor's interests will be realized to the extent provided by his power? The answer lies in making the system most closely approximate a perfect market in which resources may be exchanged. But the ultimate question of what degree of constitutional control each actor should have is outside the system and becomes truly an ethical question or else one that is answered in terms of the ulitmate recourse, the physical force that can be used by each actor in fixing his constitutional control.

ALTERNATIVES TO CONSENT

The outcome of a collective decision will ordinarily benefit some actors in the system and harm others. If it benefited all, then the action would be spontaneous, just as in ordinary economic exchanges which benefit both parties. If it benefited none, it would not be taken, since there would be no actor favoring that outcome.

In such a situation, the question must arise: Under what condition will those who see themselves as hurt by the action consent to be hurt by it? To answer such a question, one must first have some idea of the possible alternatives to consent. At the most general level, there seem to be two kinds of alternatives to consent. One is not to consent to the specific action, and the other is not to consent to the totality of actions of which the system is composed. The former refusal to consent can be implemented only for certain kinds of collective decisions. These are decisions that involve some action on the part of the actors themselves, such as a law against stealing, or a compulsory military draft, or a law against

excluding persons from a place of public business. In all those cases, and others like them, civil disobedience is an alternative to consent. Breaking the law by stealing, or by failing to register for the draft, or by arbitrarily refusing to serve customers, is a refusal to consent.

In other kinds of collective decisions, such refusal to consent is less easy. Passage of a foreign aid bill, declaration of war, decision to carry out nuclear testing, all are implemented by government authorities and require no implementation of each actor in the system. Even in many of these cases, however, there can often be refusal to consent by actively impeding the action. Some citizens have protested nuclear testing by placing themselves in an exposed position at the time of the test. Some citizens have protested declaration of war by refusing to work in war-related industries or pay taxes. These protests ordinarily cannot halt the action, however, but only apply pressure toward its reconsideration.

In considering disobedience of a collective decision which results in an outcome unfavorable to him, the actor has two sets of utilities to compare. One is the utility of his disobedience (considering both the costs and the benefits, and, if necessary, estimating probabilities of punishment, etc.), and the other is the utility of consenting to the unfavorable outcome. If he expects to lose more by disobeying than he loses by consent to the unfavorable action, he will consent. If he expects to lose more by consent to the action, he will disobey.

We may for a moment take the perspective of those whom the outcome favors, to examine the role of police. They also must make a calculation. Recognizing that the calculations of those who see themselves as hurt by the action will sometimes lead to disobedience, they can affect that calculation. They can do so by increasing the costs of disobedience through apprehension and punishment of the disobedient. Their calculations then must involve the cost to them of policing the decision versus the cost of allowing disobedience. The police activity will be supported up to the point that the costs of further policing surpass the benefits from reduction in disobedience they would bring about.

Different governments (and at a microcosmic level, different heads of households) employ quite different strategies in demanding consent. In a "police state," the number of actors who are hurt by a collective decision is quite high, and a large amount of police activity is necessary to reduce disobedience to levels that will not be costly to the government. In a more open society where police activity is minimal, the costs of disobedience to the citizen remain low, so that the threshold of disobedience is much lower.

The strategy of high police activity, however, is a dangerous one for the state. If policing makes costs of disobedience very high, the number of actors dissatisfied with any action, though consenting to it, may be very high. Thus the state has no good way of knowing the level of dissatisfaction in the society, and may invite a more general refusal to consent.

It is to this more general refusal to consent that I now turn. This is the refusal to consent to the whole set of collective decisions. Parenthetically, it may be noted that any delimitation of a set of collective decisions from the stream of events that occur in a social system is an arbitrary one. However, in this as in other things, people engage in a discounting of future events; consequently, the present theory, which consists of an arbitrary set of actions, is a first approximation to a theory that would delimit the set through the time-discounting that occurs.

Considering this set of actions, each actor can estimate, as the system proceeds, the expected utility to him over the whole set of actions. This may be difficult to do until some exchanges have taken place, and at best, there may be a high degree of error in such estimations. Nevertheless, each actor will be motivated to make such an estimation for comparison with the utility to him of alternatives to consenting. These alter-

natives are many and varied, but they can be roughly grouped into two classes: withdrawal from the system, and revolt. Withdrawal can take two forms: either emigration, leaving the system alone, or secession, a splitting off of an organized subset of actors. The calculations for the first on the part of the actor are much like those for disobedience, in that he weighs the costs and benefits of leaving the system versus the expected utility over the whole set of actions in the system. The difference is that the comparison in the case of disobedience was over only the single action; here it is over the whole set.

From the point of view of those who remain, the frequency of such emigration can be greatly reduced by increasing its costs. The question of whether to introduce police measures to increase these costs, as in the case of the Berlin Wall, or to keep the costs of emigration low, as in nineteenth-century Ireland, depends on two considerations: the cost of the police and the value to the system of the potential emigrants. The police cost is relatively small. However, in those systems where wealthy, skilled, and educated classes have lost power, such as Communist countries, the potential emigrees are the upper and middle classes. They are of high value to the system, in contrast to the poor, who are the potential emigrants under circumstances of poverty in the society. Thus the value to Ireland of those who left in the nineteenth century was quite low and perhaps negative, given its overpopulation. The value to East Germany of those who would have left if possible, however, is quite high.

Secession, as the other form of withdrawal, is complex indeed, for it involves three levels of decision-making: by the system as a whole, by the subsystem that is a potential seceder, and by the individuals in that subsystem. This complexity puts the problem beyond this paper.

Revolt against the system is also complex, for it can never be carried out by a single actor, except in the case of a very small collectivity. Thus the development of a revolutionary organization, collective decisions within it, and its very membership, are all problematic. It too is beyond the scope of this paper, except for a single point. The special character of revolutionary activity is that it is designed to change the constitutional distribution of control of decisions. Thus we come full circle to this constitutional distribution which we took as given at the outset. Revolutionary activity can change this distribution; and revolutionary activity is itself a function of the degree to which different actors can realize their interests within the existing system. Pending careful analysis, it would appear that revolutionary activity will be carried out only by groups with control of resources that lie outside the system of collective decisions (i.e., the government), such as actors with newly gained economic power, or those with military force but little governmental power, or those with access to resources supplied by another social system. As is evident, this paper can do no more than locate the conditions of revolution within the general context of a theory of collective decisions.

CONCLUSION

I have embarked upon a task here that is both difficult and rewarding: how to describe and account for collective decisions in terms of the rational behavior of individual actors. The problem arises because of the fact that a collective decision ordinarily is disadvantageous to some of those who participate in it, yet they consent to it. Under such conditions, how can a collectivity continue intact, how do collective decisions get made, and when will there be a refusal to consent? These are the major questions to which this paper has addressed itself. My intent has been to present a starting point for a theoretical treatment of those phenomena central to the functioning of social systems: collective decisions and collective action.

APPENDIX 1

CONDITIONS FOR AN EXCHANGE IN A SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS

Consider a system of actors $j = 1, \ldots, n$, with a series of two-outcome collective decisions to be carried out, $i = 1, \ldots, m$. The system is defined by the set of actors, the set of decisions, and the decision rule for each decision.

Each outcome of each action has consequences for each actor to which he attaches a given amount of utility, say u_{1ij} and u_{2ij}, the utilities for actor j of outcomes 1 and 2 on action i.

His *interest* in this action is $|u_{1ij}-u_{2ij}| = x_{ij}$. His subjective probability of a favorable outcome on action i with the present status is p_{is}.

POSTULATE

He will be willing to make an exchange, moving the system from status s to status s' if and only if his expected utility under status s' exceeds that under status s, that is, if and only if

$$x_{ij}p_{is'} + x_{kj}p_{ks'} > x_{ij}p_{is} + x_{kj}p_{ks} . \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) can be restated as

$$x_{ij}(p_{is'} - p_{is}) > x_{kj}(p_{ks} - p_{ks'}) . \quad (2)$$

Ordinarily, the change in status is one in which one probability increases (through power gained) while the other decreases (through power given up).

Suppose status s' is a status with less power over action k and more power over action i. Suppose we consider also the special case in which the increase in perceived power (i.e., subjective probability of a favorable outcome) over i equals the decrease in perceived power over k. Then $p_{is'} - p_{is} = p_{ks} - p_{ks'}$, and the exchange will be carried out if and only if

$$x_{ij} > x_{kj} . \quad (3)$$

The condition for an exchange between individuals j and j' is that the individual condition stated above for statuses s and s' hold for both individuals j and j'. Under the condition given above, s' will be a status in which j' has more power over action k and less over i. In the special case where the increase in perceived power of j' over k equals the decrease in perceived power over i, this applies, analogously to (3), that j' will be willing to make an exchange if and only if

$$x_{kj'} > x_{ij'} . \quad (4)$$

Note.—A structural situation in which the above conditions can be realized is one in which each actor has one vote on each decision, all exchanges are made before any decisions are voted on, and the decision rule is probabilistic, with the probability of outcome 1 given by the proportion of votes for outcome 1. It still may be the case that subjective probabilities may not correspond to objective ones, but in this case, the objective probabilities do give the special case of equation (3) and (4).

APPENDIX 2

POWER OF AN ACTOR AND VALUE OF A COLLECTIVE ACTION IN AN IDEAL SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS

An ideal system of collective decisions is one in which there is perfect competition for each resource (e.g., each vote of each actor), and a price (e.g., in terms of other votes) becomes established. Such a system can be approximated by a system with the following conditions:

a) The number of actors is very great;

b) The constitutional control of any actor is small relative to the total;

c) The distribution of interests for different actors is highly varied;
d) There are a large number of collective decisions;
e) Full communication exists;
f) The decision rule is probabilistic.

GIVEN: 1. A matrix C of constitutional control, showing the amount of direct control that each actor has over each action. The element c_{ij} is the direct control of actor j over action i. The sum of c_{ij} over i equals 1.0 or less (less than 1.0 if the outcome is partly determined by unknown and uncontrolled factors outside this system).

2. A matrix X of interest, showing the relative amount of interest of each actor in each action. The element x_{ij} $(= |u_{1ij} - u_{2ij}|)$ is actor j's interest in action i. The sum of x_{ij} over actions i must equal 1.0. Then the fundamental equation from which the value of each action can be calculated is based on the following identity:

The value of control over action i *is equal to the sum of interests of* i *of each actor times the total power of that actor. In turn, the total power of actor* j *is equal to the power of* j *over each action* k *times the value of action* k, *summed over all actions* k.

This definition of value of an action is only relative to the values of the other $m-1$ actions in the system. In a system with m actions, we will let the sum of the values of these actions be equal to m.

In algebraic expression, the identity is:

$$v_i = \sum_j x_{ij} \sum_k c_{kj} v_k ,$$

or in matrix notation,

$$V = XC'V .$$

The value of an action and the power of an individual is given by solution of the above equations. This may be carried out as follows, in non-matrix form. Transposing v_i, we have a set of m equations, one for each action,

$$0 = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{m} x_{ij} c_{kj} v_k + v_i .$$

There are $m-1$ independent v_i's and $m-1$ independent equations. If we rescale v_i such that $v_i^* = v_i / v_m$, then $v_m^* = 1$. Solution of the first $m-1$ equations for v_i^* by successive elimination will give the values of v_i^*. Then, using the fact that

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{m-1} v_i^* + 1 \right) v_m = m ,$$

it is possible to solve for v_m and then for v_i by $v_i = v_i^* v_m$. The real power of actor j in the system, say r_j, is the sum of his constitutional control, c_{ij}, over action i times the value of event i:

$$r_j = \sum_{i=1}^{m} c_{ij} v_i .$$

In matrix operations, the above solution is obtained by defining a vector V^* with $m-1$ elements v_i^* defined as above, a matrix $W = CX'$, a matrix W^* which is W reduced by deleting the last row and column, and a vector V, consisting of the first $m-1$ elements of the last column of W, $(w_{1m}, w_{2m}, \ldots, w_{m-1,m})$.

Then

$$V = WV ,$$

$$0 = (W - I)V ,$$

$$0 = (W^* - I)V^* + V ,$$

$$-V = (W^* - I)V^* .$$

Since $(W^* - I)$ is a non-singular square matrix, it has an inverse, and we can solve for V^*: $V^* = (W^* - I)^{-1}(-V)$. Then as above v_i may be found from v_i^*, and r_j from c_{ij} and v_i.

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The Effect of the High School on Students' Aspirations*

Richard P. Boyle

ABSTRACT

Four independent studies have found that the aspirations of students are influenced by the kind of high school they attend (predominately middle class or predominately working class). Examination of these studies reveals several inconsistencies which, it is suggested, can be accounted for by distinguishing between high schools in large metropolitan areas and those in smaller communities. Two major explanatory mechanisms are also identified: (1) variation in educational standards, and consequent differences in students' scholastic development, and (2) peer-group influence on students' attitudes and values. Research with a sample of Canadian girls supports this interpretation of previous findings, although the first mechanism is more clearly demonstrated than the second.

Recent research strongly suggests that the experiences that adolescents encounter in the high school have an important influence on their aspirations for further education. Studies by Wilson, Ramsøy, Coleman, and Turner have found that, when high schools are classified according to the *average* socioeconomic status of the student body, the aspirations of the *individual* students are influenced in the direction of the majority.[1] Working-class students attending predominately *middle-class* high schools plan to attend college much more frequently than those attending more working-class high schools. The reverse process is evident among middle-class students attending predominately working-class high schools.

On this central finding there is agreement. But on the answers to more specific questions the separate studies often disagree. In particular: *(1) Given that the population composition of a high school is important, how important is it?* What, for example, is the effect of the high school relative to the effect of family background? Some studies found the high school equal in importance to the family, while other studies found it much less important. (2) *Why* should population composition show this effect? Some writers emphasize the importance of peer-group culture, while others give greater priority to pedagogical characteristics of the high school. (3) How is this effect expressed in terms of the individual student? Again, there is disagreement over whether explanation should be in terms of values and attitudes or in terms of scholastic abilities.

Each of the four studies cited above

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[1] Alan B. Wilson, "Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys" (hereinafter cited as "Residential Segregation"), *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 836–45; Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy, "American High Schools at Mid-Century" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1961); James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Ralph H. Turner, *The Social Context of Ambition* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964). As they pertain to this paper, these studies have all been concerned with differences *between* high schools. For research into differences *within* high schools, as these differences influence aspirations, see especially Edward L. McDill and James Coleman, "High School Social Status, College Plans, and Interest in Academic Achievement: A Panel Analysis" (hereinafter cited as "High School Social Status"), *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 905–18, and "Family and Peer Influences in College Plans of High School Students," *Sociology of Education*, XXXVIII (Winter, 1965), 112–26.

has inherent limitations which preclude final answers to these questions. However, each study provides clues which, taken together, suggest a consistent underlying pattern. This paper will examine closely the available evidence as it pertains to each question, add to this new evidence from a recently completed Canadian study, and finally attempt, as tightly as possible, to draw together these separate fragments into a consistent, unified statement about the consequences of variation in population composition among high schools.

FAMILY AND HIGH SCHOOL: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE

The sample for Alan Wilson's study consisted of boys from eight high schools in the San Francisco metropolitan area.[2] When these high schools were classified according to population composition, and individual students were classified according to their fathers' occupations, cross-classification allowed evaluation of the independent effects of family and high school on the students' plan about attending college.[3] In order to have a measure of these effects, which will allow comparison with other studies, Coleman's unweighted estimate of effect for polytomous ordinal variables has been calculated and standardized to the dichotomous form.[4] In terms of this statistic, the effect of the high school in Wilson's study was 0.22, and the effect of family background was 0.19.[5] The effect of the high school, in other words, was slightly greater than the effect of the family. Closer inspection of Wilson's data also indicates that this pattern of effect was fairly consistent over all the various categories.

Comparable data from a much larger, nationwide survey of high-school students were available to Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy.[6] Applying the same statistical analysis to these data, the effect of the high school on college plans was 0.07, while the effect of family background was 0.24.[7] The population composition of the high school was thus a much less important influence on the aspirations of the students studied by Ramsøy.

Apart from slight differences in operationalization, two major differences in the studies stand out. First, Wilson studied only boys, while Ramsøy's sample included both sexes. Perhaps the effect of the high school is much stronger for boys than for girls. Second, all of Wilson's high schools were located in a single metropolitan area, while Ramsøy used a national, and hence geographically heterogeneous, sample. This could imply either that San Francisco schools are a special case or that metropolitan high schools in general have characteristics that make them distinctive. Indirect support for this last possibility is offered by a further finding of Ramsøy's, that the effect of the high school was almost entirely concentrated in the much higher aspirations of students attending the most predominately middle-class schools.[8] Since middle-class occupations comprise a much larger proportion of the total occu-

[2] *Op. cit.*

[3] Wilson first classified his high schools on the basis of census data describing the neighborhoods in which the schools were located. He then examined other indexes, such as population composition of the student bodies, and concluded that the same ranked categories would result from any classification strategy. He used three categories for high schools and four for father's occupation.

[4] This statistic may be interpreted as the average difference between proportions of students planning on college within each level of father's occupation, corrected to be comparable to the proportion-difference that would obtain if high schools had been classified into two categories instead of three (see James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* [New York: Free Press, 1964], chap. vi).

[5] Calculated from Wilson, *op. cit.*, Table 3, p. 839.

[6] Ramsøy, *op. cit.* Students were first classified according to five "family background" categories on the basis of father's occupation and education. The proportion of students in the top two of these categories was then used to classify high schools into five ranked categories.

[7] Calculated from *ibid.*, Table 8-2, p. 318.

[8] *Ibid.*

pational structure in large cities than in smaller communities, and since residential segregation on a large enough scale to be reflected in the high school is also most likely in large cities, it seems quite probable that the predominately middle-class high schools in Ramsøy's sample were disproportionately those located in large metropolitan areas. There is at least a hint, in other words, that controlling for community size would resolve some of the conflict between the findings of Ramsøy and Wilson.

The two remaining studies help to evaluate the possibility that sex and community size are underlying factors which could reconcile this disagreement. Ralph Turner's study was closely similar to Wilson's in that all ten of his high schools were located in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.[9] Using an "ambition index" that combined educational, occupational, and material aspirations, Turner carried out a partial correlation analysis which showed the high school to be only slightly less important than the family in determining ambition.[10] His findings thus agree more closely with Wilson's than with Ramsøy's. Furthermore, Turner carried out his analysis separately for boys and for girls and found that there were only slight differences.[11] Population composition of the high school did show a slightly higher correlation with ambition for boys than for girls, but this sex difference does not appear great enough to account for the divergence between the findings of Wilson and Ramsøy. Turner's work therefore provides further evidence that, at least in metropolitan areas, the high school is an important influence on aspiration.

James Coleman's sample for *The Adolescent Society* included ten high schools in northern Illinois, but only two of these were located in a large metropolitan area.[12] These two schools also recruited students from distinctly different family backgrounds. When father's education was controlled, students attending the more middle-class schools were much more likely to plan on college.[13] Among the *nonmetropolitan* high schools, however, differences in college planning associated with population composition were minimal. At the same time, Coleman's work indicates little difference in the effect of the high school on boys and on girls.

When these four studies are considered as a whole, their implication is therefore clear, although tentative. The effect of population composition on the aspirations of high-school students is considerable, but it varies according to the size of the community in which the high school is located. In large cities, the effect of the high school is roughly the same as the effect of the family, but in smaller communities this effect is much weaker. Finally, the influence of the high school appears to be fairly similar for both sexes, although slightly less important for girls.

EXPLANATORY FACTORS

While this pattern is clearly indicated, reasons for its existence are not obvious. The various explanations that have been proposed fall into two roughly distinct categories and suggest the operation of two mechanisms which account for the differences in aspirations under consideration. First, the manifest function of the high school is to impart knowledge and

[9] Turner, *op. cit.* Students were first assigned a "background-index" value on the basis of the family breadwinner's occupation, education, and independent-employee status. The mean background-index value for all students in each high school was computed and used to index high schools.

[10] The partial correlation between school and ambition with background controlled was .21 for boys and .18 for girls. The partial correlation between background and ambition with school controlled was .29 for boys and .31 for girls (*ibid.*, Table 11a, p. 58).

[11] See n. 10, above.

[12] Coleman, *op. cit.* "Executive Heights" and "Newlawn" were both located in suburbs of Chicago.

[13] *Ibid.*, figs. 9.9 and 9.10, pp. 270–71. The remainder of this paragraph also refers to these figures.

develop skills. The possibility that schools vary in their success at doing this could therefore be one important explanation. Second, a latent function of the high school may be to influence the values and attitudes of the student, thus affecting his motivation to attend college or otherwise aim high in life. These two explanations will be considered in turn.

Divergent educational standards and scholastic development.—If some high schools provide their students with a better education than other high schools, this might explain the variation in the aspirations of these students. Several authors have pointed in this direction, but they have advanced different arguments. Ramsøy suggests that it is important to consider the *structural* characteristics of the formal educational system. She argues that the decentralized nature of American education, which delegates autonomy to the local school district and does not require students to compete with one another on any sort of standardized examination, allows and encourages divergence in the educational standards of individual high schools.[14]

On the other hand, later work by Wilson emphasizes the *informal social pressures* toward divergence which arise from residential segregation along social class lines.[15] He found that within a single elementary school district, teachers in predominately working-class schools came to expect less of their students than teachers in more middle-class schools and to key their teaching to these expectations. The result was that by sixth grade the level of the subject matter taught in class varied widely between the two kinds of schools.

A hint that this process of divergence operates in high schools as well as in elementary schools is offered by Coleman's finding that, "The amount of homework done depends largely on two things: upon the amount of homework assigned by the teachers, and upon family background."[16] Students at predominately middle-class high schools spent more time studying than those at predominately working-class schools, even when father's education was controlled.

The major consequences of this divergence, therefore, should be found in the level of knowledge and the scholastic abilities of the students in different kinds of high schools. However, the suggested interplay of structural restraints and informal social pressures in determining divergence has some interesting implications. Residential segregation on a large enough scale to be reflected in the high school should be most frequent in metropolitan areas. Informal social pressures should therefore be strongest among these schools. At the same time, metropolitan high schools will most typically be single units in large school districts containing several high schools. Since the local school district is the functional administrative unit in American education, it might be expected that these metropolitan high schools *would* be subject to restraints against divergence, stemming from the central school-district administration. Insofar as divergence *does* occur among these schools, therefore, it seems better explained on the basis of strong *informal* social pressures. These ideas will be important when the Canadian data are presented, because in Canada administrative centralization at the *provincial* level provides formal restraints against divergence.

While no one has actually determined exactly what the different high schools were teaching in their courses, there is empirical support for the general notion that students from similar families show greater scholastic aptitude when they attend "higher status" high schools. Wilson, Ramsøy, and Turner all report this pattern.

[14] Ramsøy, *op. cit.*, p. 126 and *passim.*

[15] Alan B. Wilson, "Social Stratification and Academic Achievement," in A. Harry Passow (ed.), *Education in Depressed Areas* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963), pp. 217–35.

[16] *The Adolescent Society*, pp. 206 68

In order to really *evaluate* the importance of this pattern as an explanation for differences in aspirations, however, a direct statistical analysis is appropriate. Control scholastic ability and then see by how much the relation between high school and aspiration has been reduced (with family background controlled in both cases).

This kind of analysis is reported for two of the studies. With Ramsøy's data, this control eliminated almost all of the effect attributable to the high school.[17] The only exception occurred among the most middle-class high schools, which continued to send a higher proportion of students to college than other schools. On the other hand, Turner's partial correlation analysis showed a decrease, but not a drastic one, in the correlation between high school and ambition when scholastic ability was controlled.[18] The reduction was from .21 to .16 for boys and from .18 to .12 for girls.

The disagreement between these two sets of findings might be attributable to differences in measurement and analysis. However, it appears more reasonable to call attention to the probability that Ramsøy's *middle-class* schools were typically located in metropolitan areas. In this light, the two sets of findings are consistent in suggesting that (1) differential scholastic development is an important explanation for the effect of the high school, but (2) while this may be the total explanation in smaller communities, it is only a partial explanation in metropolitan areas.

Peer-group influence and motivation.—A second, sociologically appealing explanation would hold that student bodies in high schools of different population composition develop different subcultures, which in turn affect the motivation of the student to plan on college. Obviously, if scholastic development provides only a partial explanation for the effect of metropolitan high schools, there is a need for additional explanation. There is even some indication that peer-group influence may account for the dissimilar patterns discovered for metropolitan and non-metropolitan schools. Coleman found rural and small-town youth to be more parent-conforming and less peer-conforming than students living in metropolitan areas.[19] Again, however, adequate evaluation of the explanatory power of this factor requires a more direct analysis. The only report of such an analysis is provided by Turner.

Turner collected extensive data on those values "which can be translated into goals for the individual's behavior and those which the researches of others have suggested are linked to socioeconomic status."[20] From these he constructed a "class-value index" which showed a fairly high correlation with ambition when family background was controlled.[21] The essential point is this: If the high school is the important remaining influence on these values, then the partial correlation between values and ambition should be reduced considerably when high school is controlled. But this did not occur. When the high school was added as a second control variable, this correlation was reduced only from .25 to .22 (for boys), and from .33 to .31 (for girls).[22] Apparently a major source of these values lies in factors indexed by neither the socioeconomic status of the student's father nor by the population composition of his high school.

This finding, of course, does not prove that the peer group is not an important source of influence on the student's motivation to go to college or to achieve high social position. It indicates only that this influence is not expressed through values of a certain kind, having to do with long-

[17] This analysis is reported in John A. Michael, "High School Climates and Plans for Entering College," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXV (Winter, 1961), 585–95. See especially his discussion on p. 593.

[18] Turner, *op. cit.*, Table 11b, p. 59.

[19] *The Adolescent Society*, pp. 138–40.

[20] Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[22] *Ibid.*, Table 17, p. 94.

ange, lifetime goals. It is quite possible hat the high school, through the peer group, exerts an influence on other motivational factors. A likely candidate here may be the student's perception of what college life is like, of how enjoyable the experience is likely to be. As McDill and Coleman note, "For a teenager in a generally middle-class environment, college holds promise of such activities (as) campus social life, freedom from parental control, a shift to new friends, and all other social attributes of college."[23] In a generally working-class environment, on the other hand, these values and the expectations that college will fulfil them may not become a part of the student culture. It may be that influence by the peer group is expressed in terms of *short-range* values such as these.

[23] McDill and Coleman, "High School Social Status," *op. cit.*, p. 918.

Summary of explanatory mechanisms.—Quite an array of ideas and findings has been examined here, but the effort has been to show that these all fit together in suggesting an underlying pattern. At the risk of over-simplification, the suggested interplay of these different factors is represented diagramatically in Figure 1. To interpret this diagram, it may be best to start at the bottom. Whether or not students plan on college is seen as an immediate consequence of two "psychological"

FIG. 1.—Schematic diagram of factors leading to a variation in the aspirations of students attending different high schools.

factors: their level of scholastic ability and certain "motivational" factors, as yet unknown. While both of these general factors are probably determined in part by experiences in other social contexts, important sources lying within the high school can be identified.

Much of the variation in scholastic ability occurs because the educational standards of high schools vary. Because educational standards vary, students in some schools develop their abilities to a higher level than students in other schools. But the extent to which standards are divergent is, in turn, a consequence of the interplay of two other factors. First, structural characteristics of the educational system (e.g., centralized or decentralized) can impose more or less severe *restraints* on this divergence. In the United States these restraints will be strongest in large metropolitan school districts, weak among isolated rural high schools. Second, variation in the population composition of high schools creates informal social pressures *toward* divergence. It is easier for teachers to teach when the bulk of their students bring with them better preparation for learning and greater willingness to cooperate with school assignments. But the important point here is that those students in generally middle-class schools who lack this background appear to be carried along by the majority.

In more specific terms, existing research suggests that variation in scholastic development is an important explanation, that it is a *sufficient* explanation in smaller communities, but that among high schools located in large metropolitan areas it provides only a partial explanation. It is in large metropolitan areas, furthermore, that *both* structural restraints and informal social pressures should be strongest, at least in the United States.

Turning to the second explanatory mechanism, it seems likely that the adolescent subcultures which are typical of different kinds of high schools may have an important influence on the student's *motivation* to attend college. Available evidence indicates that this factor, if it operates at all, operates most strongly in metropolitan areas. There are at least two reasons why this might be so. First, since population composition should vary more widely in these areas, differences between adolescent subcultures should also be greater. Second, there is some suggestion, from Coleman, that students living in larger communities are more peer-conforming than students living in smaller communities.

However this may be, direct research into motivational factors and peer-group influences is quite limited. An attempt by Turner to locate these motivational factors with a set of values keyed to social class and long-range goals did not prove successful, but the hypothesis itself remains open.

A STUDY OF CANADIAN GIRLS

During the late spring of 1962, questionnaires were administered to 1,701 girls in their final year at seventy high schools in western Canada.[24] Data were obtained that provided measures of family background and college aspirations.[25] In ad-

[24] The girls were in their junior matriculation year in predominately coeducational high schools. Completion of this year qualifies the student to enter college, although further high-school work leading to senior matriculation and college credit is possible. The year at which junior matriculation is granted varies from province to province. In Ontario and British Columbia it is granted at grade 12; in all other western provinces it is granted on completion of grade 11. The proportion of youth completing high school, and the proportion going on to college, is more similar to the United States in western Canada than in eastern Canada. For further discussion of the comparability of this sample with American students see my "Social Context and Educational Aspiration: Influence of High School and Community on College Plans" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1964), pp. 58–64.

[25] Father's occupation and education were used to classify students into four categories of family background, in the following way: (I) all fathers with at least some college education, whatever their occupation; (II) all other fathers with

lition, high schools were classified according to population composition and the size of the community in which they were located.[26] While the Canadian educational system is quite similar to the American in most respects, there is one important difference. Administrative authority in Canadian education is much more centralized. This is particularly evident in the system of province-wide standardized examinations which determine the student's grades in all provinces except Ontario. This should result in less divergence in the standards and practices of individual high schools and a lower correlation between population composition and the scholastic abilities of the students.

The statistical procedure employed in this analysis is similar to the one used earlier to compare the findings of Wilson and Ramsøy, with one major exception. Instead of basing effect estimates on subsample proportions, the present procedure is derived in such a way as to give equal weight to each case.[27] This means that analysis is not so directly limited by the number of cases falling in each cell of the partial tables and also allows the addition of numerous control variables. As before, however, the resulting effect estimates can be interpreted as weighted averages of differences between proportions.

TABLE 1

PROPORTION PLANNING ON COLLEGE BY HIGH-SCHOOL STATUS AND FAMILY BACKGROUND

Family Background*	High-School Status†			Effect Estimates	
	High	Medium	Low		
High:					
I	0 71 (211)	0 45 (71)	0.48 (25)	High school: high vs. medium status	0 21
II	.47 (214)	.31 (134)	.32 (62)	Medium vs. low status .	01
III.	.49 (59)	.19 (124)	26 (184)	Family background (standardized to dichotomous form)	0 24
Low:					
IV	0 36 (42)	0 20 (143)	0.11 (227)		
Total.	(526)	(472)	(498)		

* Measured by father's occupation and education

† Proportion of students in family-background categories I and II

The effect of the high school on college aspirations, with family background controlled, is shown in Table 1. Attending a "high-status" school in comparison with one of "medium status" has a fairly strong effect on the student's aspirations (0.21), but there is almost no difference be-

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professional or managerial occupations, and all other fathers with clerical or sales occupations except those with only grade-school educations; (III) all other clerical and sales workers, and all other blue-collar workers and farmers with at least some high-school education; (IV) all other blue-collar workers and farmers (i.e., those with only grade-school education).

[26] In each high school the percentage of girls completing questionnaires who were in the upper two family-background categories (see n. 25, above) defined three categories of high schools as follows: over 65 per cent; 33–64 per cent; less than 33 per cent. A community population of 200,000 was used to distinguish between "metropolitan" and "non-metropolitan" high schools.

[27] Coleman derives his procedure from a model of continuous time, discrete space stochastic processes. His strategy is to estimate effect parameters in such a way as to most accurately describe the observed subsample *proportions*. If, instead, one sets out to describe the distribution of individual *cases*, it turns out that effect parameters are best estimated by a weighted average of the separate proportion-differences ($p_i - p_j$), where the weighting function is ($n_i n_j / n_i + n_j$). For further discussion of this procedure see my "Multivariate Effect Analysis: Some Modifications and Extensions of Coleman's Work" (unpublished manuscript).

tween "medium status" and "low status" schools (0.01). The effect of family background, standardized to be comparable to the dichotomous case,[28] is 0.24, or slightly more than the effect of the high school when the medium- and low-status categories are combined.

This pattern of influence is somewhat different from that predicted on the basis of earlier work. The findings fit the predictions much better, however, when community size is taken into account. In Table 2 the effect of the high school is shown separately for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.[29] The relationship between community size and population composition is so pronounced that *all* of the high-status schools, but *none* of the low-status schools, were located in metropolitan areas. As a consequence, the only comparison possible among metropolitan schools is between high- and medium-status categories, while the only comparison possible among non-metropolitan schools is between medium- and low-status categories. Among the former, the effect of population composition is quite strong ($a_1 = 0.25$), while among the latter the effect is minimal ($a_1 = 0.01$). This finding is consistent with the interpretation that more centralized administration in Canada will discourage divergence among non-metropolitan high schools but that residential segregation in metropolitan areas will create even stronger pressures toward divergence.

The problem of further analysis is simplified somewhat by this finding. The only relationship that needs to be explained occurs among the metropolitan high schools. The two explanatory variables that can be investigated in this regard are scholastic ability and occupational values Scholastic ability is defined in terms o the student's grade average, as determined by her performance on province-wide examinations.[30] As such, the present meas-

TABLE 2

PROPORTION PLANNING ON COLLEGE BY HIGH-SCHOOL STATUS AND FAMILY BACKGROUND FOR METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS SEPARATELY

Family Background	Metropolitan High Schools*		Non-metropolitan High Schools†	
	High Status	Medium Status	Medium Status	Low Status
High:				
I	0.71 (211)	0.36 (28)	0.51 (43)	0.48 (25)
II	.47 (214)	.19 (31)	.35 (103)	.32 (62)
III	.49 (59)	.29 (38)	.14 (86)	.26 (184)
Low:				
IV	0.36 (42)	0.20 (25)	0.20 (118)	0.11 (227)
Total	(526)	(122)	(350)	(498)

* Effect estimate for high-school status, 0.25.
† Effect estimate for high-school status, 0.01.

[28] See Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology*, pp. 218–19.

[29] For a discussion of the effects of community size evident in this table, see my "Community Influence on College Aspirations: An Empirical Evaluation of Explanatory Factors" (unpublished manuscript).

[30] There is, obviously, no universally agreed o[illegible] definition of "scholastic ability." If performance i[illegible] college is taken as the criterion with which t[illegible] evaluate various instruments for "measuring" scholastic ability, then tests that depend strongly on scholastic achievement and prior learning have been shown to be better predictors than tests that are more "culture-free" (Lee J. Cronbach, *Essentials of Pyschological Testing* [New York: Harper & Row, 1960]). The Canadian system of province-wide examinations should therefore provide a good

ure of ability should be more directly influenced by the educational program of the high school than the measures employed by Ramsøy and Turner. The occupational values used here represent a preference for "creativity" or "security."[31] This is very roughly similar to the "class-values" index Turner used. No measure was available of short-range values which, according to earlier discussion, are more likely to be a result of peer-group influence.

measure of this kind of ability. In Ontario, province-wide examinations were used until recently but are no longer employed. It can only be assumed, therefore, that grade averages are still meaningful when comparing schools. Students were classified as high or low in scholastic ability, depending on whether or not their grades were 70 or above. This criterion gives roughly equal distributions in all provinces and is similar to distinguishing between A's and B's and all lower grades in the United States.

Since the partial tables on which this analysis is based are rather cumbersome, the effect estimates are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.[32] In Table 3, with family

[31] The statements were "a job which will permit me to be creative and original" and "a job which will enable me to look forward to a stable, secure future." Girls choosing "creativity" more frequently planned on college. Several studies of high-school students support this finding. See, e.g., Harry Beilin, "The Pattern of Postponability and Its Relation to Social Class Mobility," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XLIV (August, 1956), 33–48; Harry K. Schwarzweller, "Value-Orientations in Educational and Occupational Choices," *Rural Sociology*, XXIV (September, 1959), 246–56, and "Values and Occupational Choice," *Social Forces*, XXXIX (December, 1960), 126–35.

[32] The partial tables from which these summaries are taken are similar in appearance to Tables 1 and 2. Copies of the full tables will be supplied by the author to anyone interested. Inspection of the partial tables indicates no evidence of interaction effects. At the same time, the relatively small number of girls attending the two medium-status

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF THE EFFECT OF SCHOLASTIC ABILITY AND VALUES ON COLLEGE PLANS

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Control Variables	Effect Estimate
Scholastic ability.......	College plans	Values and family background	0 27
Values................	College plans	Scholastic ability and family background	.19
Family background.....	College plans	Values and scholastic ability	0 26

TABLE 4

SUMMARY OF EXPLANATORY POWER OF SCHOLASTIC ABILITY AND VALUES FOR EFFECT OF HIGH-SCHOOL STATUS ON COLLEGE PLANS

(METROPOLITAN HIGH SCHOOLS ONLY)

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Control Variables	Effect Estimate
High-school status........	Scholastic ability	Family background	0 30
High-school status........	College plans	Family background	22*
High-school status........	College plans	Family background and scholastic ability	.15
High-school status........	Values	Family background	10
High-school status........	College plans	Family background	25
High-school status........	College plans	Family background and values	0 24

* Grade averages were not available for all girls, so the effect of high-school status on college plans was calculated separately for the full sample and for the smaller sample of girls for whom grade averages were available.

background controlled, ability and values both show fairly strong relationships with college plans. The effect of ability is about as great as the effect of background, while the effect of values is somewhat less than this. There is good reason for suspecting, in other words, that either of these "psychological" factors could provide an explanation for the higher aspirations of the students attending the high-status metropolitan schools.

With family background controlled, the high school has a prounounced effect on scholastic ability (0.30) (see Table 4). With ability *controlled*, the effect of the high school on college plans is reduced, from $a_1 = 0.22$ to $a_1 = 0.15$, a reduction of about one-third.[33] Or, in other words, the greater scholastic ability of students attending the high-status metropolitan schools is a *partial* explanation for their higher aspirations.

Whatever the explanation may be for the remaining effect of the high school, the present findings concur with Turner's in indicating that occupational values do not tap the important factors. The effect of the high school on these values is slight (0.10), and controlling for values does not appreciably reduce the effect of high-school status on college plans (the reduction is from 0.25 to 0.24).[34]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The findings from the Canadian study accord very well with the predictions advanced on the basis of interpretation of other research. This is not altogether surprising—the framework of ideas presented here was developed after the fact, on the basis of all available information. What is not ad hoc, as a matter of fact, is the facility with which Turner's findings fit into this framework, since his work did not become known to the author until the framework presented here was fully developed. However, what is important is that the somewhat diverse findings of five independent pieces of research do fit together in a consistent pattern. The present framework thus provides an explicit target for future research.

There are serious weaknesses in the design of all the research examined here. The problems of inferring causality from survey data are especially severe with studies of social context. Where it is necessary to infer contextual characteristics on the basis of individual characteristics, it is essential that the measure of individual characteristics employed be precise and that this measure have the same meaning in different groups. In terms of the research discussed here, this means that, first, there must be enough categories of socioeconomic status to reduce intra-category variation to an effective minimum. For example, "middle class" might include both doctors and sales clerks; if the middle-class students at one school were mostly children of doctors, while at another school they were mostly children of sales clerks, the magnitude of the bias is obvious. There is some evidence that use of four categories provides satisfactory precision. Wilson carried out his analysis first with four categories of father's occupation, then with nine, then with various detailed combinations of father's and mother's education, without appreciably changing his findings.[35]

The second requirement, that the measure mean the same thing in the different

metropolitan schools in the sample dictates caution in basing conclusions on these results. Analysis of each metropolitan school separately, however, shows consistent similarities *within* each category (high status and medium status) and consistent differences between each category. See my "Social Context and Educational Aspiration," *op. cit.*, pp. 87–89.

[33] Grade averages were not available for all girls, so the effect of high school on college plans was recalculated for this smaller sample. This figure is slightly lower than the effect estimate for the full sample.

[34] These estimates are for the full sample.

[35] Wilson, "Residential Segregation," *op. cit.*, pp. 839–44.

groups, points to potentially more serious weaknesses. Socioeconomic status has been used in this research to "control" for family background. But there is considerable evidence that other aspects of the family, such as mobility orientation, values, and child-rearing practices, are also related to the aspirations of the children.[36] It is quite plausible to argue, for example, that working-class families living in neighborhoods where their children go to predominately middle-class schools are not the same as other working-class families. These families may be especially concerned that their children "get ahead." At the same time, it has been shown that middle-class students attending working-class schools have *lower* aspirations than other middle-class students and that this "downward" pull is as strong as the above mentioned "upward" pull. To argue that middle-class families move to working-class neighborhoods in order to inhibit the opportunities of their children is much less plausible. The fact remains, however, that family characteristics other than socioeconomic status can and should be controlled in future research.

The best conclusion possible given the existing information, therefore, is that the framework of ideas developed in the first two sections is quite reasonable. To summarize the main findings: (1) The population composition of a high school does have an important effect on the aspirations of its students, but a much stronger effect in large cities than in smaller communities. (2) One important, but (at least in metropolitan areas) partial explanation for this effect is the differential success of high schools in developing the scholastic abilities of their students. (3) The failure of scholastic ability to explain all of the effects of metropolitan high schools points to the existence of other explanations, such as the influence of the peer group, but occupational or social-class values do not provide this explanation.

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[36] See, e.g., David J. Bordua, "Educational Aspirations and Parental Stress on College," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 262–69; Elizabeth D. Cohen, "Parental Factors in Educational Mobility" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958); Glen H. Elder, Jr., *Adolescent Achievement and Mobility Aspirations* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Institute for Research in Social Science, 1963), and "Parental Power Legitimation and Its Effect on the Adolescent," *Sociometry*, XXVI (March, 1963), 50–65; Joseph A. Kahl, "Educational and Occupational Aspirations of 'Common Man' Boys," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXIII (Summer, 1953), 186–203; Wilbur L. Layton, "Socioeconomic Status and After-High School Plans," in Ralph F. Berdie, *After High School, What?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 178–92.

Status Homophily, Social Context, and Participation in Psychotherapy[1]

Denise Bystryn Kandel

ABSTRACT

The concept of status homophily was extended to the physician-patient interaction in psychotherapy. Participation of patients in pyschotherapy in a mental hospital was examined as a function of social statuses of both the physicians and the patients. Social class but not religious status homophily played a role in determining the type of patient carried in psychotherapy by different therapists. The social characteristics of the hospital service in which the physician-patient pair was located could either accentuate or attenuate the process of status homophily in the psychiatrist-patient interaction.

Since Faris and Dunham first proposed a role for social factors in the etiology of mental illness,[2] several research studies have investigated the contribution of an individual's social position to his mental health. Evidence has been gathered on the relation of social factors to both the etiology and the treatment of mental illness. These data have shown that more severe forms of disease occur more frequently in the lower social classes, who in turn are less likely to utilize the treatment facilities available in the community.

The selection of patients for psychotherapy has been shown consistently to be biased against lower-class individuals. This has been found in studies looking at an entire community,[3] at an outpatient clinic,[4] or at a voluntary private hospital.[5] When therapists have no opportunity to exert bias in patient selection because cases have been assigned to them, the duration of therapy has been found to be shorter for lower-class than for middle-class patients.[6]

[1] The research on which this paper is based was carried out during the tenure of a postdoctoral fellowship in the Mental Health Research Training Program, Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts Mental Health Center, 1960–62. I am grateful to the administrative staff of the study hospital which made this study possible. I also wish to thank James S. Coleman, Eric R. Kandel, and Elliot G. Mishler for their critical reading of the manuscript.

[2] Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas: An Ecological Study of Schizophrenia and Other Psychoses* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

[3] August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); Charles C. Hughes, Marc-Adelard Tremblay, Robert N. Rapoport, and Alexander H. Leighton, *People of Cove and Woodlot* (New York: Basic Books, 1960); Leo Srole, Thomas S. Langner, Stanley T. Michael, Marvin K. Opler, and Thomas A. C. Rennie, *Mental Health in the Metropolis* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962); Frank Reisman, *The Mental Health of the Poor* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[4] Norman Q. Brill and Hugh A. Storrow, "Social Class and Psychiatry," *A.M.A. Archives of General Psychiatry*, III (October, 1960), 340–44; Jerome K. Myers and Leslie Schaffer, "Social Stratification and Psychiatric Practice: A Study of an Out-Patient Clinic," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (June, 1954), 307–10; David Rosenthal and Jerome D. Frank, "The Fate of Psychiatric Clinic Outpatients Assigned to Psychotherapy," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, CXXVII (October, 1958), 330–43.

[5] Robert L. Kahn, Max Pollack, and Max Fink, "Sociopsychologic Aspects of Psychiatric Treatment in a Voluntary Mental Hospital," *A.M.A. Archives of General Psychiatry*, I (December, 1959), 565–74.

[6] Stanley D. Imber, Earl H. Nash, Jr., and Anthony R. Stone, "Social Class and Duration of Psychotherapy," *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, XI (July, 1955), 281–84.

While the ability to afford psychotherapy may explain the differential participation of higher-class patients in private psychotherapy, a financial factor cannot account for the trends observed in outpatient clinics where rates are tailored to suit the patient's resources or in a hospital where no additional fees are charged for psychotherapeutic treatment. These trends have, therefore, been explained as a class discrepancy in education and values between the upper-class psychotherapist and the lower-class patients. It has been claimed that lower-class patients tend to feel that their psychological problems are physical in nature, rather than psychological, and that they have lower motivation for psychotherapeutic treatment.[7] According to this notion, the therapist's bias is determined at intake interview since he perceives a lower degree of psychological-mindedness in patients of lower than in those of higher social class. The assumed inappropriateness of the lower-class patients for the psychotherapeutic relationship may result from different socialization experiences and communication patterns which are learned by individuals of different social classes early in life.[8] In any event, these patient attitudes and values tend to reduce both the patient's desire to enter or continue treatment and the therapist's motivation to treat the patient.[9]

If these interpretations are correct, the physician-patient interaction with respect to psychotherapy would fall into the common class of social interactions in which similar values, associated with similar social statuses, both promote and reinforce each other. The tendency of a high social class therapist to have in treatment high social class individuals would, therefore, be a special case of status homophily which involves the "observed tendencies for similarity between the group-affiliation of friends or between their positions within a group."[10] It is assumed that the patterns of status homophily are themselves the result of value homophily, that is, of similarity among the values shared by the persons who form the friendship. The concept of status homophily can easily be extended to similarity in group affiliation, or social status, of persons who are in close social interaction but not necessarily friends.[11]

This paper is an attempt to apply the concept of status homophily to the physician-patient interaction in psychotherapy.

[7] Brill and Storrow, *op. cit.*

[8] Basil Bernstein, "Social Class, Speech Systems and Psychotherapy," *British Journal of Sociology*, XV (March, 1964), 54-64.

[9] *Ibid.* See also Jerome D. Frank, "The Dynamics of the Psychotherapeutic Relationship," *Psychiatry*, XXII (February, 1959), 17-39; Myers and Schaffer, *op. cit.*; Imber *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[10] Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Friendship as a Social Process," in Monroe Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles H. Page (eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1954), p. 24.

[11] The concept is somewhat different from Homans' concept of status congruence which "is realized when all of the stimuli a man presents rank better or higher than the corresponding stimuli presented by another man—or when, of course, all of the stimuli rank equally" (George Casper Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961], p. 248). It is to the second part of this definition that the concept of status homophily as defined by Merton and Lazarsfeld and as used in this paper would apply. Furthermore, this paper applies the concept to a much more limited range of statuses than is implied by Homans' definition. Only one or two statuses of the interacting individuals, rather than all of their statuses, are considered at any one time. This concept is also different from that of status crystallization which implies similarity among the different statuses *held by the same* individual, rather than by *different* individuals who are interacting with each other (see for instance, Emile Benoit-Smullyn, "Status, Status Types and Status Interrelations," *American Sociological Review*, IX [1944], 151-61; and Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, XIX [1954], 405-13). This point is emphasized here since Mitchell, in a recent critical review of the concept of status crystallization, subsumes the concept of status congruency under that of status crystallization (see Robert E. Mitchell, "Methodological Notes on a Theory of Status Crystallization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVIII [Summer, 1964], 315-25).

The majority of psychotherapists are from higher social class origins than the clinic patients whom they serve. Status and value homophily would explain why data based on aggregate groups of physicians have shown a constant overrepresentation of high social class patients among those in psychotherapy. In situations in which it is possible to differentiate the physicians as well as the patients according to their social class, the existence of status homophily would lead us to predict that high social class physicians would tend to have a greater proportion of high social class patients in psychotherapy than their lower-class colleagues. Physicians of lower-class origins would be more likely to carry lower-class patients than their higher-class colleagues. But is there in fact a tendency for class homophily between doctor and patient to exist? If status homophily could indeed explain the bias against lower-class patients in psychotherapy, a match between doctor and patient on social class should strongly reduce these biases in matched lower-class pairs. None of the published studies has investigated empirically the relationship between administration of psychotherapy and patient's social class, taking into account also the physician's own social status. The purpose of this research was to investigate the existence and amount of status homophily between physician and patient by examining the characteristics of patients in treatment while simultaneously comparing physician's and patient's social statuses. In addition, an attempt was made to investigate statuses other than social class which may lead to status homophily and to isolate those conditions in the individual social context which affect the process of status homophily.

PROCEDURE

The study was carried out in a small, university-affiliated, teaching state mental hospital, which had, at the time of the study, a capacity of 120 beds. The sample for this analysis included the cohort of non-court patients admitted to the hospital during the twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1959, and ending June 30, 1960. The unit of analysis was an individual admission, so that any one patient could be counted more than once.[12] Of the 437 admissions registered during this twelve-month period, 7.6 per cent were multiple admissions, 6.9 per cent patients having had two, and 0.7 per cent having had three admissions in the course of the study year. Data were obtained from each patient's hospital record and coded for IBM processing. The information abstracted included psychiatric, demographic, and family characteristics of the patient. All available information on the current hospitalization was also coded. Social class was defined according to Hollingshead's procedure where occupation and education are weighted and, on the basis of the resulting score, the individual is assigned to one of five categories.[13]

RESULTS

I. FORMS OF TREATMENT AND PATIENTS' ATTRIBUTES

The hospital from which this sample of patients was obtained is an active treatment center with a particular emphasis on psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. Drugs are the other most frequent mode of treatment. In the course of their stay in the hospital, 57.2 per cent of the patients in the sample have received drugs, and 84 per cent psychotherapy. Only 12.1 per cent have received some other treatment, most frequently electro-shock therapy (7.3 per

[12] Returns from visit (N-20) were included in the sample except when it was clear from the record that discharge-on-visit had been arranged for administrative reasons and really stood for "absence on leave," as was true, for instance, of adolescents sent home for vacations. In accordance with the legal definitions used in the state of Massachusetts, the hospital studied does not count entry into the hospital from discharge-on-visit as a new admission.

[13] August B. Hollingshead, "Two Factor Index of Social Position," New Haven, Conn., 1957 (mimeographed).

cent); 7.1 per cent of patients received no treatment. The basic hospital fee is the same for all admissions irrespective of therapeutic program. Therefore, while hospitalized, the patient's economic resources do not determine his access to therapeutic resources.

TABLE 1

PATIENTS' CHARACTERISTICS AND TREATMENTS WHILE HOSPITALIZED

Characteristics	Treatments while Hospitalized (Percentage)				Total N	χ^2 for Psychotherapy
	Drug	Psychotherapy	Other	None Reported		
Social Class:						
Class I	48.8	92.2	7.7	7.7	39	$\chi^2=10.09$; $df=4$; $P<\ 05$
Class II	59.9	90.0	11.5	2.9	70	
Class III	56.8	86.2	11.1	7.6	132	
Class IV	56.9	86.3	13.8	7.4	95	
Class V	53.7	72.2	7.6	3.7	54	
Religion:						
Catholic	55.9	79.9	9.8	8.8	193	$\chi^2=5.41$; $df=2$; $.10>P>.05$
Jewish	63.5	84.6	12.9	9.4	85	
Protestant	56.4	89.4	14.3	2.8	133	
Sex:						
Male	50.7	74.2	9.1	9.6	209	$\chi^2=8.13$; $df=1$; $.01>P>\ 001$
Female	57.8	85.4	14.5	4.8	228	
Age:						
14-24	51.2	82.7	1.6	7.1	127	$\chi^2=2.15$; $df=2$; n.s.
25-34	49.3	82.1	3.7	9.7	134	
35 and over	60.8	76.7	14.2	5.1	176	
Diagnosis:						
Schizophrenia	71.9	94.8	12.4	0.0	153	$\chi^2=152.719$, $df=5$, $P<\ 001$
Other psychotics	70.4	81.3	21.9	1.6	64	
Brain disease	22.6	3.2	3.2	45.0	31	
Personality	40.8	71.5	7.1	12.5	56	
Psychoneurosis	35.1	81.8	14.4	6.3	111	
Transient personality disorders	34.8	69.5	13.0	21.8	23	
Total sample	57.2	84.0	12.1	7.1	437	. . . .

Despite this fact, differential participation of patients in psychotherapy along social class lines is encountered. Type of treatment received by patients was examined in relationship to several of the patients' attributes. Table 1 shows that the proportion of patients in psychotherapy is significantly lower in Class V than in each of the other classes. Thus, 92.2 per cent of patients in Class I are in psychotherapy as compared to 72.2 per cent of patients in Class V. There is a sharp distinction between Class V and the other four classes; these in turn do not differ much among themselves. By contrast, when drug treatment is examined, no class differences can be seen. We will return to this finding in the discussion.

Socioeconomic status is one among several of the patient's attributes found to be related to his being in psychotherapy. Others are his diagnosis, religion, and sex. Patients are particularly likely to participate in therapy in the hospital under study if they are women, are diagnosed as schizophrenic, and are not Catholic (see Table 1). In this sample, age was not a significant factor in psychotherapy participation.

II. STATUS HOMOPHILY: SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND RELIGION

Upon entering the hospital, each patient is assigned to a first-year resident who as-

sumes complete responsibility for the patient's care for the duration of his hospital stay. Patient's participation in psychotherapy in this institution is therefore a good situation in which to study the working of status homophily. We will be further concerned only with variables on which some spread can be obtained among both first-year medical residency staff and patients so as to allow for matching and comparison between the two groups on the same variable. Since the residents belong to an exceedingly narrow age group and, in this particular year, are all of the male sex, status homophily can be examined only with respect to socioeconomic status and religion.

TABLE 2

PATIENTS' SELECTION FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY BY RESIDENT'S SOCIAL CLASS OF ORIGIN AND PATIENTS' SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

Patients' Socioeconomic Status	Percentage of Patients Selected for Psychotherapy by Resident's Social Class of Origin			
	Classes I, II		Classes III, IV	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Class I	100 0	22	94.5	13
Class II	91.1	46	89.5	19
Class III	87.7	75	91.0	45
Class IV	81.5	43	91 0	45
Class V	64.3	28	89.5	19

If status homophily explains the inverse relationship between psychotherapy and patient's social class, this relationship ought to vanish when patient and potential therapist are matched on social class. In such an analytical procedure, the interrelationships of treatment to other attributes of the patient, for example, diagnosis or age, or the relationship of these to social class are disregarded. These interrelationships are assumed to follow similar trends in similar types of patients (similar, for instance, with respect to social class background) who happen to be admitted by therapists of different classes. The variable of interest is the match between therapist and patient on social class. For the therapist, status of origin, as determined by his father's social class was used as a classificatory social class variable since all physicians would rank as equals on their achieved professional status and would not be discriminated.[14] As is to be expected in a group of professionals, the range is narrow. The majority of residents originate from Classes I or II. None were found to have fathers classified as Class V. Of the twenty-three residents whose patients were represented in the cohort, six were classified as originating from Class I, eight from Class II, seven from Class III, and two from Class IV.

The relationship between participation in psychotherapy and patient's social class was examined holding constant the social class background of the residents involved in the decision. This procedure reveals that when they are assigned to a resident from a social background originally similar to theirs, lower-class patients are as likely to participate in therapy as are the higher-class patients. However, when these lower-class patients are assigned to a high social class therapist they are much less likely to receive psychotherapy than patients of high social class. Among residents belonging to Classes I or II,[15] all their Class I admissions are in therapy but only 64.3 per cent of their Class V admissions. By contrast, among residents belonging to Classes *III* or *IV the same proportion of patients in each of the five social classes, approximately* 90 per cent, are in therapy (see Table 2).

An index of status homophily[16] was ap-

[14] I would like to thank Dr. Myron Sharaf who kindly supplied the information on residents' fathers from his own study of the residents at the hospital.

[15] Residents were combined into two social class groups to maximize the number of cases in the cells and still control for social class.

[16] See Lazarsfeld and Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 27. As applied to the particular situation under study, the index is the ratio, multiplied by 100, of the difference between the observed percentage of patients of a certain class among the resident's therapy

plied to the data since it permits a more parsimonious comparison of the processes at work among residents of different social origins. Positive values of the index reflect the presence of positive status homophily, while negative values represent, on the contrary, a moving away between persons of different statuses. As shown in Table 3, the process of status homophily is very strong among high social class residents but practically non-existent among those of more modest social origins. In the latter group, the values of the index are very close to zero for each of the three social class categories of patients. Among higher status residents, however, the index ranges from 11.2 toward higher-class patients to 22.9 away from those from Class V. The greater the status distance between the high social class residents and their patients, the smaller the chance that the patients will be in psychotherapy. It is only among the group of high social class residents that the initial inverse relationship between social class and patients' experience with psychotherapy persists and becomes even accentuated. Residents from lower social class origins do have a larger proportion of lower-class individuals in psychotherapy than do their colleagues. However, the proportion of patients they take into psychotherapeutic treatment is similar for all five social classes. Physicians originating from Classes III or IV do not show any status homophily toward or away from any social group of patients. It is as if they were better able than their colleagues to establish and encourage therapeutic relationships with individuals of varying social backgrounds. This may result from the fact that through their parental families, and later through their educational and medical careers, physicians from Classes III and IV were introduced to social partners of all social ranks.

patients and the expected percentage, divided by the expected proportion. The expected proportion is taken as the proportion of patients in that class among all the patients admitted by the resident in the course of the year.

Social class can thus be seen to be an important factor in patient's participation in psychotherapy with residents originating from high social classes. It is also the most important of the factors considered. We have seen earlier that religion was one of the patient's statuses which influenced his being in psychotherapy (Table 1). However, religion appears to play no status-homophily role in psychotherapy. The same analysis was carried out for this variable as for social class. Administration of psychotherapy was examined for each religious

TABLE 3

STATUS HOMOPHILY BETWEEN RESIDENT AND PATIENT: SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND PATIENT PARTICIPATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Patients' Socio-economic Status	Index of Homophily* for Patient Participation in Psychotherapy by Resident's Social Class of Origin	
	Classes I, II	Classes III, IV
Classes I, II . . .	11 2	−3 1
Classes III, IV . . .	− 1 8	1 3
Class V.	−22 9	0 0

* The index is defined in n. 16. Patients in classes I–IV have been classified into two categories to make their social class groupings identical to those used for the residents.

group of patients, taking into account the physician's own religion. Irrespective of the resident's own religion, more Protestant than Catholic patients are in treatment (see Table 4).

The explanation for this seems to lie in the socioeconomic distribution of patients of different religions. Catholics contain the largest proportion of lower-class individuals: 29.6 per cent of Catholic patients fall in Class IV and 19.7 per cent in Class V, as compared to 17 per cent in Class IV and slightly over 5 per cent in Class V among Jewish or Protestant patients. Correlatively, the latter have the greatest percentage of Class I and Class II patients: 32.3 per cent among Protestants, 22.4 per cent among Jews, and 16.6 per cent among Cath-

olics. The religious differences in proportion of patients in psychotherapy are due, in part, to social class differences. When social class is held constant, differences in psychotherapeutic treatment among the three religious groups disappear in all class categories except the lower two. In Classes IV and V, Catholics are still somewhat less likely to receive psychotherapy than Jews or Protestants (Table 5).

Thus, except in the case of the lowest two levels, where religion also plays a role, socioeconomic status is the most crucial social variable in explaining the participation of particular patients in psychotherapy. There is a definite matching on social status between physician and patient. As the following discussion will show, certain characteristics of the social context in which the pair is located as well as external contingencies can modify the process of status homophily.

TABLE 4

STATUS HOMOPHILY BETWEEN RESIDENT AND PATIENT: RELIGION AND PATIENT PARTICIPATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Patients' Religion	Index of Homophily for Patient Participation in Psychotherapy by Resident's Religion		
	Catholic	Jewish	Protestant
Catholic	− 7.2	−5.3	−6.5
Jewish	0.0	−5.9	3.7
Protestant	14.0	9.3	6.8

III. SOCIAL CONTEXT AND STATUS HOMOPHILY

The hospital under study is divided administratively into three inpatient services. Each of the services is staffed by a senior staff consultant, a third-year resident who is the chief, and six or seven first-year residents, as well as by nurses, social workers, an occupational therapist, a rehabilitation counselor, and medical students. At the beginning of the academic year, new residents are assigned to one of the services. Throughout the year, patient admissions are allocated to each service on a daily rotative basis, and once admitted they remain on the same service for the duration of their hospital stay. This policy of service rotation for admissions was instituted two years before the cohort under study entered the hospital. Previously, one of the wards was reserved for all new admissions. Patients who did not improve were transferred to the "chronic" ward while those who progressed were placed on the "convalescent" ward. At the time the new admission policies were instituted, one of the services was extensively remodeled. The services, therefore, differ among each other not only in their history but also in their physical appearance. Service B, which was remodeled, is more attractive than the other two serv-

TABLE 5

PATIENT PARTICIPATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY BY RELIGION AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

Patients' Socioeconomic Status	Percentage of Patients in Psychotherapy by Religion					
	Catholic		Jewish		Protestant	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Class I	86.7	15	100.0	6	91.6	12
Class II	88.2	17	84.6	13	93.5	31
Class III	90.0	50	80.0	35	86.9	46
Class IV	79.0	57	100.0	15	90.5	21
Class V	68.4	38	80.0	5	100.0	7

ices. It is composed, for the most part, of single and double rooms, while the other services accommodate their patients in several large dormitories. A rich folklore has developed among the nursing and medical personnel of the hospital about the distinctive characteristics of each of the three services. In particular, Service A, which formerly received the chronic patients, is said still to contain the sickest patients in the hospital. The more pleasant wards are said to contain patients who are both more affluent and in better psychological health. These charges are strongly refuted by the administration, which points to its random rotative admission procedure. However, our data indicate that Service B, the most modern and attractive of the services, does contain a disproportionally high percentage of the high social class population in the hospital and relatively few of Classes IV and V (Table 6). The other two services do not differ much between themselves. There might be a slight tendency for patients on Service A to be of somewhat higher socioeconomic status than those on Service C. But the differences are very small and could easily be attributed to chance. Of additional interest is that, for the year of the sample admissions, the first-year residency staff on Service B was also of higher status than the medical staff on the other two services. It was composed exclusively of residents in Class I or II. In contrast, four out of eight residents on Service C and three out of eight on Service A belonged to these upper two classes.

A situation exists, therefore, whereby clear-cut differences appear among the three services to which the residents belong. We can study how the social class biases observed in the participation of patients in psychotherapy operate in these different social contexts. As shown in Table 7, most

TABLE 6

HOSPITAL WARD SERVICE AND PATIENTS' SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

Hospital Service	Socioeconomic Status					Total N	
	Class I (Per Cent)	Class II (Per Cent)	Class III (Per Cent)	Class IV (Per Cent)	Class V (Per Cent)		
Service A....	9 3	16 3	33 3	31.8	9 3	129	$\chi^2 = 19\ 47$; $df = 8$; 02 > P > .01
Service B....	13.9	26.0	29.6	18 5	12.3	108	
Service C....	7.8	13.7	37.3	22 2	19.0	153	

TABLE 7

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND STATUS HOMOPHILY BETWEEN RESIDENT AND PATIENT IN DIFFERENT HOSPITAL SERVICES

Patients' Socioeconomic Status	Index of Homophily in Psychotherapy Participation				
	Classes I, II Residents			Classes III, IV* Residents	
	Service A	Service B	Service C	Service A	Service C
Classes I, II.......	4.8	17.4	15 7	0 0	7 0
Classes III, IV.. .	0.0	0 6	– .1	–3 2	1 7
Classes V.........	–8.7	–30.1	–19 4	6 2	3 1

* Service B did not have any residents classified as originating from either Class III or Class IV.

status homophily toward Class I and II patients and most homophily away from Class V patients occur on Service B, the service with a skewed high social class distribution among both patients and staff. The service in which the social class characteristics of its members are high is also the one in which the participation of the lowest ranking patients in psychotherapy is the lowest.

With these data, it is not possible to specify what the critical factor in the social context is, whether it is the large proportion of high social patients on the ward, or the high social class staff, or a combination of both. Whatever the specific factor at work, it seems that the composition of the social context can significantly affect the interpersonal processes taking place within it.

TABLE 8

TIME OF ADMISSION, SOCIAL CLASS, AND PATIENT PARTICIPATION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Patients' Socio-economic Status	Percentage of Patients in Psychotherapy by Time of Admission			
	First Semester		Second Semester	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Class I.........	95.6	23	87 6	16
Class II........	86.6	37	94 0	33
Class III.......	83.2	89	93.0	43
Class IV.......	87.1	54	82.9	41
Class V........	80.6	36	50.5	18

IV. STATUS HOMOPHILY AND CONTINGENCY FACTORS

The process of status homophily can also be affected by contingency factors which lower or, on the contrary, increase the individual's threshold level at which status homophily becomes effective. Time in the academic year when patients are admitted is one such factor. New residents enter the hospital in July, and it is at that time that they first begin to accept patients for treatment. After a while they have as many patients as they have time to carry. As patients get discharged, they are replaced with new cases. It seemed possible that early in their residency residents would have a more flexible schedule and that selection criteria would not operate as strongly on their part as later in the year when it would become more difficult for them to fit new cases into their load. Patient admissions, therefore, were separated into those admitted in the first six months of the residency program (i.e., from July to December) and those admitted in the last six months. Table 8 shows that patients belonging to Class V are indeed less likely to be taken into therapy if they enter the hospital in the second semester than in the first. The proportion of patients from the first four classes in psychotherapy is approximately the same in the first semester and in the second. For Class V patients, however, proportion in psychotherapy is over 80 per cent when these patients are admitted in the first six months of the resident's stay in the hospital, but only 50 per cent when admitted in the last six months.

DISCUSSION

The process of status homophily observed in patients' participation in psychotherapy could be the result of one of three processes: (1) mutual sympathy arising between physicians and patients of similar social statuses, or, on the contrary, antipathy between those of dissimilar statuses; (2) inability and/or reluctance of the physician to view lower-class patients as good or desirable therapy candidates; (3) low psychological-mindedness and verbal skills or interests of the lower-class patient, making him unable to accept or participate in psychotherapy. In the first process, the patient's participation in psychotherapy would result from a mutual decision-making process involving both physician and patient. In the second process, the therapist would be the active agent in the therapy decision, while in the last one the patient would have

the decision in his own hands. Since the present data are based on hospital records and not on actual observations of initial intake interviews between patient and physician or on subsequent research interviews with both members of the pair, they do not permit a definite conclusion as to the respective contributions of each partner to the process observed. The finding on the relevance of time of admission to the patient's participation in therapy is suggestive of the fact that the physician has an important, if not necessarily exclusive, role in the process of status homophily. Ostensibly, patients who are admitted in the second semester of the resident's stay in the hospital should not differ in their pathology, motivation, or other characteristics from those admitted earlier in the year. However, the conditions in the resident's professional schedule are different and these differences have consequences for patient selection, suggesting that in the bias observed in patient participation in therapy, the physician's role may be more important than the patient's. When subjected to less intensive time pressures, the physician may be more willing to explore therapy possibilities with what looks like a difficult patient; this attitude may, in turn, reduce the reluctant patient's diffidence to enter therapy.

As an expert trained in the care of mentally ill persons, the psychiatrist makes use principally of drugs and of psychotherapy, singly or in combination. He is trained to administer these treatment modalities on purely objective bases, determining the appropriateness of each to a particular illness. As Parsons has pointed out, "the role of medical practitioner is to a high degree segregated from other bases of social status and solidarities. . . . Whether he likes or dislikes the particular patient as a person is supposed to be irrelevant, as indeed it is to most purely objective problems of how to handle a particular disease."[17]

Our data suggest that the psychiatrist who must decide whether to administer psychotherapy does not always disregard these extra-medical attributes of the patient, especially when he, the physician, is located in certain types of social environments or is under certain contingency situations. While drugs were administered indifferently to patients of different social classes, status homophily on social class was shown to exist between physician and patient with respect to the participation of patients in psychotherapy. A much lower degree of status homophily was found among physician-patient pairs in which the physician was from relatively lower social class origins than in those in which he was of a high status. The social context in which the physician was located as well as other strain-creating conditions accentuated the tendencies toward status homophily. Thus, the very same considerations which enter into the choice of friendships seem to enter into the professional-client relation of psychotherapy. The purely biological treatment modality, on the other hand, is free of such biases.

The failure to abide by purely medical criteria has obvious consequences for the social structure at large, and these have been commented upon in the past. A segment of the ill population is potentially and perhaps arbitrarily deprived of an important treatment modality. While this may at first appear to be dysfunctional for this group of patients, it may actually be an inseparable component of therapy as a technique. Many a medical technique that has been devised to deal with a particular illness requires that additional and necessary conditions, some not directly related to the illness itself, be met before treatment can be carried out. A surgeon might not agree to operate if he felt that the patient's heart condition could not withstand the operative shock or if his obesity made him a great operative risk. Yet, no one would feel that the physician was discriminating unjustly against this patient since the criteria involved are biological and highly specifiable.

[17] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), pp. 434–35.

The case becomes more complicated in the instance of psychotherapy, where treatment involves a utilization of the social interaction between physician and patient and where the therapist himself becomes a treatment tool. Indeed, the resident learns from his teaching supervisor the importance of empathy as a basic component in his psychotherapeutic interaction with patients. A major part of the psychotherapeutic interaction is transference or the projection unto the physician of feelings and attitudes first experienced by the patient in other and earlier contexts. The therapist needs to understand and interpret these transference phenomena. A close social status similarity between physician and patient may facilitate the "feeling" process on the physician's part and the "transference" on the part of the patient and may actually be a prerequisite for effective therapy. No such factor seems to enter in the administration of drugs. One may speculate that if treatment modalities in psychiatry were to become more biological, the trend toward status homophily would decrease. An unanticipated consequence of the introduction of drugs into psychiatric treatment may be an extension of the network of patients who obtain contacts with psychiatrists. If not for these drugs, many lower-class patients would stay outside of any psychiatric contact.

The data of this study suggest further that the larger context in which the psychotherapeutic relationship is carried out can modify the extent to which status homophily enters as a factor in the selection of patients for psychotherapy. The relatively isolated interaction between physician and patient is itself influenced by the characteristics of the milieu in which it takes place. Further research is necessary to specify what particular components of this milieu have most influence. It is a logical step to deduce from our data that appropriate social engineering would permit an inpatient facility to reduce somewhat the intensity of the status homophily by a more equal distribution of staff and patients from the higher social classes among its different services. Changes could hopefully be brought about in the nature of the interaction between two individuals solely by structurally modifying the social milieu in which they operate without actually changing in a direct way the individuals concerned.

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Status Discrepancy and Prejudice[1]

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ABSTRACT

The effect of status discrepancy on attitudes toward Negroes is examined by positing an additive model of the relation between status variables and prejudice through a dummy-variable multiple-regression procedure and investigating departures from the predictions of the model. According to the status-discrepancy hypothesis, status-discrepant individuals should exhibit greater prejudice than predicted by the additive regression model. Two problems are considered, one involving income and education as status variables, the other involving education and education of spouse, using data from a representative national sample of the adult white population of the United States. For both problems, the predictions of the additive model closely match the observed patterns, indicating that status discrepancy per se has no effect on prejudice.

Students of social stratification have long recognized the multidimensional character of systems of stratification in contemporary societies, and recently attention has focused on the consequences for individuals of consistency or discrepancy among the various dimensions of status. In 1954 Lenski proposed "a non-vertical dimension to . . . status, . . . a consistency dimension"[2] which he hoped "would be capable of accounting for some of the variance in political behavior which is left unexplained by traditional methods of stratification analysis."[3] Since that time the theory of status crystallization has been employed in attempts to account for patterns of participation in voluntary associations,[4] variance in psychosomatic symptom levels,[5] choice of religious styles,[6] and suicide rates,[7] among other phenomena. The present paper examines the relationship between status discrepancy and anti-Negro prejudice, utilizing procedures somewhat different from those generally employed previously. Before beginning the analysis we briefly review some of the assumptions of the theory.

In essence, the theory of status crystallization can be stated as follows: Social status is multidimensional and hierarchical. Individuals are located in social space in terms of their positions on a variety of

[1] This paper summarizes research supported by a grant to the National Opinion Research Center from the National Science Foundation (G85, "Occupations and Social Stratification") and completed during the author's tenure as a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellow. This research serves as background to the main project, an investigation of occupational stratification in the United States. I am indebted to Robert W. Hodge for his extremely helpful advice and suggestions.

[2] Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (August, 1954), 405.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Gerhard E. Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (August, 1956), 458–64.

[5] Elton F. Jackson, "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (August, 1962), 469–80. Since the present paper was completed Jackson has published a reassessment of his data using methods similar to those utilized here (see Elton F. Jackson and Peter J. Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress: Additive and Interaction Effects," *American Sociological Review*, XXX [August, 1965], 556–64).

[6] N. J. Demerath III, *Social Class in American Protestantism* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), pp. 127–73.

[7] Jack P. Gibbs and Walter T. Martin, "A Theory of Status Integration and Its Relationship to Suicide," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (April, 1958), 140–47, and "On Status Integration and Suicide Rates in Tulsa," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (June, 1959), 392–96.

dimensions of status—occupation, education, income, ethnicity, etc. Each person occupies a particular status configuration, determined by his location on each of the component dimensions. Particular values and expectations are associated with each level on each of the component dimensions. Thus, some status sets will be "crystallized" in the sense that all of the component statuses give rise to similar values and expectations, while others will not. The theory argues that those individuals whose positions on the different dimensions are not crystallized—those whose status memberships give rise to conflicting values and expectations—are likely to experience more strain and tension than people whose status sets are crystallized. This strain may manifest itself in a variety of pathological behaviors, such as those cited above.

THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL

Although the theory itself appears plausible enough, there are serious difficulties in implementing adequate empirical tests of its validity. For example, it is not at all clear how to determine which status configurations are "crystallized" and which are not. According to the theory, a crystallized status set is one in which each of the component statuses gives rise to similar values or expectations. However, while examples of clearly discrepant statuses may be found—for example, Negro doctors, who may expect to be treated like doctors but are treated like Negroes—there is *in general* no way to match particular status categories precisely with particular values or expectations. One reason for this is that in contemporary American society there is usually not a very high degree of association between membership in particular status categories and propensities for particular behaviors. Thus, while it is possible to discover *mean* differences between status categories on particular attributes, it is difficult to match those specific categories of various status characteristics that are most similar with respect to the particular values or expectations which result in strain when in conflict.

In the absence of explicit criteria of consistency, most studies of status discrepancy employ procedures that implicitly adopt a frequency definition of norms. Typically, status-consistent and status-discrepant subgroups are identified in one of two ways: either the component status variables are cross-tabulated, with the cells of the cross-tabulation on or near the main diagonal defined as consistent and the cells in the extremes of the table defined as discrepant; or, alternatively, each component variable is partitioned into percentile classes, each class scored with its mean percentile, and a measure of the dispersion of scores over status variables—a status-discrepancy score—computed for each individual. Whatever the procedure, the sample is normally divided into groups varying in degree of status discrepancy, and comparisons on the criterion variable are made between these groups.

The difficulty with procedures of this sort is that they involve the assumption that those positions that are *statistically abnormal* give rise to *pathological behaviors* on the part of their incumbents. There is no particular reason, however, to believe that because an individual is an incumbent of an infrequently occupied status configuration he necessarily experiences any greater conflict than he would as a member of a more popular status set. The crucial question is whether he experiences any conflict between his expectations and the way he is actually treated or between the demands of various relevant others. It is easy to think of examples of groups whose status configurations are quite "inconsistent" and statistically rare and yet who experience no particular strain. For example, professional athletes and other entertainers see no conflict between their generally low educational attainment and their extremely high incomes. Similarly, Jewish professionals presumably experience no special strain

by virtue of being simultaneously of high occupational and low ethnic status. One could go on at some length with additional examples, but the point is still the same—*there is no guarantee that structurally deviant positions will give rise to the socially pathological conditions that engender strain.*[8] One must specify carefully the circumstances under which conflicts between expectations and realities, or between various expectations, are likely to occur. These are the conditions under which abnormally great strain would be expected.[9]

[8] In this connection it might be noted that the standard assumption in status-discrepancy studies that status-discrepant individuals are statistically rare is somewhat tenuous. Actually, the correlation over individuals between various status attributes is quite low for the U.S. population as a whole (generally on the order of .4). Thus it is not surprising that Nam and Powers found over two-thirds of heads of families in the United States status discrepant according to their criterion (see Charles B. Nam and Mary G. Powers, "Variations in Socio-economic Structure by Race, Residence, and Life Cycle," *American Sociological Review,* XXX [February, 1965], 97–103). In view of the low correlations among the various dimensions of status, the assumption that status discrepancy leads to abnormally great strain is weakened seriously. If most of the population experiences some "inconsistency" between their various status attributes, then it is hard to argue that discrepancy constitutes a structurally pathological state.

[9] Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 477, argues that individuals with high ascribed statuses and low achieved statuses, e.g., blue-collar workers of Anglo-Saxon ancestry, will experience frustration from not achieving what they come to expect by virtue of their high ascribed (ethnic) status. The problem with an argument of this kind is that there is no reason to suppose that people of high ethnic or other ascribed status *expect* high achievement to follow automatically from their relatively advantaged ethnic status. One could more plausibly argue that they expect the contrary, since all ethnic groups include relatively more "low achievers" (blue-collar workers, non-college trained, etc.) than "high achievers." The distribution of socio-economic status in America is skewed to the right, with relatively large portions of the population toward the low end. Once again we must underscore the point that the status-discrepancy hypothesis, if it makes any sense at all, must refer to the strains *actually felt by people,* not those *presumed* to accompany structural inconsistency.

But even when an individual is faced with conflicting demands and expectations engendered by membership in discrepant statuses, he may experience no pathological strain. An important mechanism for handling conflict is to choose one alternative to the exclusion of others. Thus, an individual who finds himself in a position of potential conflict between the demands of his various statuses may make a permanent resolution of his conflict by choosing to act in a manner appropriate to *one* of his statuses, whichever is most salient for him in general. Or he may make a new resolution of his conflict whenever it arises, sometimes behaving in a manner appropriate to one of his statuses, sometimes in a manner appropriate to another, whichever is most salient at the time. For example, high-status Catholics are confronted with conflicting pressures with regard to their vote, and appear more inclined to vote Democratic than their socioeconomic-status equals but more inclined to vote Republican than their fellow Catholics.[10] The intermediate political position of high-status Catholics at the aggregate level thus reflects the fact that for some such persons religious identification is more salient than socioeconomic status with regard to voting decisions, while for others socioeconomic status is more salient. It may also be the case that religion is sometimes more salient and that other times socioeconomic status is more salient, depending on the issues involved, the characteristics of the candidate, etc.

The mode of conflict resolution just described—the choice for one alternative to the exclusion of others—implies *at the aggregate level* a relationship between social-status memberships and behavior substantially different from that implied by the "status-discrepancy" hypothesis. This conception can be represented by an additive model in which each component

[10] See Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 118–49.

status variable has an independent effect, so that persons high on one variable but low on another will appear, on the average, to stand between the members of high-high and low-low groups in their propensities for various behaviors. In contrast, the status-discrepancy hypothesis asserts that conflict engendered by status discrepancy is likely to lead to strain and that this strain will be manifest in pathological behaviors, such as abnormally high levels of psychosomatic symptoms or unusually great prejudice against Negroes. Thus, according to the status-discrepancy hypothesis, incumbents in discrepant status configurations should, on the average, exhibit higher levels of these pathological symptoms than would be expected on the basis of the independent contribution of each of their status characteristics.

Unfortunately, previous studies have failed to distinguish between these two alternatives. This probably is due to the fact that the analytic procedures typically utilized make it impossible to take into account adequately the independent contribution of each of the component variables to the score on the criterion variable. Normally, a measure of status discrepancy is constructed utilizing one of the procedures described above. Then the sample is divided into crystallized and discrepant groups, without regard for the distribution of each of the component variables within or across the groups.[11] These groups are then compared on the dependent variable, and if the discrepant group differs from the crystallized group on the dependent variable a discrepancy effect is assumed. The problem with this procedure is that it obscures the independent effects of the component variables. Moreover, what appears to be a discrepancy effect actually may be due entirely to the effect of one of the component variables. For example, Lenski appears to have found an association between status discrepancy and liberal political attitudes. But a careful examination of his results suggests that almost all the "status-discrepancy" effect is associated with membership in low-status ethnic groups conjointly with high income, educational, or occupational status.[12] An equally plausible interpretation

[11] To be sure, some studies, e.g., Lenski's, make an attempt to control for status differences between the consistent and discrepant groups by eliminating the most extreme observations in such a way as to bring the means on each of the component variables into rough equivalence for the two groups. However, such a procedure does not take into account the *distribution* of each of these variables within the two groups, and since there is no reason to suppose that each of the variables makes an equally strong contribution to the dependent effect, there is still no way to separate the independent effects of each of the component variables from any effect of status discrepancy per se.

[12] In his "Status Crystallization: A Non-vertical Dimension of Social Status," *op. cit.*, p. 411, Lenski presents the percentage strongly Democratic and the percentage strongly liberal for each of the twelve discrepant combinations of his four status variables: education, occupation, income, and ethnicity, as well as for the status-consistent group. Inspection of the table indicates that, for each of the two tests (percentage Democratic and percentage liberal), the three highest pairs all involve low ethnicity in combination with high achieved status. Although tests of significance are not provided, it is possible to get a rough idea of how large a difference in percentage liberal or percentage Democratic would be required to reject the hypothesis that a given status-discrepant sample was drawn from the same population as the status-consistent sample. Consider the high occupation, low education configuration which has the largest deviation in percentage Democratic (47.2 per cent) from the status-consistent group (34.2 per cent) with the exception of the pairs involving low ethnicity. Applying the test that two population proportions are equal (Helen Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference* [New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1953], p. 78) given by

$$z = \frac{P_1 - P_2}{\sqrt{(pqN/N_1N_2)}},$$

we have $z = 1.57$. But for a one-tailed test the probability is less than .05 that $z \geq 1.645$. Although the N's vary among various status-discrepant groups, it can be shown, using the formula above, that the only status-discrepant pairs deviating significantly from the status-consistent group in percentage liberal or percentage Democratic are those pairs involving low ethnicity.

of his results is that in Detroit ethnicity is a more powerful predictor of political attitudes than socioeconomic variables. Negroes and Jews may be more likely to support the Democratic Party and liberal political positions than members of other groups *regardless* of their own socioeconomic status.

This suggests that the question that should be asked explicitly in tests of status-discrepancy effects is: Can a status-discrepancy model predict the behavior in question any better than a simple additive model in which each of the components of status is allowed to operate independently? If so, then we can assume a genuine *status-discrepancy* effect, and not simply a *status* effect. In short, an adequate test of the status-discrepancy hypothesis must remove explicitly the independent effects of each of the component status variables before considering the effect of status discrepancy per se.

Having reviewed some of the difficulties inherent in the empirical investigation of the status-discrepancy hypothesis, we turn now to an analysis of the relationship between status discrepancy and anti-Negro prejudice. We utilize a dummy-variable regression procedure by which it is possible to test the adequacy of an additive model in predicting prejudice and to test the hypothesis that status-discrepant groups depart from the predictions of the additive model.[13]

Before beginning our analysis, a word is necessary about our choice of dependent variables, anti-Negro prejudice. It has often been argued that one of the main sources of prejudice against minority groups is feelings of frustration and inadequacy in social situations.[14] While there have been no studies of status discrepancy and prejudice, several researchers have found social mobility to be positively associated with prejudice, particularly in situations in which upward or downward mobility was considered likely to induce feelings of frustration or insecurity.[15] Thus, if the status-discrepancy hypothesis holds—that status inconsistency leads to feelings of strain—these feelings should manifest themselves in abnormally great prejudice against Negroes.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for our analysis are derived from a December, 1963, National Opinion Research Center "Amalgam Survey." In these surveys interviews are conducted with a representative sample of the non-institutionalized adult population of the United States, chosen by multistage area probability sampling to the block level and quota sampling within blocks based on age, sex, race, and employment status. The total sample size for this survey was 1,413. Excluding 187 Negroes, 1,230 cases remain which constitute the basic sample for analysis. The findings may be generalized to the total adult white population of the United States.

To provide a measure of anti-Negro prejudice, an eight-item Guttman Scale of Pro-integration Sentiments was constructed from the items shown in Table 1. The items are listed in order of decreasing popularity, with the percentage of the sample giving the scale response—that is, the response indicating a more favorable attitude toward Negroes—shown on the right-hand side. Thus, the table indicates

[13] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Residential Areas and Differential Fertility," *Eugenics Quarterly*, XI (June, 1964), 82–89; see esp. pp. 87–88. Although Duncan utilizes a multiple-classification format rather than a dummy-variable regression format, the two procedures are basically the same. It was Duncan's idea to test the status-discrepancy hypothesis by fitting an additive model and examining the pattern of deviations from the predictions of that model.

[14] For a review of some of this literature, see Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York: Free Press, 1964), esp. pp. 49–71.

[15] See especially Joseph Greenblum and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Vertical Mobility and Prejudice: A Socio-psychological Analysis," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 480–91.

that about four-fifths of the sample (82 per cent) felt that Negroes should have equal employment opportunities, but only about one-quarter (27 per cent) indorsed aggressive integrationist activitiy on the part of Negroes.

The coefficient of reproducibility for the scale is .93; the expected coefficient of reproducibility on the asumption of independence among items is .83. Thus the improvement in reproducibility over that expected when the items are independent is $(.93 - .83)/(1 - .83) = .59$, which is significantly greater than would be expected by chance ($p < .001$).[16] We conclude that the items do form a Guttman Scale. After allocating each observed scale pattern to one of the nine scale types, scores ranging from 0 to 8 were assigned to the scale positions, high scores indicating attitudes more favorable toward Negroes. One can think of the scores on the scale of Pro-integration Sentiments as just the number of responses favorable to Negroes on an eight-item test. Mean scores are then just the average number of responses favorable to Negroes. The mean scale score for the entire sample is 4.3; for Southerners it is 2.6, while for non-Southerners it is 5.0.[17]

To assess the effect of status discrepancy on anti-Negro prejudice our strategy is to try to predict levels of prejudice from an additive model which takes into account

TABLE 1

GUTTMAN SCALE OF PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS

Item	Percentage Giving Pro-integration Response
1. "Do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any kind of job?" ("As good a chance.")	82
2. "Generally speaking, do you think there should be separate sections for Negroes in street cars and buses?" ("No.")	77
3. "Do you think Negroes should have the right to use the same parks, restaurants, and hotels as white people?" ("Yes.")	71
4. "Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools, or to separate schools?" ("Same schools.")	63
5. "How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner?" ("Not at all.")	49
6. "White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Negroes should respect that right." ("Disagree slightly" or "Disagree strongly.")	44
7. "Do you think there should be laws against marriages between Negroes and whites?" ("No.")	36
8. "Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted." ("Disagree slightly" or "Disagree strongly.")	27

[16] For procedures used in computing the coefficient of reproducibility expected on the assumption of item independence and the test of significance of the departure of the actual coefficient of reproducibility from it, see Leo A. Goodman, "Simple Statistical Methods for Scalogram Analysis," *Psychometrika*, XXIV (March, 1959), 33–34. I wish to thank Goodman for bringing his article to my attention.

[17] Because of the general difference in the level of anti-Negro prejudice on the part of whites residing within and without the South, it was considered possible that our scale of Pro-integration Sentiments might not work as well in the South as in the North. To guard against this possibility and to check for sex differences in response patterns (a matter of importance to some of the following analysis), the sample was cross-tabulated by sex and region of residence and a coefficient of reproducibility computed for each of the four subgroups thus formed. For all four groups the coefficient of reproducibility was above .9, thus providing some evidence that there are no marked differences in the structure of attitudes whites have toward Negroes which can be associated with sex or region of residence. There are, of course, mean differences between regions, but the items scale equally well.

the independent contribution of each component of a status set. If the prejudice levels for non-crystallized status configurations are greater than would be predicted from an additive model, we can infer that a *genuine* status-discrepancy effect is operative. If the actual prejudice levels do not depart from the expectations of the additive model, then we conclude that any observed differences in level of prejudice between status-consistent and status-discrepant groups can be attributed to the independent effects of the component variables, and thus that status discrepancy does not give rise to abnormally high levels of prejudice.

To test the hypothesis two problems are considered, one involving income and education as status variables and the other involving configurations of education by spouse's education.

INCOME AND EDUCATION

The top panel of Table 2 presents the mean score on the scale of Pro-integration Sentiments for the sixteen groups formed by the cross-tabulation of education of respondent by family income. Cutting points for each of the variables were chosen in such a way as to make the total distribution as symmetrical as possible around the main diagonal while retaining enough cases in each cell for analysis, within the limitations of the categories into which the data were originally coded. We would have preferred fewer "low-income, high-education" respondents, but the form of the data did not permit this. Our problem in establishing suitable cutting points for our variables serves to highlight one of the inherent difficulties of studies of status discrepancy discussed above—the absence of suitable criteria for determining which combinations of categories should be considered "discrepant" and which "crystallized."

Inspecting the top panel of Table 2, it is clear that substantial differences in pro-integration sentiments exist for the various subgroups. Examination of the row and column totals, for example, indicates that as income increases acceptance of Negroes increases, and likewise for education. Similarly, if one reads down the entries on the main diagonal (underlined in the table)—the "status-consistent" categories—it is evident that acceptance of Negroes decreases as one moves from the highest to the lowest group. Thus it is clear that there are differences in acceptance of Negroes associated with each of these two components of socioeconomic status. The question is whether these variables, *operating independently*, adequately account for the observed differences in mean scale scores between the subgroups.

The model we propose is one in which the Pro-integration Sentiments score for a given individual is the algebraic sum of four components—one common to all individuals, one common to all members of a given education category, one common to all members of a given income category, and a fourth for residence outside the South which allows us to take into account the fact that attitudes toward Negroes differ strongly between the South and the rest of the country. The model can be represented by a dummy-variable multiple-regression equation of the form

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + c_1Z_1 + c_2Z_2 + c_3Z_3 + dN, \quad (1)$$

where Y = an individual's scale score; $X_1 = 1$ if the respondent has had at least some college, and 0 otherwise; $X_2 = 1$ if the respondent is a high-school graduate, and 0 otherwise; $X_3 = 1$ if the respondent has had some high school, and 0 otherwise; $Z_1 = 1$ if the annual income of the respondent's family is at least $10,000, and 0 otherwise; $Z_2 = 1$ if the respondent's family income is between $7,500 and $9,999, and 0 otherwise; $Z_3 = 1$ if the respondent's family income is between $5,000 and $7,499, and 0 otherwise; and $N = 1$ if the respondent resides outside

the census South, and 0 otherwise. Note that the mean prejudice score predicted by the regression model for individuals in the ijth cell (representing the intersection of the ith education and jth income categories) is just

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = a + b_i + c_j + d[Pr(N|ij)], \quad (2)$$

since $X_i = Z_j = 1$ while all other X and Z are zero, and $Pr(N|ij)$ is just the proportion of respondents in the ijth cell who reside outside the South. It should be clear that this procedure gives no explicit weight for the lowest education category (eighth grade or less) or the lowest income category (under $5,000). The mean score for individuals with no more than eighth-grade education and under $5,000 annual family income is given by the constant plus the coefficient for

TABLE 2

ACTUAL AND EXPECTED RELATION OF PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS TO FAMILY INCOME AND RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Level of Education	Total Family Income				
	≥$10,000	$7,500–$9,999	$5,000–$7,499	<$5,000	Total
	Actual Mean Pro-integration Scores				
At least some college	5.67	6 16	5.28	4.16	5.41
High-school graduate	4.89	4 68	5.32	4.16	4.80
Some high school	4.24	3 76	4 23	4.10	4.11
Eighth grade or less	3.82	3.12	3.41	2.86	3 07
Total	5.06	4.72	4.62	3.59	4 32
	Mean Scores Predicted from Regression Model*				
At least some college	5.57	5.67	5.43	4.72	....
High-school graduate	5.10	4.79	5 02	4.32	....
Some high school	4.56	4.30	4.39	3.73	....
Eighth grade or less	3.17	3.10	3.50	2.89	....
	Actual Mean Scores Minus Mean Scores Predicted from Model				
At least some college	0.10	0.49	−0.15	−0.56	....
High-school graduate	− .21	− .11	.20	− .16	....
Some high school	− .32	− .54	− .16	.37	....
Eighth grade or less	0.65	0.02	−0.09	−0.03	....
	Number of Cases				
At least some college	89	55	75	45	264
High-school graduate	56	68	111	86	321
Some high school	29	37	91	120	277
Eighth grade or less	17	26	75	189	307
Total	191	186.	352	440	1,169†

* See text for details; adjusted for region of residence (South vs. other).

† The table excludes sixty-one cases for which income or education data were not available.

non-southern residence weighted by the proportion in this category residing outside the South.

For this particular problem the regression weights derived from the least-squares solution of the equation are as follows:

$$a = 1.517 \qquad c_1 = .491$$
$$b_1 = 1.879 \qquad c_2 = .313$$
$$b_2 = 1.245 \qquad c_3 = .455$$
$$b_3 = .804 \qquad d = 2.199$$

The regression accounts for about one-quarter of the variance in the Pro-integration Sentiments scale scores ($R = .527$), indicating that other factors in addition to income, education, and region of residence help to determine prejudice levels for individuals. Inspection of the net regression coefficients confirms the positive zero-order associations of income and education with acceptance of Negroes noted above, although the association between income and acceptance of Negroes, net of education and region of residence, does not appear very strong. Indeed, inspection of the coefficients for income (the c_i) indicates that the major variation in mean level of prejudice is between those with family incomes of less than five thousand dollars per year (the omitted category) and those whose family income is five thousand dollars or greater. Above five thousand dollars, income appears to have very little effect on attitudes toward Negroes.

Our principal interest here, however, is not in developing a theory of prejudice but in assessing the adequacy of the additive model to account for differences in mean levels of prejudice among different status configurations. The second panel of Table 2 gives the expected mean scale scores computed from the regression weights presented above, and the third panel presents the differences between the actual mean scores and the mean scores predicted by the equation. The status-discrepancy hypothesis calls for systematic departure of the actual means from those predicted by the additive model in the extreme cells of the table (the lower-left and upper-right corners). In particular, we would expect the additive model to overstate the mean scores on the scale of Pro-integration Sentiments for these cells of the table since, according to the hypothesis, status-discrepant individuals are subject to an *abnormal* amount of strain which gives rise to *abnormally* great prejudice, beyond what would be expected from the independent and additive effects of each of the component status variables. But it is evident from examination of the third panel of Table 2 that departures of the actual cell means from those predicted by the additive model are not very large and, moreover, are not at all systematic—both positive and negative residuals are scattered through the table. And, indeed, the largest residuals occur in cells with very small case bases, where the possibility of random fluctuation is greatest. Hence, we are led to conclude that there are no systematic interactions between income and education levels in determining prejudice.

Table 3 summarizes these results by aggregating respondents into three groups, those with education "higher" than income, those whose levels of income and education are "consistent," and those with education "lower" than income. Examination of the table reaffirms our previous conclusion: while there are substantial education and income differences in acceptance of Negroes, there is no "status-discrepancy" effect, per se. The pattern of mean scale scores observed for different status configurations is almost perfectly reproduced by the additive model.[18] Discrepancy be-

[18] To test the statistical significance of the departure of the actual means in Tables 3 and 6 from those expected from regression, t-tests were computed for each line of the tables. In order to facilitate computation the means expected from regression were treated as universe parameters and the statistic $t = (\bar{X} - \mu)/(s/\sqrt{N})$ was computed. This was an extremely conservative assumption, since in fact the means expected from regression are estimates of the universe parameters and do

tween income and educational status does not give rise to heightened levels of anti-Negro prejudice.

EDUCATION AND SPOUSE'S EDUCATION

Thus far we have considered the effect of discrepancy between two statuses conjointly occupied by a single individual—education and income. We turn now to consideration of the consequences of discrepancy between levels of educational attainment of husbands and wives. Because of the strong effect of education on attitudes and behavior, marked educational discrepancy between self and spouse might be expected to engender heightened strain and tension for each member of the marital pair, which could manifest itself in abnormally high levels of anti-Negro prejudice. In this case, levels of prejudice for those with educationally discrepant spouses would be higher than expected under the assumption that prejudice levels are independently influenced by one's own level of education and the educational level of one's spouse. If, however, actual mean prejudice levels do not depart systematically from the expectations of an additive model, we can conclude that familial educational discrepancies per se have no effect on prejudice.

There is good reason to suppose that the additive model is the appropriate one. For both males and females there is a fairly strong zero-order association between educational attainment and acceptance of Negroes. Level of educational attainment can be seen as partially determining level of acceptance of Negroes. Thus, given the further assumption that the attitudes of one member of the marital pair tend to be influenced by the attitudes of the other, we would expect acceptance of Negroes to increase systematically as spouse's educational attainment increases, net of respondent's level of education and, likewise, to increase systematically with respondent's education, net of spouse's education. This is precisely the pattern specified by the additive model.

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME-EDUCATION CONFIGURATIONS AND PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS

Status Configuration	Actual Mean Pro-integration Score	Mean Score Expected from Regression	Actual Minus Expected	Ratio of Actual to Expected	Number of Cases
Education higher than income	4.80	4.69	+0.11	1.02	492
Education and income consistent	4.00	4.04	− 04	0.99	437
Education lower than income	3.91	4.06	−0.15	0.96	240

Before turning to an empirical assessment of the relative merits of these two hypotheses, we note that in the present problem, unlike the previous one, there is reason to suspect a somewhat different relationship between status discrepancy and prejudice for males and females. In contemporary American society, men might find it more of a strain to have less education than their wives than to have more, while women might consider it more of a strain to have more education than their husbands than to have less. Even were this the case, however, predictions based on a simple additive model taking into account respondent's education, spouse's education, and region, without regard to sex of respondent, could still appear to

have standard errors > 0. Even so, the t-ratios are almost all less than unity and are never much greater. For no line of the summary tables does the actual mean depart significantly from the mean expected from regression at the .10 level for a two-tailed test.

adequately account for the observed pattern of prejudice, simply because the contradictory effects for males and females of the two types of status discrepancy—education greater than spouse's and education less than spouse's—were canceling each other out.

Inspection of the left-hand column of Table 6 would seem to indicate that an interaction between sex and the education variables exists. For males, prejudice is greatest when one's own education is less than one's wife's, while for females the reverse is the case. At this point, one could conclude that in America if the man is not in a position of educational superiority the consequences are unfortunate for both members of the marital pair. But is this conclusion warranted? It is not altogether clear, since the pattern of mean scores

TABLE 4

ACTUAL AND EXPECTED RELATION OF PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS TO EDUCATION AND SPOUSE'S EDUCATION, FOR MALES

LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT	SPOUSE'S LEVEL OF EDUCATION: At Least Some College	High-School Graduate	Some High School	Eighth Grade or Less	Total
	Actual Mean Pro-integration Scores				
At least some college....	5.39	5.41	4.56	6.75	5.38
High-school graduate.....	5.20	4.87	4.58	5.00	4.86
Some high-school........	3.80	4.30	4.50	3.78	4.28
Eighth grade or less.....	3.88	4.05	2.64	2.78	2.97
Total................	5.12	4.76	3.95	3.31	4.27
	Mean Scores Expected from Regression Model*				
At least some college.....	5.46	5.46	4.42	5.52	......
High-school graduate .. .	4.79	4.97	4.69	4.67	
Some high school........	4.21	4.44	4.25	3.91	
Eighth grade or less ..	3.88	3.25	2.91	2.86	
	Actual Mean Scores minus Mean Scores Predicted from Model				
At least some college ...	−0.07	−0.05	0.14	1.23	....
High-school graduate ..	.41	−.10	−.11	0.33	
Some high school........	−.41	−.14	.25	−0.13	
Eighth grade or less......	0.00	0.80	−0.27	−0.08	
	Number of Cases				
At least some college ..	57	41	9	4	111
High-school graduate ..	15	76	26	13	130
Some high school.......	5	44	46	23	118
Eighth grade or less....	8	20	36	88	152
Total................	85	181	117	128	511

* See text for details; adjusted for region of residence (South vs. other).

presented in the left-hand column of Table 6 could be produced under the additive assumption if it were the case that a man's level of education counts more than his wife's in determining both his own level of prejudice and hers. Inspection of the row and column totals of the top panels of Tables 4 and 5 would appear to indicate that, in fact, husbands' education makes the greater difference in level of prejudice for both themselves and their wives, although, as noted above, both own and spouse's level of education are positively associated with acceptance of Negroes. In the male table (Table 4) the range of mean prejudice scores over education categories is greater for respondents than for spouses, while in the female table (Table 5) the range is greater for spouses.

To test the hypothesis that an additive

TABLE 5

ACTUAL AND EXPECTED RELATION OF PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS TO EDUCATION AND SPOUSE'S EDUCATION, FOR FEMALES

Level of Education of Respondent	Spouse's Level of Education: At Least Some College	High-School Graduate	Some High School	Eighth Grade or Less	Total
	Actual Mean Pro-integration Scores				
At least some college	5.72	5 36	4 00	4.40	5.49
High-school graduate	5.67	4 41	5 39	3 25	4.78
Some high school	3 86	4.31	3 97	3 00	3.78
Eighth grade or less	4.20	3.75	3.92	3.20	3.41
Total	5.46	4 51	4 33	3.19	4.35
	Mean Scores Expected from Regression Model*				
At least some college	5 83	4.97	4.99	3.68	....
High-school graduate	5.41	4 66	4 86	3.60	....
Some high school	4.00	3.90	4 12	3 06	....
Eighth grade or less	4.35	3 94	3 96	3 16	....
	Actual Mean Scores minus Mean Scores Predicted from Model				
At least some college	−0.11	0.39	−0 99	0 72	....
High-school graduate	.26	− .25	.53	− .35	....
Some high school	− .14	.41	− .15	− 06	....
Eighth grade or less	−0.15	−0.19	−0.04	0 04	....
	Number of Cases				
At least some college	78	28	6	5	117
High-school graduate	43	88	31	16	178
Some high school	14	32	59	38	143
Eighth grade or less	5	12	24	96	137
Total	140	160	120	155	575

* See text for details; adjusted for region of residence (South vs. other).

model adequately accounts for the observed differences between familial educational configurations in level of prejudice, a prediction equation was constructed which includes interaction terms between sex and each of the education variables, and separate comparisons were made for males and females. The equation is given by

$$\hat{Y} = a + \sum_{i=1}^{3} b_i X_i + \sum_{j=1}^{3} c_j Z_j + dN + eF + \sum_{i=1}^{3} f_i FX_i + \sum_{j=1}^{3} g_j FZ_j, \quad (3)$$

where Y = an individual's scale score; each $X_i = 1$ for individuals in the ith education category, and 0 otherwise; each $Z_j = 1$ for individuals whose spouses fell in the jth spouse's education category, and 0 otherwise; $N = 1$ for respondents residing outside the South, and 0 otherwise; $F = 1$ for female respondents, and 0 otherwise; $FX_i = 1$ for respondents in the ith education category who are also female, and 0 otherwise; and $FZ_j = 1$ for female respondents whose husbands fell in the jth spouse's education category, and 0 otherwise.

Note that this equation is equivalent to writing distinct equations for males and females, with the exception that the same effect of residence is postulated for both sexes. For males the predicted mean prejudice score for individuals in the ijth cell reduces to

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = a + b_i + c_j + d[Pr(N \mid ij)], \quad (4)$$

since $X_i = Z_j = 1$ while all other X and Z and $F = 0$, and the coefficient d, the regression coefficient for northern residence in the original equation, is weighted by the proportion northern in the ijth cell of Table 4. For females the prediction for the ijth cell is given by

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = (a + e) + (b_i + f_i) + (c_j + g_j) + d[Pr(N \mid ij)], \quad (5)$$

since $X_i = Z_j = F = 1$ while all other X and Z are 0, and the coefficient d is weighted by the proportion non-southern in the ijth cell of Table 5. Note that the coefficient d for residence is the same for males and females. Since we know that residence makes about the same amount of difference in prejudice for males and females, the consequence of not allowing for an interaction between sex and residence is very slight.

For this problem the regression weights derived from the solution of equation (3) are as follows:

a = 1.48	c_2 = .37	f_2 = −.76
b_1 = 1.88	c_3 = .11	f_3 = −.90
b_2 = 1.36	d = 2.17	g_1 = .76
b_3 = .93	e = .30	g_2 = .17
c_1 = .51	f_1 = −.85	g_3 = .63

As in the previous problem, the regression accounts for about one-quarter of the variance in the scale scores (R = .534), indicating again that other factors are involved in the determination of prejudice. Inspection of the regression weights bears out our previous expectations about the relative importance of own and spouse's level of education for males and females. The coefficients of the X_i terms (own education) are all substantially greater than the coefficients of the Z_j terms (spouse's education), indicating that for males one's own education is substantially more important than that of one's wife in determining levels of prejudice; but females get a decrement for their own educational level and an increment for their husband's educational level since the coefficients of the interaction terms FX_i are negative and those for the interaction terms FZ_j are positive. Thus we conclude that men have substantially more influence over their wives' attitudes toward Negroes than women do over their husbands' attitudes.

Turning to the evaluation of the additive model, we note that the second panels of Tables 4 and 5 give the expected mean prejudice scores computed from the regression weights, and the third panels give the differences between the actual mean scores and the mean scores predicted by the equation. As before, in the income-by-education problem, the deviations are not systematic, and none of them are very large. Summarizing the results in Table 6, we see that for both males and females discrepancy between one's own educational attainment and that of one's spouse has no effect on prejudice toward Negroes. Examining the ratio of the actual to the expected mean prejudice scores, we see that in all cases the ratios are very close to unity. As in the previous problem, in no case are the differences between the actual and expected means statistically significant.

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS OF MARRIAGE PARTNERS AND PRO-INTEGRATION SENTIMENTS

Status Configuration	Actual Mean Pro-integration Score	Mean Score Expected from Regression	Actual minus Expected	Ratio of Actual to Expected	Number of Cases
Males:					
Education greater than wife's....	4.84	4.81	0.03	1.01	116
Education same as wife's.......	4.23	4.26	− .03	0.99	267
Education less than wife's.......	3.85	3.82	.03	1.01	128
Females:					
Education greater than husband's	4.27	4.13	.14	1.03	124
Education same as husband's....	4.29	4.40	− .11	0.98	321
Education less than husband's...	4.58	4.44	0.14	1.03	130

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of an analysis of data from a national sample of the adult population of the United States, we conclude that anti-Negro prejudice cannot be considered a consequence of status discrepancy. Two tests of the theory, one involving income and equation as status variables and the other involving education and spouse's education and treating males and females separately, both show that while substantial differences in prejudice exist between status groups these differences can be reproduced almost perfectly by an additive model which takes into account the independent effect of each of the component variables. Whether other of the posited consequences of status discrepancy will turn out "genuinely" to exist cannot be predicted at this point. It should be clear, however, that future work in this area will have to be very careful about what is defined as discrepant and what is defined as consistent, about what kinds of outcomes can reasonably be expected on the basis of the theory, and, above all, about what kinds of outcomes are truly attributable to status discrepancy and not to the independent effects of the constituent variables of the status set. Hopefully, this research has helped to point the way to a more adequate consideration of the genuine consequences of the theory of status crystallization.

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

Pressures and Defenses in Bureaucratic Roles[1]

R. Bar-Yosef and E. O. Schild

ABSTRACT

Line-bureaucrats may be exposed to conflicting pressures from superiors and from clients. In that case they are in need of "defenses" to reduce pressures or alleviate their impact. A societal ideology may serve as individual defense; moreover, the organizational unit as a whole may develop structural mechanisms of defense. Two such mechanisms, "joint defense" and "buffer defense," are discussed. The existence of "buffer defense" makes it possible for bureaucrats to resist both superiors and clients, and act according to independent criteria; the absence of any type of defense may lead to erratic behavior, where the bureaucrat bows to whatever pressure is momentarily strongest.

Blau and Scott[2] have pointed out that officials (particularly in "service organizations") frequently face a dilemma between "adherence to and enforcement of procedures" and becoming "captives of their clientele." On the one hand, they are exposed to pressures from organizational superiors that impel them toward conformity with the policy and regulations of the organization. On the other hand, clients exert pressures and present demands which may deviate considerably from the bureaucratic norms.

This dilemma is alleviated to the extent that clients are well socialized in their role as clients of a bureaucracy.[3] A bureaucratic organization makes certain assumptions as to the behavior of its clients. The client is expected to accept the authority of the organization as legitimate, and to conform in his dealings with officials to certain norms of interaction. In particular, he is supposed to acknowledge that the line-bureaucrat is restricted by the organization in his freedom to concede requests and demands. If so, the pressures which the client will exert on the bureaucrat will be restrained. Schelling[4] has pointed out that if one of the parties in a bargaining situation is committed to his stand, and if this commitment is recognized by the second party, the second party will frequently forego threats or promises which he might otherwise have profitably employed. The bureaucratic regulations serve as such "commitment" for the line-bureaucrat.

But if the client does not, or only insufficiently does, recognize the existence of this commitment, the bureaucrat's position is only worsened. He is, in fact, committed to the organization—but at the same time he is exposed to pressures as if he were a free agent. Thus, when clients are imperfectly socialized—when they recognize neither the organization's criteria for allocating services nor the rules of interaction—the client-bureaucrat encounter is likely to turn into a field of unrestrained pressures.

[1] We are greatly indebted to our two interviewers, Mrs. Rachel Seginer and Mrs. Rina Zamir, for their intelligent and stimulating co-operation throughout the study. We also want to thank Professors S. N. Eisenstadt and Elihu Katz, Dr. Y. Dror and Dr. D. Kahnemann for their valuable comments on a previous draft of this paper.

[2] Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 52.

[3] In this case, the clients may indeed be considered as participants ("low participants") in the bureaucracy; see Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press), 1961.

[4] T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 1960.

Katz and Eisenstadt[5] have, in this context, analyzed the interaction between officials of public institutions in Israel and new immigrants. The new immigrants, who have little previous experience with bureaucratic organizations, present demands which deviate considerably from the organizational norms; moreover, as (at least in the initial stages of absorption) they have not learned to accept the organization as a legitimate authority, they will exert strong pressures to make the bureaucrat accede to their demands.

Katz and Eisenstadt suggest that in this situation the bureaucrat has two choices: He may "overconform" to the organizational regulations, disregarding considerations of the interests of the clientele; or he may disregard organizational norms, and "debureaucratization" will be found.

However, whatever the choice of the bureaucrat, whether he elects to resist organizational pressures or to resist client pressures, he will always be in need of defense. Whyte[6] presents a case of the possible outcome when a member of an organization is caught in cross-pressures without appropriate defenses. Waitresses, subject to pressures from both customers and superiors, were likely—when pressures become very intense—to "break down" and cry. A different example of the need for defenses is presented by Blau,[7] who reports how workers in a public employment agency defend themselves against the impact of conflicts with clients by a mechanism of psychological tension release: complaining to colleagues and joking about the clients.

Defense can have either or both of two functions: (*a*) to reduce the pressures exerted (i.e., make threats and/or sanctions applied by client or organizational superior fewer or more lenient); (*b*) to lessen the impact of the pressures (e.g., the psychological tension release does not reduce pressures actually exerted by the clients, but makes them easier to bear). But whatever its functions, resistance to pressures presupposes the existence of appropriate mechanisms of defense.

What are the possible mechanisms of defense for the line-bureaucrat? Thompson[8] has pointed to the possibility of *ideology* as a defense (obviously fulfilling the second of the two functions mentioned above). And indeed, in regard to the Israeli case, Katz and Eisenstadt have suggested that a general societal ideology may serve as what is here termed "defense." Societal values held by the bureaucrat may legitimize his decisions—above and beyond, or in contradiction to, organizational (and/or professional) values.[9] The existence of such legitimation will reduce the impact of the pressures. Evidently, the fact that the line-bureaucrat holds a societal orientation as part of his role image does not in itself predict whether he will conform to the organizational requirements or accede to the clients' demands. The societal values may, depending upon their content, predispose to conformity to the organization or to resistance to the organization. The important point in the present context is that these values make it easier for the bureaucrat to resist pressures against a decision made in accordance with the values, and thus serve as a mechanism of defense.[10]

This mechanism of defense is an *individual* one; it is not dependent on the inter-

[5] Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, V (1960), 113–33.

[6] William F. Whyte, *Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), pp. 64–81.

[7] Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 82–96.

[8] Victor B. Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 114–37.

[9] In particular when the organization is a "commonweal" one (cf. Blau and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 54).

[10] In modern psychological language: the societal values add cognitive elements consonant with the decision and thus reduce dissonance.

action of the bureaucrat with his peers (beyond, perhaps, social support for his societal values), nor is it linked to any structural change, even informal, within the organizational framework. But if it is true that defense against pressures fulfils a crucial function for the bureaucrats who are caught up in cross-pressures, then we might expect to find some structural adjustment, too. In other words, we may look for *structural* (formal or informal) mechanisms of defense.

It is well known that the peer group may support the bureaucrat in deviations from the organizational regulations. There seems, however, to be no reason why such informal peer organization should provide defense against superiors only. Bureaucrats who conform to the bureaucracy are in need of defense against client pressures; hence, we may inquire into the possibility that this kind of defense, too, may develop on the basis of the peer group.

In defense based on the peer group, all bureaucrats perform identical roles in the defense. But a defense mechanism can also be developed by appropriate division of labor; certain bureaucrats assume the informal role of "handling pressures" and thereby reduce the pressures exerted on the colleagues.[11]

In the present paper we shall present findings which exemplify and elaborate on such mechanisms of defense. Whatever the mechanism, however, we must—as stressed above—expect a correlation between the existence of some kind of defense and the resistance to pressures. The two responses envisaged by Katz and Eisenstadt—(*a*) overconformity and (*b*) debureaucratization—seem linked, in the first case to defense against clients and lack of defense against superiors, and in the second case to defense against superiors and lack of defense against clients. But logically, at least, we may expect two further response types: (*c*) The bureaucrat may pursue an almost *independent* policy. He will decide, and legitimize his decisions, on the basis of criteria rooted in his own values or those of the unit to which he belongs (as opposed to the values of the organization as a whole or those of the clients). It would seem that such behavior on the part of the bureaucrat is contingent upon the existence of effective defenses against *both* clients and superiors. (*d*) If *no* effective defenses exist, either against clients or against superiors, we may expect the bureaucrat's behavior to be *erratic*. Whichever pressure is the strongest at any given moment will impel the bureaucrat to act in that direction. The existence of strong cross-pressures will then frequently lead to inconsistent behavior—sometimes conformity to organization, sometimes conformity to clients' demands. The "independent" bureaucrat, too, conforms to different sources of demands in different situations; his decision, however, is consistent in accordance with certain criteria—while the "erratic" bureaucrat "bows with the wind."[12]

The data to follow will offer some evidence on these two additional types of responses to the cross-pressures.

DATA

The study was carried out in two development towns in Israel where the great majority of the residents are new immigrants. Town A had, at the time of study, a population of about 30,000; town B, a population of about 5,000. The location of the two towns—at *some distance from* the national centers of population and

[11] The school principal has been described as performing such a role in respect to pressures exerted by parents on teachers. See Howard S. Becker, "Social Class Variations in the Teacher-Pupil Relationship," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, XXV (1952), 451-65.

[12] The erratic bureaucrat may seem similar to the "expedient" type described in Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958). In fact, however, our entire analysis refers to "expediency" in the sense of the control of role behavior by pressures. Only the "individual defense" by a societal ideology is relevant to "moral" behavior.

activity—made for a certain isolation from headquarters of the organizational units in the towns; thus organizational pressures were less in these units than in units located closer to big cities.

Table 1 shows the institutions in which the study was carried out. The respondents comprise practically all of the line-personnel in these institutions. Each line-bureaucrat was given a structured interview lasting about two hours, and replied to a

TABLE 1

LINE-BUREAUCRATS INTERVIEWED, BY TOWN AND ORGANIZATION

Organization	Role of Line-Bureaucrats	Respondents (N=67)	
		Town A	Town B
Social welfare office	Social welfare officers	12	4
Immigrant absorption department	Absorption officials	7	4
Health insurance clinic	Doctors and nurses	14	3
Labor exchange	Work-placement officers	8	3
Municipal department of taxes and water supply	Collectors	8	......
A and B district public health office	Public health inspectors	A and B=4	

brief questionnaire containing closed questions. All interviewing was carried out by the same two interviewers.

Each interview was analyzed and rated by three coders: (*a*) the interviewer herself; (*b*) the second interviewer (who had had no personal contact with the respondent to be rated); and (*c*) a rater who had met none of the respondents.

Each respondent was classified in one category on each of the following two dimensions:

1. Conformity and resistance
   a) Consistent conformity to organization and resistance to clients
   b) Consistent conformity to clients and resistance to organization
   c) Independent policy—conformity sometimes to clients and sometimes to organization, in accordance with criteria extraneous to organizational regulations
   d) Erratic behavior—conformity sometimes to clients and sometimes to organization, *without* criteria beyond the strength of pressure exerted
2. Individual defense
   a) Individual defense primarily against clients' pressures
   b) Individual defense primarily against organizational pressures
   c) No individual defense

While this coding was done for each *respondent*, each of the *units* was also rated on the basis of all interviews with members of that unit. The categories were as follows:

3. Defense mechanism in units
   a) Defense by division of labor
   b) Defense by peer group without specialization
   c) No structural defense

The intercoder consensus was quite high —about 80 per cent. Disagreements were resolved by the authors. Five cases could not be classified on the conformity-resistance dimension, and three cases could not be classified on the individual defense dimension.

The questionnaire included three items designed to tap the societal orientation of the respondents. These items were phrased in parallel for the different organizations, allowing for the modification of specific details in accordance with the functions of the organization. The items (each providing four response categories: very important, important, not important, and it should not be done at all) were as follows:

1. To what extent is it important that a ——— [the role of the respondent] should instruct clients in their rights and duties as citizens of Israel?
2. To what extent is it important that a ——— [the role of the respondent]

should educate the clients to general societal values?

3. To what extent is it important that a ——— [the role of the respondent] should persuade the client to ——— [do *something against his own wishes and* not required by the organization in question, but desirable according to Israeli values]?

After dichotomization of the items, they scaled in a Guttman scale with reproducibility of .90. By foldover technique the zero point was found, and the respondents were classified as holding "high" or "low" societal orientation. Two respondents did not reply to all three items and are, therefore, excluded from the analyses referring to this scale.

INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE

A respondent was classified as utilizing individual defense when he tended to legitimize his decisions by values extraneous to the bureaucratic organization. The following may serve as illustrations: "If I know that what I do is for the best in helping the immigrant to his *long-run* adjustment, then I don't care what he says." "Those people in Tel Aviv don't know what the situation is here. They have the best intentions, but their demands are not realistic. I have a clear conscience because what I do is the best possible under the given circumstances. In my way I encourage the people to stay here in town rather than moving north—and that's the important thing, isn't it?"[13]

It may be mentioned that the use of this defense is, by definition, a deviation from classical bureaucratic principles. The latter assume, in regard to any decision, first that it will be made in accordance with the organizational regulations, and second that these regulations in themselves provide all legitimation needed. If the decision made was one of conformity to the regulations, it should by this very fact be legitimized, and the extra-bureaucratic considerations involved in "individual defense" have no place as independent legitimizing criteria. If the decision was in violation of the bureaucratic rules, it should not have been made in the first place; and if brought about by *force majeure*, it should certainly not be legitimized. Thus, if the bureaucrat sees his decisions as having a source of legitimization beyond the organizational framework, this is a deviation from classical bureaucratic attitudes.

TABLE 2

SOCIETAL ORIENTATION AND INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE AGAINST CLIENTS*

	No. of Respondents Classified as Applying		
	Individual Defense Against Clients	No Individual Defense at All	Total
High societal orientation	14	15	29
Low societal orientation	6	18	24
Total	20	33	53

* $Q = .47$; $\chi^2 = 3.03$; p(one-tailed) $< .05$.

Katz and Eisenstadt suggested that this deviation may be correlated with the general societal ideology of the bureaucrat. The role image of the bureaucrat may include role goals of a general societal character not identical with the specific functions of the organization. The inclusion of such goals may aid the bureaucratic legitimation (defense against clients) or support the bureaucrat in resisting the hierarchy (defense against organization). The hypothesis may then be phrased, that a bureaucrat with a general societal orientation is more likely to have individual defense than a bureaucrat without this orientation.

Tables 2 and 3 present the relevant

[13] Much value is ascribed in Israel to the immigrants' remaining in development towns, rather than moving to the populated centers of the country.

data. In Table 2 respondents with individual defense against clients are compared to respondents with no individual defense (i.e., either against clients or against organization). It is seen that a respondent with high societal orientation is more likely to have individual defense against clients than is a respondent with low societal orientation.

Table 3 parallels 2, this time for respondents with individual defense against organization. It is seen that a respondent with high societal orientation is more likely to have individual defense against organization than is a respondent with low societal orientation.

TABLE 3

SOCIETAL ORIENTATION AND INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE AGAINST ORGANIZATION*

	No. of Respondents Classified as Applying		
	Individual Defense against Organization	No Individual Defense at All	Total
High societal orientation..........	7	15	22
Low societal orientation..........	2	18	20
Total..........	9	33	42

* $Q = .62$; $\chi^2 = 2.96$; p(one-tailed) $< .05$.

Thus, societal orientation—as hypothesized—predisposes the bureaucrat to individual defense. However, as seen by comparing Tables 2 and 3, the societal orientation does not influence the *direction* of the defense. In general, respondents are more likely to use individual defense against clients (38 percent) than against organization (18 per cent); but there is no difference in this respect between respondents with high and respondents with low societal orientation ($\chi^2 = .10$, $p \geq .60$).

We may thus conclude that to the extent the bureaucrat's role image includes general societal goals, he is more likely to be able to apply individual defense, be it against clients or against organization.

STRUCTURAL DEFENSE

The existence of individual defense is thus a question of the orientation of the individual and need not be correlated with the structure of the organization in which he serves. (Indeed, the occurrence of individual defense was found to be independent of the organizational unit.)

The story is a different one when we turn to structural defense. The respondents themselves, most of whom explicitly recognized the existence of strong pressures, suggested the initial idea in the analysis of structural defense. One respondent said: "Every Friday we have a meeting of the whole staff. Each of us presents cases, or the difficult ones he is presently working on, and we decide jointly what should be done. [Interviewer: How do you decide?] Well, usually, you see, the official who is dealing with the case knows it best, so we follow his recommendation. [Interviewer: So why couldn't he decide without a meeting?] Well, it's nicer to have a *staff* decision, and then you aren't tempted to back down later."

We see here the peer group actually formalized as a mechanism of defense. The "staff decision," or rather the stamp of approval by colleagues, makes it easier to bear pressures. Like individual defense, it provides support—this time social support—consonant with the decision. But this defense may in addition *actually reduce* the pressures exerted, and not just alleviate their impact.

First, the "collective" decision-making may assure consistency among the bureaucrats; otherwise a concession on the part of one bureaucrat may be used by clients as a precedent to extract the same concession from other bureaucrats. Second, the staff decision provides the bureaucrat with the *commitment* he previously lacked. While commitment to abstract regulations

may make little impression upon the client, the fact that the bureaucrat is bound by a staff decision in the concrete case may more easily be recognized. The "bargaining position" of the bureaucrat is thereby improved, and the potential pressures may not be exerted in full.

This mechanism of defense—we may call it "joint defense"—may thus be more effective than individual defense. But the important difference is in the type of mechanism—that the "joint defense" involves the structure of interaction in the unit. Structurally, it may seem rather primitive; but the crucial step is taken from purely psychological-attitudinal defense to a mechanism based on restructuring of role relations.

Even in units with joint defense, however, no new roles are created, and no specialization is found. But some respondents could also tell of such phenomena. A respondent reported that when he was faced with strong pressures from a client, and in particular when the pressure was backed up by the leaders of the client's ethnic group (a not infrequent occurrence in immigrant towns), he "would send him [the client or ethnic leader] to X [a colleague of the respondent]." Other respondents from the same unit told the same story. It turned out that X had become a "pressure specialist," handling all cases in which his colleagues felt difficulty in resisting. Moreover, this informal role of X's was being recognized outside the unit. Representatives of clients would turn to X even if the case was being handled by another official. Organizational superiors, too, tended to use X as a channel for dealing with suspected or actual violations of the organizational norms.

Here then, and in the other units where a similar set-up was found, a new pattern of interaction has developed to handle pressures. One of the officials acts as a "buffer" between his colleagues and sources of major pressures (particularly organized pressures). He thereby evidently releases the colleagues from a major part of the pressures, thus effectively improving their position.

Moreover, the deflection of pressures into an institutionalized channel, with consequent postponement of the immediate clash, may in itself alleviate the conflict; in this respect the "buffer defense" shows similarity to grievance procedures in industry.[14] As far as the "buffer" himself is concerned, it may paradoxically be that the very concentration of demands and pressures upon him facilitates resistance to the demands. Schelling has pointed out that a person exposed to similar demands from many sources may be in a better bargaining position in respect to each source than a person exposed to the demand from one or a few sources only. The fact that each decision, by creating a precedent, has far-reaching implications—implies a kind of commitment.

It may thus be that "buffer defense" is the most effective of the three mechanisms discussed. Certainly it is structurally the most radical. It changes the division of labor in the unit and reshuffles role definitions.

We have thus found two types of structural defense. These mechanisms are established on the basis of the organizational unit; it is, therefore, of interest to inquire into the distribution of the units studied according to type of structural defense, if any. Table 4 presents this distribution. It is seen that structural defense in one or the other form is frequent indeed, being found in seven of the ten units studied.

Inspection of Table 4 indicates a relationship between the professional background of the personnel in the unit and the type of defense applied. All of the units with professional or semiprofessional personnel have structural defense—primarily buffer defense. No non-professional unit has buffer defense, and some have no structural defense at all. Table 5 summarizes

[14] See, for example, A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin, and A. M. Ross, *Industrial Conflict* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954), pp. 57 and [illegible]-83.

this finding. Although due caution is needed because of the small number of units studied, the difference seems striking.

An interpretation may be suggested by recalling that specialization is the central characteristic of buffer defense. Professionals are, by their training, predisposed to specialization; and it may, therefore, be "natural" for them to have recourse to specialization in dealing with pressures also. Moreover, structural defense in general is based on a notion of co-ordination and increased interdependence between officials —a notion certainly familiar to those performing professional roles.

The coding of the interviews did indeed allow for classification of certain respondents as using the two latter types. Although the distinction between "independent" and "erratic" behavior was not always easy (but apparently successful, as indicated by the findings presented below), the distinction between these two types and the two originally suggested by Katz and Eisenstadt was rather clear-cut. Of a total of sixty-two classifiable respondents, thirteen were classified as "independent" and fifteen as "erratic."

The stress placed thus far on mechanisms of defense as a necessary adjunct to

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS ACCORDING TO TYPES OF STRUCTURAL DEFENSE

Buffer Defense	Joint Defense	No Structural Defense
Social welfare, Town A	Health clinic, Town B	Absorption dept., Town B
Social welfare, Town B	Absorption dept., Town A	Labor exchange, Town A
Public health, A and B	Labor exchange, Town B	Municipality, Town A
Health clinic, Town A	....	....

TABLE 5

TYPE OF STRUCTURAL DEFENSE ACCORDING TO PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND OF PERSONNEL*

	No. of Units		
	Buffer Defense	Joint Defense	No Structural Defense
Professional and semi-professional	4	1	0
Non-professional	0	2	3

* $\gamma = 1.00$.

DEFENSE AND RESISTANCE

In the introduction it was suggested that there may be more types of response to cross-pressures than those of conformity to clients (and resistance to organization) and conformity to organization (and resistance to clients). Two additional types were suggested: "independent" and "erratic" behavior.

resistance to pressures leads naturally into the question of the relation between types of defenses and types of response to cross-pressures.

The existence of defense against either organization *or* clients should incline the bureaucrat to consistent conformity to that source of pressures against which he is not defended. Independent behavior is contingent upon *effective* defense against both organization *and* clients, while erratic behavior is the outcome of *weak* defense against *both* sources of pressures.

It was implied above that the mechanisms of defense might be ordered according to efficiency. Any kind of structural defense was seen as more effective than no structural defense, and buffer defense was seen as more effective than joint defense. This then leads to a hypothesis that *independent* behavior will be particularly frequent in units with *buffer defense,* while *erratic* behavior will be particularly fre-

quent in units *without* structural defense.[15] The relevant data are presented in Table 6.

It is seen that buffer defense is indeed the mechanism predisposing to independent behavior. Only one independent bureaucrat was found in units without buffer defense. On the other hand, the absence of structural defense predisposes to erratic behavior. Erratic bureaucrats were found in other units, too, but with relatively less frequency.

It should be mentioned that the frequency of independent behavior in units with buffer defense also allows of an alternative explanation. It was previously found that buffer defense was correlated with the professional background of the personnel. May it not be that this professional background, rather than the type of defense, is the factor predisposing to independent behavior? The data do not enable us to prove or disprove this alternative explanation. The only unit that could provide a test case is the Health clinic in Town B. It has no buffer (and hence, according to the approach of the present paper, independent behavior should be scarce); on the other hand, its personnel are professional (and should, according to the alternative explanation, tend toward independence). However, this unit has only three members. We may note that none of these three shows independent behavior—thus at least not contradicting our argument on the defense-response correlation; obviously, however, the number involved does not allow for any conclusion.

TABLE 6

RESPONSE TO PRESSURES ACCORDING TO TYPE OF DEFENSE: PERCENTAGE OF BUREAUCRATS IN UNITS WITH GIVEN TYPE OF DEFENSE SHOWING*

Units	Independent Behavior	Conformity to Organization	Conformity to Clients	Erratic Behavior	Total (Per Cent)	N
Buffer defense	36	24	21	18	99	33
Joint defense	9	55	18	18	100	11
Structural defense	0	39	22	39	100	18

* $\chi^2(df = 6) = 13.04$; $p < .05$ Considering only independent versus erratic behavior: $\gamma = .88$ ($p < .05$).

[15] It was found above that societal ideology also may function as defense. However, when controlling for structural defense, no significant relationship was found between the prevalence of societal ideology and independent versus erratic behavior.

HEBREW UNIVERSITY IN JERUSALEM

On Spitting against the Wind: Organizational Precariousness and American Irreligion[1]

N. J. Demerath III and Victor Thiessen

ABSTRACT

This is an analysis of a small-town Wisconsin free-thought movement and its response to organizational dilemmas arising out of its irreligion. More particularly, it is an analysis of organizational demise. The study isolates a number of variables which help to account for the movement's history. Several relate to the community context such as vertical and horizontal differentiation. Others concern characteristics of the organization itself, including the social status of the membership, problems of leadership and charisma, the difficulties posed by negative values and goallessness, and the irreconcilability of commitment and recruitment. In each of these respects, the freethinkers offer a distinctive perspective and new propositions for both the sociology of religion and the wider study of organizational dynamics.

This paper offers a belated diagnosis of an organization that is currently in its death trance. The analysis follows the development and demise of a small-town Wisconsin free-thought movement or Freie Gemeinde which began in 1852, reached its zenith in the 1880's, and then began to atrophy with the pursuit of legitimacy. The study is intended as both a perverse chapter in the sociology of religion and a paragraph in the theory of organizational change. It has two primary justifications.

First, in focusing on irreligion it directs attention to a neglected phenomenon on the American religious scene. Although the sociology of religion has been born again, the sociology of irreligion remains in the womb[2] despite the current talk of secularization and the steady flow of theological amendments to nineteenth-century orthodoxy and despite the predictions of Weber, Marx, and Durkheim that the twentieth century would witness the decline of the religious establishment.[3] Certainly irreligion has failed to replace the churches. At the same time, studies of irreligion may provide insight into its difficulties and a new comparative

[1] This is an expanded version of a paper delivered at the American Sociological Association meetings in Chicago, September 1, 1965. We are indebted to the Danforth Study of Campus Ministries and to Dr. Kenneth Underwood for research support. We are grateful to the members of the Sauk City Freie Gemeinde for their patience, their candor, and their hospitality. Finally, we have profited from the suggestions of a number of colleagues, including Kenneth Lutterman, Roberta Goldstone, [illegible] Marwell, Phillip Hammond, and Berenice [illegible].

[2] Organizational studies of irreligion are non-existent, although there have been several surveys that tap irreligion in wider populations. See, e.g., Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Religion, Normative Standards, and Behavior," *Sociometry*, XXV (June, 1962), 141–52, and Putney and Middleton, "Ethical Relativism and Anomia," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (January, 1962), 430–38.

[3] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 181–83; *General Economic History* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 270. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 427–29; *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), esp. pp. 55–56. See, e.g., Karl Marx, "Anti-Church Movement—Demonstration in Hyde Park," in *Marx and Engels on Religion* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 127–34. Although all of these predictions are refuted in that the church remains strong, they are partially confirmed in the preconditions of that strength. Thus, the church has staved off irreligion by becoming increasingly secular and allowing room for potential irreligionists within its own ranks. The establishment may not have passed, but it certainly has changed.

basis for analysis of the churches themselves.

A second justification is more abstract. Irreligious groups are precarious by dint of their dissidence and their illegitimacy. Examination of this precariousness may inform the study of organizational dynamics generally. Most organizational analysis follows in the wake of Weber's concern with the bureaucratic monolith. While the topic of organizational growth is common, studies of organizational demise are rare. While the conservative organization has been compelling, the deviant organization is frequently ignored and often shunted to the less attended realm of collective behavior. There is, of course, a range of studies on religious sects[4] as well as the literature on political extremism[5] and social movements.[6] And yet the freethinkers have features that distinguish them from each of these.

Unlike religious sects, the free-thought movement lacks any crystallized doctrine and falls beyond the pale of American religious tolerance. Unlike political movements, the freethinkers have no sharply defined organizational goals, and pressures against them are more informal than the sanctions of the electorate or the courts. Finally, unlike the Townsend movement, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, or an educational reform group, irreligion has neither a natural population from which to recruit nor a set of values which are in any way consistent with the normative mainstream.

Because the Freie Gemeinde is peculiar in these and other respects it points to considerations that are largely mute in previous work. These include community structure and differentiation as they relate to expressed hostility; the effect of social class on the response to hostility; the difficulties of nurturing charisma as well as its importance in sustaining an illegitimate group; the problems of rallying commitment around a nihilistic doctrine and a goalless program; and the conflict between commitment and recruitment as organizational imperatives. Precisely because irreligion taxes previous frameworks without falling wholly outside of them, it should provide

[4] For the classic statement on the religious sect, see Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), I, 328-54. Several recent treatments include Bryan R. Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XXIV (February, 1959); Benton Johnson, "On Church and Sect," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (August, 1963), 539-49; and Scott Grant McNall, "The Sect Movement," *Pacific Sociological Review*, VI (Fall, 1963), 60-64. See also Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), for a more psychological analysis of a precarious religious cult.

[5] Much of the literature on political extremism is more polemical than academic. Some of the better works include: Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1963); Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History* (New York: Praeger Books, 1962); Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); Vladimir C. Nahirney, "Some Observations on Ideological Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (January, 1962), 397-405; Egon Bittner, "Radicalism and Radical Movements," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 928-40; and Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 270-382.

[6] The term "social movement" is, of course, a catchall. Several broad theoretical treatments include the divergent perspectives of Smelser, *ibid.*, and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1941). Case studies include Burton R. Clark, "Organizational Adaptation and Precarious Values: A Case Study," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (June, 1956), 327-36; Joseph R. Gusfield, "Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Women's Christian Temperance Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (November, 1955), 221-32; Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (February, 1955), 3-10; and C. Eric Lincoln, *The Black Muslims in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961). Finally, for related treatments of delinquency and lower-class culture, see J. Milton Yinger, "Contraculture and Subculture," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (October, 1960), 625-45, and Lewis Yablonsky "The Delinquent Gang as a Near-Group," *Social Problems*, VII (Fall, 1959), 108-17.

important additions to our current knowledge. Still, the study has no illusions of definitiveness. Since both irreligion and organizational precariousness have been little explored, our errors may be as instructive as our insights.

The paper comprises five sections. The first describes the study's methodology. The second offers a brief historical account of the group at issue. Third, we shall discuss some general characteristics of organizational precariousness and the range of adaptations to it. Fourth, we shall show how adaptation is influenced by external community factors. Fifth and finally, we shall discuss adaptation to dissidence and precariousness in the light of internal organizational characteristics.

METHODOLOGY

The study invokes three methodological strategies: observation, historical records, and lengthy personal interviews. Although we intend more rigorous research in the future, this first study is undeniably "soft." Accordingly, we shall heed Howard S. Becker's advice[7] and present a chronology of the investigation as one slim basis for evaluation.

As is frequently the case in exploratory research, the analytic problem which finally emerged was not the one that launched the study. Our first information on the Freie Gemeinde included only its location in the small, predominantly Catholic community of Sauk City and its shrinking size. This suggested conflict between the group and its context, a conflict which was to be the focus of the research.

It took only a few visits to teach us otherwise. We soon discovered that actual conflict had seldom occurred and that even past hostility had evanesced as the group began to camouflage its principles and seek survival instead of reform. Thus, the study quickly shifted from static to dynamic. Rather than focus on the contemporary scene, we were led to the historical problem of a changing organization and its changing community relations.

This was the result of the research's first stage, involving lengthy conversations with strategic members of the organization. A second stage quickly followed and persisted. This involved "quasi-participant observation"[8] in the society's affairs, ranging from Sunday afternoon meetings held twice monthly to more informal gatherings. Third, we took advantage of the group's unique but dusty library to read and translate historical documents on nineteenth-century free thought. Fourth, we interviewed members of the movement more systematically. By this time we were aware of most of the key issues in the group's development. We had formed a number of hypotheses around which to probe for information.

Because the current membership is less than fifty, we decided to interview the entire population. But many members are no longer in the community, and others are so old as to be non-communicating. We completed interviews with twenty. Although these span all significant viewpoints within the group, there is no way of accurately assessing their representativeness. This together with the small number precludes statistical analysis and confines the yield to qualitative insights and illustration. In addition, we also interviewed apostates and non-affiliates in the community to gain a wider perspective. There was no formal community survey for fear of artificially reviving rancor and friction.

Finally, after the study was completed, we submitted drafts to several respondents for their comments. This revealed a few minor errors of fact, but all agreed that the

[7] Howard S. Becker, "Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (December, 1958), 652–60.

[8] Participant observation is not quite apt since we were conspicuous as outsiders and made no attempt to hide our research objectives. At the same time, we were graciously received, invited to every meeting, and witnessed no inhibitions. It is a commentary on the group itself, however, that it no longer discusses issues about which inhibitions might arise.

basic theoretical points were sound, even those based on our own deductions rather than any direct mention in the interviews. Of course, acceptance of this sort may raise as many issues as it settles. It may be that our critics are too kind, especially to two outsiders who were giving them rare attention. It also may be that we suffered the analytic seduction that lurks for any observer. Nevertheless, these evaluations do confer one small stamp of validity, and validity is a precious commodity in a study of this sort.

THE FREIE GEMEINDE IN HISTORICAL REVIEW

As the analysis shifted from current conflict to organizational dynamics, history became a crucial ingredient. American irreligion has enjoyed more historical than sociological attention,[9] but even so, work on ethnic irreligion in the tradition of the Freie Gemeinde is sparse.[10] This brief chronology draws heavily upon personal recollections and untranslated documents. Some of the details await the theoretical discussion to follow.

The Freie Gemeinde emerged out of the religious and social unrest in Germany and Eastern Europe of the 1840's. Upon the excommunication of one Johannes Ronge for doubting the sacramental validity of a "holy robe" in Trier, a number of Catholics severed their ties with Rome and founded Free Christian or German-Catholic churches. The movement was neither united nor homogeneous. Ronge himself was anti-institutional rather than anti-doctrinal. Yet some were more radical than others, and upon persecution, many fled the country. The emigration was accelerated by the German Revolution of 1848; hence the term "forty-eighters" to refer to this first major wave of German settlers.

The first Freie Gemeinde in the United States began in St. Louis in 1850. Other communities formed in Pennsylvania; California; Washington, D.C.; New York; Illinois; and Wisconsin. In Wisconsin there were some thirty groups by 1852 ranging from Milwaukee and Madison to Polktown and Koshkonong. The Sauk City group in question organized on October 24, 1852. Its declared purpose occurs in its articles of incorporation:

> The United German Free Congregation is our name for our organization, for we wish to unite the enemies of clericalism, official hypocrisy and bigotry, the friends of truth, uprightness and honesty to be found scattered among all religions, creeds, churches and sects.
>
> By means of such united strength we intend to erect a strong fortification against the pernicious power of the churches, sects and clericalism.
>
> The foundation of this organization is *reason*, which is defamed by the priests of all "revealed" religions, and the book of nature and world history, feared and repudiated by cleri-

[9] Most of this historical attention has been devoted to early American deists such as Jefferson, Franklin, and Paine, together with the East Coast offspring of Unitarianism, including the ethical-culture movement. See, e.g., Stow Persons, *Free Religion: An American Faith* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1947); Sidney Warren, *American Freethought: 1860–1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943); and Martin Marty, *The Infidel* (New York: Living Age Books, 1961).

[10] Most of the literature here was locally published in limited editions and in German. For the European background of the free-thought movement, see Friedrich Schuenemann-Pott, *Die Freie Gemeinde* (Philadelphia: B. Stephen Publishers, 1861), and Johannes Ronge, *Rede Gehalten beim Ersten Gottesdienste der Freien Christlichen Gemeinden zu Schweinfurt am Palm Sonntag* (Schweinfurt, 1849). For historical materials on the Wisconsin movement, see Karl Heinzen, *Deutscher Radikalismus in Amerika* (distributed by the "Verein zur Verbreitung radikaler Prinzipien," 1879); Max Hempel, *Was Sind die Freien Gemeinden von Nord-Amerika?* (Philadelphia, 1877); Friedrich Schuenemann-Pott (ed.), *Blaetter fuer Freies Religioeses Leben* (Wisconsin, 1855–71), Vols. I–XVI; J. J. Schlichter, "Eduard Schroeter the Humanist," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* (December, 1944, and March, 1945); Freidenker Convention zu Milwaukee, *Blitzstrahlen der Wahrheit* (Milwaukee Freidenker, 1872). A good recent summary is provided in Berenice Cooper, "Die Freien Gemeinden in Wisconsin," *Wisconsin Academy of Science, Arts and Letters*, LIII (Fall, 1964), 53–65.

cals, but loved and honored by the wise of all nations and all times.

Obviously we do not recognize as "godless" those so called on account of their views (theoretical atheists) but rather the godless in fact —practical atheists, who behave as though there were no universal law to which they are obliged to submit, and no moral cosmic law to which they must conform. We dictate neither belief nor disbelief in God or immortality.[11]

Despite its stridency, the early Freie Gemeinde was a strong and cautiously respected element in the local community throughout the nineteenth century. Not only did they help to guide secular affairs, but they were often called in to mediate disputes within the churches themselves. The freethinkers were also an important cultural force. Their activities emphasized music, drama, poetry, ethics, and philosophy. Their periodic festivals drew capacity crowds and guest lecturers from all over the country.

All of this reached its zenith under the guidance of one leader in particular, Eduard Schroeter. He had received theological training in Germany but was later forced out of the country to the United States. From 1853 to his death in 1888, he was the rallying point for Wisconsin free thought. Not only was he the leader of the Sauk City group, but he also started the Milwaukee Freie Gemeinde and made yearly visits to many of the other free congregations.

At the time of Schroeter's death, the Sauk City organization had an active membership of over one hundred. Its militancy was pronounced. For example, one prominent freethinker bequeathed land for use as a cemetery and stipulated only that priests and ministers were never to set foot on the plot. A current member describes his grandfather this way: "He wasn't too tactful a person. He was a Bible scholar; he knew as much about religion as any preacher, and he'd just walk up to the preacher and argue with him about it. . . . I've seen some of the letters to the editor my grandfather wrote. I don't know of anyone now who would write things like that."

Indeed, with Schroeter's death and the turnover from first to second generation members, the Freie Gemeinde began to lose its momentum. Gradually, its membership decreased, its activities grew less frequent, and its militancy subsided. The Freie Gemeinde began to co-operate more and condemn less. Its members began to attend the services of the orthodox churches whose own members were increasingly present at the Free Congregation's meetings. Some freethinkers began contributions to the Catholic church, and intermarriage increased. All of this is reflected in the group's changing constitution. Gradually it became less vindictive. The constitution drafted in 1917 lacks any polemic against the church, and a 1951 revision drops all reference to atheism. While nineteen of our twenty respondents are admitted atheists, organizational imperatives demand a less stigmatizing public stand.

Finally, consider the Sauk City group in contrast to its Milwaukee counterpart. Both were founded by the same man, at the same time, and with the same purpose. Yet the two are now estranged. The Milwaukee Freie Gemeinde has cleaved more closely

[11] Clara Rung, "The Free Congregation of Sauk City" (unpublished manuscript, 1940), p. 11. Note that the statement is bitingly opposed to the church but somewhat ambiguous concerning doctrine. This Kierkegaardian syndrome was characteristic of early free thought, but two things are worth noting about its subsequent development in the Sauk City group. First, there is an ever widening gap between the statements of the organization and the beliefs of the individual members—perhaps an operationalization of both precariousness and bureaucracy. Confining ourselves to the former, the organization was forced to become more publicly accepting of both church and doctrine while its members increased their opposition to doctrine in particular. This leads to a second point. Over time the Kierkegaardian position has been reversed: the members' original hostility toward the church has ebbed, but their atheism has become more *pronounced* if less *announced*. This tendency to accept the church while rejecting its doctrine has, of course, cut a swath through the religious establishment as well, accounting for the concomitant rise of secularization and church participation.

to its original ideals and is more aggressive in pursuing them. To this end, it has joined the American Rationalist Federation (ARF): a lower-class, militant association that embraces Madalyn Murray and *The Realist*,[12] together with rationalist societies in St. Louis, Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, Cleveland, Chicago, and elsewhere. The ARF has repeatedly invited the Sauk City group to join. The invitations have never been answered. Instead Sauk City has chosen a different alliance. In order to legitimate itself and boost its recruitment potential, it became a member of the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship in 1955. The move has had none of the salutary consequences expected and has even led to an unintended disruption. Recruitment and activities have remained at the same low ebb. The affiliation provoked sharp opposition from some members who felt betrayed and bolted to form a smaller but less compromising circle of their own. Hence this predominantly Catholic community of some 4,000 now hosts *two* irreligious groups. Although one is moribund and the other militant, the latter may very well follow the path of its predecessor. Free thought is neither big business nor aggressive associationalism.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRECARIOUSNESS AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES

In a society in which a leading liberal politician can assert, "I don't care what a man's religion is as long as he believes in God," it is no surprise to consider the Freie Gemeinde a precarious organization. The term "precarious" is appropriate for any organization that confronts the prospect of its own demise. The confrontation need be neither intentional nor acknowledged. The important criterion is a threatened disruption of the organization such that achievement of its goals and the maintenance of its values are so obstructed as to bring on a loss of identity through deathly quiescence, merger, or actual disbandment.

There is no single source of precariousness. It may arise out of structural weaknesses concerning leadership, communication, compliance, or role differentiation. It may emerge from poor recruitment or from low commitment. It may stem from abrasive relations with a hostile environment, even relations that fall short of blatant conflict. The last is plainly the most conspicuous source for the precariousness of the dissident Freie Gemeinde. It is also a central factor in Burton Clark's insightful analysis of "precarious values."[14] Clark argues that a value may be precarious because it is undefined, because its functionaries are illegitimate, or because the value itself is "unacceptable to a 'host' population." All three of these conditions apply to the Freie Gemeinde at one time or another. And yet Clark's suggestion that groups with precarious value are led into strenuous social service in the search for acceptance is less apt. There are other forms of adaptations and other factors that govern the pressure to adapt in the first place.

In general the possible responses to a hostile environment may be ranged along a continuum. The alternatives move in two directions. On the one hand, the group may follow Clark's scheme and pursue legitimation by changing or camouflaging its values, switching its functionaries and public spokesmen, or performing redeeming services for the community. Many groups attain stability in precisely this fashion. But for others the path may lead to organizational death. This is especially likely in groups like the Freie Gemeinde for whom dissidence itself was an original *raison d'être*.

On the other hand, a second adaptation

[12] Madalyn *Murray* is an outspoken and formidably aggressive atheist who has used her legal background to push for wider separation of church and state through the courts. Her recent moves from Baltimore to Hawaii and to Texas have left behind a cloud of legal proceedings and embittered former colleagues. *The Realist* is a magazine of free-thought satire that covers issues from homosexuality to foreign policy in the unflinching manner of a literary Lenny Bruce.

[14] Clark, *op. cit.*

involves increased militancy. Selznick, Nahirny, and Bittner have all pointed to the organizational gains that may be had by widening the gulf between the group and its context.[14] If membership commitment is a concern, one way to bolster it is to make commitment irrevocable by burning the members' bridges behind them and precluding competing allegiances to more legitimate organizations. Thus, a radical group's effectiveness may be judged by its ability to turn external hostility to an internal advantage. As we shall see, however, this ability is difficult to come by.

But is it necessary to adapt drastically in either direction? Certainly some organizations are able to compensate for hostility without radical shifts in either tactics or character. Some have no design on their context, and its hostility is therefore less urgent. Organizational structure and commitment may provide an imperviousness to opposition. Finally, the hostility itself may be poorly communicated, non-consensual, or effectively blunted. In short, there are really two issues involved in the adaptation to a hostile environment: is a major adaptation necessary and, if so, in which direction? To explore these questions further, let us return to the Freie Gemeinde in theoretical rather than historical relief. The problem is to account for the Sauk City group's adaptation in the direction of legitimacy. Possible solutions lie in two artificially distinguished clusters, one having to do with the community itself, the other relating to the group in particular.[15]

DIFFERENTIATION AND THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT

There is perhaps no concept more central to community analysis than that of "differentiation." Yet there are at least two dimensions to this concept, both of which are important to the changing position of the Freie Gemeinde. First, one can speak of *vertical* differentiation, referring to social class and the ability to sustain class distinctions and elites. Second, there is *horizontal* or "structural" differentiation,[16] referring to the degree of autonomy between various institutional spheres, including economics, politics, education, religion, and, indeed, irreligion.[17]

The relevance of vertical differentiation is discernible in two propositions. One is that strong elites may thwart the sentiments of the wider community by resisting or rechanneling their expression. Another is that a small town like Sauk City is unlikely to

[14] See also the general literature on the sociology of conflict, including Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 87–104, and Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & [illegible] 1962), esp. pp. 162–64.

[15] At this point it is instructive to compare the approach to follow with Smelser's landmark, *Theory of Collective Behavior, op. cit.* Although the Freie Gemeinde fits into Smelser's category of the "value oriented movement," it cannot be understood in Smelser's terms. Because of his emphasis on political revolutionism, Smelser puts a great deal of stress on repressive control by formally constituted authorities. He gives little attention to either informal control from the wider context or to "self-control" through internal organizational characteristics. Both of these are crucial to the free-thought movement, and this is one of a number of ways in which irreligion departs from previous cases and previous theories.

[16] The theoretical literature on structural differentiation is burgeoning. For a critical exchange on its applicability to social change, see Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June, 1964), 339–57, and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June, 1964), 375–85. For two discussions of its applicability to religion in particular, see Robert Bellah, "Religious Evolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June, 1964), 358–74, and Richard A Peterson and N. J. Demerath III, "Introduction to Liston Pope," *Millhands and Preachers* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942; 5th ed., 1965), pp. xxv–xxxii.

[17] Note that differentiation can be seen *within* each of these spheres as well as *between* them. This is even the case for irreligion itself. Thus, St. Louis hosts both a strong Ethical Culture Society (middle class and churchlike) and the headquarters of the ARF (lower class and more sectlike). The groups seldom communicate, and there is virtually no overlap in membership.

retain effective elites under the encroachments of the current "mass society."[18] In all of this, the contrast between the Sauk City group of 1865 and 1965 provides an illustration. Recalling the diatribe against the church in the Freie Gemeinde's original statement of principles, one might have expected countermeasures from the local Catholics. And yet the reciprocity was frustrated by an aristocratic class allegiance between the freethinkers and the most influential Catholics. Sauk City Catholics were originally polarized into two groups occupying the same church. The "old" Bavarian Catholics—wealthy, prominent, and educated—knelt in sharp contrast to the "new" Prussian Catholics who were lower rather than upper class and had migrated for economic rather than political reasons. One member of the Catholic church had this to say about the situation:

> There was more in common between the "Old Catholics" and the Freie Gemeinde than between the "Old Catholics" and the lower-class Catholics. . . . The freethinkers were a powerful force in the community. For many years they provided a cultural leadership. . . . The "Old Catholics" are contemptuous of many of the young priests who come in here who are ignorant, who have no real grasp of theology for all the preaching they do. So although the Catholics grew till they represented 70 per cent of the population of this community, they were never in a position to challenge the Freie Gemeinde. The bond between the "Old Catholics" and the Freie Gemeinde was too great.

Although the lower-class Catholics commonly had the priest as ally in their intended war against the freethinkers, the upper-class Catholics had the church coffers as a weapon in their opposition. As long as the elite retained its distinctive power in the church and community, the Freie Gemeinde was protected. By the turn of the century, however, this protective kinship had decreased. With acculturation and both upward and downward mobility, the Catholic church grew more homogeneous. Later we will note the downward mobility of the Freie Gemeinde itself. As both Catholics and freethinkers lost their upper-class character, pressure intensified and made an adaptive strategy necessary for the Freie Gemeinde.

But why a strategy of legitimation rather than increased militancy? Here the horizontal dimension of differentiation offers insight and Milwaukee offers a comparison. As a structurally differentiated urban center,[19] it affords its dissident groups both autonomy and a structured irrelevance. We would expect the Milwaukee Freie Gemeinde to choose the adaptive tack of militancy for several reasons. It not only must if it is to be heard, but it is allowed to since few are listening. Despite its bluster and intent, its disruptiveness is more threatened than real. Its militance is generally ignored because its activities do not impinge upon other community sectors or even upon the Milwaukee churches. But the less differentiated small town of Sauk City poses a different situation for its freethinkers. Because Sauk City forces an interpenetration of the activities of the Freie Gemeinde and every other institution, hostility increases and legitimation becomes a more likely response. In a small town, an irreligious group that occupies a prominent building on a large lot in the center of the community is more visible, more stigmatizing, and more

[18] For a discussion of the role of elites in the contemporary small town, see Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday & Co., 1960), esp. pp. 114–39, 287–89.

[19] For an account of the role of structural differentiation in urban centers, see Delbert C. Miller, "Decision-Making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and English City," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (November, 1958), 299–310; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), Robert O. Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (February, 1958), 3–9, and Linton Freeman *et al.*, "Locating Leaders in Local Communities," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (October, 1963), 796

consequential. Where this group is a dwindling minority, legitimation is the only recourse in the struggle for survival.

In all of this, there is a paradox and two tainted alternatives. In a differentiated community, the dissident group may be militant precisely because its militance goes unnoticed or ignored. In an undifferentiated community, the dissident group is much more noticed and, therefore, must put a damper on its pronouncements. Thus, one may have militancy at the cost of neglect or one may have attention at the price of legitimation. Of course, after a point, militancy may stimulate attention and legitimacy may bring on neglect. The latter is a major tactic of the Sauk City group. We mentioned earlier that the Freie Gemeinde joined the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship to facilitate its recruitment by increasing its legitimacy. Even so, the group has qualms about risking a cultivated anonymity by launching a membership campaign of any sort. One member puts its this way: "If we ever battled for a member with one of the churches, then we might antagonize them. Our methods of obtaining members are far from the hard-sell type so that we don't antagonize any other group by trying to take members away from them." Of course, the churches have confronted the same problem among themselves. In many cases, they have evolved a complex set of recruitment boundaries to insure that every church has access to potential members without encroaching upon each other. The Freie Gemeinde is hardly eligible for the arrangement.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY

Other things being equal, a dissident group in an undifferentiated context will move toward legitimacy. But, of course, other things are seldom equal. Another set of factors that may mediate the influence of the community concerns internal characteristics of the dissident organization itself. Although we can assume that most groups would like to remain true to their original goals and values, we cannot assume that every group is up to the task.

Consider first the *social status of the membership*. In general, the higher the status of the members, the more militant a dissident group can be. This is so for several reasons. For one, the aura of prestige confers a certain license in itself. For another high status often implies a crucial role in the community that redeems one's illegitimacy. For a third, high status makes the person more eligible for the support and tolerance of the community's wider elite. The early members of the Free Church had unequivocably high status in the community. In addition, they had power as editors of the local press, members of the community council, leaders of the local clubs, representatives on the village planning commission, and officers of the school board. We have already seen how these early freethinkers won the succor of the aristocratic Catholics. They also had leverage on the community as a whole, despite its hostility. A quote from Martin Marty's analysis of nineteenth-century Deism makes the point well for another irreligionist in another community: "Judge Driscoll could be a free thinker and still hold his place in society because he was the person of most consequence in the community, and therefore could venture to go his own way and follow his own notions."[20]

But, paradoxically, although the upper classes *can* be more militant they frequently opt not to be. Lacking the mutual reinforcement of the ethnic freethinkers, they may be concerned about overreaching the tolerance threshold and they may be coopted by conservative elements in the community. On the other hand, the lower classes are more militant in spite of the greater likelihood of arousing hostility. They have less to lose, and continued frustration may lead them to spurn rather than eat the pie in the sky. In all of this, it is the middle class that is most constrained. Here, occu-

[20] Marty, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

pations depend on the good will of the community. Insurance agents, small businessmen, barbers, and others in personal services cannot afford to antagonize their customers. One member of the Freie Gemeinde explained, "In a small town, a tradesman can't afford to be anti-anything." As this suggests, the Sauk City freethinkers are now more middle than upper class and this has been a factor in their increased pursuit of legitimacy. Of course, none of this is new or surprising. Homans comments on the license of high status;[21] middle-class constraint has become a sociological cliché; and Gusfield corroborates the relationship between dissidence and low status.[22]

Now, however, we turn to a more theoretically provocative area, that of *leadership*. Leadership is obviously crucial in a dissident group.[23] It is here that Weber makes some of his most important contributions to theories of social change. For Weber, charisma was a key factor in producing innovations and "breakthroughs" in the social order.[24] It was only by rallying around the magical that the membership could escape the mundane. And yet once the breakthrough had occurred, it was important to consolidate the gains. At this point, Weber discusses the shift from charismatic to noncharismatic authority as a way of stabilizing the movement and insuring its orderly march into future generations.

As apt as this theory may be for other groups, it must be amended for the Freie Gemeinde. Unlike the religious sect, irreligion provides poor soil for the nurturance of charisma. Weber puts strong emphasis on charisma's magical component, but freethinkers are vehemently oriented to science and rationality. Weber also stresses the importance of sacramental trappings for routinized charisma, yet freethinkers explicitly repudiate all ceremony let alone any doctrine resembling apostolic succession. This is a first instance of the way in which irreligious organizations are betrayed by irreligious tenets. Charisma is crucial to any dissident group's success, but free thought frustrates its development. Note, however, that the Freie Gemeinde did have an early approximation. Schroeter was charismatic in most respects save the magical. Indeed, his case points to several additional elaborations of Weberian theory.

It is important to recall that German immigrants had organized Wisconsin free thought *before* the emergence or arrival of a charismatic leader. This suggests that charisma is not always necessary for the inception of social movements. While charisma may be crucial in launching movements among an *indigenous* and rooted population, it may be less important for movements occurring among uprooted transplants or those who are sufficiently alien to band together without having to be rallied. Further, charisma may be more important in sustaining a militant movement than in starting it. Although a shift away from charisma may be salutary once a group has been *accepted* by its context, it may be fatal if the group remains stigmatized. Certainly Schroeter's primary contribution was to persistence rather than incep-

[21] George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1961), pp. 349-55.

[22] Gusfield, *op. cit.*

[23] Yet there is a tentative qualification here concerning the relation between leadership and ideology. This is based on comparative observations of other irreligious groups, including the ethical movement and the ARF, together with the senior author's current analysis of civil rights organizations and their student volunteers. Where leadership is absent a strong ideology may fill the void by becoming doubly rigid and compelling. Where leadership and efficient organization occur, the ideology need be less compulsory and may be more flexible. The first case characterizes both the ARF and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. The second describes the ethical movement and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

[24] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 358-92. See also the critical piece based upon new evidence by Peter L. Berger, "Charisma and Religious Innovation: The Social Location of Israelite Prophecy," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (December, 1963), 940-50.

tion. With his death in 1888, the group began its slow demise. Although the current leader is responsible and efficient, he makes no pretense of serving charismatic functions. Unlike Schroeter, he lacks the glamor of previous persecution, and his work as an insurance salesman brands him as all too ordinary. He has no prophetic role and even avoids ethical or intellectual leadership. Here then is one more reason why the group has opted for legitimacy rather than militancy.

But note that once legitimation is pursued, the pursuit itself has further consequences for the leader. Under conditions of militancy and consequent duress, the leader's power is centralized and maximized. Under conditions of legitimation, he faces increasing difficulty in maintaining his authority since his decisions and programs are less urgent. Sensing the compromise of legitimation, the group is apt to hark back to the time when its original ideals were being forged and defended militantly. It may then idealize past rather than present leadership and confer a wishful "charisma in absentia" upon one long gone. This cultivation of the past has the best of both worlds. It reminds the group of its militant strain but locates this militancy safely in a bygone age where it can provoke no contemporary disruptions. In this regard it is important to note that although Schroeter was crucial to the Freie Gemeinde in both Milwaukee and Sauk City, he is given much less attention in the former. Milwaukee's militance has more nearly obviated such wistful glances into the heroic past.

A third organizational variable concerns values and goals or, more properly, their absence. As Clark has suggested, undefined values are one condition of precariousness. Unattainable or unrealistic goals may be another. Certainly conventional religious groups suffer on both counts since salvation is neither clear cut nor easily achieved. For this reason churches have long suffered from goal displacement or what could be termed the "means-ends inversion" in which means such as recruitment replace goals such as salvation. All of this underscores the importance of charisma; it may serve as an antidote by providing an alternative source of meaning and a more immediate rallying point. It is hardly surprising that religious groups have long outdistanced more pragmatic organizations in their production of charismatic types.[25]

But if undefined and unattainable goals are a vulnerability of the churches, they are doubly so for the freethinkers. Here the problems escalate since values tend to be wholly relativistic and goals are rarely stipulated at all. The freethinker's high regard for individual autonomy makes an organizational creed anathema. The following quotations illustrate the members' amorphous conception of the Freie Gemeinde's purpose:

> Well, I think we're looking for something we can believe in.

> We try to educate people in cultural things, in anything that's above and beyond the average humdrum existence. When I talk about "above and beyond," I mean above and beyond our lives, the way we live now, where we came from and where we're going. . . . I think we all look for meanings; if there are any we hope to find them. We don't presuppose that there are meanings, however, that there are always answers. There may not be.

> We are a group of seekers rather than a body of believers. We think that through advancements of science the truth will change. We are prepared to accept this, and we can change our beliefs very easily, because if it follows the truth, then we believe we are right in changing it in contrast to other religions.

[25] Note the reference here to the "production of charisma." This is intended to suggest that charisma is often more imputed than claimed and that it relates more to group needs than to the psychology of leadership. In this interpretation, Weber is hardly an advocate of the "great man theory of history." For an analysis in this vein, see Festinger *et al.*, *op. cit.*, and their implicit treatment of charisma as a response to collective dissonance.

With such vague goals, passion dissipates. There are no concrete actions, no gauges by which to measure progress. There is little worth suffering for, and legitimacy is seductive to those who are dissident for no compelling reasons and with no measurable end in view.

Like the churches, then, the Freie Gemeinde has indeed witnessed an inversion of means and ends. Many respondents confessed that their participation was motivated more by social reasons than anything else. The combination of "mighty fine food" and German "egg coffee" has supplanted the reformist zeal of overturning the churches and emancipating their parishioners. Insofar as substantive issues occur, one member comments upon their deliberation as follows:

> In our meetings we never talk about the Freie Gemeinde as such, or try in any way to belittle the beliefs of others. We don't do anything except maybe we have a meditation or reading with the idea that they're not too strongly worded so that they won't cause any friction or hard feelings. Some ideas appeal to us more than others, but we don't use them because we don't want people to feel that we are trying to ram our ideas down their throats.

Part of this is due to the natural legacy of free thought; part of it is a redounding effect of legitimation. For whatever reason, irreligion has been replaced by areligion, and an organization has become a collectivity.

All of this leads in turn to the further factor of ***commitment***. Obviously, membership commitment is another pre-condition to organizational militancy.[26] The commitment of most Sauk City members has flagged to the point where increased militancy would tax it beyond its breaking point. Nor does the decreasing strength of the organization bother them. One member shrugged and commented as follows:

> If the Free Church does disintegrate, fine, let it go; I've had it for fifty years, it's given me a lot of personal happiness. Let's make it pleasant for ourselves. I wouldn't want any people to join with very vehement feelings. . . . We had two or three who did that and everyone felt rather uncomfortable. It's a lot more pleasant just to let it go and not worry about it.

Certainly commitment is affected by the unattainability of goals above, but there are other factors as well. One is the generation of membership. Despite their differences, the Freie Gemeinde and the religious sect are similar in that second- and third-generation members are generally less sensitive to the original ideals and less militant in maintaining them.[27] One elderly freethinker recalled the change this way:

> The Freie Gemeinde was more antichurch at that time because the people had come from Europe and were more opposed to it and were more eager to further their education. . . . Our forebears, when they first came, were getting away from something . . . there was something to fight for, there was much more. These things were fresh in their minds, and now there is an entirely different attitude.

Yet the members of later generations must not be confused with the convert. There is a difference between those whose membership is a family legacy and those

[26] The emphasis here is on the consequences of undercommitment for the pursuit of legitimation. And yet *overcommitment* is a pathology that may disrupt the militant group. Its symptoms are a penchant for the spectacular rather than the efficient and a tendency to grapple with the first task at hand instead of considering other tasks with more delayed but more important effects. Overcommitment is visible not only in the ARF as the most militant irreligious group but in civil rights organizations as well.

[27] Clearly ethnic acculturation has taken its toll in this connection. Originally the Freie Gemeinde served an ancillary function in providing an island of old-world identity in the new-world sea. As ethnic lines blurred, the movement lost this role. Since then it has had to "make it" on the basis of irreligion alone. But, while this is an undeniable factor in the organization's decline, it is hardly a sufficient cause. Other ethnic free-thought movements in Milwaukee, St. Louis and Philadelphia have maintained their militancy and conserved their strength in spite of acculturation.

who join out of independent conviction. Those respondents whose parents had *not* been members of the group were much more disgruntled with the current complacency. Most of them favored a more militant and more active program. However, as outsiders to a familistic organization, they lacked the influence to effect a change.

Finally, it is important to consider commitment alongside recruitment. One can relate the two hypothetically. Thus a militant group maximizes the commitment of its existing members but jeopardizes the recruitment of new adherents; a legitimizing group maximizes recruitment opportunities but minimizes commitment. In short, a dissident group cannot maximize commitment and recruitment at the same time. In order to secure commitment the group must adhere strongly to its dissident values, thereby alienating a flock of potential recruits who are not prepared to go so far. In order to enhance recruitment, the group must widen its appeal by reducing its dissidence, thereby betraying the allegiances of many of its original members.

The Freie Gemeinde offers a partial illustration. It is true that the group failed to take advantage of the recruitment opportunities afforded by their affiliation with the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship. And yet merely securing the advantage at all had the predicted consequence of decreased commitment. Two lifelong members expressed their reactions as follows:

> I didn't like it very well, and I know that our forefathers wouldn't have agreed to it at all. I would rather that the group were like the way our forefathers had it.

> *The Free Church now is a negative force—even in my youth it was still a positive force culturally . . . they are not a free church anymore; they are now a segment of the Unitarian church.*

The dissension's denouement was a splinter movement that followed the classic path of the religious sect except that it moved to the radical left instead of the fundamentalist right. While the new group has only a dozen members, it is both more active and more militant. It also elicits envious reactions from older members of the parent Freie Gemeinde who did not make the jump but could understand it.

> One of the reasons they don't come anymore is that the *Freie Gemeinde* isn't as outspoken as it used to be. The group wasn't active enough to suit them. They became discouraged and therefore started a more active discussion group. . . . When Madalyn Murray was here last year, she was not invited to speak to the Free Church. She spoke to the other discussion group though, and many of us would have liked to talk to her.

SUMMARY

The preceding section isolated four distinct intra-organizational factors which inform adaptation to dissidence and precariousness: social status, leadership and charisma, organizational goals and values, and commitment and recruitment.[28] At this point it is worth considering their mutual relations. Although the four are intimately associated, this is not to say that they will always be consistent in leaning toward militancy or legitimation, growth or decline. Some organizations will maximize the conditions for growth in all four respects; some will maximize conditions in one factor but fall short on others; finally, there will be organizations like the Sauk City group that come a cropper on each. The Sauk City

[28] What is the basis of four factors, only four factors, and these four factors? They are not random choices, and they are recommended by two considerations. First, of course, they resonate in the interviews and documents that provide the data. Second, they articulate with broader theoretical schemes. E.g., there is a contrived but provocative parallel between status, leadership, commitment, and values, on the one hand, and A-G-I-L, on the other. Certainly Parsons' model can be employed in the analysis of precariousness and dissidence, as Smelser has indicated. Yet our present intention is more to elucidate a single case than to engage in higher-order systematics.

Freie Gemeinde's entire history reveals a succession of disasters as it systematically loses first one and then another factor in its favor. In its early phase it had an upper-class membership, a quasi-charismatic leader, a compelling goal in the revolt against the churches, and the high commitment of first-generation membership. Gradually each of these advantages fell away.

Nor has the community been of recent help, as was seen in the section on differentiation and the external context. The early alliance between the Freie Gemeinde and the aristocratic Catholics has dissipated and there is no longer a defending elite. Sauk City has never had the structural differentiation of Milwaukee, and therefore the freethinkers have always had to contend with a hostile community sensitive to their actions and declarations. In all of this, it is no surprise that the Freie Gemeinde is on the verge of disbanding. It may have a fling at immortality in the continued existence of its splinter movement. But even this may soon follow the path of its forerunner and convert current militancy into proximate legitimacy and ultimate demise.

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Community Leadership in an Economic Crisis: Testing Ground for Ideological Cleavage[1]

William V. D'Antonio

ABSTRACT

Among the relatively unexplored problems involved in community decision-making, one that may be expected to receive increasing attention in the years ahead concerns the increasing penetration of the federal government into local affairs. This study examines some facets of that problem in the face of an economic crisis and a political turn toward conservative Republicans in South Bend, Indiana. The departure of the Studebaker Corporation in December, 1963, followed very closely on the heels of an upset Republican sweep of local political offices. The data indicate that attitudinal differences about the role of the federal government in local affairs do distinguish community leaders who are Republicans from those who are Democrats. However, the findings also show that attitudes are not so strongly held as to prevent the local leaders, Republicans as well as Democrats, from being able to accept federal aid programs in such areas as housing, urban renewal, and manpower retraining. Attitudes between Democrats and Republicans may be statistically but not sociologically significant.

The problem which this paper explores concerns the theory that we have come to the end of ideological dispute in American political life. It attempts to probe some aspects of this theory at the local community level. Stated generally, the theory is that we have arrived at a democratic system of "liberal," pragmatic orientation wherein both political parties contend for power on platforms focusing around the center way.[2] Perhaps this center way itself may best be thought of as comprising a democratic ideology to which both parties are more or less committed. Indeed, an early formulation of this theory had been stated by Roberto Michels in 1927:

> Where there are only two parties, as in America, this system is already the extreme expression of the victory of the centripetal tendency over the centrifugal. This victory seems still more manifest considering the fact that the Democrats and the Republicans are at present almost devoid of theoretical or programmatical differences, so that they can both address themselves to the electorate without any "ballast" of differentiating ideas.[3]

While there has been increasing acceptance of this theory as delineating the broad outlines of political life in the United States, social scientists are far from agreement that this means that "each set of American party leaders is satisfied to play Tweedledee to the other's Tweedledum."[4] For example, McClosky and his associates concluded from their research that "examination of the opinions of Democratic

[1] The author is grateful to Dr. Frank J. Fahey, director of the Center for Community Analysis, for financial assistance in interviewing and data analysis through funds provided by the Area Redevelopment Administration, United States Department of Commerce. The author also wishes to thank Doctors William T. Liu of the University of Notre Dame and Howard J. Ehrlich of the University of Iowa for critical readings of this paper.

[2] See, for example, Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 403 ff.; and Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

[3] Roberto Michels, "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties," *American Political Science Review*, XXI (November, 1927), 753–72 (quotation from p. 765).

[4] See Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (June, 1960), 406–27.

and Republican leaders shows them to be distinct communities of co-believers who diverge sharply on many important issues."[5] Do these findings then reveal a "ballast of differentiating ideas" which Michels had failed to observe, or are they real but minor differences that do not constitute the basis for sharp left-right ideological differences? Can these findings be reconciled with the "end of ideology" theory by considering them as attitudinal differences that represent variants of the general democratic ideology? In this paper we will probe these questions by means of research carried out at the local community level.

Among the relatively unexplored problems involved in community decision-making is one that concerns the increasing penetration of the federal government into local community affairs.[6] The idea of local autonomy, of the local community handling its own affairs, is perhaps one of the most cherished values held by U.S. Americans.[7] Until the 1930's there had been a corresponding negative valuation of the role of the federal government in community affairs. (This despite the fact that the federal government has had an unbroken interest in local and state affairs since the earliest days of the Republic.[8])

The depression, the recovery under Franklin D. Roosevelt, World War II, and postwar events such as urban renewal have done much to change this orientation. Nevertheless, if there is an area of ideological dispute left in American politics, surely it is to be found here in the question of the relationship between the federal government and local communities.

As understood in this paper, an ideology is a complex system of beliefs, principles, and doctrines which may serve alternately as rationale, theory, or explanation for behavior that has occurred, or as a guide for social action in the future. To say that Democrats and Republicans live by differing ideologies is to say that their belief systems lead them to seek distinct patterns of decision-making regarding what decisions ought to be made and how they are to be made.

Put in ideological context, the federal government–local community relationship would be stated as follows: Democrats believe that local problems are no longer purely local in nature, and, therefore, federal assistance is needed to solve them. They see the federal government as the only agency that can act effectively to solve these problems, and they believe that it should do so. Furthermore, they assert that such action does not threaten the freedom of the local community or its members and, hence, look with favor upon such programs as federally sponsored public housing and urban renewal. Republicans believe that the local community can and should solve its own problems and that individual freedom can only be preserved if the federal government is prevented from participating in community decision-making. Hence, Republicans may be expected to oppose such federally sponsored programs as public housing and urban renewal. On the other hand, if Democrats and Republicans are as little different as Tweedledum and Tweedledee, we should find no differences between them regard-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 426. Also, Lipset himself notes that the decline of ideology on the intellectual level has not meant the end of class conflict. Polls continue to show that most people believe that the Democrats do more for the common people while the Republicans cater more to the wealthy and big business (Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 407).

[6] Among recent works which have dealt with this problem are: Joseph Bensman and Arthur Vidich, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1958); Robert Presthus, *Men at the Top* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); and M. Kent Jennings, *Community Influentials* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[7] Commentary on this value orientation may be found, for example, in Irwin T. Sanders, *The Community* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1958); esp. pp. 392–93; and Maurice R. Stein, *The Eclipse of Community* (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1964), pp. 281 and 289 ff.

[8] See Daniel J. Elazar, *The American Partnership* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

ing federal involvement in local affairs; in this case they would be sharing the same ideology, or overlapping to such an extent that clear-cut distinctions would be lacking.

A series of events beginning in late 1963 in South Bend, Indiana, provided an opportunity to test whether the Democrats and Republicans tend to diverge along these ideological lines or whether they reflect the "Tweedledee-Tweedledum" theory of American politics. These events may be summarized briefly as follows: (*a*) the election of a conservative Republican mayor and city council in November, 1963; (*b*) the departure of the Studebaker Corporation (the largest single employer in the community) in December, 1963; and (*c*) placing before the Republican-controlled city council in the spring of 1964 proposals to accept a Federal Public Housing Project, and a Federal Urban Renewal Project.

These events provided the backdrop for the study reported here. Its basic objectives are:

1. To ascertain the attitudes of community leaders toward local, state, and federal government-supported activity in an economic crisis affecting the local community; to compare these attitudes with attitudes toward local private agencies and their role in helping to resolve the economic crisis caused by the Studebaker shutdown.

2. To compare the attitudes of political and business leaders.

3. To compare the attitudes of the leaders with their behavior relative to such issues as urban renewal and public housing.

The following working hypotheses guided the development of the research design:

Hypothesis 1. Leaders who identified themselves as Democrats were expected to look with significantly more favor than Republicans upon federal government support of programs designed to help the local economy, while leaders who were Republicans would tend to give greater support to local and state government agencies and private agencies to help resolve local economic problems.

Hypothesis 2. We expected that among the Republicans, businessmen would be more likely than political leaders to look favorably upon federal government participation in local economic affairs. On the other hand, we expected no differences between Democratic business and political leaders. This hypothesis was premised on the belief that political leaders are more committed to extremist statements of a local versus federal nature than are businessmen in the American community. Businessmen tend toward a more pragmatic orientation and, when faced with an economic crisis, will be determined to do something, even if they do not like what they have to do. As Mr. X., one of the most distinguished and influential business leaders put it, "On a practical level, I would rather see the state government acting more. But the federal government has the money." In effect, what we expected to find was a continuum: the least favorable toward the federal government would be the Republican political leaders; next would be the Republican business leaders, followed by the Democratic business leaders, with the Democratic political leaders the most favorable.

Hypothesis 3. If Republicans and Democrats differed in the direction predicted, and if these differences were ideological, this should be reflected in their approach to such issues as federally sponsored "worker retraining programs" and federally sponsored public housing and urban renewal. In fact, however, the prediction we made during the course of the study was that whatever the attitudinal differences between the Democrats and the Republicans, federal aid would be sought and accepted by the Republicans as well as by the Democrats because of the overriding economic "needs" of the community. Thus, in such a crisis situation as South Bend was facing, attitudinal differences, if they existed, would simply

not be sufficiently strong to prevent positive action, which would suggest that the differences were those emerging out of a single ideology, rather than out of two opposing orientations.

METHODOLOGY

The problem of locating community leaders is still far from a satisfactory resolution. For this study the problem was somewhat simplified by the variables that had to be taken into account. Our main concern was the relationship between the local economy and government help at all levels. In particular, we wanted to find out how the local leaders (political as well as business) evaluated the situation and what they were doing about it.

Almost immediately following the announcement by Studebaker in December, 1963, of its pending departure, the outgoing Democratic mayor appointed a "Mayor's Committee on the Studebaker Crisis," popularly labeled the "Blue Ribbon Committee" by some and a "Tired Old Cheering Section" by others. The committee was comprised of thirty-five members including representation from all community sectors (business, communications, religion, labor, professions, and politics). Those chosen were indeed the top executives in their organizations, and their organizations were clearly important to the community. This fact suggested that we define community leadership primarily on the basis of the criterion of formal position in the major institutional sectors of the community.

It was decided to build upon the basic list of the "Mayor's Committee," which, by the way, was kept intact by the incoming Republican mayor. Thus, we sought out those persons within the spheres of business, politics, and the professions who held the most important offices in the community. Since our focus was on business and political sectors primarily, we decided to include other leaders only insofar as they were seen to be playing a role in the economic crisis, for instance through membership in the Mayor's Committee. Most selections of leaders were made independent of the Mayor's Committee.

Leaders of business enterprises were selected on the basis of the fact that their businesses were evaluated at a minimum tax assessment of $100,000 (which seemed to divide the larger from the many smaller businesses in South Bend) and employed at least 250 persons. In addition, all five major banks were included in the list. The local heads of the organizations so qualifying were selected to be interviewed. A total of forty-two businessmen qualified as leaders in this category.

In politics, the mayor, city council and county commissioners, the party leaders of both parties, and the recently defeated candidates for local office, were all listed to be interviewed. This presented us with the names of twenty-eight political leaders.

The final category included leaders in religion, labor, education, and welfare agencies, most of whom were on the Mayor's Committee. These totaled twenty-four names.

As an additional measure designed to uncover any other community leaders who might have been missed by using the formal position technique, we interviewed seventeen "knowledgeable" persons.[9] They were asked several questions dealing with the "reputed" community-leadership structure, and were asked to designate those persons who had the "most influence" in community decision-making, that is, whose influence tended to permeate beyond a single-issue area. Twenty-six persons received three or more votes, but twenty of them were already included in the list as formal-position leaders. The other six were added to the list to be interviewed, one

[9] By "knowledgeable" is meant a person who occupies a position of some importance in community organizations and, thus, is aware of at least some aspects of community decision-making. Such a person may or may not turn out to be an influential one. Examples of knowledgeable persons are City Clerk; newspaper reporter; executive directors of Urban League, United Fund, and Chamber of Commerce.

political leader and five professional welfare leaders, bringing the totals for these two groups to twenty-nine each.[10]

In all, then, one hundred persons were found to qualify as community leaders under the criteria used. A total of eighty-nine interviews were obtained, but two were incomplete. Two persons refused outright to be interviewed, and the remaining nine were out of town or "unavailable."[11] The data presented here came from eighty-seven community leaders representing business (33), government and politics (28), and professional-welfare (26).

Our analysis of the data is based on the leaders' response to the question: "Do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent in political affiliation?"

TABLE 1

NET EFFECTIVE BUYING INCOME, 1963*

	Per Capita	Per Household
South Bend..........	$2,363	$7,610
Indiana.............	2,004	6,738
United States	2,029	6,874

* "Current Market Data of South Bend, Indiana," Bulletin published by the *South Bend Tribune* (1963), p 27 Net effective buying income is a measure of purchasing power It consists of wages, salaries, dividends, interest, government payments, and all miscellaneous items of income from all sources It is an arbitrary, arithmetical average computed by dividing total income by total number of households.

THE RESEARCH SITE

South Bend is a diversified industrial city of 133,000 persons, the hub of a larger metropolitan complex of some 250,000 persons, roughly corresponding to St. Joseph County. Some twenty-five industrial and commercial firms in the area employed at least 250 persons, and six employed 1,000 or more persons. Before its shutdown in December, 1963, the Studebaker Corporation with 8,700 employees, was the area's largest single employer. Despite the shutdown it continued to employ about 1,200 persons in personnel and maintenance, as home office for Studebaker International. Unemployment just before the shutdown in 1963 was about 2.2 per cent out of a metropolitan labor force of some 94,000. As of June, 1964, unemployment stood at 9 per cent, a decrease of some 2 per cent since December, 1963.[12]

The purchasing power of South Bend families reflected the low unemployment rate. According to 1963 figures, South Bend was above both the state and national averages in net effective buying power, as is shown in Table 1. Thus, the Studebaker shutdown was affecting a community of above-average prosperity.

For most of the last twenty years, South Bend and St. Joseph County had been strongholds of the Democratic Party. However, corruption charges against Democratic office-holders, intraparty ethnic friction, and poor leadership resulted in Republican victories at both the county and city levels in 1962 and 1963, culminating in the election of a Republican mayor and seven out of nine councilmen in the Fall of 1963. Thus, the stage was set for a test of the "end of ideology" theory when Studebaker announced its intention to shut down in December, 1963.

FINDINGS

Table 2 summarizes the backgrounds of the leaders in relation to their political party affiliation.[13] There was little difference between Republicans and Democrats in regard to age and education. Republi-

[10] None of these six was among the top vote receivers.

[11] Interviewing was carried out primarily during the months of April and May with the assistance of several graduate students and two professional interviewers. The Urban Renewal and Public Housing Projects were still unresolved at the time of the interviewing.

[12] Indiana Employment Security Division, June, 1964.

[13] Later in the paper we will separate out and compare those who were selected because of their known political-governmental activity and those who were selected because they were business leaders.

cans, as expected, enjoyed a much higher income level, with their median income almost $10,000 a year higher than that of the Democrats.

Religion is significant in South Bend politics, as elsewhere. Democratic party leaders especially were sensitive to the religious factor and went to great lengths to present a "balanced ticket" to the voters.[14] Republican leaders shunned this device. Interestingly enough, all but one of the Democratic candidates for office in 1963 were Catholics, while none of the Republican candidates was a Catholic.[15] The data show that the leaders of South Bend seemed to conform to the generalization that Catholics and Jews were more likely to be Democrats, and Protestants were more likely to be Republicans.

Again, as expected, a majority of Republican leaders were executives of the larger corporations, and well over 75 per cent were businessmen in one form or another. Less than half of the Democrats fell into the business category. In sum, the crucial differences between the Democrats and the Republicans followed the expected patterns of income, religion, and occupation.

Hypothesis 1 stated that Republicans would be more likely to look to local agencies while Democrats would be more likely to look to the federal government for help. Respondents were first asked to evaluate the responsibility of various local community organizations (Central Labor Union, Chamber of Commerce, the Catholic Church, etc.) toward helping to restore community health and prosperity threatened by the Studebaker crisis. There were no differences between the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans. The leaders were unanimous about the direct responsibility of local government to do all in its power to alleviate the situation. The Chamber of Commerce, Central Labor Union, Businessmen's Committee of 100, and the United Community Services equally were perceived to have a direct responsibility also.

Responses were much the same in an-

TABLE 2

SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH BEND COMMUNITY LEADERS BY THEIR POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION

	Democrats (N = 28)	Republicans (N = 46)	Independents (N = 11)
Age (in mean years)	47.2	51.1	50.5
Education (median years completed)	14.9	14.6	16.0
Income (median)	$14,570	$23,347	$14,999
Religion:			
Catholic	15	3	2
Jewish	3	0	2
Protestant	9	41	7
Other	1	4	0
Occupation:			
Corporation executive	6	25	1
Proprietor, manager	6	13	3
Government (local-elected, appointed)	5	4	2
Labor union leaders	3	0	0
Professional	8	6	4
Voluntary association member	25	43	10

[14] This meant essentially trying to get representatives of all three major religious groupings "on the ticket." There was also an ethnic dimension to this process, involving the attempt to provide places for Negroes, Hungarians, and others to "balance" the predominant Polish segment in the party. Again, Republicans officially denounced such practices.

[15] The 1962 and 1964 elections were more "balanced" in this respect on both party tickets.

swer to the question on the role of the state government in a situation such as the departure of the Studebaker Corporation. Just about 50 per cent of each party thought that the state government should actively seek to help the community in every way possible. Nevertheless, five Republicans—but no Democrats—stated categorically that the state government had no role to play, that such a crisis was strictly a local problem.

Although the opinions of Democrats and Republicans were the same regarding the responsibility of local organizations and state government to help revitalize the local economy when a large industry shuts down, there may be differences in the way they perceived the local scene. If Republicans and Democrats tended to think differently about the role of the federal government in the local community, the reasons for this difference might be the way the respective groups of leaders evaluated the local community's ability to handle its own problems. The respondents were asked to evaluate the ability of the community to solve its own problems and whether the community leaders could do the job. As Table 3 shows, Republicans and Democrats answered these questions in significantly different ways.

TABLE 3

RESPONSES OF COMMUNITY LEADERS TO QUESTIONS EVALUATING THE ABILITY OF SOUTH BEND TO RESOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS, AND THE BELIEF THAT LEADERS HAVE THE DESTINY OF THE CITY IN THEIR OWN HANDS

	Democrats ($N=28$) (Per Cent)	Republicans ($N=48$) (Per Cent)
Yes, South Bend can resolve its own problems*	39	79
Yes, the leaders believe that they have the destiny of the city in their own hands† ...	40	71

* $\chi^2 = 12.5$; $p < .001$.
† $\chi^2 = 7.3$; $p < .01$.

A majority of South Bend leaders who were Democrats rejected the idea that the community could resolve its own problems on its own resources, nor did they think that the leaders believed that this was possible. They cited lack of sufficient financial resources as well as the fact that this sort of thing was no longer a local problem as the main reasons for their negative responses. The Republicans had the opposite opinions. The differences in both cases were statistically significant at the .01 level. In this situation, then, with the Democrats believing that local leadership could not resolve the problem alone, and Republicans believing the opposite, we might expect the Democrats to turn to the federal government as an alternative, while the Republicans would be more likely to reject the federal government as an aid, since they believed that ample resources were available at the local level. In both cases this would be in keeping with traditional views of national party positions.

The respondents were also asked to "agree" or "disagree" with the statement that "Democracy in government depends fundamentally upon the existence of free business enterprise." Twenty-eight Democrats and forty-eight Republicans were asked for their opinions. It was found that 54 per cent of the Democrats and 94 per cent of the Republicans agreed that free enterprise is fundamental ($\chi^2 = 17.1$; $p < .001$).[16]

While a majority of both groups agreed with the "conventional wisdom" that democracy in government depends on the existence of free business enterprise, the difference between the two groups was great. The Republicans almost unanimously supported the proposition, while Democrats had 46 per cent disagreeing or undecided. Such a difference of belief

[16] Differences between Democrats and Republicans were also significant at the .001 level to the question: "Do you think the country as a whole would be a better place to live if taxation and spending by the government were reduced in the area of general welfare?"

would seem to leave the Democrats more open than the Republicans to seeking alternatives to help a sagging local economy. The data presented so far give partial support to Hypothesis 1; the leaders differed in their perception of the community's ability to handle its problems, and they differed in their views about the relation of free enterprise to democracy.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS ROLE IN LOCAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

A series of questions was asked to test the hypothesis that Democrats and Republicans would differ in their perceptions of the role of the federal government in local economic affairs, and the results are presented in Tables 4–6.

TABLE 4

RESPONSES OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY LEADERS TO THE QUESTION "WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN A LOCAL COMMUNITY WHEN A MAJOR INDUSTRY SHUTS DOWN?"*

	Democrats (N=28) (Per Cent)	Republicans (N=48) (Per Cent)
The federal government has no role	0	23
Limited welfare aid is all	18	40
Act promptly and with whatever means are needed and legally possible	50	21
Provide financial support and expert consultation, and other stimulation	32	16

* $\chi^2 = 15.814$, $p < .01$, $df = 3$.

Twice as many Democrats as Republicans expressed the attitude that the federal government should act promptly and with all means at its disposal. While most Republicans acknowledged that the federal government should have some role, fully 23 per cent of the Republicans said that the federal government should have no role to play in such a situation. In sum, both parties recognized the responsibility for some federal aid, but the Democrats tended to look with favor upon all-out support, while the Republicans thought in terms of limited support. The data in Table 5 help to clarify this difference.

As expected, the Democrats overwhelmingly supported the view that the federal government tries to emphasize the importance of local initiative, a view shared by less than 40 per cent of the Republicans. On the other hand, just about half the Republicans perceived the federal

TABLE 5

ATTITUDES OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY LEADERS TO THE QUESTION ON THE ROLE PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN LOCAL AFFAIRS*

	Democrats (N=28) (Per Cent)	Republicans (N=48) (Per Cent)
Federal government intrudes whether or not it is invited in, and gradually takes over efforts to promote local economic growth	0 0	8 3
Federal government tries to emphasize the importance of local initiative in promoting local economic growth	78 6	37 5
Federal government acts in *ad hoc* manner, without plans, and ends up stifling local initiative	21 3	54 2

* $\chi^2 = 11.917$, $p < .01$, $df = 2$

TABLE 6

RESPONSES OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY LEADERS TO TWO QUESTIONS

	Democrats (N=28) Per Cent Agreeing	Republicans (N=48) Per Cent Agreeing
The federal government is so distant that it cannot understand how the people of a community feel about a certain issue*	32	70 1
The federal government tends to overlook the work of community leaders and tries to replace their work with its own setup†	32 1	77 1

* $\chi^2 = 19.2$, $p < .001$

† $\chi^2 = 17.2$, $p < .001$

government as intruding, acting in an *ad hoc* manner without adequate planning, and in general stifling local initiative. Substantially the same results were obtained when two related questions were asked later in the interviews; these results are summarized in Table 6.

The data presented in Tables 4–6 strongly supported the hypothesis that there were substantial differences of opinion among community leaders about the role of the federal government in local affairs based on party affiliation. At least as regards their opinions, they were not the differences between "Tweedledee" and "Tweedledum". That these differences represented fundamentally opposed ideological orientations, however, is a different matter.

According to Hypothesis 2, among Republicans, businessmen would be more likely to look with favor upon federal government activity on the local level than would political leaders. Businessmen might grumble that that government was best which governed least, but they are first and foremost concerned with keeping the economic system healthy, even if this means government aid. They might grumble that federal aid threatens the health of the economy, but not so much as no aid at all threatens the economy. It was further predicted that political leaders would diverge more sharply from each other than would business leaders.

The data to test Hypothesis 2 were obtained by analyzing the responses of Tables 4, 5, and 6 according to the further breakdown of occupational orientation (politician or businessman), with the professional welfare leaders dropped from the discussion. The findings are mixed, but generally in the expected direction. For example, there were no differences among Republicans on the questions probing the proper role of the federal government in local affairs, and on the belief that the federal government is too distant to be able to understand local feelings. At the same time the Republican politicians were more likely than the businessmen to acknowledge that the federal government tries to emphasize the importance of local initiative.

Minor variations characterized the attitudes of Democratic political and business leaders. Although the N's were small, the direction of differences was consistent, with the business leaders slightly more critical of the federal government. When the four groupings were compared, the political leaders, as expected, were found to be farthest apart, with the business leaders in between.

The pattern was most clearly shown in the question: "Do you agree or disagree that the federal government tends to overlook the work of community leaders and tries to replace their work with its own setup?" Among Republicans, 93 per cent of the politicians and 76 per cent of the businessmen stated that they agreed; among Democrats, 50 per cent of the businessmen and 38 per cent of the politicians agreed.

To summarize, Republican political leaders were the most negative, Republican business leaders were only slightly less so. Businessmen who were Democrats were favorable and Democratic political leaders were the most favorable in their attitudes toward the federal government.

The hypothesis that the Republican businessmen, because of their more pragmatic orientation, would be less negative than Republican political leaders in their appraisal of the role of the federal government in local economic matters, was not supported by the data. There were no differences among Republicans in this regard. In other respects the data supported the hypothesis.

Our data so far support the finding of McClosky that Democrats and Republicans speak with different voices. But we have long since learned that there is no simple one-to-one relationship between the attitude and the act. If this is true in general, then perhaps what Lipset and others are saying is that in a showdown,

when political and economic realities have to be faced, we find that differences do not express ideological division in the United States. Hence, the differences in opinions, attitudes, and beliefs that distinguish Democrats from Republicans are neither sufficiently great nor strongly held to bring about the kind of ideological cleavage that is the mark of Latin American and some European multiparty politics.

Our third hypothesis involved an attempt to compare the attitudes of the leaders studied with their behavior in South Bend during the six months immediately following the shutdown of the Studebaker Corporation. In the following discussion the behavior examined is largely that of the Republican leaders. Some Democrats did play key roles (for example, the local housing director), but they were behaving in accord with their attitudes and, furthermore, were not in control of the city government at this time. Of concern here is the behavior of the Republican mayor and city council and of the Republican business leaders.

In the critical situation of 1964, then, we expected Republicans, despite their negative appraisal of or mental reservations about the federal government, to support programs of federal aid. Where a vote by the city council might be necessary, the Republicans were expected to support such programs whatever their personal feelings.

A list of events was compiled which might have contributed to the economic recovery of the city (see Table 7). Respondents were asked to indicate which ones were the most important in helping the city to resolve its economic problems. Of the five events most frequently mentioned, only two were selected by a majority of the respondents with little difference between Democrats and Republicans.

While the purchase by Kaiser Corporation of part of the Studebaker plant to build trucks was as frequently selected, the event most talked about was the "Manpower Retraining Program" set up with federal government funds and aid.[17] The editor of the *South Bend Tribune*, a moderate Republican and sometime critic of federal aid programs, co-chairman of the Mayor's Committee, and considered the single most influential person in the city, was generally acknowledged to be most responsible for the development of this program in the city. Thus, whatever their attitude toward the federal government in the abstract, the Republicans were almost as ready as the Democrats to see the federally sponsored worker-retraining program as one of the two most important events that had so far taken place. However, nine out of the eleven Republicans who said that the federal government had no role in local affairs also failed to select "Manpower Retraining" as an important step to recovery.

TABLE 7

RESPONSES OF COMMUNITY LEADERS TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT EVENTS SEEM MOST IMPORTANT TO DATE IN HELPING TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDEBAKER DEPARTURE?"

	Democrats (N=28) (Per Cent)	Republicans (N=48) (Per Cent)
Establishment of Manpower Retraining Program	71	60
Purchase by Kaiser Corporation of part of Studebaker plant	71	58
Establishment of Mayor's Committee	21	25
Purchase of part of Studebaker by Allied Stamping Plant	21	29
Industrial expansion efforts in general	32	27

During the course of the development of this study, two other important issues

[17] It should be noted that the Kaiser Corporation purchased the Studebaker truck division with the expectation of securing a number of "military contracts." This in fact did occur. Somehow businessmen do not object to this kind of federal intervention.

arose in the community that provided further evidence for the test of this hypothesis. The first one concerned a federally aided Public Housing Project.[18] A three-site, decentralized, $5 million project had been approved by the previous Democratic city administration and the federal government. The measure was known to be opposed by several Republican councilmen. One who had just been elected had campaigned to keep public housing out of his district.

On March 9, in a move that had been expected for a month, the Council adopted by a 7–2 vote (strictly along party lines), an ordinance compelling appropriate zoning for public housing projects. The mayor, who previously was cool to public housing, had by then decided that public housing was vital to South Bend's economic recovery. Nevertheless, he was unable to gain any support from the Republican councilmen (for his opposition to this ordinance). The local public housing officials claimed that such an ordinance would make it virtually impossible for the city to get any future public housing approved. While most of the councilmen claimed that the ordinance would not affect the current public housing project, it was known that they intended to oppose such housing in the Northwest area of the city. They said that a site could be found elsewhere "if it were needed." The federal officials let it be known that any change in plans from those already adopted would mean the end of the whole project, including the clearing of the city's worst slum. The councilmen charged that the federal government was trying to dictate to them, and that they would not be bound by the actions of the "old council." For a month councilmen and housing leaders squabbled about sites, projects, and threatened loss of funds. It was revealed that the city had already invested some $200,000, which would be lost if the project were blocked. In late April, the first-district Republican councilman introduced a resolution to repeal the Northwest housing site, but under pressure from other councilmen, he agreed to wait for a postponement on the vote. The *South Bend Tribune* and members of the Mayor's Committee supported the public housing proposal.

Meanwhile, in early April, the Cummins Engine Company of Columbus, Indiana, announced plans to purchase the Studebaker foundry, thus providing jobs for 300–600 persons. At the same time the company asked the city government to help it get some room for expansion by undertaking an urban renewal program to clear an area near the foundry. This move was hailed by the *South Bend Tribune* and local businessmen. When, however, the issue was brought before the city council on May 11, there was an unexpected 4–4 split, with one conservative councilman absent. The result was that the council refused to authorize the Redevelopment Department to seek federal funds to begin the renewal process. However, as a result of pressure from the *South Bend Tribune*, other business groups, and the mayor himself, it was decided that the issue would be restudied and reconsidered at the meeting on May 25. On that date, also, the public housing issue was to be resolved.

Our interviews with the business leaders had indicated that they expected the conservative councilmen to "come around"

[18] Public housing developed slowly and fitfully in South Bend during the long period of control by the Democrats. As in many other cities, it was closely tied to the racial problem. In the fall of 1963, a group of Democratic leaders prepared a proposal for a fair-housing ordinance designed to guarantee equal housing opportunities for Negroes. The ordinance was defeated (7–2) in February, 1964, by the Republican controlled council, with the mayor also opposed. The eighty-seven community leaders overwhelmingly supported the idea of fair housing, but the Republicans (business as well as political leaders) generally opposed legislation "as a matter of principle." The Democrats strongly favored such legislation. The most notable exception among the Republicans was the editor of the *South Bend Tribune*.

soon. They were confident of favorable votes on public housing and urban renewal. On May 25 the council met and voted to: (1) rezone the Northwest housing site in order to permit public housing there (8-1); (2) defeat an ordinance that was designed to kill the site (7-2); and (3) authorize the Redevelopment Department to go ahead with the Urban Renewal Project (9-0).

While taking these positive stands, the council president made a statement blaming the previous administration for leaving the council with no "out" on public housing. Furthermore, he claimed that their previous negative vote against Cummins was designed only to delay action until full opportunity was possible for a study of the issue.

The localist-oriented councilmen had suffered a defeat, but they were by no means tamed yet. On July 27, the council voted to cut the salary of the executive director of the Redevelopment Department by $3,000, from $15,000 to $12,000. He had been earning $15,000 for seven years. In the words of one of the councilmen, this was done "to try to correct inequities of the past." The several business groups protested this move and the *South Bend Tribune* (July 29) editorialized as follows:

> Council members surely are not so naïve that they didn't realize Mr. Sucher would have no choice but to look for work elsewhere after that rebuff. The council, in effect, fired him.

It was perhaps more than coincidence that this latest council move followed by less than a week the announcement by a consulting firm of long-range plans for downtown renewal which called for vastly increased federal aid. The issue was further complicated by the suicide of the Redevelopment Director the following Sunday.

In summary, the issues discussed above, plus the fact that retraining of the workers was selected as one of the most important things that had happened so far to help South Bend resolve its economic problems, support the hypothesis that in a showdown federal aid would be accepted, whatever the preferences of the leaders might be in an abstract sense. In the case of public housing and urban renewal, the "conservative" council was won over by a mayor and group of business leaders who had a solid Republican orientation, but who were not ideologues committed to complete local autonomy.

CONCLUSION

What then can we say about the place of ideology in American community politics? Were the attitudinal differences between the Democrats and the Republicans which were shown here really ideological? Or were they something less? Were they the rhetoric of conventional wisdom which was simply irrelevant to ongoing community reality? Perhaps they were more than mere rhetoric; they were preferences which did distinguish the parties. But they did not have the highest priority in guiding leaders to social action. The highest priority went to "getting things done," or "doing something to get the economy on the move"; the business leaders were constantly reiterating these attitudes, and the councilmen were also aware of the need to counteract the economic loss by some positive actions. The attitudinal differences found apparently were statistically significant without being sociologically so.

Furthermore, the Republicans in general thought that the federal government had some responsibility, no matter how limited, to help out; public housing and urban renewal might be construed by them as limited aid. For it must be recognized that criticism of federal government involvement does not necessarily mean outright disapproval. Only one-fourth of the Republican leaders saw no role for the federal government in local affairs. These might be called the ideologues. For most of the leaders the distinctions they made would appear to be of degree, rather than of kind.

It would seem safe to predict that federal government involvement in local community affairs, especially through public housing and urban renewal, will increase considerably in the years to come. No matter how federal government legislation may be written to encourage local initiative, it is clear that such involvement, in some way at least, tends to restrict local options for action. (This is not to overlook that it may also increase local options where communities lack resources but want to take actions to change what they perceive to be negative situations.) Thus, this federal involvement forces us to confront anew the belief that democracy in America has flourished best at the local level, free from outside encumbrances.[19] The data from South Bend suggest that there are indeed two schools of thought on the subject, but that they do not lead to two distinct modes of action. The federal programs begun under a Democratic administration were continued and enlarged by the Republicans under the stimulus of an economic crisis. Thus, perhaps the data clarify the theory of pragmatic-democratic ideology adhered to by both parties in the United States, while revealing the continued existence of attitudinal differences among Democrats and Republicans which might be sociologically significant in non-emergency situations.

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[19] Elazar states the issue as follows: "In the past, many Americans have been attracted to this simplistic approach in their verbal images, while, in actuality, they have not hesitated to ignore those same images when and where it seemed necessary to do so" (*op. cit.*, p. 307).

COMMENTARY AND DEBATE

Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies

ABSTRACT

Theories of social problems and deviant behavior are normative; they interpret facts within the context of ideological assumptions about the nature of man and society. Normative theories can be classified as variants of two ideal types—order and conflict theories. As an exercise in the use of these models, American sociological approaches to the Negro question are examined with the following conclusions: (1) they are similar to politically liberal interpretations; (2) both sociological and liberal approaches to the race question represent conservative variants of order theory.

A recent best seller, *The One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding*,[1] should be required reading for every student of social problems and deviant behavior. The novel makes clear what is often dimly understood and rarely applied in sociology—the fundamentally social and symbolic character of existing theories of behavior. In the novel a square, white college boy and a Lolitaesque Negro prostitute recount their shared weekend experience. But what they have shared in action, they do not share in words. Each tells a different story. Their clashing tales express different vocabularies and different experiences. Gover stereotypically dramatizes a now hackneyed theme in the modern theater and novel—the misunderstandings generated by a conflict of viewpoints, a conflict between subjective representations of "objective" reality.

Paradoxically, this familiar literary insight has escaped many social scientists. The escape is most baffling and least legitimate for the sociologists of deviant behavior and social problems. Social values define their phenomena; their social values color their interpretations. Whatever the possibilities of developing empirical theory in the social sciences, only normative theory is appropriate in the sociology of social problems. I would accept Don Martindale's definitions of empirical and normative theory:

> The ultimate materials of empirical theory are facts; the ultimate materials of normative theory are value-imperatives . . . empirical theory is formed out of a system of laws. Normative theory converts facts and laws into requisite means and conditions and is unique in being addressed to a system of objectives desired by the formulator or by those in whose service he stands.[2]

The problem for the sociologist is not that normative theories contain values, but that these values may go unnoticed so that normative theories pass for empirical theories. When his own values are unnoticed, the sociologist who studies the situation of the American Negro, for example, is a little like the middle-class white boy in Gover's novel, except that only one story is told, and it is represented as *the* story. The result could be a rather costly misunderstanding: the Negro may not recognize himself in the sociological story, worse, he may not even learn to accept it.

[1] Robert Gover, *The One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961).

[2] Don Martindale, "Social Disorganization: The Conflict of Normative and Empirical Approaches," in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), *Modern Sociological Theory* (New York: Dryden Press, 1959), p. 341.

One of the tasks of the sociologist is to recognize his own perspective and to locate this and competing perspectives in time and social structure. In this he can use Weber, Mills, and the sociology of knowledge as guides. Following Weber's work, he might argue that in so far as we are able to theorize about the social world, we must use the vocabularies of explanation actually current in social life.[3] This insight has been expanded by C. W. Mills and applied to theorizing in general and to the character of American theorizing in particular. The key words in Mills's approach to theorizing are "situated actions" and "vocabularies of motive." His position is that theories of social behavior can be understood sociologically as typical symbolic explanations associated with historically situated actions.[4] Thus, Mills argues that the Freudian terminology of motives is that of an upper-bourgeois patriarchal group with a strong sexual and individualistic orientation. Likewise explanations current in American sociology reflect the social experience and social motives of the American sociologist. Mills contends that for a period before 1940, a single vocabulary of explanation was current in the American sociologist's analysis of social problems and that these motives expressed a small town (and essentially rural) bias.[5] He interpreted the contemporary sociological vocabulary as a symbolic expression of a bureaucratic and administrative experience in life and work.[6]

Continuing in the tradition of Weber and Mills, I attempt to do the following: (1) propose a method of classifying current normative theories of deviant behavior and social problems; (2) discuss liberal and sociological approaches to the race question as an example of one of these theories; and (3) point out the implications of the normative character of theory for sociology. My general discussion of competing theories will be an elaboration of several assumptions:

1. All definitions and theories of deviation and social problems are normative. They define and explain behavior from socially situated value positions.

2. Existing normative theories can be classified into a limited number of typical vocabularies of explanation. Contemporary sociological theories of deviation are adaptations of two fundamental models of analysis rooted in nineteenth-century history and social thought. These are *order* and *conflict* models of society. Order models imply an *anomy* theory of societal discontent and an *adjustment* definition of social deviation. Conflict models imply an *alienation* theory of discontent and a *growth* definition of deviation.

3. In general, a liberalized version of order theory pervades the American sociological approach to racial conflict, juvenile delinquency, and other social problems. I use the term "liberal" because the sociological and the politically liberal vocabularies are essentially the same. Both employ an order model of society; both are conservative in their commitment to the existing social order.

4. Alternatives to the liberal order approach exist both within the context of sociological theory and in the contemporary social and political fabric of American society. More radical versions of order models have been used by European sociologists such as Emile Durkheim; radical versions of order models are presently being used in American society by political rightists. The conflict vocabulary has been most clearly identified with Karl

[3] For Weber's discussion of explanation in the social sciences see *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 87–114.

[4] C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," *American Sociological Review*, V (December, 1940), 904–13.

[5] C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of the Social Pathologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX (September, 1943), 165–80.

[6] C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

Marx and continues today in the social analysis of socialists and communists, while an anarchistic version of conflict theory pervades the politics of the so-called new left.

5. Current vocabularies for the explanation of social problems can be located within the social organization of sociology and the broader society. As a generalization, groups or individuals committed to the maintenance of the social status quo employ order models of society and equate deviation with non-conformity to institutionalized norms. Dissident groups, striving to institutionalize new claims, favor a conflict analysis of society and an alienation theory of their own discontents. For example, this social basis of preference for one model is clear in even the most superficial analysis of stands taken on civil rights demonstrations by civil rights activists and members of the Southern establishment. For Governor Wallace of Alabama, the 1965 Selma-Montgomery march was a negative expression of anomy; for Martin Luther King it was a positive and legitimate response to alienation. King argues that the Southern system is maladaptive to certain human demands; Wallace that the demands of the demonstrators are dysfunctional to the South. However, if one considers their perspectives in relationship to the more powerful Northern establishment, King and not Wallace is the order theorist.

In sociology, order analysis of society is most often expressed by the professional establishment and its organs of publication. Alienation analysis is associated with the "humanitarian" and "political" mavericks outside of, opposed to, or in some way marginal to the established profession of sociology.

ORDER AND CONFLICT THEORIES: ANOMY AND ALIENATION ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AS IDEAL TYPES

The terms "alienation" and "anomy" current in the analysis of social problems derive historically from two opposing models of society—order and conflict models.[7] A comparison of the works of Marx and Mills (classical and contemporary conflict models) and Durkheim and Merton or Parsons (classical and contemporary order models) highlights the differences between the two social vocabulraies. These competing vocabularies can be abstracted into ideal types of explanation, that is, exaggerated and ideologically consistent models which are only approximated in social reality.

THE ORDER VOCABULARY

Order theories have in common an image of society as a system of action unified at the most general level by shared culture, by agreement on values (or at least on modes) of communication and political organization. System analysis is synonymous with structural-functional analysis. System analysis consists of *statics*—the classification of structural regularities in social relations (dominant role and status clusters, institutions, etc.)—and *dynamics*—the study of the intrasystem processes: strategies of goal definition, socialization, and other functions which maintain system balance. A key concept in the analysis of system problems (social problems, deviation, conflict) is anomy. Social problems both result from and promote anomy. Anomy means system imbalance or social disorganization—a lack of or breakdown in social organization reflected in weakened social control, inadequate institutionalization of goals, inadequate means to achieve system goals, inadequate socialization, etc. At a social psychological level of analysis, anomy results in the failure

[7] In contemporary sociology, the concepts of alienation and anomy are often used synonymously. In practice, this usually means that alienation, a key term in conflict analysis, has been translated into a more conservative-order vocabulary; for a discussion of differences between past and present uses of these concepts see John Horton, "The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation," *British Journal of Sociology*, XV (December, 1964), 283-300.

of individuals to meet the maintenance needs of the social system.

Order theories imply consensual and adjustment definitions of social health and pathology, of conformity and deviation. The standards for defining health are the legitimate values of the social system and its requisites for goal attainment and maintenance. Deviation is the opposite of social conformity and means the failure of individuals to perform their legitimate social roles; deviants are out of adjustment.

A contemporary example of an order approach to society and an adjustment interpretation of health and pathology has been clearly stated in Talcott Parsons' definition of mental health and pathology:

> Health may be defined as the state of optimum *capacity* of an individual for the effective performance of the roles and tasks for which he has been socialized. It is thus defined with reference to the individual's participation in the social system. It is also defined as *relative* to his "status" in the society, i.e., to differentiated type of role and corresponding task structure, e.g., by sex or age, and by level of education which he has attained and the like.[8]

THE CONFLICT VOCABULARY

Conflict theorists are alike in their rejection of the order model of contemporary society. They interpret order analysis as the strategy of a ruling group, a reification of their values and motivations, a rationalization for more effective social control. Society is a natural system for the order analyst; for the conflict theorist it is a continually contested political struggle between groups with opposing goals and world views. As an anarchist, the conflict theorist may oppose any notion of stable order and authority. As a committed Marxist, he may project the notion of order into the future. Order is won, not through the extension of social control, but through the radical reorganization of social life; order follows from the condition of social organization and not from the state of cultural integration.

Conflict analysis is synonymous with historical analysis: the interpretation of intersystem processes bringing about the transformation of social relations. A key concept in the analysis of historical and social change (as new behavior rather than deviant behavior) is alienation—separation, not from the social system as defined by dominant groups, but separation from man's universal nature or a desired state of affairs. Change is the progressive response to alienation; concepts of disorganization and deviation have no real meaning within the conflict vocabulary; they are properly part of the vocabulary of order theory where they have negative connotations as the opposites of the supreme values of order and stability. Within the conflict framework, the question of normality and health is ultimately a practical one resolved in the struggle to overcome alienation.

Conflict theory, nevertheless, implies a particular definition of health, but the values underlying this definition refer to what is required to grow and change, rather than to adjust to existing practices and hypothesized requirements for the maintenance of the social system. Health and pathology are defined in terms of postulated requirements for individual or social growth and adaptation. Social problems and social change arise from the exploitive and alienating practices of dominant groups; they are responses to the discrepancy between what is and what is in the process of becoming. Social problems, therefore, reflect, not the administrative problems of the social system, nor the failure of individuals to perform their system roles as in the order explanation, but the adaptive failure of society to meet changing individual needs.

A growth definition of health based on a conflict interpretation of society is implicit in Paul Goodman's appraisal of the

[8] Talcott Parsons, "Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American Values and Social Structure," in E. Gartley Jaco (ed.), *Patients, Physicians and Illness* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963), p. 176.

causes of delinquency in American society. Unlike Parsons, he does not define pathology as that which does not conform to system values; he argues that delinquency is not the reaction to exclusion from these values, nor is it a problem of faulty socialization. Existing values and practices are absurd standards because they do not provide youth with what they need to grow and mature:

> As was predictable, most of the authorities and all of the public spokesmen explain it (delinquency) by saying there has been a failure of socialization. They say that background conditions have interrupted socialization and must be improved. And, not enough effort has been made to guarantee belonging, there must be better bait or punishment.
>
> But perhaps there has *not* been a failure of communication. Perhaps the social message has been communicated clearly to the young men and is unacceptable.
>
> In this book I shall, therefore, take the opposite tack and ask, "Socialization to what? to what dominant society and available culture?" And if this question is asked, we must at once ask the other question, "Is the harmonious organization to which the young are inadequately socialized, perhaps against human nature, or not worthy of human nature, and *therefore* there is difficulty in growing up?"[9]

The conflict theorist invariably questions the legitimacy of existing practices and values; the order theorist accepts them as the standard of health.

PARADIGM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND ORDER APPROACHES TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In order more sharply to compare order and conflict models in terms of their implications for explanations of deviation and social problems, essential differences can be summarized along a number of parallel dimensions. These dimensions are dichotomized into order and conflict categories. The resulting paradigm can be used as a preliminary guide for the content analysis of contemporary as well as classical studies of social problems.

[9] Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 11.

ORDER PERSPECTIVE	CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE
1. UNDERLYING SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE AND VALUE POSITIONS (IDEAL)	
a. Image of man and society	
Society as a natural boundary-maintaining system of action	Society as a contested struggle between groups with opposed aims and perspectives
Transcendent nature of society, an entity *sui generis*, greater than and different from the sum of its parts; lack of transcendence as lack of social control means anomy	Immanent conception of society and the social relationship; men are society; society is the extension of man, the indwelling of man; the transcendence of society is tantamount to the alienation of man from his own social nature
Positive attitude toward the maintenance of social institutions	Positive attitude toward change
b. Human nature	
Homo duplex, man half egoistic (self-nature), half altruistic (socialized nature), ever in need of restraints for the collective good or *Tabula rasa*, man equated with the socialization process or *Homo damnatus*, the division into morally superior and morally inferior men	*Homo laborans* existential man, the active creator of himself and society through practical and autonomous social action
c. Values	
The social good: balance, stability, authority, order, quantitative growth ("moving equilibrium")	Freedom as autonomy, change, action, qualitative growth

2. MODES OF "SCIENTIFIC" ANALYSIS

Natural science model: quest for general and universal laws and repeated patterns gleaned through empirical research Structural-functional analysis	Historical model: quest for understanding (Verstehen) through historical analysis of unique and changing events; possible use of ideal type of generalization based on historically specific patterns
Multiple causality; theory characterized by high level of abstraction, but empirical studies marked by low level of generalization (separation of theory from application)	Unicausality; high or low level of theoretical generalization; union of theory and practice in social research and social action
Conditions of objectivity: accurate correspondence of concepts to facts; rigid separation of observer and facts observed—passive, receptive theory of knowledge	Utility in terms of observer's interests; objectivity discussed in the context of subjectivity—activistic theory of knowledge
Analysis begins with culture as major determinant of order and structure and proceeds to personality and social organization	Analysis begins with organization of social activities or with growth and maintenance needs of man and proceeds to culture
Dominant concepts: ahistorical; high level of generality; holistic; supra-individual concepts; ultimate referent for concepts—system needs considered universally (i.e., the functional prerequisites of any social system) or relativistically (i.e., present maintenance requirements of a particular social system)	Historical, dynamic; low level of generality and high level of historical specificity; ultimate referent for concepts—human needs considered universally (i.e., man's species nature) or relativistically (demands of particular contenders for power); referent often the future or an unrealized state of affairs

3. ORDER AND CONFLICT THEORIES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND DEVIATION

a. Standards for the definition of health and pathology	
Health equated with existing values of a postulated society (or a dominant group in the society), ideological definition	Health equated with unrealized standards (the aspirations of subordinate but rising groups), utopian definition
b. Evaluation of deviant behavior	
Pathological to the functioning of the social system	Possibly progressive to the necessary transformation of existing relationships
c. Explanation of deviation or a social problem	
A problem of anomy in adequate control over competing groups in the social system; disequilibrium in the existing society	A problem of self-alienation, being thwarted in the realization of individual and group goals; a problem of illegitimate social control and exploitation
d. Implied ameliorative action	
Extension of social control (further and more efficient institutionalization of social system values); adjustment of individuals to system needs; working within the system; the administrative solution	Rupture of social control; radical transformation of existing patterns of interaction; revolutionary change of the social system

4. ORDER AND CONFLICT THEORIES AS SOCIALLY SITUATED VOCABULARIES

Dominant groups: the establishment and administrators of the establishment	Subordinate groups aspiring for greater power
Contemporary representatives: Parsonian and Mertonian approach to social problems as a liberal variant of order models; politically conservative approaches	C. W. Mills, new left (SNCC, SDS, etc.) approaches and old left (socialistic and communistic)

The order and conflict models as outlined represent polar ideal types which are not consistently found in the inconsistent ideologies of actual social research and political practice. If the models have any utility to social scientists, it will be in making more explicit and systematic the usually implicit value assumptions which underlie their categories of thinking. In this paper as an exercise in the use of conflict-order models, I examine some of the normative assumptions which can be found in the approach of the sociologist and the political liberal to the Negro question. My thinking is intentionally speculative. I am not trying to summarize the vast literature on race relations, but merely showing the existence of an order pattern.

LIBERALS AND SOCIOLOGISTS ON THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A CONTEMPORARY ADAPTATION OF ORDER THEORY

Contemporary liberalism has been popularly asociated with a conflict model of society; actually it is a variant of conservative order theory. Within the model, conflict is translated to mean institutionalized (reconciled) conflict or competition for similar goals within the same system. Conflict as confrontation of opposed groups and values, conflict as a movement toward basic change of goals and social structures is anathema.

The liberal tendency of American sociology and the essentially conservative character of contemporary liberalism are particularly marked in the sociological analysis of the Negro question. In the field of race relations, an order model can be detected in (1) consensual assumptions about man and society: the "over-socialized" man and the plural society; (2) a selective pattern of interpretation which follows from these assumptions: (a) the explanation of the problem as a moral dilemma and its solution as one requiring adjustment through socialization and social control; (b) the explanation of the minority group as a reaction-formation to exclusion from middle-class life; (c) an emphasis on concepts useful in the explanation of order (shared values as opposed to economic and political differences); an emphasis on concepts useful in the explanation of disorder or anomy within an accepted order (status competition rather than class conflict, problems of inadequate means rather than conflicting goals).

THE LIBERAL VIEW OF MAN: EGALITARIAN WITHIN AN ELITIST, CONSENSUAL FRAMEWORK: ALL MEN ARE SOCIALIZABLE TO THE AMERICAN CREED

No one can see an ideological assumption as clearly as a political opponent. Rightist and leftist alike have attacked the liberal concept of man implicit in the analysis of the Negro question: conservatives because it is egalitarian, radicals because it is elitist and equated with a dominant ideology. The rightist believes in natural inequality; the leftist in positive, historical differences between men; the liberal believes in the power of socialization and conversion.

A certain egalitarianism is indeed implied in at least two liberal assertations: (1) Negroes along with other men share a common human nature socializable to the conditions of society; (2) their low position and general inability to compete reflect unequal opportunity and inadequate socialization to whatever is required to succeed within the American system. These assertations are, in a sense, basically opposed to the elitist-conservative argument that the Negro has failed to compete because he is naturally different or has voluntarily failed to take full advantage of existing opportunities.[10]

The conservative, however, exaggerates liberal egalitarianism: *it is tempered with* elitism. Equality is won by conformity to

[10] For a conservative argument, see, among many others, Carleton Putnam, *Race and Reason* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961).

a dominant set of values and behavior. Equality means equal opportunity to achieve the same American values; in other words, equality is gained by losing one identity and conforming at some level to another demanded by a dominant group. As a leftist, J. P. Sartre has summarized this liberal view of man, both egalitarian and elitist. What he has termed the "democratic" attitude toward the Jew applies well to the American "liberal" view of the Negro:

> The Democrat, like the scientist, fails to see the particular case; to him the individual is only an ensemble of universal traits. It follows that his defense of the Jew saves the latter as a man and annihilates him as a Jew . . . he fears that the Jew will acquire a consciousness of Jewish collectivity. . . . "There are no Jews," he says, "there is no Jewish question." This means that he wants to separate the Jew from his religion, from his family, from his ethnic community, in order to plunge him into the democratic crucible whence he will emerge naked and alone, an individual and solitary particle like all other particles.[11]

The conservative would preserve a Negro identity by pronouncing the Negro different (inferior), the radical by proclaiming him part of the superior vanguard of the future society; but the liberal would transform him altogether by turning him into another American, another individual competing in an orderly fashion for cars, television sets, and identification with the American Creed. In their attack on the liberal definition of man, the conservative and leftist agree on one thing: the liberal seems to deny basic differences between groups. At least differences are reconcilable within a consensual society.

THE LIBERAL SOCIETY: STRUCTURAL PLURALISM WITHIN A CONSENSUAL FRAMEWORK

Thus, the liberal fate of minorities, including Negroes, is basically containment through socialization to dominant values. Supposedly this occurs in a plural society where some differences are maintained. But liberal pluralism like liberal egalitarianism allows differences only within a consensual framework. This applies both to the liberal ideal and the sociological description: the plural-democratic society *is* the present society.

This consensual pluralism should be carefully distinguished from the conflict variety. J. S. Furnivall has called the once colonially dominated societies of tropical Asia plural in the latter sense:

> In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indian, native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds to its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the marketplace, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division along racial lines.[12]

For Furnivall, a plural society has no common will, no common culture. Order rests on political force and economic expediency. For liberals and sociologists, American society has a common social will (the American Creed). Order rests on legitimate authority and consensus. The whole analysis of the Negro question has generally been predicated on this belief that American society, however plural, is united by consensus on certain values. Gunnar Myrdal's influential interpretation of the Negro question has epitomized the social will thesis:

> Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, and colors, have something in common: a social ethos, a political creed. . . . When the American Creed is once detected the cacophony becomes a melody . . . as

[11] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George J. Becker (New York: Grove Press, 1962), pp. 56–57.

[12] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 304.

principles which ought to rule, the Creed has been made conscious to everyone in American society. . . . America is continuously struggling for its soul. The cultural unity of the nation is sharing of both the consciousness of sin and the devotion to high ideals.[13]

In what sense can a consensual society be plural? It cannot tolerate the existence of separate cultural segments. Robin M. Williams in a recent book on race relations writes: "The United States is a plural society which cannot settle for a mosaic of separate cultural segments, nor for a caste system."[14] Norman Podhoretz, a political liberal who has written often on the Negro question has stated the issue more bluntly. In his review of Ralph Ellison's *Shadow and the Act*, a series of essays which poses a threat of conflict pluralism by asserting the positive and different "cultural" characteristics of Negroes, Podhoretz states his consensual realism:

The vision of a world in which many different groups live together on a footing of legal and social equality, each partaking of a broad general culture and yet maintaing its own distinctive identity: this is one of the noble dreams of the liberal tradition. Yet the hard truth is that very little evidence exists to suggest that such a pluralistic order is possible. Most societies throughout history have simply been unable to suffer the presence of distinctive minority groups among them; and the fate of minorities has generally been to disappear, either through being assimilated into the majority, or through being expelled, or through being murdered.[15]

The liberal and the sociologist operating with an order ideology positively fear the conflict type of pluralism. As Sartre rightly observed, the liberal who is himself identified with the establishment, although avowedly the friend of the minority, suspects any sign of militant minority consciousness. He wants the minority to share in American human nature and compete like an individual along with other individuals for the same values.

As Podhoretz has observed, pluralism never really meant the co-existence of quite different groups:

For the traditional liberal mentality conceives of society as being made up not of competing economic classes and ethnic groups, but rather of competing *individuals* who confront a neutral body of law and a neutral institutional complex.[16]

How then can ethnic groups be discussed within the plural but consensual framework? They must be seen as separate but assimilated (contained) social structures. Among sociologists, Milton Gordon has been most precise about this pluralism as a description of ethnic groups in American society.

Behavioral assimilation or acculturation has taken place in America to a considerable degree. . . . Structural assimilation, then, has turned out to be the rock on which the ships of Anglo-conformity and the melting pot have foundered. To understand the behavioral assimilation (or acculturation) without massive structural intermingling in primary relationships has been the dominant motif in the American experience of creating and developing a nation out of diverse peoples is to comprehend the most essential sociological fact of that experience. It is against the background of "structural pluralism" that strategies of strengthening inter-group harmony, reducing ethnic discrimination and prejudice, and maintaining the rights of both those who stay within and those who venture

[13] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), pp. 3-4.

[14] Robin M. Williams, Jr., *Strangers Next Door* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 386.

[15] Norman Podhoretz, "The Melting-Pot Blues," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1964.

[16] Norman Podhoretz, as quoted in "Liberalism and the American Negro—a Round-Table Discussion," with James Baldwin, Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, Gunnar Myrdal, and Norman Podhoretz (moderator), *Commentary*, XXXVII (March, 1964), 25-26.

beyond their ethnic boundaries must be thoughtfully devised.[17]

Clearly then the liberal vocabulary of race relations is predicated on consensual assumptions about the nature of man and society. The order explanation of the Negro problem and its solution may be summarized as follows:

1. *An order or consensual model of society.*—American society is interpreted as a social system unified at its most general level by acceptance of certain central political, social, and economic values. Thus, the Negro population is said to have been acculturated to a somewhat vaguely defined American tradition; at the most, Negro society is a variant or a reaction to that primary tradition.

2. *Social problems as moral problems of anomy or social disorganization within the American system.*—Social problems and deviant behavior arise from an imbalance between goals and means. The problems of the Negro are created by unethical exclusion from equal competition for American goals.

3. *The response to anomy: social amelioration as adjustment and extension of social control.*—Liberal solutions imply further institutionalization of the American Creed in the opportunity structure of society and, therefore, the adjustment of the deviant to legitimate social roles.

THE RACE QUESTION AS A MORAL DILEMMA

A familiar expression of liberal-consensualism is Gunnar Myrdal's interpretation of the American race question as a moral dilemma. According to this thesis, racial discrimination and its varied effects on the Negro—the development of plural social structures, high rates of social deviation, etc.—reflect a kind of anomy in the relationship between the American Creed and social structure. Anomy means a moral crisis arising from an incongruity between legitimate and ethical social goals (for example, success and equality of opportunity) and socially available opportunities to achieve these goals. American society is good and ethical, but anomic because the American Creed of equality has not been fully institutionalized; the ethic is widely accepted in theory but not in practice.

Sidney Hook as a political liberal has likewise insisted that American society is essentially ethical and that the Negro problem should be discussed in these ethical terms:

> Of course, no society has historically been organized on the basis of ethical principles, but I don't think we can understand how any society functions without observing the operation of the ethical principles within it. And if we examine the development of American society, we certainly can say that we have made *some* progress, to be sure, but progress nevertheless—by virtue of the extension of our ethical principles to institutional life. If we want to explain the progress that has been made in the last twenty years by minority groups in this country—not only the Negroes, but other groups as well—I believe we have to take into account the effect of our commitment to democracy, imperfect though it may be.[18]

THE SOLUTION: WORKING WITHIN THE SYSTEM

The liberal solution to the racial question follows from the American-dilemma thesis: the belief in the ethical nature and basic legitimacy of American institutions. Amelioration, therefore, becomes exclusively a question of adjustment within the system; it calls for administrative action: how to attack anomy as the imbalance of goals and means. The administrator accepts the goals of his organization and treats all problems as errors in administration, errors which can be recti-

[17] Milton Gordon, "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality," *Daedalus*, XC (Spring, 1961), 280, 283.

[18] Sidney Hook, "Liberalism and the American Negro—a Round-Table Discussion," *Commentary*, XXXVII (March, 1964), p. 31.

fied without changing the basic framework of the organization. Karl Mannheim has aptly characterized the bureaucratic and administrative approach to social problems. What he says about the perspective of the Prussian bureaucrat applies only too well to his counterpart in American society:

> The attempt to hide all problems of politics under the cover of administration may be explained by the fact that the sphere of activity of the official exists only within the limits of laws already formulated. Hence the genesis or the development of law falls outside the scope of his activity. As a result of his socially limited horizon, the functionary fails to see that behind every law that has been made there lie the socially fashioned interests and the *Weltanschauungen* of a specific social group. He takes it for granted that the specific order prescribed by the concrete law is equivalent to order in general. He does not understand that every rationalized order is only one of many forms in which socially conflicting irrational forces are reconciled.[19]

The liberal administrator's solution to the Negro question entails the expansion of opportunities for mobility within the society and socialization of the deviant (the Negro and the anti-Negro) to expanding opportunities. Hence, the importance of education and job training; they are prime means to success and higher status. Given the assumption that the American Creed is formally embodied in the political structure, the liberal also looks to legislation as an important and perhaps sole means of reenforcing the Creed by legitimizing changes in the American opportunity structure.

NEGRO LIFE AS A REACTION FORMATION

Another important deduction has followed from the assumption of the political and cultural assimilation of the American Negro: whatever is different or distinct in his life style represents a kind of negative reaction to exclusion from the white society. The Negro is the creation of the white. Like the criminal he is a pathology, a reaction-formation to the problem of inadequate opportunities to achieve and to compete in the American system.

Myrdal states:

> The Negro's entire life and, consequently, also his opinions on the Negro problem are, in the main, to be considered as secondary reactions to more primary pressures from the side of the dominant white majority.[20]

More recently Leonard Broom has echoed the same opinion:

> Negro life was dominated by the need to adjust to white men and to take them into account at every turn. . . . Taken as a whole, the two cultures have more common than distinctive elements. Over the long run, their convergence would seem inevitable. . . . Because Negro life is so much affected by poverty and subservience, it is hard to find distinctive characteristics that can be positively evaluated. In the stereotype, whatever is admirable in Negro life is assumed to have been adopted from the white man, while whatever is reprehensible is assumed to be inherently Negro.[21]

CONFLICT THEORIST LOOKS AT ORDER THEORIST LOOKING AT THE NEGRO

A liberal order model—consensual pluralism, with its corollary approach to the race question as moral dilemma and reaction-formation—colors the sociological analysis of the race question. It is interesting that the fundamental assumption about consensus on the American Creed has rarely been subjected to adequate empirical test.[22] Lacking any convincing evi-

[19] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936), p. 118.

[20] Gunnar Myrdal as quoted by Ralph Ellison, "An American Dilemma: A Review," in *Shadow and the Act* (New York. Random House, 1964), p. 315.

[21] Leonard Broom, *The Transformation of the American Negro* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 22-23.

[22] For a recent attempt to test the American dilemma thesis see Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemma: An Empirical Test," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (August, 1965), 527-38.

dence for the order thesis, I can only wonder who the sociologist is speaking for. He may be speaking for himself in that his paradigm answers the question of how to solve the Negro problem without changing basic economic and political institutions. He probably speaks least of all for the Negro. The liberal socioligists will have some difficulty describing the world from the viewpoint of Negro "rioters" in Los Angeles and other cities. In any case, he will not agree with anyone who believes (in fact or in ideology) that the Negro may have a separate and self-determining identity. Such a view suggests conflict and would throw doubt on the fixations of consensus, anomy, and reaction-formation.

Conflict interpretations are minority interpretations by definition. They are rarely expressed either by sociologists or by ethnic minorities. However, a few such interpretations can be mentioned to imply that the end of ideology and, therefore, the agreement on total ideology has not yet arrived.

Ralph Ellison, speaking from a conflict and nationalistic perspective, has made several salient criticisms of the liberal American dilemma thesis. He has argued that Myrdal's long discussion of American values and conclusion of multiple causality have conveniently avoided the inconvenient question of power and control in American society.

> All this, of course, avoids the question of power *and* the question of who manipulates that power. Which to us seems more of a stylistic maneuver than a scientific judgment. . . Myrdal's stylistic method is admirable. In presenting his findings he uses the American ethos brilliantly to disarm all American social groupings, by appealing to their stake in the American Creed, and to locate the psychological barriers between them. But he also uses it to deny the existence of an American class struggle, and with facile economy it allows him to avoid admitting that actually there exist two American moralities, kept in balance by social science.[23]

Doubting the thesis of consensus, Ellison is also in a position to attack Myrdal's interpretation of the American Negro as a reaction-formation, and assimilation to the superior white society as his only solution.

> But can a people (its faith in an idealized American Creed notwithstanding) live and develop for over three hundred years simply by reacting? Are American Negroes simply the creation of white men, or have they at least helped to create themselves out of what they found around them? Men have made a way of life in caves and upon cliffs, why cannot Negroes have made a life upon the horns of the white men's dilemma?
>
> Myrdal sees Negro culture and personality simply as the product of a "social pathology." Thus he assumes that "it is to the advantage of American Negroes as individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white American." This, he admits, contains the value premise that "*here in America,* American culture is 'highest' in the pragmatic sense. . . ." Which aside from implying that Negro culture is not also American, assumes that Negroes should desire nothing better than what whites consider highest. But in the "pragmatic" sense lynching and Hollywood, fadism and radio advertising are products of "higher" culture, and the Negro might ask, "Why, if my culture is pathological, must I exchange it for these?" . . . What is needed in our country is not an exchange of pathologies, but a change of the basis of society.[24]

CONCLUSION

The hostile action of Negro masses destroying white property is perhaps a more convincing demonstration of conflict theory than the hopes of Negro intellectuals. But as a sociologist I am not really interested in raising the question of whether a con-

[23] Ralph Ellison, *Shadow and the Act*, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 316–17.

flict definition of the race question is more correct than the more familiar order model. Each view is correct in a normative and practical sense in so far as it conforms to a viable political and social experience. What indeed is a correct interpretation of the Negro problem or any social problem? The answer has as much to do with consensus as with correspondence to the facts. Normative theories are not necessarily affected by empirical evidence because they seek to change or to maintain the world, not describe it.

Whenever there is genuine conflict between groups and interpretations, correctness clearly becomes a practical matter of power and political persuasion. This seems to be the situation today, and one can expect more heated debate. If conflict continues to increase between whites and Negroes in the United States, the liberal sociologist studying the "Negro problem" had better arm himself with more than his questionnaire. A militant Negro respondent may take him for the social problem, the sociologist as an agent of white society and the scientific purveyor of order theory and containment policy.

This clash of perspectives would be an illustration of my general argument: explanations of the Negro question or any other social problem invariably involve normative theory, values, ideologies, or whatever one may care to call the subjective categories of our thinking about society. Concepts of deviation and social problems can be discussed only in the context of some social (and therefore contestable) standard of health, conformity, and the good society. Terms like "moral dilemma," "pluralism," assimilation," "integration" describe motives for desirable action: they are definitions placed on human action, not the action itself independent of social values.

The error of the sociologist is not that he thinks politically and liberally about his society, but that he is not aware of it. Awareness may help him avoid some of the gross errors of myopia: (1) mistaking his own normative categories for "objective" fact; thus, the liberal sociologist may mistake his belief in the consensual society for actual consensus; (2) projecting a normative theory appropriate to the experience of one group on to another group; this is what Ellison means when he says that the liberal sociologist is not necessarily speaking for the Negro. Indeed, the errors of myopia are perhaps greatest whenever the middle-class sociologist presumes to describe the world and motivation of persons in lower status. Seeing the lower-class Negro within a white liberal vocabulary may be very realistic politics, but it is not very accurate sociology.

Once the sociologist is involved in the study of anything that matters, he has the unavoidable obligation of at least distinguishing his vocabulary from that of the groups he is supposedly observing rather than converting. As a scientist, he must find out what perspectives are being employed, where they are operating in the society, and with what effect. Perhaps this awareness of competing perspectives occurs only in the actual process of conflict and debate. Unfortunately, this is not always the situation within an increasingly professionalized sociology. The more professionalized the field, the more standardized the thinking of sociologists and the greater the danger of internal myopia passing for objectivity. But outside sociology debate is far from closed; conflict and order perspectives are simultaneously active on every controversial social issue. The liberal order model may not long enjoy uncontested supremacy.

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Coercion and Consensus Theories: Some Unresolved Issues

Down through the centuries social theorists have been divided concerning the basis of societal integration. Many have asserted that it is consensus, or common interest and need, which links human beings in institutional or societal structures. Others have claimed that coercion, or the oppression of some by others, is the cement of social organization. While it would be of interest to trace the history of these two theoretical viewpoints, such is not the purpose of the following brief commentary. Instead, we begin by noting that the coercion-consensus debate, while still largely unresolved, has in recent years been productive of important synthesizing attempts, some of the more important being those of Ralf Dahrendorf, Max Gluckman, Lewis Coser, and Pierre van den Berghe.[1] However, in the course of these efforts certain ambiguities have been allowed to persist which, in the opinion of the present author, require explication.

FUNCTIONALISM AND DIALECTICS

In his recent article in the *American Sociological Review*, van den Berghe has taken steps toward a synthesis of functional and dialectic theories. He points out that, as Coser and Gluckman observe, conflict may be functional, and, on the other hand, consensus may be upon competition or conflict as a societal value.[2] Furthermore, both functionalism and dialectics tend to be evolutionary, and both are based on an equilibrium model of society.[3] While these similarities between functionalism and dialectics may be granted, the difficulty lies in the tacit assumption that functionalism is virtually synonymous with the consensus theory of social integration, as is dialectics with the coercion theory. A more adequate statement of the relations between these four conceptualizations would seem to be that dialectics is a *species* of the coercion theory *genus*, and functionalism is an overarching "family" principle of which coercion and consensus theories of integration are *genera*. Let us further develop this thesis.

Coercion theory, as a basic understanding of the manner in which groups and societies cohere, has been well expressed in Dahrendorf's treatise on class conflict. Coherence and order in society, Dahrendorf affirms, are "founded on force and constraint, on the domination of some and the subjection of others."[4] However, he admits, society actually has two faces, that is, integration, or consensus, and coercion.[5] The idea of authority reveals these two faces, for it is not only productive of and the product of conflict, as C. Wright Mills suggests; neither is it only a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system, as Talcott Parsons indicates.[6] Yet, says Dahrendorf, underlying the various allegiances of men in society is always coercion; this is in fact the pervasive characteristic of social organization.

Dahrendorf is considerably indebted to and appreciative of Marx's treatment of class conflict, but he rejects two key tenets of the Marxist position, or of the Hegelian dialectic in general. In the first place, Dahrendorf's conceptualization is non-evolutionary; there is no logical progression within the system. Second, stability or equilibrium is foreign to his think-

[1] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959); Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1955); Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); Pierre van den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (October, 1963), 695–705.

[2] Van den Berghe, *op. cit.*, pp. 702–3.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. [illegible]–4.

[4] Dahrendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

ing. It is conflict, disintegration, and change which are ever present in social groups and societies. Van den Berghe's interpretation of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis scheme of the dialectician makes certain assumptions which are not common to coercion theory in general: the assumptions of stability with each new synthesis and of progress from stage to stage. Therefore, the finding of a common ground between coercion and consensus theories is a more formidable task than van den Berghe would have us believe. The dialectic, as he interprets it, is simply the species of coercion theory which most closely resembles consensus theory in its basic presuppositions.

At times social theorists have been wont to label the polar theoretical positions regarding social cohesion "functional" and "conflict" theory, or, in van den Berghe's case, functional and dialectic theory. To propose that functionalism is the antithesis of coercion theory requires an acceptance of an extremely narrow definition of functionalism, in which each part of a system is contributing willingly to the ongoing of the whole. However, in recent years Robert Merton, Kingsley Davis, and others have sought to redefine functionalism more broadly in terms of the proposition that the elements of any society or social group are interdependent. On the basis of such a definition, Davis has asserted that functionalism is in fact sociology parading under another label.[7] Whether or not we accept Davis' dictum that the time has come to abandon the term "functionalism," it is noteworthy that two decades ago Robert Merton pointed to the inclusive nature of functionalism as social theory. Functional analysis, we were reminded, does not require acceptance of the viewpoint that all cultural items are indispensable for the entire society.[8] More important, functionalism is neither conservative nor inherently radical. It can be either in the hands of the user.[9] Coser and Gluckman have made quite apparent the functional character of conflict at various societal levels. By this they mean that conflict frequently serves to perpetuate, or even establish, the boundary lines of groups and societies.[10] This, however, does not signify that in these writings the authors have espoused either the coercion or the consensus position regarding societal integration. What it means is that conflict is not necessarily disruptive on any given level of social organization.[11] It is therefore misleading to claim that functionalism is the antithesis of coercion theory: to the point is the introductory comment in an article on "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," that "functional prerequisites refer broadly to the things that must get done in any society if it is to continue as a going concern."[12] The continuation,

[7] Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 771.

[8] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Stucture* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1949), p. 25.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[10] See especially Coser, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[11] Although not essential to the discussion of the basis of societal integration, a further clarification of the issues involved in conflict would be of considerable value. As a corrective upon Coser's and Gluckman's emphases, stress is needed upon the dysfunctionality of conflict on levels of organization other than the one at which it is acting as an integrative agent. A public official may, for example, espouse a viewpoint which results in conflict and the disintegration of relations with his constituents, but which furthers integration on a higher societal level. Examples of this are plentiful in John F. Kennedy's popular little book, *Profiles in Courage*. Or the same conflict which binds together the members of a nation may be extremely dysfunctional or disintegrative on the international level. Furthermore, on the personal and familial level, a man may permit internal conflict between his ideal and actual family identity, even though it is dysfunctional for his mental health, for the sake of familial integration While these problems deserve much attention, we mention them but in passing.

[12] D. F Aberle, A. K Cohen, A. K. David, M J. Levy, F X Sutton, "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," *Ethics*, LX (January, 1950), 100.

or "functioning," of the society may be by means of mutual co-operation and consensus, or it may be a result of the coercion of some by others. A functional approach does not necessarily presuppose either generic theoretical base.

THOUGHTS ON CONSENSUS AND COERCION

Perhaps we should have granted at the outset that in many ways the dilemma of consensus and coercion theories resembles that concerning free will and determinism: both problems may be approached from so many vantage points as to lead many to consider them inherently insoluble. Yet theoretical discussions and syntheses are valid as attempts to provide better keys with which to unlock social reality; that is, they are valid insofar as deductions derived from them make possible the more adequate interpretation of empirical social relationships.

The results of the current synthesizing attempts are primarily effected by assimilating one viewpoint in the other. That is, in one form of synthesis the focus is upon the social system as a mechanism for meeting the mutual needs of its constituents. Conflict is seen as a temporary upset requiring system adjustment. Coercion may, therefore, be viewed as a necessary deviation from consensus in order to control the non-co-operative. On the other hand, it is argued by some that consensus is a tool for the entrenchment of the elite, a creation for the purpose of legitimating the coercion which is already in progress.[13] In the former view consensus is ubiquitous, in the latter coercion. Each viewpoint grants that consensus and coercion are both present in society; disagreement arises concerning which is more fundamental, or which is the basis of societal integration.

At this point we have sociological presuppositions which are not being utilized to the full in this theoretical controversy. These presuppositions or understandings may be helpful in our synthesizing, and they also present us with an interesting problem in the sociology of knowledge. Above it was noted that there is some similarity between the coercion-consensus argument and that regarding free will and determinism. However, most sociologists are agreed that determinism predominates over free will; they have, in fact, decided this issue. The socialization process produces social men, imbued with their culture, and not merely individual personalities. This quasi-deterministic position in sociology has been so prevalent that Dennis Wrong, Melford Spiro, and others have felt it necessary to caution us not to be led to extremes in describing social man.[14] Yet even critics of the "oversocialized" conception of man generally accept the proposition that socialization is the primary means for the perpetuation of social forms. This process itself is one of coercion: we learn to curb our aggression and other impulses deemed "antisocial" to keep our behavior within the range of the socially permissible, and in so doing we learn to co-operate. Any sort of organic analogy breaks down when we consider the basis of societal integration, for the members of an *organism* do not have to be taught to work for the good of the whole. It may be granted that there are many organized manifestations, such as voluntary associations, of human beings arriving at a consensus and co-operating in the meeting of needs or the furthering

[13] Gerhard Lenski has recently done a monumental task in spelling out this synthetic position in his book *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), now in press.

[14] Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (April, 1961), 183–93; Melford E. Spiro, "An Overview and a Suggested Reorientation," in Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), *Physical Anthropology* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1961), pp. 459–92, in which the author asserts that the study of culture and personality has been overly concerned with the role of culture and not concerned enough with the active role of personality.

of common interests. These appear, however, to be epiphenomena grounded in socialization and control processes.

Social control, we have said, whether through socialization or through differing access to society's rewards, is basic to any level of societal integration. Conflict thus becomes a rebellion against coercion, and viewed this way consensus becomes more a group-imposed phenomenon than the basic aspect of social existence. In other words, consensus is derived from coercion. From toilet-training to taxes and take-home pay, it is coercion which maintains society and its subdivisions, and it is conflict which changes them.

It is perplexing, albeit somewhat tangential, that many of those who place great emphasis upon socialization and boundary maintenance in the social system also find it possible to argue that society is held together primarily by an inherent consensus of the constituent parts. How did American social theorists fail to link the conception of social man with a coercion theory of social integration? At this point the problem becomes one in the sociology of knowledge; the social history of the theorists is involved. The accusation has been made that in consensus theories we are actually viewing social organization in terms of American idealism, rather than social realism. Be that as it may, our major concern in this brief commentary has been to point out some difficulties in current synthesizing attempts and to introduce to the discussion of consensus and coercion the sociological understanding of socialization and control. To the present author it appears that coercion theory comes closer to accounting for social organization in its various manifestations. Coercion, conflict, and change do seem, on balance, to be more basic societal attributes than consensus and equilibrium.

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Some Further Comments on Chronic Controversies

Each intellectual generation in certain of the social sciences seems to return, again and again, to a list of basic questions that repeatedly arouse interest, challenge imagination, and generate debate. Included are the issues of free will and determinism, the nature of human nature, heredity and environment, reality of society, subjective versus objective factors and rationality and non-rationality in social behavior, and others too numerous and familiar to catalogue here.

In American sociology only a few years ago the hope was sometimes expressed that many of the old "schools" of thought—with all their rigidity and distortion—might be dissolving in favor of an emerging pluralistic consensus in methodology and concepts that would mark initial scientific maturity. After all, many sociologists did use a wide range of concepts and research techniques; they no longer argued so fiercely about "attitudes versus actions," or the four wishes, or the number of instincts involved in stamp-collecting; nor did the new experimentalists stone the participant observer off the golf links. In some sociologists' offices it was not a matter of special comment to find classical and modern books peaceably coexisting—with the works of order theorists, conflict theorists, statisticians, social psychologists, anthropologists, demographers, and just ordinary sociologists contributing greatly to new ideas and approaches.

But this amiable disorder could not be expected to last. New lines of battle were being drawn. Some persons who earlier had

warned of the dissolution of social order through anomie now saw hope in the reorganization of alienation to shatter this "sorry state of things entire" in the interests of a new social order. First, fresh significance gradually came to be attached to the older distinctions between "action-oriented" and "knowledge-oriented" approaches.[1] Second, sociology was once more charged with being too empirical, provincial, and value-laden, on the one hand, and being socially trivial and timidly captive to the power structure on the other.

A second line of cleavage appeared in the numerous debates over the meaning and significance of "functional" theories of various kinds, ranging from totalistic functionalism applied to whole societies over to causal-functional analysis of specified variables in exactly delimited small-group experiments. Although recent analyses by A. Kaplan, E. Nagel, T. Parsons, R. Brown, K. Davis, R. Merton, and others might seem to have provided adequate basis for resolving misunderstandings, clarifying issues, and getting on with the work, argument has continued unabated. Meanwhile, the proposal that we agree to regard functional analysis as one special class of causal analysis seems to have been mislaid in the fray. Adams' article helps to clarify these disputes.

The debates over functional theory have overlapped with the "consensus versus conflict" (or, more narrowly, "coercion") dichotomy to which Adams directs attention. Throughout these controversies, running references abound to "equilibrium," "social change," and "evolutionary" notions. In turn, the distinction between "'order" models and "conflict models" is a variant on the same central theme.

I have been asked to comment on this confused and turbulent intellectual scene. Let me first try to clear the ground a little. It seems clear that many of the debates have consisted of the demolition of strawmen. Indeed, what sociologist in his right mind ever regarded any empirical society as *only* "consensus" or *only* conflict? Certainly not Simmel, or Marx, or Weber, or Durkheim, or Parsons. (Strange as it may seem, I have found no difficulty personally in understanding Coser and Parsons, Merton and Horowitz, Dahrendorf and Moore, or van den Berghe and Davis.)

For purposes of clarity in discussion, we propose the following empirical propositions:

1. All interacting human populations exhibit many social conflicts.
2. All interacting human populations that remain in interaction over a period of time develop normative regularities.
3. All interacting human populations manifest some continuity of social patterns.
4. All interacting human populations manifest change in social patterns, over time.
5. All interacting human populations show both coerced and voluntary conformity.

If intercommunicating actors remain in interaction long enough, some of them will develop some agreements concerning beliefs, norms, and values. They do not *all have* to develop shared norms; some may continue to fight to the death, to be followed by others who do the same. The question is merely, under what specific conditions does order or chaos ensue, does conflict or agreement emerge? This is not, in any usual sense, an "ideological" question; its answer is one of fact.

Second, many "order" theories contain a great deal of conflict, and many "conflict" theories manage to find a great deal of order. Awareness of conflict did not begin with Hobbes nor end with Marx. Have modern sociologists really neglected social conflict and social change? Who, then, are these negligent students of society—do they include Coser, Mills, Dahrendorf, Lynd, Park? Can they encompass such students of racial, ethnic, and religious groups as Hughes, Myrdal, Rose, Thompson, or Frazier? Do they include such political so-

[1] See my comments in "Continuity and Change in Sociological Study," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII, No. 6 (December, 1958), 622-23.

ciologists as Barrington Moore, Jr., Selznick, Lipset, Janowitz? Why is it in the twentieth century—which Sorokin has called the bloodiest of all centuries—that every few years we have to persuade ourselves that we should rediscover social conflict, violence, revolution, and social change? How can we suppose that any sophisticated social theorist could be *unaware* of these massive events?

Certainly Adams is correct in holding that there is *no* insuperable theoretical barrier to a synthesis of "conflict" and "consensus" approaches. Our real task is to build workable models that depict social systems in which both conflict and consensus are *continuous processes* in *differentiated structures*. All empirical systems of this kind will include some exercise of sheer power as well as of legitimate authority, some power will be *zero-sum* (power *over*); some will be *non-zero-sum* (power *with*—facilitating or mobilizing power). Some "power" will be coercive; other power will not. It is bootless to discuss whether these social phenomena exist; they do. It is fruitless to argue which is more important: it depends on the problem and the facts of the case.

Likewise, there are always norms, socialization, and social control; there is always violation of norms, resistance to socialization and social control, deviance, anomie, alienation, conflict, innovation, and drastic organized breaches of established orders. Is not all this obvious?

But consensus is not *merely* an epiphenomenon "derived from coercion" (Adams, p. 6). In their turn socialization and social control derive in part from prior culture, for example, accepted resolutions of past conflicts. These processes are inherently mutually causal in overlapping series through time. The "disorder" of a jungle becomes a scientific order to the properly equipped biologist. The obvious concrete "normative" disorder of many social events may be similarly lawful in terms of basic initial conditions and processes.

With reference to the global judgment as to whether "coercion, conflict, and change" are "more basic" as societal attributes than "consensus and equilibrium," I shall have to plead lack of omniscience as well as the lack of existence of a single, unidimensional tested scale of basicness. Most sociologists, at least, surely have encountered *all* these apects of reality in their research as well as in their personal lives.

Dr. Horton's paper raises still other facets in his review of "normative" versus "existential" theories. Now, all theories (or propositions and explanations) that describe and explain aspects of reality are existential to the extent that they rest upon cognitively certified procedures and data concerning what *is*. Of course, all science is *at the same time* methodologically "normative" in the sense that it represents agreement on the criteria of fact, evidence, proof, honesty, communicability, and so on. But within such limits, it surely is not merely "evaluative." In this sense, I must disagree that "only normative theory is appropriate in the sociology of social problems" (Horton, p. 1). Somebody's values identify some characteristics of "social problems," but these do not have to be my values. Of course, if a sociologist is competent to ply his profession he surely must not allow implicit values to go unnoticed "so that normative theories pass for empirical theories." However, one would think that after decades of saturation in Marx, Freud, Pareto, Weber, *Wissensoziologie*, semantics, analytical philosophy, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, and modern methodology, the profession has some rather high level of sophistication in these matters. Obviously, all sociology (like all physics) is located in time and space, and it changes through history. But this does not in any important sense negate objectivity or explanatory capacity.

It is possible to argue endlessly as to whether sociological analyses of social problems are "conservative" or "radical." The characterization depends upon the

point of reference. But if the facts are facts and the reasoning correct, the descriptions and explanations should be clear to any properly detached, qualified observer whether in South Africa, U.S.S.R., Viet Nam, Los Angeles, Chicago, or Jackson (Mississippi) or Jackson Heights (New York).

I do not question that ideological and even temperamental preferences help to generate preferences for one rather than another vocabulary or for one or another problematical hypothesis or conceptual scheme. What I do deny is that the findings of a *Wissensoziologie* of sociology demonstrate inherent unreliability in the scientifically controlled investigations of sociological research.

Some caveats:

1. I do not see why "conflict analysis is synonymous with historical analysis"; it would seem that much historical analysis has been profoundly aliented from a "conflict" perspective.

2. Let us not denigrate sociological accomplishments. I do not believe that Everett Hughes—contrary to the tone of his own presidential address—lacked "imagination" in his understanding of racial and ethnic relations during the 1940's and 1950's. The record shows that some sociologists understood quite well many of the conditions necessary for intergroup violence, at least as early as the close of World War II. Not everyone was surprised by the Negro revolution, and some white sociologists said what was coming nearly twenty years before Watts. The trouble was that very few people were listening. (To counter *One Hundred Dollar Misunderstanding*, I recommend Albert Camus, *The Rebel*.)

This is not a protest against Horton's rich, subtle and stimulating polemic; his article serves some very valuable purposes and the explicited insights into types of ideologies could become the starting point of numerous excellent researches. I do find it difficult to understand why names are seldom named when broad characterizations are offered of "liberals," "sociologists," and the like; thus the first paragraph on page 16 is either true by definition or *someone* should be cited as an empirical case.

3. Finally, I fail to see why "system analysis is synonomous with structural-functional analysis" (p. 6). Are there not examples of good structural-functional analyses that pretty well avoid the notion of systems? Are there not systems-analysts who just work with descriptive simulations?

As valuable as these two commentaries are in focusing issues and encouraging professional self-awareness, have we not now reached a stage at which our (highly necessary) theoretical and methodological debates can put aside the global issues that are here at the center of attention? Aside from the present papers, furthermore, much of the discussion of structural-functional "theory," conflict "theory," and consensus "theory"[2] seems to have been marked by failure to read, or at least to comprehend, the alleged opponents; this is notably true of some critics of Parsons.

Let us end these remarks as briefly as possible. Some conceptions of society would have it exist purely as an outgrowth of consensus—that is, of agreement upon basic values and beliefs shared within any human population aggregate. This is "Consensus Doctrine."

Some conceptions hold that society is an interlocking web of advantaged interdependence, either as a mutual-reward system or a system of stabilized exchanges of scarce divisible and transferable values. There are the doctrines of "Economic Man," of "bribed interdependence," of the "invisible hand," of organic solidarity, and so on.

Some theorists have seen society as a network of cathexes of positive interpersonal sentiments, or of natural social affinity, "gregariousness," and the like. The result is a "Community of Personal Attractions." This is "Sociability Doctrine."

[2] The quotation marks signify my doubts that these are genuine scientific theories; they are more nearly conceptual schemes, perspectives, or simply points of view.

Some theorists—often regarded as tough minded or pessimistic—have regarded society as primarily the outcome of conflict and resulting relationships of domination and subordination. This is Conflict Theory, so called.

As we have seen, much controversy has raged over the question, which of these doctrines is correct? My own answer is quite direct: all are correct in part, all are partly wrong, none is wholly adequate. Actual societies are held together by consensus, by interdependence, by sociability, and by coercion. This has always been the case, and there is no reason to expect it to be otherwise in any foreseeable future. The real job is to show how actual social structures and processes operating in these ways can be predicted and explained. That task will require our best efforts for a long time to come.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies. By S. N. Eisenstadt. New York: Free Press, 1963. Pp. 524. $15.00.

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt received the 1964 MacIver Award for this book. This professional recognition makes it possible to take its importance for granted and to measure it against the highest standards. The book indeed "represents a significant step in the direction of more systematic use of comparative and historical materials" (to quote from the award citation); it has also been hailed as "the most successful historical-sociological study to appear since Max Weber" (Gabriel A. Almond). An outright comparison, then, will not only provide a good test but appears especially desirable since *The Political Systems of Empires* may be called Eisenstadt's own version of Weber's *Economy and Society*, so close is the similarity in substantive treatment.

Eisenstadt, like Weber, is a very sober sociological realist: he focuses his study on the precariousness of empire, on the delicate balance of forces that make for limited success or total failure. There is not a shred of evolutionist or romanticist illusionism, although the author has a simple three-stage scheme of his own, ranging from societies with predominantly ascriptive membership through the historical bureaucratic empires to modern industrialized and bureaucratized polities; patrimonial and feudal structures are fitted in between local traditionalist communities and the larger bureaucratic polities. The historical empires were all hybrids in that they fused traditionalist elements with more rational means of administration. Perennially, the rulers had to face the contradiction between traditionalist legitimacy, which they could not forsake, and the need for political and economic flexibility; between securing "free-floating" resources and preventing their "floating away," or their depletion by the empire's own hubris. The ruler confronted not only the major status groups, especially the secular aristocracy and the priesthood, but also his own creation: the civil and military administration, which was bureaucratized in varying degrees. Apart from external involvements, the history of empire is a three-way struggle among ruler, bureaucracy, and "society," that is, traditional status groups and less entrenched commercial and industrial interest groups. The rulers stood or fell largely depending on their success in "generalizing power," for which purpose they availed themselves of many makeshift and institutional devices.

Weber, too, analyzed the structure and the functioning of the empires along these lines. Eisenstadt deals essentially with what Weber called the bureaucratized patrimonial state, in which a "political patrimonial lord" and his officials rule over "political subjects." Weber's treatment of the patrimonial state in relation to feudalism, the Estates General, and caesaropapism constitutes the bulk of his massive *Herrschaftssoziologie*, of which only the chapter on bureacracy and some sections on charisma are familiar to the English reader, but other relevant passages are found in the chapters on religion, law, and the city. The parallelism inevitably goes into details and even exists where Eisenstadt seems to disagree with Weber. In one of the rare references to the earlier work, we read that Weber "has pointed out that every bureaucratic administration characteristically tries to 'level out' various social differences. It is important, however, to note that this tendency . . . occurs also, and perhaps mostly, in the political elites of bureaucratic polities" (p. 119). This refers to the well-known chapter on bureaucracy, but here the author fails to remember that this point is basic to Weber's analysis of the various compromises between patrimonial rulership and status groups within and without the patrimonial administration.

Eisenstadt's distinctive effort is largely one of developing what Weber called "sociological casuistry"—the name he gave to his own terminological endeavors. The emphasis is on definition, classification, ranking, comparative summary, ideal-type construction, and model-building. Polemically, Eisenstadt wants to demonstrate the utility of a structural-func-

tionalist approach to the "rise and fall" of empire. He succeeds impressively in casting his theoretical net over a complex historical subject; his approach is certainly *one* way of conceptualizing the matter. There can be no disagreement with his belief that a systematic structural analysis is a prerequisite for an adequate analysis of change—unless this is meant in an exclusive sense. Part of any disagreement here would center on the meaning of the term "systematic." It is true that the first part of *Economy and Society* (translated by Parsons and Henderson) consists merely of static definitions; but the second, major, and older part is a dynamic analysis or, if one prefers, a "systems analysis." Hence, it appears to me that the difference is not so much theoretical as technical. Eisenstadt's text is broken down into small, readable sections, whereas Weber's draft chapters are seemingly interminable and blur both the theoretical matrix and the definitely exisiting chapter outlines. Where Weber allows himself to pursue themes on their own momentum, or engages in veiled political polemic, Eisenstadt does not permit himself any excursus; whereas Weber wrote not only a sociological casuistry but *sub rosa* a universal history, Eisenstadt achieves a "more" of sociology (i.e., of generalization) by minimizing historical description; whereas Weber rarely referred to the substantial body of literature on which he relied for his facts, Eisenstadt painstakingly provides cross-references to a large body of literature, a great help for the contemporary reader. Finally, Eisenstadt is more "systematic" in formulating and verifying hypotheses, whereas Weber engaged in less explicit "mental experiments." However, in the nature of the historical subject matter, such hypotheses must be phrased rather broadly and create the familiar difficulties of tautological formulation. Perhaps the major trouble with the author's approach is the self-evident nature of his conclusions. Example: "The greater the intensity of the internal contradictions and of the pressure of external exigencies with which the internal forces of the society could not deal, the quicker and more intensive were the intensity and accumulation of processes of change in the society and the tempo of transformation of its political systems" (p. 338).

Another dilemma besets any attempt at such systematic completeness: the manuscript threatens to be both excessively brief and overly long. The book is throughout a catalogue-like enumeration of dimensions and cases; this makes for a certain flatness of style and cumbersome reading, which also handicaps the first part of *Economy and Society*. Eisenstadt tries to cope with the problem of lengthiness with a tabular presentation, but his one hundred-page tabular appendix cannot be more than a bare shorthand device. Concretely, Eisenstadt's tenacious effort at drawing every possible variable into his compass tends to lead to a lack of explicitness on any given point as well as to repetitiveness. Thus, the important distinction between patrimonial and feudal regimes, on the one hand, and the centralized bureaucratic empires on the other is made on barely one page (p. 23); the term "caesaropapism" as applied to Byzantium is considered misleading, but the explanation is rudimentary, and it is not clear against whom this critique is directed—Weber, for one, contrasted the ideal-typical notion of caesaropapism with the limitations of the Byzantine *basileus*.

Who should read the book? Like Weber's, Eisenstadt's is genuinely a text, a learning book. In its orientation to "how to run an empire and cope with a society," the work would have made a good handbook for the education of princes. In their absence, it makes imperative reading for students who have never seen an aristocrat or who feel uncertain about the role of empire in our days. The book is also a technical primer for more particularist studies. The author himself has followed up his book with several theoretical elaborations, but the payoff will have to consist in detailed research and description—and here both the historian and the sociologist should face their scholarly responsibilities.

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Community Influentials: The Elites of Atlanta. By M. KENT JENNINGS. New York: Free Press, 1964. Pp. xii+212. $4.95.

The controversy over the proper way to study the decision-making apparatuses of American communities has raged in the pages

of the social science journals with some light and a great deal of heat. A major focal point in the controversy has been Hunter's *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953; reissued in a paperback edition in 1964 by Doubleday & Co.). The textual criticism of Hunter's monograph has proceeded about as far as that method can go without being able to come to terms with the critical question of to what degree his findings were due to the peculiar features of Atlanta, Georgia, and to what degree to his particular theoretical stance and specific empirical procedures. A replication was obviously called for.

The appearance of Jennings' volume on Atlanta, Georgia, is therefore doubly welcome. It represents a contribution to the literature on community decision-making in its own right, and at the same time can serve as an approximation to a replication of Hunter's earlier work. More than a decade separates Hunter's and Jennings' fieldwork, and although we cannot be sure that whatever variance we find between the two works is due to the intervening decade's changes, there certainly cannot be much to the conception of social structure if the circulation of elites in a city like Atlanta is so rapid as to transform the city in so short a span of time.

An exact replication of Hunter's work would be less useful than one which was sufficiently similar in procedure to allow comparison but at the same time incorporated the changes and improvements in methods and techniques that have taken place since the early 1950's. Jennings' work represents just such an extension and elaboration. His procedure was to identify three elites: "attributed influentials," individuals who garnered a large number of designations as influentials from the set of informants (similar to the procedures which Hunter used to identify his community power structure); "ascribed influentials," individuals who held down top governmental and community association posts in Atlanta; and "economic dominants," top executives in the major business enterprises of Atlanta. Members of these elites were interviewed concerning their participation in decision-making in Atlanta. The analysis of these data centers on two main themes: first, a major portion of the analysis concerns the composition of these three groups with respect to the extent and scope of their influence on major decisions in Atlanta, Georgia. Jennings' findings indicate that while his attributed influentials and ascribed influentials play important roles in decision-making, the economic dominants are relatively unimportant. Furthermore, he discerns a fairly wide dispersion of influence with the attributed and ascribed elite playing major roles in a large number of community decisions, but by no means exclusive roles. According to Jennings, there is no "ruling elite" in Atlanta, Georgia.

While there is much to admire in Jennings' monograph, it is particularly disappointing that it is so oriented to the polemical literature concerning whether there is a "ruling elite" in American local communities. An overzealous desire to produce more evidence against the "ruling elite" approach and for the pluralist view of political behavior has led Jennings to commit two major errors: first, he defines his three elite groups so as to exclude by definition any degree of overlap between them. Thus, if an "economic dominant" is also designated as an "attributed influential," he is no longer counted in the "economic dominant" columns, but in the prescribed influential columns. The finding that "economic dominants" do not play a major role in community decision-making in Atlanta, Georgia, is more than a slight stacking of the cards. Furthermore, when we look at the economic and occupational characteristics of the "attributed influentials," these are by no means an ordinary group. Thus we find in a footnote that somewhere around a third of the attributed influentials had annual incomes over $100,000, and 83 per cent of them had incomes over $20,000. In short, just as Hunter reported, the persons who have reputations for wielding power and influence in Atlanta, Georgia, are at the top of the income, occupation, and stratification distributions of that community. This is not to say, as has often been attributed to Hunter, that to be wealthy means that you are influential. It only means that if you are wealthy, you *can* be influential.

The second major error is to employ so narrow a definition of "ruling elite" that no empirical situation is likely to fit it. To say that there is a ruling elite if, and only if, any decision of note is referred to a small, closed group of individuals, draws attention away from the more important question of what are the determinants of varying degrees of concentration of power of influence in American local com-

munities. Thus, the fact that more than a third of Jennings' economic dominants are members of the "attributed influential" group is glossed over and not regarded as particularly significant, although this may represent, as it does in comparison to New Haven, Connecticut, an unusual amount of influence wielded by the "economic dominants."

In short, if you look closely at Jennings' findings, they are not very different fom Hunter's, although his conclusions suggest that there is more of a difference than I can discern. Jennings' contribution is to show how much Hunter has ignored the important role of governmental officials and leaders and civic associations, as compared with the economic dominants, but the latter still play the major role in Atlanta. Just as Hunter ignored the important roles played by governmental officials, expressing a view of politics as mainly epiphenomenal, so does Jennings err in the opposite direction by ignoring his own evidence that political officials are closely dependent on "economic dominants" for financial and other types of support.

So long as community power studies remain on the level of case studies of individual communities, the constraint of data upon interpretation will be minimal. The study of decision-makers and decision-making has not benefited greatly by the addition of one more case study, except to show how much the desire to demonstrate a viewpoint can dominate the handling of data and their interpretation.

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Influentials in Two Border Cities: A Study in Community Decision-making. By WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO and WILLIAM H. FORM. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965. Pp. xii+273. $7.95.

Students of community power will find in this volume much that is familiar from the authors' earlier papers on influentials in El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Despite this repetition, the book is a valuable addition to the maturing body of literature on community decision-making because it unites and expands previous findings, adding to them some new material to provide a comprehensive picture of leadership in these two cities.

The comparative design, in this uniquely interesting international setting, is enhanced by a longitudinal analysis. The two cities are compared in terms of local autonomy, makeup of leadership groups, and resolution of issues in 1955 and 1958. Initially, the researchers focused on business and political influentials in both towns and the relative prominence of each in community leadership. Generally speaking, businessmen are more influential in El Paso and politicians in Juárez, though in the former case a good deal more consensus and co-operation exists among representatives of both institutions. If, as the authors say, overconsensus is a problem in El Paso, the chief threat to the democratic process in Juárez is the cleavage and conflict between the two institutions.

Closer analysis, however, reveals that in neither city do we find a monolithic business or political power elite. In three chapters devoted to an absorbing account of issues having to do with municipal elections, hospital building, welfare campaigns, and border-crossing facilities, the authors demonstrate that the processes of decision-making are varied indeed, ranging from individual leadership and unchallenged dominance by a small faction to hard-fought campaigns with community-wide mobilization and public referenda. On the basis of their analysis, D'Antonio and Form conclude that while "the power structures of both communities seemed to be in a state of flux" (p. 235), they were "tending" in the direction of a pluralistic model.

In view of the possibility of bias, which many writers have pointed out to be inherent in studies that rely on a single method for the study of community power, the authors advisedly employ both reputational and decision-making techniques. The results of both methods are interpreted in the light of considerable knowledge of the cities, and in this fashion methodological biases seem to be avoided.

Nevertheless, one aspect of their procedure may have produced some misleading results. The initial study in 1955 chose to focus exclusively on influentials in the fields of business and politics. At that time, informants were asked to nominate separately the most important people in each area. This procedure, no doubt, reflected a bifurcated leadership

structure in each city whether or not one actually existed. In the 1958 follow-up study the researchers' aims and procedures were altered in order to examine the general patterns of leadership. The problem grows out of the fact that the "bifurcated" list of influentials from 1955 was employed as a principal source for a checklist from which seven of the "most reliable" judges (also used in the previous study) selected the 1958 influentials. (In 1955 judges made their selection without the suggestion of lists.) In short, the procedure for selecting influentials in the follow-up study was heavily influenced by the earlier results, inviting the discovery of similar groups at the two separate times. For this reason, findings having to do with the stability of influence may be less valid than they appear.

Unfortunately, in view of the rich fund of data provided by the comparative-longitudinal approach, the study is without a conceptual framework to order the data and facilitate comparisons with other research. The power structures in both cities are variously described as not monolithic, not pluralistic, "tending" toward the pluralistic, and in a state of flux. The key concepts, monolithic and pluralistic, are not defined nor are any criteria suggested according to which particular patterns of power distribution could be classified. The ambiguity of the findings could have been reduced and the descriptive character of the study generalized if the authors had developed conceptual tools to match their data.

Whatever else is lacking in the area of community power studies, methodologically balanced, comparative and longitudinal investigations continue to be at a premium, and these qualities in the D'Antonio and Form contribution set it above much of the literature in the field.

JOHN WALTON

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Santa Barbara

Education in Tokugawa Japan. By R. P. DORE. Berkeley: University of California, 1965. Pp. xiii+346. $6.00.

Dore has given us a model of scholarship. For no Western country do we have so comprehensive and sophisticated an account of an educational system within a single volume. This monograph is equally a history of education, an essay in comparative education, and a sociological analysis. It is tightly and lucidly written. Combining it with Herbert Passin's *Society and Education in Japan,* we now have (in English) a detailed picture of the transformation of Japanese education over a period of two centuries.

The schools for Samurai and those sponsored by the fief authorities receive major attention. That is not solely because the materials are more complete than on commoners' schools. It was the initially elite schools that introduced literacy, systematic study, and intellectuality into the texture of Japanese life—even before the period dealt with. These schools for the elite—astonishingly like the British public schools—performed the double syncretism: domestication of Chinese learning and the subsequent reception of Western learning, in both episodes with accompanying modification of the native heritage of ideas and learning. The curriculums of the various schools are presented in copious detail together with much of the controversy over content and especially about purpose that marked the major turning points in policy.

Of particular interest is the linking of changes in content and goals for education with variations in clientele by locale and time, though I regret that more attention was not given to developing the ecological correlations between school attendance and other indexes of social and economic change. For, perhaps to a unique degree, Japan was a country well prepared educationally for "modernization," perhaps the most literate country when economic "development" began. Though commoners did attend the elite schools, there emerged also a vigorous system of village schools; effectively literate men (and numerous women) were experienced in using that skill for responsible social rules many decades before the opening of the Maiji period.

Dore gives a fascinating account of the attrition in ascriptive and particularistic norms for schooling and for public positions and their replacement by notions of talents and universalistic criteria of merit. The interconnections of these reinterpretations with the uneven but rapid absorption of Western technological and other lore is of special importance for anyone who would comprehend the complexities of modernization in new nations today.

In depicting "the legacy" of Tokugawa education to Meiji Japan, Dore estimates, as have others, that a large percentage of adults were literate and had learned to utilize that skill in daily life. Even more important was the contribution of formal schooling to establishing the custom and appreciation of its importance and to establishing habits and expectations of orderly and graduated achievement in intellectual endeavor. At the same time, an experienced cadre of administrators, drilled in intellectual habits and accustomed to national responsibilities in complex organizations, was linked with a disciplined populace that was also familiar and often experienced in formal learning and its use in their affairs. As we have learned for Western nations, an established system of formal education, however closely linked with elite interests, inevitably includes representatives of the lower orders among its pupils and thus forms one among many binding forces across the social structure during the disturbing social realignments that accompany rapid change.

If anyone could do so, Dore has demonstrated that the most appropriate educational model for developing countries today should be not the Western nations nor Russia nor China but Japan.

C. Arnold Anderson
University of Chicago

The Unconscious in Social Relations. By Otakar Machotka. New York: Philosophical Library, 1964. Pp. xxiii+321. $6.00.

The avowed objective of this book is to call attention to the importance of unconscious processes in social life. The author's aim is to outline problems, to clarify basic issues, to formulate hypotheses, and to clear the way for subsequent empirical research. Drawing upon a wide range of literature, he presents a catalogue of unconscious behavior patterns, shows how they are subject to social control, and indicates ways in which they enter into the preservation and transformation of society and culture. Case materials are not cited as evidence; they are intended only as illustrations. While the author is certainly to be commended for pointing, once again, to this important area of inquiry, the book unfortunately suffers from several shortcomings.

Key contentions are difficult to assess because the identifying characteristics of the classes being discussed are not specified. Various behavior patterns are listed—activities that are subliminal, lacking in insight, forgotten, unrecognized, ignored—but nowhere is the term *unconscious* defined. Since *consciousness* also remains undefined, the subject matter cannot be identified even as a residual category. Of the many conceptions of consciousness in psychological literature, the most frequently found definition is in terms of verbal report. Linguistic categories presumably increase precision of discrimination and facilitate communication to oneself as well as to others. If this conception is used, *most* human behavior is unconscious; men become aware of what they do only under unusual circumstances. This may explain why the book covers virtually the whole range of human conduct.

Another curious feature is the treatment accorded the one school that has emphasized the unconscious: psychoanalysis. The author states at the outset that his conception of "unconscious" is more comprehensive than that of Freud; indeed, much of what he discusses Freud would have labeled "preconscious." There is no critique of psychoanalysis; in fact, the few references made to it are laudatory. Since the conception used subsumes the subject matter of psychoanalysis, it is odd that there are so few references to psychoanalytic theory. Although the book does not suffer from a paucity of citations, the extensive research literature based upon psychoanalytic concepts and hypotheses is for the most part ignored.

Can the study of unconscious aspects of social interaction be advanced by such a treatise? While the author's discussion of some problems, especially of social change, contains a number of perceptive observations, it would appear that much more remains to be done. The classifications used are inadequate for empirical research. Since most of the categories are not explicitly defined, a research worker would be unable to ascertain which observations to include. Furthermore, the categories are not mutually exclusive; sometimes the same illustrations are used in different contexts. Many of the state-

ments about these classes of unconscious behavior cannot be tested as hypotheses because they contain too many hedging terms: "may be," "seem to," "probably," "often," "usually." In some cases the author speaks of conscious *and* unconscious processes, without any specification of the conditions under which one or the other prevails. No attempt has been made systematically to collate the available research literature on such phenomena as subliminal perception, hypnosis, selective memory, or expressive movements; nor does the book contain a discussion of the complex methodological and technical problems involved in handling data on activities of which the subjects have no awareness.

Few social psychologists today would question the importance of this subject matter, and many will welcome this contribution as another step toward making it an integral part of theories of human behavior. Pioneering efforts in any field are often sketchy and informal, but one is left wondering whether the state of knowledge in this area is really so undeveloped.

TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI

University of California, Santa Barbara

Economics and Sociology of Industry: A Realistic Analysis of Development. By P. SARGANT FLORENCE. London: C. A. Watts & Co., 1964. Pp. xiii+258. 27*s*. 6*d*.

A distillation of results from four decades of prolific research, Florence's admirably lucid treatise both advocates and exemplifies the strategy he terms "realistic analysis," that is, "an approach based on observation and records of the real facts, but proceeding beyond mere description and empiricism to comprehensive measurement and causal interpretation and a hunt for some possible underlying logic." The results often issue as sets of indicators, classification schemes, or causal diagrams whose apparent simplicity and intuitive appeals seem to belie the considerable effort entailed in their evolution.

In place of a definition of "development," the work begins with a documentation of nine salient trends that may be distinguished in the historical development of modern economies. It then proceeds to survey factors affecting mobilization of manpower, the interrelations of industrial localization and urbanization, and the causes and correlates of changes in scale of organization. The dialogue between disciplines continues into the chapter on "industrial government," where, without invoking the mysteries of "bureaucracy," it is shown that understanding the organization and behavior of firms requires an interplay between the economist's interest in "demand and supply" and the sociologist's preoccupation with power relations, or "command and reply." (The author relishes a play on common words as much as most of us enjoy a formidable neologism.)

The final two-fifths of the volume surveys the conditions confronting countries aspiring to development and outlines the requirements placed upon the social sciences which would attempt to play some role in seeing such aspiration realized.

Here, then, is a panoramic rather than myopic view of what is commonly called industrial sociology, coupled with a spirited espousal of induction as a sociological strategy. It is the kind of work one might place in the hands of novices for a counterpoise to the various current presentations of sociology as a literary discipline.

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN

University of Michigan

Assuring Freedom to the Free: A Century of Emancipation in the USA. Edited by ARNOLD M. ROSE with an Introduction by President LYNDON B. JOHNSON. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964. Pp 306. $6.95.

In recent years there has been a proliferation of books published in the general area of Negro-white relations. So voluminous is the number that it is impossible to read all of them. As is likely to be the case in such circumstances, the quality of these books varies greatly. The several essays in the present volume were presented as lectures at Wayne State University as part of a yearlong series entitled: "The Development of the Negro and of a Free Society." The presentations were made in the year 1963 in honor of the one-hundredth anniversary of the

Emancipation Proclamation. Like the books published in this area the essays in this volume are uneven.

In addition to the Introduction by President Johnson and a Postscript by President Clarence B. Hilberry of Wayne State University, the book is made up of three parts: (1) "The Negro in the Context of American History," (2) "The Negro in a Changing Society," and (3) "Social Movements among American Negroes." Each part is introduced with a brief statement by the editor. Part I includes a short account by John Hope Franklin of the status of the Negro from the Emancipation to the present time. Special attention is paid to the longstanding indifference of the federal government to the rights of Negroes. Arnold M. Rose contributes an essay on distortions and myths created by white historians, in both the North and the South, relative to various aspects of the relations between Negroes and whites. Carleton L. Lee discusses at some length the religious role of the Negro protest movement, and Broadus N. Butler writes of the historical role of the city of Detroit in Negro-white relations dating back to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.

Part II begins with an article by Gunnar Myrdal in which he compares the effects of emancipation in the United States on Negroes with the liberation of colonies on non-white peoples in the world. G. Franklin Edwards discusses the role that changes in occupations has had on the status of Negroes in the larger society. Robert C. Weaver writes about the effects of urbanization on the Negro and the effects of Negroes on urban areas. Charles W. Quick and Donald B. King discuss the changing legal status of the Negro. James Q. Wilson's essay is on the role of political action in raising the level of living among Negroes. Finally, Rayford W. Logan concentrates on some of the educational changes affecting Negroes, especially the changing image of the Negro in the mass media and the changes taking place in emphasis on various aspects of Negro life in courses taught in American colleges and universities. In the final section of the book Whitney M. Young, Jr., discusses the role of the Urban League; C. Eric Lincoln presents the Black Muslims as a protest movement; and John Hope Franklin discusses the historical role of the Negro intellectual in the United States.

It is difficult to evaluate a book with such a diversity of topics; therefore, the discussion will be centered on those that appear to this reviewer to have greatest merit. Rose's paper performs a much needed service in that he posits some of the causes of the low status in which Negroes find themselves today, that is, the myths created about them which have served to shape attitudes and behavior toward them. Myrdal's comparison of the emancipation of Negroes with the freeing of colonial peoples is stimulating, although his concern is more with the latter than the former. It would have been interesting to see how this distinguished scholar views the status of Negroes in the United States since the publication of *An American Dilemma.* Quick and King put forth some interesting possibilities for legal action to bring social practices in the realm of race relations into harmony with cultural pronouncements.

Special praise is due for Wilson's essay on the general ineffectiveness of political action in assisting those who need aid most and who are the most numerous, that is, the low-income Negroes. This is especially true outside the South. Wilson cites impressive evidence to support his contention that greater changes in the status of Negroes have resulted from economic expansion than from political protest. While this type of analysis is not new, it needs to be said over and over again. Marches on Washington and civil rights bills may be necessary, but they are insufficient to deal with social problems that stem in part from basic structural factors. As Wilson says, "the problems which confront the mass of American Negroes will, I strongly suspect, remain for many years even if every major political goal of Negroes is attained tomorrow." In an otherwise excellent paper Wilson cites the FBI's *Uniform Crime Reports* as proof that although Negroes comprise only one-tenth of the urban population they commit more than one-third of all "serious" crimes in these regions (p. 183). Surely the writer is aware that Negroes are more likely to be convicted of crimes than whites, and that those crimes that are most likely to go undetected are those that tend to be the specialty of higher-income individuals (that is, non-Negroes). Lincoln's essay on the Black Muslims as a protest group contains the best writing he has done on that subject to date.

for he captures the importance of the movement to those who become involved. Finally, Franklin presents an illuminating essay on the role of the intellectual in fostering or impeding social change, with special reference to Negro intellectuals in the United States since Emancipation. The factor of racism in American life imposes a severe hardship on these people. They can never be intellectuals who happen to be Negro; they must be Negro intellectuals.

In spite of its many shortcomings, this volume is an important one because it clearly demonstrates that there is little cause for celebrating the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation. The promise is yet to be fulfilled. Considering the aversion of most Americans to rapid social change, especially when it affects the status of Negroes (witness the so-called white backlash), it is likely that should a volume be written on the bicentennial celebration of the Emancipation Proclamation it will again find a significant gap between the status of Negroes and whites in the United States.

ALPHONSO PINKNEY

Hunter College

The Control of Human Fertility in Jamaica. By J. MAYONE STYCOS and KURT W. BACK. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964. Pp. xii+377. $7.50.

In the tradition of their earlier work in Puerto Rico, the authors have continued the Jamaican study reported in 1961 (Blake, in collaboration with Stycos and Davis, *Family Structure in Jamaica*). This volume reports the results of an extensive survey of Jamaican fertility patterns, as well as the results of an educational experiment in family planning. It compares well, in experimental design and execution, with the earlier *The Family and Population Control,* to which the present authors also contributed, and it places similar emphasis on the role of the family in fertility—however, since Jamaica is somewhat unique in that reproduction takes place largely outside legal marriage, the Jamaican situation makes the family important in an entirely different way.

The book is divided into three major sections. In the first, the authors discuss attitudes toward family size and attitudes toward, and knowledge of, birth control, using data from a sample survey of 1,359 currently mated lower-class women of childbearing ages. This section is the weakest in the book, as the authors do not sufficiently probe the component motives underlying family-size ideals and birth-control attitudes. Particularly in the discussion of family size, they seem aware of the problems, but their interview does not provide the necessary probing.

The second major section of the book deals primarily with the relation of marital status to Jamaican fertility. It provides a valuable comprehensive explanation of the problem. The most important illumination provided is that sexual relations out of wedlock tend to reduce rather than to raise fertility. This condition holds because (1) there are substantial periods between the breakup of one union and the start of another, with much of this turnover taking place during what are normally peak years for fertility; and (2) the frequency and regularity of coitus are less in the non-marital unions. The importance of these factors is accentuated because of the large period spent by Jamaican women in non-marital sexual unions. The average woman in the Stycos and Back sample had 16.2 mated years, of which 4.3 years were spent in marriage, 5.3 years were spent in cohabiting unions, and 6.5 years were spent in non-cohabiting unions.

The educational experiment is the topic of the third section of the book. Some of the 1,359 women in the original sample were included in an experiment to compare the effectiveness of three methods of birth-control education: group meetings, pamphlets, and case visits. After the completion of the educational program, three more interviews were conducted—six weeks later, seven to nine months later, and three years later. Each successive sample was smaller, the final sample having only ninety-seven cases. The results of the experiment are somewhat inconclusive. Although the educational program produced some increased use of contraception, with delayed effects as well as immediate ones, the authors point out that "the differences between the effectiveness of methods are small in comparison to the differences in expense, elaboration, and organization involved in con-

ducting them" (p. 276). Fortunately, they do show that the different methods are differentially effective in population subgroups and they do analyze the effects on various preconditions for actual use. This discussion is quite instructive.

In addition to the earlier points, this reviewer is bothered by the use of some parametric statistics with data that usually do not meet the assumptions that are essential for the significance tests to have any meaning. However, as a whole, *The Control of Human Fertility in Jamaica* is a valuable addition to demographic literature and a worthy companion to the authors' earlier works.

JAMES A. PALMORE, JR.

University of Chicago

Population Dynamics: Causes and Consequences of World Demographic Change. By RALPH THOMLINSON. New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. xxvi+576. $8.50.

This work by Thomlinson is primarily a textbook and a good one at that. It should serve well for courses in demography. The book is written with considerable skill and, therefore, should be recommended reading for a much broader public than those who register for a demography course. It is primarily sociological in its orientation, but also incorporates data from economics, political science, medicine, public health, and anthropology. The first part discusses the history of world population and presents a brief survey of research procedures. In the second part the dynamics of population are analyzed in terms of three major variables—birth, death, and migration. Part 3 deals with demographic issues and problems such as city and metropolitan growth, resources and food, industrialization, level of living, politics and power, and national policies relating to population control. The political implications of the uneven distribution of the world's population are discussed in the chapter on "politics and power." In Part 4 population composition in terms of both ascribed and achieved statuses are analyzed for individuals, nations, and regions.

While presenting the methodological tools of demographic research, the author is equally sophisticated in pointing out the current shortcomings and cautions in the applications of demographic techniques. The general trend in demography more and more to study the relationship of population trends to attitudes and values is clearly reflected in the approach of this book. Thomlinson points out that 62 per cent of the members of the Population Association of America with doctorates are sociologists by training, and that 90 per cent of all population courses are given by departments of sociology.

While demographic variables are limited, the demographic framework deals with the world community. This provides a framework for sociological analysis involving cross-cultural comparisons, historical analysis, and the wider perspective which relates demographic studies to economic, political, medical, religious, health, educational, and recreational institutions. The admonition of some sociologists to focus sociology on broad world problems might partially be met by greater attention to the kind of demographic framework outlined by Thomlinson. Significant and even theoretically important topics for the study of the larger social system abound in the social, social psychological, economic, and political implications of fertility, population growth, differentials in mortality, migration, and population distribution. This is not the only way to focus sociological research on significant and macroscopic topics, but one which has promise.

Thomlinson deals with demographic data from a number of countries, and does it well, although relatively little attention is given to Canada, and this was a little disappointing.

In all, this book will make an interesting and worthwhile textbook for demography courses.

GEORGE A. THEODORSON

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Status Integration and Suicide: A Sociological Study. By JACK P. GIBBS and WALTER T. MARTIN. Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1964. Pp. xviii+225. $8.00.

The social sciences currently stress the necessity for synthesizing theory and research, and rightfully so. This task is not an easy one

and any carefully executed study which attempts to do this is worthy of careful consideration. This is especially so when the work attempts to build on and systematize extant theoretical perspectives. Because this study of suicide does attempt to state in systematic terms at least a portion of Durkheim's framework for explaining suicide and because there is a conscientious effort to relate the theoretical framework to a massive quantity of empirical data, the work deserves considerable attention. But unfortunately, the merits of the work are primarily in the effort, not in the accomplishment.

The "theory" which consists of five postulates is fraught with problems. The concepts employed in the postulates are for the most part left undefined. At least one of the postulates is not a statement of an empirical relationship but only a definition of a concept. The postulates, as the authors recognize, do not make possible the deduction of implications for matters of fact except for the one theorem that the authors test. What this means, in effect, is that the postulates are largely superfluous to the work. They provide a rather superficial attempt to give the work the appearance of a general theory when in fact it is really a test of a single proposition. That proposition may be worth investigating but enshrining it with a set of vague and sometimes tautological postulates in order to give it greater respectability is certainly unnecesary and may be misleading.

Despite these shortcomings in the logical structure of the theory, some of which the authors recognize, it is possible to deduce *the theorem* that the authors test in the subsequent chapters: "The suicide rate of a population varies inversely with the degree of status integration in that population." The crucial question, then, is not the utility of the *theory* but the *truth* of the *theorem*. Do societies (states, metropolitan areas, etc.) that measure high on status integration have low suicide rates? And do people who occupy status configurations (two or more statuses) that are well integrated have low suicide rates? Conversely, do societies that have a relatively low degree of status integration have high suicide rates? And do people who occupy status configurations that are not well integrated have a propensity to commit suicide? Apparently the answer to these questions is yes. The authors provide some two hundred tables which analyze census data. The number of comparisons between suicide rates and status integration measures which are in the direction anticipated by the theorem are much greater than would be expected on the basis of chance.

Were it not for the authors' failure to present some alternative analyses of their data, the findings would be more convincing. For example, when the suicide rates of different states within the United States are cross-classified with measures of status integration, the authors do not provide sufficient information (such as would be provided by scatter diagrams) for us to know whether or not the correlation between these measures can be attributed to the presence of a few extreme cases.

More important is the fact that throughout the study, age, sex, and marital status are used as statuses with which other statuses are integrated. And whenever this occurs, the contribution of age, sex, or marital status to the status-integration index is greater than the contribution of the other status. We know, of course, that if the analyses were reversed, the results would not be the same. The question is, would the data have supported the theorem to the same extent had different operations been performed? If not, then the number of tables which support the theorem might be greatly reduced and the theorem's ability to predict would certainly be lessened; it might even disappear.

In view of these shortcomings, it is difficult to know whether this work adds much to our knowledge of suicide. The theory is quite weak and is little more than a nod in the direction of providing a "systematic" set of postulates in order to legitimize the investigation of the theorem. The failure to pay more attention to alternative ways of analyzing the data—ways that might well have turned up evidence contradictory to the theorem—makes any judgment of the empirical validity of the theorem premature. As it stands, the study may be more a suggestion for future research on Durkheim's imaginative work than a systematization of it.

WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS

University of Washington

Teaching Styles and Learning. By DANIEL SOLOMON, WILLIAM E. BEZDEK, and LARRY ROSENBERG. Chicago: Center for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults, 1963. Pp. x+164. $2.00 (paper).

The principal conclusion drawn in this book is that different teaching styles may be required to maximize student gains in factual information and in idea comprehension; and that different styles may be appropriate for classes of different sizes, of different sex ratios, and of different age categories. These are intriguing ideas, but the empirical research reported in this book, because of difficulties related to the dependent variable, is less than convincing with respect to documentation of them.

The basic strategy of this study was to relate independent "teaching-style" variables, measured on twenty-four college teachers of evening credit courses in Introductory American Government, to dependent "learning" variables measured on a total of 401 students enrolled in these courses. Independent variables were collected from four instruments: a questionnaire administered to the teachers themselves, a questionnaire administered to students of the teachers, and researcher analysis of direct classroom observation and also of tape recordings of two class sessions These instruments yielded some 169 items which were then subjected to factor analysis in which eight orthogonal factors were extracted for further use in the main analysis as summary "teaching-style" variables.

Dependent variables were collected by giving a multiple-choice test to students of the twenty-four teachers at the beginning and again at the end of the semester. This test consisted of thirty-five items aimed at testing factual information about American government, plus ten items designed to test comprehension of ideas about American government. The absolute differences between beginning-of-the-semester and end-of-the-semester scores (that is, "gains") are the dependent variables. Here this reviewer takes several exceptions to the study's validity.

It appears that the idea-comprehension test is questionable on the following grounds: Despite the fact that the passage chosen for the test came from Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*, the passage itself contains no technical terms or syntax peculiar to the study of American government, and as the authors themselves say: "This part of the test, being primarily a measure of reading comprehension did not depend on any *particular* material being covered in class" (p. 23). This reviewer wonders whether it much depended on *any* material being covered in a class specifically on American government. It seems more likely that comprehension of this passage is mainly a function of a generalized reading ability that may in turn be a consequence of the total educational experience, rather than of any particular college course experience. Thus, it seems to us that the comprehension test used in this study is not a valid measure of the kind of subject-specific comprehension increment that is to be expected from taking a course in American government. The factual information test, however, seems to have far greater "face validity."

The difference in validity of measures on the two dependent variables seems clearly reflected in the finding (Table 17, p. 114) that class mean raw gains in comprehension of Lippmann's passage tended to be *randomly positive and negative*. (Mean gains in factual information were very strongly skewed toward the positive, with only one negligible negative.) In the face of this finding, we can accept the course-specific validity of the comprehension test only if we are willing to argue that students who did not take Introduction to American Government would have performed differently from students who did take the course. That is, we could predict that gains in comprehending the Lippmann passage would be strongly skewed either toward the negative or the positive among students who did not take the course and that taking the course therefore had (1) a merely saving effect on students' naturally declining comprehension, or (2) a definitely negative effect on students' naturall high comprehension. Both seem bizarre suppositions.

Moreover, one has to contend with a remarkable −.01 correlation between factual and comprehension gain measures. The authors note that this lack of relation between the two suggests "as one possibility, that they are in fact measuring different types of learning" (p. 45). Another (and unmentioned) possibility seems to be that one or both meas-

ures are invalid. It must be difficult for any teacher to imagine that gains in valid measures of comprehension and of factual information should be so totally unrelated at the zero-order level.

When we examine the way in which the authors derive their measure of factual and comprehension "gain" and the meaning which they assign to it, further problems emerge. The authors are well aware of the pitfalls which threaten the uncritical use of gain measures when they write that it is important to "see if the raw gain measure was being contaminated by the student's ability and by his level of initial knowledge in American government. It was possible that students with greater ability would show a greater gain than students with lesser ability. If this were so, the raw gain score would not be an appropriate measure of learning. Another possibility was that the amount of information at the beginning of the course might affect the gain score. A student with much knowledge at the outset of the course might be able to demonstrate little gain, particuarly if our tests happened to measure those areas in which the student was already well informed" (p. 24).

Despite this clear and explicit recognition of two major difficulties, neither is successfully met by this study, apparently because a confusion of "final score" (or end-of-semester score) with "gain" (or the beginning-end difference in scores) results in the authors' doing the very thing they started by warning themselves against: that is, using the raw gain measure as though it were uncontaminated by student ability or knowledge.

One way of dealing with this problem, given only the data at hand, would have been to regress score *gains* (not final scores, as was done in the study) on initial factual knowledge and comprehension, and then employ the regression residuals—representing that part of the gain which is not attributable to initial knowledge or initial comprehension —as measures of the dependent variable. An alternative way of dealing with the same problem would have been to compute each student's gains in factual information and comprehension as proportions of the total gains possible for him given his initial level on each test and given the absolute limits of each test scale.

As it is, however, this study neither tells us how much of factual gain or of comprehension gain is attributable to the initial ability and knowledge of the student nor controls gain for the latter. It, therefore, leaves us with the patently erroneous impression that only teaching styles, and not "learning styles," affected student learning.

Despite these and other serious weaknesses in design and analysis, this study does present some intriguing ideas. For example, the study suggests that women may learn better in response to lecturing than to a teaching style that emphasizes student expressive participation. Second, the proportion of females in a class was found to be positively related to the "flamboyance" of teachers. (We are not told the sex distribution of teachers, either in the total sample or among various types of classes, but things being what they are, this finding probably refers to male teachers.) For another and most interesting example, the authors imply that there is some level of student classroom social-emotional stimulation which is optimal for student learning, and that this level may be achieved through different combinations of teacher-originated stimulation and student-originated stimulation, depending on the size of the class. Thus, "Students in large classes learned factual material best with teachers who were permissive, who emphasized student growth, were 'warm,' and were 'flamboyant'; while students in small classes did best with teachers who lectured, were relatively 'dry,' and emphasized student factual participation. In small classes, students can perhaps depend on each other for various social-emotional gratification, and the teacher's appropriate role can be to lecture and give factual emphasis. In large classes, however, student social interaction may be less in evidence, and the effective teacher must take on himself some of these functions" (p. 7). This is a particularly chastening idea to the reviewer, who feels more relaxed and social-emotionally inclined before a small class and more constrained and formal before a large one. If this study's findings are to be believed, these

are precisely the feelings least functional for good teaching in the two situations.

WALTER L. WALLACE

Northwestern University

Symbolic Leaders: Public Dramas and Public Men. By ORRIN E. KLAPP. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964. Pp. 272. $5.95.

Ours is a society of images and celebrities; one in which mass media scrutinize the lives and actions of public figures. Politicians, movie stars, and sports figures participate in the drama of our day and their crises occupy an important part of public attention. The death of Marilyn Monroe, the underdog victory of Harry Truman, the villainy of Joe McCarthy are episodes that arouse a strong emotional reaction that is not clearly explained in terms of social group commitment. Such events have great power to move and change human spectators.

In this book, Klapp has made a significant contribution to the study of mass communications and modern societies through the analysis of such public dramas and their stars. It continues his earlier interest in public celebrities and examines the kinds of public dramas through which men become heroes, villains, and fools. But it is more than a handbook on how to become popular. Klapp asserts that the processes he describes have a power to transcend structure, "to make and break statuses, to give and take prestige, to generate enthusiasm, to involve and mobilize masses in new directions, and to create new identities" (p. 257).

In *Symbolic Leaders*, Klapp recounts the stories of many public figures in an effort to analyze the evolution and devolution of the public hero, villain, and comic figure. We learn how Joe McCarthy, Will Rogers, Harry Truman, Charles Lindbergh, and other celebrities gained and lost in public repute. In a long account of the career and public actions of Richard Nixon, the author shows us how Nixon's image of untrustworthy efficiency emerged from the dramatic sequence of the Checkers incident.

A large proportion of the book is given to analysis of the troubles of maintaining images. The dramatic encounters with other persons and groups is fraught with danger for the public figure who runs the constant risk of violating the type into which he has been cast. Most frequent are those events that upset the appropriate ratio of forces. In the public eye, the underdog always has the advantage and the public figure who has been made to look too strong for his opposition can quickly lose favor, as did Joe McCarthy in the Army hearings and Tom Dewey in 1948.

Klapp believes that the dramatic crisis, because it touches deeply human emotions, is capable of arousing sharp identifications and antipathies toward the celebrity. In this way it is capable of changing orientations toward such figures and creating new perceptions toward the self of the spectator. In modern society this is more than a potent source of unstable leadership. The drama of public leaders lifts the citizen out of the structural routines of his daily life and into new and unpredicated actions. Martyrdom, for example, has the dramatic power "to go beyond special audience sets to that which is fundamentally human" (p. 172).

In his noble effort to give significance to "process," Klapp has been far too cavalier in negating "structure." He settles questions that should be the starts of research not conclusions. A large body of work on differential responses among audiences cannot be waved aside so easily. Nor are all "celebrities" to be analyzed in similar terms, whether movie stars or government officials. Is Truman's or Nixon's image the same among loyal Democrats as among loyal Republicans? Is there a common human drama, as Klapp implies, or do structural facts influence the content of the drama perceived? We would suggest that while "human interest" is part of the orientation to public figures, so too are other interests of structural positions also involved. Klapp appears to throw out Durkheim along with Sumner and to found a sociology on George Herbert Mead alone.

Despite these limitations, the author's message is an important one and his theoretical position is addressed to a central question in social science. The capacity for change in men's hearts is greatly underestimated by us cynical sociologists in our emphasis on

structural commitments. Leaders of social movements have implicitly understood that stirring drama has immense power to affect action. Anyone who doubts that has but to mention the names of Christ, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King.

JOSEPH GUSFIELD

University of Illinois

Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in the Twentieth Century. By GORDON WRIGHT. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. xi+271. $6.00.

The revolution in question is, in the words of the author, essentially "a much delayed adaptation of the rural world to the modern era—an adaptation that might have begun seventy-five years ago if it had not been artificially repressed by the dominant elites of the Third Republic with their peasantist dogma" (p. 178). Implicit in this statement are the characteristics of the book: it is political rather than sociological; it is historical rather than analytical. It is mainly concerned with French agricultural syndicalism and its relationship to the development of agricultural policies of the state. Wright's thesis is that in the last few years the old farm leaders, motivated by a traditional ideology that had little to do with economic realities, have been replaced by young men motivated by economic considerations and determined to "rationalize" French agriculture. The word "peasantry" in the title has further political overtones, for French farmers are not called peasants anymore—except by politicians speaking demagogically or city people speaking nostalgically or contemptuously. Farmers today call themselves "cultivateurs."

But to say that this book is a history of French agricultural policy is to stress its importance, though it might not seem so to Americans who tend to minimize History, Agriculture, and the State. For an understanding of French culture, however, these considerations are fundamental. How often have I seen French and Americans fail to understand each other because they differ so in this respect and are almost unaware of the difference. The French constantly try to explain everything in historical terms, while Americans seek more immediate psychological or sociological explanations. To understand the French, one must try to look at phenomena historically.

One must also be aware of the French attachment to the Soil. Probably most city people everywhere have a sentimental feeling for rural life, all the stronger if they have had little farm experience. At any rate, this feeling is particularly strong in France. However much the bourgeois may contemn the boorish peasant and use the word "paysan" as an insult to fling at awkward drivers in a Parisian traffic jam, still they feel a need to attach themselves as closely as they can to rural life. They hang on to the old family farm and manage to spend a few days a year there renewing the virtuous contact with the soil. There is an old tradition of blasé city people, from Marie-Antoinette to Jean Gabin, playing at being farmers. Otherwise they are "déracinés"; they have lost their roots. The "peasantism" to which Wright refers is based on this belief that the strength and virtue of France depend on the strength and virtue of independent, little farmers.

Americans, by assuming that France has a weak government, miss an essential characteristic of French culture: the role of the state. By state I mean here the authoritarian, centralized civil service (though civil service is a weak expression with misleading connotations, used here only because there is no English equivalent for the French word *administration*) that has preserved France as a conservative, stable society despite superficial political turmoil.

The authority of the state, motivated by "peasantist" doctrines and strengthened by an attachment to the good old days of the past, is an essential factor in French life, so that this book is far more important for an understanding of contemporary France than Americans might be inclined to suspect. Wright shows specifically how certain myths have developed on the basis of these orientations and have been used by ideological groups for political purposes. One is the legend that the French Revolution of 1789 "gave the land back to the peasants." Another is that the parceling of farms may be

attributed to the Napoleonic Code. Another is that the peasantry is an undifferentiated bloc acting as a unit and, therefore, capable of being manipulated by a single set of forces. The author analyzes the effect of these myths on successive regimes—the Third Republic (with special emphasis on years of the Depression and of the Popular Front), the Vichy government, the constituent government that tried to build a new France after the Second World War, the Fourth Republic, and finally, of course, de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. A refreshingly personal appendix is added, relating Wright's visits to six rural communities, and especially to peasant political leaders in these communities, in 1950 and 1960. There is also a selection of photographs, including aerial photographs, which illuminate the ideas of the text

There is no other book in English on this aspect of French society, and there are few, perhaps no. French books that treat the subject so well. Of course, many French authors have written on the subject and often in much more detail, but the French are so emotionally involved with the land and the past that they find it more difficult than they realize to dicuss agricultural matters objectively. This, then, is a valuable book, made even better by the author's admirable and often proven capacity for clear, honest, cogent historical writing.

Of course, one can always ask more of any book. In this one we might have liked more insights into the revolution taking place in rural technology and social structure—and into the *absence* of revolution in the crucial matter of land tenure. My most serious complaint is petty, however. My students and I have found the book very useful, but it would be more helpful if it had an adequate index. It does have useful tables of organizations, long statistical footnotes, an excellent bibliography, pertinent maps—but it is difficult to locate facts. One reason is the unsolved problem of whether and when to translate French expressions, titles, names of organizations, etc. But the main difficulty lies in the incompleteness and unevenness of the index. A test case: suggest to a student that he find out from this book about the very important *statut de fermage*.

This complaint only underlines the essential fact about the book, however. Wright has given us a long-needed study that will remain basic to an understanding of France today.

LAURENCE WYLIE
Harvard University

Mental Health on a New Housing Estate. By E. H. HARE and G. K SHAW. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. v+135. $8.75.

The slum, visible as it is, long has been regarded as the locus of pathology. Obviously, reformers and planners have held, urban redevelopment will ameliorate community disorganization. Of solutions to the problem, Britain's "new town" approach is one of the most radical. It is posited on a view that redevelopment should reckon with population density and provide for the most effective use of land. Such a relocation policy, one may speculate, could result in undesirable as well as desirable consequences, for it leads to shifts in the pattern of social relations and in availability of community resources for those transferred.

This study, though focused primarily on one criterion—mental health—provides a needed assessment of the program. It appears that residents of new towns differ little from their peers living in slum housing, if one is willing to generalize from a comparison of families in a single new town with a group residing in a nearby core-city neighborhood. The findings from a family survey, a study of physicians' records, and an analysis of hospital cases are consistent and reveal no differences in the prevalence of mental illness. Other criteria are examined, although less thoroughly. With the possbile exception of a higher prevalence of respiratory diseases in the slum—probably related to air pollution—there are no difference in physical health. Moreover, dissatisfaction with neighborhood is about equal for the two groups and, though the substance of complaints differs in the new town and the slum, their volume is the same.

The study was conducted with the care typical of British researchers. Given the small sizes of the study groups, the investigators have undertaken a thorough analysis. They

present a convincing case, certainly, for questioning the impact of housing on health status, indeed for re-assessing assumed links between urban conditions and other social problems.

HOWARD E. FREEMAN

Brandeis University

Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World. By CHARLES ABRAMS. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. $7.95.

Charles Abrams' book is a planner's odyssey. Traveling by jet plane, he covered more than a dozen countries. In each place he noted the incorrect proposals offered by previous advisers. He looked over the situation, talked to people, saw the slums, and made his recommendations—generally self-help schemes with loan features. He felicitously combined the elements of town-planning, building, and financing. His reports were delivered to government officials and to United Nations headquarters. In Ghana his suggestions seem to have been acted on, and some three thousand loans of $560 each were awarded for building the cores. In Bolivia they were turned down on the grounds that "the country simply did not have a million dollars" (p. 193), and referred to the U.S. Agency for International Development, which apparently agreed with the government in assigning them a low priority. Undiscouraged, Abrams crossed the ocean again to Nigeria, where he recommended roof loans; this time they were accepted.

If rather little information is offered in the book on how many houses were built as a result of advice given, there is no lack of material on the likes and dislikes of the author. Among the latter are architects who recommend large projects on which they would draw architectural fees; economists who prefer to support industry rather than housing in the expectation that this will develop housing spontaneously; World Bank and A.I.D. officials who agree with the economists.

In the future this book may well be seen not so much as an account of the shelter problem but as the tragic autobiography of one of the helpless players in the drama of technical assistance. Never have more intelligent men set themselves nobler goals than that of helping the new countries. Never have the rich and advanced nations tried harder to bring the poor and backward ones up to their own level. But because of the way the world is made, the poor countries fall steadily further behind their would-be benefactors, both relatively and absolutely.

This is because the problems of technical assistance cannot be resolved in their own terms. The over-all food problem cannot be dealt with by training better cooks, nor the housing problem by more and better housing experts. It is even possible that such experts make worse the matters they are attempting to improve. Suppose a housing scheme like the Ghanaian one mentioned above gets three thousand houses built but attracts to the city ten thousand new families, and that these families cannot secure high-productivity employment. A new deterioration will result.

The genuine crisis that the underdeveloped world is facing requires some larger thought than a housing expert as such can bring to bear. The issues are food, industry, and numbers of people. Food must be made to increase not at a mere 2 or 3 per cent per year for that only keeps up with population; the problem thus remains and indeed increases in scale. Food production must altogether outdistance population growth and provide a breathing space from the constant imminence of famine and the chronic dependence on gifts. Industry must be made to expand, in part because it brings a new type of man with social and economic ambition and the discipline to limit his family. Population must be brought under control both indirectly, through the change in way of life that industry implies, and directly, through making people aware of the problem and of the need for restraint. These three requirements can substitute for one another—more indsutry can result in sales of industrial products abroad so that self-sufficiency in food is unnecessary. Sales of agricultural products enable a country to buy manufactured goods. With less population the food problem is less acute. But in no conceivable way can housing substitute for food, industry, or population control.

If these are really matters of life and death and if uncertain governments, unaware of priorities, want development but do not quite know whether it consists of arms, a national airline, factories, or food, a persistent sales pitch on behalf of housing is not constructive.

The most important single thing that can be said about housing, whether in existing or new structures, is that it should be allocated in such a way as to provide the maximum incentive to labor and enterprise. The one thing I did not find in this book is that housing will genuinely serve production insofar as it is a wage good, made available to people engaged in the production of genuine utilities, and in proportion to their contribution to production. The specialist in housing is of every use in the developed world where the other fields of production are well established and can look out for themselves; in the underdeveloped country he adds to the confusion. It is fortunate indeed that he is not much listened to, that, notwithstanding his words, people do not turn from building factories to building houses.

One way to find out about the process of development is to study the countries that have achieved it. None of these started with housing. The process of development is inevitably characterized by tarpaper shacks or by two families to a room in the shell of a house left behind by a displaced nobility, while the able-bodied members of each family are out building spacious factories. This is obliquely recognized throughout Abrams' book, both with respect to the advanced western nations and the Soviet Union. Abrams writes: "While a Soviet cosmonaut can orbit the world, the state that launched him cannot establish a good housing program on the ground." Such being the low priority of housing, we are surprised to find it being recommended by the United Nations to Ghanaians, rather than to Russians and Japanese, not to mention Americans who are now at last in a position to take the advice without sacrificing longer-range objectives.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

University of Chicago

Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation. By WENDELL BELL. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1964. Pp. vii+229. $6.00.

The book jacket announces "a study of the sociology of nationalism, using as a case in point the society of Jamaica." It opens with a brief survey of Jamaican history, including an exceptionally good account of the changing relationships between the free and slave populations before Emancipation and among the major social classes since. Bell's thesis is "that change in Jamaica can best be understood as a set of interrelated long-term trends toward increases in the scale of society" (p. 33). The European discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries multiplied the connections among previously isolated societies and prepared the way for a single, global network of political, economic, and social relations. As a local society, like Jamaica, is drawn into the expanding network, it increases "immeasurably" its ability to achieve collective goals. There are corresponding increases in functional differentiation, complexity, per capita wealth, energy, and "internal inclusiveness." According to Bell, these changes tend in the long run to promote democratic principles and to reduce class and ethnic differences. The development of complex institutions, the movement toward national autonomy, the reduction of class privileges, and the emergence of a democratic polity are visualized as different aspects of the same phenomenon. Bell holds the continuation of this hopeful trend to be probable but not certain. In a concluding chapter, "Jamaica's Precarious Future," he asserts that the promising future may still be upset by "inequalitarians, authoritarians, and anti-nationalists."

The larger part of the book is devoted to the findings of a survey of Jamaican leaders conducted in 1958. A written questionnaire was distributed to 803 persons representing all of the elite categories in Jamaican society. The response rate (29 6 per cent) was mediocre. The questionnaire covered the respondent's personal history, a wide range of political and social attitudes, and several sociometric scales adapted from previous studies including indexes of equalitarianism and political cynicism and a scale of occupational mobility.

The consensus supported national independence, autonomy, political democracy, equality of opportunity, and the continuation of close ties with Great Britain and the United States. For all the flamboyance of Jamaican politics, the findings display a rather narrow range of public opinion without fundamental lines of cleavage. The ideological foundations for Jamaican nationhood were firmly established by 1958. The survey results clearly foreshadowed the rejection of the West Indies Federation by

the Jamaican electorate in 1961 and the subsequent choice of complete independence.

The defects of the presentation are minor. Measure of significance might have been used more freely in the tables. The language is occasionally unclear, especially in the use of "elite" as an adjective, a singular noun denoting an individual, and a collective noun with a variety of meanings.

THEODORE CAPLOW
Columbia University

The Mobility of College Faculties. By HOWARD D. MARSHALL. New York: Pageant Press, 1964. Pp. 152. $5.00.

This is a statistical study of faculty mobility, based on questionnaire responses from a large number of departments in three disciplines—economics, chemistry, and English. Nearly a thousand departments, containing more than nine thousand faculty positions, were covered. An additional survey of economists was conducted among a sample drawn from the new appointments list of the *American Economic Review*. A number of special inquiries were undertaken to deal with specific points.

Among the interesting findings are:

There are marked differences in mobility among the three disciplines studied: economists are more mobile than teachers of English and nearly twice as mobile as chemists.

Small departments have higher rates of turnover than large departments.

The typical academic career shows considerable movement among institutions, and in and out of non-academic positions, at all levels of seniority.

Geographical location, institutional and departmental prestige, student quality, and teaching loads are influential in retaining faculty. Tenure, faculty housing, pension plans, institutional growth, physical plant, and community characteristics are relatively unimportant.

Most vacancies in most institutions at all levels are satisfactorily filled soon after they occur.

Many departments in all three disciplines place heavy reliance on unsolicited letters of application from candidates. Informal channels generally have great importance; advertising and placement services are used only with reluctance.

Presidents and deans usually make the hiring decisions for small departments. Chairmen exercise this responsibility in larger departments, subject to the veto or approval of higher administrators.

Recruitment from within is not a debatable policy in most departments. It is practiced wherever circumstances permit.

The overwhelming majority of new outside appointments involve instructorships or assistant professorships.

Incentives to mobility tend to multiply faster than deterrents.

The present institutional arrangements, as described by Howard D. Marshall, are inconvenient to almost everyone concerned, but painful to few.

THEODORE CAPLOW
Columbia University

Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. By MAX GLUCKMAN. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xxxii+339. $7.50.

The many students familiar with Max Gluckman's early work on the Zulu, his mature master works on the Barotse, and his essays on rituals of rebellion and other topics have long recognized him as a leading figure of contemporary anthropology. An heir to the great tradition of Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, he transcended the impasses of naïve functionalism and restored conflict to its central place in social analysis. Gluckman's readers have long been waiting for him to publish a general statement of his thought unfettered by the narrow confines of the technical monograph or journal article, and here it is. But whereas many of his colleagues would have given birth to a ponderous and pedantic textbook, Gluckman has fathered an elegant, loosely integrated three-hundred page personal document full of insights and aphorisms (e.g., "a science is any discipline in which the fool of this generation can go beyond the point reached by the genius of the last generation"). The style is that of a discursive essay (with most of the illustrations drawn from Africa), rather than of a systematic treatise, and is easily accessible to the layman.

Gluckman calls "tribes" all non-urban, nonliterate societies, whether stratified and politically centralized or not. A basic characteristic of such societies, he argues, is the relative absence of non-perishable prestige goods and, hence, of class differentiation in standards of consumption. Goods are distributed, rather than hoarded or consumed, and converted into power or influence over people or, more gen-

erally, into a nexus of social relations. The largely subsistence economy makes for a minimum of functional interdependence and, hence, is not a significant factor in political cohesion. The author then deals with the problem of the maintenance of order in stateless societies and stresses the integrative role of countervailing relationships and criss-crossing lines of cleavage. Turning to politically centralized societies, Gluckman examines the role of institutionalized civil strife, rebellion, and dualistic opposition or division of power in the maintenance of order. Among the Southeastern Bantu, for example, rebellion, as distinguished from revolution, is directed against the incumbents of political office, but in order to defend the office. Plurality of structure and of ties, as in Ruanda, is another source of political cohesion: "Tendencies to fissure are inhibited also by a plurality of intersecting systems of allegiance" (p. 164).

In dealing with the settlement of disputes, Gluckman restricts the term "law" to cases when evidence is examined and assessed in courts. He takes an evolutionary view of jurisprudence, claiming that legal concepts become more differentiated as political and economic institutions become more complex and that these concepts are comparable between various societies. Here he takes issue with the relativistic position of Bohannan.

The next chapter is devoted to the role of ritual and mystical agents (witches, sorcerers, diviners) in social control. Here Gluckman restates and elaborates his now familiar ideas on the expression of a dialectic of cohesion and conflict through ritual, and rejects the psychological, cathartic interpretation of phenomena of ritual license or rebellion.

The concluding chapter is the most disparate; it covers such topics as indigenous concepts of time, the sources of change in systems characterized by "repetitive equilibria," the anthropological treatment of radical change in the urban milieu, cultural anthropology's stress on custom as distinguished from social relations, and the question of whether anthropology is a science or an art (answer: a science because it is cumulative).

Perhaps my most serious question concerns Gluckman's use of the term "tribal society" as an analytical category. Even if one accepts Gluckman's sophisticated brand of evolutionism and rejects extreme relativism (which I do), "tribes" as defined by the author cover such an enormous range of societies (from the smallest to all but the very largest and most complex) as to be of extremely limited analytical use. Indeed, Gluckman himself fails to show that these societies have anything in common beyond the absence of such general things as a market economy with generalized exchange media.

Unsystematic as the book is, it is most stimulating, and could be read profitably, particularly by some American anthropologists and sociologists among whom Gluckman's views are still regrettably unfamiliar.

A minor criticism concerns the plates. Many of the photographs are technically mediocre, add little to the text, and presumably inflate the cost of the book.

PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE

University of Washington

The Study of Urbanization. Edited by PHILIP M. HAUSER and LEO F. SCHNORE. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. viii+554. $9.75.

This book consists of a collection of fifteen essays, written mostly by members of an interdisciplinary Committee on Urbanization established by the Social Science Research Council in May, 1958. A few papers were written on request "to fill conspicuous gaps."

Over-all, the essays are of excellent quality, individually equipped with extensive bibliographies, well written, and highly informative to anyone concerned with the study of urbanization or the nature of the urban social structure. Probably because the contributors were able to discuss the subject with each other before writing, the book has the sort of consistency and continuity (unusual in collections of articles) which evidences itself, for example, in the considerable agreement on the importance of defining the process of urbanization demographically (cf. pp. 9 and 521-22). The papers accomplish their purpose, to examine most of the major generalizations on urbanization available in the social sciences and point to future research needs. For example, Schnore's critical review of ecological generalizations and his systematic statement of the broad factors that "affect the internal arrangement of cities by

their joint effects upon organization" (p. 383) are a timely contribution.

Among these excellent pieces—on whose relative merits readers will differ according to their own interests—some seem to me especially notable. Hauser's introductory essay, "Urbanization: An Overview," most valuable for clearly distinguishing between the city (defined demographically by size and density) as a dependent and as an independent variable, provides a necessary framework for the voluminous discussions of the effects of cities. The essay by Sayre and Polsby should be useful to urban sociologists because it indicates how many issues—decision-making, community power, urban social organization, and so on—are important to both sociologists and political scientists. Similarly, the essays by Ginsburg and Berry indicate how much of the research done by geographers is relevant to sociological concerns. Though the demand for the re-examination of our older hypotheses in a cross-cultural context runs through the book as a theme, some papers deal with it more explicitly than others. Sjoberg's essay comparing preindustrial with industrial cities is followed by a detailed discussion of the *new* imbalance in the economic and political relationships between the city and its hinterland in South and Southeast Asia (Keyfitz), which itself precedes a review of geographical research on non-Western cities (Ginsburg). Fittingly, Lampard's concluding essay, "Historical Aspects of Urbanization," provides the reader with a framework within which to analyze the origin of cities, the historical incidence of urbanization, and changes in the degree of urbanization that could be achieved by different societies during different historical periods.

If there is a flaw in the book, it is that the distinction between the study of urbanization as a process of increasing population concentration and the study of cities is not systematically maintained throughout. This may be responsible for the omission of a systematic discussion of the demographic variables of city growth (natural increase, net migration, annexation only if the city area is politically defined) and their relevance for the process of urbanization. Numerous references to the characteristics of cities in underdeveloped countries (e.g., pp. 511–13) indicate that the effects of the city on its own population, its relationship with its hinterland, and its role in the total society vary with the source of its population growth. But this is a minor deficiency in a collection which is so consistently first rate.

HILDA H. GOLDEN

University of Massachusetts

North China Villages. By SIDNEY D. GAMBLE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Pp. x+352. $7.50.

We are again greatly in Sidney Gamble's debt. In this volume he presents us with a great deal of material—the most readily available in English—on a considerable number and variety of Chinese villages as they existed under the regime of the Chinese Republic in the 1930's. The study is systematic and detailed about eleven villages but elaborated in terms of many from other areas. Gamble states it well and succinctly in his preface:

> At first it was planned that the study should include only villages around Peiping, but, as the students who were natives of Shantung, Honan, and Shansi told what they knew about villages in those provinces, it became evident that a much larger area should be included. With the basic patterns established through intensive studies of sample villages, the latter part of the work became extensive in order to discover how individual villages varied from those patterns. Besides the first group of villages studied in Hopei, about a hundred villages were visited in more than thirty hsien in Shansi and a smaller number in Honan and Shantung.

Gamble's study is completely unencumbered by the concepts and dichotomies so fashionable in our discipline today. His concepts are, on the whole, simple common-sense ones: village residents, families, education, income, crop-watching, land holdings, political organization, etc. He gives figures or unambiguous descriptions in these terms. He is frank and forthright about the "possibility of error in any Chinese statistics" (see p. ix), but he gives them in that light.

He is unusually considerate of the reader who is not interested in knowing all the author knows about these villages: He gives a summary of his findings in the first chapter of the book and a general (and somewhat generalized) description of the villages in his second chapter.

Highly sophisticated social science Gamble's book is not, but little that is contains so much of broad general relevance for the work of others, quite apart from the author's interest. He may fail to delve many points of great interest to others, such as child-rearing (i.e., adult-making), but almost nothing that he gathered and presented is likely to be irrelevant to others interested either in Chinese villages or China specifically, or in societies in general.

Finally, although Gamble appears to be totally preoccupied with the now never-never land of the *was*, that is not the case. We are never going to understand the current situation and changes in China without much better knowledge of the bases from which the changes have taken place. This work is richly and modestly descriptive of how things were for at least an important sample of perhaps 80 per cent or more of the members of Chinese society. Future studies of the *now* can more accurately tell us of what the changes have been. Gamble's capacity for taking pains has paid off with a steady but important, if not spectacular, increment.

MARION J. LEVY, JR

Princeton University

The Urban Scene: Human Ecology and Demography. By LEO F. SCHNORE. New York: Free Press, 1965. Pp. x+374.

This volume consists of a collection of twenty papers written by the author, nineteen of which were published during the period from 1954 to 1965. One of the papers was presumably previously unpublished—at least no indication of previous publication is given.

The title of the book is somewhat misleading. It does not provide a survey of urban life. It is not a text in urban sociology. Only the subtitle indicates the ecological and demographic orientation of this specialized collection of articles. In fact it is the ecological-demographic orientation that gives a sense of unity to the separate parts of this book.

The book consists of six parts. The first, "Human Ecology and Demography: Scope and Limits," contains the main theoretical discussion of the book. The three articles included in this section are concerned with the relationship of human ecology and demography to sociology. Schnore is very concerned with demonstrating that human ecology is an integral part of sociology and not a marginal discipline, tracing the ecological-type orientation to Durkheim to vadidate its true sociological nature. He maintains, however, that demography, which is usually closely associated with ecology, is a separate discipline and not a part of sociology.

Most of the articles in this book deal with the analysis of metropolitan areas. In Part 2 are found articles on "Metropolitan Growth and Decentralization." The third, fourth, and fifth parts of the book are concerned with differentiation within metropolitan areas—differentiation by socioeconomic status, race, and governmental form—not only between central cities and suburbs but also between residential and employing suburbs.

The final part of this volume contains four articles on various aspects of the problem of commuting. Here may be found an excellent example of the crucial value to urban planners of the type of research reported by Schnore. It is commonplace to read of the recent trend toward decentralization in the large metropolitan areas of the United States. Since decentralization is occurring for both industries and residences, it might seem at first that the problem of commuting may become less serious in the future. However, Schnore points out that commuting is becoming a more serious problem, for decentralization has tended to increase rather than decrease the average distance between home and work. Industry and residence are typically segregated in increasingly distant parts of the metropolitan area. Moreover, decentralization has increased dependence on the private automobile, for it is difficult to develop an economic system of public transportation that would link dispersed places of residence with dispersed places of work.

The articles in this volume are scholarly and well written. At times, however, the reader may feel a lack of sufficient theoretical interpretation of the significance of the various findings. The reader will find in this volume a valuable summary of important data on the rapidly changing demographic and ecological structure of large urban areas in the United States. These data have significant implications for those interested in scientific research as well as for those interested in applied

planning. This book should be a very useful addition to the library of urban sociologists, ecologists, demographers, and urban planners.

GEORGE A. THEODORSON

Pennsylvania State University

The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life. By JOHN C. BOLLENS and HENRY J. SCHMANDT. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp. xvi+643. $8.95.

The "exploding metropolis" is more than a figure of speech. It is a rather late twentieth-century reality that is forcing a re-examination of ideas about urban life. The authors note that in recent times most aspects of the metropolitan scene have not only grown but also changed substantially, and these basic transformations have called for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of metropolitan problems. Many universities have responded to this call either by establishing institutes of urban affairs or by attempting interdepartmental courses on metropolitan issues. It seems that Bollens and Schmandt have sought to write a textbook for such an interdepartmental course, although it can be used, nevertheless, to great advantage in a regular course in local government. They have endeavored to avoid "a compartmentalized treatment of the local community" (p. xv). They also have chosen to regard the metropolitan area "as a functioning and dynamic system of interacting relationships among people, organizations, and institutions" (p. xv). A well-organized and highly readable volume has resulted.

Being political scientists, the authors have given more elaborate treatment to the political aspects of the metropolitan scene than to the sociological and economic aspects. A sociologist would regard the sections on the Negroes as meager. An economist might consider the question of land values to have been slighted. "Outside readings," however, could be employed as remedies; so the book could still serve as an interdepartmental text. Although some sociologists might hesitate to employ this book in an interdepartmental situation because of its limited exposition of urban ecology, urban ecology is more properly the subject matter for a specialized departmental course.

JAMES E. MCKEOWN

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Southern California Metropolis: A Study in Development of Government for a Metropolitan Area. By WINSTON W. CROUCH and BEATRICE DINERMAN. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Pp. xi+443. $7.50.

This is a reference book on the outline of the civil structure of the Los Angeles area. It is also a partial economic history of metropolitan Los Angeles. It is the kind of book that should be well accepted by those who teach courses in municipal government and who are in accord with the view that political organization in American communities is a composite of pluralistic forces constraining each other and countervailing one another in a series of polite, legalized struggles between any number of decision centers.

Because I do not adhere to this fiction, it has been difficult for me to read through *Southern California Metropolis*, which describes in Section 1 the "countervailing forces of the metropolis" and the "legal restraints of legislation," before swinging into the "contenders for leadership" in Section 2, which turn out to be the geographical areas (not real, live people) of the central city contending with the urban county and the suburbs In Section 4 a massive decentralization unfolds, and localism is hard at work. All of which leads up to a discussion in Section 4 of a framework for change, which says localism has been a fine, democratic thing, but that it has not solved any number of problems and thus something like: well, perhaps a "metropolitan special district" could do better.

It is evident that the authors were careful not to step on anyone's toes. All is well documented, well mapped. There is missing, however, much discussion about where the action of Los Angeles is. The flamboyant economic wheelers are not there. The people who have options on all the real estate around are not mentioned; the people who actually demand all the streets, sewers, sloppy utility lines, and police force, the book does talk about.

The $21 billion of gross industrial product kicked up by the economic movers in the city is the basis of a tremendous amount of decisions and countervailing, it would seem, but only the public budgets are mentioned—which are but a token amount of the price paid for the movement of goods and services in Los Angeles. In short, the people who will finally call the shots on whether there will be a change to one form of government or another in Los Angeles are not effectively alluded to. This, I would suggest is an oversight in a book that reaches for a solution to the massive problem of metropolitan change.

But, as first stated, the book should do well for those who wish to perpetuate the myths of civil government in the nation, and I should think that the John R. Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation would be pleased with the result. It is well within the tradition of municipal studies.

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Social Relations and Social Roles: The Unfinished Systematic Sociology. By FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xxviii+372. $2.00 (paper).

This is the last work of Znaniecki, posthumously published. It is a part of Znaniecki's unfinished *Systematic Sociology*. It covers his conception of sociology, its fields and its humanistic approach different from that of the natural sciences. In its second part, the volume gives a systematic theory of social relations and of social roles. Social relations are exemplified by social relations in communities, mother-child relations, fraternal relations, marital, and other relations.

Social roles are typified by various roles of men and women in tribal communities, by the social roles of kings, of priests, of warriors, and of statesmen and politicians. Through a concrete analysis of these social relations and roles, the concepts of social relations and especially of social roles (initially introduced by H. Spencer and since 1922 developed by Znaniecki) are tangibly clarified and demonstrated in their cognitive fruitfulness.

The value of the book is notably increased by a fairly complete bibliography and biographical sketch of this eminent sociologist, written by his daughter, Dr. Helena Znaniecki Lopata.

Though the volume does not contain anything basically new that cannot be found in the preceding works of Znaniecki, especially in his *The Method of Sociology, Social Actions*, and *Cultural Sciences*, nevertheless it clearly sums up his conception of systematic sociology as a generalizing, axionormative science dealing mainly with four classes of social phenomena: social or interpersonal relations, social roles, organized social groups, and societies as the vastest integrated social systems. Sociologists can but regret that Znaniecki's *Systematic Sociology* remained unfinished. If completed, it would certainly be one of the important systems of sociology in today's sociological literature: despite its immensity, this literature still has very few real systems of sociology.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

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Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction. By THEODORE M. NEWCOMB, RALPH H. TURNER, and PHILIP E. CONVERSE. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965. Pp. xii+591. $8.50.

At this writing, the two "hot" themes in social psychology seem to be exchange "theory" (Homans, Thibaut, and Kelley) and what may be called cognitive-structure theory (Heider, Festinger, etc.). Since Newcomb is one of the leading exponents of the structuralist point of view, it does not come as a complete surprise that this book attempts to organize the great bulk of social psychology around the "A to B re X" principle. In a way, the result is a remarkable job, for the authors do manage to use these rather simple ideas to encompass a surprising fraction of social psychology. At the same time, the model just does not have enough "stuff" to generate five hundred pages of crisply detailed implications. Unfortunately, textbooks are supposed to be five hundred pages long, and the gap between the roughly two hundred pages of solid material and the quota is filled up by a lot of repe-

tition, laboring of the obvious, repetition, laboring of the obvious, repetition. . . .

JAMES A. DAVIS
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Lorenzo Von Stein: The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789–1850. Introduced, edited, and translated by KAETHE MENGELBERG. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. 467. $10.00.

Since Anglo-Saxon and continental European sociology have developed in very different ways, any contribution to better mutual understanding must be considered meritorious. Nevertheless, it remains a bold undertaking on the part of the publisher as well as the author to revive the work of Lorenz Von Stein. It is amazing to what extent Stein has been forgotten even in Germany. Born in Schleswig-Holstein, as a Danish subject, he rose during his long academic tenure in Vienna (1855–85) to the position of one of the most influential academic teachers in the field of the developing social sciences; especially his comprehensive works on government finance and on administrative law were of considerable impact. Nothing of it remains. Even his major work, which he wrote as a young man in the 1840's—and which has now been translated into English for the first time—has not been given much attention in recent decades, in spite of the excellent and unabridged new edition in three volumes by the late Gottfried Salomon-Delatour in 1921. Kaethe Mengelberg has skilfully condensed these three volumes into three chapters contained in one volume (*The Concept of Society and the Social History of the French Revolution until 1830; Industrial Society, Socialism and Communism in France, 1830–1848; The Monarchy, the Republic and the Sovereignty of French Society since the February Revolution, 1848*). The editor has also added an introduction which informs the reader about Stein's life and analyzes his work and the position it occupies in the history of social thought. Notes on the translation, an outline of the unabridged original three volumes, bibliographies of books and articles by and about Stein, as well as general literature related to the problems which were of interest to Stein, and an index are appended. It is a most commendable job.

Should sociologists trouble themselves with reading *The History of the Social Movement in France?* I believe the answer is "yes." To be sure, Stein's work is not a sociology in the sense that it presents a social system. It is a social history which, however, refrains from merely telling a story and, rather, attempts to interpret historical data within the conceptual framework of an elaborate and sophisticated theory of social change. With problems of social change enjoying considerable vogue recently, this should be enough to arouse interest. What Stein did is equivalent to what a young African scholar might do nowadays if he undertook a thorough study of either American or Russian social, economic, and political development over the last fifty years, with a view to making the folks back home aware of the direction in which they themselves are moving. But it is dubious whether our young African would do it upon a double background of Hegelian dialectics and Saint-Simonian socialism, as was the case with Stein.

Another possible comparison—and one that would be of interest to a young African—is between Stein and Marx. The major part of Stein's work was published prior to the first writings of Marx and, although the actual data are sparse, it would seem obvious that Stein must have both influenced and irritated Marx to a considerable degree. The idea that the material, that is, the socioeconomic substructure (in Stein's parlance, "society") decisively determines the legal and ideational superstructure (in Stein's words, "the state") stems from Stein, not from Marx. Marx's sociology is therefore as Steinian as his economics is Ricardian. According to Stein, the concatenation of the two elements of "state" and "society" forms a basic Hegelian "contradiction," inasmuch as the state, ideally, is supposed to be the impartial arbiter of social conflict and the protector of the laboring classes, while the actual state is directed by the interests of a ruling class. Stein follows the unfolding of this antagonistic coincidence from the feudal-industrial conflict that broke into the open in the first French revolution, via the Napoleonic interlude, to the conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat in the

newly emerging "acquisitive" society, and beyond. But contrary to the left-Hegelian position taken by Marx, Stein's position may be called a right-Hegelian one, inasmuch as he believed that government, in spite of all pitfalls, retains the duty to maintain the societal balance. To Marx, this was a contradiction in terms. Stein argued that property, which is the condition of liberty, deprives the nonpropertied man of the attainment of liberty and that the dilemma ("contradiction") which is thereby indicated cannot be solved satisfactorily except by government intervention. He asserts that there would be a mutual interest of workers and employers alike in increased productivity, if the dilemma of their antagonism could be overcome. *Mutatis mutandis*, this is the rationale of the modern welfare state. In terms of theory, it is a halfway house between positivism and idealism.

Although Stein's diction at times is either a bit tedious or somewhat dogmatically inspired, his analysis is replete with shrewd observations, such as that of republicanism, which is seen as based on the principle of abstract legal equality, as against democracy, which aims at achieving social equality by political means (p. 313); or, the one about the institution of the independent presidency as adequate only to a fully developed industrial society (p. 353). As already said, it does seem worthwhile for a sociologist to get acquainted with Stein, but with a twofold proviso: he ought to be read from the vantage point of some amount of historical knowledge; and the conclusions drawn by the old gentleman when he was a young hopeful should be applied flexibly to the changed scene of today. While the problem of the workingman—the "social question" of the nineteenth century—is largely solved, the related problems of the Negro and of the underdeveloped areas of the world may still be approached in modified Steinian terms.

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